The Suez Canal Set the Stage Reading: Liberation and Containment: The Tension between Two Foreign Policy Aims Primary Sources: 1952 article in Life magazine by John Foster Dulles First Inaugural Address of Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 20, 1953 Timeline The Main Drama Reading: The Suez Canal: A Cold War “Battlefield” Biographies Timeline Primary Sources Activity: Deciding How to Respond The Anticlimax Primary Sources Activity
Set the Stage Reading Liberation and Containment: The Tension between Two Foreign Policy Aims During the 1950‟s two aims drove U.S. foreign policy: the containment of Soviet power and influence; and, the liberation and self determination of people. The crisis over Egyptian President Gamal Abdel-Nasser‟s nationalization of the Suez Canal and the response by Britain, France and Israel illustrated both how these two aims could complement each other, as well as cause tension. One feature of the world after World War II was the “sharp disparity in material capabilities between the „first‟ and „second‟ worlds, on the one hand, and the „third‟ world on the other. The existence of this power gradient – with quarreling superpowers at one end of it – created the potential for an imperial rivalry on a global scale….” (Gaddis, pp. 153-54) Since many third world nations were just emerging from European colonialism, their leaders desired strong national economies. Given the Soviet Union‟s success in using its rapid pace of industrialization to recover from the devastation of the war, the Soviet Union seemed to offer these new nations a good role model. The importance the U.S. placed upon self determination, first expressed by Wilson and then by Franklin Roosevelt, initially served as a potential counterbalance to what the Soviet example offered. In one of Stalin‟s initial forays into Iranian affairs, for example, he tried to separate Iranian Azerbaijan from the rest of Iran. In 1946 he demanded territorial concessions and naval bases from Turkey. Rather than creating the impression that the Soviet Union wished to help “liberate” people from Western influence, such actions raised concerns about Soviet imperialism. Given U.S. leadership in the creation of the United Nations, the U.S. was poised to step forward as an enemy of colonialism and a friend of the world‟s oppressed people. The early years of President Harry Truman‟s administration dashed these hopes. In the Middle East, for example, the U.S. found itself in an awkward position with respect to deciding whether to recognize the independence of Israel in 1948. On the one hand, the U.S. took an anticolonialism stance in this region due to its support of the self determination of peoples. The U.S. hesitated stepping into the vacuum that was created as Great Britain gradually left the region for fear of being tainted with Britain‟s colonial past. In so doing the U.S. appeared supportive of Arab nationalism. Some foreign policy experts believed that such a position would make the emerging independent Arab nations more willing to help the U.S. contain the Soviet Union. On the other hand, if Truman supported the creation of Israel, it would come at the expense of Palestinian self-determination. U.S. diplomat George Kennan argued against recognizing Israel for fear that it could “disrupt the unity of the western world and… undermine our entire policy toward the Soviet Union.” (Kennan memorandum, 21, May 1948, FRUS: 1948, v. 1021.) The State Department Policy Planning Staff concluded that recognition of Israel “would be construed by the Arabs as a virtual declaration of war against the Arab world.” (“The Problem of Palestine,” 11 Feb. 1948, The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers, New York: Garland, 1983, ii.) Despite this advice, given the horror of the Holocaust and an interest in recognizing the self determination of the Jewish people, Truman felt obligated to recognize the Israeli nation. As a result, in this region of the world, U.S. recognition of Israel put containment of Soviet power and the liberation of people at odds with each other. The U.S. found it difficult
to convince Arab nations that the Soviet Union was a threat to “free people” and therefore in need of containment. The establishment of Israel led to a war between the new nation and several Arab nations such as Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. The U.N. Security Council requested that Israel and the Arab nations negotiate an armistice in the fall of 1948. By the summer of 1949 Israel had entered armistice agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Iraq refused to enter an agreement. Despite the agreement, Egypt closed the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping in 1949. The U.N. negotiator, Ralph Bunche, declared: “There should be free movement for legitimate shipping and no vestiges of the wartime blockade should be allowed to remain, as they are inconsistent with…the armistice agreements.” The U.N. negotiations ultimately failed and the Canal remained closed to Israeli ships. The fate of Israel and the Suez Canal now were linked. The strategic and economic importance of the Canal to Britain and the U.S. was unquestioned. “The British-run Suez Canal was a vital link for world trade as well as Western military transport, and British air bases nearby would bring some 94 per cent of the Soviet Union‟s oil refineries within range of American B-29s if war should break