2011 - Paperless Debate

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					Aid to
                                         Yes Pakistan Aid
Aid to Pakistan has been authroized
Dawn, Staff Writer, 3-7-2012, “US to give 40pc aid via non-govt sector,” Dawn.com,
With more than 75 per cent payment of the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) still due, Pakistan and the
United States agreed on Sunday to channel 60 per cent assistance under the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act
through the government and 40 per cent in civil society initiatives. Pakistan sought a clear system of
information-sharing from Washington and a joint mechanism for oversight of the funding to be
disbursed by the US through civil society organisations. New US Special Representative to Pakistan and
Afghanistan Marc Grossman will hold discussion on the joint oversight mechanism with the top political
leadership on Monday against the backdrop of the diplomatic row over the Raymond Davis issue.

Aid to Pakistan is high in the squo
DOS, State Department and USAID Officials, 2-13-2012, “Background Briefing on 2013 State
Department-USAID Budget,” US Department of State,
The authorization bill, the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill you refer to, authorized up to $1.5 billion over five
years. This was the bill that was enacted in 2010. For the first couple of years, we have requested $1.5
billion. The Congress – and through the negotiation over the budget, we never got that high. And so
given the budget constraints, given the fact that we’re under caps, and the fact that we really had to
look very hard at our spending, we have since decided to request something a little bit lower than the
1.5. We did the same thing last year. So we’re at about 1.1 billion for Kerry-Lugar – for the non-military
assistance program. It just means that to get to the $7.5 billion of what we refer to as Kerry-Lugar-
Berman funding, it’s just going to take us a little bit longer. But we still have a very, very robust
commitment to Pakistan.

ESF aid to Pakistan now
Susan B. Epstein, Specialist in Foreign Policy, and Marian Leonardo Lawson, Analyst in Foreign
Assistance, 1-6-2012, “State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2012 Budget and
Appropriations,” Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41905.pdf
In the FY2012 request, Afghanistan tops the list at $3,213.4 million, including $1.2 billion in Economic
Support Fund-OCO funds. Israel ranks second, with all of the $3,075 million requested for Foreign
Military Financing (FMF). Pakistan ranks third at $2,965 million, 80% of which is for activities supported
by the Economic Support Fund (ESF) and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund-OCO (PCCF).
Iraq moves up from sixth in FY2010 to fourth in the FY2012 request. This is largely because of $1.0 billion
for INCLE-OCO and $1.0 billion for FMF-OCO. Haiti, which was a top recipient in FY2010 as a result of
supplemental funds for post-earthquake relief and reconstruction, would not be among the top 10
recipients in FY2012 under the Administration’s proposal.

Aid to Pakistan will stay high—new budget
PTI, 2-14-2012, “Obama unveils $3.8 trillion budget, proposes $2.2bn aid to Pakistan in 2013,” The
Times of India, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-02-14/us/31058543_1_overseas-
Unveiling its annual budget of USD 3.8 trillion that calls for tax hikes on the rich, the Obama
administration on Monday proposed USD 2.4 billion in financial aid to Pakistan for the fiscal year 2013.
Of this, USD 2.2 billion is in assistance to strengthen democratic and civil institutions that provide a
bulwark against extremism and support joint security and counter- terrorism efforts, including USD 800
million for the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Capability Fund, the State Department said soon after the
White House sent the budgetary proposals to the Congress.

Civilian aid to Pakistan is safe despite cuts
Pak Tribune, 11-5-2011, “US cuts civilian aid to Pakistan,” Pakistan News Service,
The State Department report said Congress had slipped on its 2009 promise to triple non-military aid to
Pakistan over five years. The appropriations reached the promised level of $1.5 billion in 2010, but this
year amounted to $1 billion, the document said. It said, however, the Obama administration intended
for assistance to Islamabad to continue and wants to focus on "signature" projects in Pakistan. US
officials are currently looking to select a major new infrastructure project "that would both contribute to
power generation and water management" in Pakistan, it said. US civilian aid to Afghanistan has peaked,
the report said, declaring the United States would spend less on development assistance there as it
withdraws troops from the country. "We have reached the high water mark of our civilian funding
levels" for Afghanistan, the department said in a status report on civilian efforts in Afghanistan and
Pakistan that was sent to congressional offices. US economic and humanitarian aid to Afghanistan has
fallen from $4.1 billion in 2010 to $2.5 billion this year, the report by the Office of the Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan said. — Online INP adds: The State department said the
relationship with Islamabad "is not always easy, but it is vital to our national security and regional
interests." The administration said it would continue to provide civilian aid to Pakistan, which has
fallen this year. The report said next year's levels are uncertain, but the administration reaffirms its
"commitment to providing robust, multi-year civilian assistant to Pakistan."

Civilian aid is high and secure from cuts
Zee News, 11-4-2011, “S to continue civilian aid to Pakistan: Hillary,”
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Friday said the generous civilian aid to Pakistan would continue
despite the uneasy relationship with Islamabad as disengagement with it is not an option for the US.
"As our commanders on the ground will attest, it is critical to our broader strategy that civilian
assistance continue in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Disengaging now would undermine our military
and political efforts and the national security interests of the US," she said in remarks accompanying a
status report on Afghanistan and Pakistan. "The civilian surge in Afghanistan and Pakistan that
President (Barack) Obama launched in 2009 to accompany the military surge in Afghanistan has helped
advance our goals of defeating al Qaeda, reversing Taliban's momentum in key areas, and bolstering the
economy and civil society of both countries," she said.
                                     2NC General Aid Now
Default to issue specific uniqueness – their aid now evidence proves the brink –
further aid will tradeoff
Past aid was small and no new aid
Patrick Corcoran, writer for Washington Diplomat, and Anna Gawel, managing editor, 2-29-2012,
“Short on Money, U.S. Digs Deeper To Find Ways to Support Arab Spring,” Washington Diplomat,
For better or worse, it's belt-tightening time in Washington. And unfortunately for U.S. policymakers,
the budget crunch did not have the courtesy to wait for a world-changing foreign policy crisis to settle
down. More than a year after the outbreak of civil unrest in nations across the Arab world, there's still
not even a consensus on how to describe the unrest — the proverbial Arab Spring has been interspersed
with Arab Awakening, Arab Winter, etc. However it goes down in the history books, the future of the
Arab world is being rewritten through revolution. In Syria, the Assad regime clings to power through
increasingly violent attacks against opposition forces. In Egypt, despite the removal and pending
prosecution of Hosni Mubarak, Tahrir Square remains a locus of protest, as Egyptians press the military
to stop dallying and hand the reins of power to a new civilian government. Libya and Yemen are trying
to envision a future without entrenched authoritarian rule, while Tunisia, the spark that lit the Arab
flame, is working to see if Islam is compatible with democracy. Many experts view this as the kind of
transformative moment that took place after the Cold War when Eastern Europe rid itself of
communism, with Western financial help. After all, stagnant economies marked by cronyism, corruption
and unemployment were one of the main reasons that drove Arab protesters to challenge their ossifying
political systems. Yet in Washington, foreign aid borders on a dirty word these days, even though it's
never taken up much of the U.S. budget — contrary to popular opinion, foreign assistance amounts to
roughly 1 percent of total federal expenditures. Still, the proposed 2013 budget for the State
Department and USAID saw a modest bump from the year before, with a plan to allocate more funds
toward "transitioning" Arab governments. Any sizeable increase in American tax dollars being sent
abroad, however, is out of the question. Money can also be a double-edged sword, as evidenced by the
recent spat over Egypt's decision to prosecute 19 Americans — including a Cabinet member's son — for
trying to influence the country's political system through democracy-building civil society groups. The
flare-up has jeopardized $1.3 billion in annual U.S. military assistance to Egypt, with Congress
threatening to withhold the money until the Americans are released and Egypt's military leaders take
tangible steps toward democracy. On the one hand, the incident reveals the enduring power of money
to induce change — with the $1.3 billion in military aid one of the few forms of leverage the U.S. retains
over the cash-strapped Egyptian government. On the other hand, Egypt's military has rebuffed demands
to release the Americans and insisted that foreign meddling would not be tolerated — a sign of how
sensitive the perception of outside interference, especially from Washington, remains in the Arab world.
A recent Gallup poll also showed that more than 70 percent of Egyptians don't even want U.S. funding
anyway (although the survey notes that opposition could stem from conditions attached to the aid,
including obligations under the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty). So, given the dearth of resources to
support fledgling governments and democratization movements, how can the U.S. government ensure
that countries in the midst of historic transition lay the groundwork for political and economic reforms,
without sparking a backlash? Is there even a role for the United States to play, financial or otherwise, or
should the people of the Arab world sort out their own destiny? No Mideast Marshall Plan America's
current fiscal straitjacket differs enormously from its position during two comparable regional
transformations. Under the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States pumped
$13 billion — more than $250 billion in today's dollars — into Western Europe to aid its reconstruction
from World War II and counter the Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, as the Cold War receded and
Eastern Europe lurched to capitalism, the U.S. government again, despite a sharp recession, was able to
drum up significant amounts of money for the burgeoning democracies. Today, the coffers are empty
and the mood is skeptical. Take the case of Egypt. Aside from being a linchpin nation that's the most
populous in the Arab world, it's also enjoyed a decades-long security partnership with the United States
under Mubarak. Yet the scope of post-Arab Spring non-military assistance has been relatively paltry
given Egypt's regional and bilateral importance. Obama initially called for $1 billion in debt forgiveness
for Egypt, with some additional economic aid. "It was not a very big package — not very impressive to
the Egyptians," Thomas Carothers, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, told The Diplomat. Despite that, the outlays were drastically curtailed by the Senate
Appropriations Committee and never even made it through the House of Representatives. What was
proposed for other Arab nations was even more limited. President Obama managed to eventually
cobble together a $1 billion debt relief package for Egypt, though he still ran into congressional
opposition for an even more modest proposal: a $60 million economic "enterprise" fund to assist small
businesses, akin to what was given to Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Civilian aid to Pakistan now uniquely vulnerable
India Post, 3-2-2012, “US lawmakers threaten to divert Pak aid to Mexican border,”
US lawmakers have introduced legislation in the Congress to divert American aid meant for Pakistan to
the Mexican border until Islamabad takes concrete and satisfactory action against Haqqani terrorist
network. Fearing that some of the aid running into billions of dollars could end up in the hands of the
Haqqani network, the lawmakers voiced concern as the dreaded terror group is believed to be behind
suicide attacks in Afghanistan responsible for hundreds of American deaths. The legislation introduced
by Congressman Michael McCaul, and co-sponsored among others by the Foreign Affairs Committee
Chairwoman, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, would require the Secretary of State to certify to Congress that
Pakistan is not aiding, assisting, advising or informing the Haqqani terrorist network in any way.
Otherwise US aid to Pakistan will be cut off and redirected toward fighting Mexican drug cartel violence
on US-Mexican border, the legislation says. In a statement, McCaul said this year the State Department
is requesting USD 2.4 billion in civilian and security assistance to Pakistan, some of which could end up
in the hands of the Haqqani network. But, the legislation does not seek to touch Defense and
intelligence aid. “When I met with (Pak) President (Asif Ali) Zardari he expressed a commitment to
eradicating the Haqqani terrorist network, but I am not convinced that he has enough control over his
military and intelligence to follow through,” said McCaul, who led a Homeland Security Committee
delegation to Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq in November. “I tried to make it clear to him that foreign
aid from the US is in jeopardy . In my view it is an absurd foreign policy to indirectly fund a terrorist
network that has killed Americans and continues to plot against us,” McCaul said. During a
Congressional hearing on Wednesday Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had acknowledged links between
elements of Pak establishment and terrorists.
                                           2NC Link Ext
Increasing democracy aid trades-off with other ESF priorities—education gets cut
Glenn Kessler, staff writer, 2-10-2011, “Follow the Egyptian money,” Washington Post,
A major contributing factor to the limited achievements for some of these programs resulted from a lack
of support from the Government of Egypt," the report said. "According to a mission official, the
Government of Egypt has resisted USAID/Egypt's democracy and governance program and has
suspended the activities of many U.S. NGOs because Egyptian officials thought these organizations
were too aggressive." Toward the end of Bush's term, his fiscal year 2009 budget proposed spending
$45 million on democracy and good-governance programs in Egypt, including more than $20 million on
promoting civil society. This would have kept the amount earmarked for democracy programs the same
as 2008, even as spending in other areas, such as health, education and economics, was scheduled to
be reduced in what is known as the Economic Support Fund as part of a reordering of priorities. "The
United States has developed strategic partnerships with reformers from Egyptian civil society and within
governmental institutions," the administration said in a document to Congress. "While some democracy
and governance activities, such as reforming the judiciary, will be implemented through direct
assistance to the GOE [Government of Egypt], assistance to civil society and other non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) will be funded directly." But that nascent effort was largely shelved when the
Obama administration took office. For fiscal year 2009, the administration immediately halved the
money for democracy promotion in Egypt; the civil society funds were slashed 70 percent, to $7 million.

No risk of new allocations – plan trades off.
Stephen McInerney, director of POMED, 5-11-2011, “The Logic of the Donor Community: American
Donors,” http://pomed.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EMHRF-paper-the-logic-of-the-
(1) What kinds of foreign assistance are most needed during the period of transition that follows the fall
of a ruler, as seen in Egypt and Tunisia (and which could soon become the case in other countries such
as Libya, Yemen, or Syria)? And how can such aid be delivered most effectively, and by which
institutions? (2) How can and should foreign assistance be adapted in countries such as Morocco and
Jordan, where the existing regime remains essentially intact, in reaction to the urgent need for genuine
reforms demonstrated by the uprisings across the region? Principle obstacles to addressing these two
challenges include: (1) the inertia of various U.S. government institutions and a natural resistance to
significant changes in approach and strategy, (2) the present U.S. federal budget environment that
 prevents additional funding from being allocated , and (3) the difficulty of responding to such dramatic
developments in so many MENA countries all at the same time. Overview of U.S. Donor Institutions
USAID The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the U.S. government’s
primary institution for delivering foreign assistance, including assistance for democracy and governance.
USAID is responsible for the delivery of the vast majority of nonmilitary bilateral foreign assistance
allocated through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) and Development Assistance (DA) accounts.
Currently, USAID manages the delivery of approximately $1.7 billion in foreign aid to the MENA region,
including approximately $400 million designated to support democracy and governance programming.
As compared with other U.S. government initiatives, USAID programming is on a larger scale, featuring
longer-term projects with larger budgets. USAID generally manages its work in the region through its in-
country missions, although these are only found in lower-income countries to which significant levels of
economic assistance have been allocated. Currently, USAID missions are found in Egypt, Jordan,
Lebanon, Morocco, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen, and they are. Notably, such missions have been
absent in the GCC states of the Arabian Peninsula, as well as in Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia. Perhaps
USAID’s biggest challenge in implementing effective democracy and governance programming is that
such work is only one small component of USAID’s work, and a component that may be at odds with
the majority of USAID’s other programming.
                                        AT: Aid No Solve
Aid does not have to be substantial to create enough stability in Pakistan to solve
Ahmed Humayun, Staff Writer, 8-15-2011, “Don't Cut Civilian Aid to Pakistan,” World Politics Review,
Pakistan does not need Swiss-level governance, but it does need institutions capable of maintaining
law and order and providing essential services. In particular, Pakistan needs an effective and dedicated
police force, courts that can dispense appropriate sentences to insurgents, and provincial officials who
possess the authority and resources to execute sustained counterterrorism campaigns. Essential
investments in infrastructure, electricity generation and water supplies are also critical to cope with
Pakistan's burgeoning population. Without a deep and enduring financial investment in Pakistan's
civilian institutions, instability and terrorism will continue to rise.

