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Afrikaner Republicanism in South Africa - A Concise History

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					AFRIKANER REPUBLICANISM IN
      SOUTH AFRICA
     - A CONCISE HISTORY -




        BY WALDO KÜHN
     AFRIKANER REPUBLICANISM IN
   SOUTH AFRICA – A CONCISE HISTORY

                         BY WALDO KÜHN

                     Published: SCRIBD, 2012
           Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives




Front page: Five-color, united Afrikaner flag used during the Anglo-Boer
War.
                                             INDEX

Introduction..................................................................................... 4
Chapter 1: The Cape Colony.......................................................... 5
Chapter 2: The Eastern Frontier – Part I........................................11
Chapter 3: Stockenstrom and the Missionaries............................. 24
Chapter 4: The Eastern Frontier – Part II...................................... 33
Chapter 5: Piet Retief's Manifesto..................................................44
Chapter 6: The Great Trek............................................................. 51
Chapter 7: The Boer Republics – Part I......................................... 61
Chapter 8: The Rise of Afrikaans................................................... 74
Chapter 9: The First War for Independence (1880-1881).............. 92
Chapter 10: The Boer Republics – Part II...................................... 95
Chapter 11: The Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902)
             Part I – The Cape Colony Front.................................108
             Part II – The Natal Front.............................................115
             Part III – To The Bitter End.........................................126
             Part IV – Peace......................................................... 140
Chapter 12: Post-War South Africa............................................... 143
Chapter 13: Union of South Africa (1910)..................................... 150
Chapter 14: Resistance to a White South Africa........................... 153
Chapter 15: The 1914-15 Rebellion.............................................. 161
Chapter 16: The 1922 Rand Revolt...............................................164
Chapter 17: The Nationalist Party – Part I.....................................168
Chapter 18: The Second Language Movement.............................172
Chapter 19: The Nationalist Party – Part II....................................175
Chapter 20: Defending Apartheid................................................. 182
Chapter 21: Social Engineering Gets Personal............................ 187
Chapter 22: Cold War South Africa............................................... 192
Chapter 23: An Impotent Minority.................................................. 202



Numbers in brackets after sentences or paragraphs refer to the numbered
citation-list at the end of the book. Sources are noted whenever statements
might require further inquiry, or for the purpose of recognition when I have
relied heavily on a particular source. Word-for-word quotes from sources are in
italics and typed in gray, followed by the source-number as in the list at the
back. I use this method wherever a source is strong or unique in bringing an
idea across, or gives a knowledgeable opinion.
                          INTRODUCTION

Afrikaner, as defined by the Afrikaner Vryheidstigting (Afrikaner Freedom
Foundation): A cultural-political community of Afrikaans speaking South
Africans of mainly European descent, who by virtue of a shared past
and shared expectations for the future have a self-aware existence, are
recognized as a People and used to have sovereignty in an own state, is
still recognizable by culture and language and who holds the right to
maintain its identity and to not be extradited or handed over to forced
incorporation (into a dominant culture.)

The story of Afrikaner republicanism is one of repeated ascendency of a
group of people from a cauldron of chaos, marked by a special leader
who personifies the movement at its critical stage, and whose personal
integrity precludes ulterior motives.
Such notable leaders have been, in my mind, Andries Stockenstrom,
M.T. Steyn, Kruger, the generals and heroes of the Anglo-Boer War and
the likes of Professor Carel Boshoff and General Constant Viljoen.

I am an armchair historian, biased towards the ideals which I share with
a relatively small number of Afrikaner republicans, who see as the only
hope for the future survival of Afrikaner culture, as we know and cherish
it, the need for ethnic consolidation in a cultural heartland, traditionally
called a Volkstaat (People's State). I do not hold to rigid racial
ideologies, although it is true that we are a people largely descended
from Europe, who have struggled to maintain our European civilization
through the past 350 years amongst the often much different culture of
African civilization, and we do still desire to do so.
Culture, as I understand and use the term, refers to the following ways
of life of a community: Language, religion, norms and value systems,
shared ideals, struggles and identity within the community. Other
aspects of a cultural group are mutual history, worldview, political
solidarity and social interaction like custom, openness and trust; as well
as the society's expression in arts and industry – though not necessarily
in a competitive Darwinist sense. Many of these aspects overlap
between traditional ethnic groups and some cultural fluidity is natural,
while manipulative social engineering creates culture that tends to be
shallow and religiously apostate (i.e. unnatural). I believe different
societies with different identities are God-planted, and the product of
Promises and Blessings made to forefathers.
                     1. THE CAPE COLONY