out.” (Gaddis p. 165) The challenge facing the U.S. was how to ease possessions, such as the Suez Canal, away from Great Britain without creating a power vacuum for the Soviet Union to fill. Britain desired to remain a power in the Middle East, but as Winston Churchill noted: “We are no longer strong enough ourselves to bear the whole political burden we have hitherto borne in the Mediterranean …but the United States and Britain together, aided by France…would be in a powerful position to deal with…the Egyptian problem and…the defence of the Suez Canal.” (Kissinger, p. 524) Since Truman and Eisenhower both rejected colonialism, they opposed efforts by France and Britain to use military force in the Middle East, such as in Iran and Egypt. The dilemma the Suez Canal created for the U.S. was how to protect it without appearing either to be taking over for Great Britain and France, opposing Arab nationalism or siding with Israel. On the one hand, access to the military bases in the Canal Zone played a vital role in containing the Soviet military and in pointing a dagger at the heart of Soviet oil production. A Western controlled Canal guaranteed Europe access to a vital trade route, most importantly oil. Great Britain and France were wartime allies of the U.S. and the U.S. felt a moral obligation to support Israel. On the other hand, support of Israel limited U.S. appeal in this region. Association with Britain and France risked guilt by association. Since Britain and France no longer were capable of managing their colonial empires, nations might perceive the U.S. as stepping forward to assume stewardship of them. The challenge that began to arise was what would happen as Britain removed itself from overseeing the Suez Canal.
Set the Stage Primary Sources Excerpts of a 1952 article in Life magazine by John Foster Dulles (He argues that the liberation of peoples, not simply containment, should serve as the guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy.) Soviet Communism confronts our nation with its gravest peril. To meet its long-term strategy of encirclement and strangulation, we have adopted a series of emergency measures which are fantastically costly not only in money but in their warping of our American way of life. …[these] policies are not designed to win a victory conclusively. …our policies have largely involved emergency action to try to “contain” Soviet Communism by checking it here or blocking it there. We are not working, sacrificing and spending in order to be able to live without this peril-but to be able to live with it, presumably forever…. There is one solution and only one: that is for the free world to develop the will and organize the means to retaliate instantly against open aggression by Red armies, so that, if it occurred anywhere, we could and would strike back where it hurts, by means of our own choosing…. Consider the situation of the 20-odd non-Western nations which are next door to the Soviet world. These exposed nations feel that they have been put into the “expendable” class, condemned in perpetuity to be the ramparts against which the angry waves of Soviet Communism will constantly hurl themselves. …[T]oday they [the 20-odd non-Western nations] live close to despair because the United States…seems dedicated to the negative policy of “containment” and “stalemate.” …liberation from the yoke of Moskow will not occur for a very long time, and courage in neighboring lands will not be sustained, unless the United States makes if publicly known that it wants and expects liberation to occur.
Set the Stage: Primary Sources First Inaugural Address of Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 20, 1953 The world and we have passed the midway point of a century of continuing challenge. We sense with all our faculties that forces of good and evil are massed and armed and opposed as rarely before in history…. In the swift rush of great events, we find ourselves groping to know the full sense and meaning of these times in which we live. How far we have come in man‟s long pilgrimage from darkness toward the light – a day of freedom and of peace for all mankind? Or are the shadows of another night closing in upon us? Great are the preoccupations absorbing us at home, concerned as we are with matters that deeply affect our lifelihood…each of these domestic problems is dwarfed by, and often even created by, this question that involves all humankind…. At such a time in history, we who are free must proclaim our faith. This faith is the abiding creed of our fathers. It is our faith in the deathless dignity of man, governed by eternal moral and natural laws. The faith defines our full view of life. It establishes, beyond debate, those gifts of the Creator that are man‟s inalienable rights, and that make all men equal in His sight…. The enemies of this faith know no god but force, no devotion but its use. They tutor men in treason. They feed upon the hunger of others. Whatever defies them, they torture, especially the truth. Here, then, is joined no argument between slightly different philosophies. This conflict strikes directly at the faith of our fathers, and the lives of our sons. No principle or treasure that we hold, from the spiritual knowledge of our free schools and churches to the creative magic of free labor and capital, nothing lies safely beyond the reach of this struggle. Freedom is pitted against slavery; lightness against darkness….