Reforms solve the impact—even if not completely sufficient
Ahmed Humayun, Staff Writer, 8-15-2011, “Don't Cut Civilian Aid to Pakistan,” World Politics Review,
Of course, one can support civilian leaders in Pakistan without subscribing to any illusions about them.
Pakistan's elected leaders are far from committed democrats: They run feudal, personality-based
political parties, and when in power, they constantly try to undermine competitors by breaking the rules
of the democratic game. Yet for all its limitations, civilian rule is infinitely preferable to rule by the
military. Since the 2008 elections, crucial democratic reforms -- such as the devolution of powers from
the central government to the provinces -- have been passed, despite a dizzying succession of political
and economic crises. These reforms, if properly implemented and resourced, have the potential to
significantly strengthen Pakistan's democracy. And even if they only partially succeed, they represent
the fruits of an imperfect, patronage-driven, but nonetheless genuinely deliberative political process.
Most important from Washington's perspective, as the national government grows in strength and
legitimacy over the long term, its influence on foreign and national security policy, currently
monopolized by the Pakistani army, will increase. The end result of this process is by no means certain,
but the alternatives are either to rely exclusively on a relationship with the military, a policy that has
failed to end links between the Pakistani state and militant groups, or to move to isolate and contain a
frail and failing Pakistan, a prospect none can be sanguine about.
                       Pakistan Instability Bad—Asian Stability
Pakistan instability destabilizes South Asia
Karin von Hippel, co-director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 5-5-2009, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Scenarios, U.S. Solutions,” The New York Times,
A Taliban and Al Qaeda takeover of Pakistan, along with its nuclear arsenal, pose the worst-case
scenario for Western policymakers and far too many Pakistanis. But two other, less extreme scenarios
also cause serious concern. The first would be yet another military coup, potentially led by junior
officers with sympathy for the Islamist militants. Many of these junior officers are largely unknown to
their counterparts in the West, unlike the senior military officers. This lack of familiarity is the result of
U.S. sanctions placed on Pakistan between the end of the Cold War and Sept. 11, 2001, moves that were
intended to punish the country for its nuclear program and, later, for a military coup. The second
nightmare scenario would be continued state disintegration, resulting in competing militias, terrorist
groups and criminal gangs in charge of most of Pakistan’s provinces and territories, with the
government exercising only nominal control over parts of the capital city and — maybe — some of the
nuclear weapons. Any of these formulations will have direct and enormous consequences not only for
the people and governments in the greater South Asia region — home to nearly half the world’s
population and several nuclear-armed states — but also further afield in Europe and North America.

Regional instability leads to nuclear war and destruction of the world.
Michael May, Engineering-Economic Systems at Stanford, Washington Quarterly, Summer 1997.
The unpalatable facts, to Europeans and North Americans, are that Asia has about half of the world's
people, that it is growing faster than other parts of the world, and that, by mid-century, it will probably
have more than half the population of the developed world and more than half of its money. Energy
consumption, economic influence, and military power will be distributed in proportion. That is the rosy
scenario. The dark scenario is that of a war that would, in all likelihood -- because nuclear weapons can
be procured and deployed by any of these countries at a fraction of the cost of peaceful development -
-leave most of the civilized world devastated.
                                                        Turns Case – Cred
Romney kills our alliance structure – ends heg
David Solimini, the Communications Director for the Truman National Security Project, 9-30-2011,
“Mitt Romney Throws America’s Allies Under Bus for Political Gain,” The Moderate Voice,
This week, Mitt Romney clumsily waded into the discussion of Israel and Palestine. By calling for a wholesale re-evaluation of relations with
dozens of countries, he called more than his own judgment into question. Strong         alliances are an essential element of
American power. They are difficult to build, important to maintain, and essential in a world of inter-connected economies and cross-
border security threats. It is in this essential context that leading conservative voices have engaged in a perilous race to
the bottom on issues of American national security. Most recently, former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romneyz suggested that
the United States reconsider a number of long-standing alliances purely to further domestic political
considerations. On Tuesday, right-wing radio show host Jordan Sekulowz asked Romney how he would handle the application by
Palestine for statehood recognition by the UN if he were president. Romney responded: Putting aside what’s already happened, at this stage
the president should make it very clear that we stand with Israel, that this is very important to the United States of America and that any nation
that votes against Israel and against the United States in the vote in the United Nations will recognize that America will very carefully reconsider
our relationship with that nation. Defenders of Romney’s position might say it was an important statement in support of Israel. Critics would
note that there are far better ways to demonstrate support for an independent Jewish state free from terrorism – a position he shares with
President Obamaz. Romney went farther than he needed to go, apparently in an attempt to place political distance between himself and the
president. Had the words he uttered – “America will very carefully reconsider our relationship with that nation” – actually come from the
mouth of a sitting president, the impact would have been significant. The former governor’s answer to a straightforward question is revealing
to the point where one might wonder if Romney realizes the enormity of the job he seeks. These are not quarterly earnings reports or 10K
filings, these are nations – some of which have nuclear weapons and thousands of our troops stationed in them. Let us consider exactly what
Romney suggested: Romney       would be open to re-analyzing our relationships with China, the world’s most populous
                                                                                                           and South
nation; Russia, the nation with the most nuclear weapons in the world; India, the world’s largest democracy; and Brazil
Africa, two of the world’s largest developing nations. Our relationship with Russia is essential to the prevention of a
second Cold War. India is America’s best bulwark against China in the East and Pakistan to the North.
Also among those who would fall afoul of Romney’s domestic political concerns include Spain, France, Norway, and Ireland, some of America’s
longest held friendships. If a president were to say what would-be-President Romney said, we would be forced to ask what it means to
“reconsider” these relationships. Would a President Romney take the same actions in re-evaluating our relationship with China, our largest
trading partner, as he would with Ireland? Would a President Romney cut funding to the efforts to stabilize Iraq over its vote on Palestinian
statehood? Would he pull out of the 2016 Olympic Games because of Brazil’s statement of support, or shut down the $160 billion per year in
American goods sold to countries supporting the UN resolution? And what of our ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Would we stop the
rebuilding efforts essential to peace in Iraq over this issue, even if it meant stretching out our military presence there? Governor Romney’s
willingness to use our international alliances for political gain will likely be seen by many as deeply troubling.
America’s interests are clearly served by a stable solution to the conflicts in the Middle East, and Israel is a valuable if sometimes imperfect ally.
It’s also in our interests for ostensibly credible candidates not to make inflammatory policy proclamations for political gain. Romney’s
comments cannot be taken in isolation. It is possible, and perhaps even likely, that he is exercising the political triangulation he
is famous for and is simply catching up with some of the clumsier comments of his peers on the campaign trail. Michele Bachmannz, for
example, believes the Arab Spring is a problem for which she must assign the blame to President Obama. It is a familiar and troubling playbook
from the ex-governor. Keeping America safe requires that we exercise delicate diplomacy backed by the effective and powerful force of our
military. We have seen both exercised with deftness under President Obama, with relationships improving between us and our allies and
precisely targeted strikes taking out more of our enemies than the Bush Administration managed to accomplish. America is not well-served
when the talk is tough but the strategic considerations are ignored.
                            Turns Case – ME War/Oil Shocks
Obama loss causes Middle East war and oil shocks
Jonathan Curiel, respected journalist, taught as Fulbright Scholar at Punjab University in Lahore,
Pakistan, researched at Oxford as a Reuters Foundation Fellow, “What just might happen if Obama loses
in 2012,” 2011.
The Republicans’ ascension marks the return of chickenhawk diplomacy. Instead of the Obama
administration’s reasoned approach to Iran, the new administration relies on all-or-nothing
antagonism, leading to the third Gulf War in two decades. What ensues are thousands of new military
deaths, a dangerously destabilized Middle East, and an oil crisis that shocks Western economies for
years. As in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. tries to shepherd in a friendlier government, but now all three
countries – connected geographically, religiously and historically – become the world’s leading front for
insurgency against the United States.
                                        2NC Impact Wall
Straight times says that us china war escalates to extinction – draws in all other great

High risk – their evidence doesn’t assume romneys belligerent new strategy – means normal crises don’t
get resolved – even if Romney alone isn’t sufficient, it put the US down a path that inevitably leads to
confrontation and war – prefer our evidence – phd from Harvard

Romney overreacts to US decline in Asia – causes spiraling arms race and China war.
Michael Swaine, Phd Harvard, specializes in Chinese security and foreign policy, U.S.–China relations,
and East Asian international relations, one of the most prominent U.S. analysts in Chinese security
studies, senior political scientist in international studies and also research director of the RAND Center
for Asia-Pacific Policy, & Raymond Lu, lead author in this Asia Security Dispatch, 3-6-2012, “Mitt
Romney’s Bleak China View”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
But these ideological assumptions could be more problematic if translated into military strategy. As
China expands its inventory of capabilities, the U.S. military is devising battle plans ostensibly aimed at
neutralizing those systems and maintaining its superior position in maritime Asia. One unsettling
possibility is that Romney could endorse aggressive proposals with little regard to their long-term cost
and feasibility, imprinting an ambitious, even dangerous vision of great power competition on defense
planning for a decade or more. Championed by the air force and navy, the Air-Sea Battle Concept has
emerged as one answer to China’s (and to some extent Iran’s) growing ability to control its maritime
reaches. One likely version of the concept envisions an array of high-tech systems working in concert to
destroy an enemy’s anti-access arsenal, from long-range stealth bombers that could strike targets inland
to missile-armed submarines to cripple Chinese coastal defenses. Preparations for elements of Air-Sea
Battle are already underway in the air force and navy. Yet Romney could be tempted to commit to a
more extensive array of strategies, doctrines, and capabilities associated with the plan, going beyond
the nebulous endorsement offered in the recently released Joint Operational Access Concept. However,
the success of that effort would hinge on some shaky assumptions. Crucially, Air-Sea Battle presumes
the U.S. military will be able to break with its troubled record in acquisition to rapidly develop, build,
and integrate an extensive suite of high-tech weaponry into a new force structure. Yet delays,
interruptions, and cost overruns have dogged the programs that will likely underpin Air-Sea Battle.
From the previously aborted long-range stealth bomber to the technologically challenged littoral
combat ship, no system has emerged unscathed. Given his pledge to reverse the Obama
administration’s defense cuts, Romney might try to spend his way out of this conundrum. But pouring
money into acquisition accounts would not necessarily ensure quantum leaps in military innovation
within a short time frame, nor would it necessarily produce more discipline in development, testing, and
production—indeed, the result could be just the opposite. Soaring personnel costs and anemic
economic growth could also torpedo the dream of a truly integrated, next-generation air force and navy.
As a result, Romney over-promises and under-delivers in attempting to preserve an overwhelming
margin of conventional superiority in Asia. If Air-Sea Battle were to fail, a China rendered even more
paranoid than at present by fears of encirclement could have few qualms about testing the resolve of a
vulnerable United States, perhaps in a higher-stakes replay of the EP-3 or Impeccable incidents. The
reality is that even a well-funded, fully realized Air-Sea Battle could fall short of its goals to deter
China and reassure U.S. allies, setting the two powers on a collision course instead. Part of the
problem lies with the weapons that both parties are assembling. To counter Chinese missiles that could
sink an aircraft carrier, for example, the United States is building radar-evading bombers that could
destroy major military installations within the Chinese mainland. And in the absence of deeper high-
level military contacts between the nations, each countermeasure would simply confirm the worst
suspicions about the other’s intentions. In a raw, militarized form, untempered by substantive mutual
security assurances with China, Romney’s vision for an “American century” in the Pacific could fuel a
vastly more intense arms race than at present, polarizing the region when few countries want to align
themselves explicitly with either nation.

US China Crises inevitable – high risk
Thomas Wright, Exec. Dir. @ Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 4-30-2009, “5 Questions,” Rising
Powers, http://risingpowers.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/04/
The implications are enormous because it implies that the great dramas of the 21st century will play
out in Asia rather than Europe. Let me just focus on two implications that don’t get as much attention as
they should. The first has to do with strategic culture. The United States is used to great power politics
in the Atlantic area and most US foreign policy experts have learned their trade from studying that
experience. The United States must be careful not to assume that the lessons learned from that are
transferable to Asia. India-China-Japan relations will not necessarily play out like Germany-France-
Britain relations in the 19th century. So it will be important for the US foreign policy community to
appreciate and understand the specific context of great power relations in the 21st century. Given that
strategic misunderstanding and misperceptions can heighten the risk of conflict, it is tremendously
important that America gets this right. The second has to do with worse case scenarios. East Asia is
probably the only place on the planet where one could imagine a major war or struggle on a par with
the conflicts of the 20th century. Regional multipolarity, volatility in economics, rising nationalisms,
historic animosities and grievances, legitimate differences of interests and dramatic power transitions
make East Asia unique in the modern world. It falls to the United States, as the world’s strongest
power and as a Pacific nation, to take the lead in managing this situation, reassuring all nations,
dissuading and deterring aggression and guiding them to a mutually beneficial future. This may be
America’s greatest foreign policy challenge of the next half century.

US-China trade relations are collapsing
Gary Shapiro, President and CEO of Consumer Electronic Association, 1-12-2010, “U.S. And China on
the Brink of a Trade War”, CNBC,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/34822607/Gary_Shapiro_U_S_And_China_on_the_Brink _of_a_Trade_War
But brewing behind the scenes is another economic battle of global proportions, one that also impacts
each American on a personal level but has received comparatively little attention from the Obama
administration – U.S.-China global trade relations. China is now the world’s top exporter, with the
country’s customs agency releasing figures Sunday showing its 2009 exports exceeded $1.2 trillion. This
past year, China also emerged as the world’s largest automobile market and the world’s biggest steel
manufacturer. China’s growing global dominance causes particular concern in light of numerous policy
disagreements heating up in Washington. Friction is building between the United States and China, and
it’s time for all of us to pay attention. We are on the brink of a trade war with an uncertain behemoth,
and recent policy decisions from Washington are fanning the flame. In the past few months, the
United States has imposed anti-dumping duties on Chinese-made pipes and high tariffs to discourage
the import of Chinese-made tires. Likewise, China has reciprocated with government regulations that
would grant preference to technologies with intellectual property indigenous to China, excluding the
U.S. technology industry at large from selling to the Chinese government. The Chinese government has
also imposed tight Internet controls on its 300 million users, blocking popular U.S. sites such as
YouTube and Facebook and making it exceedingly difficult for individuals to register their own Web
sites. This past month, from the U.N. climate change talks in Copenhagen, China and the United States
battled it over their participation in the international accord to curb carbon emissions, with the U.S.
delegation demanding that China open its books on efforts to limit Beijing’s carbon footprint and allow
experts to review its data. China, arguing they should be considered a developing and not an industrial
nation, went so far as to argue the United States should fund their carbon cleanup. Then, perhaps most
contentious is the brewing antagonism and angry diplomatic letter writing over China’s currency.
Many elected officials have accused China of deliberately undervaluing its currency against the dollar
to give Chinese companies the upper hand in international trade. China’s restrictive currency rules have
made it the world’s leading creditor. The nation, in part because of its convertible currency, has
amassed a large trade surplus with the United States. U.S. lawmakers have proposed legislation to
impose a 27.5 percent tariff on imported Chinese goods until China satisfies concerns over the valuation
of its currency. China’s inadequate level of protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights,
questionable government subsidies and misguided technology mandates certainly deserve criticism
from the U.S. government, but the Obama administration must reject at trade policy solely focused on
enforcement-enforcement-enforcement and move the debate toward openness and dialogue.
Precarious tit-for-tat trade relations between the United States and China has been unfolding against
the backdrop of the Obama administration’s uncertain and at time schizophrenic trade strategy.
                                AT: Bernstein – Too Far Off
Bernstein goes neg – says that issues will be important if politicians talk about them
Jonathan Bernstein, staff writer, 3-28-2012, “Why the Obamacare Verdict Won’t Have Any Effect on
the 2012 Election,” TNR, http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/102090/obamacare-supreme-court-
There are two reasons for this. First, most events have much less staying power than we expect they
do. Even truly important events—take, for example, the September 11 attacks—fade. Of course, events
can have lasting effects, including electoral impact, even after we stop being aware of them. But it’s not
at all hard to find a half dozen or more events that are said to be election-changing when they happen,
only to disappear without a trace months later. No, Barack Obama’s church didn’t wind up dominating
the November 2008 election; nor did how many houses John McCain owned. Or, for a (slightly!) more
substantive issue: Remember when everyone cared so much about the federal government’s credit
rating? When was the last time that was mentioned? The Supreme Court will likely decide the fate of
ACA in June, some five months before Election Day; there will be dozens of headlines between decision
day and when voters go to the polls. Unless one of the candidates puts a lot of effort into keeping it in
the news, it’s not going to be on people’s minds. The second reason is just that the room for influencing
the vote is much less than some believe. Most voters are partisans, and are going to vote on that basis
(that includes those who say they are independent but lean to one party, who tend to behave just like
weak partisans do). For swing voters, health care reform must compete with everything else: the
economy, the death of bin Laden and the continuing war in Afghanistan, and whatever smaller issues
affect them personally. Indeed, this was already visible among Republicans during the presidential
nomination battle. If ACA was really a make-or-break priority, there’s no way that Mitt Romney would
have emerged as the GOP pick. That’s not to say that people don’t care about it; it’s just that they care
about it as a function of, say, disliking Barack Obama. For a large number of opponents, if it wasn’t
health care, it would be something else. Some people may, in fact, care enough about health care
reform that it will affect their vote. But I’m even more skeptical of the idea that anyone cares about the
Constitutional issues that the Court will be discussing. I can’t imagine there are more than a handful of
people who basically support the ideas behind ACA but are reluctant to approve of the law—and thus
support the president—unless it receives a SCOTUS seal of approval. Of course, whatever people care
about now, if a campaign highlights an issue in the fall then people will start to care about it then.
That’s not unusual. Something that people normally wouldn’t care about at all can be far more salient
because candidates talk about it—after all, Republicans who would never have been affected by the
law themselves cared quite a bit about inheritance taxes over the last decade because Republican
politicians talked about that tax all the time.

