Angola Left_ Right _ Wrong

ANGOLA: LEFT, RIGHT & WRONG by Gerald J. Bender T h e Reagan administration's emerging policy on southern Africa has deftly managed to disturb almost all parties concerned. Initially, the left was disconcerted. Disposed to favor South Africa, administration officials stressed the Pretoria government's anticommunism and its friendship with the United States. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Jeane Kirkpatrick received top South African intelligence officers. The State DepaRtment labeled the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)-- South Africa's rival for control of Namibia--a terrorist organization supported by Moscow. American liberals were critical; black African nations harshly denounced the U.S. moves. Then it was the right's turn to feel aggrieved. Washington shifted closer to the Carter administration's policy of holding South Africa at arm's length. Reagan, in an interview with the Washington Post, offered a more balanced and realistic view of the Namibia situation. Secretary of State Alexander Hair, Jr. testified in Congress that the United States wanted to work with both Marxist and non-Marxist governments in solving the problems of the area. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs-designate Chester Crocker went on a 12-nation tour of the region and was spurned by South African Prime Minister P. W. Botha. Senator Jesse Helms (R.-North Carolina), vocal defender of South Africa's apartheid regime, denounced Crocker after the trip. The administration had learned that it is simply not possible to separate the good guys from the bad guys in southern Africa. Like those who had previously stumbled over the region's complexities, the administration thus discovered that although campaign rhetoric could profitably ignore the importance of local factors, practical policy making could not. Nowhere is this more evident than in AnGERALDJ. BENDERis associateprofeuor at the School of International Relations, Uni~rsi~ of Southern 3 CaUfo~.. 3. gola. The administration has backed itself into a corner where it has little room to maneuver. Washington first wanted to support Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, the charismatic leader of a rebellion against the Marxist-oriented Angolan government and the 17,000 troops of its ally, Cuba. Backed politically by many American conservatives and militarily by South Africa, Savimbi had expected the Republican administration to look favorably on his cause. Twice in March 1981, Savimbi prepared to fly to Washington; twice he was told at the last minute not to come. Reagan policy makers feared that hosting Savimbi would be interpreted as proof of the widely anticipated U.S. tilt toward South Africa and cause a diplomatic uproar. Yet Washington also refused to take a more conciliatory stance toward Angola. Instead, the administration asked Congress to repeal the 1976 Clark Amendment, which prohibits covert U.S. aid to any Angolan forces. It also demanded the withdrawal of the Cuban troops as a precondition for U.S. diplomatic recognition. The Angolans reject such a condition because they believe that without the deterrent of the well-armed Cubans, South Africa would not hesitate to overrun their country. (Even with the Cuban presence, South Africa has launched a number of maior military attacks on Angola since 1978.) Congressional liberals along with many moderates denounced the call for repeal of the Clark Amendment as untimely and unwise, given the need for Angola's cooperation in the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Namibia. Conservatives were distressed by the turning away of Savimbi, whom they regard as a pro-Western anticommunist. U.S. corporate executives, who find the Angolans cooperative business partners, were worried by the attempt to repeal the Clark Amendment and feared that any attempt to intervene would ieopardize the American corporate presence in Angola. Nevertheless, the administration's vacillation should not obscure its general policy preferences in southern Africa. For Haig and others, the introduction of Cuban troops and Soviet advisers in Angola in 1975 marked a watershed in U. S.-Soviet relations. It signaled, 54. Bmder they believe, the start of increased Soviet risktaking in the Third World, which then spread to Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and El Salvador. They say the United States should not have tolerated the Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola. Many in the administration argue that the United States should now re-enter the Angulan conflict to deliver a message to the Soviets that they believe is six years overdue. An odd coalition of corporation presidents, academic experts, intelligence specialists, and State Department officials oppose this view. This group argues that the Cuban presence in Angola is not necessarily permanent and that above all it has not hurt U.S. interests. They argue further that U.S. hostility to Angola helps the USSR, not America, by forcing Angola to align itself more closely with the Soviets and the Cubans. Both sides agree that Angola would be a useful friend of the United States. A huge country with 7 million inhabitants, Angola has abundant natural resources including oil, uranium, manganese, diamonds, iron ore, and gold. The country's climate permits production of cash crops such as coffee, cotton, and corn; the infrastructure left over from the days of Portuguese rule is the envy of most of Africa. In addition, the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations have discovered that the Angolans readily cooperate in efforts to resolve peacefully the problems of central and southern Africa. Richard Moose, former assistant secretary of state for African affairs, testified in 1980 that the United States could not have expected a more constructive, collaborative relationship with any other Angolan government on matters of regional concern. A Policy Boomerang Why have American policy makers failed to construct a coherent, pragmatic policy toward this country, a potential leader of the Third World, in spite of the obvious advantages of normal U.S.-Angolan ties? First, the United States has changed its mind several times about which forces in Angola deserved U.S. support. Second, current policy debates tend to overestimate the virtues and strengths of reputed allies in Angola. Third, 55. the weakness of the Marxist government and the threat it poses to U.S. interests have been similarly exaggerated. Since 1960 U.S. Angola policy has zigzagged. In 1961 the Kennedy administration provided covert assistance to Angolan nationalists fighting against the Portugese colonialists. Later in the 1960s, the United States pursued a contradictory policy of covertly aiding both the Portuguese and the Angolan insurgents. After the election of Nixon in 1968, the United States cut its ties to the nationalists and greatly increased its support for Portugal. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger doubted at the time that the local nationalists could gain power. The 1974 coup in Portugal and the subsequent beginning of decolonization exposed the vacuity of Kissinger's belief. The ensuing power struggle in Angola, which culminated in the civil war of 1975-1976, again attracted American covert intervention. The Angolan civil war was a complex, threesided affair. The perplexing alignments of the numerous outside powers that intervened suggests that few fully understood the situation into which they had stepped. On one side, the United States, China, Zaire, North Korea, Rumania, and India supported a very tenuous alliance between Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). In the American media, the UNITAFNLA alliance was labeled pro-Western; the Chinese and many others regarded the alliance as Maoist. The USSR had abandoned the third group, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), prior to the war. Once the war began, Moscow returned to its assistance with Cuba, Yugoslavia, Sweden, Denmark, and Nigeria; the MPLA was labeled pro-Soviet. The United States, via the Central Intelligence Agency, rejected the possibility of a negotiated settlement to the civil war. The CIA began to provide aid to the FNLA in January 1975 and arms to UNITA in mid-summer 1975. On August 20, 1975, Savimbi told the chief of the CIA's Angola~task force that "the ultimate hope for Angola still lay at the conference table rather than on the battlefield." But the CIA, 6. Boukr determined to take a hard line, had not planned on negotiations. The CIA urged Savimbi toward military confrontation, even though it had calculated that whereas UNITA could raise the number of Cuban and MPLA casualties, it could never win the war. Undeterred by the CIA pressure, Savimbi sent representatives to meet with the MPLA in Lisbon and to explore a reconciliation. In August 1975 a cease-fire between UNITA and the MPLA was announced, and plans were nearly finalized for an official alliance between the two rivals, However, the CIA promptly dispatched its Kinshasa station chief to Angola. The CIA official called Savimbi on the carpet to let him know the United States wanted no "soft" allies in its war against the MPLA. In short, the United States intervened in Angola with the explicit goal of making life difficult for the Soviets. The policy boomeranged. Unable to gain military victory and unwilling to accept a negotiated settlement, the United States accomplished nothing. Tarnished by association with South Africa and Western mercenaries, America succeeded only in legitimating the Cuban presence in Angola. Within months of the revelation of U.S. and South African intervention, 41 of the 46 African countries had recognized the MPLA. By early 1976 the MPLA and its Cuban and Katangese allies had defeated UNITA, the FNLA, and their South African, Zairian, and mercenary allies. The alliance between the FNLA and UNITA disintegrated before the civil war ended. Both factions turned their U.S.- and Chinese-supplied weapons on each other out of frustration and deep-seated personal and ethnic antagonisms. UNITA retreated south toward Namibia, while the FNLA scurried northward into Zaire. Until 1978 Zairian president Mobutu Sese Seko allowed the FNLA to stage guerrilla raids into Angola from his country. But Mobutu paid a high price for his support of the FNLA when Zairian exiles based in Angola launched two invasions into Zaire's mineralrich Shaba province. With encouragement from the United States, Mobutu made peace with Angola in 1978 and expelled FNLA leader Holden Roberto. Today Roberto languishes in France because no African country will 57. grant him asylum, and the FNLA appears to be moribund. UNITA, in contrast, is very much alive. Thanks to an underground network in central and southeastern Angola established during the years of fighting the Portuguese before 1975, UNITA has survived the loss of the civil war. Friendly countries including South Africa, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia supply it with arms, money, logistical assistance, and propaganda support. Although UNITA's overall power is disputed, it is very much a factor inside Angola. Those who believe the United States ought to support UNITA'S cause are divided over what kind of aid to provide. Some would recognize the current MPLA government, and then urge it to share power with UNITA. Others would give UNITA the means to shoot its way into power. Although the Carter administration generally favored the former approach, it never mustered the courage to risk a fight with Congress over the recognition of Angola; so it did nothing. Those in Washington who lean toward arming UNITA argue the party is a near-ideal candidate for U.S. military aid. They say that Savimbi--black, bright, and articulate--can become a credible African leader who also supports Western, not communist, interests. They argue further that as a loyal ally, Savimbi cannot be abandoned. Materiel support for UNITA will help tie down the Cubans and thus discourage communist adventurism elsewhere in Africa. In fact, they claim that more than any guerrilla movement in the world, UNITA has a chance to topple a Soviet-backed government. A Pact with the Devil Savimbi's appeal is undeniable. A remarkable man, he has impressed practically all who have met him, from Mao Zedong to Malcolm X to Jesse Helms. Born in central Angola in 1934, Savimbi acquired a thirst for education and ability in public speaking. Graduated at the top of his high school class, he was sent in 1958 by Protestant missionaries to Lisbon to pursue his studies. Harassed by Portugal's secret police for his political activities, he fled to Switzerland in 1960. Savimbi's first contact with the U.S. govern- 58. Bender ment occurred in early 1961 when he appeared unannounced at the U.S. embassy in Bern. State Department documents show that he told the charg~ d'affaires that he had been inspired by U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Adlai Stevenson's speech in favor of self-determination for all peoples; sticking out his hand, he introduced himself as "the future president of Angola." The charg6 d'affaires later wrote: Savimbi showed much more animosity toward other rebel groups in Angola than he did against the Portuguese. In particular, he showed dislike for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. He made it a point to tell me that the leaders of this group were mulattos who had accepted Portuguese citizenship and were disliked by most Angolans. Savimbi still demonstrates these same qualities: driving ambition to be president of Angola, an ability to tell foreigners what they want to hear, and bitterness about mulattos and whites in Angola. Savimbi joined Roberto in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) in mid-1961, and soon became the foreign minister and secretary general of the FNLA. However, by early 1964 Savimbi's personal relations with Roberto had been poisoned by mutual distrust and competing ambition. Savimbi angrily resigned from the FNLA declaring that "no progressive action is possible with men who serve American interests.., the notorious agents of imperalism." During the next decade, Savimbi maintained a highly visible revolutionary, anticapitalist, and anti-American posture. He traveled around the world meeting famous revolutionaries, most of whom supported him: Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ahmed Ben Bella, Nguyen Giap, Che Guevara, and Mao. The Chinese provided a year's training for Savimbi's initial group of cadres and furnished military and financial assistance for Savimbi to begin fighting inside Angola. UNITA was founded in 1966; by Christmas of that year, the group had launched its first attack against the Portuguese. Savimbi and his top cadres frequently attacked the role of whites and mulattos in the MPLA leadership and made a strong appeal to black power groups in the United 59. States. During the eight years before the coup in Portugal, UNITA spokesmen also stressed that the group's ideology was socialism "within Marxism-Leninism lines." Savimbi turned an about-face in early 1975. In an appeal for support from Angola's 325,000 white settlers, Savimbi dropped the antiwhite and pro-Marxist rhetoric from UNITA's line. The maneuver succeeded. As UNITA prepared for elections that were supposed to decide who would rule Angola after independence, Savimbi was the champion not only of his people, the Ovimbundu, but also of the whites. UNITA's v a l u e t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s p r i m a r i l y as c a n n o n f o d d e r in a proxy struggle with the Soviet Union. As increasing outside intervention doomed the dections, Savimbi did not attract U.S. support. When the Ford administration first oftidally approved covert aid to forces in Angola in January 1975, it preferred the FNLA to UNITA. CIA documents show that the United States turned to Savimbi only in the final months of the war, after it had become obvious that the FNLA was little more than a paper tiger. The documents also show that the OA knew that the weapons it was supplying could not prevent the collapse of UNITA's small, untrained army. UNITA's value to the United States was primarily as cannon fodder in a proxy struggle with the Soviet Union. As the war escalated, UNITA was caught between two superior forces--the South Africans and the Cubans. When MPLA and Cuban troops moved south to repel the advancing South African troops threatening the capital, they did not stop until they reached the Namibian border in early 1976. UNITA was caught in a cruel dilemma: make a pact with the devil--South AfricaQor be crushed. Savimbi chose the former and survived. In the guerrilla war against the MPLA since 1976, UNITA has continued close military cooperation with South Africa. Those who follow the communiqu6s issued by both UNITA and the South African government note a close 0. Bender overlap between the operational areas of their two military forces. While undoubtedly significant, the magnitude of South African assistance to UNITA is difficult to determine precisely. In House testimony last fall, Moose stated that South African support for UNITA "has varied from time to time," but that he was persuaded South Africa supports UNITA through "clandestine deliveries of military supplies of one sort or another and, I suspect, intelligence support. I believe in some ways they operate jointly . . . . " T h e West German magazine Do" Spiegel recendy published the sensational revelation that South Africa had secretly purchased $8.1 million of Soviet arms from Bulgaria and Poland and flown the weapons into Angola. UNITA troops could then claim to have captured the guns from Cuban troops. UNITA's Reputation Savimbi's reliance on South Africa has undermined his nationalist credentials. Inside Angola, however, UNITA apparently suffers little from the taint of South Africa--especially among the Ovimbundu--because Savimbi has once again appealed to black resentment of the presence of whites and mulattos in positions of power in Angola. But internationally, most nations believe that aid to UNITA furthers the aims of only the South Africans, who have staged unpredictable and highly aggressive military operations in Angola since 1975. UNITA officials have privately told their American supporters that U.S. military aid would reduce their dependence on South Africa. However, even if U.S. aid did lessen UNITA's dependence on South Africa, doubts would remain about UNITA's popular support in Angola. Haig testified in January 1981 that UNITA "is a very strong independent movement which represents a substantial portion of the popular will." But U.S. and West European intelligence sources disagree. They indicate that UNITA has practically no appeal to ethnic groups other than the Ovimbundu. This lack of support means that UNITA appeals to about one-third of the population--assuming that all Ovimbundu support UNITA. In fact, not all do, and there is no way of knowing whether even a majority of them support 61. Savimbi. Most Ovimbundu live in areas administered by the MPLA; many thousands of Ovimbundu men tight against UNITA in the MPLA army and militia. American conservatives have made expansive claims for UNITA'S territorial strength. Reagan stated in 1980 that he favored supplying arms to UNITA because "Savimbi the leader, controls more than half the country." Newspaper columnist William Satire has alleged that the MPLA and the Cubans are confined to Angola's cities and towns while UNITA "controls the countryside." However, in a recent issue of Reader's Digest, journalist Smith Hempstone, also a Savimbi backer, located UNITA's strength in the southeastern provinces of Moxico and Cuando-Cubangu; most observers agree. The Portuguese called the Moxico and Cuando-Cubango region "the end of the world." According to the 1970 Portuguese census, these two provinces contained less than 6 per cent of the Angolan population. Interviewed in summer 1980 in London, Savimbi claimed to control the Huila and Cunene provinces in southern Angola, among others. UNITA does not control these provinces. One West European ambassador calls UNITA claims "ridiculous." This was evident to the author on a 650-mile drive through the region to within five miles of the Namibian border. The trip did not establish that the MPLA controls the area or that UNITA has no popular support there. It did suggest, however, that Americans should be cautious about claims made by UNITA and its supporters. Savimbi himself has encouraged the dubious notion that with just a little arms aid from the United States he could overthrow the Luanda government. He told a West German news service in March 1981 that he needed "not even as much as $100 million" in military aid in order to defeat the MPLA. Savimbi claims to have 15,000 troops inside Angola; Western intelligence sources say a more realistic figure is .6,000, approximately double the number of .UNITA troops in 1976. Yet UNITA remains decidedly inferior to the MIPLA with its 30,000 troops, a militia perhaps 10 times as large, and roughly 17,000 Cuban troops. Sources note that whereas there used to be considerable con2. Bot&r tact between UNITA and Cuban troops, fighting has gready diminished in the past two years. They say that even if all the Cubans were withdrawn, UNITA on its own could not defeat the MPLA. Jeremias Chitunda, UNITA's principal spokesman in the United States, has acknowledged that what Savimbi needs most is not military aid, but increased credibility in the Third World and especially among African nations. Reliable sources indicate that Savimbi's top advisers heatedly debated the wisdom of the aborted U.S. visit. Some argued that trip would be counterproductive because a warm embrace from the American right-wing and CIA would further damage UNITA's reputation. Others tried to persuade Savimbi that U.S. covert support at this time would reduce, if not preclude, the likelihood of an African diplomatic resolution. Savimbi overruled his aides. Truth vs. Fiction The difficulty of determining the facts about Angola results, in part, from a growing number of articles written by respectable authors that combine truth and fiction. Whether they suspended professional judgment is uncertain. It is obvious, however, that they have not made much effort to check their facts. Former Newsweek chief foreign correspondent, Amaud de Borchgrave, and Washington Quarterly editor, Michael Ledeen, recently quoted Savimbi at length in the Ne~ Republic on the rebuff the UNITA leader received from the Carter administration in November 1979. According to Savimbi, two State Dep~tment officials called on him privately to tell him that "the Carter administration did not want to be bothered by UNITA. They even said mine was a lost cause, and that I should give up. They asked me why I was afraid of communism." Had Ledeen or de Borchgrave tried to confirm this story with the two officials, they would have learned that Savimbi's version of the meeting was "totally false, a lie." De Borchgrave added more fiction to the Angola debate in April when he told a House subcommittee that 10 African countries support UNITA. Refusing to name the countries, de Borchgrave said: "I'm not sure you can get 3. this information from the CIA." H e was right; the CIA has no evidence to support the assertion. According to one CIA Africa expert: "Naturally it depends upon whether one means moral or military support and whether you consider countries in the Middle East as part of Africa, but even if one counts the latter and includes those offering moral support, de Borchgrave's figure is grossly exaggerated." The MPLA government has been misrepresented in the opposite direction. Luanda, its enemies contend, oppresses the Ovimbundu people, is anti-American, and is little more than a Soviet puppet. All three assertions are misleading at best. Pointing out that the Ovimbundu are the largest ethnic group in the country and that UNITA draws most of its strength from the Ovimbundu, some assert that the United States should help them "have a cut of the pie," as Crocker put it. The Ovimbundu are underrepresented in top leadership positions in both the government and the party. Not a single Ovimbundu is on the 1 l-man MPLA Political Bureau, and only a few are among the Central Committee's 65 members. Only one Ovimbundu minister sits in the cabinet. Political or economic stability will be difficult to obtain in Angola while such a sizable minority is under-represented. Yet even if UNITA won a military victory, minority problems in Angola would persist, as the ethnic groups that strongly support the MPLA t o d a y - - t h e Kimbundu, Kikongo, whites, and mulattos--fell into disfavor. Moreover, given the peculiar history of settlement and colonization in Angola, an ethnic under-representation problem would undoubtedly have arisen there after independence, even without the civil war between the MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA. Angola is no different in this respect from most other Third World countries, where colonial divide-and-rule policies and varying levels of assimilation favored some groups over others at independence. If the Reagan administration decides to make ethnic equality the cornerstone of its Angola policy, it will sink into a quagmire from which it will never emerge. For it will have to pressure most African countries, including U.S. allies, 64. Bender to accommodate under-represented minorities. Most important, the United States can hardly adopt the hypocritical position of making ethnic equality the cutting edge of its Angola policy while ignoring the same issue in South Africa. On the one hand, the Reagan administration is divided over how far it should go to improve the lot of the Ovimbundu and over policy questions that range from whether to provide UNITA with military assistance to whether to withhold diplomatic recognition from the MPLAuntil it unites with UNITA. On the other hand, the same administration is apparently united in its belief that the United States should do little, if anything, to redress the grotesque racial imbalance in South Africa where more than 80 per cent of the population is excluded from political and economic power and suffers daily humiliation. No matter how Washington may attempt to package or euphemize such a policy, it will still smack of racism. The ethnic conflict in Angola resembles the persistent tension common in the United States or Kenya much more than the genocide that has occurred in Uganda or the systematic hatred and repression of South Africa. The MPLA generally distrusts the Ovimbundu, which is not surprising given the background of Savimbi and UNITA. Yet the MPLA has also trained and armed tens of thousands Ovimbundu in the armed forces. Since independence, the MPLA has placed thousands of Ovimbundu in secondary positions in the party and the bureaucracy. A recent State Department survey of Africa concluded that Angola has a better human rights record than do many countries, including several close U.S. allies. It should also be pointed out that very few of those in the present administration have displayed a long-term concern about the Ovimbundu. Few of today's policy makers objected when the Portuguese forced hundreds of thousands of the Ovimbundu off their land to work as laborers on Portuguese plantations or moved them into economically unviable strategic hamlets during the independence war. Citing today the need to help the Ovimbundu people as the rationale for urging U.S. intervention in Angola has an obvious political advantage: It is more palatable than the cold war rhetoric 65. that, according to a r e c e n t / m Angeles Times poll, persuaded only one-third of the public to support U.S. military aid to El Salvador. S a v i m b i h a s n e v e r d r o p p e d his s t r o n g c o m m i t m e n t to s o c i a l i s m , a fact that Reagan and Helms may n o t care to p u b l i c i z e . A large segment of the American business community opposes another round of U.S. intervention in Angola and even favors retention of the Clark Amendment. Oil companies such as Gulf, Texaco, and Mobil Corporation; banks such as Chase Manhattan, Citibank, First Boston, and Bankers Trust Company; high-technology firms such as Boeing Company, Lockheed Corporation, and General Electric Company fear that intervention would be disastrous for their business interests. Most, if not all, favor U.S. recognition of Angola. The MPLA government has impressed many American businessmen. "They are pragmatic people," Gene Bates, a Texaco vice president told the Wall Street Journal. "Their Marxist friends can't give them what they need so they have turned to the West." T. J. Fahey, an executive of General Tire and Rubber Company, which has an interest in a factory in Angola, said that his company was "delighted" to operate in Angola. Melvin J. Hill, president of Gulf Oil Exploration & Production Company, said last September: "Gulf, as any commercial enterprise, would benefit by U.S. recognition of Angola and the establishment of a U.S. embassy in Luanda." The U.S. corporate sector does not believe it would obtain better treatment from a Savimbi government. Savimbi has never dropped his strong commitment to socialism, a fact that Reagan and Helms may not care to publicize. During Savimbi's November 1979 visit to the United States, the UNITA leader failed to answer questions on what specific changes he would make in the Angolan economy given that he, like the MPLA leadership, professes to be socialist. A U.S. official said Savimbi gave "the impression that he would not change a thing in the economy." The executive officer of a large American corporation that operates in 66. Bender Angola told several other executives in February 1981 that "Savimbi would be the worst socialist of the lot and would be much harder to do business with than the MPLA." Pretoria before Moscow In light of Angola's cooperation with Western commercial interests, the charge that the MPLA government is a Soviet puppet is absurd. Since 1978 the MPLA has repeatedly declared that it will send the Cuban troops home, once it can be assured that Angola is not threatened by South Africa. Prior to the Angolan-Zairian rapproachement in 1978, 35,000 Cuban military personnel were stationed in Angola. With Mobutu's expulsion of the FNLA from Zaire and the repatriation of Zairian refugees from Angola, relative calm was restored in northern Angola. The number of Cuban troops then dedined by 50 per cent, according to Western intelligence analysts. The only security guarantee that will satisfy Luanda is the true independence of Namibia, the California-sized territory separating Angola and South Africa. The current Namibian government, installed by and closely allied with Pretoria, permits South African troops to launch operations into Angola on the pretext of fighting SWAPO guerrillas. These raids have penetrated 200 miles into Angolan territory and resulted in severe damage to Angolan infrastructure. All observers agree that if elections were held in Namibia, SWAPO would win easily. A SWAPO government, according to the MPLA, would provide a safety buffer and render outside military aid unnecessary. Those who do not care about the facts of the Angolan situation can always take refuge in the apparent position of Helms: that anyone who opposes the forces of white domination is ipso facto a communist. This foolishness is such an obvious recipe for disaster in Africa--nothing could be more helpful to Soviet interests--that it would be tempting to dismiss it as ludicrous if Helms had not gained such respectability and power. As a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Helms has a ready forum from which to try to impose his antiquated views on U.S. Africa policy. Unless Haig is willing to stand up to Helms, the 67. United States will suffer repeated embarrassment, if not defeats, in the Third World. With the debate over U.S. policy taking place on a political spectrum between Helms and Haig, it is easy to forget that there are alternative approaches to realizing American goals in Angola. No white paper is likely to persuade other countries--even close U.S. alliesmthat Angola does not have a legitimate right to seek foreign assistance to help protect itself against South Africa's frequent and damaging attacks. It will be even more difficult to convince these countries if the United States joins South Africa and its allies in the conflict. Thus, South Africa, not the USSR, is responsible for the entry, size, and continuation of the Cuban combat troops in Angola. If the United States seriously wants to reduce the Cuban role, it should look toward Pretoria before Moscow. Instead of seeking the means to intervene militarily in Angola, the United States should help South Africa find the political courage to withdraw from Namibia and allow an internationally supervised election to take place. U.S. South Africa policy holds one key to an Angolan solution. Reagan arrived in Washington determined to reverse Carter's approach toward South Africa, which he branded as harsh and preachy. Crocker has long advocated showing more sensitivity to the problems confronting South Africa's white minority. However, the Nixon and Ford administrations tried this approach from 1968 to 1976, with no success in resolving regional disputes. South Africa's domestic and foreign policies will continue to be based on Pretoria's own perceptions of what is necessary for its future survival regardless of U.S. inducements. Those perceptions appear impervious to pressures from the United States, short of the unlikely imposition of economic sanctions. During the early months of the Reagan administration, Pretoria heard statements more sympathetic than anything emanating from Washington since the 1950s. Yet South Africa responded with a harder line internally and externally than it had taken in the Carter years. The administration's current attempt to force the Cubans out of Angola while simultaneously threatening to repeal the Clark t 68. Bender Amendment may have painted U.S. Africa policy into a corner. First, repeal of the Clark Amendment will make Cuban withdrawal less, not more, likely by increasing what the Angolan government views as a serious external threat to its survival. Second, to ask Congress to repeal the amendment without also seeking repeal of legislation specifically prohibiting the United States from providing economic aid to Angola reinforces the perception that the administration wants flexibility to make war, not peace; to use sticks, not carrots in Angola. Finally, the Reagan approach puts the cart before the horse; as Nigerian President Shehu Shagari put it: "If there were no threat of South Africa, there would be no Cubans in Angola." When the Reagan administration took office, it pledged to add consistency and efficacy to U.S. Africa policy. The difficulty in fulfdling this pledge can be seen in the contrasting approaches adopted toward Angola and South Africa. Ambassador Kirkpatrick provided the most articulate statement of the administration's policy when asked on the MacNtil-l_,ebrer Report: "Given that the U.S. finds South Africa's apartheid policy to be reprehensible, what does it plan to do about it?" She replied: Basically we believe that the chance of influencing governments is better if we have reasonably good relations with them. We tend to believe that public denunciations of other government's policies may make us feel good about ourselves but probably hardens the resistance of the government in question to our suggestion. If this same logic were applied to Angola, it would lead to prompt U.S. recognition of the MPLA governnment. This is the second key to an Angolan solution. During the last six years, three U.S. administrations have demonstrated the futility of trying to affect the presence of Cubans or the process of national reunification by refusing to normalize relations. There is no evidence that non-recognition will now produce the results that it has previously failed to achieve. It is time to try a new policy, one that springs from the premise "that the chance of influencing governments is better if we have reasonably good relations with them." 69.