Set the Stage Timeline 1951 –Iranian Prime Minister nationalized oil industry and demanded that Britain remove its troops. July 23, 1952 – Colonel Nasser, General Neguib & the Free Officers of Egypt overthrow King Farouk November 4, 1952 – Eisenhower elected President. March 5, 1953 – Josef Stalin dies. July, 1953 – Korean War ends. August 14, 1953 – Soviet Union explodes hydrogen bomb. August 16, 1953 – Shah of Iran flees the country. August 22, 1953 – U.S. backed coup overthrows new ruler in Iran and restores Shah of Iran. 1954 – U.S. gives military and economic aid to Iraq. Israel protests since Iraq never signed an armistice with Israel. Britain and Egypt negotiate to transfer control of Suez Canal from Britain to Egypt. July, 1954 – Geneva Accords signed, ended French colonialism in Indochina. August 24, 1954 – Eisenhower signed Communist Control Act, ended Communist Party in U.S. September 7, 1954 – SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization) Australia, Britain, France, the Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand and the U.S. form alliance. October 19, 1954 – Britain pledged to give up Suez Canal in 2 years and withdraw troops February, 1955 - The “Baghdad Pact,” consisting of Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq & Britain, formed. President Nasser unhappy with U.S. aid going to Iraq, rejects the Baghdad Pact. May 5 1955 – West Germany joined NATO. September, 1955 – Czechoslovakia sold military arms to Egypt. December, 1955 - U.S. loan offered to assist Egypt with building of Aswan Dam. July, 1956 – Britain withdraws troops from Suez Canal Zone.
The Main Drama Reading The Suez Canal: A Cold War “Battlefield” The Suez Canal was completed in 1869 and connected the Mediterranean with the Red Sea. An international company comprised of French and British came to operate the Canal. The British Army occupied Egypt in 1882 and the British government put a Consul-General in place to rule the country. The two nations entered the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, whereby Great Britain maintained military forces in the Suez Canal Zone for defensive purposes. Egyptian nationalists though continually demanded that Britain remove the troops. Shortly after a military coup overthrew King Farouk in July 1952 Gamel Abdul Nasser came to power. When courting Nasser in 1953, Secretary of State Dulles was informed that Egypt was unlikely to support the U.S. against the Soviet Union so long as the British retained control of the Suez Canal. In 1954 Britain and Egypt entered into a treaty whereby Britain agreed to remove its troops from the Suez Canal in two years. Britain retained the right to reintroduce them if any country threatened the canal. Beginning in 1955 Nasser started a policy of playing one superpower off against the other. Nasser believed that such an approach, as opposed to siding just with the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., gave Egypt more freedom of movement. In September 1955 Nasser purchased military equipment from Czechoslovakia. Despite ample warning about the impending sale, the U.S. had failed to act. U.S. officials were aware that Czechoslovakia was acting on behalf of the Soviet Union. Secretary of State John Dulles knew that Nasser desired funding for a dam at Aswan. As a way to win favor with Nasser, a loan to Egypt was considered. Initially supportive of the loan, Dulles withdrew his support when Egypt recognized the People‟s Republic of China, a communist government under Mao Tse Tung. Representing a new breed of leaders in the Middle East, Nasser realized that given their recent colonial past nationalism proved very appealing to Arab peoples. Nasser capitalized upon such feelings. Opposing Israel and maneuvering the U.S. and U.S.S.R. into currying favor with an Arab nation like Egypt, for example, proved to be a highly effective means to foster a sense of nationalism. Seizing the Suez Canal would take these means one step further. The Suez Canal Crisis In speaking to a crowd in Alexandria on July 26, 1956, Nasser said: “This O citizens, is the battle in which we are now involved. It is a battle against imperialism and the methods and tactics of imperialism, and a battle against Israel, the vanguard of imperialism….Arab nationalism progresses. Arab nationalism triumphs. Arab nationalism marches forward; it knows its roads and it knows its strengths. Arab nationalism knows who are its enemies and who are its friends….(Kissinger, p. 530). As he spoke Nasser gave a code word that alerted Egyptian forces to seize control of the Suez Canal. “At this moment…some of your Egyptian brethren…have started to take over the canal company and its property and to control shipping… - the canal which is situated in Egyptian territory, which…is part of Egypt and which is owned by Egypt.” (Kissinger, p. 530). Thus began the series of events that transpired over the next several months, which became known as the Suez Canal crisis.