GOP will harp on the plan and bash Obama over Israel
Sahil Kapur, staff writer, 3-4-2012, “At AIPAC, Obama Seeks To Blunt GOP Criticisms On Israel,” TPM,
Bashing Obama on Israel has been a recurring feature of right-wing politics, but there are signs that
Republicans intend to zero in on this attack. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) is expected to do
just that in a speech to AIPAC Monday, one day after Obama’s address. In a new Foreign Policy op-ed
titled “How to Beat Obama,” Karl Rove and Ed Gillespie urge Republicans to use the issue of Israel to
hurt the president politically. “His approach to Israel must be presented as similarly weak and
untrustworthy,” Rove and Gillespie write. “The Republican candidate must make clear the existential
threat to Israel from a nuclear-armed Iran — not only because it will lead to a better policy, but also
because it will reduce the president’s support among this key voting bloc in the critical battleground
states of Florida, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.” Appearing on CNN’s State of the Union Sunday,
House Homeland Security Chairman Peter King (R-NY) said he has “no doubt that Iran is getting
extremely close to being able to have a nuclear weapon that’s operational.” Obama’s carefully worded
speech aimed to thread a fine needle: shield himself from conservative attacks while also seeking to
quiet the growing saber-rattling about war with Iran. “Already, there is too much loose talk of war,” he
said, declaring that such “bluster” has “only benefited the Iranian government, by driving up the price of
oil, which they depend on to fund their nuclear program.” The Republican attacks are likely to intensify
this week as Obama meets with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Monday. In prior policy
disagreements between the two leaders, Republicans have routinely sided with Netanyahu, and will be
eagerly looking for opportunities to make political hay out of any possible daylight between their
president and the Israeli leader.
                                     2NC Yemen Link Wall
Israel prefers Yemen over a possible Islamist state.
Morgan Muchnick, graduate of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, 2011, previously served as
professional staff to Senator Fred Thompson and as a volunteer for Senator Thompson’s presidential
campaign. In addition, Mr. Muchnick served as chief speechwriter for Daniel Ayalon, former Israeli
Ambassador to the United States, and as a policy analyst for various organizations on Capitol Hill. “The
Devil We Know vs. The Devil We Don’t”, http://upsidepolitics.com/2011/02/02/the-devil-we-know-440
This is why I have come to the opinion that strong, secular, militaristic leaders are currently most
appropriate in the Arab Muslim world. We know these devils; they have been present in Egypt (for
now), Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states, and Pakistan. We have learned to work with them to
further US interests. Indeed, even Israel has learned to work with them to ensure long-term stability.
The instability from a successful revolution in Egypt is a far-greater threat to the West than Mubarak’s
army. Stability in a universe devoid of liberty is better than chaos. Interestingly, the Obama
Administration shares this opinion, at least publically. The US is predictably calling for calm, and for
respect for the life and safety of the protestors. However, we also back the Mubarak regime and will
continue to do so during the protests. If the US is to play a role in the ending of the Mubarak dynasty, it
must do so in a way that ensures we do not see the rise of an Islamic regime, much like what followed
the overthrow of the Shah of Iran. The world simply cannot afford another 1979 and President Obama
cannot afford another Jimmy Carter comparison. Here is hoping we get neither.

Prefer the link – Israel views the plan through a tainted lens
Medea Benjamin, works for the fellowship of reconciliation, 2-28-2012, “AIPAC undermines
democracy at home and in the Middle East,” Fellowship of Reconciliation,
AIPAC undermines American support for democracy movements in the Arab world. AIPAC looks at the
entire Arab world through the lens of Israeli government interests, not the democratic aspirations of
the Arab people. It has therefore supported corrupt, repressive regimes that are friendly to the Israeli
government, such as Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak. Events now unfolding in the Middle East should convince
U.S. policy-makers of the need to break from AIPAC’s grip and instead support democratic forces in the
Arab world.

New aid spun as weakness
Gordon Robison, Middle East journalist and US political analyst, teaches political science at the
University of Vermont, 12-28-2011, “Fearmongering over Arab Spring,” Gulf News,
As bellicose as the Republican hopefuls are regarding Israel and Iran, their positions on those countries
do not place them far outside of the American mainstream (what that says about mainstream US
opinion itself is a separate discussion). It is GOP reaction to the Arab Spring that has really been
interesting to watch. Rabble-rousing Among the party's presidential contenders, the general feeling
appears to be that 2011's Arab revolutions are a bad thing. Several candidates have criticised
Washington for failing to cling to Hosni Mubarak as his presidency crumbled last winter (though none
have offered any workable ideas about what the US ought to have done instead). Newt Gingrich has
called the Arab Spring "an interesting fantasy". This dismissive, fearmongering attitude toward the Arab
revolutions of 2011 ought to give thoughtful observers pause. The coming year will be critical for all of
the region's still-unresolved revolutions, both those that appear to be moving forward in a positive way,
such as Tunisia, and those, such as Yemen and Syria, that remain violent and far from a resolution. As
the world's sole superpower, America must find a way to engage positively with the ongoing
movements pressing for change throughout the Arab world. It cannot do this if it opposes progress for
fear of what democracy might bring, or because it views any change to the status quo as something
that might aid terrorists. The danger is not simply that know-nothings on the political right will advocate
an unworkable policy of rolling back the clock, but also that during the coming year Obama will be
forced to cut back his already tepid support for democratisation in the region for fear of being called
weak during an election year.

Creates a wedge issue – GOP spins the plan as weak on Israel creating a wedge issue
Sahil Kapur, staff writer, 3-4-2012, “At AIPAC, Obama Seeks To Blunt GOP Criticisms On Israel,” TPM,
Bashing Obama on Israel has been a recurring feature of right-wing politics, but there are signs that
Republicans intend to zero in on this attack. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) is expected to do
just that in a speech to AIPAC Monday, one day after Obama’s address. In a new Foreign Policy op-ed
titled “How to Beat Obama,” Karl Rove and Ed Gillespie urge Republicans to use the issue of Israel to
hurt the president politically. “His approach to Israel must be presented as similarly weak and
untrustworthy,” Rove and Gillespie write. “The Republican candidate must make clear the existential
threat to Israel from a nuclear-armed Iran — not only because it will lead to a better policy, but also
because it will reduce the president’s support among this key voting bloc in the critical battleground
states of Florida, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.” Appearing on CNN’s State of the Union Sunday,
House Homeland Security Chairman Peter King (R-NY) said he has “no doubt that Iran is getting
extremely close to being able to have a nuclear weapon that’s operational.” Obama’s carefully worded
speech aimed to thread a fine needle: shield himself from conservative attacks while also seeking to
quiet the growing saber-rattling about war with Iran. “Already, there is too much loose talk of war,” he
said, declaring that such “bluster” has “only benefited the Iranian government, by driving up the price of
oil, which they depend on to fund their nuclear program.” The Republican attacks are likely to intensify
this week as Obama meets with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Monday. In prior policy
disagreements between the two leaders, Republicans have routinely sided with Netanyahu, and will be
eagerly looking for opportunities to make political hay out of any possible daylight between their
president and the Israeli leader.
                                      2NC Link Outweighs
Florida is key – can’t lose it and win the election
Anthony Man, staff writer, 2-19-2012, “5 things Obama needs to win Florida (or that Republicans must
counter),” Sun Sentinel, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2012-02-19/news/fl-obama-florida-strategy-
With 29 electoral votes, Florida is the most glittering prize in this year's presidential election. Without
a win in the nation's biggest swing state, it's hard to come up with a scenario that keeps Barack
Obama in the White House. Since 1960, only one winner has captured the presidency without carrying
the Sunshine State, said Lynn University American studies professor Robert Watson. "Florida is vital,"
he said. In 2008, Obama won 51 percent of the vote in Florida, besting Republican Sen. John McCain by
236,450 votes out of nearly 8.4 million votes cast. For Obama to repeat, Watson and state Rep. Scott
Randolph, D-Orlando, chairman of the Orange County Democratic Party, said he must minimize losses in
conservative north Florida, run competitively in the Interstate 4 corridor in central Florida, and win big
in South Florida.
                                                 Link Frame – Worst Case
Pessimism – Israeli security planners start with worst-case thinking – they won’t listen
to the potential “benefits” of engagement
Daniel Byman, Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, Summer, 2011,
“Israel’s Pessimistic View of the Arab Spring,” The Washington Quarterly, 34:3 pp. 123-136,
Americans took heart as they watched Egyptian demonstrators rally in Tahrir Square and topple the
regime of Hosni Mubarak in a peaceful revolution. Next door in Israel, however, the mood was somber:
‘‘When some people in the West see what’s happening in Egypt, they see Europe 1989,’’ an Israeli
official remarked. ‘‘We see it as Tehran 1979.’’1 Political leaders vied to see who could be the most
pessimistic, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly warning that it was even possible
that ‘‘Egypt will go in the direction of Iran,’’ with the new Cairo government becoming even more
dictatorial and lashing out abroad.2 As he pointed out in remarks to the Knesset, ‘‘They too had
demonstrations; multitudes filled the town squares. But, of course it progressed in a different way.’’3 As
unrest spread from Egypt to Bahrain, Jordan, Syria, and Yemen, the gloom seemed to deepen. These
apocalyptic predictions and Israel’s doom-and-gloom mentality are easy, too easy, to dismiss. Israelis
 are always sensitive to their security . Indeed, their reaction to the spread of democracy so close to
their borders seems churlish, as does their tendency to look on the dark side when so many of their
Arab neighbors now have hopes for a better life. But dismissing Israeli concerns would be a mistake.
Some of Israel’s fears are valid, and others that are less so will still drive Israeli policies. The new regimes
and the chaotic regional situation pose security challenges to the Jewish state. These challenges, and the
Israeli reactions to them, are likely to worsen the crisis in Gaza and make the prospects for peace
between the Israelis and Palestinians even more remote. The new revolutions also have the potential
to complicate the U.S.—Israel relationship further and make it harder for the United States to benefit
from the Arab Spring.

There’s only a risk of a link – Israel is sensitive
Ted Koppel, currently a contributing analyst for BBC and a commentator for NPR, 4-29-2011, “The
Arab Spring and U.S. Policy: The View From Jerusalem,”
It is provocative, but not entirely inaccurate, to suggest that U.S. foreign policy these past few months has
been sufficiently erratic to make America's allies reconsider the degree to which we can be trusted—
and our adversaries re-evaluate the degree to which we must be feared. The canary in the coal mine on
such matters is Israel. None of America's allies is more sensitive to even the most subtle changes in the
international environment, or more conscious of the slightest hint of diminished support from
Washington. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been so concerned that a member of his fractious coalition might give vent to
some damaging public observation on this issue that he has imposed a strict "nobody talks on the subject but me" rule. That the gag has been
even partially effective, given the wide-open nature of the Israeli political process, is astonishing. It is also a measure of how worried the Israelis
are. My own reporting on the Middle East in general and Israel in particular goes back almost 40 years—to the days of Henry Kissinger's shuttle
diplomacy in the region. On a recent visit to Jerusalem, I met with a number of very senior current and former government officials who spoke
on a not-for-attribution basis. They were anything but restrained in voicing their concerns, and some of the views expressed in this article
                                                    all other concerns is the fear that Iran is poised to
reflect the outlook of the prime minister himself. Overshadowing
reap enormous benefits from the so-called Arab Spring. "Even without nukes," one top official told me, "Iran
picks up the pieces. With nukes, it takes the house." Hearing Israeli leaders express grave concerns about Iran and its
nuclear potential is nothing new. What is new is a growing worry that America's adversaries will be less inclined to take warnings from
Washington seriously. Each week that passes without the overthrow or elimination of Moammar Gadhafi is perceived in Jerusalem as
emboldening the leadership of Iran and North Korea."Imagine," one source told me, "how Gadhafi must be kicking himself for giving up the
                                        Israeli government is so concerned that America's adversaries may
development of Libya's nuclear program." The
miscalculate U.S. intentions that it is privately urging Washington to make it clear that the U.S. would intervene in Saudi Arabia
should the survival of that government be threatened. That is, after all, what President George H.W. Bush did more than 20 years ago when
Saddam Hussein ordered Iraqi forces into Kuwait and moved forces in the direction of Saudi Arabia. "This," President Bush said on more than
one occasion, "will not stand." And it didn't.
                                                  Link Frame – GOP Spin
GOP controls the spin of the plan – movements have been demonized to the public
Abdullah Al-Arian, an assistant professor of history at Wayne State University, 12-29-2011, “Let
Freedom Ring (But Not Too Loud),” The European, http://theeuropean-magazine.com/481-al-arian-
From the perspective of many American politicians, the Arab populations of countries from Morocco to Yemen could not have picked a worse
time to revolt. On the eve of a national election cycle set to begin with Republican Party primaries in just a few weeks, the
reality taking shape in places like Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia has been obscured by American candidates seeking to
score cheap political points by feeding into popular fears and misconceptions about a region that has been an
unfortunate focal point of United States policy for the last decade. The national conversation about the Arab Spring has been characterized by
the tension between two conflicting impulses that have defined American policy toward the region since World War II. The first is the desire to
promote the universal ideals of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. But after 1945, colonial rule was replaced by American
hegemony in pursuit of the second impulse: the desire to protect strategic and economic interests, often by providing considerable support for
authoritarian regimes. In the quest to protect secure access to oil, underwrite Israeli regional military superiority and expansionism, and project
American economic and military might, U. S. leaders have preferred dictators to popularly elected governments that are far more likely to
oppose such policies.Consequently, successive U.S. administrations have provided considerable military, economic, and diplomatic support to
nearly every Arab authoritarian ruler from Saddam Hussein and Moammar Qaddafi to Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The effects of
that policy were felt on September 11, 2001 The resulting “War on Terror” has been one of the most contentious policy initiatives in recent
American history. However, the Arab revolts of the past year are set to pose a far more permanent challenge to the long-term position of the
                                    as Obama has expressed verbal support for the aspirations of the Arab populations, his
U.S. in the region. Consequently, even
administration has  quietly proceeded with business as usual, sending emissaries to help conserve the
existing political order, while continuing to provide the weaponry used by Arab militaries against peaceful civilian protestors. For their
part, the rightwing presidential candidates have not even feigned support for the promotion of democratic ideals in the Middle
East. Instead, they have presented the Arab Spring as a threat to American interests and a sign of the Obama
administration’s failed foreign policy. With Islamically oriented political parties poised to sweep elections in Tunisia as well as Egypt,
the public discourse in the U.S. has been dominated by an alarmist trend, warning that democratic
elections are simply a path to Islamic totalitarianism. Congress has proposed that future economic aid to Egypt should be
contingent on whether the Secretary of State deems that the elected government is controlled by “terrorists”. In effect, the popular will of tens
of millions of Egyptians is meaningless as long as Hillary Clinton holds the deciding vote that is critical to the survival of a weak state that was
formed on the basis of its patronage of Western powers.
                                                           2NC Now Key
Now is key
Frank Newport, staff writer, 2-6-2012, “Where the U.S. Election Stands Now,” Gallup,
This historical pattern suggests that Obama would need to see his job approval rating climb to 50% to be
in a comfortable position for re-election. History shows that by March of the election year, all winning
presidents in the modern era, including George W. Bush, had job approval ratings above 50%, and all
losing presidents had job approval ratings below 50%. This suggests that where Obama stands by next
month may be an important indicator of his ultimate re-election chances.

Now key to form vote impressions
Terence Samuel, Senior Correspondent at the American Prospect and Chief Congressional
Correspondent for U.S. News & World Report, 4-12-2004, “A TV Slugfest, No Holds Barred; Bush’s ad
buys batter Kerry, but the challenger has a new weapon,” U.S. News & World Report, proquest
Which they may be. Voter impressions often get formed early in a presidential race, and neither candidate
can afford to waste time in trying to define [themselves] himself--and his opponent. "We have been operating
on the assumption that this election will be as close as the election in 2000," says Terry Holt, spokesman for the Bush campaign. For that
reason, there can never be enough time and money. Money, however, is only where the intrigue begins: "We are dealing with a whole new
campaign funding system," says Larry Noble, executive director of the Center for Responsive Politics, a Washington watchdog group. "The
tactics have changed, the power centers have changed, and we'll have to see how it all shakes out." Both candidates will set records for
fundraising, and the new laws have produced a whole other source of political money--so-called 527 committees, named for the section of the
tax code that allows their existence and their tax-exempt status. Kerry raised more than $20 million in March alone and more than $43 million
since January--$26 million of it on the Internet. He's on track to get the $80 million he says he needs before the Democratic convention in late
July. That's pretty good by past standards, but it pales next to the Bush haul. Having recently surpassed its goal of $170 million, the president's
campaign announced last week that, after about 150 fundraisers in the past year, Bush will cut back on his in-person fundraisers to concentrate
on campaigning. Aides said the campaign will rely on the Internet and traditional mail and phone solicitations from now on, which is hardly
good news for Kerry. "Anybody who thinks that George Bush is going to stop raising money, when he hits $170 [million] or $180 million or
whatever it is they raise, is crazy," says Democratic fundraiser David Jones. "There is no such thing as too much money." The Bush camp doesn't
disagree. "Our Internet fundraising and our phone and mail have been outpacing the donor events," says Bush spokesman Holt. But what does
                                            president's month of television ads attacking Kerry have
all that money buy, exactly? Early evidence suggests that the
been effective in establishing the Massachusetts senator in the minds of some as a waffler and a tax raiser. In
the 17 states where Bush has been running ads against Kerry, polls show that despite weeks of bad news on the Iraq-terrorism situation, Bush
has regained a lead over Kerry, who came out of the early primaries ahead of the president in most polls. In mid-February, before      Bush
launched his ad campaign in the 17 swing states, Kerry held a 28-point lead over the president, 63 percent to 35 percent.
But after the $20 million ad blitz, that lead had vanished, and by the end of March Bush was leading Kerry,
51 percent to 45 percent; Kerry's favorable rating had slipped from 60 percent to 53 percent , according to the most
recent CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll. Early impressions. For Kerry, the big question is whether he'll have enough
money to define himself before the Bush campaign cements an unflattering picture of him in the
minds of swing voters. Early and aggressive advertising has worked to do just that in races like Ronald
Reagan's landslide over Walter Mondale in 1984 and the elder Bush's victory over Michael Dukakis in 1988. Over the
weekend, Kerry launched a spot in the same 17 states the Bush ads are running in, attacking the president for the loss of American jobs and
promoting his own plan to solve the problem. Can he keep it up? "We will have enough money," Meehan says, "to be competitive."

Now is key to ensuring base turnout –
Paul Farhi, staff writer, 3-9-2012, “Voters tuning out GOP campaign,” Washington Post,
Whatever the reason, Republican voters — and perhaps just people generally — seem to be losing interest in the party’s
prolonged and messy contest to choose a nominee to challenge President Barack Obama in November. Voter turnout in the 22 states that have
held primaries and caucuses so far, including the 10 states that voted on Super Tuesday, has fallen about 8 percent overall compared with
2008. In seven of those states, the decline has been far more dramatic, with at least one in five voters staying away compared to the same
primaries in 2008. Television ratings for the Republican debates started strongly last year, suggesting that viewers were hungry to see the 2012
candidates in action. But the numbers for some campaign events have plateaued, too. Primetime ratings for Super Tuesday coverage on the
three leading cable news networks fell nearly 40 percent compared with the same coverage in 2008. And this time around, the broadcast
networks — which had attracted some 15 million people to Super Tuesday coverage in 2008 — didn’t even bother to show it. Only NBC cut into
its regular entertainment schedule, with just an hour-long show to cover the big vote. Of course, it’s hard to compare any two election cycles
since no two are entirely alike. The 2008 campaign may have been especially unusual, given that it featured an open race, and two Democratic
front-runners — Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton — who inspired an extraordinarily passionate response from supporters. But even with
those caveats, the 2012 campaign is starting to drag for would-be voters and viewers. “Something has turned them off,” says Chuck Todd, NBC
News’ political director and chief White House correspondent. “Is it Limbaugh or the negativity or the super PACs? We don’t know fully why.
                                                                                   trick for Republicans, and perhaps for
But there’s something happening here.” Or simply not enough happening to bring people out. The
Obama, too, is going to be how to figure out how to avoid the same thing happening in November. “I think
we are going to have a … challenge” firing up the base, said Ken Blackwell, a Republican who has served as Cincinnati
mayor and Ohio’s secretary of state. “And we need to start working on that right now.”

Enthusiasm now key – spillover to the general election
Jessica Wehrman, staff writer, 3-10-2012, “Low voter turnout may carry over to fall election, experts
say,” Springfield News-Sun, http://www.springfieldnewssun.com/news/springfield-news/low-voter-
Historically, low primary turnout hasn’t always carried into the fall. But turnout expert Curtis Gans of the
Center for the Study of the American Electorate said 2012 may be a year when low turnout early means
low turnout late. “I think it will have an effect this time around because of the lack of enthusiasm
factor,” Gans said. If Mitt Romney becomes the nominee, some in the right will stay home out of
apathy, and if another GOP candidate prevails, the moderates will stay home, he said. Gans said another
factor too could depress turnout: Obama. Democrats don’t appear as enthusiastic toward him as they
were four years ago, which could result in an “en masse” turnout decline, he said. “There is not a level of
enthusiasm,” Gans said. “And that’s the root cause of (low turnout).” Mike Dawson, a Republican
political operative, said 2008 and 2012 cannot be compared. He points out that while 2.3 million
Ohioans voted for a Democrat in 2008, only 547,588 voted for Obama on Tuesday, when he was
unopposed on the ballot. And while Obama and Clinton were neck-and-neck for weeks prior to the 2008
Democratic primary, this year’s Republican contest “lasted seven days,” he said. “You don’t build up a
lot of grass-roots intensity in a seven-day time frame,” Dawson said. “You can’t compare the two.”

Now is key – primary season determines voter turnout
David Shribman, staff writer, 2-26-2012, “The turnout threat: when voters vamoose,” Post Gazette,
Ordinarily the relationship between primary turnout and general-election turnout is tenuous at best.
But special factors in 2012 are at work. For the Democrats, the risks are in small turnouts among young
and blue-collar voters. For the Republicans, the risks are in small turnouts among conservatives and
party regulars who may find they can't fall in love with Mr. Romney. This time, the election may be won
by the party that can turn around the turnout threat.

Primaries determine energy levels for voters
Krisy Force, staff writer, 2-29-2012, “Primary season hits Michigan,” Grand Valley Lanthorn,
Don Zinman, a political science professor at Grand Valley State University, said many students do not
vote in the general elections, let alone the primaries. Zinman said primary voters tend to have stronger
political convictions than those who vote only in the general election or not at all. According to the
Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement, only 58 percent of U.S. citizens
between ages 18 and 29 voted in the 2010 midterm election. “Students who show up for primaries are
students who are very politically engaged,” he said. “In the November election you will have more
passive voters.” However, the professor said primaries are important and should be taken seriously. “If
Republicans are going to be a majority party in the future they will have to at least draw parity with the
Democrats among 18 through 29-year-old voters,” he said. “The decisions voters make today can shape
a lifetime of voting habits. Primaries are the venue for voters to choose the leaders of their parties.
Primaries can energize a party’s voters for the general election in November.”

March is key
Frank Newport, staff writer, 2-6-2012, “Where the U.S. Election Stands Now,” Gallup,
Obama's job approval rating appears to be improving at this point, and history suggests that his
approval ratings in March will likely portend whether he is re-elected. The direction of change in
Americans' views of the economy in the next several months will also be critically important.\
                                              Yes AIPAC/Jewish Support
General Jewish support may be low but our 1nc evidence says its still sufficient for
Obama to hold Florida – they need to read specific cards about the outcome of jewish
votes in florida.
AIPAC and Jews behind Obama but their support can end – GOP will use wedge issues
Glenn Thrush, staff writer, 3-4-2012, “Obama’s 2012 AIPAC test,” Politico,
But Obama’s election-year trek to AIPAC promises to be a considerably less consequential high-wire act
this time. The reason: Iran has entirely eclipsed the West Bank as the central issue this year, and opinion over the threat, even among
members of the most influential pro-Israel group in the country, remains divided. Inside the White House, there is a growing
confidence that Obama has struck the right political balance on the Iran nuclear crisis, even if the situation remains
dangerous and negotiations with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu this week are expected to be another painful trip to the diplomatic
dentist’s office. “As many Israeli leaders — including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and President Shimon
Peres — have said, the U.S.-Israel relationship has never been stronger, and President Obama has been a
stalwart friend and ally,” said Democratic National Committee Chairwoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz, who, like many residents in her
South Florida congressional district, is a staunchly pro-Israel Jew from New York. While few Jewish leaders have gone as far as Wasserman
Schultz has — she praises Obama’s “unprecedented support” for Israel — polls taken in the past month in Israel and the U.S. show no clear
Jewish consensus on how to proceed. Citizens in both countries fear an assault on Iran’s nuclear facilities will be anything but surgical, perhaps
initiating another Middle Eastern war with wild-card consequences — despite Tel Aviv’s claim that Iran’s nuclear advances will soon put it in a
“zone of immunity,” making attacks impossible. But the  polling that matters most to Obama is at home, where his
support among the country’s small but influential Jewish community remains solid, if not spectacular. In 2008, Obama
reversed a four-election slide for Democrats among Jewish voters, garnering 78 percent of the vote to John McCain’s 21 percent. His
numbers have held up for the most part, even if Jews remain leery of his positions on Israel. And even if Jews
abandon Obama in greater numbers, their tiny proportion of the electorate (New Jersey and Florida have the largest percentages, with Jews
representing 7 percent and 4 percent of the population, respectively) is so small that it most likely wouldn’t have a great impact on even a tight
election. “The only problem that Obama and Democrats have with Jewish voters,” quipped Democratic pollster Jim Gerstein, “is that there are
not more of them.” That hasn’t stopped Republicans from trying to drive a wedge, as they have since Ronald Reagan
grabbed 39 percent of the Jewish vote from Jimmy Carter. And painting Obama as weak on Israel feeds into the larger GOP argument that he’s
afraid of standing up to dictators.