The sea route around the Cape was well known. Bartholomeu Dias
called it Cabo das Tormetas, or Cape of Storms on his return to Portugal
after a brief visit for repairs to his ship in 1488. King João of Portugal
named it Cabo da Boa Esperança; Cape of Good Hope.
Real interest in a settlement (not colonization) was shown by the
international trading company based in the Netherlands called the Dutch
East India Trading Company.
The Company's interest was in a replenishment station for ships passing
the Southern Cape route between Europe and East Asia (India, the
Malay Archipelago, China and Japan). The functions of the station were:
supply of fresh produce (especially young wine and vegetables to ward
of scurvy), wheat, fresh water and meat; as well as ship repairs and
guiding ships into Tablebay harbour in rough seas.
The first three Company ships arrived on April, 6 th 1652. Initially a
fortification of mud and wood and some wooden houses were
constructed as living courters for employees, surrounded by plantations
of vegetables, fruit and vines. It was later (1674) replaced by the
beautiful stone fortification, “The Cape Castle”, a tourist attraction in the
centre of Cape Town. In charge of the Company activities in the Cape
was Jan van Riebeeck, who had held a similar position in Vietnam (then
part of a greater Japanese empire), but got into trouble for trading for his
own account, a common practice among both Company officials and
servants.
Van Riebeeck allowed company servants whose contracts had expired,
to own small farms outside the settlement. They were called free
burghers. They were to sell all produce to the Company at very low fixed
prices, and if found guilty of not abiding by Company law, would be
reinstated into the service of the Company. That could mean becoming
sailors and soldiers again, shipped off to fight in the Malay Archipelago
or perish on board (15–20 percent of Company sailors died at sea). (2)
Most of these free burghers were single men of Dutch heritage. They
traded with the Khoikhoi for livestock and there was some racial
intermarriage, especially when, in 1658, slaves were brought to the
Cape. Slaves came initially from Mozambique and Madagascar. In the
first thirty years, the Cape was settled mostly by single Dutch men and
slaves, many from Angola, South-India and the Malay Archipelago.
A steady stream of immigrants from all over Europe followed, mostly
Flemish, Frisians, Walloon as well as Dutch girls from orphanages.
From 1688-1700, some two hundred French Huguenots settled. The
Huguenots comprised mostly families fleeing religious persecution.
Many of them were skilled viticulturalists and wine makers. They were
assimilated into the Dutch culture, spurred by the Company that did not
want a French corner and Governor Simon van der Stel, a veteran of the
Dutch-French war of the 1670s(2), but also because of the identical
Protestant religions of the Huguenots and the Dutch. In the 1700's the
majority immigrant-group were poor Germans, also Protestants, mostly
single males speaking diverse dialects that married either Dutch or
French women. (2)
    A sense of being Afrikaners rather than being Dutch or French or
German had crystallized by the end of the eighteenth century... People
from Dutch and German descent dominated the make-up of this
[colonist] community; according to J.A. Heese, [the dominant make-up
was] 36% Dutch, 35% German, 5% French and 7% non-European. (2)
(Another calculation by Professor Heese in 1971, of the origins of the
modern Afrikaner, estimates 35% Dutch, 34% German, 13% French, 7%
non-European, 3% British, 3% other European and 3.5% undetermined.)
The official religion of the European colonists was Dutch Calvinism and
the official language was Dutch, although the general Cape populace
spoke a distinct dialect of the language. These included the European
peasants, Company slaves, free blacks (freed slaves) and local
Khoikhoi. In the early years of the colony, Portuguese and Malay were
also widely spoken. The Malay slaves (Dutch political prisoners) had
also brought the religion of Islam to the Cape. (10)

When the European colonists, collectively known as the Cape Dutch,
began to resist Company restrictions and also later when they resisted
anglicization under British Imperialism, they frequently referred to
themselves as Afrikaners, and the peasant farmers also were known as
Boeren. The first person on record to do so was Hendrik Biedouw in
1707, and in 1708 the Rev. E.F. Le Boucq spoke of the danger that 'the
Africaanders will fall to the level of the Hottentotdom.' (2)
Afrikaner really means African (Afrikaans for African: Afrikaan), and
initially was used in that sense. (2) Giliomee goes into finer detail on the
intellectual debate over Hendrik Biedow's statement “...ik wil niet lopen
(I will not leave the colony), ik ben een Afrikaander al slaat die landdrost
mijn dood...(I am an Afrikaander even if the magistrate beats me to
death...)”. But as republicanist ideals grew (largely from the 1780s) the
term Afrikaner became more exclusively associated with republicanist
Afrikaans speaking colonists, with notable exception of some English
media which used the term, either in a negative sense, or inclusively for
the sake of anglicization. From the late 1700s there were little reference
to the indigenous peoples as Afrikaners; instead referred to as Africans,
Bantu, Natives (for servants and free blacks), Hottentots (for Khoikhoi),
Bushmen (for San), Coloureds or Basters (for mixed races) and,
probably most unflatteringly, Savages and Kaffirs in reference to
“uncivilized” tribes of the interior. (4)

