Sri Lanka
Introduction The tiny island nation of Sri Lanka, located off the southern tip of India, has been embroiled in a vicious and deadly civil war that has now entered into its third decade of conflict. Its relatively small land mass and subsequent population are two major reasons why the war on this island does not receive the international publicity that other more “provocative” outbreaks do. Though the world may focus more upon the internal battles that exist in Africa, the Middle East, and larger Asia, the cause of the people of Sri Lanka is not any less deserving of our attention and resources in an attempt to bring peace to a significant civilian population that looks to maintain life amidst violent chaos. At first glance, certain conclusions are sure to be drawn by the general public that are not accurate. Based on the reporting of this issue many people, myself included, would come to believe that this is primarily a religious conflict between Hindus and Buddhists and little more, but further analysis highlights the inherent complexity of the situation, of which religion is only a supporting element of tension. Along with the spiritual component, the Sri Lankan civil war is also an ideological, economic, socio-cultural, and ethnic battle among historically peaceful people, which begs me to ask the questions “How did this war come about?” and “Why now?” Answers to these two questions are as important to know as the actual components of the war and the civilian casualties caused by it. To achieve this end we need to learn about and understand the multiethnic population that exists in Sri Lanka, as well as, the role that India and England have played in jeopardizing the future of this nation, and how ultimately the international community will come together to save Sri Lanka from destroying itself by creating a plan for long-term peace.
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Part I Sri Lanka has long been a strategic outpost for colonial powers with an embattled history that dates back more than six hundred years. The current majority population, the Sinhalese, are believed to be the original modern inhabitants settling on the island in 6th century B.C. This primarily Buddhist sect maintained relative autonomy until an invasion by the South Indian Tamils who established a kingdom in the North during the 14th century. The Tamils were largely defined by their practice of Hinduism and presently comprise the largest minority group in Sri Lanka. Despite their initial conquest, the Tamils and Sinhalese lived in relative peace for many centuries, based in large part to colonial domination by European powers.1 Sri Lanka first succumbed to European control when Portuguese traders occupied the land and maintained control for the explicit purpose of taking advantage of its location as a tactical port located along Asian trade routes during the 16th century. This arrangement lasted about a hundred years until the Dutch ousted the Portuguese in their efforts to control access to valuable Asian goods. Though these two European powers established control over Ceylon (original name of Sri Lanka until 1972), neither had much interaction with the people, nor did they directly interfere with their way of life. Direct control and imperialist influence on this island did not become a reality until the British Empire overtook Ceylon in 1796.2 To begin to understand contemporary life in Sri Lanka it is necessary to divulge the circumstances that existed prior to the island gaining independence in February 1948. In his article, “A Democratic Paradox,” Harshan Kumarasingham theorizes rather succinctly the effect that
1
CIA The World Fact book. Available online at: www.cia.gov/cia/publications
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Ibid. Harshan Kumarasingham, “A Democratic Paradox: The Communalisation of Politics in Ceylon, 19111948,” Asian Affairs 37 (2006) 342-344.
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British imperialism had on this nation for 150 years and provides an adequate template for understanding the problems that arose because of it when he said, So long as an alien power governs a Southeast Asian country, the situation is relatively simple- a very small minority controls larger minorities, as well as the dominant indigenous people. But when this foreign imperialism comes to an end, or when it genuinely begins to share its power with the nationalists of the country, readjustment in relationships between the various ethnic groups becomes imperative.3 By 1815, the British had establish full control of Ceylon and its population whose composition was made up by the majority Buddhist Sinhalese (70%), the indigenous Hindu Tamils (11%), and many smaller groups such as the Muslims, the Burghers, and imported Indian Tamils who shared common ancestry with the Ceylon Tamils, but were brought to this land to serve as slave labor on tea plantations, and were subsequently placed on the lowest rung of Ceylon society.4 How the British subdued the Ceylonese for nearly 150 years, with little violence, is in itself a masterful and ingenious performance that all aspiring colonialists should envy. By creating a class system based on wealth and education, the British were able to divide and suppress an entire population much in the same way they had done in numerous other countries throughout their empire. The strategic decision to create an elite class of Ceylonese, with equal representation from the Sinhalese and Tamils, allowed for the development of a ruling class that could directly control the common people while reaping minor rewards from the British, who in turn pilfered the land and its resources, not to mention establishing a secure station along the Asian trade routes. So this elite class served as a buffer between the main population and the British and thus stifled any thoughts of an uprising because ultimately those who governed were Ceylonese. The British knew full well that
3 4
Ibid, 342. Ibid, 342. K.M. Silva. “Sri Lanka: Keeping the Peace in a Sharply Divided Society,” Available online at: www.lankalibrary.com/pol/background.htm.
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educating and producing a “Westernized Colombo elite” would go a long way towards maintaining peace and security while providing the optimal conditions for financial success.5 As the 20th century progressed, so too did the concepts of nationalism and anti-colonialism, and Ceylon was no exception to this trend. As the country was fighting for its independence from Britain, it was simultaneously trying to grapple with the concepts of self-governance and democracy (As we will see later, the adaptation to self-rule will provide the biggest obstacle to peace the country has ever experienced). As difficult as it was, the transition to life apart from Britain was extremely peaceful. Having already established an elected President and National Congress, the fluidity of the government was a reason for all to be optimistic, especially the Sinhalese and Tamils. As early as 1919, Sinhalese President Sir James Peiris said about their fledging freedom, “The past few years have shown us that the Sinhalese and the Tamils are one people. The struggle we are entering today will cement that union stronger and stronger.”6 With help from Britain, Ceylon was able to create a unified government with a Constitution to secure basic rights for its people, and become a fully autonomous nation by 1948. But the problems were just about to begin.
Part II As I mentioned earlier, the British had developed an elite ruling class that was to help govern Ceylon, but what was unique about this arrangement was that the Tamil minority was given equal power and representation even though it only constituted a little more that ten percent of the whole population. The Sinhalese did not waste any time in trying to redefine the balance of power that more equitably represented their overwhelming majority status. At first glance, a minor revision of government control would not have been unreasonable or even unexpected. “The
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Kumarasingham, 342-346. Ibid, 345.
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minorities would, it was thought, accommodate to a measured Sinhalese majority domination over the country. British officials shared the same delusion.”7 Delusion is the key phrase in this statement because nobody could have predicted the extreme nature of Sinhalese actions to redress perceived wrongs, nor the Tamil’s violent response to those changes. So for nearly four hundred years the Tamil and Sinhalese populations lived in relative peace in harmony. They had distinct differences in culture, ethnicity and practiced two different religions, but never once proceeded towards the cataclysmic violence that exists today. With this general understanding it is easy to see that it was what Ian Lamb called Britain’s “divide and rule”8 strategy that is the root cause of this conflict. Once those separations of society were created, the exclusion of British control coupled with the Sinhalese’s desire to reassert dominance has plunged Sri Lanka into a Civil War. There are three distinct factors that many scholars agree are the reasons for the animosity and rage that exists between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. The first problem has to do with differing perceptions of reality by the two parties and that is a direct byproduct of the atmosphere created by the British during their rule. Most Sinhalese believe that the Tamil minority was given a privileged status during colonization and feel that they are now the appropriate beneficiaries of all that entails of being the majority in power. For over a hundred years, the Tamils did enjoy a disproportionate amount of power and control in Ceylonese society despite their rather miniscule population, but by no means were they willing and eager to give back what they feel they rightfully earned.9 So the beginning of this conflict was simply a nonviolent pursuit of power versus
7 8
Ibid, 350. Ian S. Lamb. “The Other War: On Sri Lanka and how this tiny nation recorded many terrorist acts,” The New Presence (Summer 2006) 33. 9 Silva; Lamb, 33-34.
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maintaining the status quo as the two dominant ethnic groups jockeyed for greater representation within the government and civil sectors of the economy. The second catalyst to undermine the stability of Ceylon, and probably most destructive, was the Sinhalese’s decision to pass the Sinhala Only Act in 1956. In a glaring attempt to suppress the Tamils, the new Sinhalese majority made Sinhala the official language of Ceylon, thus driving a wedge between the communities. Not only were all state sanctioned institutions, and schools to be stripped of any Tamil language, English, which had created a universal bond for the entire island, was relegated to a secondary status. These actions left the Tamils disenfranchised from much of the socio-political process.10 They responded by rioting, which of course the Sinhalese government squashed with more violence, and Ceylon was now fully immersed in the nation’s first ethnic conflict since the Tamils invaded four hundred years earlier. The third problem, and the one that seemingly severed the relationship of the two factions, arose in the early 1970’s. By this time, young Tamil men had created the political infrastructure in their own communities to organized themselves and fight back politically. They began to demand for the dissolution of Ceylon and in return wanted the establishment of an independent Tamil state, called Tamil Eelam, located in the northern part of the island. In response to the growing pressures, the Sinhalese majority government felt that it was in their best interests to counter with a show of force rather than reconciliation. So in 1972, the Sinhalese changed the official name of their country to a Sri Lanka, calling it a unified republic and turning their backs on any two state solution. They also established Buddhism as the official religion of the state and called on their people “to make it their duty to practice and promote above all other faiths.”11 You can imagine the anger this must have created within the predominantly Hindu Tamil community, who must have felt
10 11
Silva. Lamb, 34.
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that they had no more political answers to maintain any semblance of representation within the new government.
Part III In direct response to a growing wave of anti-Tamil legislation, the Tamils took to the streets in a grassroots campaign to generate support for their dreams of an independent state, though peaceful resistance was no longer an option considered. This group was comprised mainly of young men who felt they were subjected to institutional discrimination by the government and by employers, or students who were unfairly rejected by academic institutions. They were well organized by 1975, under the ruling thumb of a shy, but charismatic leader named Velupillia Prabhakaran, whose first act of defiance was to assassinate the mayor of Jaffna.12 By the following year, the Sinhalese majority government of Sri Lanka had its first viable threat to its power, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Violent attacks by the Tamil Tigers against the Sinhalese happened with such frequency in the coming years that government was forced to declare martial law in 1979, so that they could “control the violence.” But instead of quelling the resistance, the government chose to respond with more violence, committing atrocious acts that caused the deaths of thousands of civilians. Unfortunately we know this narrative too well. As year after year has gone by, every attack needs to responded to in turn by an equally forceful act of revenge. Though the actual dates are insignificant as to when the fighting began, it is widely understood that the tiny island nation of Sri Lanka has been engaged in a civil war since the summer of 1983.13
12 13
Ibid, 34-35. Lamb 33-35; “Sri Lankan Civil War,” Available online at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sri_Lankan_civil_war. Silva; “CIA World Factbook,” Available online at: www.cia.gov
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The graphic nature of the violence that has crippled this country is not as important to know as the root causes of the conflict are, or how peace can be achieved in the aftermath of a civil war, but certain aspects are worth mentioning. State sanctioned attacks aimed at desecrating entire Tamil villages, what are known as pogroms, have occurred regularly throughout the campaign. Though cloaked in the rhetoric of self-defense as justification, the Sri Lankan government has slaughtered thousands of unwilling combatants and civilians, but the responses of the Tamil Tigers should, and has, caused the international community to become outraged. The Tamil Tigers have garnered a reputation as terrorist aficionados based on a flourishing track record that is highlighted by suicide bombings. “The most radicalized recruits have joined the Black Tigers, the suicide-bomber division of the LTTE formed in 1987, which many terrorism analysts consider the father of modern suicide attacks.”14 As if warfare wasn’t gruesome enough, the world over can thank the Tigers for giving us this contribution that has been mimicked by numerous radical terror groups who may be trying to make a political statement, but are generally only successful in murdering civilians. Another disturbing piece of the Tiger’s arsenal is their willingness to use children, even young girls, to wage their war for independence. James Mitchell, in his piece “Soldier Girl?,” showcases this disgusting attempt to use the most shocking means of terrorism. In his interview with a sixteen year old female, Mitchell was able to expose many of ways the Tigers have used propaganda to brainwash children into becoming soldiers, even though the LTTE claims that this has never happened. Beginning at the age of eleven, this girl was routinely forced to watch videos and receive lectures, along with dozens of other girls, about the bravery and sacrifice that was needed for them to win their freedom, and that they would never have a chance if these girls were not willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause. She is even quoted as saying that “Listening to the
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Lamb, 35.
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lectures made me feel good about dying for my country, I thought it was the right thing to do.” 15 Not only are they prepared for martyrdom and suicide bombings, these children also receive the training necessary for physical combat, including the use of an AK-47 assault rifle “capable of discharging 600 rounds per minute.”16 According to this child not every Tamil teen wants to be a Tiger, but with enough children brought up with this virulent strain of hatred and rage, how can this ever be overcome and peace be achieved?
Part IV Despite the carnage that has been wrought on the war torn nation of Sri Lanka, there have been attempts, albeit with minimal success, to curb the violence and restore order. Throughout the 1980’s, India sponsored numerous treaties in an effort to acquire some semblance of a peace plan for the Sinhalese and the Tamils. Scholars have opined about the motivation of India’s involvement ranging from purely humanitarian to a desire to show the world that it was indeed a burgeoning regional power. Whatever the reasons were, India was able to broker the Indo-Sri Lanka peace accord in July of 1987. The first success of this agreement was in persuading the Sri Lankan government to officially acknowledge the Tamil language, thus correcting their fatal decision to outlaw it in 1956. The next objective came from the Indians who agreed to support peacekeeping missions in the Northern and Eastern parts of the island where there was a heavy concentration of Tamils, supposedly to foster relationships between the ethnic rivals.17 Though at the time it seemed like two major goals had been accomplished, the reality was that nothing was done to promote the long-term stability of Sri Lanka. By only incorporating one element, peacekeeping, of theorist Johan Galtung’s three strategies for peace (the other two; peacemaking and peacebuilding), the
15 16 17
James A. Mitchell. “Soldier Girl?,” Humanist (Sep/Oct 2006) Vol. 66, Issue 5, 16-18. Ibid. Silva; Lamb 35; Wikipedia; “Sri Lanka: The Battle for Jaffna,” The South Asia Monitor (June 2000) No. 22
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1987 peace accord was seemingly destined to fail which is precisely what happened by the early 90’s. The on and off again Civil War ensued throughout the end of the 20th century and into 2001 when Norway intervened as a potential peace broker. The results of this second peace treaty were limited in scope and effectiveness. The cease-fire that was achieved was commonly referred to as “tense” and in fact has completely fallen apart in the past couple of years. The other interesting strategy that was implemented was the creation of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission; a group of supposed “watchdogs” whose job it was to observe both parties and report any violations of the cease-fire agreement.18 Though the Norway strategy has at this point been a failure it does give the international community a theoretical building block because the decision to watch the actions of the combatants has had a somewhat successful track record in other peacekeeping missions. The general consensus is that people will act civilly when they know they are being scrutinized. Seeing that the previous efforts to achieve peace in Sri Lanka have failed miserably, is there any reason for optimism that a solution can be procured? I mentioned earlier about Galtung’s three strategies for peace and I think it is necessary to analyze each aspect in regard to the conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamils, as well as, the roles and responsibilities of the international community. The first element, peacekeeping, was tried with limited success partly because it was not fully supported by the other two elements, peacemaking and peacebuilding. Galtung defines the purpose of peacekeeping as a means to “control the actors so that they at least stop destroying things, others, and themselves.” Peacemaking is defined as being “concerned with the search for a negotiated resolution of the perceived conflicts of interests between the parties.” And peacebuilding “is the strategy which most directly tries to reverse those destructive processes that accompany
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Lamb 35; Wikipedia; Teresita C. Schaffer, “Fragile Hopes in Sri Lanka,” The South Asia Monitor (July 2002)
No. 48.
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violence.”19 As we have seen peacekeeping seems to be the easiest to implement, but without a logical line of support it has no chance. Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka has been tried and has had varying degrees of success. The Sinhalese majority has gone a long way towards redressing the grievances that caused the conflict in the first place half a century ago, mainly by officially recognizing the Tamil’s language in the government and education system. The next logical response should come from the Tamils who are still living in their pre-independence fantasy world where they held a disproportionate amount of power and influence and have been unwilling to grant the Sinhalese the appropriate measure of respect as the country’s majority. This certainly can be accomplished; one would not have to look outside of our own country to see this dynamic achieved. In America, the majority English speaking population has not officially sanctioned Spanish, but has incorporated the language into nearly every fabric of our communications and the overwhelming mass of Hispanics are not demanding their own state, nor are they committing acts of terrorism. The current demands of the Tamils are truly the crux of the matter and the focal point of Galtung’s peacemaking theory. Their insistence to have an independent Tamil Eelam state located within the physical borders of Sri Lanka is unrealistic and is essentially where the negotiation ends. The Government of Sri Lanka maintains that it is vital to remain united for strategic and security purposes, which is a logical argument especially when considering the tiny size of the island and what logistically is to be gained by making two smaller states. The other problem comes from India though a general supported of the Tamil cause, would probably fight with all its diplomatic fervor against a Tamil state because of the uprising it could cause amongst its own Tamil population. The Sinhalese have capitulated and unfortunately I think the world is going to be waiting a long time for the Tamils to respond in kind.
19
Damon Lynch, “Three Peace Forces,” available online at: www.asianreflection.com
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Despite the uphill battle that Sri Lanka’s Civil War poses, there is one considerable element that continues to foment the peace process outside the realm of the principle actors. The Sarvodaya Shanti Sena Peace Army has crossed the channel from its home in India and has begun the process of deconstructing the causes of the Civil War. The Shanti Sena was created with the mindset that the Gandhian principles of nonviolent resistance as a means for settling conflict was the most proactive and productive method human beings could use to achieve peace. They consider their inclusive methods to be a healthy alternative to the military or the police. Instead they try and break down the crisis in each village to the communal and interpersonal levels of being and they have generated a lot of support for their movement. They entered Sri Lanka shortly after the outbreak of war in 1983 and have worked feverishly since, but to what end have their efforts been rewarded? According to their official transcript they were on record at the onset of hostilities, as recognizing that this problem “was the result of more than political causes and required more than political solutions.”20 With over 86,000 members, and 8,000 village units, I am convinced that they have had an impact, but how much more needs to be done, and how effective have they been if the violence that permeates the entire society has not decreased as a whole since the first fighting began? It seems that for every inroad they make with a child towards peace education, the Tamils and Sinhalese who promote the conflict are able to coerce two children, constantly putting the Shanti Sena in an impossible position to prevail. Their communitarian theories of life, such as “the good of the individual is contained in the good of all,” and that “full and equal justice should extend to the weakest and lowest in the community,”21 are equally lofty and laudable goals, but are difficult to
20 21
“Sarvodaya: Strategic Goals,” available online at: www.sarvodaya.org “Sarvodaya;” N.J. Colletta, R.T. Ewing, and T.A. Todd. “Cultural Revitalization, Participatory Nonformal Education, and Village Development in Sri Lanka: The Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement,” Comparative Education Review (June 1982) Vol. 26, No. 2, 271-285; Wilf E. Bean. “Community Development and Adult Education: Locating Practice in its Roots,” New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education (Spring 2000) Issue 85, 67-76.
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apply to those whose lives are engulfed by hatred and have no desire to change, which is not only a healthy portion of the Sri Lankan population but much of the world over as well.
Part V If you were to ask me before I learned about the Civil War in Sri Lanka if I believed that Hindus and Buddhists could cohabitate peacefully my answer would of course have been yes, but now that I have exposed myself to the harsh reality that indeed the descendents of Buddha, and at least in modern times Gandhi, can also forgo their peaceful theologies and reduce themselves to primitive warriors, I have become further emboldened in my belief that peace is not a universally attainable attribute of human society no matter how hard we try. Sifting through the rank pessimism that is ingrained in my conscience, I am left to opine as to how the problem that is Sri Lanka can be fixed, and by whom, if the indigenous groups decide they cant do it alone. Aside from the usual United Nation blowhards who never seem to accomplish anything, I think the onus has to fall on India and England respectively. I believe India should be the country to spearhead the effort for two reasons; one being the fact that the Civil War is occurring in its own backyard. The other rationale for India’s involvement has to do with its growing role as a superpower and what better way for a country to prove to the world that it is capable and worthy of leadership than by solving a crisis within its own region. As for England, they need to be engaged in the future of Sri Lanka because their actions as an imperial power are the very reason why this conflict has arisen. If England could carry out a peacekeeping mission with the same zeal that it had for colonial conquest and wealth than maybe I could afford not to be so cynical about the chances for peace in Sri Lanka.
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