BYRON TAU, freelance reporter for Politico, 3-2-2012, “Dem pollster: No danger of Obama losing the
Jewish vote”, Politico, http://www.politico.com/politico44/2012/03/dem-pollster-no-danger-of-obama-
Jim Gerstein, a Democratic pollster who works with the liberal Middle East advocacy group J Street,
says that there is no danger of President Obama losing a major share of the Jewish vote in 2012. “As
the biannual claims of Democratic decline with Jews resurface over the next eight months, it is
important to keep perspective: The only problem that Obama and Democrats have with Jewish voters is
that there is not more of them,” Gerstein wrote in a 10-page polling memo released Friday. "The
President is well-positioned to have another strong showing with Jewish voters." Many Republicans
are convinced that they can win over more Jewish voters, convincing many to abandon their traditional
Democratic voting patterns and back GOP candidates at the presidential and congressional levels. As a
result, President Obama has faced increasing criticism from his rivals on his relationship with the Israeli
government and his commitment to stopping Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon — all charges that
the president and his supporters deny vehemently. According to Gerstein, Democrats still maintained a
66 to 31 percent advantage among Jewish voters in the 2010 midterms — in a year where the GOP
won in a landslide. Jewish voters voted for Democrats in greater numbers than other key Democratic
constituencies, including unmarried women, Hispanics and voters under 30. Further, Gerstein notes,
Republicans and conservatives still have high disapproval numbers among Jewish voters — while
Democrats, including the president, remain relatively popular. In July J Street polling, Jews disapprove
of the tea party movement 74 percent, with 12 percent approval. They disapprove of Mitt Romney 60
percent to 16 percent, and they disapprove of former President George W. Bush 73 percent to to 16
percent. In the same survey, Obama is above water 56 percent to 34 percent — numbers similar to a
recent Gallup polls from the fall that showed Obama at 54 percent to 41 percent. Gerstein's memo
comes in advance of this week's American Israel Public Affairs Committee conference, where Obama,
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Mitt Romney, Rick Santorum, Newt Gingrich and many
others will address the group. Obama is also scheduled to meet with Netanyahu next week in a crucial
summit to discuss the Iranian threat and other bilateral U.S.-Israel issues. Democrats have spent the
week pre-butting Republican charges that the president isn't committed enough to Israel's security. The
DNC released a video accusing Republicans of playing politics on the issue this week. And the president
himself addressed the charges in an interview that was published Friday. "Every single commitment I
have made to the state of Israel and its security, I have kept," Obama told the Atlantic's Jeffrey
Goldberg. "Why is it that despite me never failing to support Israel on every single problem that they've
had over the last three years, that there are still questions about that?"
                                                             2NC Plan Key
They can tank his reelection
Douglas Feith, frmr. Undersec. Of Defense, 11-2-2011, “Israel should be a u.s. campaign issue,”
Hudson Inst., http://mobile.hudson.org/articles/articledetails.cfm?id=8458
Pro-Israel organizations have long been active in American politics, promoting friendly relations between the U.S.
and Israel. Jewish groups, in particular, have helped ensure that candidates' attitudes toward Israel would be an
important element in congressional and presidential elections. Yet now, two venerable Jewish organizations, the
American Jewish Committee (AJC) and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), are saying that it is improper to do this in the
case of President Obama. They have taken the initiative to shield Mr. Obama from the political consequences
of his cold treatment of Israel. The AJC and ADL are jointly promoting a "national pledge for unity on Israel." Its essence is that
"America's friendship with Israel . . . has always transcended politics" and that "U.S.-Israel friendship should never be used as a political wedge
issue." Explaining this effort, ADL chief Abraham Foxman lamented that presidential candidates have recently "challenged their opponents' pro-
Israel bona fides" and "questioned the current administration's foreign policy approach vis-à-vis Israel." True, every political movement wants
unity in support of the common cause. But since when have American supporters of Israel believed that a candidate's attitudes toward Israel
should be kept out of electoral politics? Since never. In   1984, pro-Israel groups exerted themselves to block the re-
election of Illinois Republican Sen. Charles Percy, the prominent chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who was an
outspoken critic of Israel and champion of U.S. engagement with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Percy lost and, in an election night
interview, attributed his defeat to the Israel lobby. Other politicians who met a similar fate include Reps. Paul Findley (R., Ill.) and Cynthia
                                                                                      took full advantage of Mr. Bush's
McKinney (D., Ga.). When running against President George H.W. Bush in 1992, Bill Clinton
testy relationship with Israel. As the New York Times reported in March 1992: "Some leaders of American Jewish groups predicted today
that President Bush would pay in the November election for his demand that Israel freeze settlements." One such leader spoke of the "anger
and dismay in Jewish communities over Bush Administration policy that is increasingly perceived as one-sided and unfair against Israel," adding
"I imagine it will be translated into an unwillingness to vote for this Administration or contribute funds." By the way, the speaker was Jess
Hordes, Washington director of the ADL. President Obama came into office determined to distance the U.S. from Israel and to portray Israel as
the impediment to Middle East peace. He insisted on an unprecedented Israeli settlement freeze, exceeding the demands at that time of the
Palestinian Authority itself. And he went along with the PA's refusal to renew direct negotiations with Israel, agreeing that the Palestinians
could use U.S. officials to conduct indirect talks. Meanwhile he offered "engagement" to Israel's Iranian and Syrian enemies, a vain policy that
failed as the courted regimes rebuffed the offer and brutalized their own pro-freedom demonstrators. Mr. Obama also orchestrated a public
imbroglio with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, walking out of a White House meeting with him in 2010 and refusing to be
photographed with him. Quarrels between the men this year have been openly bitter. This vexed Mr. Netanyahu and the Israeli public in
general, which overwhelmingly views Mr. Obama as anti-Israel, and it antagonized not only the president's domestic political opponents but
also many Democrats in Congress. When Mr. Netanyahu addressed Congress in May, most Democrats, including the leadership, joined in the
numerous standing ovations that were obviously intended to contrast the affection for Israel on Capitol Hill with the bad feeling emanating
from the White House. So anyone truly intent on preserving unity among Israel's friends could do so by building on the substantial bipartisan
opposition to Mr. Obama's policies on Israel. Instead, the AJC and the ADL are working to protect Mr. Obama. These organizations exist in large
part to defend the Jewish state from unfair criticism, pressure and attacks. But they are defending President Obama from well-grounded
charges that he has subjected Israel precisely to that. If the AJC and ADL want to defend Mr. Obama straightforwardly, they could do so. They
might argue that his record on Israel is not unremittingly hostile. They could try to balance some of the healthy features of the U.S.-Israeli
relationship—for example, the continuation of defense cooperation—against the bad parts. But it's not a strong argument, which explains why
they are claiming to uphold a venerable (though previously unheard of) principle of unity that precludes criticism of a president's position on
                                     can expect to pay a substantial political price in 2012 for his
Israel. Whatever the AJC and ADL say, Mr. Obama
antagonism toward Israel and feckless courting of its enemies.

Jewish vote is key to the election – Obama is on the brink of losing it now
Dan Senor, senior adviser to CPA in Iraq, 9-14-2011, “Why Obama Is Losing the Jewish Vote,” WSJ,
New York's special congressional election on Tuesday was the first electoral outcome directly affected by President
Obama's Israel policy. Democrats were forced to expend enormous resources in a losing effort to defend this
safe Democratic district, covering Queens and Brooklyn, that Anthony Weiner won last year by a comfortable margin. A Public Policy Poll taken
days before the election found a   plurality of voters saying that Israel was "very important" in determining their
votes. Among those voters, Republican candidate Robert Turner was winning by a 71-22 margin. Only 22% of Jewish voters approved of
President Obama's handling of Israel. Ed Koch, the Democrat and former New York mayor, endorsed Mr. Turner because he said he wanted to
                                                               preview of what President Obama might face in his re-
send a message to the president about his anti-Israel policies. This is a
election campaign with a demographic group that voted overwhelmingly for him in 2008. And it could affect the electoral map,
given the battleground states—such as Florida and Pennsylvania—with significant Jewish populations. In another
ominous barometer for the Obama campaign, its Jewish fund-raising has deeply eroded: One poll by McLaughlin & Associates found that of
Jewish donors who donated to Mr. Obama in 2008, only 64% have already donated or plan to donate to his re-election campaign. The
Obama campaign has launched a counteroffensive, including hiring a high-level Jewish outreach director and sending former
White House aide David Axelrod and Democratic National Committee Chair Debbie Wasserman-Schultz to reassure Jewish donors. The Obama
                            Israel problem is a messaging problem, and that with enough explanation
team told the Washington Post that its
of its record the Jewish community will return to the fold in 2012. Here is an inventory of what Mr. Obama's aides
will have to address:

Even if the plan isn’t a concern for Jewish voters, it’s a concern for Jewish DONORS –
also GOP spin means the plan loses Obama the Jewish vote.
James D. Besser, 11-8-2011, “Obama’s Real Jewish Problem,” http://
So why the huge emphasis on Israel in GOP Jewish outreach? The simple answer: money. “My guess is
that the breakdown of Jewish money is much more even than the typical breakdown of the Jewish vote
— there are some very wealthy conservative Jews out there who give lots of money to Republican
candidates,” said Alan I. Abramowitz, an Emory University political scientist. And Jewish campaign giving
is much more Israel-focused than Jewish voting. So while the economy will be the overwhelming
priority for a strong majority of Jewish voters, the Republicans are making the not unreasonable bet
that in yet another presidential campaign certain to shatter spending records, playing the Israel card
early and aggressively will pay significant dividends on their campaign balance sheets. Obama is
almost certain to win a substantial majority of the Jewish vote, and a Tea Party ticket could turn
“substantial” into “overwhelming.” But he could face losses among centrist, business-oriented Jews if
the Republican nominee runs a more centrist campaign in the general election and is able to offer solid
economic credentials. As the OWS movement spreads, with polls showing surprising popular support for
its core arguments, the president also faces the danger disillusioned progressives — including many
Jews — may opt out of Election 2012. And the Israel card will still pack some punch in campaign
finance — which is why the Democratic Party continues to pour resources into fighting the claim their
standard bearer is anti-Israel.
                                                          AT: Aid Now
Past aid didn’t trigger the link because no one was focusing on the election – new aid
would be seen though the elections prism – also default to issue specific uniqueness –
obama’s sufficiently reassured Jews – more aid can freak them out.
No future increases
Patrick Corcoran, staff writer, 2-29-2012, “Short on Money, U.S. Digs Deeper To Find Ways to Support
Arab Spring,” The Washington Diplomat,
Yet in Washington, foreign aid borders on a dirty word these days, even though it's never taken up much of the U.S. budget
— contrary to popular opinion, foreign assistance amounts to roughly 1 percent of total federal expenditures. Still, the proposed 2013 budget
for the State Department and USAID saw a modest bump from the year before, with a plan to allocate more funds toward "transitioning" Arab
governments. Any sizeable increase in American tax dollars being sent abroad, however, is out of the question. Demonstrators
protest the ongoing use of weapons by rebel militias inside Tripoli and the lingering sense of lawlessness as the newly formed Libyan
government struggles to assert itself in the war-torn nation. Money can also be a double-edged sword, as evidenced by the recent spat over
Egypt's decision to prosecute 19 Americans — including a Cabinet member's son — for trying to influence the country's political system through
democracy-building civil society groups. The flare-up has jeopardized $1.3 billion in annual U.S. military assistance to Egypt, with Congress
threatening to withhold the money until the Americans are released and Egypt's military leaders take tangible steps toward democracy. On the
one hand, the incident reveals the enduring power of money to induce change — with the $1.3 billion in military aid one of the few forms of
leverage the U.S. retains over the cash-strapped Egyptian government. On the other hand, Egypt's military has rebuffed demands to release the
Americans and insisted that foreign meddling would not be tolerated — a sign of how sensitive the perception of outside interference,
especially from Washington, remains in the Arab world. A recent Gallup poll also showed that more than 70 percent of Egyptians don't even
want U.S. funding anyway (although the survey notes that opposition could stem from conditions attached to the aid, including obligations
under the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty). So, given the dearth of resources to support fledgling governments and democratization movements,
how can the U.S. government ensure that countries in the midst of historic transition lay the groundwork for political and economic reforms,
without sparking a backlash? Is there even a role for the United States to play, financial or otherwise, or should the people of the Arab world
sort out their own destiny? No Mideast Marshall Plan America's current fiscal straitjacket differs enormously from its position during two
comparable regional transformations. Under the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States pumped $13 billion — more
than $250 billion in today's dollars — into Western Europe to aid its reconstruction from World War II and counter the Soviet Union. In the
early 1990s, as the Cold War receded and Eastern Europe lurched to capitalism, the U.S. government again, despite a sharp recession, was able
to drum up significant amounts of money for the burgeoning democracies. Today, the     coffers are empty and the mood is
skeptical. Take the case of Egypt. Aside from being a linchpin nation that's the most populous in the Arab world, it's also enjoyed a decades-
long security partnership with the United States under Mubarak. Yet the scope of post-Arab Spring non-military assistance
has been relatively paltry given Egypt's regional and bilateral importance. Obama initially called for $1 billion in debt
 forgiveness for Egypt , with some additional economic aid. "It was not a very big package — not very impressive to
the Egyptians," Thomas Carothers, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told The Diplomat. Despite
       outlays were drastically curtailed by the Senate Appropriations Committee and never even made it
that, the
through the House of Representatives. What was proposed for other Arab nations was even more limited.

Obama’s letting the Arab spring slide – cements AIPAC support
Arik Elman, staff writer, 3-4-2012, “Obama at AIPAC, a Preview for a Miracle?” algemeiner,
After the disaster that was the Presidential speech to AIPAC in 2011, no doubt many delegates to this
year’s gathering (which is constantly portrayed by assorted anti-Semites as a nexus of Jewish power yet
curiously turns out to be as dangerous for Obama as a petting zoo) have offered thanks to the heavens
for the Iranian nuclear program. Every minute spent speechifying about Iran is a minute saved from the
discourse on Israel’s shortcomings in the peace process. After the president’s minions had berated
Israel on various occasions for failing to embrace the Arab spring (now demoted from a glorious
daybreak of democracy to “upheaval and uncertainty”), for lack of good manners vis-à-vis Obama’s
best friend, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, for resembling an Islamist theocracy with regard to the
rights of women, all that Obama has had to do was to avoid those issues and he had the audience in
the bag.
                                                  Link U
Obama’s backed off and now is key
Josh Block, senior fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute and a former spokesman for the American
Israel Public Affairs Committee, 3-5-2012, “How AIPAC Beat J Street,” Foreign Policy,
For decades, the number one rule of ally-to-ally diplomacy governing America's relations with our
closest friends was simple and straightforward: We settled our differences in private. But when
President Barack Obama's administration took office three years ago, that axiom appeared to fall out of
practice -- at least when it came to the U.S. relationship with Israel. The White House struck a
confrontational stance with Israel from the outset, choosing to elevate the issue of Jewish housing
construction across the 1949 armistice lines, even in Israel's capital city of Jerusalem, as the
fundamental issue of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The administration also refused to
acknowledge prior understandings between the United States and Israel -- breaking with American
promises that had come in conjunction with irreversible Israeli concessions. Some, like Michael Lerner of
the fringe-left Tikkun magazine and self-proclaimed "pro-Israel and pro-peace" group J Street, an old-
wine new-bottle version of groups long calling for pressure on Israel, cheered the White House's
approach. Many were frequent visitors to the West Wing. Their calls for an increasingly confrontational
style with the Jewish state were suddenly en vogue. In more recent months, however, things have
changed. As ideology gave way to reality, longtime Middle East hands and mainstream pro-Israel
organizations, which have long argued the Obama administration's publicly confrontational approach
was faulty, appear to have won the White House over to their side. This transformation was on full
display during the president's remarks at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee's annual
conference, which has gathered 14,000 people in Washington to voice their support for a close U.S.-
Israel relationship. "[T]here should not be a shred of doubt by now," Obama said. "When the chips are
down, I have Israel's back." The tension of the past has given way to a less confrontational style from
the Obama administration -- and none too soon . But was it soon enough? And will it be enough to
overcome the deficit of trust between Obama and Netanyahu?

Its working – Jews are sufficiently reassured
Shani McManus, 3-14-2012, “Obama affirms support for Israel”, Jewish Journal, http://www.sun-
In the 2008 presidential election, Barack Obama garnered more than 75 percent of the Jewish vote.
During his administration, however, Jewish support for Obama has somewhat waned, due to a
number of troubling incidents that have left some in the Jewish community questioning his support for
Israel. But during his speech at last week's American Israel Public Affairs Committee Conference in
Washington, D.C., President Obama got an opportunity to woo back Jewish voters when he reassured
the Jewish community of his strong support for Israel. "Four years ago, I stood before you and said
that, 'Israel's security is sacrosanct. It is non-negotiable.' That belief has guided my actions as President.
The fact is, my administration's commitment to Israel's security has been unprecedented," he said. "But
as you examine my commitment, you don't just have to count on my words. You can look at my deeds,"
Obama noted. Obama also addressed the threat to Israel by a nuclear-armed Iran. "No Israeli
government can tolerate a nuclear weapon in the hands of a regime that denies the Holocaust,
threatens to wipe Israel off the map, and sponsors terrorist groups committed to Israel's destruction,"
Obama said to loud applause. "A nuclear-armed Iran is completely counter to Israel's security
interests." Reaction to Obama's AIPAC address in the South Florida community has been mixed. "I
realize that in certain circles there is no trust in President Obama's policies toward Israel," Esther Adler,
chairperson of the Holocaust Learning Center at Boynton Beach's Temple Torah said. "Not only in my
opinion, but in the opinions of my Israeli relatives, there is no reason to doubt the President's
commitment to the security and well being of Israel." Rachel Miller, director of Palm Beach County
region of the American Jewish committee, said AJC was "reassured" about Obama's support for Israel.
"President Obama stressed the special connection between the United States and Israel; specifically
citing the two countries shared interests and common ideals," Miller noted. U.S. Rep. Ted Deutch, D-
Boca Raton said it was a privilege to attend the AIPAC conference and hear President Obama detail his
Administration's efforts to strengthen Israel's security and "thwart the grave threat" posed by Iran's
nuclear weapons program. "As a result of the sanctions imposed by the U.S., Europe, and even Russia
and China, Iran is now confronted with an unprecedented level of economic isolation," he said. "As a
result of this Administration's efforts, the Ayatollahs currently face a crumbling economy, an
international blacklist, a restive population and, as the President made clear, if they continue their
weapons program, the hammer of U.S. military might." Andrew Rosenkranz, Anti-Defamation League
Florida regional director said that while America and Israel both want to solve the problem of the Iranian
nuclear threat peacefully, "time is of the essence." "President Obama has clearly articulated that Iran's
nuclear program is a threat not only to Israel, but to world peace," he said. "However, during a press
conference this past Tuesday, the President's omission of positive linkage between Israel's self-defense
and U.S. interests with regard to ensuring that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon weakens the
President's earlier message about the benefits accrued for the U.S. and the West if Iran is stopped."
Rachel A. Streitfeld, South regional director of J Street said Obama's remarks to AIPAC's policy
conference reiterated his "unshakable commitment" to Israel and to its security. "He spoke with
conviction and clarity about how ensuring Israel's security requires not only continued military support
and standing up for Israel," she said, "but on concerted U.S. engagement in facilitating a two-state
resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well."

His approach now is uniquely key – Obama will avoid touching the Arab Spring
Jennifer Rubin, staff writer, 3-2-2012, “Obama talks to AIPAC and Bibi while the mullahs build nukes,”
Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/obama-talks-to-aipac-and-
On Sunday morning, President Obama will speak at the national AIPAC conference. Given that it is a presidential election year and a critical
time in the Mideast, it’s not surprising that there would be a big turnout. But even AIPAC officials are somewhat slack-jawed that
14,000 attendees have signed up (the usual crowd is 8,000-9,000) for the three-day event. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will meet
with Obama at the White House on Monday and speak to the AIPAC crowd Monday night (no dinner this year since tables simply can’t be set
up for so many attendees). On Tuesday, which of course is Super Tuesday, three of the four GOP presidential contenders will speak via video or
              is Obama going to say and what does he need to say? It is easier, I think, to anticipate what he is
satellite. So what
not going to spend much time discussing in public. The “peace process” is dead, so expect a couple of lines at most. To put
it mildly this has not been a success for him, and the less said the better. Syria is in turmoil, but Obama has no policy there, so expect him to
slide by that topic. Egypt’s turmoil     is creating grave uncertainty in the region, causing Israel to reassess its
security assumptions and devote more resources for securing its southern border that now abuts a Yemen-like no man’s land where
the Egyptians exercise little control. Obama has no viable policy there either, so expect minimal discussion of
Egypt. The president’s speech, everyone expects, will therefore be almost entirely about Iran. Obama has two interests: keeping
up the appearance that sanctions are actually working and demonstrating to American pro-Israel voters (i.e. the vast majority
of Americans) that the United States and Israel are not at odds over Iran. The latter is a bit tricky given the public back-and-forth
over whether the U.S. will guarantee military action if sanctions fail (no), whether Israel will give a heads-up to the U.S. before acting (no) and
whether Israelis can entrust the survival of the Jewish state to any government other than its own (that’s complicated, as I discuss below). No
doubt the administration would rather not hear a lot in public about who is going to act militarily and at what point. Remember the Obama
administration script: S anctions are working. Israel can hold off. There is time for Iran to change course. Many consider all that to be delusional
and dangerous, ignoring evidence (e.g., progress at Iran’s Fordo nuclear site and its decision to exclude IAEA inspectors) and in effect forcing
Israel to act on its own behalf. But since this is the Obama gambit, it is not so hard to predict what he’ll say. He’s likely to be big on platitudes,
waxing on about the nations’ long-term relationship and the enhanced military and intelligence cooperation. He’ll pat himself on the back for
increasing overall aid to Israel. He’s likely to talk about his “smart” diplomacy in lining up E.U. support for tougher sanctions, and maybe even
grab credit for the recent U.S. sanctions, which his administration opposed for a time. But I would expect few specifics or definitive promises of
U.S. action in the event sanctions don’t work. I don’t imagine he’s suddenly going to adopt regime change as U.S. policy. He will certainly not
rule out more diplomatic outreach, although certainly there are some within the administration who find it unpalatable to sit down with Iranian
representatives without concrete and verifiable steps to halt its nuclear weapons program and to allow in inspectors. It is fair to say that
Obama will aim to make as little news as possible over the next few days. He wants no confrontation with
Netanyahu. He wants no awkward press conferences. And he certainly doesn’t want to underline the real divide between
the U.S. and Israel on the efficacy of sanctions.

Wont do anything to freak out AIPAC – now is key
Jeffrey Goldberg, staff writer, 3-20-2012, “Obama Administration, Scared of AIPAC, Punts on J Street,”
The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/03/obama-administration-scared-of-
J Street, the left-leaning pro-Israel group, is having its big conference in Washington starting this
weekend. It's not going to be an AIPAC-sized 13,000-person circus, but J Street is still expecting 2,500
people or so. One person who won't be coming is President Obama, even though (or perhaps because)
roughly 100 percent of the attendees will be Obama supporters. The Administration isn't sending the
vice president, the secretaries of state or defense, or the national security adviser, either, to speak at
the conference. Instead, in a clear sign that the Administration is spooked by AIPAC, which sees J Street
as a left-flank threat, the White House, according to J Street's Jeremy Ben-Ami, is sending Tony Blinken,
the vice president's national security adviser and a senior official of the National Security Council, to
speak to the gathering next Monday. One important note: Tony Blinken is a great guy (and a friend-of-
Goldblog), a huge brain, a powerful inside player, and a highly-respected adviser to both the president
and vice-president. But he's not the president, or the vice-president, or a cabinet-level official. He's the
choice of a White House that isn't interested in upsetting its tenuous relationship with the Jewish
establishment. J Street's head, Ben-Ami, told me he's disappointed with the White House. "Tony Blinken
is one of the absolute best foreign policy thinkers in the Administration, so he's a great representative
for the Administration to send, but I also think they're missing an opportunity to excite a passionate
portion of their base." Ben-Ami went on, "This decision is really indicative of the problem we started J
Street to fix. This is precisely the kind of calculation that shouldn't be made." Goldblog readers know I
have many doubts about J Street's actual policy ideas (I have plenty of doubts about AIPAC as well.) But I
believe that J Street should be part of the pro-Israel conversation in America, and it would be quite a
signal if the White House sent a higher-ranking official to speak to the group. But it seems that the
White House will do nothing to inflame the right-leaning AIPAC just months before the general

Obama’s firmly behind Israel
Michael Totten, staff writer, 3-5-2012, “AIPAC's Victory,” World Affairs,
Barack Obama delivered the most pro-Israel speech of his presidency to a bipartisan round of
applause. I objected to one or two lines, but that was it. He seemed to relish picking public fights with
the Jewish state and its prime minister early in his presidency, but he hasn't been doing it lately. So
there's a case to be made that he really has changed, that his caustic relationship with Jerusalem is a
thing of the past. I can be as cynical about politicians as the next person, and of course it's entirely
possible that he was just telling everyone in the crowd what they wanted to hear, but the speech was
broadcast on television. When the president of the United States speaks, the entire world hears him.
“When the chips are down,” he said, “I have Israel's back.” Those words were heard not only at the
AIPAC conference, but also in the heartland of America, in Jerusalem, in Cairo, and in Tehran.
                                   AT: Foreign Policy Win
Foreign policy can only hurt Obama – Libya, Osama prove domestic issues outweigh
Aaron David Miller, public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and
a former U.S. Middle East negotiator, 9-22-2011, “The Do-Nothing Strategy,” FP,
Still, amid all the fog and confusion, the road for this American president has never been clearer.
Foreign policy will do very little to boost his credibility. It will either be neutral or drag him down.
Against the backdrop of diminished credibility, a failing economy, and polls indicating that 70 percent
of the American public thinks the country is headed in the wrong direction, neither the killing of
Osama bin Laden nor a successful policy toward Libya has done much to boost Obama's sagging
prestige. His problem is at home, and it is strategic. He cannot allow himself to be diverted and
distracted by costly fights with important domestic constituencies; nor can he give his Republican
opponents easy issues with which to hammer him. Most American Jews will still vote Democratic, but in
a close election (Florida is a recurring dream/nightmare) nothing should be taken for granted. In such a
campaign, you can't afford to give the opposition any ground , least of all a way to mobilize its own
base by raising money and exploiting highly combustible issues like Israel.

Can’t get credit – no doctrine means he can’t build public support for success
Michael Hirsh, staff writer, 1-30-2012, “The 3 a.m. Strategy,” National Journal,
And yet, the administration has failed to articulate anything like a doctrine or even a clear message
that might win it some credit at the polls: a Truman Doctrine directed at containing the Soviets. A
Nixon-like opening to China. The response from senior Obama officials to that familiar complaint is an
equally familiar refrain: We don’t do doctrines. That’s what Bush did, and see where it got him. “In the
previous administration, there were things communicated that weren’t followed through on—the
freedom agenda, the doctrine of preventive war,” Rhodes says. “What we’ve been very careful to do is
communicate in line with our actions.”
                                  AT: Public Likes the Plan
Support to specific Egyptian factions generates fear of entanglement and unforeseen
Lincoln A. Mitchel, Staff writer, 2-22-2011, “Egypt and Post Affluent America,” The Faster Times,
This is not, however, any time. We are in a moment not just of declining American influence and
wealth, but of an increasing awareness, even among the American people, of this declining influence
and wealth. Thus, the challenge of responding to events in the Middle East has become exponentially
more complex because they represent the first real test of post-affluent American. Talk of being
committed to building strong democracies in the Middle East, for example, must be tempered by the
economic reality that we don’t have any money with which to do this, as well as the political reality
that a substantial, and probably growing, proportion of Americans don’t want to borrow more money
from China to do this. The U.S. obviously can still afford democracy and civil society support programs,
but this is only part of the expense the U.S. will need to make if it seeks to play an instrumental role in
the next iteration of the Middle East. That would require making new commitments to new
governments and possibly providing massive economic support, particularly in Egypt, to ensure that
new, elected governments can be successful. There would also be unforeseen expenses as new
governments asked for things like military hardware or, in worst case scenarios, being pulled into costly
conflicts between various factions in some of these countries. Of course, even if the U.S. agreed to
invest these resources, political outcomes would be uncertain. This point will not be lost on an
American electorate may, understandably, be a little gun shy about investing large sums of money into
reinventing domestic political arrangements in countries of the Middle East.

No constituency support
William Eagle, staff writer, 12-19-2010, “New Congress Expected to Review Foreign Aid, International
Programs,” VOA, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/west/New-Congress-Expected-to-
Schaefer says many of the expected cuts will come in the budgets of programs and groups – including
the United Nations and U.S. State Department – that do not have strong domestic constituencies to
defend them. Many foreign policy institutions, including the United Nations, lack strong domestic
constituencies to ward off budget cuts "There has been talk about reducing spending to 2008 levels," he
says. "That would imply an immediate reduction across the board, but I would also expect a more
conservative House (of Representatives) to scrutinize funding for foreign aid and international
programs in general, as they have been more skeptical and critical of those types of programs than
Democrats traditionally have been."

Perceived opportunity cost and long term commitment causes constituency backlash.
Susan B Epstein, et al. Specialist in Foreign Policy and Trade Foreign Affairs, 12-26-2007, “Democracy
Promotion: Cornerstone of US Foreign Policy? CRS Report for Congress,
According to some critics, pushing democracy promotion as a primary objective of U.S. national security
and foreign policy has reduced support, and generated a skepticism around the world, for democracy
promotion activities. According to one study: “[T]he rhetorical conflation by the Bush Administration
and its allies of the war in Iraq and democracy promotion has muddied the meaning of the democracy
project, diminishing support for it at home and abroad.... Some of those opposed to the invasion of
Iraq, Americans and others, appear to have been alienated from democracy promotion more generally
and this is to be regretted.”26 The high military and opportunity cost of some activities currently
associated with democracy promotion is criticized by many observers, especially when democracy is
imposed by outsiders rather than initiated by local citizens. 27 Democracy promotion expenditures
compete with domestic spending priorities. Critics note that using the various tools to promote
democracy abroad — foreign aid, military intervention, diplomacy, and public diplomacy — can be very
expensive and may provide little assurance that real long-term gains will be made. They add that it
involves a high probability of sustaining costly long-term nation-building programs down the road.
U.S. funding obligations supporting America’s democracy promotion effort in Iraq, for example, are
estimated to be about $10 billion per month. 28 Is spending this amount of money for democracy
promotion rather than for domestic programs worth it to American taxpayers? Many Americans have
come to view the military and opportunity cost of funding democracy promotion activities overseas
rather than spending those funds on domestic programs or other pressing global concerns, such as
infectious disease and extreme poverty, as being too great.

Public support for democracy is at an all time low
Jeremy Kinsman, former Canadian ambassador and currently heads a Community of Democracies
program for democracy development and is Regents’ Lecturer at the University of California, Berkeley,
April 2011, “Democracy Rising: Tunisia and Egypt, When Idealists Got it Right”, Policy Options Dossier,
In the US, when pollsters the Pew Research Center asked citizens to indicate their chosen priorities in
foreign policy, democracy promotion was noted by only 10 percent, a drop in 10 years from 44
percent, the biggest drop for any category recorded since the Second World War. The explanations are
no mystery. Ten years ago, the Bush administration launched its “freedom agenda,” an exercise in
national hubris that was used to explain the invasion of Iraq, when the other reasons such as WMD and
support for 9/11 came up dry. Americans pushed back at the notion it is their business to worry about
how other people were governed. The quagmire of Afghanistan sealed the point. When I was going
through US Border Protection at Seattle Airport in 2007 to take up direction of an international
democracy support project for the Community of Democracies I was conducting out of Princeton
University, the tough African-American officer bridled when she heard the reason for my visit. “You’re
doing WHAT?” she asked. “Haven’t we stuck our noses enough in other folks’ business? Haven’t we
done enough damage?” So they had. And with the deepest economic recession in 60 years on their
plates, as well as a vivid debate about the quality of American governance, American democrats
weren’t feeling much solidarity with the aspirations of would-be democrats across the sea. The drop
in support paralleled what Freedom House, which keeps democratic score globally, termed a
“democratic recession” in its 2010 Annual Report. For the fourth year in a row, retreats from democracy
outscored gains, the longest period that had happened in 40 years.

Democracy assistance unpopular
Erik Jones, Professor of European Studies, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center, 9-30-2011,
“Power, Leadership and US Foreign Policy,” in US Power and the Transatlantic Relationship,
Throwing money at the Arab world is not an option. The Obama administration simply does not have the
resources at its disposal. Military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq has resulted in an
unprecedented degree of American warweariness. When they met for their first major debate in New Hampshire, the
contenders for the Republican Party’s presidential nomination were all competing to explain how they would put an end to foreign
entanglements.18 Meanwhile, President Obama has announced an accelerated draw-down of US foreign troop deployments.19 Budgetary
debates in the United States underscore the limits to American resources as well. As Republicans and Democrats wrangle over how best to cure
the government’s fiscal deficits, the market actors fear that political inattention to the need to raise the statutory debt ceiling will result in an
                                                                                         though foreign
unintended technical default. Meanwhile, every aspect of discretionary spending is under the microscope.20 And even
assistance amounts to less than one percent of the federal budget, the fact that it has so few domestic
constituents means that the foreign assistance budget line will suffer significant cuts.
                                           2NC No AQAP
Spencer says AQAP is dying – cooperation between local populace and AQAP will
collapse post Saleh – means they can’t find recruits or bomb makers.
Sharp says support is declining – tribes wont support their ideology – they are
opportunistic and will help the US to crack down on AQAP.
AQAP is only 100 and their operations are all low tech and fail.
Jeb Boone, former managing editor of Yemen Times, 5-7-2011, “Yemen: the new front line in the war
for Obama’s second term,” http://jebboone.com/2011/05/07/yemen-the-new-front-line-in-the-war-for-
However, contrary to popular belief, AQAP is most likely comprised of around 100 religious fanatics
somewhere in Shabwa. The operational strength and resources of AQAP is highly overestimated by
western governments and analysts. If we look back on AQAP’s three biggest operations since the
organization’s founding in January of 2009, we can clearly see that not only are they executed fairly
cheaply (AQAP even bragged about this in an issue of inspire) but they really don’t take much skill to
pull off. Not to mention, all the following operations ended in failure.

AQAP isn’t winning hearts and minds with governance – they’re too small
Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, prof @ West Point, September 2011, “A False Foundation: AQAP, Tribes
and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen,” Combating Terrorism Center @ West Point,
Nor is there an indication that al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula has generated local support by
solving tribal disputes. This is a critical distinction from attempts at Tribal Engagement by other Yemeni
actors, particularly the Huthi movement. 300 Though it falls outside this study, discussions with shaykhs
from Sa`da and al-Jawf, and eight interviews with a former Huthi commander from July 2009 to March
2011, suggest that members of that movement used the promise of support in intertribal conflicts to
win initial acceptance. Huthi leaders also served as arbiters in village disagreements in order to solidify
their positions in surrounding communities. Yet in the case of AQAP, no such account exists. Fears that
the group has won tribal support by filling voids in public services, health and education are not
substantiated by events on the ground. The much-discussed declaration of the Islamic Emirate of Abyan
is a useful example. On 29 March 2011, online sites began reporting that al-Qa`ida in the Arabian
Peninsula had seized a local radio station in Abyan, announcing an al-Qa`ida Emirate in the governorate
and barring women from leaving their homes. 301 Western news services quickly picked up the story,
and by early April unnamed U.S. officials spoke to the press about concerns over AQAP’s expanding
presence in Yemen’s ungoverned South. 302 Despite the reporting, AQAP had not in fact established
any type of governing body in Abyan. Within hours after reports surfaced of the “Islamic Emirate,”
members of Internet forums set about verifying the authenticity of the claim. By 30 March, forum
participants living in Abyan argued that the story was a fake, or at least grossly inaccurate. 303 Though
Islamic militants have sporadically clashed with security forces in Abyan for more than fifteen years,
most recently repelling the Yemeni military from Zinjibar and Ja`ar in spring 2011, al-Qa`ida in the
Arabian Peninsula has yet to conclusively prove its role in the violence. Nor has it demonstrated that it
is capable of taking, holding and administering territory. Despite AQAP’s failure to issue any media
claiming control of Abyan, the assumption that the group is poised to govern Yemen’s tribal hinterlands
persists. 304 As Chapter One suggests, the incentive or ability of alQa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula to
administer territory is questionable. It remains a small group with limited resources and is constrained
by operational security concerns. Actually governing impoverished Yemeni communities would require
providing goods and services, and in much of the country, would necessitate displacing existing forms of
social organization and traditional power brokers. To date, AQAP has not attempted to do so in Marib
and al-Jawf. While the group may be making inroads in the south, the burden of proof remains on AQAP
to distinguish itself from other local Islamist actors, long fixtures in Abyan.
                                             2NC SQ Solves AQAP – Intel
SQ solves their links
Hendawi says the US has sufficient intelligence to fight AQAP – we get intel both from
Yemeni informers and the Saudis – US shift to focus on local efforts is paying off
Arrot says Yemeni are pragmatic and will continue cooperating with the US – they
hate al-qaeda as much as we do and don’t need extra incentives to give us intel –
current intel is sufficient as proven by the killing of Awlaki. Our drone strikes are
become more effective.
We get tons of intel – sufficient to kill AQAP
Ken Dilanian and David S. Cloud, 9-15-2011, “Yemen aids in terror fight,” LA Times,
America's role clearly is growing, however. In May, the radical Yemeni-based cleric Anwar Awlaki was targeted by a U.S. missile
strike in Yemen. He escaped injury and remains active. Awlaki, who was born in New Mexico and delivers fiery online sermons in English, has
been linked to numerous terrorist plots, including the failed bombing of a Northwest flight bound for Detroit in December 2009 and a shooting
rampage at Ft. Hood, Texas, that left 13 people dead in November 2009. Briefing reporters at the Pentagon on Wednesday, the officials
amplified comments last week by John Brennan, the White House counter-terrorism advisor, who said "counter-terrorism
cooperation with Yemen is better than it's been during my whole tenure." "The Yemenis have done a good job
of finding and arresting and carrying out attacks against Al Qaeda types," Brennan told the Intelligence and National
Security Alliance, a Washington trade group. "So even though Yemen is in the midst of this internal domestic turmoil ... the information
is flowing back and forth. We're sharing information." Brennan said that the Al Qaeda offshoot in Yemen "is the most
operationally active franchise that is out there right now.... It's taking on many, many characteristics of a traditional insurgency. "But then you
have people within the organization like Awlaki who are determined to carry out attacks against the [U.S.] homeland." U.S. officials also have
concluded that other Al Qaeda affiliates in Africa have begun cooperating with one another. Gen. Carter Ham, who heads the U.S. Africa
Command, said three militant groups in Africa -- the Shabab in Somalia, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Nigeria-based Boko Haram --
appear to be collaborating in training and operations. The three groups have said they want to target the U.S. "I have questions about their
capability to do so, but I have no question about their intent to do so," Ham told Pentagon reporters at a separate event Wednesday. U.S.
intelligence agencies have intensified their efforts in Yemen and other African nations now that Al Qaeda's core leadership in Pakistan has
suffered heavy losses from CIA-launched missile strikes. Michael Vickers, undersecretary of Defense for intelligence, told the National Defense
University at Ft. McNair, Va., on Tuesday that if U.S. operations continue at the current pace, "within 18 to 24 months, core     Al Qaeda ...
operational capabilities could be degraded to the point that the group could fragment."

Saudi’s fill-in for Yemeni intel
Thomas Megghammer, research fellow @ Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, 11-2-2010,
“Saudi Intelligence Key in Detecting Bomb Plot,”
STEVE INSKEEP, host: Americans found out about bombs headed for American borders thanks to a tip. The tip came from
the intelligence service of Saudi Arabia. They were the ones who learned of a plot to send explosives from Yemen to Chicago by
international air freight. We're going to talk about Saudi intelligence and how they collaborate with the United States with
Thomas Hegghammer. He's a research fellow with the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, a government research group in Norway.
Welcome to the program. Mr. THOMAS HEGGHAMMER (Norwegian Defense Research Establishment): Thank you very much. INSKEEP: So how
effective are the Saudis at tracking radical groups? Mr. HEGGHAMMER: Oh, they've become very effective indeed since 2003, when
al-Qaida launched a terrorism campaign in Saudi Arabia. That really woke up the Saudis to the threat from militant Islamism, and it really
sparked a complete overhaul of the Saudi security system. INSKEEP: Well, now, this is interesting. I mean, this has always been an authoritarian
government. They've always had internal security and that sort of thing. But you're saying they just weren't very good at tracking radicals until
they were attacked themselves? Mr. HEGGHAMMER: That's right. I think before 2003 they had a very reactive approach to militant Islamism.
After 2003, their intelligence service became much better and they were able to sort of monitor communities and preempt attacks before they
happen. INSKEEP: Now, if they do their job well, we usually wouldn't know everything that they're doing, but do you have a sense of how it is
that the Saudis have become more effective? Mr. HEGGHAMMER: The backbone of their system is technology. They've made
enormous investments in the past six, seven years in various forms of surveillance technology and they've been able to do so
mostly because of their oil wealth. At times in the past few years, the Saudis have showed off some of their capabilities. They have invited
journalists into, for example, the control rooms where they monitor every street, every yard, by camera, for example. But another important
component of their capability increase is assistance from Western services. U.S. agencies and also British agencies have been involved in
providing advice and support for Saudi intelligence analysts and so on. INSKEEP: Now, some years ago there was an undercurrent of distrust, at
least on a political level, between Saudi Arabia and the United States. Americans couldn't help but notice that most of the 9/11 hijackers were
linked to Saudi Arabia - the country, not the government. There were people who questioned the motives of the Saudi government, whether
they were really serious about cracking down on militants, whether they were really serious about preventing money from leaving Saudi Arabia
to support militant groups. Have the intelligence agencies, though, of the United States and Saudi Arabia been able to work quite closely
together all these years? Mr. HEGGHAMMER: I think that there was tension, particularly after 9/11 and before the terrorism campaign in Saudi
in 2003. But I think since 2003, cooperation has greatly increased and media reported very close collaboration, where, for
example, teams of U.S. intelligence analysts were embedded on Saudi soil and provided direct assistance, working side-by-side with Saudi
analysts. INSKEEP: Now, this incident would suggest that in addition to keeping a close eye on what's happening within Saudi Arabia, that the
Saudis have some grip on what's going on in their neighboring country, Yemen, which is where this plot originated that the
Saudi's exposed. Mr. HEGGHAMMER: Yes, that would seem to be the case. I think, though, that this is a relatively recent development that has
much to do with the attempted attack on the life of Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, the Deputy Interior Minister, who... INSKEEP: This was - this
happened last year, in 2009? Mr. HEGGHAMMER: That's right, in late August, 2009. And that attack was instigated by the Yemen-based al-
Qaida, and I think that really woke up the Saudis to a threat from Yemen and motivated greater involvement. INSKEEP: And what form has that
involvement taken as far as you can tell? Mr. HEGGHAMMER: It seems from hints given by - I use the Saudi spokesman and also from
information provided by al-Qaida in their own propaganda, that agents have been sent to Yemen to try and recruit informants and infiltrate al-
                                                                   Yemen they're clearly relying more on human
Qaida. In the past they relied mainly on surveillance technology, but in
intelligence. INSKEEP: Getting people on the ground to give them information directly. Mr. HEGGHAMMER: That's right. That's right.

Tribes can kick AQAP ass on their own – any failures are due to lack of willpower that
the aff doesn’t effect
James Spencer, retired infantry commander, 6-8-2011, “A False Dawn for Yemen’s Militants,” Foreign
Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ARTICLES/67883/james-spencer/a-false-dawn-for-yemens-
But this catalogue of putative successes masks a number of fundamental vulnerabilities. It remains unclear
how many members AQAP actually has -- perhaps a few hundred -- because incidents are often attributed to it
inaccurately. For example, the Abida tribe near Marib, an area in Yemen's east rich in oil and natural gas, became enraged after a U.S. drone
strike killed a senior sheikh in May 2010, possibly due to Saleh's duplicity. In response, the tribe has severed the main road in the area,
interrupted power supplies to Sana'a, and blocked oil exports -- strikes that the Saleh regime regularly blames on al Qaeda. (In truth, the
similarity of tactics often makes it difficult to determine whether tribesmen or jihadis are responsible for a particular attack.) Similarly, the
Islamists who recently established a so-called Islamic Emirate in the southern province of Abyan have denied that they are affiliated with al
Qaeda, although they confess to having a common Islamist philosophy. Indeed, they have patrolled Jaar, one of Abyan's major towns, in tanks
captured from the Yemeni army -- hardly the actions of al Qaeda militants living under the constant threat of missile attacks from U.S. drones.
Yet the Saleh government has consistently labelled these Islamist insurgents as al Qaeda members ever since they took de facto control of
Abyan. (They have, however, since been repulsed from their footing in Abyan's capital, Zinjibar.) Saleh and a number of Western analysts have
argued that many of the country's tribes provide sanctuary to AQAP members, making uncooperative tribal leaders and Islamist militants equal
targets. Yet Yemen's tribes function as statelets, entirely capable of repudiating members who transgress tribal law or who represent a greater
risk than providing sanctuary is worth. Indeed, over the last couple of years, Yemen's   tribes have arranged several
handovers of AQAP members to state security forces. The tribes have also created special tribal
counterterrorism militias (on the model of the Iraqi al-Sahwa), although their effectiveness is debatable. What is clear is that the
tribes are more than capable of neutralizing any al Qaeda presence in their homelands. The fact that
they have not vanquished al Qaeda to date is less a testament to AQAP's strength or to tribal military
weakness (after all, the al-Hashid tribal confederation is currently battling elements of the Yemeni military on equal footing) than to
the fact that the tribes use AQAP as a bargaining chip with the government -- for example, to demand
employment in special counterterrorist militias, which, of course, would not exist without the danger of terrorists. Yemen's tribes and
AQAP have far more potential points of friction than they do common cause. For starters, many of Yemen's
combative tribes are Zaydis, a pragmatic Shiite sect, for whom the fundamentalist Sunni members of al Qaeda have a vitriolic ideological
aversion. Beyond that, the jihadis threaten entrenched tribal interests, such as the production and use of qat (a mildly
stimulant leaf beloved by many Yemenis but abhorrent to Salafis) and the lucrative trade of smuggling drugs and alcohol into Saudi Arabia.
                                              No Solve
Can’t drain the swamp – AQAP is too engrained to be kicked out by engaging in civil
society law training – cordsman evidence says that too many structural factors trump.
Threshold for solving is too high – AQAP only needs a basement and a couple grand to
attack the US.
Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, prof @ West Point, September 2011, “A False Foundation: AQAP, Tribes
and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen,” Combating Terrorism Center @ West Point,
Terrorism beyond Yemen’s borders demands very different capabilities than insurgency. AQAP’s ability
to launch high-profile attacks against the United States is not strongly tied to its relationship with the
local population. Neither fixed territory nor a critical mass of supporters was necessary to carry out
the Christmas Day attack of 2009 or the parcel bombings of October 2010. Presumably no more than a
handful of safe houses, a single explosives expert and several thousand dollars were necessary for
each attack. 448 Nor is a capacity to conduct terror abroad contingent on Yemen’s multiple political,
resource and economic crises. While a permissive Yemen has long enabled jihadist groups, the unhappy
experiences of AQAP’s predecessors suggest that jihadists do not enjoy de facto success in Yemen.
AQAP’s rise with the prison break of 2006 bears little imprint from preexisting al-Qa`ida members or
sympathizers in Yemen. Although the group’s leadership does claim close historical ties with Bin Laden
and other prominent al-Qa`ida leaders, there is no open source evidence to substantiate the claim that
AQAP is under the operational control of al-Qa`ida Central. Nor does al-Qa`ida Central’s longstanding
interest in Yemen adequately explain AQAP’s success. Osama bin Laden called for jihad against Yemen’s
socialists nearly two decades ago. 449 For much of the 1990s and 2000s, loosely affiliated al-Qa`ida
commanders and strategists alike trumpeted the country’s mountains, tribes and proximity to shipping
and energy reserves. 450 Yet none of these factors has proven sufficient to sustain an enduring jihadist
group in Yemen prior to al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula. 451