The British response was swift and definitive. Prime Minister Anthony Eden stated: “No arrangements for the future of this great international waterway could be acceptable to Her Majesty‟s Government which would leave it in the unfettered control of a single Power which could, as recent events have shown, exploit it purely for purposes of national policy.” (Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden, London, Cassell, 1960, p. 498.) The threat of military force was implicit in Eden‟s statement. Initially, Dulles shared Eden‟s position: “A way had to be found to make Nasser disgorge what he was attempting to swallow….We must make a genuine effort to bring world opinion to favour the international operation of the canal….It should be possible to create a world opinion so adverse to Nasser that he would be isolated. Then if military operations had to be undertaken it would be more apt to succeed and have less grave repercussions than if it had been undertaken precipitately.” Kissinger, p. 532. Then, contradicting his earlier statement, Dulles moved toward a more neutral position: “We do not…want to meet violence with violence. We want, first of all, to find out the opinion of the many nations vitally interested because we believe that all the nations concerned, including Egypt, will respect the sober opinion of the nations which are parties to the internationalizing treaty of 1888, or by its terms, entitled to its benefits.” (Dulles statement of August 3, 1956, in U.S. Department of State, The Suez Canal Problem, July 26-September 22, 1956: A Documentary Publication Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1956, p. 37.) In separate diplomatic efforts both Dulles and the United Nations worked with British, Egyptian and French foreign ministers during the next two months. The U.N.‟s efforts succeeded and resulted in the Six Principles. President Eisenhower spoke before a television audience in October and announced: “The progress made in the settlement of the Suez Canal dispute…at the United Nations is most gratifying. Egypt, Britain, and France have…agreed on a set of principles on which to negotiate; and it looks like…a very great crisis is behind us.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956 vol. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 903) His announcement was premature. While the Security Council approved the six principles, the Soviet Union vetoed the implementing measures. Adding fuel to the crisis, on October 14th Nasser said: “I am not solely fighting against Israel itself. My task is to deliver the Arab world from destruction through Israel‟s intrigue…There is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There is not even the smallest place for negotiation.” On October 25 th 1956 Nasser signed a tripartite agreement with Syria and Jordan, seemingly the beginnings of a united Arab front. As the diplomatic efforts failed, Britain, France and Israel conspired to have Israel invade the Sinai Peninsula. Given that Egypt continued to disrupt Israeli shipping through the Canal and Nasser‟s public statements about fighting Israel, Israeli leaders wanted to check Egyptian influence. The three nations agreed that an Israeli invasion of the Sinai would trigger the provision of the treaty that permitted the British to bring troops to protect the canal. Israel invaded the Sinai on October 29. On October 30 France and Britain demanded that both sides withdraw from the Canal. On October 31 France and Britain announced that they would land troops. President Eisenhower now faced a decision – how to respond to the use of military force by Britain, France and Israel.
The Main Drama Biographies David Ben-Gurion – born in Russia in 1886, Ben-Gurion emigrated to Palestine in 1906 where he became a supporter of Zionism. Zionism was an international movement for the establishment of a Jewish community in Palestine. He studied law at the University of Constantinople, but was expelled from Turkey during World War I because of Zionist activities. He became secretarygeneral of the Jewish Labour Party in 1921 and leader of the socialist Mapal Party in 1930. Israel was founded in 1948 when the British mandate over Palestine expired. He became prime minister and served from 1948 to 1953 and again from 1955 to 1963. John Foster Dulles: Born in Washington DC in 1888, John Foster Dulles was the grandson of one Secretary of State and the nephew of a second one. He graduated from Princeton and attended the Sorbonne in Paris. He practiced law from 1911 to 1917, served in World War I and returned to the practice of law after the war. He was an advisor to President Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference. During the 1930‟s he opposed U.S. involvement in Europe since the victorious nations only sought to uphold the harsh conditions of the Versailles treaty. He served as a delegate to the Berlin Debt Conferences in 1933 and the United Nations Conference at San Francisco 1945. Initially supportive of a bipartisan approach to foreign policy after World War II, he grew to oppose Truman‟s containment policy. Dulles became Eisenhower‟s Secretary of State in early 1953 and served until his death in 1959. Anthony Eden – born in Auckland in 1897, Eden attended Eton. He entered the British Army during World War I and secured a commission as a Lieutenant with the King‟s Royal Rifle Corps. He received the Military Cross and was promoted to major by the end of the war. He first won election to Parliament as a member of the Conservative Party in 1923. He served as appointed parliamentary private secretary to Austin Chamberlain at the Foreign Office. When Ramsey MacDonald formed a Conservative government in 1931, Eden became Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (1931-34). He became Foreign Secretary in 1935, but resigned in 1938 in a disagreement in how Neville Chamberlain was handling fascism in Europe. When Winston Churchill became Prime Minister in 1940 he reappointed Eden as Foreign Secretary, a post he served on and off until becoming Prime Minister in 1955. Guy Mollet – born in Flers, France, in 1905, he became a member of the French Socialist Party. He joined the French Resistance during World War II and was arrested and interrogated by the Gestapo three times. He was elected to the National Assembly in 1945 and became SecretaryGeneral of the Socialist Party a year later. He became prime minister of a coalition government in 1956. Gamar Abdel Nasser – born in Alexandria, Egypt, in 1918, Nasser was educated at the Cairo Military Academy. Becoming a republican during World War II, he formed the Free Officers Movement. Growing concerned over the government of Farouk I, Nasser became convinced Egypt needed a new government after the failed 1948 Palestine military campaign. In 1952 he and General Mohammed Neguib forced Farouk I to abdicate. Starting as the Minister of the Interior, by the end of 1954 Nasser had become the prime minister and president of Egypt. Given his desire to help the Palestinians, he began buying military hardware from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. He started the Aswan Dam project and sought to nationalize the Suez Canal.
