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					Studies in Intelligence
    Journal of the American Intelligence Professional

Unclassified articles from Studies in Intelligence Volume 55, Number 1
                            (March 2011)

        KAMEN: A Cold War Dangle Operation with
        an American Dimension

        What I Learned in 40 Years of Doing Intelligence
        Analysis for US Foreign Policymakers

        The Lessons for CI of the Dreyfus Affair

        Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

                Center for the Study of Intelligence
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Awards                        The Sherman Kent Award of $3,500 is offered annually for the most signifi-
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Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                      i
                                                  C O N T E N T S
       Washington, DC 20505

EDITORIAL POLICY                               Ensnaring the Unwitting in Czechoslovakia
Articles for Studies in Intelligence may       KAMEN: A Cold War Dangle Operation
be written on any historical, opera-           with an American Dimension                            1
tional, doctrinal, or theoretical aspect       Igor Lukes
of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting         In the First Person
or rejecting an article rests with the         What I Learned in 40 Years of Doing Intelligence
Editorial Board.
                                               Analysis for US Foreign Policymakers             13
The criterion for publication is               Martin Petersen
whether, in the opinion of the Board,
the article makes a contribution to the
literature of intelligence.                    The Dreyfus Affair: Enduring CI Lessons          21
                                               John Ehrman
                                               Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf                 31
Peter S. Usowski, Chairman                     Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake
Pamela S. Barry
Nicholas Dujmovic
John McLaughlin
Philip Mudd
Wayne M. Murphy
Matthew J. Ouimet
Valerie P.
Michael Richter
Michael L. Rosenthal
Barry G. Royden
Ursula M. Wilder
Not listed are three members who are
under cover. Members of the board are
drawn from the Central Intelligence
Agency and other Intelligence Commu-
nity components.

Andres Vaart

                                           Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)               iii

John Ehrman is an officer in CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence. He is a frequent con-
tributor, especially on matters related to counterintelligence.

Igor Lukes is Professor of History and International Relations in the College of Arts
and Sciences of Boston University. He is also an associate of the Davis Center for Rus-
sian Studies, Harvard University. He is a historian of Central Europe in the 20th cen-
tury. His latest book is Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of
Edvard Benes in the 1930s.

Hayden Peake is curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection. He served in
the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Operations.

Martin Petersen is a retired CIA Directorate of Intelligence officer and author of nu-
merous articles and teaches on the subjects of intelligence, intelligence analysis, and
the management of intelligence analysts.

Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                 v
Ensnaring the Unwitting in Czechoslovakia

KAMEN: A Cold War Dangle Operation with an
American Dimension
Igor Lukes

                                              Soon after the coup d’état in                Europe with frightening suc-
                                            February 1948 that brought the                 cess. In the late 1940s and early
                                            Communist Party of Czechoslo-                  1950s, Wolnosc i Niezawislosc
                                            vakia (CPC) into power, the                    (WiN)—a Soviet and Polish
                                            government granted the secu-                   Communist security (Urzad
                                            rity services—civilian and mili-               bezpieczenstwa [UB]) joint

                                            tary—unlimited freedom of                      operation—identified an under-
                                            action against any target, with                ground organization, took it
      Soon after the                        no regard for the rule of law.                 over, built it up, and used it to
                                            The StB (Statni bezpecnost, the                gain significant US, British,
   Communist Party of
                                            civilian state security appara-                and Polish émigré support.
  Czechoslovakia came                       tus) was especially cunning in                 They ran this fictitious scheme
 into power, the security                   adapting and combining the                     to discourage domestic resis-
  services were granted                     techniques of Nazi Germany’s                   tance and to gain Western cash
   unlimited freedom of                     Gestapo and the Soviet Union's                 and intelligence technology. The
action against any target.                  special services in the struggle               ruse ended in December 1952,
                                            against the StB’s primary tar-                 when the communists publicly

                ”                           gets: Americans and their
                                            Czech associates.

                                              The StB embraced the view of
                                            its Soviet teachers that its mis-
                                                                                           declared themselves to be the
                                                                                           creators and managers of WiN. 1

                                                                                             Smaller and less ambitious,
                                                                                           but still lethal, dangle organiza-
                                            sion was not merely to identify                tions were created in postwar
                                            and neutralize existing oppo-                  Czechoslovakia. One such orga-
                                            nents to the new order through                 nization, SVETLANA, grew out
                                            routine investigative methods.                 of a plan to study public opin-
                                            Instead, the StB adopted a                     ion in the country while it was
                                            more proactive method: It cre-                 still adapting to the Commu-
                                            ated fictitious resistance orga-               nist takeover. The StB soon
                                            nizations, dangled them as bait,               realized that this could evolve
                                            and waited for potential new                   into something bigger and more
                                            resisters—in addition to those                 profitable. With the use of
                                            already active—to be drawn to                  agent provocateurs, it merged
                                            them.                                          its own fictitious underground
                                                                                           organization with elements of
                                              Soviet special services intro-               the true anti-Communist resis-
                                            duced this approach to counter-                tance. The hybrid grew and
                                            intelligence in postwar Eastern                spread with astonishing speed

                                            All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the
                                            author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US govern-
                                            ment endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations. © Igor Lukes.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                                         1
Cold War Deception

Dangle organizations grew and spread with astonishing speed
as StB agent provocateurs established full control over the                 ing “interviews” with under-
genuine components of networks.                                             cover NKVD personnel,
                                                                            indicting themselves as well as
                                                                            family, friends, and whomever
as StB agent provocateurs             WiN, SVETLANA, and other              else had helped them along the
established full control over the   Eastern European variations on          way.
genuine components of the net-      the same theme helped the
work.                               Communist security services               Soviet military counterintelli-
                                    crush a significant segment of          gence also practiced this tech-
  Many victims never realized       the opposition at the onset of          nique in postwar Germany,
they had fallen for an StB trick.   the Cold War. The swift and             focusing mainly on Red Army
Between 1949 and 1950, the          deadly response by those ser-           soldiers. Some were eager to
service arrested close to 500       vices likely drove many poten-          escape the Stalinist system,
men and women who had joined        tial resisters into resigned,           and Berlin, where one could
SVETLANA. Some unfortu-             passive acceptance of the new           cross from east to west with rel-
nates had done so after a cere-     regime.                                 ative ease, was a magnet for
mony that included the signing                                              such dreamers. Soviet agents
of sworn anti-Communist decla-                                              posing as Westerners would
rations and distribution of         KAMEN: The United States                deliver these would-be desert-
SVETLANA membership cards,          as Bait                                 ers to an apartment in East
all under the watchful eyes of        There were other operations           Berlin, where fake US Army
the undercover StB agents. A        of this kind, and some have             personnel interviewed them.
series of show-trials provided      remained largely unknown to             After a deserter had fully impli-
many opportunities to attack        this day. At least one directly         cated himself and identified
the West in general and the         involved the United States.             comrades with similar atti-
United States in particular as      Operation KAMEN (meaning                tudes toward Soviet power, the
the alleged masters of SVET-        “stone” or “border marker”) was         illusion was burst, and the vic-
LANA. Although some of the          one of the most cunning StB             tim was brought to face an
defendants fervently believed       schemes. Launched only a few            executioner. 6
they had “worked for the Amer-      weeks after the February 1948
icans,” the United States was       coup d’état in Czechoslovakia,            Organization. KAMEN fol-
never involved. 2                   KAMEN, like WiN and SVET-               lowed this Soviet pattern with
                                    LANA, was a copy of a strata-           some local variations. Ultimate
  In the end, there were 16                                                 responsibility resided with the
                                    gem that Stalin’s special
death sentences, more than 10                                               bosses of the StB (see table on
                                    services (in this case, the
executions, several suicides, 20                                            right). Practical details of the
                                    NKVD) had invented before
life sentences, and close to 300                                            kombinace, to use the contem-
                                    WW II.
other prison sentences. 3 To                                                porary terminology for a decep-
maintain operational cover, the       In the Soviet version, a provo-       tive scheme, were in the hands
StB had at least one of its own     cateur would offer a person who         of the personnel of Group BAa
agent provocateurs executed,        feared arrest safe passage to           (internal state security),
not an uncommon practice dur-       freedom abroad. Guides posing           Sector I (Counter Intelligence),
ing that time. 4 Antonin Slabik,    as agents of a Western intelli-         Referat 28 (directed against the
SVETLANA’s putative “chief of       gence service would lead the            US Army Counter Intelligence
staff,” was luckier and avoided     victim to a location where the          Corps [CIC], a generic term
that fate. He managed to emi-       NKVD had created a false bor-           used for all US intelligence in
grate under murky circum-           der post. Mistakenly thinking           the 1950s) and Referat 29 (its
stances and died peacefully in      they were already safely out-           target was the US Embassy and
Australian exile in 1981. 5         side Soviet territory, the would-       Americans in Prague), and Sec-
                                    be defectors spoke freely dur-

2                                                      Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
                                                                                                  Cold War Deception

tor IV, Operations, Department              local smuggler or a bribed bor-
3 (Arrests). 7                              der guard official who then               StB Personnel and Compo-
                                            offered, for a fee, to take the           nents in KAMEN
  Method of Operation. Typi-                refugees into the woods and
cally, Joseph Janousek or                                                           • Jindrich Vesely
                                            across the German border. The
Milena Markova of Depart-                   victims were led, usually under         • Stepan Placek
ment 3 (as an agent-provoca-                cover of darkness, to a ficti-
teur) contacted a suspect                                                           • Oswald Zavodsky
                                            tious US Army post visible from
government official, military               afar at night. In reality, the          • Ivo Milen
officer, Czechoslovak employee              building was well inside
of the US Embassy, or business-                                                     • Sector I, Counterintelligence
                                            Czechoslovakia. (see map on
man, and claimed to have been               next page) The post was                 • Referat 28 (US intelligence orga-
sent by the CIC. The agent told             guarded by StB agents posing              nizations)
the victim that, according to US            as German border police and
sources, his downfall was immi-                                                     • Referat 29 (US embassy, US citi-
                                            manned by StB agents wearing              zens)
nent and offered safe passage               US Army uniforms. The diffi-
across the Iron Curtain into the            cult role of the US intelligence        • Sector IV, Operations
open arms of the United States.             officer was frequently played by
Waves of arrests had been                                                           • Department 3 (Arrests)
                                            StB agent Amon Tomasoff
directed against democrats,                 (“Tony”). 8                             • Evzen Abrahamovic, “Evzen” or
Catholic activists, intellectuals,                                                    “Dr. Breza.”
military officers, and the prop-              The final stages of KAMEN
                                                                                    • Emil Orovan,”Oliva.”
ertied class, making the threat             followed various scripts. Some
of arrest entirely credible.                victims were directed to take a         • Amon Tomasoff, “Tony,” F-7.
                                            copy of the protocol of their
  Following painful decisions,                                                      • Rudolf Freund
                                            interview to a second American
individuals, couples, and fami-             post, which they were to find           • Josef Janousek, “Johnny.”
lies with small children, carry-            unescorted. On the way, they
ing only cash and jewelry, were             were stopped by Czechoslovak            • Milena Markova, “Vanda Rouba-
escorted to the border area by                                                        lova,” “Kolda,” K-40, AK-950
                                            border guards and placed under
StB agents posing as members                arrest. It was impossible for vic-
of a resistance organization.               tims to deny their guilt, as they
They introduced the refugees to             carried signed statements in
another StB agent, posing as a              which they boasted of their             anti-Communist convictions
                                                                                    and activities.

                                                                                      Given that the victims were
                                                                                    moving at night through unfa-
                                                                                    miliar and dense woods, they
                                                                                    tended to blame themselves for
                                                                                    having lost their way and sel-
                                                                                    dom realized that they had
                                                                                    fallen for an StB provocation.
                                                                                    Some firmly believed they had
                                                                                    already been on German soil
                                                                                    but were kidnapped by the bor-
                                                                                    der guards and taken back into
                           The sealed border with West Germany was a formidable
                           challenge for anyone seeking to escape the Communists.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                             3
Cold War Deception

  The fake US Army officer                                        give up and submit to the Com-              Communist government. In
occasionally chose a different                                    munist regime.                              addition, as parents of two
ending. He told the applicants                                                                                daughters, Vera and Jana, the
that their petitions for political                                                                            Prosvics had been unwilling to
asylum were denied and                                            Cases                                       risk exile, although the authori-
handed the victims over to the                                      The first documented KAMEN                ties had started to harass them
Czechs. The news that the US                                      case involved Jan and Jirina                in early spring 1948: Prosvic
had turned down some appli-                                       Prosvic. 9 Jan was a brilliant              was arrested, mistreated, and
cants and forced them back into                                   engineer, designer of household             then suddenly released.
the arms of the StB trickled out                                  products, and a founder of the
of prisons and labor camps and                                    ETA Company, which produced                   On 13 April 1948, only six
had a desirable effect on the                                     irons, vacuum cleaners, and                 weeks after the Communist
rest of the population. The mes-                                  toasters. Prosvic was so com-               takeover, Janousek approached
sage intended, and received,                                      mitted to improving his prod-               the couple, introduced himself
was that there was no escape,                                     ucts that he initially stayed on            as “Johnny,” a CIC operative,
no hope, and that it was best to                                  as a lowly employee after ETA               and offered to arrange an
                                                                  had been nationalized by the                escape. Mrs. Prosvic energeti-

O p er a t io n KAMEN, Czechoslovakia, 1949–52
                                                                                                      Ode r
          Boundary representation is
          not necessarily authoritative.
    0    20        40         60 Kilometers                                                                           CZECHOSLOVAKIA
    0         20               40             60 Miles
                                                         lb                              P O LAN D                ‘‘Army post’’

          GERMANY                                                                                               West

                                                                                                                                               P O L A ND
                   Cheb                                             Prague
                              Marianske Lazne
 GERMANY                     Svaty Kriz


                                                                          C Z E C H O S L O VA K I A

        to Ludwigsberg                                                                  Danube
        115 km
                                                                                                                 DI Cartography Center/MPG 793647AI (G03253) 3-11

4                                                                                        Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
                                                                                               Cold War Deception

                                             Prosvic was shattered to hear that his application for political
cally turned down the offer and              asylum was denied.
refused to discuss it. Even her
husband was far from eager to
risk crossing the border, living             Janousek in the center of             without difficulty, and the fake
in a camp for refugees, and                  Prague. They drove together to        German border guards invited
then starting anew abroad.                   Kdyne, a small town nearly 100        them inside. There, a visibly
                                             miles to the southwest. For a         nervous Tomasoff, wearing a
  Janousek later testified that              while they rested in the Hotel        US Army officer’s uniform,
Prosvic had little desire to                 Modra Hvezda, located on a sce-       offered the Prosvics a choice of
leave: “But since I knew I                   nic square lined with old trees.      Lucky Strikes or Camel ciga-
would earn a lot of money, I                 At 10 p.m. Janousek intro-            rettes; he gave their daughters
tried to talk them both into                 duced them to Stanislav Liska,        Swiss chocolate and allowed
it.” 10 That first approach was              the chief of the police station in    them to sleep in the waiting
followed by anonymous phone                  Vseruby—a sad hamlet on the           area. The office was decorated
calls from supposedly well-                  border. After Prosvic had paid a      with a large US flag and por-
meaning sympathizers who                     hefty fee of Kc 70,000 [other         traits of Presidents Roosevelt
warned that another arrest was               protocols mention the sum Kc          and Truman. A bottle of whis-
imminent. Then came a second                 60,000], Liska left to make sure      key stood on the table.
visit by Janousek and more                   that the escape plan was in
pressure. Mrs. Prosvic                       order.                                  Tomasoff began by asking
remained adamant: The family                                                       Prosvic about his connections
would stay at home. It took                 At midnight, Liska returned            with the anti-Communist
more anonymous calls and a                to report that all was well. He          underground, of which the engi-
third visit by Janousek to                drove the couple to Vseruby.             neer and businessman knew
change the minds of these                 They were stopped several                absolutely nothing. All other
increasingly desperate people. 11         times at roadblocks manned by            questions, such as “What do you
                                          security personnel, but Liska,           think of Communism?” sounded
  On 23 April 1948, the couple            wearing his uniform, “always             politically illiterate to Prosvic.
and their children met                    knew what to say.” The Pros-             The interrogation continued:
                                                         vics were                 who knew about his escape,
                                                         impressed. From           who helped him, what reliable
                                                         the edge of Vse-          friends could he recommend for
                                                         ruby, Liska and           the Americans to contact in
                                                         the family contin-        Prague?
                                                         ued on foot
                                                         through Mysliva,            Prosvic did not like the ques-
                                                         a place so small          tions and resented the interro-
                                                         that it no longer         gator’s arrogant tone, and their
                                                         exists, and around        conversation became tense. Nev-
                                                         a lake. Standing          ertheless, he signed the proto-
                                                         by a border               col, as Tomasoff requested. But
                                                         marker, Liska             Prosvic was shattered to hear
                                                         pointed out a well-       that his application for political
                                                         lit building in the       asylum was denied. “We have no
 In the only known photo of KAMEN in action, an agent in distance: the sup-        interest in Czech Communists,”
 US Army uniform is shown interviewing a victim, a man
 named Jaroslav Hakr. A notation on the photo reads      posed US Army             said Tomasoff. He drew his
 “Compromising photograph of Hakr with a CIC officer”—a post.                      revolver and forced Prosvic into
pretender serving as “proof ” of Hakr’s disloyalty and as                          a car in which his frightened
evidence for others considering flight that Hakr had been        The family        wife and daughters were already
successfully led to safety. Photo courtesy of Archiv bezpec-
nostnich sluzeb, ABS H-253.                                     reached the post   waiting. 12 The family was

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                         5
Cold War Deception