When the European settlement expanded in the 1600s, tensions
developed between the Europeans and the indigenous Khoikhoi who
were systematically losing grazing for their livestock to settler farmers.
The first Khoikhoi attack under Doman occured as early as 1659 (seven
years after the Company post had been established). They destroyed
most farms and carried off the livestock. Doman was banned to Robben
Island and a nervous peace ensued. The Khoikhoi answered Van
Riebeeck when he remarked that there was not enough grazing for all:
'As for your claim that the land is not big enough for both of us, who
should rather in justice give way, the rightful owner or the foreign
intruder?' (2)
Van Riebeeck has been accused of having attempted to enslave the
Khoikhoi. This is based on an inscription in his journal over his
frustration with the conflicts, that “living in peace with the Khoikhoi was
impossible, but killing them was barbarous and unchristian.” He
considered enslaving them as a compromise, but knew that enslaving
the indigenous peoples were a contravention of Company instructions.
As the farming colony expanded, the Khoikhoi – many having been
driven north by the repeated wars with colonists and with San-tribes –
reached (for a while) a workable relationship with the farmers. Khoikhoi
laborors, living on frontier farms with their clans and raising their own
livestock and receiving seed and other provisions from the farmers, did
well for themselves. Gradually, as the frontier moved on and the colony
closed around them, the labor-relationships decayed into serfdom. (1)
Ownership of land was not restricted by race, but only Christians were
allowed to swear an oath, a legal requirement to obtain land. Most
Khoikhoi were not Christian. Khoikhoi and free blacks did not generally
have the same rights as burghers. They invariably lost out to burghers in
cases where land claims were contested (as in wills) and did not have
access to borrowings, usually supplied to whites by family-members.
Some became addicted to liquor and tobacco which the Company
supplied liberally (2) – the start of the infamous dopstelsel (tot-system).
Many became drifters. Some (mainly of mixed Khoisan, slave and
European heritage) formed independant societies like the Griqua in the
north-eastern Cape, or found refuge at missionary stations which
developed into towns, many of which still exist. The Khoikhoi as a
people were largely decimated by a smallpox epidemic in 1713, but
some royal dynasties are being restored. The major clans today are the
Nama and Griqua.
The most prominent missionary societies were the German Rhenish
Mission Society, Morawian Missionary Society, the Afrikaans Zuid
Afrikaansche Sending Genootschap (ZASG or ZAZG) and the London
Missionary Society (LMS). For decades of Afrikaner history, the schools
provided for free by missionary societies were responsible for the
education of poor Afrikaner children, sharing with the “colored” children.
The London Missionary Society and the Afrikaners were not close
friends though...

Slavery became well-instituted on Cape farms; ownership correlating
with wealth, with highest ownership (amount of slaves held per individual
as well as percentage of colonists owning slaves) in the western Cape
heartland (up to 70% of farms in Stellenbosch) and progressively
decreasing eastwards as poorer burghers settled on loan farms;
Khoisan servants and laborors were common. Hideous forms of
punishment for slaves in slave colonies had applied in the early years of
the Cape as well, like mutilation (replaced in 1727 by branding on the
back) to serve as a warning to fellow slaves for the rest of the poor
man's days. The Company's justification for judicial torture of slaves,
was that they were “descended from wild and rude Nations” which
generally had so little regard for life, as to not be deterred by the death
penalty in itself. White employees of the Company (sailors and soldiers)
were also subject to extreme types of punishment for various offences,
like death for mutiny or cowardice, or keelhauling for desertion; and
burghers in a handful of notable cases received severe sentences for
killing slaves or Khoisan. But slave punishment was more public in order
to serve as a deterrent to possible slave uprisings. Roman Law, applied
in the Cape, recognized slaves though, as persons and not mere
property. They were also allowed to bring charges against their masters.
    Seeing their role as guardians of the peace, the Stellenbosch college
of landdrost and heemraden in 1776 observed that ill treatment of
slaves could only lead to 'huge misfortune for the general welfare.' Thus,
the law was used not only to punish them but also to protect them. (2)
Working slaves in good condition also increased a farm's value in the
case of privately owned slaves. I.e. They had commodity-value. (1 – p.57)

The insidious expansion of the frontier of the colony – to the north and
the east led to increased racial tension. Conflict first broke out with the
San in the 1700s and in the latter part of the 1700s the stock farmers
collided in the eastern Cape with the Xhosa – the first Nguni civilization
encountered. The war against the San was harsh from the side of the
Afrikaners. Their poisoned arrows were indeed deadly and they had
killed hearders when stealing livestock and attacked farmers' families,
leaving large swaths of farms in the northeastern frontier uninhabited,
but they sometimes met with unnecessary violence from the
commandos, notably under field corporal Adriaan van Jaarsveld.
Another trend that came into the spotlight was “indenturing” of San
children, a twisted form of custodianship reminiscent of the European
workhouses, that claimed to “civilize children”. The practice had a more
benign and official origin though. When Commandant Godlieb Rudolph
Opperman failed to resolve the crisis peacefully and was instructed to
expell (vergelden) the Bushmen, the very specific intention of
detainment of women and children was to save them from getting killed
in the conflict, which sometimes amounted to massacre. (2) Concilliation
with the Bushmen ensued after Field Commandant J.P. Van der Walt
asked the landdrost to refuse requests for the commandos to attack the
Bushmen and capture children since, 'the burghers would also give their
all if they were robbed of their children.' (2) But in later years capture of
children became widespread, though not universally acceptable, in the
early Natal and Transvaal (ZAR) and children were often “indentured”.
They might have had some commodity-value like the slaves had had,
but were not generally mistreated, often being employed as hearders.
Sometimes tribes, notably the Rolong and Bushmen sold their own
children to farmers, e.g. in exchange for blankets or livestock. (3, 14) The
abduction of children were by no means exclusively an Afrikaner-
practice, nor was it found acceptable by all commando-members (2). The
practice was also common in tribal conflicts. (4 – p 425 – 427), (5)
     Some Southern African groups in New Scotland, such as the
amaNgqamane, still paid tribute to the Swazi royalty and hence
regarded the area as rightfully belonging to Swaziland. Since the 1840s
Swazi impis regularly transversed this area in search of booty. This
included children of neigboring tribes, including Bushmen who were
abducted to become serfs. Many of these children were again sold to
Boer farmers who needed cheap labor to develop their farms (Bonner
1983). Others were taken to Swaziland where they became known as
titfunjwa (non-Swazi captives from outside the borders of Swaziland).
Such captives formed an important part of the Swazi economy and were
in fact assimilated into Swazi society. From Natalia.org article. (5)

The primary objective of identuring the children was most likely the
breaking up of menacing tribes by stamping burghers' authority on them,
rather than demand for cheap labor as a substitute for slavery.
(Burghers had once complained that a slave-economy was inherited
through a Company that had instituted the practice and “every ship
under every flag offloading slaves at the Cape.” (1))
The paternalistic-minded Afrikaners probably also really believed that
they were civilizing Africans through indenturement. Indigenous culture:
customs like initiation rites and polygamy, dress and religion (diviners,
trance, ritual practices, superstition) conflicted with what Afrikaners
considered Christian and very strongly influenced their idea of a savage
people. (4,6,7,8)
    To avoid being discredited for permitting slavery, the ZAR authorities
tried to regulate the practice, and, in 1851 issued the Apprentice Act,
which permitted burghers to apply to the landdrost or field cornet to
indenture African children 'given as gifts or obtained in any other legal or
voluntary manner'. After the age of twenty-five they were to be exempt
from 'all compulsory labour obligations' and be released. But the act
also permitted the transfer of indentured servants called 'inboekelinge'
which encouraged trade in these children. By the mid-1850s the trade
had reached such a scale that, in Cape Town, De Zuid-Afrikaan
reported 'a regular export' of captives to other parts of the ZAR.
President Boshoff told the OFS Volksraad that it was well-known that
some farmers had bought child apprentices from ZAR burghers. Some
burghers made no secret of it and did not consider it a crime. (2)
     In 1869 the synod of the Dutch Reformed Church in the ZAR
considered the situation so serious that it adopted a resolution that
stated: 'Church discipline will be applied to all members of our
denomination found guilty of buying or selling or exchanging or
accepting in exchange, Kaffir children, contrary to the laws of the state.'
… two years later it decided to rescind the resolution on the grounds
that the evil no longer existed. (2)

Thus had begun a very long chapter in Afrikaner history: the question of
morality had gained momentum from various sides for various reasons,
and naturally the missionaries became involved, though sometimes for
political reasons more than philanthropy. Slavery, maltreatment and
perceived maltreatment of the Khoisan, encroaching on indigenous land,
indenturing of children and denying rights like suffrage, had colluded to
haunt Afrikaners against a backdrop of transfer of ownership of the
Cape colony to the British Empire – a civilization that considered itself
more liberal, more moral and more cultured than any other.
         2. THE EASTERN FRONTIER – PART I
In 1795 France invaded the Netherlands. A new (short-lived) republic
fashioned on post-revolutionary France, called Batavia was declared.
The monarg (Stadtholder) of the Netherlands, William V (Willem
Batavus) Prince of Orange, fled into exile in England. Fearing the Cape
colony would fall into the hands of the French, England annexed it under
the pretext of “securing it for the House of Orange” and proclaimed it a
British protectorate.(7) It was transferred temporarily to Dutch (Batavian)
administration again untill 1806, when Britain retook it. In 1814 the Cape
finally became British property.

In 1714, the then-government of the Cape introduced the loan-farm
system to enable poor burghers, otherwise faced with a life as knechten
(servants) on the western Cape's wine and wheat farms, to obtain land
for an affordable rental. This encouraged settlement in the eastern
districts of the Cape. No statutary restrictions prevented non-Europeans
from acquiring land, but usually only burghers received loan farms for
reasons that are not clear. (Van der Merwe, Trek, pp. 71-85 and J.B.
Peires, The House of Phalo, Jhb: Ravan Press, 1981, p. 85 are the
sources given by Giliomee.) (2)
Thus were founded the agricultural districts of Swellendam and Graaff
Reinet, the hotbeds that would spurn the Great Trek.
Intensive cattle grazing wore out the veld. The farmers could not
speculate with the land, so intensive grazing was the best way to
become more than a subsistance farmer. They could borrow capital on
the farm as a business though, but this led to a severe debt crisis. In
1812 a report on the situation by the judges of the first circuit court
noted: “All the young people, of which many of the houses are full, have
no other prospect than breeding of cattle and to obtain (land) for that
purpose … All look forward to becoming graziers, and no person forms
for himself any other plan of livelihood.” (2)

In 1778-1787, the Cape Patriots were an anti-Orangist movement that
networked with Dutch Patriots, who were calling for “overthrow of the
Stadtholder of the Netherlands and self-appointed regents that thwarted
the aspirations of the burghers.”
The Cape Patriots' main issue was with Governor Joachim van
Plettenberg and Fiscal (chief prosecutor) Hendrik Boers, who enforced
the Company regulation to re-enlist recalcitrant burghers into Company
service. They petitioned to the Company HQ for burgher-elected
representation on the Council of Policy when it discussed matters
affecting burghers, as well as half the seats on the Court of Justice for
elected burgher representatives.
They also called for a clearer definition of burgher rights, openness in
making of laws and a stop to the banishment of burghers, unless with
permission from burgher councilors.
They complained to the Company about the trading activities of officials
and the lack of free trade. They called for better prices, lower farm
rentals and access to export markets in the Netherlands and East India.
They also requested that white men not be arrested by “kaffirs” (slave
police constables) and that burghers be allowed to punish their own
slaves.
   Their principle argument was that the 'constitution' of the colony had
become so defective that the survival of burgher society as a whole was
imperiled. (2)
They played on fears in the Netherlands that discontented burghers'
dispersal into the interior would dissolve civilization and spell the end of
the colony, suggesting that if reform did not come to government
structure in the colony, colonists would continue to be driven out.
The Company made some major concessions. Alhough it did not
concede to burgher representation on its Council of Policy, it gave
burghers representation on the Council of Justice.
Burghers would no longer be re-enlisted in the Company's service.
Though they would not be allowed to export in their own ships, trade
was permitted with foreign ships once all the Company's needs had
been met.
Revolutionary sentiments kept brewing however.
In 1795 when a British force occupied the Cape on behalf of the Prince
of Orange, it encountered a deeply divided white population with most
of the top officials Orangists, anti-revolutionary and pro-Britain, but the
burghers in general, strongly pro-France, pro-revolution and anti-Britain.
(2)
The British quickly snuffed out revolutionary sentiment in the western
Cape, but the burghers on the eastern frontier would challenge the
political order.

The Company during Dutch reign did not bother much with the workings
of the eastern frontier. Two small towns, Swellendam (est. 1745) and
Graaff Reinet (est. 1796) were the only administrative infrastructure
between the mountain ranges encircling the Cape colony and the Fish
River (some 800 km east of Cape Town), the eastern-most border with
the Nguni-speaking Xhosa tribes. Each town housed a drostdy (office of
the landdrost.) The frontier's security needs were met by the commando,
comprised of burghers (after 1739, commando service was compulsory
for every burgher with interests in the outlying districts) and Khoikhoi
auxilliaries. The commando was headed by a field cornet – a burgher
appointed by the landdrost. He could mobilize the commando and act
with much discretion to respond swiftly to recover stolen cattle. (2)

The main economy of the Xhosa was pastorialism, supplemented by
agriculture and hunting. The Xhosa's crops dictated settlement patterns
in the high summer rainfall areas of the eastern parts of South Africa.
The Xhosa had been migrating slowly westwards from the Kei River
since the early 18th century and settled up to the Fish River. An area
west of the Fish up to the Bushman's River (actually stretching as far
west as the Sundays River) was a region of uncertain rainfall called the
Zuurveld, which formed a natural buffer between the Xhosa and the
colonists.

Governor Joachim van Plettenberg in a 1778 visit, reached an
agreement with some minor Gwali chiefs that the upper Fish River and
Bushmans River would serve as borders. But two years later the Council
of Policy made the Fish the official border and included the Zuurveld in
the Cape colony. Even field corporal Adriaan van Jaarsveld believed the
Zuurveld had first been settled by the Xhosa, and said that it should be
returned to them for the sake of a lasting peace. But, as it was, the 1778
treaty had not been taken seriously by either burghers or Xhosa. The
Zuurveld Xhosa were renegades. The Xhosa tribes were not united in
those days and groups in the Zuurveld usually sought alliances with
burghers against other chiefs.
   The Xhosa attempted to enmesh the burghers in their networks and
eventually integrate them into their society along the pattern of the
Xhosa absorption of the Khoikhoi clans. (Xhosa historian, J.B. Peieres,
The House of Phalo) Trading, begging and military alliances all formed
part of the Xhosa's initial interaction with another society, followed by
marriage and other forms of social incorporation. All hinged on outsiders
accepting African leadership and on payment of tribute to a chief,
according to Xhosa custom. The Xhosa paramount chief Ngqika, for
example was eager to marry the daughter of the burgher Coenraad de
Buys who had struck up a relationship with the local kraal. (2)

The two societies managed to coexist. The few clashes that broke out
were due to deliberate provocations from either side.
The beginnings of the conflict on the frontier were complex. There was
an influx of Xhosa into the Zuurveld, caused by conflicts in the Xhosa
hinterland. The influx was accompanied by increased theft of burghers'
farmstock.(1) And there was Willem Prinsloo, involved in illegal trade with
the Xhosa, who had shot a Xhosa in an argument over stolen sheep,
'...whereapon the Xhosa rose up and attacked the inhabitants, resulting
in the terrible slaughter of the Xhosa and the ruin of many inhabitants',
according to the report by the landdrost of Stellenbosch.
The Xhosa also resented a trigger-happy field corporal Adriaan van
Jaarsveld, whom they knicknamed “the red captain,” for shooting a
friendly party of Xhosa in the belief that he was being led into an
ambush. Tensions continued. The Xhosa became threatening, walking
around on farms in armed bands and demanding whatever they wanted,
especially when the men were not there. A farmer said, “It is hard to be
oppressed by the heathens on our own loan farms.” A small group of
burghers took matters into their own hands and the second frontier war
ensued in 1792. After the second war, the Zuurveld was abandoned by
burghers and most of their livestock were taken by the Xhosa. The
concept of the laager started, where burghers formed military camps by
drawing into a circle, fifty or more wagons with thorn branches thrust
between the openings. The elderly, women and children would hide in a
square of four wagons in the center, roofed with planks and raw hides. (2)

A new district secretary, Horatius Maynier attempted to stabilize the
situation by ordering burghers who had fled their farms, to move back. If
they were not back within a month, they would be facing disposession.
To add to burghers' frustration, the Company, trying to ward off financial
collapse, decided to collect arrears taxes. Tax collection had not been
rigorously enforced in the past and burghers did not consider the service
they were getting in exchange as worth their while, especially not in
terms of security.
Company agents who held the sole right to buy meat from the farmers,
were instructed to collect three years worth of arrears taxes from the
farmers. Many farmers refused to sell any stock, and Secretary Maynier,
who had connections to the meat monopoly, was branded a
slagterskneg or butcher's servant for supporting the tax collection.
Security was a big concern for the eastern burghers, but they were
divided (depending on where they resided) whether priority should be
given to the Bushmen in the north or the Xhosa to the east.
Adriaan van Jaarsveld (the heavy-handed field corporal) did not want
conflict with the Xhosa and went on an expedition north, against
Secretary Maynier's instructions. On his return he was charged with
undermining Maynier's authority and, subsequently also with financial
irregularities.
This drove him into an allience with an old enemy, Marthinus Prinsloo,
the man who had set off the first Frontier War.
In 1795 Britain took over the Cape. In the eastern Cape, the Van
Jaarsveld revolt (named after Field Corporal van Jaarsveld) broke out.
Van Jaarsveld was jumped from prison and a gang of armed burghers
took over Maynier's administration and ordered Maynier to leave Graaff
Reinet. Similar anarchy erupted in Swellendam.
The insurrection leaned heavily on burghers' frustrations over taxes and
failing security. They called for tougher measures against the Bushmen
and Xhosa, including the need to recapture stolen cattle from the Xhosa
and indenturing Bushmen children. These were smokescreens though.
Typical of the lawless (and near-bankrupt) Zuurveld-men involved in the
insurrection, was Coenraad De Buys. A family member described him as
follows: 'He is an intriguer who has not a single friend. He has been no
good since his earliest years. He has always been a disturber of the
peace and the persecutor of Christians as well as blacks.' (Noel Mostert,
Frontiers, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992, p. 317.) (2)
De Buys had seven children with a “colored” wife, when he also married
the mother of the Rharhabe chief, Ngqika, as well as a Thembu wife.
Maynier had considered him one of the principle causes of the 1793 war
with the Xhosa. He had stolen cattle from several chiefs, as well as
wives. When some Xhosa confronted him, his Khoikhoi servants shot
dead five and De Buys had beaten several others up severely (He was
said to be about seven feet tall). The Xhosa who raided the Zuurveld in
1793 targeted De Buys, burned down his farmstead and took all his
cattle.
Now, De Buys was instrumental in the 1795 Van Jaarsveld uprising. He
was still on good terms with the Xhosa chief Ngqika (Gaika), whose
mother he had married and he hated the English, calling them the
“Bushmen of the Sea.” The instigators made veiled threats to burghers
that those who would not join the rebellion could potentially become
targets of Coenraad De Buys' Xhosa and could see their cattle handed
over to the Xhosa.

The British government at the Cape, following on the momentum of
suppressing the western Cape resistance, raised a corps of about 300
Khoikhoi (later to become the Cape Corps) and included fifty of them in
the British force led by General T.P. Vandeleur, sent to crush the Van
Jaarsveld revolt. (“Nothing I know would intimidate the Boers more,” the
British commander wrote later.) The rebels, on hearing the news,
threatened that they would unleash De Buys “with all of Kaffirland” if a
single Pandoer (Khoikhoi soldier) was included in the army sent against
them.
The Swellendam uprising had fizzled out and the Graaff Reinet rebels
capitulated when the government suspended ammunition supply to the
districts, declared martial law and disarmed all the burghers. Van
Jaarsveld and Prinsloo were arrested. Ninety-three burghers received
heavy fines and twenty were sent to Cape Town for trial. In September
1800, the Court of Justice composed of colonists, sentenced Van
Jaarsveld and Prinsloo to death. All were pardoned, but Van Jaarsveld
died while imprisoned in the Castle.
There was a twist though. The Khoikhoi servants, believing that the
tables had now been turned against the disarmed burghers, rose up
against them. It was alledged that as Vandeleur's troops marched
towards the rebels on the frontier, soldiers had incited servants to rise up
against their masters. A Khoikhoi insurrection under Klaas Stuurman,
drove many burghers from their farms; then asked the British military
force for protection against the “cruel” burghers, as well as restoration of
Khoikhoi independance.
General Dundas, acting British governor, also tested his army against
the Xhosa in the Zuurveld, but realized it would not be an easy fight. The
troops were returned to Cape Town by sea.
Most of the Khoikhoi rebels now joined the Gqununkhwebe – a Nguni
people of largely Khoikhoi descent. They organized a huge fighting force
comprised of various Khoikhoi and Xhosa clans. These insurgents,
armed with horses and guns and large numbers of Xhosa on foot, began
to attack burghers' farms. The burghers were severely hampered by a
shortage of ammunition and still Vandeleur would not issue any to them.
Dundas refused to commit British troops, but fearing for the loss of the
eastern districts, gave the order to call up a burgher commando to expel
the Xhosa over the Fish and get the Khoikhoi to return to their masters.
The commando was defeated in a surprise night attack by 150 Khoikhoi
and Xhosa. The insurgents now raided the frontier, burning farms and
carrying off livestock. All burghers except three families had fled into
laagers. Insurgents on the farms of the Scheepers and Strydom families
killed fifteen burghers and held twelve women and children captive for
two weeks.
Dundas, attempting to shift the blame for the fiasco onto the burghers,
called them 'timid to an extent beyond example' and 'a troublesome and
disaffected race,' characterized by 'the strongest compound of
cowardice and cruelty, of treachery and cunning.' (2)
The government decided to take the route of reconcilliation with the
Xhosa. Dundas, accompanied by Maynier, travelled to the frontier. They
played down the threat and instructed burghers yet again, to return to
their farms or risk disposession. The Khoikhoi were offered the promise
of labor contracts and arbitration with the landdrost rather than the field
cornet. Maynier was instated as resident commissioner of Graaff Reinet
with twenty-two British soldiers and a large contingent of armed
Khoikhoi.
To outrage burghers further, two missionaries of the London Missionary
Society, Rev. Johannes van der Kemp and James Read used the
burghers' church to accommodate destitute Khoikhoi converging on
Graaff Reinet. The Khoikhoi would now also attend regular church
services with the burghers. With peace briefly restored on the frontier in
1802, the two missionaries received an abandoned farm where they
established the mission station Bethelsdorp. (2)

The Batavian Republic that ran the Cape from 1803–1806 on the
Enlightenment principles of good government brought some stability to
the frontier with the new districts of Uitenhage and Tulbagh added, as
well as a drostdy and military post (Fort Frederick) at Algoa Bay. The
Batavians introduced severe penalties for burghers who crossed the
colonial border or ill-treated servants.(2) In 1806, Britain again took
posession of the Cape. A report by Colonel Collins found that the
Khoikhoi were still being ill-treated on farms.
In the meantime, Ngqika had lost control over the Xhosa to his rival
Ndlambe, and De Buys left the eastern frontier for the north. He is said
to have fathered children wherever he encountered a tribe and to have
left a legacy of 3 000 (!) grandchildren. (12)