The Main Drama: Timeline July 26, 1956 – Nasser nationalizes Suez Canal and blockades the Straits of Tiran. July 27, 1956 – Prime Minister Anthony Eden cabled President Eisenhower that Britain would respond to Nasser‟s seizure of Canal. July 30, 1956 – President Eisenhower started stockpiling oil. U-2 spy photographs revealed British, French and Israeli troop movement. August 3, 1956 – In televised address President Eisenhower urged peace and proposed conference to consider internationalization of Canal. October 29, 1956 – Israel invaded the Sinai. October 30, 1956 - France and Britain demanded that Egypt and Israel withdraw from the Canal Zone. The ultimatum also asked Egypt to permit a “temporary” occupation of the Zone. Egypt rejected the idea. October 31, 1956 - France and Britain announced that they would land troops.
The Main Drama: Deciding How to Respond Directions: As fighting broke out near the Suez Canal, President Eisenhower also was receiving updates on the revolt against the Communist government in Hungary. Several options are available to President Eisenhower in Egypt. As one of the president‟s foreign policy advisors you need to choose an option that President Eisenhower ought to implement. You must provide reasons why you believe that the option you choose is the best. _____ Option 1: Remain neutral – Nasser had played the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. against each other for over a year. While Nasser‟s nationalization of the Canal threatened to disrupt trade, which affected the U.S, the U.S. must not play into Nasser‟s hand. If the U.S. sided with Nasser, other Arab leaders might consider the nationalization of industries as a means to secure favor with their people and to threaten the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Given the presence of western businesses in Middle Eastern oil fields, the U.S. could not afford to give Arab leaders any ideas. On the other hand, taking sides with Britain and France might cause Egypt to side with the U.S.S.R. Egypt, more importantly the Canal Zone, was too important to fall under the influence of the Soviet Union. Also, the U.S. was seeking to develop better relations with Arab nations and support for Britain and France meant support for Israel. Association with Israel might damage those relations. _____ Option 2: Support Britain and France – as with the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere and the U.S.S.R. in Eastern Europe, the Suez Canal was within the British and French sphere of influence. While the attack by Israel was staged and served as an excuse for Britain to send in military forces, the operation of the Suez Canal was of vital economic and military importance and required such intervention. The Egyptians lacked the expertise and military strength both to ensure the smooth operation of the Canal and to provide for its defense. An open and secure Suez Canal was vital to U.S. economic interests and to the containment of the Soviet Union. _____ Option 3: Take the matter to the United Nations – the United Nations was created to address such situations. Working through the U.N. would demonstrate U.S. confidence in the organization. Also, the U.N. was the only forum in which to ensure that all those with an interest had a voice. While inviting nations to attend a summit to resolve the crisis was an alternative, such a meeting only would work if the number of nations involved was kept small. The Suez Canal crisis involved quite a number of nations. The immediate parties involved were Britain, Egypt, France and Israel, with the U.S., a host of Arab nations and the U.S.S.R. as secondary parties. Given this situation, the U.N. was the best forum. While Britain and France, as members of the U.N. Security Council, would likely veto any action by the U.N. to intervene, they would do so under the spotlight of international attention. This option allowed the U.S. to honor the role of the U.N. as an international peacekeeper.
