Tudor Popa by goodbaby



Student: Tudor Popa Course: POLI 315/4 AA

Professor: Stanley Nachfolger

Concordia University December 8th, 2008

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Table of Contents
Short History ............................................................................................................................... 3 Raison d’être............................................................................................................................... 4 Admission Policies ...................................................................................................................... 4 Internal Structure and Management ......................................................................................... 7 NATO Organization Chart ........................................................................................................... 8 Successes and Failures of the Organization ............................................................................... 9 Case Study: NATO mission in Kosovo ..................................................................................... 9 Case study: NATO mission in Afghanistan ............................................................................ 11 Works Cited .............................................................................................................................. 14 References ................................................................................................................................ 15

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Short History1
After the Second World War, Western Europe was economically and physically destroyed. Cities were bombed, the morale of the people was at the lowest level ever and France was under Nazi occupation. Once Nazis were defeated, communism came along as a new enemy. After the war, American, Canadian, British and French soldiers return back home, whereas Soviet armies stay and overthrow government after government in Eastern Europe. American wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union comes to an end and a new era of arms race begins. The enemies become allies (Japan and Germany become “friends” with the US and Western Europe) and China and Russia become the enemy. After the war, in 1945, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Luxemburg and Belgium decide to meet in Brussels and sign a pact creating a united resistance against a possible Soviet attack. It is the Brussels Pact, which is soon to become something greater. On April 5, 1949, the signatories of the Brussels Pact meet again with additional states and sign a new treaty, called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States are all signatories of this Treaty. Greece and Turkey enter the alliance three years later, in 1952. West Germany (now Germany) enters in 1955. The Soviet Union creates the Warsaw Pact as a direct response to Germany becoming part of NATO. Spain joins in 1982. In 1999 the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland join through the Partnership for Peace, and Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia join five years later, bringing the membership to 26. NATO’s headquarters are located in Brussels, Belgium. In the 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO's role in world affairs changed. U.S. armed forces in Europe were gradually reduced. Many East European nations sought NATO membership as a counterbalance to Russian power, but they, along with other European and Asian nations (including Russia), initially were offered only membership in the more limited Partnership for Peace, formed in 1994. Twenty-three countries now belong to the partnership, which engages in joint military exercises with NATO. Partnership for Peace nations are not subject to Article 5 of NATO Official Text, which states that an attack against one is to be considered an attack against all. In other words,

Adapted from http://query.nytimes.com/search/query?srchst=ref&query=NATO and POLI 315 – fall 2008 course notes.

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NATO is not required to defend these nations in case of an attack. In 2002, NATO and Russia establish the NATO-Russia Council, through which Russia participates in NATO discussions on many non-defence issues.

Raison d’être
NATO was one of the major Western countermeasures against the threat of aggression by the Soviet Union during the cold war, and was aimed at safeguarding the freedom of the North Atlantic community. In Article 5 of NATO Official Text, it is stated that an armed attack on any member is considered an attack against all, therefore the treaty provides for collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The treaty was also designed to encourage political, economic, and social cooperation. The organization was reorganized and centralized in 1952 and has seen many changes to its mandate since the collapse of the Soviet Union. NATO has increasingly concentrated on extending security and stability throughout Europe, and on peacekeeping efforts in Europe and elsewhere. NATO air forces were used under United Nations auspices in punitive attacks on Serb forces in Bosnia in 1994 and 1995, and the alliance's forces were subsequently used for peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. NATO again launched air attacks in March–June 1999, this time on the former Yugoslavia following the breakdown of negotiations over Kosovo. In June 1999, NATO was authorized by the United Nations to begin trying to restore order in the province, and NATO peacekeeping forces entered Kosovo. In August 2003, NATO assumed command of the international security force in the Kabul area in Afghanistan, which by 2006 had expanded to include some 31,000 troops (including 11,000 Americans) deployed throughout Afghanistan; in October 2003, a NATO rapid-response force was established. The membership of many NATO nations in the increasingly integrated European Union (EU) has led to tensions within NATO between the United States and those EU nations, particularly France and Germany, who want to develop an EU defence force, which necessarily would not include non-EU members of NATO.

Admission Policies
The treaty by which NATO was created was initially signed by 12 states, but that figure has gone up to 26. Expansion is not a new phenomenon, it started little after NATO’s creation when Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, then West Germany in 1955. In 1982 Spain

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also joined. NATO has always had a clear admission policy stated in Article 10 of its Official Text:
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession. 2

In other words, upon consensus, member states invite new states. Expansion was “scarce” during the Cold War. Only 3 states joined between the first signature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organizationand the fall of communism. After the Cold War, things changed. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were invited in 1994, when the Partnership for Peace was put in place, and joined in 1999, followed by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia five years later, bringing the membership to 26. In addition to its members, NATO has partnerships with 24 other states. Admission requirements and procedures have not been consistent throughout the rounds; they were adapted to the international situation of that period. The latest round of NATO enlargements is the fifth one and by far the most important: it involves as many countries as the previous 4 rounds. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia formally became NATO members on March 29, 2004, with all the benefits and responsibilities that Alliance membership entails. These states, all of which are former Central and East-European communist countries, joined the Partnership for Peace in 1994 soon after its creation. Thanks to great cooperation under the intensive Membership Action Plan (MAP), all of these countries had to implement a series of reforms covering a wide variety of areas beyond security issues, defence and military capabilities. These included the provision of “evidence that they each represented a functioning democratic, political system based on a market economy; that they treated minority populations in accordance with OSCE guidelines; had resolved outstanding disputes with neighbours and had made an overall commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes; had the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to the Alliance and to achieve interoperability with other members’ forces; and were committed to democratic civil-military relations and institutional



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structures.”3 The candidate’s progress in these matters was evaluated on a yearly basis. Finally, the formal joining procedure starts with accession talks and leads to the signature of the treaty by the new members. Also, the candidates of the fifth round participated in NATO-led peace keeping missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan even before formally becoming members of the Alliance. In fact, by participating to such missions, these countries demonstrated that in “addition to being consumers of security –benefiting in particular from the Alliance's collective-defence guarantee that is enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty – they are also able to contribute to security and to help increase stability in and beyond the EuroAtlantic area.”4 This measure is critical to the admission of any new member to the Alliance since candidates have to demonstrate the capacity “to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area” before becoming members. The final goal is to make sure that new members are not only customers of security, but also providers. In 1995, the Alliance carried out a study on enlargement and published its results. According to the results, once candidates demonstrate the fulfillment of requirements and are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, the formal joining procedure can begin. Accession talks are the first step of this procedure. Talks bring together NATO experts and representatives from the invited countries and involve formal confirmation by the invitees of their “interest, willingness and ability to meet the political, legal and military obligations and commitments of NATO membership”5, in line with the Washington Treaty and the Study on enlargement. For the last round of candidates, talks took place in two sessions: the first session dealt with political and military issues; the second session was characterized by discussions on more technical issues, such as resources, security, legal questions, and budget contributions. Accession talks can produce a timetable for the completion of the necessary reforms, some of which can be long-term reforms. The timetable is based on a number of issues, including the MAP objectives.

3 4

http://www.nato.int/docu/enlargement/enlargement_eng.pdf (p.4) http://www.nato.int/docu/enlargement/enlargement_eng.pdf (p.2) 5 http://www.nato.int/docu/enlargement/enlargement_eng.pdf (p. 4)

Tudor Popa The second step consists in candidates sending a formal letter to the Secretary General of NATO, confirming the acceptance of obligations and commitments of membership, including the timetable.


The third step requires NATO to prepare the Accession Protocols to the Washington Treaty, which are in fact amendments and additions to the Treaty, by which candidates become integrate part of the Treaty. The forth step requires actual NATO member states to ratify the protocols according to their respective national procedures. Since NATO functions on consensus, once all members ratified the protocols, the process is said to be complete. The fifth and last step requires NATO candidates to ratify the protocols and deposit the “instrument of accession” with the US State Department. For the last round of candidates, a ceremony at the White House in Washington DC was organized, and it is on this occasion that the seven candidates formally became members of NATO.

Internal Structure and Management6
At the November 2002 Prague Summit, NATO Heads of State and government approved a package of measures aimed at enhancing the Alliance's ability to meet today's security threats and challenges. The reorganization began in December 2002 and was completed in summer 2003. It included a reorganization of NATO's International Staff and the implementation of modern management processes. NATO's International Staff was therefore reorganized to better reflect the Alliance's new missions and priorities. As of August 2003, NATO is composed of six main divisions, each headed by an Assistant Secretary General. The NATO Office of Security is headed by a Director, for a total of seven main organs.


Adapted from http://www.nato.int/issues/restructuring/index.html

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NATO Organization Chart7
The structure consists of six divisions, each headed by an Assistant Secretary General (ASG), and the NATO Office of Security, headed by a Director:

1. Executive Management - is tasked with running the Headquarters effectively, ensuring that NATO's international staff works efficiently, and providing support to all elements operating at NATO headquarters, including support and conference services, information management and NATO's human and financial resources. 2. NATO Office of Security - will remain a distinct organization responsible for coordinating, monitoring and implementing NATO security policy, overall security within NATO and the NATO Headquarters Security Service. It is headed by a Director as opposed to all other divisions, which are headed by an Assistant Secretary General. 3. Political Affairs and Security Policy - will have the lead role in the political aspects of NATO's fundamental security tasks, including regional, economic and security affairs, relations with other international organizations and partner countries. 4. Operations - will provide the operational capability required to meet NATO's deterrence, defense and crisis management tasks. Responsibilities include NATO's crisis management and peacekeeping activities and civil emergency planning and exercises.



Tudor Popa 5. Defense Policy and Planning - will take the lead role in the defense policy aspects of NATO's fundamental security tasks. This includes defense planning, the Alliance's nuclear policy and defense against weapons of mass destruction. 6. Public Diplomacy - will be responsible for informing the wider public about NATO's activities and policies through contacts with the media, the NATO Web site and print publications, seminars and conferences, as well as NATO's Science Program. 7. Defense Investment - will be responsible for the development of and investment in assets and capabilities aimed at enhancing the Alliance's defense capacity, including armaments planning, air defense and security investment.


Successes and Failures of the Organization
Up until the Partnership for Peace was put in place, NATO’s main goal was to protect its members from a Soviet attack. NATO had 16 members and consensus was required prior to any action, but now, there are 26 members, and NATO leads a variety of missions at once (Goering). NATO forces now fight Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan, protect United Nations food ships from pirates along the Somali coast, train police in Iraq, train troops for Darfour, and send food supplies to earthquake and tsunami victims… (Goering).

Case Study: NATO mission in Kosovo
Since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, NATO missions are very different from what the organization was shaped to offer: protection against a possible Soviet attack. For example, in 1999, Yugoslavia’s Serb authorities started an ethnic cleansing against Albanians separatists in Kosovo under Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic’s command. NATO launched a heavy air strike which backed off Serb authorities. According to USATODAY.com, in 2000, Secretary General George Robertson stated that the mission was a success, but that much more work was still needed to stabilize the Yugoslavian province. As a matter of fact, NATO forces remained in KOSOVO until 2004. The Alliance’s foreign ministers stated during NATO’s mission in Kosovo that its objective was to “respond

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resolutely to any attempts to disrupt the safety and security of any of the people of Kosovo” (Lee), and according to them, they are doing so with success. Therefore, according to NATO officials, the mission is going well. Despite the Alliance’s optimistic perspective, Human Rights Watch (HRW) considers that NATO did not succeed in Kosovo. In 2004, a 66-page report called Kosovo: Failure of NATO, U.N. to Protect Minorities is published. The report “documents the widespread attacks against Serbs, Roma, Ashkali (Albanian-speaking Roma) and other minorities that took place in Kosovo on March 17-18” and argues that NATO failed to protect those minorities. The report is based on numerous interviews with minority victims and security officials and provides inside information on what happened in the communities during the riots. The report argues that on too many occasions “NATO peacekeepers locked the gates to their bases, and watched as Serb homes burn” (HRW). It is interesting to note that prior to the publication of the report, on March 17, riots broke in Kosovo: 19 people died, 550 homes and 27 churches were burned. In villages affected by the violence, “every single Serb, Roma or Ashkali home was destroyed” (HRW). Ethnic hatred between Serbs and Albanians and vandalism were definitely present in Kosovo, but to what extent is NATO responsible for offering protection against such actions? According to this study, NATO and its related services were a failure in Kosovo precisely because their mission was to protect any of the people in Kosovo against any attempts to disrupt their safety and security. In the light of these two conflicting points of view, one wonders if NATO’s mission was a success or a failure. It is reasonable to argue that NATO’s military air strike mission was a success considering that it backed off the Milosevic-led ethnic cleansing, but can this be considered a total success? As an international organization, it is shaped and meant to deal with international affairs. According to the Official Text, NATO’s goal is to protect its members in case of an attack, but Yugoslavia and Kosovo weren’t even part of the Treaty. In this case, NATO’s jurisdiction was extended beyond sovereign state conflicts. NATO got involved in the management of internal conflicts, so how can a success be measured when the mission statement is not clear? Is NATO an organization dealing with international issues, or has it become an international police force? In the eyes of some, NATO forces failed to protect minorities, but in the eyes of others, it succeeded in stopping war crimes and crimes against humanity. It’s success or failure can only be partial. The extent of the mission and the responsibility of NATO have to be well defined in a statement. If the military mission was successful, the humanitarian mission is without doubt questionable. Critics should be critical and consider alternatives, if any. There was no other organization capable of doing a better job. NATO did something it had never done before: it

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became an offence-based armed force having as a goal the protection of civilians. NATO needs to reconsider its missions and the extent to which it will act. It should either use the appropriate amount of military to succeed, or refrain from acting insufficiently. An insufficient action cannot lead to a complete success, and an incomplete success is a failure. NATO did stop the Milosevic-led ethnic cleansing, but didn’t manage to adequately protect all civilians. Wars and conflicts since the fall of communism have played an essential role in the evolution of international organizations. NATO’s participation in domestic affairs opened the door to UN reforms, such as the Responsibility to Protect, which now entitles an international organization (the UN) to act in cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

Case study: NATO mission in Afghanistan
NATO allied forces, mainly lead by the US, have been fighting Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan for a while now. This mission is arguably the most challenging mission in NATO’s history. During the Cold War, NATO has been quite successful in maintaining peace, but NATO forces didn’t have to open fire. In Afghanistan, the Alliance “is learning on the job”. The Iraq war “forced adaptation in American military and development tactics and strategy [in a similar way in which] the Afghanistan mission is forcing changes in NATO” (Nuland). As they go, the Allies on the battlefield learn more about what it takes to fight insurgents in the 21st century. Securing the country and establishing a peaceful environment requires from NATO “new training, new equipment, a new doctrine and new flexibility” (Nuland). In fact, U.S. commanders in Afghanistan are requesting 3,300 more troops to accelerate the training of new Afghan army and police forces, a job seen as critical to defeating Afghanistan's growing insurgency” (Tyson, Nov. 30). President Bush was also pushing the other Allies to send as many troops as the US, and spend as much money in order to succeed. But European states do not see the threat in Afghanistan the same way the US does. Therefore, it is without doubt hard to convince the people and the government of the necessity of this war. NATO representatives have failed at explaining to the population that this war is not America’s war, but an international effort to put an end to insurgents. States refuse to send massive troops to highly insecure areas fearing substantial losses, so NATO forces are weak and operate in regions far from conflict. Consequently, the US , the British and their allies have the highest troop death tolls in the Alliance.

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NATO’s success in Afghanistan is limited and compromised by the refusal of Allied countries to commit to actions called for by the threat. The success of the mission will remain a hypothesis and a dream for as long as measures taken are not sufficient to fight and defeat the insurgents. Commanders in Afghanistan are asking for more troops, but Allies don’t seem to respond accordingly. As a matter of fact, out of the 54,000 foreign troops in the country, almost half are American. NATO troops have the lead combat role in eastern Afghanistan, whereas U.S. Special Operations forces operate in all regions: according to Ann Scott Tyson (Jan. 2008), British, Canadian, Australian and Dutch forces play key combat roles in southern Afghanistan, where violence has surged over the past year, particularly suicide and roadside bombings. NATO forces are not involved in those areas, showing weakness and inability to come to a consensus on how to go about the war. NATO’s mission in Afghanistan hasn’t come to an end, it is therefore inappropriate to state whether it has been a success or a failure. It can be argued that it may turn into a failure if measures taken remain insufficient and if NATO members refuse to participate adequately. NATO is facing a series of challenges related to the mission in Afghanistan. For example, Pakistani truckers are refusing to haul vital supplies to NATO and U.S. forces in Afghanistan because of mounting attacks along the main route. Drivers boycott work carrying NATO military supplies because they are afraid of ambushes. Pakistani troops have already started to escort convoys to protect them from Taliban Ambushes, but officials argue in favor of the truck drivers saying that “If all the countries of NATO cannot control the situation in Afghanistan, how can escorts from the [Pakistani] Frontier Corps ensure our safety?” (Khan).

NATO has probably been the most successful military international organization. Throughout the Cold War, it had a well determined goal and there were no consensus issues when it came to protecting the members from a Soviet attack. The enemy was well defined, the threat was obvious and the measures turned out to be adequate: as it was mentioned, not a single bullet was shot between NATO and the opposing organization, the Warsaw Pact. Nevertheless, things changed after the fall of communism and NATO’s initial mission became irrelevant. The dissolution of the organization was taken into consideration, but the restatement of its mission was a more adequate solution. Hence, NATO missions have taken a sharp turn as the organization became larger and harder to lead due to the admission of numerous states and to its decision making rules. NATO missions of the past decade have

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been more or less successful. In fact, there is no consensus on the evaluation criteria on which to argue whether a mission succeeded or failed. Various opinions are being expressed on the success or failure issues, and there does not seem to be consensus for either side. NATO needs to reevaluate its role in the 21st century. It does function according to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, but it should not serve as an alternative to Security Council’s failure to take decisions. For example, if a decision is vetoed in the Security Council, the US can take it to NATO and eventually obtain consensus to act. NATO and the UN need to be reshaped so they can be used to reach a common goal, international peace and security. Russia is not a member of NATO, but has demonstrated a great power in vetoing the admission of Georgia and Ukraine. Should this be considered a weakness of the organization, or just simple diplomatic measures to avoid conflict?

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Works Cited
GOERING, LAURIE. After 60 years, wrestling to reinvent NATO's mission. In ChicagoTribune.com. Published on Dec. 5, 2008. Last visited on Dec. 11, 2008. [http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-europenato_goering_05dec05,0,7439313.story] LEE, MATTHEW and LEDERER, EDITH M. NATO and Russia clash over Kosovo status. In USATODAY.com. Published on Dec. 2, 2008. Last visited on Dec. 13, 2008. [http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-12-07-3485196555_x.htm] THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY. Official Text. Last visited on December 15, 2008. [http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm] HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. Kosovo: Failure of NATO, U.N. to Protect Minorities. Published on July 26, 2004. Last visited on December 15, 2008. [http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/07/26/kosovo-failure-nato-un-protectminorities] NATO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DIVISION. Enhancing security and extending stability through NATO enlargement. Published in April 2004. Last visited online on December 15, 2008. [http://www.nato.int/docu/enlargement/enlargement_eng.pdf] NATO. Organigram of the new structure. Last visited on December 15, 2008. [http://www.nato.int/issues/restructuring/chart.htm] TYSON, ANN-SCOTT. U.S. to Bolster Forces in Afghanistan: Pentagon Cites NATO's Failure to Provide Additional Troops. In the Washingtonpost.com. Published on Thursday, January 10, 2008. Last visited on December 16, 2008. [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2008/01/09/AR2008010903724.html] 3,300 More U.S. Troops Sought to Train Afghans. In the Washingtonpost.com. Published on Thursday, November 13, 2008. Last visited on December 16, 2008. [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/11/12/AR2008111202681.html] KHAN, RIAZ. Pakistan truckers refuse to haul NATO, US supplies. In the Washingtonpost.com. Published on December 15, 2008. Last visited on December 16, 2008. [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/12/15/AR2008121500868.html]

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RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ENGAGING CIVIL SOCIETY. Security Council reaffirms R2P in Resolution on Protection of Civilians. Last visited on December 15, 2008. [http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/civil_society_statements/613?t heme=alt1] ASSOCIATED PRESS and REUTERS. NATO: Kosovo Operations Success. In CNN.com. Published on March 20, 2000. Last visited on December 15, 2008. [http://edition.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/03/21/kosovo.01/] Columbia Encyclopedia Online. NATO, through the New York Times Website. Last visited on December 15, 2008. [http://query.nytimes.com/search/query?srchst=ref&query=NATO] NATO. Restructuring NATO's International Staff. Last visited on December 15, 2008. [http://www.nato.int/issues/restructuring/index.html]

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