Marie trusted the fictitious American officer so completely that
she agreed to answer in her own hand his semi-literate and                    his life was in danger, and he
grotesquely misspelled “Guestionaire.”                                        and his wife agreed to leave. On
                                                                              30 April 1948, Janousek took
                                                                              them along the same sorrowful
speechless and could hardly          took place outside the legal             path the Prosvics had treaded
believe it when the “Germans”        framework, the confiscation of           before. From Prague they trav-
drove them back to Vseruby,          the apartment by the state was           eled to the Modra Hvezda in
where they were handed over to       illegal, and the sale of the villa       Kdyne, where Mrs. Malac emo-
Czechoslovak security officers.      in Vonoklasy to comrade Zapo-            tionally begged her husband
The Prosvics were interrogated       tocky was inappropriate. It              not to proceed; it was a trap,
and arrested, with the excep-        could be used by our enemies to          she insisted. He replied that it
tion of the youngest daughter,       defame us.” 14 The report made           was too late, whereupon his
who was too young to be pro-         no mention of Mr. and Mrs.               wife-according to Janousek-suf-
cessed by the judicial system.       Prosvic.                                 fered a nervous breakdown. 17
  The protocol, dated 24 April         Malac. Only five days after              On 1 May 1948, the couple
1948, noted with satisfaction        the Prosvic family had been              went with Liska to Vseruby and
that “Prosvic carried with him       sent back to Prague in hand-             further to the fake US Army
lots of valuables, especially jew-   cuffs, the next victims of               post. There the StB’s scheme
els.” Much of it disappeared into    KAMEN, Oldrich and Ludmila               began to unravel. Malac imme-
the pockets of Evzen Abraham-        Malac, were on their way. 15 As          diately noticed that the two StB
ovic, Emil Orovan, and Toma-         an official of the Ministry of           agents pretending to be Ger-
soff. But that was trivial           Interior, a democrat with con-           mans spoke non-native Ger-
compared with the property the       tacts in the United States, and          man. Although Tomasoff
Prosvic family had left behind.      a security specialist, Malac was         interrogated Malac wearing a
There was the “beautiful apart-      a prime target of the Commu-             US uniform, he spoke the sort
ment,” to use the words of the       nist regime.                             of English he had learned
StB, in Prague and a spectacu-                                                among sailors, which was not
lar villa just outside the capi-       During the war, Malac worked           enough to fool Malac, a lawyer
tal. Exquisitely furnished, both     for Czechoslovak intelligence on         who had spent time in the
homes were filled with works of      behalf of the London-based gov-          United States during the war
art. Even though the villa had       ernment-in-exile. 16 He was fired        (1943–44). Moreover, Malac
belonged to Mrs. Prosvic, whom       from the Ministry of Interior on         noticed that Tomasoff used a
the court found innocent, the        4 March 1948, an obvious pre-            Czechoslovak-made typewriter
entirety of the Prosvic property     lude to more serious trouble.            with a keyboard that an Eng-
was confiscated. 13                  While Malac was contemplat-              lish-speaking user would have
                                     ing his bleak future, Janousek           found confusing. It became
 The crass nature of the CPC         came unannounced to see him              clear to Malac that he was sur-
bosses—and possibly the prime        in his apartment on Kamen-               rounded by actors. He refused
motivation for the operation         icka Street in Prague.                   to cooperate and was arrested,
against Prosvic—was revealed                                                  together with his wife. She was
when the villa was “purchased”         Janousek introduced himself
                                                                              treated gently by the still tenta-
the following year by Antonin        as “Johnny,” a courier of the
                                                                              tive Communist system of jus-
Zapotocky, one of the top three      CIC. He insisted that Malac's
                                                                              tice, but her husband was
party leaders at the time and        arrest was imminent, which
                                                                              sentenced to 15 years of hard
the eventual president of            was true, and proposed to
                                                                              labor. 18 Although the KAMEN
Czechoslovakia (1953–57). A          arrange for his and his wife’s
                                                                              personnel had failed to fool
review of the Prosvic case in        escape to the US-occupied zone
                                                                              Malac, the StB had nonethe-
January 1957 concluded that          of Germany. Given the purge
                                                                              less reached it objective and
the “seizure of the Prosvic villa    raging all around, Malac knew
                                                                              destroyed an opponent.

6                                                        Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
                                                                                            Cold War Deception

                                             Several days later, the whole group was found in the woods
  Sterbova. Malac proved to be               close to the border, mowed down by an automatic weapon.
far too sophisticated and knowl-
edgeable to find Tomasoff ’s per-
formance credible, but others               women were then escorted out         eral days later, the whole group
believed the KAMEN scheme                   by a fake German policeman,          was found in the woods close to
until the end. Such was the                 who indicated the direction          the border, mowed down by an
case with two women, Mrs.                   they were to follow and turned       automatic weapon. 21
Marie Sterbova and her daugh-               back. “I don't know how it hap-
ter, Vlasta, who experienced the            pened,” Mrs. Sterbova                 Military targets. KAMEN
KAMEN ordeal in June 1950.                  recounted, “but the moment the       was frequently used against
Mrs. Sterbova later confessed to            German official left us, we were     military officers. Major Josef
the StB: “Having crossed the                arrested by the Czech border         Hnatek, a Czechoslovak Air
state border we were guided by              guards, taken to Cheb and the        Force officer who had served as
a German customs officer to a               same day we were back in             a pilot with the Royal Air Force
CIC office where I made a com-              Prague.” Both women were con-        (RAF) and was a decorated vet-
plete statement regarding my                vinced they had been kid-            eran of the Battle of Britain,
underground organization. Sub-              napped from German territory.        was dismissed from service
sequently, I received a letter              After intense interrogations,        shortly after the Communist
recommending me to the CIC in               Mrs. Sterbova suffered a break-      coup. An StB agent approached
Selb.”                                      down and died in prison in           him in May 1948 and offered to
                                            December 1951. 20                    help him escape across the Iron
  Mrs. Sterbova trusted the fic-                                                 Curtain. The police protocol
titious American officer so com-              Bozena. Some not only never        puts it simply: “From the very
pletely that she agreed to                  reached safety but died en           beginning the escape was
answer in her own hand his                  route, possibly in ill-fated         arranged and directed by the
semi-literate and grotesquely               attempts to escape after they        security organs (KAMEN).”
misspelled “Guestionaire.” Hav-             realized they were being
ing declared herself a sworn                tricked. Such most likely was          Hnatek also invited his
enemy of Communism and a                    the case of Bozena, a “beguil-       brother and a friend. They trav-
member of an underground                    ing, vivacious, lovely blond girl    eled with a group of 11 others
resistance cell that she had cre-           of 20,” who caught the atten-        to Marienbad and then on to
ated on behalf of the CIC, she              tion of the StB as a girlfriend of   the Czechoslovak-German bor-
helpfully identified a soldier              Walter Birge, an assistant to        der. They were interrogated
when asked to list “Persons not             Ambassador Laurence A. Stein-        through the night. After they
agreeing with the present                   hardt at the US Embassy in           had completed the necessary
regime and wishing to ascape                Prague. In the summer of 1948,       forms, the phony American told
[sic] across the frontier.” Mrs.            at the end of their last date,       them they were “unreliable for
Sterbova also wrote a note to a             Bozena told Birge with an air of     the West,” and they were
relative, stating that she was              mystery: “Maybe next time we         handed over to Czechoslovak
“safe and under American pro-               meet, it will be in the West.”       authorities. “The financial
tection in Germany” and urg-                When she dropped out of exis-        means obtained from the
ing him to join the anti-                   tence, Birge anxiously investi-      arrested men were applied to
Communist resistance. “I hope               gated her disappearance among        benefit Operation KAMEN,”
you won't let me down,” she                 her friends. What he discov-         states the protocol, without
added.                                      ered was appalling. Bozena had       offering any further details.
                                            received an offer from an            The military court sentenced
  Vlasta filled in her own form,            unknown man to take her              Hnatek to death; this was
providing more names of cur-                across the border. She trusted       changed on appeal to 16 years,
rent and potential members of               him so much that she invited         and subsequently to 15 years,
the resistance. 19 The two                  seven friends to join her. Sev-      in prison. 22

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                   7
Cold War Deception

Even more shocking to StB inspectors was the discovery that                 setup in surprising detail. 27
the victims were sometimes chosen because they owned                        (See text box on facing page.)
something desirable and not because they posed a threat to
the regime.                                                                    About two weeks later, on 2
                                                                            July 1948, there was another
                                                                            US protest. It stated that
  KAMEN claimed many other         Discovery
                                                                            Czechoslovak security person-
victims in the officer corps,
                                     The StB was understandably             nel had been seen moving about
especially among those who had
                                   pleased by the productivity of           the border area in “American
distinguished themselves in the
                                   KAMEN. Jindrich Vesely, chief            cars and wearing United States
war against Germany. Air Mar-
                                   of the StB in the late 1940s, tes-       Army uniforms.” The embassy
shal Karel Janousek, RAF, the
                                   tified before an internal com-           made it clear it had no inten-
highest-ranking Czechoslovak
                                   mission in 1963: “I considered it        tion of interfering with what-
Air Force officer in Great Brit-
                                   then and still consider it now a         ever methods Prague used to
ain during the war, was lured
                                   clever, well thought out trick.” 25      guard the borders, but it disap-
into KAMEN shortly after the
                                   The stratagem played out not             proved of the misuse of Ameri-
Communist takeover. He was
                                   only in Vseruby but also near            can uniforms and insignia. 28
sentenced first to 19 years and
                                   Cheb, Marienbad, Domazlice,
then to life in prison. Inevita-                                              Czechoslovak authorities
                                   and other locations. But there
bly, KAMEN sowed seeds of                                                   rejected the protests with a sar-
                                   were problems. Only a small
mistrust among the officers and                                             castic note of their own. They
                                   fraction of the money and valu-
made it impossible for them or                                              denied the existence of any-
                                   ables confiscated from the
anybody else to distinguish                                                 thing untoward in the Vseruby
                                   would-be refugees was reported
between professional provoca-                                               area and hinted that the Ameri-
                                   and placed in state coffers; the
teurs and genuine operatives                                                cans were being somewhat par-
                                   bulk disappeared into the pock-
dispatched across the Iron Cur-                                             anoid. Even the “most minute
                                   ets of those running KAMEN.
tain by Western agencies.                                                   investigation in Vseruby has
                                     Even more shocking to StB              failed to find the smallest trace
  In accordance with the harsh
                                   inspectors was the discovery             or suspicion of a misuse of
logic of Stalinism, KAMEN was
                                   that the victims were some-              American insignia or portraits
eventually aimed at high-rank-
                                   times chosen because they                of US statesmen. We maintain
ing Communists targeted in the
                                   owned something desirable and            that the protest is based on a
purge, including, for instance,
                                   not because they posed a threat          report of an unreliable
Vladimir Clementis, a life-long
                                   to the regime, as had been the           informer.” 29
Communist who in 1948
                                   case with the Prosvics, for
replaced Jan Masaryk as for-                                                 The American description of
                                   example. It was also a source of
eign minister. On 28 January                                                KAMEN was accurate, and
                                   embarrassment that some vic-
1951, Clementis was snatched                                                Prague’s rejection of the US
                                   tims virtually had been forced
off the street in Prague and                                                protest can be ignored as diplo-
                                   to accept the phony offer of
forced into a car. 23 The StB                                               matic persiflage. But how did
                                   escape. 26 Those were minor
crew introduced themselves as                                               the United States find out
                                   problems from the point of view
CIC agents who had come to                                                  about KAMEN so quickly? This
                                   of the StB, however.
rescue him from an imminent                                                 question can now be answered
arrest and execution. He was         In its early weeks, the scheme         with complete certainty. The
put through the KAMEN rou-         seemed to be working fine.               source was Stanislav Liska, the
tine, was brought back to          Then came a big surprise: The            supposed escort to safety of the
Prague, formally arrested, tried   Americans found out about                Provic family and more who
and executed in the show trial     KAMEN and formally pro-                  would follow.
centered around former CPC         tested with a note on 15 June
Secretary General Rudolf           1948. It described the whole              Liska was part of a network
Slansky. 24                                                                 that gathered information for

8                                                      Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
                                                                                              Cold War Deception

   US Protest Note,                         orated officer of its elite branch-   were sent to dig uranium for
   15 June 1948                             the SOS (Straz obrany statu).         many years. 35
                                            Having served in the danger-
   For approximately four weeks, rep-       ous and often volatile prewar           Details contained in the US
   resentatives of the Czechoslovak         Sudetenland, Liska also               protest of KAMEN turned out
   State Security Police (S.N.B.),                                                to be Liska’s downfall. It was
                                            acquired an admirable military
   dressed in full uniform with insignia                                          obvious that the description of
   of officers of the United States         record. 32 He returned home and
   Army, have been conducting an            to his police work as soon as the     the fake US Army post could
   office in a house on Czechoslovak        Third Reich was defeated. In          have come only from someone
   territory in the western outskirts of    the winter of 1945, his chief,        who had been there. There had
   the village of Vseruby. In the con-      LtCol. Frantisek Havlicek,            to be a rotten apple in the
   duct of their business, these repre-                                           group that ran the operation in
   sentatives are seated behind a
                                            invited Liska to join a US-run
   desk on which there is conspicu-         intelligence gathering network.       Vseruby, and that group was
   ously displayed a bottle of Ameri-       Liska accepted the offer. 33          small. An internal investiga-
   can whiskey, packages of American                                              tion concluded that Liska was
   cigarettes and a small American            The network was initially pro-      the traitor, and he was arrested
   flag. On the wall behind their desk      ductive, and Liska, one of the        on 10 December 1948. 36
   is a large American flag and pic-
                                            principal players, was the rea-
   tures of Presidents Truman and
                                            son why the United States               The experienced policeman
                                            found out about KAMEN so              knew how to conduct himself in
   These S.N.B. representatives,            quickly. He later testified that      such circumstances. Despite
   dressed in uniforms of the United        at the end of February or in          harsh treatment and long inter-
   States Army, are assisted by other                                             rogations by Abrahamovic, he
   S.N.B. representatives who are
                                            early March 1948, Evzen Abra-
   dressed in uniforms of the German        hamovic of the StB came to            was cleared of all suspicion and,
   border police. According to factual      Vseruby, introduced himself as        after five months in prison, was
   evidence in the possession of the        Dr. Evzen Breza, and told             released because of lack of evi-
   Government of the United States,         Liska, “You have been chosen          dence. When other people
   the purpose of this office, as well as                                         around him continued to be
   of the fraudulent misuse of the uni-
                                            …to run a certain operation in
                                            this area. You will take people       arrested, Liska decided not to
   form of the Army of the United
   States and of the German border          across fake borders, we will          test his luck any further, and he
   police, as well as the display of the    arrange for a certain measure         crossed the border to the US-
   American flag and pictures of the        to take place, and interrogate        occupied zone in Germany on
   former and present presidents of                                               12 August 1949. 37
                                            them.” Abrahamovic then asked
   the United States, is to supplement
   other measures taken by the              to be taken to Mysliva, where
                                            he made a detailed plan of the          Liska found no respite west of
   Czechoslovak Government to pre-
   vent illegal departures from             area, and then left for Prague. 34    the Iron Curtain, however. His
   Czechoslovakia.                          He did not know that Liska,           life in the refugee camp in Lud-
                                            whom he had just recruited to         wigsburg took a dramatic turn
                                            be one of the main actors in          shortly after he arrived; he ran
US Army intelligence from the               KAMEN, was a part of the US           into Jan Prosvic, his first vic-
winter of 1945 to the summer of             network.                              tim in KAMEN. It turned out
1948. 30 The network was cre-                                                     that after his arrest in Vse-
ated by LtCol. Zoltan Josef                   Like other networks of its          ruby, Prosvic was sentenced to
Havas, US Army intelligence                 kind, this one eventually was         a forced labor camp, but the
(MIS), stationed in Regensburg              wrapped up by the StB. Two            enterprising engineer escaped,
and Straubing in southern                   men—Havlicek and Liska’s              fled the country, and made his
Germany. 31                                 deputy at Vseruby, police offi-       way to Ludwigsburg, where he
                                            cer Vaclav Snajdr—were sen-           ultimately had the pleasure of
  Liska had joined the police               tenced to death, and others           confronting the man who had
force in 1935 and became a dec-                                                   deceived and ruined him and

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                     9
Cold War Deception

Operation KAMEN was a fiendishly clever scheme with real
counterintelligence potential. However, the StB bosses failed to            alive as of October 2010, at the
exploit it because they were focused on destroying the “class               age of 89, living in the Czech
                                                                            Republic. Until some two or
                                                                            three years ago, undisturbed by
                                                                            any of the geopolitical upheav-
his family. Prosvic reported        some 2 or 3 km from Cheb, RFE           als that beset his country after
Liska to the US authorities as a    described the ersatz US Army            the Velvet Revolution of 1989,
Communist spy.                      post and the tragedy that               he could be seen lunching regu-
                                    played out there when three US          larly at the same place as the
  Liska was arrested by US Mil-     Embassy employees—two                   notorious traitor Karel Köcher.
itary Police and interrogated. In   young Czech women and a
his defense he typed out a long     man—arrived for their interro-            Tomasoff ’s boss, Evzen Oro-
statement, wherein he revealed      gation by the supposed US               van, became the head recep-
his three years of work for US      Army officer. This was followed         tionist and StB rezident (code
intelligence, his contribution to   by a dramatic portrayal of the          name OTA) in the Alcron Hotel,
the unmasking of KAMEN, and         Prosvic case, narrated by sev-          now the Radisson Blu, in
his other activities on behalf of   eral voices. The script con-            Prague. He assisted in all the
the democratic cause. 38 The US     cluded with a stern warning to          operations the StB ran against
authorities at the camp did not     “Dr. Evzen,” i.e., Abrahamovic,         westerners in the Alcron. His
charge Liska with espionage on      and to other top officers               StB employers viewed him as
behalf of a Communist power,        involved in KAMEN.                      completely reliable until 2 July
as they did in countless cases                                              1969, when he suddenly left for
involving double agents, nor did      Like most such threats float-         Israel with his third wife. They
they exclude him from consider-     ing over the heavily fortified          traveled with valid passports
ation for a visa to another West-   Iron Curtain on jammed radio            and exit permits but never
ern country. Instead, they          waves, this one was without             returned. 40
accelerated his departure, most     teeth. Tomasoff, the fake US
likely to Canada. This suggests     Army officer, died in January             Operation KAMEN was a
that Liska’s description of his     1953 of a brain tumor. But the          fiendishly clever scheme with
morally ambiguous role in the       other mastermind, Abraham-              real counterintelligence poten-
Cold War was accurate.              ovic, was more fortunate. He            tial. However, the StB bosses
                                    was injured in the fall of 1949         failed to exploit it because they
                                    in a mistaken shoot-out                 were focused on destroying the
Closure and Aftermath               between two StB undercover              “class enemy” and not on gath-
  After Liska’s departure in        teams in Prague. Each was               ering intelligence and learning
August 1949, two other actors       independently seeking to arrest         the truth about US activities in
in KAMEN, the fake German           a foreign agent, and at least one       Czechoslovakia. Indeed, their
border guards, crossed into the     StB officer was killed by               victims could reveal little, and
US-occupied zone in Germany.        friendly fire. Abrahamovic’s            while KAMEN did serve the
It would have been natural for      injury made it possible for him         interests of the StB and its CPC
the StB to discontinue the oper-    to weather the Stalinist purge          bosses by heightening distrust
ation at this point, yet KAMEN      while recovering at a spa.              and insecurity among demo-
continued until August 1951,                                                crats, its real impact was the
when Radio Free Europe (RFE)          Abrahamovic ultimately con-           destruction of the lives of inno-
warned against the deception. 39    tinued on to a long and happy           cent victims and the corrupt
Focusing on Svaty Kriz on the       life as a director of a large           enrichment of Communist
Czechoslovak-German border,         department store. He was still          thugs.

                                                                                            ❖ ❖ ❖

10                                                     Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
Cold War Deception


1. Zrzeszenie ‘Wolnosc i Niezawislosc’ w dokumen-       August 1945, when Tomasoff returned to Czechoslo-
tach, 6 volumes (Wroclaw: Zarzad Glowny WiN,            vakia. In Prague, Tomasoff contacted security spe-
1997-2001); Jerzy Slaski, Zolnierze wykleci (War-       cialists in the Central Committee of the Communist
saw: Oficina Wydawnicza Rytm, 1996).                    Party (CPC) who directed him to join the CPC intel-
                                                        ligence apparat, ZOB. Having lived in Great Britain,
2. National Archives and Records Administration,
                                                        Canada, United States, and South America, Toma-
NARA, College Park, MD. Laurence Steinhardt, US
                                                        soff claimed to speak Russian, Polish, Hungarian,
Embassy, Prague, to the Secretary of State, Wash-
                                                        German, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian,
ington, 30 April 1948, 860F.00/4-3048. The embassy
                                                        Hebrew, Yiddish, Danish, Norwegian, Hindu, and
strictly followed Ambassador Steinhardt’s view that
                                                        Latin. I am grateful to Colonel Adolf Razek of UDV,
once the police state had been formed in February
                                                        Prague, for documents on Tomasoff. The most com-
1948, all armed resistance became futile and coun-
                                                        prehensive treatment of this figure is in Prokop
                                                        Tomek, “Amon Tomasoff,” Securitas Imperii 12
3. Josef Spidla, “Krvava Svetlana,” Reflex 5, 16        (2005): 5–28.
(1994): 16–17.
                                                        9. AMI, 319-38-6, AMI 13065, and AMI 4219.
4. Archives of the Ministry of Interior (AMI), fond A
                                                        10. AMI, 13065, “Statement by Josef Janousek,”
8, inventory unit 156, sign. IM-085/55, 120 pp.
                                                        7 July 1948.
5. Spidla, “Krvava Svetlana,” Reflex 5, 16 (1994):
                                                        11. AMI, 13065. “Statement by Jan Prosvic,” 3 July
                                                        1948, StB, Prague.
6. Tennent H. Bagley, Spy Wars (New Haven, CT:
                                                        12. AMI, 4219.
Yale University Press, 2007), 110, 130–31.
                                                        13. AMI, 319-38-6. “Jan and Jirina Prosvic. For com-
7. AMI, H 796. The most comprehensive description
                                                        rade Minister,” 7 January 1957.
of Operation KAMEN comes from the pen of one of
its main protagonists, SNB (Police) Sergeant Stanis-    14. Ibid.
lav Liska, Ludwigsburg Camp, no date. See also
                                                        15. AMI, 319-22-6.
“Akce KAMENY,” UDV, Prague, 10 May 1996.
Milena Markova was blackmailed into employment          16. AMI, A8-1355. “Statement by Oldrich Malac,”
with the StB in 1947 on the basis of her less than      7 January 1966.
honorable behavior during the Nazi occupation.
                                                        17. Ibid and “Statement by Josef Janousek,” 9 Janu-
Having successfully used her several times, the StB
                                                        ary 1966.
decided she had become a liability and arrested her
in 1949. Having been held incommunicado in a soli-      18. AMI, file 13065, “Statement by Oldrich Malac,”
tary cell without any explanation, Markova hanged       12 July 1948, StB, Prague.
                                                        19. Jan Frolik, “Plukovnik Antonin Prchal a jeho
8. Amon Tomasoff (1922–1953) left Czechoslovakia        doba,” Minulosti zapadoceskeho kraje XXXI , (1996):
in 1937 and entered the United States. In October       179–84.
1944 he walked into the Soviet Consulate General in
                                                        20. Frolik, 141–42.
New York City and was received by Anatolii Yakov-
lev; he offered his services as a spy. After a severe   21. Walter Birge, Mémoirs, 253–54. This is an
lecture never again to come near the consulate,         unpublished manuscript. I am grateful to Mr. and
Tomasoff was introduced to an NKVD officer who          Mrs. Birge for giving me a copy.
called himself Alex. The Russian became particu-
                                                        22. AMI A-8-354-379. “The former Air Force Major
larly attentive when Tomasoff told him he was in the
                                                        Josef Hnatek,” 25 October 1956.
United States Merchant Marine and knew of fellow
sailors who had smuggled Trotskyite literature to       23. National Archives, Prague, Fond Commission II,
Soviet personnel during trips to Murmansk. Toma-        vol. 3, archival unit 37.
soff and Alex worked together in the United States,
                                                        24. Open Society Archives, Budapest (OSA), OSA-
observing strict tradecraft rules until the end of
                                                        300-30-31/box 18.

11                                                       Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
                                                                                         Cold War Deception

         Endnotes (cont.)

         25. Zdenek Valis, “Akce KAMENY,” 4. This is an           a journalist on various occasions in the 1960s and
         unpublished internal study, 10 May 1996.                 was always closely followed by the StB.
         26. Karel Bayer, Lubomir Stepan et al., Dokumen-         32. AMI, H 796, Stanislav Liska, “False Border,”
         tace vzniku a pricin nezakonnosti v cinnosti prokura-    Ludwigsburg, and interview with Jan Frolik, 13 Feb-
         tury v letech 1948–1952, 25–28. I am grateful to         ruary 1998, Prague.
         Colonel Razek for a copy of this document.
                                                                  33. AMI, 319-38-6. In light of the fact that both Hav-
         27. Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs          licek and Liska were part of a US Intelligence net-
         (AMFA), General Secretariat, 1945–1954, box 192,         work, it is ironic to read the former’s evaluation of
         US Embassy note no. 4680, 15 June 1948.                  his subordinate. Havlicek found Liska’s station in
                                                                  Vseruby to be in “excellent” condition. He admired
         28. AMFA, General Secretariat, 1945–1954, box 192,
                                                                  Liska’s “considerable achievements, especially in the
         US Embassy note no. 4749, 2 July 1948.
                                                                  field of special measures in the border area…” The
         29. AMI, sector II Ab to sector III Aa, 24 June 1948,    evaluation also stressed Liska’s active membership
         Jiri Wehle, chief of III/Ab; and AMI, sector III Aa to   in the CPC.
         sector III Ab, “Reply to the American Protest Note.”
                                                                  34. AMI, H 796, Stanislav Liska, “False Border,”
         30. AMI, 44516, Record of Interrogation of Emil          Ludwigsburg.
         Sztwiertnia, 14 April 1950, and Reports from Ger-
                                                                  35. Ibid. According to Liska’s testimony, Vaclav Sna-
         many, 3 May 1950.
                                                                  jdr played one of the German guards.
         31. AMI, 596973, “Causa Zoltan Joseph Havas.”
                                                                  36. Ibid.
         Born in 1920 in Czechoslovakia, Havas moved to the
         United States in 1937 on Columbus Day and became         37. AMI, A8-1355.
         a US Army intelligence officer. He was discharged as
                                                                  38. AMI, H 796, Stanislav Liska, “False Border,”
         a Lieutenant Colonel. Using police chief Frantisek
         Havlicek (code-named Sumava) as his point man,
         Havas (he signed his notes as “Zofka”) created an        39. OSA, Budapest, 300-30-31/box 18. The program
         intelligence network that involved mainly policemen      was broadcast on 31 August 1951.
         serving along the border. Havas later worked for the
                                                                  40. AMI, 638585.
         New York Times in Paris. He returned to Prague as
                                                                                         ❖ ❖ ❖

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                12
In the First Person

What I Learned in 40 Years of Doing Intelligence
Analysis for US Foreign Policymakers
Martin Petersen

                                            Martin Petersen is a retired senior CIA Directorate of Intelligence (DI)
                                            officer and the author of a number of articles on intelligence and intelli-
                                            gence analysis. In late 2009 he was asked by then–director of
                                            intelligence Michael Morell to create a course for managers on review-
                                            ing analytic products and teaching tradecraft, which became the Art of
                                            Review Seminar. This article is adapted from remarks delivered to DI
                                            managers in September 2010.

   Every intelligence
product must be rooted
      in a strong
                                              An advantage of getting older is increased perspective. I have
                                            been doing, thinking and writing about intelligence and intelli-
                                            gence analysis for almost 40 years now. The business we are in has
                                            changed a great deal in that time, but more in its form than in its
  understanding of the
audience it is written for.
                                              I want to focus on three broad topics: understanding the cus-
                                            tomer, the importance of a service mentality, and the six things I

                ”                           learned in doing and studying intelligence analysis during my
                                            career in the DI. While these experiences are drawn from work in
                                            the CIA, I believe the principles apply across the Intelligence Com-
                                            munity (IC).

                                             Understanding the Consumer: Five Fundamental Truths

                                               I believe every intelligence               tion—there is an overabun-
                                             product must be rooted in a                  dance of information, data,
                                             strong understanding of the                  opinion, and secrets—but time.
                                             audience it is written for, and I            The “future” in Washington is
                                             believe there are five funda-                four years at its longest point
                                             mental truths about the analyt-              and every day it is one day
                                             ical products and their                      shorter. It is not surprising
                                             consumers.                                   then that consumers of our ser-
                                                                                          vices are in a hurry and that
                                             Truth number one: the                        they are very busy people; the
                                             product is “optional                         president’s day is actually
                                             equipment” for many key                      planned in five minute incre-
                                             consumers.                                   ments. These people have
                                               The most precious commodity                many, many sources of informa-
                                             in Washington is not informa-                tion, and many of the people we

                                            All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the
                                            person interviewed. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or imply-
                                            ing US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                                   13
Lessons in Serving Policymakers

serve believe they are better plugged into the          assessments as long as they are well-reasoned,
world than we are. And in many cases, they are.         supported by data and argument, and presented
                                                        without rancor, value judgments, or arrogance.
  Our customers in the policymaking realm often
do not understand our mission, our values, or our       Truth number two: the written product is
standards. They tend to be skeptical of intelli-        forever.
gence, especially if they are new to the policymak-
                                                          A colleague who spent half his career in the DI
ing world. They formed their views about who we
                                                        and half in the National Clandestine Service
are, what we do, and how we do it from the same
                                                        (NCS) once said only half jokingly, “You know
sources other Americans do: popular media, the
                                                        what the DI’s problem is? You guys write things
press, and congressional reports—not always the
                                                        down. In the NCS we believe in the oral tradi-
most accurate or sophisticated of sources and
                                                        tion.” He was right in the sense that the written
generally not the most flattering. Our consumers
                                                        word is forever. Once it is printed, there is no tak-
have strong world views and clear policy agen-
                                                        ing it back or modifying it.
das, and they often assume we have a policy
agenda, too.                                            Briefings and background notes are important
                                                      parts of doing the mission, but they leave no per-
  It is not surprising then that policymakers do
                                                      manent record. One can fight over what was said
not always see how we can help them: “After all,
                                                                                         in a briefing,
I, the policy-
                                                                                         but the written
maker, am smart
                     Policymakers do not always see how we can help them.                word is in black
and have excel-
                                                                                         and white. It is
lent sources of
                                                                                         the WorldIntel-
information (including all the ones you have), and
                                                      ligenceReview (WIRe) article, the serial flyer, the
I am very busy, so why should I spend some of my
                                                      intelligence assessment, and the national intelli-
most precious commodity on you?” The reality for
                                                      gence estimate (NIE) that end up in the archives,
intelligence officers is that we must woo them,
                                                      and it is the paper product that gets held up at a
sell them on the need for our services, and dem-
                                                      congressional hearing or eviscerated on an edito-
onstrate the value of our material daily through
                                                      rial page.
its timeliness and its sophistication. If you are an
intelligence officer, the title will often get you in   And when I say forever, I mean forever. Rela-
the door, especially the first time, but it will not  tively few people have read the now infamous
keep you there. Newcomers to the IC may not           NIE done in 2002 on Iraq’s weapons of mass
realize that the CIA presence in the Oval Office      destruction (WMD), but everyone knows what it
during the George W. Bush administration was          says. And everyone years and years from now will
the exception, not the rule.                          know what it said, because it is viewed—rightly
                                                        or wrongly—as fatally flawed and responsible for
  If the IC is going to be part of the regular rou-
                                                        the second Iraq war. It will never go away, and it
tine in the White House, not only must we have
                                                        joins the pantheon of other real and imagined
something to say that people there cannot get
                                                        CIA failures. Every time we publish, we go “on
somewhere else—which has to be more than hav-
                                                        the record” and the record is there forever, for the
ing secrets—but we have to be mindful of how we
                                                        second guessers, the hindsight experts, and any-
deliver it. We are not only optional equipment; we
                                                        one with an agenda. Thus, our judgments need to
are also guests at their dinner party. If we spill
                                                        be as precise as we can make them, supported by
the wine, insult the host, and overstay our wel-
                                                        evidence and argument, and accurately reflect
come, we will not be invited back.
                                                        our level of confidence every time.
 Speaking truth to power first requires access to
power. My personal experience is that our con-
sumers will take frequent bad news and unhappy

14                                               Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
                                                                        Lessons in Serving Policymakers

Truth number three: the public does not                         ucts that go out the door are not personal
segregate success and failure.                                  products but corporate ones.
  Critics of intelligence, our customers, and the                 IC products have brand names, and they are
general public do not say that the products of a                important and powerful ones. They can open
certain office in CIA or DIA are really great, but              doors, but they will not keep any analyst inside
that the products of another office in that agency              circles of power if that brand name is devalued by
are awful. Nor do they say that one type of analy-              shoddy work. Our customers read our products
sis, say political, can be trusted, but that our                for many reasons: to learn, to make better deci-
work on something else, say S&T is unreliable.                  sions, to know what the President’s Daily Brief-
Nor will they say that although they were wrong                 ing tells the president, to look for ammunition in
last time, we can trust them this time.                         a policy fight, or to discredit what the IC says.
  No, customers remember, and they question.         Every poorly-reasoned piece of finished intelli-
Sometimes they question fairly, but often they do  gence tarnishes a brand name a bit and over time
not, especially those customers who find what is   can produce cracks in the trust they place in us to
being said to be inconvenient or “unhelpful” in    live up to our tradecraft. When that happens
advancing a policy position they favor. From the   there is nothing one can say and eventually the
CIA alone, I can produce a list of what I call                                         broader trust is
“everybody                                                                             lost. Ask BP and
knows”: every-
body “knows”       Every poorly reasoned piece of finished intelligence tarnishes Toyota. One bad
                                                                                       oil well and a
the CIA failed to a brand name.                                                        few sticky accel-
predict the fall                                                                       erators undid
of the Shah of Iran in 1979 or the collapse of the years of excellent performance, and shouting “but
Soviet Union in 1991 or the Indian nuclear test in our record is still better than that of [someone
1998 or this or that. The facts are often far more else]” makes no difference. We do not drill oil
complex, but they have entered the popular         wells or build cars. We do the mission—the mis-
mythology. And the consumers of intelligence say   sion of protecting the United States. Our ability
out loud “Why should I trust you on this issue     to “raise the level of the debate” or to “help policy-
when you were wrong on that one?” Weak perfor-     makers make the best decisions possible” or to
mance in one DI area immediately calls into        “speak truth to power”—however one defines the
question all work in the CIA.                      mission—rests on one thing and one thing only:
  President Kennedy famously said of the CIA       our reputations for analytic rigor, objectivity, and
that its successes will be secret and its failures total integrity. Lose that and we lose everything.
will be trumpeted. To which I add my own corol-
lary: in the intelligence business success is transi-           Truth five: our customers are smarter and
tory, and failure is permanent.                                 more sophisticated than we give them credit
                                                                for; they have their own independent sources
Truth four (closely related to truth three):                    of information and analysis with which we
our individual and collective credibility                       are competing.
—and thus our ability to do the
                                                                 And these customers are continually changing.
mission—rides on every piece of finished
                                                                We have to establish our credibility and useful-
intelligence that goes out the door.
                                                                ness individual by individual, administration by
 Sad to say, no one cares what I think about a                  administration. There is no down time when it
particular issue—and no one cares what you per-                 comes to quality.
sonally think either. They do care tremendously
about what the CIA or DIA—or name the IC orga-
nization—thinks. The finished intelligence prod-

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                  15
Lessons in Serving Policymakers

  These five truths demand tradecraft excellence,      on the producer, who thinks of a product as his or
they demand exacting standards. (see the DI            hers. It is also about packaging that product and
Quality Framework above for an example), and           disseminating it widely. Success is measured in
they demand the pursuit of perfection. They            numbers—how many units were produced or how
demand that we learn from our past, and they           many received each unit. It is about filling a book
demand that we ask the best of ourselves every         or producing a product to demonstrate that an
time. To do the mission; to serve the policy-          analyst is ready for the next big step in a career.
maker; to protect the nation—requires nothing
less.                                                    In a service mentality, the focus is on the cus-
                                                       tomer—the consumer of our services—and specifi-
The Importance of a Service Mentality                  cally on how best to meet the customer’s needs. It
                                                       is not about the author or the producing compo-
  Excellence requires more than a standard of          nent; it is about the recipient. It is about helping
quality. I believe it also demands a specific          that customer understand an issue. It is about
approach to the craft of intelligence analysis: it     being timely, relevant, expert, and corporate in
requires a service mentality. A service mentality      our approaches to providing service, intelligence
is the opposite of a product mentality, which often    analysis. Success is measured not by the number
seems to drive the work of intelligence analysis,      of units produced, but by how well the product
and the difference is easiest to explain by compar-    addresses and answers the specific concerns of an
ing the two. In a product mentality, the focus is      identified and targeted audience.

16                                              Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
                                                                        Lessons in Serving Policymakers

  Product and service are not mutually exclusive.               weakest analytic efforts. In the Art of Review
Ideally every product we produce should be                      Seminar we talk about “The Road to Ruin,” the
infused with a service mentality—although we                    first step on which is not clearly defining the
often act like we are in the product business.                  issue to be addressed. This in turn easily leads to
What difference does it make? When the product                  other, too common, failings in analytical writing:
is more important than the service it provides, we
relax our standards to get the product—another                  A failure to present a clear basis for
unit of production—off the assembly line and out                judgments.
the door. Close enough becomes good enough, and                   A weak piece typically speculates on what hap-
the brand name suffers.                                         pens next but seldom provides the reason an ana-
                                                                lyst believes the speculation is correct. The most
  To infuse every product with a service mental-
                                                                underused word in CIA DI analysis is “because.”
ity requires two things of intelligence analysts:
                                                                Every “may” and “likely to” and “could” requires a
One is a set of standards—the DI Quality Frame-
                                                                “because” statement or its equivalent—the rea-
work in CIA’s case; the other is mastery of a sim-
                                                                son we believe what we believe. Absent the
ple technique—asking two questions before
                                                                “because,” or its equivalent, that article is just
writing or briefing: who is the primary audience
                                                                another opinion in a town full of opinions.
for this piece and what is the specific intelligence
question they                                                                          The use of
need help with?                                                                        imprecise
                      Excellence requires a service mentality approach to the craft of language.
  It is very hard intelligence analysis.
for the author of                                                                                    It is not so
a piece to have a                                                                                  much that lan-
service mentality when he or she is focused on a                guage in a work of analysis is opaque but that the
broad intelligence topic rather than a specific                 point it is trying to make does not come through.
intelligence question. It is the difference between             It is stating that “X benefits from Y” without pro-
“we need a piece on the demonstrations in Tuni-                 viding a standard by which to measure the bene-
sia” and “we need a piece on the options the Tuni-              fit or spelling out precisely how and why X
sian government has for addressing the cause of                 benefits. Words like “limits,” “benefits,” “sug-
the demonstrations.” A good intelligence question               gests,” and all adverbs need a “because” or “why”
has the following properties: it bounds or nar-                 or “how” to convey precise meaning. Internal
rows the subject matter to be addressed; it gener-              inconsistencies, not surprisingly, are often rooted
ally contains a what, who, why, or where is it                  in imprecise language.
going element; it is specific as to the topic or
event being addressed; and it is a question and
                                                                The Six Things I Learned
generally not a “yes or no” question.
                                                                 We all learn the craft of intelligence analysis by
  It is possible to have many different intelli-                doing. The lessons are iterative and frequently
gence questions for the same event. Current intel-              opaque, and they generally come slowly. Often
ligence pieces generally work best when they are                they are only clear in looking back. Now looking
organized around one central question, although                 back over nearly 40 years, I think I have learned
they may touch on others. Which question to                     the following six things.
focus on is determined by who is selected as the
primary audience and what that audience is most                 First, how one thinks about the mission
interested in or most needs to understand.                      affects deeply how one does the mission.

  Forty years of experience have taught me that                   I think the intelligence analyst’s mission is less
failing to identify a specific audience and an intel-           about “connecting the dots” (although sometimes
ligence question up front is often at the root of the           it is) or predicting the future (although some-
                                                                times it is) or speaking truth to power (although

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                             17
Lessons in Serving Policymakers

we often do) than it is about understanding the          stand them. Every analyst—regardless of disci-
world. Dots and prediction and truth can cause us        pline or role—needs a deep appreciation of how a
to narrow our focus in a world of intelligence           people see themselves, their historical ambitions,
challenges that are characterized by their com-          and their grievances. For analysts focused on for-
plexity and most important, by their dynamic             eign leaders, or politics, or economics, it is essen-
nature. In 40 years I learned that quite often the       tial that they understand how power is acquired,
most important piece of the puzzle, and often the        the preferred way of exercising power, and the
hardest one to get a handle on, is what the              acceptable and unacceptable uses of power, as
United States is doing in a given situation—or, in       well as the defining life experiences of the key
military intelligence terms, understanding the           actors in the countries they specialize in.
“Blue” component of a situation.
                                                         Third, good analysis makes the complex
  I always thought of my job as “bounding uncer-         comprehensible, which is not the same as
tainty” and by doing so helping make my guy              simple.
smarter than their guy, whether it was across a
                                                           The key to making the complex comprehensible
conference table or across a battlefield and
                                                         is having in mind a specific audience and a very
enabling our policymakers to make the best deci-
                                                         precise intelligence question for the analysis to
sions possible given the time and information
                                                         tackle. Data dumps and murky analysis almost
available. Some-
                                                                                             always are
times that
                                                                                             rooted in try-
involved connect- Absent the “because,” or its equivalent, an article is just anoth-
                                                                                             ing to write
ing dots or pre-      er opinion in a town full of opinions.                                 about a devel-
dicting courses of
                                                                                             opment with-
action or provid-
                                                         out first asking, “Who is my audience and what
ing warning, but it always meant understanding
                                                         specific question does it need answered?” It is that
the forces at work in any situation—the key vari-
                                                         difference between “we need a piece on the riot-
ables and drivers and our adversary’s perspec-
                                                         ing in Athens” and “we need a piece on the gov-
tive. It is the difference between strategic
                                                         ernment’s options for addressing the underlying
understanding and tactical command of an issue.
                                                         cause of the rioting.”
Second, intelligence failures come from                    We do very well as a rule in responding to ques-
failing to step back to think about                      tions from policymakers. We come up short when
underlying trends, forces, and assumptions               we have to supply the audience and the question
—not from failing to connect dots or to                  ourselves and we start to write before we have
predict the future.                                      done all the thinking. If we think in terms of
  When our focus becomes too tactical we fail to         answering well defined questions, we can make
see the strategic. We must learn to step back from       complex situations comprehensible, and we also
time to time and ask ourselves: what are we not          stand a better chance of making clear what we
seeing that we would expect to see if our line of        know and do not know accurately, conveying our
analysis were correct. The IC’s 24-hour produc-          level of confidence, and presenting a convincing
tion cycle often makes this hard to do, but              basis for our judgments.
because it is hard to do, it is essential that we do
it.                                                      Fourth, there is no substitute for knowing
                                                         what one is talking about, which is not the
  An understanding of history and culture is key         same as knowing the facts.
to coming to grips with the assumptions that
                                                           Former CIA Director Michael Hayden once
underpin much of our analysis. And I am not
                                                         famously said, “If it is a fact, it ain’t intelligence.”
talking about our history and culture, but the his-
                                                         The business of intelligence analysts is more
tory and culture of the countries we work on as
                                                         about putting facts in perspective than it is hav-
the people and leaders of those countries under-

18                                                Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
                                                                                 Lessons in Serving Policymakers

ing command of the facts. We are paid not for                    DI’s greatest strengths. It is also one of its great
what we know, but for our ability to think about                 vulnerabilities. It makes it harder to step back
what we know—or think we know. It is about                       and think about underlying causes, drivers, and
knowing what is important. It gets back to those                 variables, especially in a crisis situation. My
assumptions, drivers and variables I dwell on.                   Tiananmen story is the exception. My career as
                                                                 an analyst taught me that lesson one (how we
  Sources—clandestine, open source, technical,                   think about the mission) and lesson two (under-
diplomatic, etc.—are not the same as knowledge.                  standing forces at work) are the key to operation-
Sources are not the equivalent of, or a substitute               alizing lesson five—the need to explain events.
for, expertise, the type of knowledge I talked
about in the second thing I learned. All sources                 Sixth, managers of intelligence analysts get
are best thought of as opinions, some more                       the behavior they reward, so they had better
authoritative than others, but all should be sub-                know what they are rewarding.
ject to careful reflection and comparison to what
                                                       This is a message for all managers and all who
we know and believe. The dangers in sources are
                                                     aspire to management. It is my experience that if
                                                     you have clear standards and are seen as consis-
• We tend to give greater credence to those that     tent and fair in applying them, your unit will live
  support what                                       up to the standard. And, you must also hold your-
  we already                                                                              self to the same
  believe.                                                                                standards. If
                    If we think in terms of answering well-defined questions, we you value ana-
• Sources are not
                    can make complex situations comprehensible.                           lytic trade-
  a scientific                                                                            craft, talk
  sample but a small slice of a much larger and      about it and practice it. If you want open commu-
  more complex information picture.                  nication where different interpretations are con-
                                                     sidered, invite it. If you want honesty, be honest.
• They never answer the critical question of what    And reward the behavior you profess to value.
  are we not seeing but should see if our analysis
  were correct.                                        There is a Chinese proverb: “If your vision
                                                     extends one year, grow wheat; if it extends 10
  During one of the most challenging times in my     years, plant trees; if it extends 10,000 years, grow
analytical career, I worked for the finest analyst I and develop men.” Managers, your job is to grow
ever knew. In the middle of the Tiananmen Cri-       men and women who can do the mission. The
sis in 1989—when everyone’s hair was on fire—I       standard of success, I believe, is uncompromis-
found him late one afternoon going through a         ingly simple: “Did I leave the unit I led stronger
stack of musty old reports. I asked him what he      than I found it?”
was doing. He said, “I am looking for things that
did not make sense then, but do now.” He found
some, and it profoundly affected our line of analy-  Why It All Matters
sis.                                                   If there is an underlying reality to all that I
                                                     have learned, it is the obvious: we are in a very
Fifth, intelligence analysis starts when we          difficult business. It is more life and death now
stop reporting on events and start explaining        than it was in my heyday. The consequences of
them.                                                getting analysis wrong are much greater now.
  Our production cycle puts a premium on being       Intelligence is also more “political” now in the
agile, quick, and smart. It is often 24 hours or     sense that what is done today is more open than
less. The DI is one place where a consumer can       it has ever been and as a result more subject to
ask a question and get an answer—a thoughtful        partisan sniping.
and considered one—overnight. It is one of the

       Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                               19
Lessons in Serving Policymakers

  There are some who say the United States is a      romanticized than other aspects of the Great
declining power or that it is the source of many of  Game. It is frustrating. It is exhausting. And even
the world’s problems. Time will tell on the first    the best efforts will be picked at. The analyst’s
question, but I believe the United States is a force work will be criticized by the knowledgeable and
for good in the world, and how powerful a force      the ignorant alike. It will even be demonized at
depends as much on our knowledge as on our mili-     times—independent of its quality—and it will
tary and economic might. I tell intelligence ana-    always be hostage to the politics of the moment.
lysts I teach that more often than not they are the
source of that knowledge. It is their professional-    But—and I say this with my four decades of per-
ism and tradecraft that provide checks on the sys-   spective—what intelligence analysts do has
tem, light the way, and leverage US power. All the   impact. It matters. I have seen the quiet victories
dollars spent on intelligence—the collectors in the  of intelligence and the mistakes averted, and I
field, the technical systems, and the lives at       have seen critics become advocates because of
risk—are for                                                                               what analysts
naught, unless                                                                             do every day.
that knowledge       What intelligence analysts do matters. I have seen the quiet
comes together in victories…mistakes averted…and critics become advocates.                   We all chose
what analysts do                                                                           careers in intel-
every day.                                                                                 ligence for the
                                                     same reason: to make a difference, to do the mis-
  As the deputy executive director at the CIA, I     sion. The colleague who teaches the Kent School’s
addressed each class of just-promoted CIA Senior     Art of Review Seminar with me tells a story
Intelligence Service officers, and each time I       about Abraham Lincoln, who in one of the dark-
asked for a show of hands of those who believed      est hours of the Civil War attended a Sunday ser-
they would never see WMD used on US soil in          vice in that little church that still stands across
their lifetimes. The question always startled        from the White House. On his way back, he was
them, and I never saw a single hand raised. We       asked by a fellow parishioner what he thought of
cannot afford to accept anything less than the       the young reverend. Lincoln replied that he had a
pursuit of perfection. We cannot accept anything     strong voice and clear message, but that he failed
less than holding ourselves to the highest stan-     to do one thing; he failed to ask us to do some-
dards. We cannot accept anything less than our       thing great.
best effort every time, every day. The potential
consequences are too great.                            I am asking every analyst who reads this to do
                                                     something great. Do what brought you here. Do
  And I know it is damn hard. Intelligence analy-    the mission every day to the best of your ability.
sis is less fun than a policy rotation or an over-   And, may God bless you for doing it.
seas assignment. It is less honored and

                                                  ❖ ❖ ❖

20                                               Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
Intelligence in Public Literature

The Dreyfus Affair: Enduring CI Lessons
Why the Dreyfus Affair Matters, by Louis Begley. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), xvi +
 250 pp., notes, index.

For the Soul of France: Culture Wars in the Age of Dreyfus, by Frederick Brown. (New York:
  Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), xxv + 304 pp., notes, index.

Dreyfus: Politics, Emotion, and the Scandal of the Century, by Ruth Harris. (New York: Henry
  Holt, 2010), xvii + 542 pp., notes, bibliography, index.

John Ehrman
   Officers new to counterintelligence (CI) and                      Editor’s Note: Readers familiar with the
overwhelmed by the scope of what they need to                     events are welcome to jump to the reviews of the
learn often ask the same question: “Where do I                    three new works on the subject, beginning on
start?” The best place might be the Dreyfus                       page 26, at “The Irresistible Topic.” Those new
affair. The tale of French Army Captain Alfred                    to or only slightly familiar with the case will
Dreyfus, his wrongful conviction for treason,                     want to read on to make the reviews more
and how the argument about his guilt plunged                      meaningful.
France into turmoil is as dramatic and rivet-
ing as any true story can be. Just as impor-
                                                                  An Apparent Success
tant, it took place at the dawn of the modern
intelligence era, when governments were form-                        The Dreyfus affair began, ironically, as an
ing the permanent, professional intelligence                      outstanding CI success. After the disaster of
services that we know today. Its timing made                      the Franco-Prussian War and collapse of the
the affair not only the first modern CI case but                  Second Empire in 1870, France began to
also the first modern CI disaster—that is, not                    develop a modern military intelligence sys-
just an investigative and legal error, but one                    tem and, during the 1880s, added a substan-
that spilled over from the intelligence world                     tial CI capability, housed in a unit of the
into the sphere of mass politics, with conse-                     General Staff called the Statistical Section.
quences for culture and society as well.                          Commanded by Col. Jean Sandherr, the Sta-
                                                                  tistical Section caught several spies in the
                                                                  army during the late 1880s, ran numerous
  Is there anything new to be learned about
                                                                  double agents, and built extensive surveil-
the Dreyfus affair? More than 115 years have
                                                                  lance networks to watch the movements of for-
passed since Dreyfus was convicted of treason,
                                                                  eign—and especially German—diplomats in
and it has been more than a century since he                      Paris. One of the section’s most valuable
was exonerated. With the facts of the case long                   recruits was Madame Marie Bastian, a clean-
settled, the archives thoroughly mined, and                       ing woman who worked in the German
hundreds of books and articles published, it                      Embassy and the apartments of German dip-
would seem unlikely that there is much left to                    lomats. The Germans routinely tore up sensi-
be discovered or said. As the appearance of                       tive documents and dropped the scraps into
three new books within a year indicates, how-                     their wastebaskets, which Mme. Bastian duti-
ever, scholars still can find new ways to look at                 fully emptied. Starting in 1889, she began
the affair and draw fresh insights from it.                       delivering the contents of the embassy’s

            All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in
            the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article’s
            factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                            21
The Lessons for CI of the Dreyfus Affair

wastebaskets to officers of the Statistical Sec-                   A Time of Troubles
tion. Much of what she handed over was ordi-
nary trash, but the French frequently                                 France in the mid-1890s was a troubled
reassembled and translated important docu-                         country, buffeted by numerous political, social,
ments. a                                                           and economic forces. The Third Republic had
                                                                   the support of most Frenchmen but, because
                                                                   many others were ambivalent about it or even
   One of Mme. Bastian’s deliveries, in Septem-                    denied its legitimacy, the republic was unsure
ber 1894, contained a torn-up note in French                       of its strength. Monarchists still hoped to
that, when pieced together by the Statistical                      restore a king, and conservative Catholics and
Section, proved to be a list of French military                    many clergy—themselves employees of the
secrets someone had given to the German mili-                      French state since 1802 and still in control of
tary attaché. An investigation started immedi-                     many aspects of French life—hated the repub-
ately, and suspicion soon fell on Capt. Alfred                     lic’s secularism. These groups were fiercely
Dreyfus, a 35 year-old Jewish artillery officer                    opposed by radicals and socialists, who not only
from a wealthy family in the lost province of                      defended republican ideals dating from 1789,
Alsace, then serving on the General Staff. The                     but also wanted to eliminate the Church’s
                                                                   influential and privileged position in French
investigators quickly concluded that the hand-
                                                                   life. Spectacular financial scandals wracked the
writing on the note, known as the bordereau,
                                                                   republic and often involved prominent political
belonged to Dreyfus, and he was arrested on 15                     figures. Added to the mix was the fear of sup-
October and charged with treason.                                  porters of the republic that the army was not
                                                                   loyal to the government, a specter that had
   Dreyfus was court-martialed and convicted                       become all too real in the late 1880s when it
in December, and sentenced to life in prison.                      seemed that a popular general, Georges Bou-
On 5 January 1895 in the courtyard of the                          langer, was close to seizing power. c
École Militaire, Dreyfus was publicly
degraded—his badges of rank and decorations                           France’s problems extended to the eco-
stripped, and his sword broken over the knee of                    nomic and demographic spheres. The Indus-
                                                                   trial Revolution was late coming to France
a sergeant—and sent to Devil’s Island, a hell-
                                                                   and, through the end of the 19th century,
ish rock off the coast of French Guiana. French-
                                                                   French economic growth lagged behind those
men of all political persuasions expressed their                   of other major European states. Its popula-
relief that the traitor had been caught and                        tion remained more rural, its industries were
given an appropriately harsh sentence. Except                      less capital-intensive, and its productivity
for Dreyfus’s brother, Mathieu, wife, Lucie, and                   growth was lower than Britain’s or Ger-
lawyer, Edgar Demange, all France ignored the                      many’s—Europe’s economic and technological
captain’s claim of innocence and seemed con-                       powerhouse—and overall growth in the 1880s
tent to forget about him. b                                        and 1890s was low enough that economic his-

a For the establishment of French intelligence after the Franco-Prussian War, see Allan Mitchell, “The Xenophobic Style: French
Counterespionage and the Emergence of the Dreyfus Affair,” Journal of Modern History 52, No. 3 (September 1980): 414–25, and
Douglas Porch, The French Secret Services (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995), 28–30. For the Statistical Section, its ca-
pabilities, and Madame Bastian’s role, see Jean-Denis Bredin, The Affair (New York: George Braziller, 1986), 43–47, and Marcel
Thomas, L’Affaire Sans Dreyfus (Paris: Fayard, 1961), chap. 2.
b Bredin, The Affair, 98.

c For the evolution of the Third Republic and the various political splits in France during the late 1800s, see Jean-Marie Mayeur

and Madeleine Rebérioux, The Third Republic From its Origins to the Great War, 1871–1914 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1984), Part I, originally published in French as Les Débuts de la Troisième République and La République radicale? (Paris,
Editions du Seuil: 1973); and Norman Stone, Europe Transformed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 271–303. For
the position of the Catholic Church, see Othon Guerlac, “The Separation of Church and State in France,” Political Science Quarterly
23 (June 1908): 259–96, and for Boulangism, see Bruce Fulton, “The Boulanger Affair Revisited: The Preservation of the Third Re-
public, 1889,” French Historical Studies 17, No. 2 (Fall 1991): 310–29. A brief overview of the Third Republic before the Great War
is Alan Farmer, “The Third French Republic, 1871–1914,” History Review (September 2001): 41–46.

22                                                                Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
                                                                              The Lessons for CI of the Dreyfus Affair

torians have talked of France’s stagnation                          sphere, and during this period was intimately
during the period. Comparisons with Ger-                            connected with France’s conception of itself.
many, of course, were critical to the French.                       With the country so divided, the conscription-
Even as they talked bravely of the inevitabil-                      based army was the only institution that
ity of another war and gaining revenge for the                      Frenchmen had in common and upon which
humiliation of 1870, Frenchmen knew that                            they all looked with respect. The army, in turn,
their country was falling behind in the vital                       saw itself as rising above the country’s politi-
indexes of national power. a                                        cal squabbles and petty problems to embody
                                                                    the true spirit of France. Still, however,
   By far the ugliest manifestation of France’s                     because of the mystical conception of its role,
nervousness, however, was the wave of anti-                         as well as the widespread fear that anything
Semitism that had been spreading across the                         that undermined the army’s claim to infallibil-
country since the late 1880s. It started in 1886,                   ity would increase France’s vulnerability to
when a racist journalist named Édouard Dru-                         Germany, officers and many civilians believed
mont published La France Juive, a book that                         that the army had to be exempt from any
blamed all of France’s troubles on Jews. Dru-                       external criticism. c
mont and others, using the new media of mass
newspapers and inexpensive books, found a
nationwide audience for a message built on the                      The Case Returns
ancient theme that Jews were treacherous out-
siders. Conservative Catholics, blaming Jews                           Even before Alfred was deported to Devil’s
for the republic’s anticlericalism and accusing                     Island, Mathieu, Lucie, and Demange began
them of conspiring against Christianity, and                        working to void the conviction and secure a
socialists, who held Jews responsible for the                       new trial (“révision”). As they approached
evils of capitalism, also took up the cause.                        senior political figures and journalists seeking
Although anti-Semitism had peaked and was                           support, the trio gradually learned that Drey-
in decline as a political movement by 1894, in                      fus’s conviction had been far more than a
large part because it lacked a coherent pro-                        ghastly mistake and miscarriage of justice.
gram and strong leadership, it still remained,                      Sandherr and other senior officers were truly
as one historian of the phenomenon has noted,                       convinced that Dreyfus was guilty—they
“a considerable latent force” in French society. b                  believed the handwriting on the bordereau to
                                                                    be his and took it for granted that a Jew would
  Amidst the troubles of the Third Republic,                        be predisposed toward treason, but they also
the French army occupied a unique position.                         understood that the investigation had been
The army not only was the country’s defense                         badly flawed and that the case against him was
against Germany, but it also was expected to be                     weak. In the weeks before the trial, they had
the instrument—having been reformed and                             searched for additional evidence but, finding
modernized after the war—with which France                          little, began forging documents to shore up the
eventually would gain revenge for its defeat.                       case. They secretly gave a file combining real
But the army’s role went beyond the military                        and forged documents to the judges at Drey-

a Mayeur and Rebérioux, Third Republic, 46, 42; Rondo Cameron, “Economic Growth and Stagnation in France, 1815—1914,” Jour-

nal of Modern History 30, No. 1 (March 1958): 1—13; N. F. R. Crafts, “Economic Growth in France and Britain, 1830—1910: A Re-
view of the Evidence,” Journal of Economic History 44, No. 1 (March 1984): 59; “War, Migration, and the Demographic Decline of
France,” Population Index 12, No. 2 (April 1946): 73–75.
b Robert Byrnes, Antisemitism in Modern France (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1950), 180–81, 251, 321–22; Paula

Hyman, “The French Jewish Community From Emancipation to the Dreyfus Affair, in Norman Kleeblatt, ed., The Dreyfus Affair:
Art, Truth, and Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 28; Michael Marrus, “Popular Anti-Semitism,” in Kleeblatt,
Dreyfus Affair, 59. See also Robert Byrnes, “The French Publishing Industry and Its Crisis in the 1890’s [sic],” Journal of Modern
History 23, No. 3 (September 1951): 232–42, and Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Co., 1951), chap. 4.
c Allan Mitchell, “‘A situation of Inferiority’: French Military Reorganization after the Defeat of 1870,” American Historical Review

86, No. 1 (February 1981): 60; Mayeur and Rebérioux, The Third Republic, 188–90.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                                    23
The Lessons for CI of the Dreyfus Affair

fus’s court martial and, with the defense              Next, while on leave in Paris in June 1897, Pic-
unaware of the file’s existence and unable to          quart told his lawyer what he had learned. The
refute it, convinced them to convict the cap-          lawyer, in turn, passed the information to some
tain. Mathieu found out about the file in Febru-       of the same individuals whom Mathieu Dreyfus
ary 1895, and its existence became public              had approached for help.
knowledge in September 1896, when
L’Éclair—an anti-Dreyfus newspaper seeking                With these revelations, events began to
to refute articles by Dreyfus’s supporters             move swiftly, and public support for révision
(Dreyfusards)—cited it as irrefutable proof of         grew. L’Aurore, a newspaper edited by Georges
his guilt.                                             Clemenceau—a politician who initially believed
                                                       Dreyfus guilty, but who now supported révis-
   In the meantime, the case against Dreyfus           ion—started publication in October 1897 and
fell apart, causing the leadership of the army         became the major Dreyfusard platform. In mid-
to take desperate measures to maintain the fic-        November, Mathieu—upon learning that Ester-
tion of his guilt. In early March 1896, another        házy had written the bordereau—published an
of Mme. Bastian’s deliveries contained a note          open letter to the minister of war accusing the
that became known as the petit bleu, which             major. Another investigation followed, and
indicated a French traitor still was providing         Esterházy, demanding a trial to clear his name,
military secrets to the Germans. Commandant            was court-martialed in January 1898. The
Georges Picquart, who had succeeded Sand-              Dreyfusards had great hopes for the trial—the
herr as commander of the Statistical Section,          evidence against Esterházy was strong, and a
immediately started an investigation. Picquart         conviction promised to exonerate Dreyfus and
had observed Dreyfus’s trial for the Ministry of       force révision. But the General Staff, deter-
War and General Staff and believed him to be           mined to cover its tracks, manipulated the trial
guilty, but Picquart also was a thorough and           behind the scenes, and the major was acquit-
honest investigator. As he went to work on the         ted on 11 January. It was this sham trial and
petit bleu and reviewed the Dreyfus evidence,          prearranged verdict that led the novelist Émile
Picquart found the truth: the handwriting of           Zola, who already was a leading voice for the
the bordereau and the petit bleu was that of           Dreyfusards, to write and publish in L’Aurore
Major Ferdinand Esterházy, an officer chroni-          two days later his “Letter to M. Felix Faure,
cally in debt and with a well-earned reputa-           President of the Republic,” or, as Clemenceau
tion as a scoundrel. With Picquart beginning to        concisely titled it, “J’Accuse.”
press his superiors to arrest Esterházy—and
they, in turn, determined to preserve the
army’s image and conceal their own mis-                The Affair
deeds—the deputy chief of the General Staff in
October 1896 sent Picquart on a mission to                The publication of “J’Accuse” started the 20-
eastern France and, from there, in December            month period during which Dreyfus dominated
assigned him to a post in Tunisia. With Pic-           French politics and society, and that is remem-
quart out of the way, General Staff officers con-      bered as the heart of the affair. Zola, in prose
spired directly with Esterházy to forge more           that retains its power even today, accused the
documents to add to the case against Dreyfus           army of multiple violations of the law and
and discredit Picquart.                                named the officers responsible. His goal was to
                                                       challenge the government to try him for libel
   The truth could not be suppressed indefi-           and thus give the Dreyfusards another chance
nitely, however. Until the revelation of the secret    to present their case in court. Again, however,
file, Lucie, Mathieu, and Demange mostly had           the army thwarted the Dreyfusards. Zola was
worked behind the scenes to gain support for           tried on a narrow charge that effectively
révision, and the public paid little attention to      excluded evidence relating to Dreyfus. Despite
Dreyfus. Now, Lucie petitioned the Chamber of          damning testimony from Picquart, the Drey-
Deputies for révision, bringing the case greater       fusards lost when Gen. Raoul de Boisdeffre, the
prominence in the newspapers and public arena.         chief of the General Staff, intimidated the court

24                                                    Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
                                                                              The Lessons for CI of the Dreyfus Affair

with a reminder of the army’s central role in                       French politics—and the press carried their
French life. “If the nation does not have confi-                    arguments to every corner of France. The affair
dence in the leaders of its army, in those who                      focused, too, on the place of Jews in France.
bear the responsibility for the national                            Anti-Dreyfusards tarred Jews as traitors or
defense,” he told the court, “they are ready to                     worse, and anti-Semitic newspapers, including
relinquish that onerous task to others. You                         Drumont’s Libre Parole and much of the Catho-
have but to speak.” Zola was convicted on 23                        lic press, spread vile anti-Jewish propaganda
February and in July fled to England to avoid                       and imagery. Not surprisingly, anti-Semitic
imprisonment just a few days after Picquart                         rioting swept France and Algeria in early 1898,
was jailed on a trumped-up charge of divulging                      leading an American journalist to note that in
state secrets by telling his lawyer the previous                    “France today, it is perilous to be a Jew.” b
year what he had learned. a
                                                                       As the affair continued in the streets and
   The affair now engulfed France, bringing the                     newspapers, the legal maneuvering went on.
various forces in French life into a massive col-                   Finally, on 3 June 1899, France’s highest court,
lision. To a modern American audience, the                          the Supreme Court of Appeal, granted révision
depth of division and feelings ignited by the                       and ordered a new trial. On 9 June, Dreyfus
affair are almost incomprehensible. In US his-                      boarded a French cruiser, and he arrived in
tory probably only the climax of the debate on                      France on 1 July. Zola, meanwhile, had
slavery in 1860 was similar. The factions                           returned to Paris on 4 June, and Picquart was
arranged themselves on each side, and each                          released from prison on 9 June.
organized mass groups and demonstrations. On
the Dreyfusard side, pressing the legal and                            Politically, too, the Dreyfusards seemed to
political cases for révision, stood an alliance of                  have gained the upper hand. On 22 June, a
republicans, secularists, modernizers, and                          Dreyfusard, René Waldeck-Rousseau, formed a
socialists, as well as those conservatives                          center-left coalition government. A stronger
appalled by the injustice of the case and by the                    individual than most previous Third Republic
army’s extralegal maneuvering. Leading the                          prime ministers, Waldeck-Rousseau was deter-
fight against Dreyfus was the army, which                           mined to end the turmoil that threatened the
claimed that no legal basis existed for révision,                   republic. He moved quickly to restore disci-
that reopening the case would weaken the                            pline to the army by reassigning or retiring
army disastrously, and that the calls for révis-                    senior officers involved in the affair. He also
ion were a Jewish plot to undermine the army                        ordered the arrests of prominent anti-Semites
and France. The army was joined by tradition-                       for fomenting unrest and suspended the sala-
alists, nationalists, the Catholic clergy, and                      ries of Catholic clergy who were speaking out
anti-Semites, each of whom saw révision as a                        against the government. c
threat to their particular conception of what it
meant to be French. Intellectuals on both sides                       Dreyfus’s second court martial began on 7
wrote voluminously—the affair marked the                            August 1899 in the town of Rennes. Counting
emergence of the intellectuals as a force in                        the Esterházy and Zola trials, it was the fourth

a De Boisdeffre quoted in Bredin, The Affair, 268.
b Meyeur and Rebérioux, The Third Republic, 185; John T. Morse, Jr., “The Dreyfus and Zola Trials,” Atlantic Monthly (May 1898):
589. Every account of the Dreyfus affair contains detailed descriptions of the impact on French life in 1898–99, but Bredin, The
Affair, part III, may be the best. On specific aspects of this period, see Stephen Wilson, “The Antisemitic Riots of 1898 in France,”
Historical Journal 16, No. 4 (December 1973): 789–806; Paula Hyman, “The Dreyfus Affair: The Visual and the Historical,” Journal
of Modern History 61, No. 1 (March 1989): 88–109; Nancy Fitch, “Mass Culture, Mass Parliamentary Politics, and Modern Anti-
Semitism: The Dreyfus Affair in Rural France,” American Historical Review 97, No. 1 (February 1992): 55–95; Norman Kleeblatt,
“MERDE! The Caricatural Attack Against Emile Zola,” Art Journal 52, No. 3 (Fall 1993): 54–58; Jeremy Jennings, “1898–1998:
From Zola’s ‘J’accuse’ to the Death of the Intellectual,” European Legacy 5 (December 2000): 829–44; and Susan Suleiman, “The
Literary Significance of the Dreyfus Affair,” in Kleeblatt, Dreyfus Affair, 117–39.
c On Waldeck-Rousseau’s ministry, see R. A. Winnacker, “The Délégation des Gauches: A Successful Attempt at Managing a Parlia-

mentary Coalition,” Journal of Modern History 9, No. 4 (December 1937): 449–70.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                                    25
The Lessons for CI of the Dreyfus Affair

time the case had come to a court and, once                         French as L’Affaire in 1983, with the US edi-
again, army witnesses insisted that the evi-                        tion appearing in 1986), remains the best avail-
dence confirmed Dreyfus’s guilt. On 9 Septem-                       able in English. Bredin, a prominent French
ber, the court-martial convicted Dreyfus of                         lawyer, tells the story carefully and with pre-
treason, but this time with attenuating circum-                     cise detail. His prose, however, is never ponder-
stances, and sentenced him to 10 years. The                         ous, which makes the book’s 500-plus pages
absurdity of the verdict—Esterházy had pub-                         easy to read, especially as he gives his readers
licly admitted in July that he had written the                      a good feel for the passions that swept France.
bordereau and, in any case, how could treason                       Given his reliability as a historian and his lit-
be excused?—appalled the world. The judges,                         erary skill, Bredin is unlikely to be surpassed
wrote the New York Times in a comment typi-                         for many years. Nonetheless, in the past two
cal of foreign reaction, “looked more guilty”                       years three authors have tackled the Dreyfus
than Dreyfus ever had. a                                            affair. Each has looked at it from a different
                                                                    point of view, and each is worth reading for dif-
   With France exhausted by the affair and the                      ferent reasons.
object of worldwide ridicule, a solution had to
be found. After the Rennes verdict, Waldeck-                           The first of the books, by lawyer-novelist
Rousseau began working with other Drey-                             Louis Begley, is Why the Dreyfus Affair Mat-
fusards to arrange a pardon, which President                        ters. At just over 200 pages of narrative, it is
Emile Loubet granted on 19 September 1899.                          the shortest of the three, and Begley provides a
Two days later, the minister of war, Gen. Gas-                      concise and workmanlike narrative of the
ton de Galliffet, instructed the army that the                      affair. Indeed, anyone who is new to Dreyfus
“incident is over,” and, in December 1900, an                       and simply wants a quick overview of the case
amnesty law was passed, excusing all mis-                           will be satisfied. But Begley has a greater pur-
deeds related to the affair. The Dreyfus affair                     pose for his book. It is part of a Yale Univer-
quickly died away, although Alfred continued to                     sity Press series called “Why X Matters,” which
pursue révision of the Rennes verdict and com-                      tries to show the current relevance of people
plete exoneration. Finally, on 12 July 1906, the                    and ideas from the past. For Begley, the rele-
Supreme Court of Appeal overturned Rennes,                          vance comes from the war on terror, the abuses
declaring that “of the accusation against Drey-                     at Abu Ghraib, and questionable charges
fus, there is nothing that remains standing.”                       against detainees at Guantanamo. “Just as at
On 20 July, in the same courtyard where he                          the outset of the Dreyfus Affair the French
had been degraded almost 12 years before,                           found it easy to believe that Dreyfus must be a
Dreyfus was restored to the army with the                           traitor because he was a Jew, many Americans
rank of commandant and was made a knight of                         had had no trouble believing that the detain-
the Legion of Honor. b                                              ees at Guantanamo–and those held else-
                                                                    where—were terrorists simply because they
                                                                    were Muslims,” he writes.(43) Begley’s heroes
The Irresistible Topic                                              are the Dreyfusards and those he sees as their
                                                                    modern-day heirs in the United States—the
   The drama of the affair has made it irresist-                    whistle-blowers, lawyers, and judges who have
ible to writers. All of the major participants                      stood up against “kangaroo trials” and
wrote books and memoirs, the first appearing                        “redeemed the honor of the nation.”(45)
while the affair still was unfolding, and hun-
dreds of works have appeared since. Amidst                            Begley has a point, but it is not as strong as
this wealth of written accounts, however, that                      he believes. He certainly is correct that the
of Jean-Denis Bredin, The Affair (published in                      Dreyfus affair is a reminder of the need for

a Rowland Strong, “‘Guilty’ Is the Dreyfus Verdict,” New York Times, September 10, 1899: 1. For foreign reactions to the Rennes ver-

dict, see R. D. Mandell, “The Affair and the Fair: Some Observations on the Closing Stages of the Dreyfus Case,” Journal of Modern
History 39, No. 3 (September 1967): 253–65.
b Bredin, The Affair, 434, 480.

26                                                                Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
                                                                       The Lessons for CI of the Dreyfus Affair

great care in making serious charges and of                     trolled the republican government. Similarly,
humanity’s almost infinite capacities for injus-                Brown’s description of reactions to the Eiffel
tice and hysteria. But Americans do not need                    Tower shows how these controversies encapsu-
to look to Dreyfus for that lesson; we have                     lated the passions and irrationality running
cases like Leo Franks, the Scottsboro Boys, My                  through French society. “For aesthetes, Eiffel’s
Lai, and Watergate to show us our own records                   tower was the grotesque child of the industrial
of injustice and the covering up of official mis-               age, desecrating a museological city. For Catho-
deeds. More important, the United States in                     lics, it was the sport of revolutionary Nimrods
the first decade of the twenty-first century is                 expounding their secularism in Notre Dame’s
not France in the 1890s. There are no serious                   parish with phallic arrogance. And for nation-
challenges to the legitimacy of our republic, no                alist zealots, who joined the chorus, the
institution makes the French army’s claim of                    wrought-iron tower, incommensurate with
being exempt from criticism, and US adminis-                    everything else in Paris, was a tyrannical
trations have not used slander or forged evi-                   mutant, a foreigner lording it over the French
dence to cover up crimes. Rather, the debates                   past and future, a cosmopolite aspiring to uni-
about Guantanamo and the treatment of pris-                     versality, a potential instrument of treason. As
oners have been typical of how modern Ameri-                    such, it could only be the invention of ‘Israel.’”
can politics work through controversial issues                  (151)
for which there are few precedents—slowly and
hesitantly, surrounded by noise, and with the                      In this telling, the Dreyfus affair becomes
fear of making an irrevocable mistake out-                      just one more front in France’s internal con-
weighing any desire to rush to a conclusion.                    flicts. Indeed, Brown’s account of the affair
This muddle may be unsatisfying, but it also                    takes only 50 of the book’s 250 pages of text,
means that the United States is not ripping                     and it seems notable more for its intensity than
itself apart or indulging in the kind of ethnic                 for the issues in play. Every factor at work dur-
hatred that marked the French debate about                      ing the affair had been on display since 1870,
Dreyfus.                                                        and many of the individuals who would play
                                                                major roles in the controversy had come to
   If Begley’s book serves best as an introduc-                 prominence in the episodes Brown describes;
tion, Frederick Brown’s For the Soul of France                  French cultural and political history from 1870
places the affair in its broad context. This is                 until Dreyfus’s arrest seems to be a long
the best written of the three books, as Brown,                  rehearsal for the climactic period from his deg-
who previously penned a biography of Zola,                      radation to the Rennes verdict. The risk of this
combines deft writing and biographical                          approach is that the affair might start to lose
sketches with brief histories of the major politi-              its visibility and no longer seem as important
cal and cultural conflicts that marked the first                an event as we are used to viewing it. Nonethe-
three decades of the Third Republic. Each of                    less, For the Soul of France is the account for
the cases he presents—including the building                    those who like their history presented with lin-
of Sacré-Coeur, the scandals over Union Gén-                    ear themes and who want to know the long
érale and Panama, the rise and fall of Bou-                     background to specific events.
langer, the building of the Eiffel Tower, as well
as the Dreyfus affair—pitted the forces of                         The last of the three books, by Oxford Uni-
French traditionalism and Catholicism against                   versity historian Ruth Harris, is Dreyfus: Poli-
modernizers and secularists, in battles far                     tics, Emotion, and the Scandal of the Century.
more fierce than any of the culture wars we                     This is a comprehensive history of the affair
have experienced in the United States during                    and goes well beyond the standard narrative
the past two decades. In each episode, more-                    approach, such as that used by Bredin.
over, the arguments eventually centered on the                  Instead, Harris dives deeply into the people,
Jews and their place in French society. The col-                ideas, and cultural phenomena of the affair.
lapse of the Union Générale, which was run by                   The result is a book of great complexity, filled
a Catholic financier, was widely attributed to                  with many surprises. The history of the affair
Jewish conspiracies that simultaneously con-                    has been written from the Dreyfusard side,

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                  27
The Lessons for CI of the Dreyfus Affair

which has given us a portrait of brave and good      Dreyfusards’ propaganda and myth-building as
Dreyfusards fighting the reactionaries and big-      well as the anti-Dreyfusards’ use of Catholic
ots. By digging deep, however, Harris shows          martyrology to build support for their cause.
that the situation was much more complicated.        Elsewhere, Harris wonders why many on the
Early on, for example, she shows that the            right insisted on Dreyfus’s guilt despite the evi-
army’s relationship with Dreyfus was uneasy          dence and their own unease with anti-Semitic
long before the discovery of the bordereau.          excesses. The answer, she says, lies in their
Dreyfus owed his advance to reforms—enacted          memories of political battles from years past.
after the Franco-Prussian War— that created a        “When they saw Joseph Reinach and Georges
modern staff system and opened opportunities         Clemenceau, who had been tainted by the Pan-
for Jewish officers who, until then, would have      ama Scandal, running the Dreyfusard cam-
been on the margins of the army. But tradition-      paign, they were appalled that such politicians
alists disliked the reforms, many of which were      should now claim the moral high ground,” she
copied from the Germans. By 1894, the tradi-         explains.(217) Harris also has a fascinating
tionalists were regaining power in the army,         chapter on salonnières and mistresses of pow-
and the officer corps was again closing to out-      erful men—what is French history without
siders; Harris speculates that Dreyfus’s career      them?—who played critical roles in the affair.
probably would not have lasted much longer,          On the Dreyfusard side, too, Harris reveals
even if he had never come under suspicion of         that backbiting and self-serving behavior were
espionage.                                           the norm.

   Harris finds other crosscurrents to explore.         This is an insightful and sophisticated book.
One intriguing aspect was the role of the many       Harris’s micro-level view of the affair gives a
Alsatians who were involved in the affair and        vivid demonstration of how and why people
who, like the Jews, were in a difficult position.    acted as they did, and few come out as purely
“Alsatians insisted on their Frenchness, but         good or bad. She also tells us much about what
they were often seen as the embodiment of            was happening around France and how the
Germanness. They thus had to position them-          affair played out in the provinces. This is not
selves against the prejudices and storms that        an easy book, however. The prose is clear and
such polarized categories created,” she writes.      generally lively, but the level of detail means
(74) Dreyfus, in an unfortunate reflection of his    that in some places it is hard going. Nor is this
Alsatian origin, spoke French with a German          the book for anyone new to the affair. A reader
accent, which made him doubly suspect. This          who plunges into Dreyfus without either a
also leads to her portrait of Picquart, whom the     familiarity with French history and politics or
Dreyfusards held up as a great hero of the           without first reading Bredin or Brown is
affair, but who also typifies the contradictions     unlikely to get very far. Those with the back-
within many of the players. Picquart was an          ground, however, will find it an exceptionally
Alsatian, which made it that much easier for         rewarding work.
his superiors to hound him and portray him as
a pawn in external conspiracies; he was a
shrewd bureaucrat but fudged some aspects of         Dreyfus and Counterintelligence Today
his investigation to protect his career; he was
an intellectual and a polymath in an army that          As interesting as Brown’s and Harris’s
distrusted too much cleverness; and he shared        approaches to Dreyfus are, some may wonder
the anti-Semitism of the officer corps.              what relevance these books, and the affair,
                                                     have for us today. There are several answers to
  Harris undertakes many other interesting           this question. The most obvious, from Begley, is
explorations, each of which shows that nothing       that the affair is a timeless warning about
about the affair can be taken at face value. For     injustice. The memory of Dreyfus does indeed
example, Harris shows how Dreyfus became a           remain a touchstone for those who want to call
useful object for both sides as they pursued         attention to wrongful judgments. Unfortu-
their broader political goals, and she covers the    nately, this also leaves the affair vulnerable to

28                                                  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
                                                                            The Lessons for CI of the Dreyfus Affair

manipulation—defenders of the Rosenbergs                           for that matter, the different ways they
and Alger Hiss, to note two major American                         respond to espionage cases—without knowing
cases, for decades claimed that these spies                        the contexts in which they are situated. A CI
were Dreyfus-style victims. Another answer is                      officer needs to be a historian, sociologist, polit-
that the case actually has never gone away,                        ical scientist, and cultural analyst, all at once.
especially in French political life. In 1983, Jack
Lang, the minister of culture in the Socialist                        I began this essay by suggesting that an
government, commissioned the creation of a                         aspiring CI officer begin learning his craft by
statue of Dreyfus. When it was ready in 1986,                      studying the Dreyfus affair. The contributions
the proposal to place the statue at the École                      of Begley, Brown, and especially Harris remind
Militaire enraged the army and started fresh                       us that Dreyfus is the starting point for mod-
discussions of the traditionalist-modernist                        ern CI history and show that the case is a
divide in French political culture. After two                      model for approaching the study of CI and espi-
years of indecision, the statue was finally set                    onage. The large and varied number of factors
up in the Tuileries. Six years after that, on the                  involved makes a final point, as well. Anyone
centenary of Dreyfus’s original conviction, the                    planning to do serious CI work has a lot of
head of the French army’s historical section                       studying to do.
was sacked after he wrote an article minimiz-
ing the army’s misconduct and suggesting
Dreyfus may not have been innocent. The epi-                       For Further Reading
sode, noted Bredin, showed the “persistence of
the old anti-Dreyfusard mentality, conserved                          The Dreyfus affair has generated an enor-
and transmitted for over a century.” Others                        mous literature—the Library of Congress cata-
have noted that, as a result of the affair,                        log lists more than 150 books, in both English
French governments still distrust their intelli-                   and French—beginning with works written
gence services and consequently make poor use                      shortly after Dreyfus’s conviction and continu-
of them. a                                                         ing to the present.

   For US intelligence officers, the affair has an                    Three books are indispensable to under-
entirely different relevance. It is a basic truth                  standing the affair. The first is Jean-Denis Bre-
in the CI world that intelligence services are                     din, The Affair (New York: George Braziller,
products of their societies and reflect the histo-                 1986), originally published in French as
ries, politics, morals, and cultures of the popu-                  L’Affaire (Paris: Julliard, 1983). Bredin, a
lations that supply their officers. Studying                       French legal scholar, covers both the case and
these topics is an important part of any effort                    the political and social aspects of the affair in
to understand the behavior of an intelligence                      depth, and with insights that make his work
service, which is the essence of CI work. In the                   the best single volume on the affair. After Bre-
Dreyfus affair, this means understanding why                       din, the best account is Marcel Thomas,
the Statistical Section and the army, at every                     L’Affaire Sans Dreyfus (Paris: Fayard, 1961).
turn, doubled and redoubled their bets against                     Thomas, a French archivist, is more narrowly
Dreyfus. Their behavior is incomprehensible                        focused than Bredin and based his work on a
without an understanding of the anxieties and                      deep familiarity with the original documents
conflicts that wracked France at the end of the                    from the case; unfortunately, his book has
19th century. Today, too, no one will understand                   never been translated. The third book is an
the behaviors of the US, British, French,                          English collection—translated by Eleanor
Israeli, or Russian intelligence services—and,                     Levieux and edited by Alain Pagès—of Zola’s

a Stanley Meisler, “Statue Needs a Home: The Dreyfus Affair—It Never Dies,” Los Angeles Times, October 30, 1986: 1; Stanley
Meisler, “Paris Finally Finds a Place for Dreyfus Statue,” Los Angeles Times, June 9, 1988: 11; Scott Kraft, “A Century-Old Scandal
Haunt’s France’s Army,” Los Angeles Times, February 18, 1994: 4; Alan Riding, “100 Years Later, Dreyfus Affair Still Festers,” New
York Times, February 9, 1994: A10; Eric Denécé and Gérald Arboit, “Intelligence Studies in France,” International Journal of Intel-
ligence and Counterintelligence 23, Issue 4 (Fall 2010): 727.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                                  29
The Lessons for CI of the Dreyfus Affair

articles on the affair, The Dreyfus Affair:          Transformed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
“J’accuse” and Other Writings (New Haven:            versity Press, 1984).
Yale University Press, 1996), which also con-
tains a useful chronology and capsule biogra-          On anti-Semitism and the affair, see Robert
phies of the major figures. Although not central     Byrnes, Antisemitism in Modern France (New
to understanding the case, Alfred Dreyfus, Five      Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press,
Years of My Life: 1894–1899 (New York:               1950); Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totali-
McClure, Phillips & Co., 1901) provides              tarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.,
extracts from Dreyfus’s letters and prison diary     1951), chap. 4; and Nancy Fitch, “Mass Cul-
and gives a good sense of his character.             ture, Mass Parliamentary Politics, and Modern
                                                     Anti-Semitism: The Dreyfus Affair in Rural
                                                     France,” American Historical Review 97, No. 1
   Other works cover specific aspects of the
                                                     (February 1992): 55–95.
affair. Bredin provides a thorough bibliography,
broken down by subject area, although most of
                                                        For the French military and the affair, the
his references are to French works. Frederick
                                                     major work is Douglas Porch, The March to the
Busi, “A Bibliographic Overview of the Dreyfus
                                                     Marne: The French Army 1871–1914 (Cam-
Affair,” Jewish Social Studies 40, No.1 (Winter
                                                     bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),
1978): 25–40, is a useful guide to the French and
                                                     chaps. 1–4. Allan Mitchell’s two articles, “The
English literature as it stood in the late 1970s.
                                                     Xenophobic Style: French Counterespionage and
Two review articles by Eric Cahm, “No End in
                                                     the Emergence of the Dreyfus Affair,” Journal of
Sight for Dreyfus Research: The Beginning of a
                                                     Modern History 52, No. 3 (September 1980):
Twelve-Year Centenary,” Modern and Contem-
                                                     414–25, and “‘A situation of Inferiority’: French
porary France 3, Issue 2 (May 1995): 202–5, and
                                                     Military Reorganization after the Defeat of
“Centenary Reflections on Rennes and the Drey-
                                                     1870,” American Historical Review 86, No. 1
fus Affair,” Modern and Contemporary France 7,
                                                     (February 1981): 49–62, also are valuable aids
Issue 4 (November 1999): 509–12, update Busi’s
                                                     to understanding the army’s behavior. Robert
listings. Below are individual works particu-
                                                     Kaplan, “Making Sense of the Rennes Verdict:
larly useful for understanding various aspects of
                                                     The Military Dimension of the Dreyfus Affair,”
the affair.
                                                     Journal of Contemporary History 34, No. 4
                                                     (October 1999) 499–515, makes interesting
   The standard account of the early years of        points about the value the French military
the Third Republic is Jean-Marie Mayeur and          secrets involved in the affair but spins an
Madeleine Rebérioux, The Third Republic              unlikely explanation for the army’s behavior.
From Its Origins to the Great War, 1871–1914
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,                 For a collection of images generated by the
1988). For an overview of European political,        affair, as well as essays on its artistic, legal, lit-
economic, and social change in the late nine-        erary, and intellectual aspects, see Norman
teenth and early twentieth centuries that            Kleeblatt, The Dreyfus Affair: Art, Truth, and
places French developments in their interna-         Justice (Berkeley: University of California
tional context, see Norman Stone, Europe             Press, 1987).
                                                ❖ ❖ ❖

30                                                  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
Intelligence in Public Literature

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf
Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

                                                     Current Topics

         Dismantling the Empire: America’s Last Best Hope by Chalmers Johnson

         Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Rela-
            tions after 9/11 by Adam D. M. Svendsen

         A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World
           by Emile Nakhleh

         Securing the State by David Omand

         Skating on Stilts: Why We Aren’t Stopping Tomorrow’s Terrorism by Stewart Baker

         Spies, Lies and the War on Terror by Paul Todd et al.

         The United Nations and the Rationale for Collective Intelligence by Bassey Ekpe


         Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy: The Secret World of Corporate Espionage by Eamon

         Surveillance Tradecraft: The Professional’s Guide to Covert Surveillance Training
           by Peter Jenkins


         The Nine Lives of Otto Katz: The Remarkable True Story of a Communist Super-
           Spy by Jonathan Miles

         Spies of the First World War: Under Cover for King and Kaiser by James Morton

         ULTRA versus U-Boats: Enigma Decrypts in the National Archives by Roy Conyers


         In Pursuit of Shadows: A Career in Counterintelligence by Thomas M. Slawson

         Intelligence Abroad
         Good Arabs: The Israeli Security Agencies and the Israeli Arabs, 1948-1967 by Hil-
           lel Cohen

         A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the Mukhabarat, 1910-
           2009 by Owen L. Sirrs

         All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the
         article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article’s factual
         statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                             31
Bookshelf—March 2011

                                                     Current Topics

Dismantling the Empire: America’s Last Best Hope by Chalmers Johnson (New York: Henry
Holt and Company, LLC, 2010), 212 pp., index.

  In his 1964 book about Ozaki Hotsumi, the                       duct clandestine operations. Johnson then went
principal agent in the Richard Sorge Soviet spy                   on to challenge the need for military bas-
network in pre-war Japan, the late University of                  es—they should be dismantled—and called for
California professor and former CIA analyst                       shutting down the military industrial complex.
Chalmers Johnson hinted at his views of the                       The military establishment that has “created a
American democratic system when he wrote                          worldwide sexual playground” and whose troops
that after the war “it was difficult for the Japa-                “have been taught to think of [foreign] inhabit-
nese people to comprehend that the Americans                      ants as inferior to themselves,” (194) the book
intended to subvert the older order and replace                   intones, should be reduced in size and kept at
it with a ‘democratic’ one.” 1 (201) Dismantling                  home. These steps, it argues, must be taken be-
the Empire, is less subtle. It criticizes the United              fore the US economy collapses and the country
States for being “a foreign imperialist” and its                  is bankrupted.
“democracy peddlers” (62) for their dismal re-
cord in Iraq and Afghanistan. (29) Three of the                     In the end, Johnson recommended that the
four essays in the book attack the CIA and its                    CIA be abolished and replaced by the State De-
putative ineptitude in the two countries.                         partment’s Bureau of Intelligence and Re-
                                                                  search. This done, he argued, “we must
  Essay number two is a review of Timothy                         liquidate our empire or else watch it liquidate
Weiner’s book Legacy of Ashes. 2 Here Johnson                     us.”
linked our current situation in the Middle East
to “blowback” from the 1953 coup in Iran and to                     Dismantling the Empire is a thoughtful book,
US assistance to the mujahedeen resistance to                     but it lacks sources, offers no alternative solu-
the Soviets in Afghanistan. Then follows inaccu-                  tions, and does not assess the practical impact of
rate history when the book states that President                  the recommendations. The book should not go
Truman never meant to permit the CIA to con-                      unchallenged.

Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations
after 9/11 by Adam D. M. Svendsen, (London: Routledge, 2010), 236 pp., end of chapter notes,

  As a visiting scholar at Georgetown University                  2005. After outlining the general nature of “US-
during 2007, Adam Svendsen conducted more                         UK intelligence relations” and its “gains and
that 60 “elite” (xi) interviews, most off the record              strains” as he puts it, (3-8) Svendsen addresses
and not cited in this book, concerning intelli-                   interoperability, which he concludes “has been
gence cooperation between the United States                       enhanced, and intelligence liaison appears to be
and the United Kingdom. While acknowledging                       structurally even closer,” (30) although he ac-
the overall importance of the relationship and                    knowledges persistent differences. To illustrate,
that it “is almost universally recognized as be-                  Svendsen presents two case studies. The first
ing remarkably close and enduring,” (3) Svends-                   describes the relationship as it deals with ter-
en considers only the period between 2000 and                     rorism, but Svendsen’s vague language detracts

1 Chalmers Johnson, An Instance of Treason: Ozaki Hotsumi and the Sorge Spy Ring, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2 Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, (New York: Doubleday, 2007). See Nick Dujmovic’s review in Studies in In-

telligence 51, No. 3 (2007).

32                                                               Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
                                                                                         Bookshelf—March 2011

from his argument and leaves the reader aching                  commission report was critical of the British in-
for simple explanations. For example, in stress-                telligence services on the WMD issue. This sec-
ing that the “intelligence liaison relationship is              tion also considers problems associated with
overwhelmingly important as a mode of activi-                   counterinsurgency operations by special opera-
ty” he goes on to say that “‘functionalism’ and                 tions forces in Iraq.
‘evangelicalism’ were the dominant drivers.”
                                                                  For intelligence professionals, there is little
  The second case study deals with Weapons of                   new in this book. For academics, Svendsen pro-
Mass Destruction (WMD) and counterprolifera-                    vides a different way of thinking about the rela-
tion efforts, which Svendsen finds have mixed,                  tionship by dividing basic factors in the
though complex, results. He includes commen-                    relationship into eight levels and then into two
tary on the policy aspects of the Iraq war and                  groups. Whether this approach is of value must
criticism of the United States for “bypassing…                  be left to the reader. In the end, however, it does
experts and advisers in both the UK and US in-                  not change the view that the US-UK intelli-
telligence and diplomatic communities.” Like-                   gence relationship is important and necessary
wise, he points out that a UK government                        to both countries.

A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World by
Emile Nakhleh (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 162 pp., bibliography, glossary,

  Dr. Emile Nakhleh was born in Palestine,                      sessment of how these contradictory views can
raised as a Greek Catholic, and attended a                      be reconciled.
Franciscan high school in Nazareth. After immi-
grating to the United States 51 years ago, he at-                 The first of the four chapters provides back-
tended St. John’s University (a Benedictine                     ground on political Islam and Islamization (the
school in Minnesota), Georgetown University                     spread of Islamic political influence). Nakhleh
(run by the Jesuits), and American University                   stresses that his Muslim interlocutors condition
in Washington, DC. He taught at Mount Saint                     progress on ending the Iraq “occupation,” reduc-
Mary’s University, a Catholic school, for 26                    ing—not ending—military operations in Af-
years before becoming a scholar in residence                    ghanistan, halting renditions, and treating
and then a senior analyst at the CIA, where he                  prisoners humanely. Most Muslims, he notes,
specialized in political Islam. His duties, espe-               “expressed strong interest” in participating in a
                                                                democratic political process. Jihad, they insist,
cially after 9/11, included briefing policymakers
                                                                is viewed by most Muslims as a religious effort.
in the executive branch and members of Con-
                                                                (3) The radicals take a different path, and Na-
gress. To gain contemporary perspective, he
                                                                khleh discusses their views at length.
traveled to more than 30 Muslim countries in
the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and South-                   The second chapter deals with how the US In-
east Asia. Fluent in Arabic, Nakhleh inter-                     telligence Community, in particular the CIA,
viewed Islamic scholars, government officials,                  views political Islam. There are some surprises
intelligence officers, radical leaders, and ordi-               here. Nakhleh argues that the CIA has pursued
nary citizens. The results of these interviews                  Islamic expertise for far longer and with more
convinced him that most Muslims want peace,                     success than is commonly reflected in the press.
not conflict. They admire America and desire a                  The real problem before 9/11, he argues, is that
better relationship. By contrast, Nakhleh cites                 policymakers failed to take seriously the exist-
discussions in US media and public opinion                      ing warnings regarding the threat of Islamic ac-
polls to show that most Americans “view the Is-                 tivism. The claim attributed to Richard Perle
lamic world through the prism of terrorism.”                    that the CIA “failed to understand and sound an
(xi). A Necessary Engagement presents his as-                   alarm at the rise of jihadist fundamentalism,”

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                  33
Bookshelf—March 2011

he writes, “is patently false.” (39) Nakhleh de-      scribes the differing views of “Islamic reformists
scribes in considerable detail successful efforts     and modernists,” including the Muslim Brother-
to establish internal expertise (training, lan-       hood, so that the reader can better grasp the
guage skills, overseas assignments, and gradu-        complexity of the Islamic world.
ate studies), to battle bureaucratic
impediments, and to build closer relationships          Nakhleh lays out a “public diplomacy blue-
with specialists from academia during the 16          print” for changing, if not correcting, the Muslim
years he was at the CIA.                              view of American national objectives. It is not a
                                                      cookbook remedy, but a summary of practical
  The final two chapters discuss what Nakhleh         measures and the necessary accumulation of
calls “public diplomacy” or the effort to convince    knowledge and expertise that must precede
Muslims that “the so-called war on terror is not      them. He also takes into account the inherent
a war against Islam.” (71) He provides a lengthy      risks and potential benefits of such an effort.
discussion, with supporting evidence, to show
that the negative view of America held by many          A Necessary Engagement is an articulate,
Muslims is policy driven and not a clash of val-      stimulating treatise on a controversial topic.
ues or ideas. The most prominent example is the       Moreover, it presents a candid, yet optimistic,
invasion of Iraq, an action that Muslims tend to      challenge to the tendency to view all Islam as a
view as a deplorable attack on Islam, not as a        breeding ground for terrorists. Well written,
logical response to 9/11. Here too, Nakhleh de-       well researched, and well worth reading.

Securing the State by David Omand (London: Columbia/Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 2010),
345 pp., endnotes, index.

  Sir David Omand joined the United Kingdom’s           Securing the State examines the conditions
Government Communications Headquarters                needed for civil security, which he defines as “a
(GCHQ) in 1969 and rose to become its director        sense of public confidence that it is safe to go
in 1996. He went on to serve in the Ministry of       outside, work and play, and get on with one’s
Defence, in the Home Office as permanent sec-         life…the heart of good government.” (7) The first
                                                      four chapters discuss the evolution of the “public
retary, and in the Cabinet Office as the first se-
                                                      value” of security, intelligence, national resil-
curity intelligence coordinator. He retired in
                                                      ience, and civic harmony as they have evolved
2005 and became a visiting professor at King’s        through the Cold War and into the current era of
College London. Securing the State reflects this      terrorist threats. He places particular emphasis
unique background and commands serious at-            on the national infrastructure necessary to
tention. The book begins with an examination of       manage risk and reduce vulnerability to terror-
Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s three-part, 14th century        ist acts and their effects. Omand defines this as
fresco inside the Hall of Peace in Siena, Italy,      national resilience, “the ability of society to
which depicts the features of bad and good gov-       bounce back as quickly as practicable into pat-
ernments. Bad government is shown in “the ex-         terns of normal after a major disruption.” (60)
ercise of arbitrary power” and in the conduct of      Central to his thesis is the protection of civil lib-
the associated vices of “cruelty, betrayal, fraud,    erties, especially in the development of policies
                                                      to deal with threats from radical movements
terror, internal discord, and conflict.” Good gov-
                                                      that “see themselves as the vanguard of a wider
ernment is shown flowing from “peace, stability
                                                      global movement.” (87).
and security, prosperity, and culture.” (2)
Omand suggests that in the centuries since the          The next chapters look at innovative, yet prac-
fresco’s creation, the characteristics of bad and     tical, steps to achieving a state’s security goals.
good government have remained constant, but           A chapter is devoted to the intelligence cycle, a
achieving the latter while avoiding the former        well-known topic, which Omand expands with
has become more complex.                              developments from open sources, secret sources

34                                                   Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
                                                                                          Bookshelf—March 2011

and “personal protected data.” (120) This is fol-               intelligence failures, and the ethical consider-
lowed by a discussion of “elucidation,” which                   ations associated with countering terrorism.
Omand describes as a combination of analysis                    There is a summary chapter, “Intelligence De-
and assessment that begins with the receipt of                  sign—Building Intelligence Communities,” that
intelligence reports. “Analysis,” he writes, is                 reviews the concepts discussed in the book. The
more than “validation,” and assessment is more                  final chapter returns to the Lorenzetti fresco
than analysis.” (150) The latter is a complex pro-              and considers how it might be viewed from a
cess that includes the problem of validation.                   modern perspective, emphasizing the impor-
Other factors include data sharing, single-                     tance of history and recognizing that in today’s
source issues, fragmentary data, speaking truth                 world “the public must accept…that there is no
to power, cognitive biases, and the role of au-                 general right to know about intelligence sources
thority. He also gives examples of how to solve                 and methods, but the public has the right to
problems using the scientific method, brain-                    oversight of the intelligence agencies.” (325)
storming, and Richards Heuer’s competing hy-
potheses techniques.                                              Throughout Securing the State, Omand ap-
                                                                plies his perceptive analysis to both the British
  The concluding chapters cover the relationship                and American intelligence communities in a
between analysts and policymakers—essential-                    narrative that demands a reader’s close atten-
ly realists vs. idealists—at various levels of gov-             tion. Given his extensive experience, it is well
ernment. Topics include surprise and                            worth the effort.

Skating on Stilts: Why We Aren’t Stopping Tomorrow’s Terrorism by Stewart Baker (Stan-
ford, CA: Hoover institution Press, 2010), 370 pp., endnotes, index.

  After serving as General Counsel at NSA and                     Baker provides extensive detail about opposi-
on the Robb-Silberman Commission on Weap-                       tion to whole-body scanners and efforts by pri-
ons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Stewart Baker                    vacy groups in Europe and America to prevent
joined the Department of Homeland Security                      the use of technology to collect passenger data
(DHS) as assistant secretary for policy. DHS was                that would help track and identify suspected
two years old and still somewhat bureaucrati-                   terrorists. (27ff.) In one chapter he recounts ac-
cally unsettled. Skating on Stilts is the story of              tions by a FISA judge to discipline an FBI agent
Baker’s four-year tenure working to develop pol-                because his proposals failed to “protect the civil
icies on border security, airline travel, cyberse-              liberties of terrorist suspects.” (39ff.) In his dis-
curity, and ways to counter bioterrorism.                       cussion of the Patriot Act, which Baker judges to
                                                                be “a modest set of changes in the right direc-
                                                                tion,” (73) he explains how legal actions by civil
  The central theme of the book is that necessary               liberties groups have inhibited essential data
intelligence reforms are difficult to implement                 gathering efforts.
because the technology that would make im-
provements possible is viewed as too invasive by                  Despite obstacles, progress was made, accord-
privacy advocates on both sides of the Atlantic.                ing to Baker. The Europeans caved when DHS
Before addressing these issues Baker reviews                    threatened to deny Europeans entry into the
the failures that preceded 9/11, including the                  United States unless requested passenger data
prohibition of information sharing among gov-                   were provided. To show that this would not solve
ernment agencies—the so-called wall—and the                     the entire problem, however, he reviews the
actions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance                “Christmas Day” bomber case in which authori-
Act (FISA) court. He then summarizes the pro-                   ties failed to act on available data.
grams he initiated to improve security, especial-
ly with regard to travel and data sharing. The                   On the subject of cybersecurity, Baker, luke-
balance of the book is devoted to the battles                   warm to existing national strategy, outlines the
fought to implement these programs.                             danger of inadequate preventive measures,

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                     35
Bookshelf—March 2011

though he doesn’t detail what he would mea-                              Skating on Stilts is easy reading, but it is a se-
sures he would adopt. Likewise, in the chapter                         rious treatment of the conflict between the need
on biosecurity he describes the conflicts between                      for improved security and the privacy and other
                                                                       concerns that oppose making better use of avail-
intellectual property concerns and the need for
                                                                       able technology to provide that greater safety.
improved biosecurity standards. Relying on bio-
                                                                       Baker doesn’t pretend to have all the answers,
technology companies to demonstrate that they                          but he makes a strong argument that early ac-
have met security requirements is fraught with                         tion is critical to preventing the next terrorist
danger, he argues.                                                     attack.

Spies, Lies and the War on Terror by Paul Todd, Jonathan Bloch, and Patrick Fitzgerald (Lon-
don: Zed Books, 2009), 212 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

  There are no spies or lies mentioned in this                         warranted “bugging and data mining.” (86ff.)
book. There is an extensive discussion of the                          Turning to Europe, they examine the role of in-
“war on terror.” Its political perspective is in                       telligence in the European Union and the “rapid
keeping with the articles Mr. Bloch coauthored                         unaccountable growth of databases of personal
in Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa, a book con-                        information.” (163) The authors conclude that
taining an introduction by Philip Agee. 3 The                          “intelligence is more than ever a coin with two
authors of Spies, Lies and the War on Terror ar-                       sides: a tool for gaining knowledge and a tool for
gue that “a key enabling factor” in the war on                         exercising government power.” (169) The bene-
terror “has been the use of intelligence to legiti-                    factors of the Global War on Terror, they add,
mize expedient and often illegal military adven-                       are “arms manufacturers, mercenary contrac-
ture and civil repression.” (1) To justify the wars                    tors, demagogues and authoritarians of every
in Iraq and Afghanistan, they claim, “intelli-                         stripe.” (170)
gence was simply massaged and fabricated to fit
predetermined policy.” (3)                                               These views are supported by extensive source
                                                                       notes, but the same sources could be used to jus-
  After a discussion of intelligence and Islam                         tify contrary interpretations. Spies, Lies and the
from the Cold War to the present, the authors                          War on Terror presents an unbalanced assess-
analyze what they term “spinning the peace” to                         ment flowing from flawed assumptions. For an
explain how the US government uses the media                           alternative analysis of the same topics, consult
to gain public support. They go on to attack the                       David Omand’s Securing the State reviewed
concept of “preemptive war,” renditions, and un-                       earlier in this issue of “Bookshelf.”

The United Nations and the Rationale for Collective Intelligence by Bassey Ekpe (Amherst,
NY: Cambria Press, 2009), 390 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

  British strategic consultant Bassey Ekpe chal-                         Ekpe’s approach to the problem is mostly aca-
lenges the “widely held view” that collective in-                      demic and his structure somewhat disorga-
telligence “is infeasible and incompatible with                        nized. He first discusses methodology,
the UN system.” The reason, he suggests, is that                       frameworks, paradigms, a variety of consider-
the concept is “widely misunderstood, partly be-                       ations in the UN system, and the rationale for
cause there is no known detailed study of such a                       collective action. He then considers the UN it-
concept.” His book is intended to fill that gap. He                    self, its charter, organization, and components of
concludes that “with suitable refinements, an                          collective security. This is followed by two chap-
intelligence structure need not be incompatible                        ters on intelligence concepts and process-
with the UN system.” (1)                                               es—strategic and tactical—with some

3   Ellen Ray et al., Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa (Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart Inc. 1979).

36                                                                   Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
                                                                                         Bookshelf—March 2011

theoretical considerations tossed in. Some chap-                didn’t start with this topic. The practical prob-
ters seem less applicable. For example, the                     lems and their possible solutions are evident.
chapters “Relevance of Authority in the Anarchy
Paradigm” and “Micromotives and Macrobehav-                       That the UN requires information and intelli-
ior in the Theory of Collective Action,” just to                gence to perform its peacekeeping missions is a
cite two examples, is obscure.                                  given. Likewise, the UN’s acquisition of intelli-
                                                                gence is complicated by national secrecy issues.
                                                                Whether the complex considerations described
 The final part of the book deals with prece-                   by Ekpe are a necessary prerequisite for dealing
dents in UN collective intelligence, UNMOVIC                    with these issues is unclear. The Rationale for
(UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection                    Collective Intelligence is indeed one approach,
Commission) in Iraq being one exemplar. The is-                 but a more common sense, experience-based al-
sues raised may lead some to ask why the book                   ternative should be considered.


Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy: The Secret World of Corporate Espionage by Eamon Javers
(New York: HarperCollins, 2010), 306 pp., endnotes, index.

  Investigative journalist Eamon Javers doesn’t                 phy of Hughes. Perhaps the most unusual case
explain what prompted him to spend nearly five                  involves the Walmart Corporation, which hired
months collecting information on Diligence                      a commercial satellite company to provide imag-
LLC, a corporate intelligence firm with an office               es of its stores and their neighborhoods so Wal-
in Washington, DC, before meeting with its                      mart could determine why some stores did
CEO, Nick Day, a former MI5 officer, in January                 better than others. (212ff.)
2007. But he does say that the experience re-
vealed a world of corporate espionage of which                    Javers provides details of well-known firms like
he had been unaware. His findings are revealed                  Kroll Associates and some less familiar ones like
in Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy. At the outset,                  the Hamilton Trading Group—Javers says for-
Javers raises the fundamental question: Is cor-                 mer CIA officer Jack Platt runs the group. Also in-
porate spying “right or wrong?” (xi) He never an-               volved in it was former KGB officer Gennady
swers the question directly, but he proposes in                 Vasilenko, who, Javer writes, was abducted by
his epilogue—in the interest of what is good for                past comrades and imprisoned in Russia—he was
society—the creation of a “spy registry” modeled                recently released as part of the exchange for the
on lobbying disclosure rules coordinated by the                 10 Russian illegals arrested in the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission. (185)                       in the summer of 2010. Russian intelligence offi-
                                                                cers, writes Javers, are not uncommon in the cor-
  Between his opening question and the epi-                     porate espionage business in America. Another
logue, Javers tells some fascinating stories of                 example is former GRU officer Yuri Koshkin, who
corporate espionage and security operations. He                 runs the Trident Corporation in Arlington, Vir-
shows how corporate spies travel the globe seek-                ginia. The company tracked digital pirates mak-
ing the secrets of competitors, surveilling hu-                 ing illicit copies of Disney films in Moscow.
man targets, and providing security for VIPs.
For example, he writes of the Peloquin firm,                     Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy is well written and
which arranged refuge in Bermuda for the de-                    documented. The ubiquity of the corporate espi-
posed Shah of Iran in 1979 and two corporate es-                onage world it exposes raises genuine concerns
pionage firms that worked for Howard                            over privacy, though, as Javers acknowledges,
Hughes—one of which exposed Clifford Irving’s                   not questions of legality. It is a topic that is not
false claims to have cowritten the autobiogra-                  going to go away.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                   37
Bookshelf—March 2011

Surveillance Tradecraft: The Professional’s Guide to Covert Surveillance Training by
Peter Jenkins (Harrogate, UK: Intel Publishing, 2010), 461 pp., photos, index.

  Surveillance, the intentional, often prolonged       planning and the new high-tech equipment re-
watching of something, is not only a key element       quired; the Minox camera is no longer state of
of espionage tradecraft. In fact, it has also be-      the art. There are also chapters on surveillance
come an accepted, even expected, ingredient of         detection and, perhaps most important, “evi-
civilian life, thanks in part to 9/11. Author Peter    dence and law.” The narrative provides sugges-
Jenkins built his expertise in surveillance while      tions for implementation—there are no absolute
serving in the British army and in private busi-       rules, just well-tested experience—on every-
ness. When corporate, government, and security         thing from specific techniques and staffing to
service demands necessitated well-trained per-         data recording and report writing. Short case
sonnel, Jenkins helped address that need with          summaries emphasize methods and outcomes.
his first book on the subject, Covert Surveil-         An interesting observational skills test is pro-
lance, in 2000. Revised editions with a new title      vided on page 325. The only technique not in-
followed. Surveillance Tradecraft, an oversized,       cluded is internet monitoring.
extensively illustrated, softcover book is the
third.                                                   Jenkins makes clear that surveillance, no mat-
                                                       ter how high-tech, is often physically demand-
  The 14 chapters in this guide cover the various      ing, if not boring. But if one wants to learn what
forms of surveillance—covert, mobile, foot, and        is involved in this essential operational tech-
static—under all conditions, plus operational          nique, this book is the place to start.


The Nine Lives of Otto Katz: The Remarkable True Story of a Communist Super-Spy by
Jonathan Miles (London: Bantam Press, 2010), 366 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

  Otto Katz was a defendant in the 1952 Soviet-        cow for training, Katz returned ?n time to ghost-
sponsored purge trial in Prague. He was                write and edit one of the most famous anti-Nazi
charged with championing the cause of Jews,            books of the interwar years, The Brown Book of
fraternizing with Hollywood film stars, and            the Reichstag Fire and Hitler Terror, a work of
working for Noel Coward in British intelligence        propaganda that blamed the Reichstag fire on
and for American intelligence as well. All true.       the Nazis. In Moscow he had been given the mis-
What was omitted, and what he was not allowed          sion of spying on Münzenberg, which he obedi-
to say, was that all this had been done at the bid-    ently did.
ding of Soviet intelligence, which he had served
loyally, using numerous aliases, for most of his         By 1935 Katz was in France staging anti-Nazi,
adult life. The Nine Lives of Otto Katz tells the      pro-communist demonstrations in Paris. Speak-
story of this remarkable spy.                          ers for the occasion included E. M Forster, Ber-
                                                       tolt Brecht, Aldous Huxley, John Dos Passos and
  Born on 27 May 1895, Katz was a German-              Upton Sinclair. Later that same year, Katz was
speaking Czech Jew. A high school dropout, he          sent to the United States, where he lived for a
served briefly in the Army during WW I, after          time in New York, encouraging young writers in
which he sought his fortune in Berlin—he later         “Red” Greenwich Village. (150) He also met with
claimed to have discovered Marlene Dietrich            a number of Soviet agents operating against the
there. After joining the Communist Party of            Roosevelt administration, including Hede Mass-
Germany, he went to work for the arch Soviet           ing and members of the notorious Ware group.
propagandist, Willi Münzenberg. Sent to Mos-           Then it was off to Hollywood to exercise his in-

38                                                    Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
                                                                                                 Bookshelf—March 2011

fluence in the communist cause in the name of                       Author Jonathan Miles’ biography fills in the
anti-fascism. There he worked with Peter Lorre,                   colorful details of this extraordinary agent of in-
Marlene Dietrich, Greta Garbo, Charlie Chap-                      fluence who figured prominently in the promo-
lin, and Frederic March, among others. Katz re-                   tion of communism in much of the Western
turned to Europe in 1936 and served the Soviets                   world. In thanks, Stalin made sure Katz was re-
in the Spanish Civil War. By 1940 he was back                     warded with a trip to the gallows. The Nine
in the United States, where he came to the at-                    Lives of Otto Katz is a stirring tale of dedicated
tention of the FBI and was forced to leave for                    service that reveals the realities of Soviet espio-
Mexico. He spent the war years there (240) and                    nage.
returned to Czechoslovakia in 1946 after stops
in America and France.

Spies of the First World War: Under Cover for King and Kaiser by James Morton (Kew, UK:
The National Archives, 2010), 240 pp., endnote, bibliography, photos, index.

  Readers who enjoyed the recent authorized                       Lady network, the Zimmermann telegram, the
and unauthorized histories of the British intelli-                spy panic in Britain, Somerset Maugham, and
gence and security services will find little new in               Room 40 are typical examples. Sidney Reilly,
this book. 4 Except for a few comments in the in-                 “Ace of Spies,” is inexplicably omitted. Spies of
troduction on Alfred Redl, the Russian agent in                   the First World War is well written and well doc-
the Austrian Army, and some stories about the                     umented, however, and will do nicely for those
Kaiser’s female spies, the cases and agents are                   wishing a succinct, easy-reading overview.
the same. Mata Hari, Henry Landau’s White

ULTRA versus U-Boats: Enigma Decrypts in the National Archives by Roy Conyers Nesbit
(Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword Books Ltd., 2008), 248 pp., bibliography, photos, index of U-boats.

  In his book Seizing The Enigma David Kahn                         ULTRA versus U-Boats is a history of the Al-
told how British codebreakers attacked the Ger-                   lied battle against U-boats, beginning with the
man naval codes and made victory possible in                      period before the Enigma decrypts were avail-
the Battle of the Atlantic. 5 He cited contributing               able. Nesbit describes the terrific British losses
decrypted messages but not their actual con-                      and the largely ineffective counter-measures
tent. With the release of the ULTRA decrypted                     initially employed. The situation gradually re-
messages by the British National Archives, his-                   versed as the ULTRA intelligence became avail-
torian Roy Nesbit was able to correlate decrypt-                  able and as the US Navy became a player.
ed message content with resulting anti-                           Among the examples of decrypted messages are
submarine operations. ULTRA versus U-Boats                        those used in the Allied antisubmarine cam-
presents his research.                                            paign in support of land operations in Africa and
                                                                  Italy. By January 1944, the German U-boat
  Nesbit worked through more than 100,000                         force had been reduced to 168 boats manned by
messages and selected 200 for this study. Many                    inexperienced crews—this was “two-thirds of
are reproduced in the book. Messages on pages                     [the force’s] strength nine months previously,
70-72, for example, reveal U-boat position and                    despite a continuous flow of replacements.”(181)
movement data, and an accompanying narra-                         Nearly 270 new U-boats were undergoing trials,
tive provides detail about specific U-boats and                   but by then it was too late, although the large
attacks.                                                          number of new vessels in the pipeline demon-

4 Christopher Andrew, Defend The Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (New York: Knopf, 2009); Keith Jeffery, The Secret History
of MI6 (New York: Penguin Press, 2010); Michael Smith, SIX: A History of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service—Part 1: Murder &
Mayhem, 1909–1939 (London: Dialogue, 2010).
5 David Kahn, Seizing The Enigma: The Race to Break the German U-Boat Codes, 1939–1943 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991).

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                               39
Bookshelf—March 2011

strated the ineffectiveness of Allied attacks on                      decrypted message in the book is the order for
U-boat production facilities.                                         all U-boats to comply with the conditions of sur-
                                                                      render in 1945. (244).
  Nesbit includes photographs showing naval
vessels involved in the battles, some actual bat-                      ULTRA versus U-Boats is a fine contribution to
tle scenes, and aerial shots of targets. The final                    WW II naval history.


In Pursuit of Shadows: A Career in Counterintelligence by Thomas M. Slawson (London:
Athena Press, 2006), 205 pp., glossary.

 In flight school, Tom Slawson’s instructors                          South Vietnamese and participated in the plan-
convinced him that he had a bright future in the                      ning of the Son Tay raid. His next overseas tour
Air Force, but not as a pilot. He applied to the                      was in Libya as it closed the US air base after
Office of Special Investigations (OSI), encour-                       Qadhafi took power. Slawson’s final assignment
aged by the prospect of counterintelligence (CI)                      was in Britain, where CI was the main focus of
duties. In Pursuit of Shadows tells the story of                      his duties.
his career as an Air Force CI officer.
                                                                        Throughout the book, Slawson describes the
  OSI had been established in 1948 by an FBI                          CI cases he worked on, the periodic bureaucratic
special agent, Joseph Carroll, who was then giv-                      conflicts with Army CI elements, and difficulties
en a reserve commission as a colonel and                              encountered with CIA field stations. In the final
brought on active duty as a brigadier general.                        chapter, he discusses many of the valuable les-
The 14-week training program Slawson entered                          sons he learned during his career. In an epi-
was staffed by other former FBI agents. It con-                       logue, he expands his views on CI, concluding
centrated more on criminal investigation prac-                        that “on balance the United States has not done
tices and techniques than CI. But much of the                         a very good job in CI.” (195) Unfortunately, a
tradecraft was the same, and Slawson describes                        source for this judgment is The Secret History of
it in detail. During his initial assignment Slaw-                     the CIA by Joseph Trento, 6 the most inaccurate
son paid his dues doing background investiga-                         book ever published on the subject.
tions in the United States. After further
training he was sent to Okinawa, where he fi-                           In Pursuit of Shadows paints a good picture of
nally got a chance to learn CI in the field. After                    everyday military CI, its adventurous cases, and
another tour in the States, Slawson served in                         its less stimulating administrative duties. It is a
Vietnam, where he worked CI cases with the                            first-rate introduction to the profession.

                                                     Intelligence Abroad

Good Arabs: The Israeli Security Agencies and the Israeli Arabs, 1948-1967 by Hillel Cohen
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010), 281 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

 The nation of Israel was proclaimed on 14 May                        Iraq declared war on the new state. When the
1948. The next day, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and                        war ended a year later with an Israeli victory,

6   Joseph J. Trento, The Secret History of the CIA, (Roseville, CA: Prima Publishing, 2001).

40                                                                   Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)
                                                                                              Bookshelf—March 2011

165,000 Arabs remained within Israel’s bor-                          ed just to put food on the table—resources were
ders—15 percent of the new country’s popula-                         scarce in the new state. Informers were recruit-
tion. They were declared citizens of a country                       ed among village leaders, the working class, and
they strongly opposed and which most wanted                          potential militant groups. Some helped security
annihilated. In order to establish political con-                    forces battle the constant infiltration of Arabs
trol and prevent violence, the Israeli security                      who returned illegally to their former villages in
forces—mainly the police, the Army, and Shin                         Israel after finding life in the no-man’s land out-
Bet—moved quickly to create networks of in-                          side its borders too difficult. Others, however,
formers within the Arab communities. They                            assisted the “infiltrators,” as they became
were largely successful, and Good Arabs is their                     known, while feigning cooperation with author-
story.                                                               ities.

  To those familiar with Israeli domestic intelli-                     As political opposition among the Arabs grew,
gence operations, the use of informers to moni-                      actively provoked by the Israeli Communist
tor Arab activities will come as no surprise. But                    Party, the demands on Israeli counterintelli-
revealing operational details is a different mat-                    gence to recruit informers increased. Giving
ter. Thanks to the recent release by the Israeli                     many examples, Cohen writes of Israeli empha-
state archives of security files for the period of                   sis on influencing Arab teachers and what they
1948–67, author Hillel Cohen was able, for the                       taught in an effort to “shape political conscious-
first time, to document and describe in detail                       ness of Israeli Arabs” (235) and limit dissension
specific objectives, individual recruitments, and                    and resistance. Chapter 5 describes this pro-
agent-informer handling methods.                                     gram in detail.

  What Cohen calls the “collaborator class” grad-                     Israeli efforts to control their Arab citizens had
ually emerged with informers who penetrated                          only limited success. Arab opposition to the Is-
all levels and activities of Arab life in Israel. At                 raeli state was never eliminated and Good Ar-
first the Israeli Arabs were cooperative. Many                       abs shows that maintenance of control was a
offered their services as “consultants,” others                      constant struggle. The insights provided in this
wanted to continue relationships with Zionists                       thoroughly- documented book make clear why
formed before the war (21), and some collaborat-                     the Arab-Israeli conflict persists to this day.

A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the Mukhabarat, 1910-2009 by
Owen L. Sirrs (London: Routledge, 2010), 271 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

  Books on Arab intelligence services are in                           The book is divided into four parts and begins
short supply. Yaacov Caroz, a former Mossad of-                      in 1910. The first part deals with the British-
ficer, published the most recent one, The Arab                       sponsored service (under the Egyptian monar-
Secret Services, in 1978. 7 Owen Sirrs, a former                     chy) designed to counter threats from national-
senior intelligence officer and Arab specialist at                   ist and Islamic parties and, later, the Axis
                                                                     powers in WW II. It concludes with the failure of
DIA and now with the University of Montana
                                                                     the service to prevent the coup in July 1952 that
has produced a fine, well-documented volume on
                                                                     brought Nasser to power. The second part is con-
the Egyptian intelligence service—al-mukhaba-
                                                                     cerned with the Nasser period (1952-70), when
rat in Arabic—that adds significantly to public                      the domestic security service, or GID (General
knowledge. While the focus of his book is on the                     Investigations Directorate), the EGIS (Egyptian
Egyptian service—“the oldest, largest and most                       General Intelligence Service)—modeled after
effective in the Arab world”—Sirrs discusses                         the CIA (44)—and the MID (Military Intelli-
those in other Middle Eastern countries as well.                     gence Department) were established. The major

7   Yaacov Caroz, The Arab Secret Services, (London: Corgi, 1978).

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)                                                        41
Bookshelf—March 2011

threats during this formative period came from         In each part of his book, Sirrs analyzes the
the Muslim Brotherhood, dissident military offi-     mukhabarat performance in several areas: col-
cers, and communists. Sirrs also examines how        lection, evaluation, counterintelligence, covert
the services performed during the Suez Crisis of     action, and liaison with foreign services. Back-
                                                     ground data on principal figures, human rights
1956, the Yemen Wars in 1962-67, and the 1970
                                                     issues, organizations, and power struggles are
War of Attrition. Part three deals with the ser-     also included. Several short case summaries il-
vices under Anwar Sadat (during 1970-1981),          lustrate operations. For example, he reviews the
their operations associated with the 1973 war        controversial case of Ashraf Marwan, whom
with Israel, and the services’ failure to prevent    both Egypt and Israel claim as their best agent.
Sadat’s assassination. Part four brings the story    As Sirrs notes, Marwan died under suspicious
to the rule of the now deposed President Hosni       circumstances and the ambiguity remains.
Mubarak. The principal operations discussed
here include threats from the local Islamic com-       “One in four Arabs is Egyptian,” write Sirrs.
                                                     (197) This fact and Egypt’s close links to the
munity and how they have been sternly and ef-
                                                     United States make this book an important
fectively muted. Sirrs also explores the             source for the general reader, for students of in-
controversial role of the mukhabarat—he uses         ternational relations, and certainly for anyone
this term synonymously with intelligence ser-        desiring to become a professional intelligence of-
vice—and the CIA’s rendition program.                ficer.

                                               ❖ ❖ ❖

42                                                  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)