_____ Option 4: Provide diplomatic support to Egypt – under a treaty Great Britain had withdrawn its troops from the Suez Canal, thus relinquishing control of the Canal to Egypt. While supposedly enforcing the part of the treaty that permitted them to come to the defense of the Canal, Britain and France obviously not only had known but encouraged Israel‟s invasion of Egypt. Britain, France and Israel clearly were the aggressors. Given the importance that the U.S. placed upon defending free peoples, the nation was honor bound to support Egypt. The U.S. would work with Egypt to pressure Great Britain, France and Israel to withdraw their troops from Egyptian territory. _____ Option 5: Commit military forces to Egypt and the Middle East – as with Greece and Turkey, the U.S. would agree to provide Egypt with military arms and advisors. Given the strategic importance of the canal, the U.S. should make sure that the Egyptian military is capable of defending it. Also, the U.S. would, if necessary, use military force to not only to stop the fighting, but to ensure the three nations left Egypt.
The Anticlimax: Reading President Eisenhower‟s response was both immediate and long range. First, on October 30th he suspended aid to Israel. On October 31st in a televised address he declared: As it is the manifest right of any of these nations to take such decisive actions, it is likewise our right – if our judgment so dictates – to dissent. We believe these actions to have been taken in error. For we do not accept the use of force as a wise and proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes. After making his opposition to the action taken by the British, French and Israelis known, on November 1st the United States and the Soviet Union joined together at the United Nations to demand a cease fire. While Great Britain and France vetoed the cease fire in the Security Council, it passed in the General Assembly by a vote of 64 to 5. On November 5th, English and French forces captured Port Fuad and Port Said. Israel already had captured the Sinai Peninsula. Shortly thereafter though, Britain, France and Israel agreed to the cease fire and their forces were replaced by U.N. troops. By November 22nd the last of the British forces had left Egypt. In the midst of the crisis Eisenhower was reelected president on November 6. On January 5, 1957, he sent Congress a request for a threefold program of economic and military aid for the Middle East and protection against communist aggression. This later became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. Finally, in his State of the Union Address he proclaimed the following: First, America‟s vital interests are worldwide, embracing both hemispheres and every continent. Second, we have community of interests with every nation in the free world. Third, interdependence of interests requires a decent respect for the rights and the peace of all peoples. (Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 10, 1957.) His statements not only illustrated the now global reach of U.S. foreign policy, but illustrated how far the U.S. had come since the words of George Washington, also a wartime general, who advised against becoming entangled in alliances.
The Anticlimax: Activity To Reelect or Not? – A Question Facing You as a Voter Overview: In the midst of the Suez Canal crisis, Dwight Eisenhower ran for reelection as president. Typically, you would not want to cast a vote for a candidate based on one action. For the sake of this activity though assume that you are a voter in 1956. You have read a lot a bout Eisenhower and his Democratic opponent, Adlai Stevenson, and are undecided how to vote. You realize Eisenhower‟s handling this crisis will determine whether you vote for him or not. Directions: Below are some statements that illustrate the importance and possible consequences of how Eisenhower ultimately handled the situation. Consider each statement and determine which ones furthered the ability of the president and the nation to better “provide for the common defence” or not. After considering the statements, cast your vote for and against Eisenhower and provide the reasons for your vote. Statement1: By working through the United Nations to oppose the actions of England, France and Israel, the U.S. acted in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Statement 2: By siding with the Soviet Union in the United Nations, the United States sided with a communist government against three democratic governments. Statement 3: The United States took the position that the use of violence to settle an international problem was wrong. Statement 4: England and France were protecting a resource in what each one considered its sphere of influence, similar to what the Soviet Union was doing in Hungary at the time and the U.S. had done in Greece and Turkey earlier. Statement 5: The United States sided with Egypt, the nation that now owned the Suez Canal. Statement 6: Egypt used the Suez Canal as an economic weapon against Israel, which sought to defend part of its economic livelihood. Statement 7: By siding with Egypt the U. S. demonstrated the self determination of people did not just apply to traditional allies of the U.S. such as in Europe, but to the Arab peoples as well. Statement 8: The U.S. was forsaking the warning of President Washington not to get involved in affairs in that part of the world and was risking over extending its reach. _____ I would vote for Eisenhower Reasons: _____ I would vote against Eisenhower Reasons: