Energy Challenges Seminar
The Emerging U.S. Natural Gas & Electricity Crisis – How You Can Help
Andrew D. Weissman Senior Managing Director FTI Consulting, Inc. Andy.Weissman@FTIConsulting.com
University of North Carolina/Duke University September 28, 2005
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Major Threat
U.S. faces serious energy crisis
– Natural gas & electricity as much or more than oil
Supplies of fuel & feedstock no longer sufficient to sustain normal growth of U.S. economy
– Major dislocation point; due to long-term structural imbalance between supply and demand
Already has resulted in serious economic harm
– At least $ ½ trillion bite from U.S. economy over past 2 ½ years
Could quickly become far more severe
– In BTU equivalent terms, by 2015 potential natural gas supply gap = 1 ½ X current U.S. oil imports from Middle East
Potentially = greatest threat to health of U.S. economy over next 10 to 15 years Could also thwart efforts to achieve major environmental goals, significantly affect careers of current UNC and Duke students
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Questions Posed
Presentation focuses on four key issues: 1. Fundamental drivers 2. Actions required to ameliorate 3. Reasons not recognized sooner 4. Steps to strengthen our institutions to avoid repetition – Government, private industry, academic Many lessons learned applicable to other major public policy issues:
– Inability to effectively control health care costs/maximize quality of health care services provided
– Lagging quality of U.S. public education system – Lagging penetration rate for access to broadband
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Solutions Start Here
Thesis: need to teach more effectively -1. Limits of what markets can accomplish – Problem of the commons, difficulty of ensuring adequate investment in public goods, reluctance to make large capital investments in high-risk projects with long lead times 2. Skills in integrated, interdisciplinary problem solving
Real world has come to mirror division of university into series of separate academic disciplines
– Armies of highly skilled specialists, but remarkably few capable generalists; disinclination to focus on effectively solving problems in holistic manner
Greatest value often resides in connecting dots Also need to devote far more academic research & course work to major public policy issues + develop new models for partnerships with government to tackle these issues
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Emerging Natural Gas & Electricity Crisis Poses Greater Threat to U.S. Economy Than Rising Oil Prices
4
Key Fuel For Economy
One quarter of our total energy supply
U.S. = largest natural gas U.S. in world 97 % of current supply obtained from U.S. & Canada
Perceived as clean fuel Has been fuel of choice to meet incremental demand for:
– Residential
– Commercial – Electric power – Manufacturing sector
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Increasingly Drives Electricity Pricing
Natural gas is setting an increasing critical role in power generation
Sets market-clearing price for electricity in wholesale markets increasing number of hours every year:
Source: CERA
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Risks to U.S. Economy > Than for Oil
Future natural gas price shocks = greater risks than oil Unlike oil (where impact global), impact of higher prices and supply shortages concentrated in U.S.
Including electricity, $$’s at stake nearly 50 % > than for oil
Total U.S. Energy Use – 2004 (Quad BTU)
Energy Source Generation of Electricity Direct Use of Natural Gas by Residential, Commercial & Industrial Users Direct Use of Oil (Including Transportation) Direct Use of Coal & Other Fuels Total U.S.
Fuel Consumption 38.86 Quad Btu (Incl. Use of 5.33 Quad Btu of Natural Gas and 1.20 Quad Btu of Oil) 17.40 Quad Btu 38.86 Quad Btu (Incl. 2.85 Quad Btu of Natural Gas Liquids) 4.69 Quad Btu 99.81 Quad Btu
Percentage of Total U.S. Fuel Use 38.9 % 17.4 % 38.9 % 4.7 % 100.0 %
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No National Energy Policy
U.S. Department of Energy currently expects major shift in future sources of supply
Largely by default, U.S. now dependent upon two highly uncertain potential sources of supply to meet future needs
– Hoped for major expansion in LNG + proposed Alaskan pipeline
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LNG Imports Expected to Increase Sharply
Longer term, LNG imports could add significantly to U.S. trade deficit
By 2020, in BTU equivalent terms, expected to exceed current oil imports from Persian Gulf by 20 %
EIA estimates will account for up to 87 % of incremental U.S. natural gas supply
Potential Increase in Balance of Payments Deficit Due to Increased Imports of LNG
$ 60
Impact of Liquefied Natural Gas Imports
$ 50
$ 50.0
$ 40
(billion per year)
$ 40.0 $ 32.0
$ 30
$ 20
$ 18.0
$ 10
$ 3.5
$0
2004
2010
2015
2020
2025
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U.S. Reaching a Crisis Point
Recent events highlight vulnerability of U.S. economy to soaring energy costs
Severe natural gas summer-month price spike Post-Katrina/post-Rita explosion to all-time highs
Not a short-term problem; past 3 ¾ years:
6 X increase in natural gas prices, 3 X in oil
Recent Increases in Natural Gas Prices
Daily Closing Prices Natural Gas October '05 $12
$70
Recent Increases in Crude Oil Prices
Daily Closing Prices Crude Oil October '05
$11
$65
$10
$60
$9
$55
$8
$50
$7
$45
$6
$5
$40
6-Jun
20-Jun
6-Jun
20-Jun
4-Jul
18-Jul
4-Jul
9-May
23-May
17-Jan
31-Jan
15-Aug
29-Aug
9-May
23-May
18-Jul
3-Jan
1-Aug
3-Jan
17-Jan
31-Jan
1-Aug
15-Aug
29-Aug
14-Mar
28-Mar
11-Apr
25-Apr
14-Mar
28-Mar
11-Apr
14-Feb
28-Feb
14-Feb
28-Feb
25-Apr
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Major Long-Term Inflexion Point
Still just “tip of the iceberg” Cause = long-term structural imbalance between growing demand and available supplies
– In North America for natural gas, globally for oil
Supply gap certain to:
– Become more severe over time
– Result in major dislocations to U.S. & global economies
No easy or quick solutions
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Price Shocks to U.S. Economy
Past 4 years have seen:
– $ 400 billion/year + increase in oil costs – $ 225 billion/year + increase in natural gas costs – $ 100 billion/year + increase in price of electricity
Significant adverse impact on U.S. economy
– Reduces consumer spending power, ability of U.S. companies to compete in global markets
– Federal Reserve Board estimates reduced U.S. GDP by ¾ of 1 % in 4th quarter of 2004 alone
$ 200 billion/year + increase over past 4 years in energy contribution to balance of payments deficit
– Creates need to borrow an additional $ 500 million per day from other countries to pay for imported fuel
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Katrina & Rita Add to Urgency
Katrina & Rita have thrown a match onto an uncovered tank of kerosene Production losses virtually certain to be far greater than for Ivan one year ago
Ivan: 45 million barrels of oil, 178 Bcf of natural gas, minimal impact on refined products
Katrina/Rita: could easily result in 160 to 180 million barrels of lost oil production, 300 to 500 Bcf of loss natural gas production, steepest draw downs ever of gasoline and other refined products
Impact on oil market partially mitigated by surge of oil imports from Europe + draw downs of government reserves
No similar source of relief available for natural gas
Magnitude of natural gas price increase depends upon severity of winter weather
But risk of severe price spikes is off the charts
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Decisive Action Required
Creates urgent need to put in place comprehensive program to develop alternative sources of supply under direct U.S. control Emphasis should be on critical period of next 3 to 10 years
– Available options limited; risk of price spikes & potential supply shortages particularly high
In addition to conservation & renewable energy, potential
elements for inclusion in any response plan include:
1. Rapid deployment of advanced coal gasification systems to provide an alternative fuel supply for currently under-utilized gas-fired combined cycle units & major industrial users 2. Replacement of older, less efficient gas-fired generating units with new advanced pulverized coal-fired units or combined cycle units that utilize synthetic gas 3. Efforts to significantly accelerate development of new on-shore and off-shore gas fields 4. Modernization of electric T&D system to significantly reduce line losses
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Rapid Deployment of Coal Gasification = Key
Major goal: to minimize growth in use of natural gas to generate electricity in order to preserve available supplies for higher priority uses Rapid deployment of coal gasification = key to achieving this goal Low-hanging fruit
– Technology already demonstrated
– Ample coal supplies available – Issue = willingness to take decisive action in a timely manner
Requires adding at least:
– 35,000 to 50,000 MW’s of gasification capability by 2015 – An additional 35,000 MW by 2020
Sufficient to displace:
– 33 to 45 % of expected increase in natural gas demand by 2015 – 40 to 50 % of expected increase in demand by 2020
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Alternatives Potentially Dire
Other potential actions (e.g., nuclear power or renewables) can contribute significantly to long-term solution but will not provide relief soon enough or on required scale Life or death issue for many U.S. companies Significant portion of U.S. manufacturing sector cannot survive $ 12 to 20/MMBTU natural gas
– Even prices this high may not be sufficient for market to clear
Potential adverse impact on U.S. balance of payments deficit, value of U.S. dollar of lost manufacturing revenues could be severe
Massive imports of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) not the answer
– Far too few multi-billion dollar liquefaction projects being under-taken to meet likely global demand
– Competition for output likely to fierce + priced against oil
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Not a Short Term Problem
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Collision of Tectonic Plates
Train wreck that is beginning to occur stems from collision of two tectonic plates set in motion long ago:
1.
After several decades of development, production from most conventional on-shore fields in U.S., Alberta and Near-Shelf region in Gulf has either hit plateau or entered into a period of rapid – and irreversible -- decline
Particularly severe in shallow waters off Gulf Coast
Until recently, most important source of new U.S. supplies
2.
Simultaneously, demand is growing rapidly due to shift to natural gas as near-exclusive fuel to meet incremental electricity needs of U.S. economy
Due in part to:
Delayed impact of Clean Air Act requirements enacted long ago 20-year period required to work off huge generation surplus left over after oil price shocks of ’70’s
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Continued Economic Growth Requires Expanded Supplies of Electricity
Demand for electricity generally increases every year
Current ratio = 0.72% increase for each 1% growth in GDP
Electricity Consumption Grows Every Year
4.00
GWhrs (thousands)
2.25 1982
1985
1988
1991
1994
1997
2000
2003
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Major Shift in Incremental Source of Supply
Prior to late ’90’s, possible to meet high % of incremental electricity needs of U.S. economy thru increased utilization of existing coal and nuclear units:
Source of Electric Generation to Meet Incremental Demand (1979-97)
1400
Billion Kwh
0
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Coal
Nuclear
Natural Gas
Renewable (excl. Hydro)
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Sharp Increase in Natural Gas Consumption
Beginning in 1998, however, as coal and nuclear fleet increasingly utilized at maximum capacity, power sector consumption of natural gas began to rapidly increase:
5.8 5.6 5.4 5.2 5.0 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.2
Power Sector Consumption of Natural Gas (1997-2000)
5.691
TCf
5.322 5.081
TCf
TCf
4.561
TCf 1997
1998
1999
2000
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Mild Winters Temporarily Masked Increase
Warmer-than-normal winters initially masked magnitude of increase
Resulting reductions in use of natural gas for space heating entirely offset power sector demand for natural gas
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Prices Quadrupled
In 2000, mild winter weather no longer masked increase in power sector demand
Led to 4X increase in natural gas prices nationally not predicted in advance by anyone in industry
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Abrupt Shift in Strategy for Meeting U.S. Electricity Needs Without Careful Evaluation by Any Federal or State Agency
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Need for New Capacity
By late 1990’s, as load continued to grow, new electric generating capacity needed in every region of U.S. for first time in almost 30 years
At this key choice point, utility industry in midst of far-reaching change
FERC de-regulation of wholesale markets + state PUC restructuring Explosive growth of Independent Power Producer industry & power marketers
Power plant developers strongly favored gas-fired capacity over coal
Shorter lead time and much lower (apparent) capital cost Lower perceived permitting risk/seen as “pro-environment”
Near universal belief natural gas supplies would remain plentiful and prices would remain low, based in part upon 1999 National Petroleum Council Study
Parallels in some respects impact of 2003 NPC Study urging strategy of massively increasing dependence upon imports of LNG
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Ample Natural Gas Supplies Expected
1999 NPC Study forecast North American natural gas production rising to 33.5 TCf by 2015 without significant price increases
Increased production expected to come principally from U.S. sources
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Key Juncture
Timing of 1999 NPC study critical Key choice point regarding long-term strategy for meeting incremental electricity requirements of U.S. economy
Potential long-term implications for U.S. economy of decisions required to be made during this period not well understood at the time
With benefit of hindsight, one of the most significant failures of public policy formulation of past decade
Lack of adequate analysis and review at both federal and state level nationwide
Arguably already has resulted in $ 100 billion + in potentially avoidable energy costs
Negated all or most of the benefits of industry restructuring
Potential long-term costs could be many times greater
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Choices Necessary
Result of choices made = abrupt shift in U.S. energy policy
$ 100 billion investment in new gas-fired plants
Enough generation to meet total current electricity demand in Great Britain, Germany and France combined
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One of Two Major Causes of California Energy Crisis in 2000
U.S. now dependent upon gas-fired units to meet virtually all of its incremental electricity needs for at least the rest of this decade
Expected Sources of Incremental Generation (2000-2020)
1800
Billion Kwh
0
20 00 20 02 20 04 20 06 20 08 20 10 20 12 20 14 20 16 20 18 20 20
Coal
Nuclear
Natural Gas
Renewable (excl. Hydro)
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Primary Driver of Increased Consumption
After brief pause early in decade, power sector consumption of natural gas likely to increase significantly every year:
Cumulative Increase in Power Industry Natural Gas Consumption (2004-2015) vs. 2003
7 6 5
Total TCf
4 3 2 1 0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Year
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Cumulative Increases Huge
Increase likely to be > 3.4 TCf by 2010, > 5.7 TCf by 2015 No other current source of generation to meet incremental electricity needs of U.S.economy
Projected Increase in Power Sector Natural Gas Consumption
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Increase 0.275 0.462 0.563 0.522 0.460 0.568 0.568 0.353 0.353 0.546 0.546 0.546 TCf TCf TCf TCf TCf TCf TCf TCf TCf TCf TCf TCf Increase vs. 2003 0.250 TCf 0.712 TCf 1.275 TCf 1.797 TCf 2.257 TCf 2.825 TCf 3.393 TCf 3.746 TCf 4.099 TCf 4.645 TCf 5.191 TCf 5.737 TCf Total 5.486 5.948 6.511 7.033 7.493 8.061 8.629 8.892 9.335 9.881 10.427 10.975 TCf TCf TCf TCf TCf TCf TCf TCf TCf TCf TCf TCf
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Creates Massive Hole in Expected U.S. Energy Supply
2003 NPC Study reduces 1999 estimate of total natural gas production from “traditional” North American sources of supply by an almost unfathomable 50 TCf + between now and 2015
Creates >21 TCf gap between projected needs and available supplies and between now and 2010
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Creates Huge Void
North American supply certain to fall far short of current estimates of U.S. demand
NPC U.S. production estimate for 2010 reduced by a staggering 16 BCf/day vs. 1999 forecast (i.e., just under 6.0 TCf/year)
2003 NPC Forecast of U.S. Production
33
Production Has Hit Plateau
At best, production increases in Rockies and Deepwater projects in Gulf of Mexico expected to just barely offset declines in other basins
2003 NPC Forecast of North American Production
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May Overestimate Significantly Available Supplies
NPC estimates more of a “best case” than a “most likely” scenario Many assumptions – while plausible – may not be achieved
No contingency for further declines
Assumes that:
Decline rates, which have been increasing significantly, will soon level off
Well size, which has been falling rapidly, will soon begin to stabilize, with only modest further decreases in future years
Also assumes that high degree of success in finding new targets in existing fields and new fields in unexplored regions even though:
Expenditures on exploratory drilling have slowed markedly (as companies prefer to buy proven reserves than to explore) Many E&P companies are said to have largely exhausted their inventory of attractive prospects during 2000/2001
Also, does not take into account potential for steep decline in imports in Canada due to Tar Sands development + commitment to retire all existing coal-fired plants in Ontario by 2007 and other potential Kyoto-related measures
35
High Level of Uncertainty Regarding Ability to Achieve Targets
To meet NPC targets, more than ½ future U.S. production must come from undiscovered wells in undiscovered fields
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Steep Price Increases Likely
Potential price increases likely to be far greater than currently assumed
To a significant degree, all but core industrial users who value natural gas highly already have been driven out of market For remaining users, cost of natural gas often a smaller % of total cost of goods produced than for users forced to leave market in previous years Economy currently still reasonable strong Far higher percentage of industrial users hedged than in earlier years Most viable fuel switching already has occurred
End result: may require steep increases to free up even relatively modest supplies – let alone amounts required
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Bottom Line
U.S. faces unprecedented natural gas supply shortfall Already has caused serious harm to the economy
Severe, unanticipated price spikes 3 out of past 5 winters One of two major precipitating causes of California crisis in 2000 May have helped to precipitate recession in 2001 (worst manufacturing recession in 22 years)
No precedent for being able to sustain growth of U.S. economy without being able to expand supplies of electricity
Yet, no urgent effort is being made at national level to:
Dramatically improve efficiency of energy utilization beyond current levels
Increase our ability to supply electricity from alternative sources (e.g., coal, nuclear and renewable energy)
Unless corrected, likely to have severe adverse repercussions for economy
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Why Isn’t Urgency of Emerging
Crisis Better Understood?
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Masked by Weather
Winter of 2002-2003 gave an early indication of severity of current shortfall
Started winter with above-average amounts of natural gas in storage Number of gas-weighted Heating Degree Days only 0.7 % > normal
Still just barely avoided crisis Since that time, demand has grown significantly and supplies have fallen
On a weather normalized basis, even at current record price levels, U.S. market chronically under-supplied
Energy Ventures Group estimate: by at least 500 to 750 BCf
During the past year, only an extraordinary streak of back-to-back mild weather events has masked severity of shortfall
As soon as weather reverts to historical norms, natural gas prices will soar
Even if oil prices moderate (which is not likely to occur)
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Extraordinary String of Back-to-Back Events
In 2004, not just one episode of milder-than-normal weather, but an unbroken string of one after another followed by another
Temperatures generally warmer-than-normal (in winter, spring and fall), significantly reducing space heating demand
But summer then far cooler-than-normal (reducing use of power sector demand for natural gas to run air conditioners by at least 300 BCf)
Includes:
3rd mildest spring in past 110 years in spring of 2004
Followed by 2nd coolest summer in 30 years Followed by an exceptionally mild fall
Followed by an exceptionally mild winter, with Heating Degree Days far below normal for 4 months in a row (i.e., November through February)
March was the first month in a year with slightly above normal weather-related demand - but April has again been exceptionally mild
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Extremely Mild Spring Last Year
3rd mildest spring in 110 years
42
Like Flicking a Switch on First Day of Summer
Followed immediately by exceptionally mild summer
Huge impact on power sector consumption of natural gas
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Switch Back
Then switched back in fall:
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Exceptionally Mild Winter
Then capped off by exceptionally mild temperatures in core winter months from December through February – particularly in Midwest
Greatest impact on consumption of natural gas
45
Current Strategy For Meeting U.S. Needs Certain to Fail
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Role of LNG
Increased imports of LNG should and almost certainly will play at least some role in filling a portion of existing U.S. natural supply gap Concerns regarding transportation safety appear to be exaggerated BUT -- availability of new supplies in timely manner + price = far greater concerns Increased imports of LNG may be appropriate when:
Obtained from reliable suppliers Within time frame required to meet U.S. needs Pursuant to firm, long-term commitments made directly to end-users of natural gas, Local Distribution Companies or generators With guaranteed, commercially binding start-dates for deliveries enforceable through meaningful penalties At reasonable prices not indexed to the price of oil Pursuant to contracts that guarantee replacement supplies if shipments from the expected source of supply are curtailed
Even then, however, dependence upon LNG has a huge potential cost in terms of job loss to U.S. economy and adverse balance of payments impact
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Threatens Long-Term U.S. Prosperity
Impact of energy costs on trade deficit = particularly serious longterm threat
>30 % decline in value of U.S. dollar vs. EURO over past 2 years
Decline expected to continue and potentially accelerate
Higher energy costs increase trade deficit through:
Rapid increase in expenditures for imported fuels (i.e., oil + LNG)
Decline in U.S. exports – particularly chemical industry & agricultural products (two largest exporting industries)
Heavily-LNG dependent strategy virtually guarantees U.S. natural gas & electricity costs will be among highest in the world
Greater distance from producers results in higher delivered costs
As a result, heavily LNG-dependent likely to:
Increase inflation rate
Significantly reduce growth rate of U.S. economy
Cause significant job loss Seriously impair ability of U.S. companies to compete in world markets
48
Fuel Imports Drive Trade Deficit
Dollar outflow to pay for imported fuels has tripled over past 4 years:
US Fuel Imports (billions of dollars)
$ 250 U.S. Fuel Imports
$ 225
$ 200
$ 150
(billions)
$ 100
$ 75
$ 50
$0
2002 2005
Could double again over next 24 to 48 months
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LNG Imports Expected to Increase Sharply
Longer term, LNG imports could add significantly to U.S. trade deficit
By 2020, in BTU equivalent terms, expected to exceed current oil imports from Persian Gulf by 20 %
EIA estimates will account for up to 87 % of incremental U.S. natural gas supply
Potential Increase in Balance of Payments Deficit Due to Increased Imports of LNG
$ 60
Impact of Liquefied Natural Gas Imports
$ 50
$ 50.0
$ 40
(billion per year)
$ 40.0 $ 32.0
$ 30
$ 20
$ 18.0
$ 10
$ 3.5
$0
2004
2010
2015
2020
2025
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Need for Careful Evaluation of Alternatives
To date, no careful effort has been made at either Federal or State level to evaluate potential alternatives to a policy of massively increasing imports of LNG
In many respects surprising Just 36 months ago, EIA did not expect increased imports of LNG to play an significant role in meeting future U.S. energy needs
U.S. now expecting to rely upon increased imports of LNG for up to 87 % of its incremental supplies of natural gas (potentially 100 % excl. Alaska)
Must be obtained almost entirely from projects that have not yet even broken ground
Pricing terms uncertain – but likely to be closely linked with oil
By 2020, in BTU equivalent terms, imports of LNG expected to significantly exceed current oil imports from Middle East
Could seriously exacerbate already severe U.S. balance of payments deficit and further weaken value of U.S. dollar
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Unanswered Questions
Unanswered questions include:
1. How many new projects actually will be built
2. When they will be completed 3. Likely price terms/extent to which pricing will be tied to oil
4. How U.S. can protect itself against potential for extended delays in completion of projects not under its control
5. Extent of risk U.S. will be outbid for the output of these projects from competitors in other Regions (e.g., China, India, Japan, Korea, many European countries)
6. Potential for shipping to be disrupted or for shipments to be diverted to other countries 7. Potential pricing power of suppliers (who have the ability to sell spot market cargoes to the highest bidder anywhere in the world)
8. Whether there is any way to mitigate the job loss or the severe potential adverse impact on the U.S. balance of payments deficit from relying on a new source of imported fuel rather than domestic sources of supply
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Potential Alternatives
Potential alternatives include:
More intensive efforts to facilitate development of domestic supplies of natural gas
An urgent effort to rapidly deploy coal gasification on a major scale nationally, both to provide a source of fuel for existing gas-fired combined cycle units and existing industrial facilities and as a source of fuel for new facilities
Relief of major electric transmission bottlenecks that prevent full utilization of existing coal-fired plants
Replacement of older, steam-fired gas plants in load pockets with new, more efficient combined cycle units
Accelerated construction of new coal and nuclear plants
Further efforts to promote renewable energy Accelerated energy conservation, especially in commercial office buildings and retail shopping malls (where the greatest waste currently occurs)
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Issues Requiring Evaluation
To date, there has not been any rigorous analysis – or, indeed, any analysis at all – of the potential risks and benefits of these alternatives vs. a heavily-LNG dependent strategy in terms of:
Reliability of U.S. energy supply Potential pricing power of major LNG suppliers/ability to dramatically increase U.S. natural gas prices by shipping to other countries cargoes originally expected to be delivered to the U.S. market Resulting potential for severe price shocks and heightened price volatility in the U.S. natural gas and electricity markets Potential job loss or job creation in the U.S. economy depending upon whether U.S. energy supply is obtained using domestic resources or by increasing dependence upon imported fuels The continued ability of U.S. industry and U.S. farmers (who depend upon the availability of competitively-priced fertilizer) to compete in world markets The U.S. balance of payments deficit The future growth of the U.S. economy
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Lack of Any Fall-back Strategy
Nor has any apparent effort been made to develop a possible U.S. “fall-back” strategy if:
The global LNG market does not develop as rapidly as forecasts assume or available reserves are used to develop liquid fuels instead of LNG;
Other countries outbid the U.S. for the limited new supplies expected to become available on the world market over the next 7 to 10 years; or
Supplies from one or more suppliers are interrupted at any point in time due to political unrest, labor strikes, terrorist incidents, wars or any of the other factors that frequently interrupt international shipments of oil
Instead, to date, one of the most important energy policy choices ever facing the U.S. has been made almost entirely by default, with little or no apparent thought given to the potential risks of a heavily LNG-dependent strategy It’s as if we learned nothing from the gas-fired plant fiasco of the first ½ of this decade – which already has resulted in $ 100 billion or more in unanticipated costs – or dependence upon imported oil
55
Urgent Need to Deploy Coal Gasification On a Major Scale
56
Rapid Deployment of Coal Gasification = Key
Major goal: to minimize growth in use of natural gas to generate electricity in order to preserve available supplies of natural gas for other, higher priority uses
Rapid deployment of coal gasification = key to achieving this goal
Low-hanging fruit
Technology already demonstrated
Ample coal supplies available
Issue = willingness to take decisive action in a timely manner
Requires adding at least:
35,000 to 50,000 MW’s of gasification capability by 2015
An additional 35,000 MW by 2020
Sufficient to displace:
33 to 45 % of expected increase in natural gas demand by 2015
40 to 50 % of expected increase in demand by 2020
Proposed Alaskan pipeline potentially can supply most of the remaining required increase by 2016 or 2017
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Huge Potential Benefits
Potential benefits compelling:
1. Huge reduction in natural gas & electricity costs, compared to increases that are otherwise nearly certain to occur
– Savings easily could reach $ 150 to 300 billion per year
2. Creates a large number of new U.S. jobs, to construct new gasification facilities and coal mines and provide required fuel on an ongoing basis
3. Greatly reduces risk of a long-term, energy-price-induced slow down in growth rate of U.S. economy
4. As a practical matter, only strategy to avoid massive further declines in U.S. manufacturing sector
5. Eliminates – or at least reduces greatly – massive increase in U.S. balance of payments deficit otherwise likely to occur due to:
– Loss of large number of U.S. manufacturing jobs
– Proposed massive increase in imports of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
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Compelling Reasons to Act
Health and prosperity of U.S economy for at least next 10 to 15 years directly at stake
Steep natural gas price increases of past several years demonstrates seriousness of problems Realistic action plan at federal level must be developed and implemented on an “urgent, highest priority possible” basis
Alternative = potentially catastrophic further energy price increases and potential periodic shortages of electricity and natural gas
Proposed actions cost effective even at prices well below current levels
Only unresolved issue = willingness to act – especially in the time frame required to avoid severe potential set-backs for U.S. economy
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How to Contact Andy for Questions
Mailing Address:
Andy Weissman FTI Consulting, Inc. 1201 Eye St., N.W. Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20005
E-mail: Office Phone: Cell: Fax:
Andy.Weissman@FTIConsulting.com 202/589-2391 202/744-1956 202/312-9101
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FTI CONSULTING INC.
SEPTEMBER 2005
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