AQAP strength isn’t correlated with structural problems in Yemen
Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, prof @ West Point, September 2011, “A False Foundation: AQAP, Tribes
and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen,” Combating Terrorism Center @ West Point,
Lastly, there is reason to question whether pressuring Sana`a to address drivers of instability is an
appropriate tool for counterterrorism. To be clear, as normative and even strategic ends, longer-term
U.S. efforts to slow state collapse, help provide basic services and bolster the accountability of the
Yemeni government are more than justified in Yemen. However, it remains less certain that structural
reforms are a useful tool for reducing AQAP’s capabilities to attack the West, which have not relied on
large numbers of disaffected Yemenis. A correlation between economic deprivation and extremism
must be established to justify such a policy from a counterterrorism perspective. In Yemen this has not
been demonstrated, particularly in the poorly integrated eastern governorates that are the central
focus of this report. As discussed in Chapter One, Yemen’s structural challenges proved insufficient for
generating resilient and internationally minded jihadist movements prior to the emergence of al-Qa`ida
in the Arabian Peninsula in 2006. Because AQAP’s center of gravity remains its uniquely capable Yemeni
leadership, ambitious efforts to refashion Yemeni society misdiagnose the causes of the group’s
successes. Treating Yemen’s very real maladies is a worthy political and humanitarian aim, but it will
not diminish the threat posed by AQAP.
                                                           AQAP not key
1nc evidence says that AQAP is resilient – they will shift to other regions in response
to the plan – they will go to Iraq, Libya, or Somalia.
 Many alt causes – US counterterrorism in one country solves nothing
Zalmay Khalilzad, former US representative to the UN, 9-9-2011 “The Next Ten Years of Al-Qaeda,”
Overall, the future of al-Qaeda depends on five factors: First, U.S. counterterrorism efforts. American
operations around the world have limited the space in which al-Qaeda can plot new attacks. Through improved defenses, better interdiction
efforts, and bolstered intelligence and law enforcement capabilities, the United States has hardened itself against new attacks even as the
overall number of attempts to hit the country has remained high. The challenge, though, is that al-Qaeda    has evolved and
adapted as well. The network is shifting to virtual attacks waged by self-starting groups. At the same time, the imperative of old capabilities
has not diminished. Al-Qaeda continues to pursue weapons of mass destruction while seeking to regain and
expand physical sanctuaries. Second, the war in Afghanistan. The surge has made important security gains in southern and
eastern Afghanistan. But the Taliban remains a threat. Despite progress on many fronts, institutional weakness and corruption
within the Afghan government feed the insurgency. Afghan security forces are growing in capability but still rely heavily on
the U.S. presence. If the United States draws down precipitously, the Haqqani network and extremist Taliban will
fill the vacuum and again provide safe haven for al-Qaeda. If the Taliban-Haqqani network succeeds in taking over a
significant part of Afghanistan or in inciting a new Afghan civil war, safe havens for al-Qaeda will expand, and the threat to the U.S. homeland
will increase. On the other hand, if Afghanistan is successful it will be a major setback for extremists and terrorists. Third,   relations with
Pakistan. Pakistan’s security forces are still playing a double game of providing some tactical support to the United States while
fueling the insurgency in Afghanistan. There are three main reasons: Pakistani military leaders remain wedded to a strategy of
zero-sum competition with India; the military and intelligence services of Pakistan wield disproportionate influence over the government of
Pakistan and its more moderate, albeit corrupt, civilian leadership; and Pakistan is pursuing broader regional interests. It remains unclear
whether Islamabad is simply hedging against Indian influence and a potential American withdrawal from Afghanistan, or if it seeks to create an
expanding empire through Central and South Asia. The question is whether Pakistani civilian leaders and the United States will be able to shift
Pakistani policy and politics in a more stabilizing direction, facilitate an Indo-Pakistani rapprochement and negotiate an Afghan-Pakistani
settlement. Fourth, the future of Iraq. The United States has succeeded in creating a basic political compact and reasonably stable
democratic institutions in Iraq. Yet the Iraqi government remains plagued by political stalemate and sectarian agendas. Tehran continues to
wield extensive influence over Iraqi politics. These factors account in part for the recent Iraqi decision not to request an adequate long-term
                                                                       if the United States leaves now, before Iraq
U.S. presence in the country. From the point of view of countering al-Qaeda,
reaches a sustainable level of security and sociopolitical cohesiveness, the prospect of sectarian warfare will
increase, thereby providing openings for al-Qaeda. Given Iraq’s geopolitical weight, what happens in Iraq will have a shaping
role in the broader Middle East. Fifth, the Arab Spring. The unrest in the greater Middle East appears to be the consequence of a
revolutionary gap between moribund regimes and restive populations. It is an encouraging prospect. Anti-Americanism does not seem to be a
                                              Arab Spring could evolve in ways that benefit al-Qaeda. So
principle motivating factor for the youth-led revolts. But the
                                                                                                threat is
far it has been secular dictatorships broadly aligned against al-Qaeda that have proven most vulnerable to internal upheaval. One
that Islamist parties with greater ideological and strategic sympathies to al-Qaeda will usurp the
revolutions. Perhaps even more dangerous is the risk of chaos and instability creating opportunities
for al Qaeda.

Yemen is only a tiny part of US counterterrorism – threats elsewhere are greater
Michael Scheuer, adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University, 8-24-2011,
“The Zawahiri Era,” http://nationalinterest.org/article/zawahiri-era-5732)
For all the Obama-administration rhetoric to the contrary, bin Laden’s creation of a survivable entity
was an unqualified success. To protect his organization against decapitation—something he knew
America’s legalistic “catch ’em, try ’em, hang ’em” ethos would focus on—bin Laden began dispersing
al-Qaeda soon after 9/11. The first step was to send fighters home who were not needed in the early
stages of war with the U.S.-NATO coalition; after all, the fewer fighters forced to run and hide in the
Afghan mountains or Pakistan the better. The second step, so foolishly catalyzed by the 2003 U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq, was bin Laden and his senior lieutenants building and strengthening organizational
offshoots in Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, the Levant, Palestine and North Africa. As he drew his last
breath, in fact, bin Laden knew al-Qaeda’s horizontal growth since 2001 had given it seven locations
from which to plan, train for and launch operations—as opposed to one at 9/11—none of which, save
Pakistan, has been more than marginally damaged by U.S. or Western military forces over the last
decade. He also knew that al-Qaeda’s multiyear investment in inciting young Muslims worldwide, from
Nigeria to New Delhi to the North Caucasus, had been a substantial success. More specifically, al-
Qaeda’s recruitment of talented, young U.S.-citizen Muslims—men such as the editor of the group’s
online magazine Inspire, Samir Khan, senior operative and media adviser Azzam al-Amriki and public-
preacher-cum-recruiter Anwar al-Awlaki—gave the organization’s media arm a powerfully influential
means with which to promote war in the streets of the English-speaking world, especially in the United
States, Britain, Canada, Australia, South Africa and India.

b. AQAP spreading in Libya, Iraq, and Somalia.
Frida Ghitis, “Resilient Al-Qaida Struggles to Survive in a New Era.” World Politics Review. 01-12-12,
Elsewhere, al-Qaida is trying to gain a foothold in Libya, a country that remains unstable. The group
finds its most appealing environments in places where chaos reigns and where a central government
has a weak hold on its territory. That description increasingly applies to restive states in the Middle East.
Al-Qaida is also trying to make a comeback in Iraq now that U.S. forces have left the country, claiming
responsibility for some of the gruesome attacks carried out after the last American troops withdrew.
Unlike the attacks that killed Israelis, al-Qaida's operations in Iraq have created animosity among Arabs
and other Muslims. The first wave of post-American bombings in Baghdad left at least 70 dead and
more than 200 wounded, a clear violation of Islamic law. But al-Qaida may be finally learning about the
need to win hearts and minds the old-fashioned way, a lesson that has surprisingly eluded it until now.
In Somalia, where the al-Qaida-affiliated al-Shabab militia controls part of the country, the group
previously tarnished its reputation by blocking aid workers from helping famine victims. In an about-
face, it is now said to be handing out food, water, money and clothing to victims of the drought.
However, facing a three-sided onslaught by Ethiopian troops on one side, African Union forces on
another and U.S.-trained forces from Djibouti now also joining the fray, the group’s days could be
Conventional retaliation is most likely

No risk of nuclear terrorism – their authors trump up their

No aqap nuclearization – way to weak to build their own – not enough fund or recruits – not popular
enough to get a state transfer
Can’t attack Saudi oil installations – they are resilient and have large defenses – past
attacks have all failed.
No impact to oil shocks – Auerswald says the best models predicts only minimal drop
in GDP – proven by Iraq in Katrina that the economy is resilient
Only a small part of the real economy
Tobias Rasmussen, Senior Economist, Middle East and Central Asia Department, IMF, and Agustin
Roitman, Economist IMF, 8-25-2011, “Oil shocks around the world: are they really that bad?”
To put these numbers in perspective, it is useful to think of an economy where oil accounts for 4% of
total expenditure and where aggregate spending is determined entirely by demand. If the quantity of oil
consumption remains unchanged, then a 25% increase in the price of oil will cause spending on other
items to decrease and, hence, real GDP to contract by 1% of the total. From this reference point, one
would expect the possibility of substituting away from oil to reduce the overall impact on GDP. At the
same time, there could also be factors working in the opposite direction, via, for example, confidence
effects, market frictions, or changes in monetary policy. With our estimates of the GDP loss at only
about half the level implied by the direct price effect on the import bill, the results presented here
suggest the size of any such magnifying effects, if present, is not substantial across countries. Are oil
price increases really that bad? Conventional wisdom has it that oil shocks are bad for oil-importing
countries. This is grounded in the experience of slumps in many advanced economies during the 1970s.
It is also consistent with the large body of research on the impact of higher oil prices on the US
economy, although the magnitude and channels of the effect are still being debated. Our recent
research indicates that oil prices tend to be surprisingly closely associated with good times for the global
economy. Indeed, we find that the US has been somewhat of an outlier in the way that it has been
negatively affected by oil price increases. Across the world, oil price shock episodes have generally not
been associated with a contemporaneous decline in output but, rather, with increases in both imports
and exports. There is evidence of lagged negative effects on output, particularly for OECD economies,
but the magnitude has typically been small. Controlling for global economic conditions, and thus
abstracting from our finding that oil price increases generally appear to be demand-driven, makes the
impact of higher oil prices stand out more clearly. For a given level of world GDP, we do find that oil
prices have a negative effect on oil-importing countries and also that cross-country differences in the
magnitude of the impact depend to a large extent on the relative magnitude of oil imports. The effect is
still not particularly large, however, with our estimates suggesting that a 25% increase in oil prices will
typically cause a loss of real GDP in oil-importing countries of less than half of 1%, spread over 2 to 3
years. These findings suggest that the higher import demand in oil-exporting countries resulting from
oil price increases has an important contemporaneous offsetting effect on economic activity in the
rest of the world, and that the adverse consequences are mostly relatively mild and occur with a lag.
Econ integration
Deterrence solves Indo-Pak war – encourages mutual restraint even during crises
Sumit Ganguly, Professor of Political at Indiana University, Fall 2008, “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,”
International Security, Volume 33, Number 2, Muse
As the outcomes of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises show, nuclear deterrence is robust in South Asia.
Both crises were contained at levels considerably short of full-scale war. That said, as Paul Kapur has
argued, Pakistan’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability may well have emboldened its leadership,
secure in the belief that India had no good options to respond. India, in turn, has been grappling with an
effort to forge a new military doctrine and strategy to enable it to respond to Pakistani needling while
containing the possibilities of conºict escalation, especially to the nuclear level.78 Whether Indian
military planners can fashion such a calibrated strategy to cope with Pakistani probes remains an open
question. This article’s analysis of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises does suggest, however, that nuclear
deterrence in South Asia is far from parlous, contrary to what the critics have suggested. Three speciªc
forms of evidence can be adduced to argue the case for the strength of nuclear deterrence. First, there
is a serious problem of conflation in the arguments of both Hoyt and Kapur. Undeniably, Pakistan’s
willingness to provoke India has increased commensurate with its steady acquisition of a nuclear
arsenal. This period from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, however, also coincided with two parallel
developments that equipped Pakistan with the motives, opportunities, and means to meddle in
India’s internal affairs—particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. The most important change that occurred
was the end of the conºict with the Soviet Union, which freed up military resources for use in a new
jihad in Kashmir. This jihad, in turn, was made possible by the emergence of an indigenous uprising
within the state as a result of Indian political malfeasance.79 Once the jihadis were organized, trained,
armed, and unleashed, it is far from clear whether Pakistan could control the behavior and actions of
every resulting jihadist organization.80 Consequently, although the number of attacks on India did
multiply during the 1990s, it is difªcult to establish a ªrm causal connection between the growth of
Pakistani boldness and its gradual acquisition of a full-ºedged nuclear weapons capability. Second,
India did respond with considerable force once its military planners realized the full scope and extent of
the intrusions across the Line of Control. Despite the vigor of this response, India did exhibit restraint.
For example, Indian pilots were under strict instructions not to cross the Line of Control in pursuit of
their bombing objectives.81 They adhered to these guidelines even though they left them more
vulnerable to Pakistani ground ªre.82 The Indian military exercised such restraint to avoid provoking
Pakistani fears of a wider attack into Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and then into Pakistan itself. Indian
restraint was also evident at another level. During the last war in Kashmir in 1965, within a week of its
onset, the Indian Army horizontally escalated with an attack into Pakistani Punjab. In fact, in the
Punjab, Indian forces successfully breached the international border and reached the outskirts of the
regional capital, Lahore. The Indian military resorted to this strategy under conditions that were not
especially propitious for the country. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s ªrst prime minister, had
died in late 1964. His successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was a relatively unknown politician of uncertain
stature and standing, and the Indian military was still recovering from the trauma of the 1962 border
war with the People’s Republic of China.83 Finally, because of its role in the ColdWar, the Pakistani
military was armed with more sophisticated, U.S.-supplied weaponry, including the F-86 Sabre and the
F-104 Starªghter aircraft. India, on the other hand, had few supersonic aircraft in its inventory, barring a
small number of Soviet-supplied MiG-21s and the indigenously built HF-24.84 Furthermore, the Indian
military remained concerned that China might open a second front along the Himalayan border. Such
concerns were not entirely chimerical, because a Sino-Pakistani entente was under way. Despite these
limitations, the Indian political leadership responded to Pakistani aggression with vigor and granted the
Indian military the necessary authority to expand the scope of the war. In marked contrast to the
politico-military context of 1965, in 1999 India had a self-conªdent (if belligerent) political leadership
and a substantially more powerful military apparatus. Moreover, the country had overcome most of its
Nehruvian inhibitions about the use of force to resolve disputes.85 Furthermore, unlike in 1965, India
had at least two reserve strike corps in the Punjab in a state of military readiness and poised to attack
across the border if given the political nod.86 Despite these signiªcant differences and advantages, the
Indian political leadership chose to scrupulously limit the scope of the conºict to the Kargil region. As
K. Subrahmanyam, a prominent Indian defense analyst and political commentator, wrote in 1993: The
awareness on both sides of a nuclear capability that can enable either country to assemble nuclear
weapons at short notice induces mutual caution. This caution is already evident on the part of India. In
1965, when Pakistan carried out its “Operation Gibraltar” and sent in inªltrators, India sent its army
across the cease-ªre line to destroy the assembly points of the inªltrators. That escalated into a full-scale
war. In 1990, when Pakistan once again carried out a massive inªltration of terrorists trained in
Pakistan, India tried to deal with the problem on Indian territory and did not send its army into
Pakistanoccupied Kashmir. Subrahmanyam’s argument takes on additional signiªcance in light of the
overt acquisition of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan.

Past attacks should trigger

Aqap isn’t the only group which targets india.
This advantage is a special type of dumb – a month after their India retaliation
evidence was written, the ISI bombed India – no escalation occurred
Larry Johnson, staff writer, 7-13-2011, “More Pakistani Terrorism in India,” No Quarter,
The Pakistani Inter Service Intelligence agency (aka ISI) is at it again–three bombs exploded in Mumbai,
India today killing at least 13 and wounding more than 80. In the past we’ve always labeled near
simultaneous bombs as an “Al Qaeda” tactic. Wrong. It is not Al Qaeda, it is a fingerprint of Pakistan’s
ISI. The bagmen for this terrorist attack is most likely the Lashkar Tayyiba aka Army of the Pure aka LET.
LET is based, funded and trained by Pakistan. Period.

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