Soon the situation on the frontier began to deteriorate again. A British
officer stationed on the frontier warned that without immediate aid, the
entire eastern Cape was in danger of falling to the Xhosa.
Two perspectives on the situation were considered:
Colonel Collins suggested that a community of some six thousand new
settlers be placed in a compact settlement in the Zuurveld to shore up
the border.
Another report was written in 1810 by the Swede, Anders Stockenström,
landdrost of Graaff Reinet. (His son was to become the first significant
Afrikaner-leader.) His comments would be considered extremely racist
by today's commentators, but should be seen in the context of the
provocative (intimidatory) stance the Xhosa had taken on the farms:
“The Kaffirs are naturally insatiable beggars and thieves. All domestic
and agricultural labor being performed by women and the cattle being
hearded by the boys, the men have nothing to do but to hunt and to
wander among the colonists. On arriving on a farm, a party begged for
victuals while watching their oppertunity to carry off something for their
journey into the bargain.” He called for decisive action, since “they fancy
us afraid or unable to punish them according to their deserts.” He also
wrote: “Neither peace nor friendship can subsist between the inhabitants
and the Kaffirs while both inhabit the same country. [The reason] is
interwoven in the character of the Kaffir, in that of the colonist and in the
nature of the country.”
In 1811, Sir John Cradock(11) became governor of the Cape colony. To
him a military operation was the only option: “No benefit could possibly
arise either to the Kaffir tribes or the Dutch settlers from any intercourse
and all the present evils proceed from their intermixture.”
There was a degree of consensus that previous military expeditions
against the Xhosa had been unsuccessful because the burgher
commandos had made recapturing of livestock their primary objective
over military goals.(2) Colonel Collins wrote: “The wars that were first
waged against the Caffres were carried out exclusively by the settlers,
who seem, whenever they have been unsuccessful, to have failed in a
large degree from their having considered the recovery of stolen cattle
as the principle object of the hostility.”

To the end of 1811 a large force was assembled under leadership of
Colonel John Graham. It consisted of 440 British troops, 431 Khoikhoi
soldiers and 450 burghers on commando. Districts that did not provide
men for commando duty were heavily taxed to the amount of £47 750.
   Over the previous forty years the Xhosa, in the eyes of the burghers
had been many things – foes, certainly, but also trading partners,
laborers and potential military allies. (2)
Colonel Graham intended a total onslaught. Marauding Xhosa were to
be persued to their settlements where 'every man Kaffer' found was to
be slain and, if possible, the chief 'destroyed', as to instill in the Xhosa 'a
proper degree of terror and respect,' to prevent their return. (2)
Hopes for a peaceful settlement were dashed, when an unarmed party
of twenty-four men, headed by landdrost Anders Stockenström, went
among a group of hundred Xhosa to persuade them to retreat peacefully
across the Fish River. The Xhosa attacked the men after receiving word
that a Xhosa had been shot by a soldier. They killed Stockenström and
seven other men.
The military force quickly moved to expell 8 000 Xhosa from the
Zuurveld. A series of forts were built along the border and two new
frontier towns, Grahamstown and Cradock were founded.
When cattle rustling began again, encouraged by a severe drought, a
large commando under Captain George Fraser was assembled. His
deputy was a Graaff Reinet deputy landdrost, Andries Stockenstrom, the
son of Landdrost Anders Stockenström. Stockenstrom later summed up
the intention of the commando: “To kill, to make an example of, to strike
terror into the enemy was a duty, a standing order.”
The Xhosa suffered many casualties and chiefdoms in the Zuurveld
were destroyed. Soldiers killed a chief, Chungwa, in his own bed.
Some commando burghers remained apprehensive about British
motives though, especially after a rumour had started that they would be
enlisted in the British army and shipped off to other wars. (2)

In 1809 the Hottentot Proclamation (Caledon's Code) gave more
protection to servants by requiring written contracts. It also formalized
the pass system to curtail vagrancy on farms, presumably because
vagrants could be taken advantage of by farmers.
An annual circuit court touring the interior was introduced. The second
circuit court of 1812 became known as the Black Circuit. The
missionaries Van der Kemp and Read from Bethelsdorp, aided Khoikhoi
laborers who brought charges of maltreatment against burghers. The
judges were probably biassed in favor of the burghers, but the real
significance of the Black Circuit was that the missionaries had
succeeded in attracting the attention of influential people in London to
the issue of maltreatment of the Khoikhoi. (2)
Other laws introduced in the same time seem contradictory. An 1812
regulation allowed colonists who had maintained a Khoikhoi child for his
first eight years, to apprentice the child for ten years. In 1819, farmers
were also authorized to apprentice Khoikhoi orphans and children with
no parental care, until age eighteen.
In an attempt to stabilize the frontier and drive out lawlessness, as well
as inefficient farmers, Cradock ended the loan farm system, replacing it
with title deeds on properly surveyed land. In practice it made farms
smaller and more expensive, and delays in processing new land claims
added to frustrations.

Respect for the law started to take root more effectively when a new,
more articulate class of landdrost were appointed, who managed to
communicate to the heemraden and burghers, that the new order of law
was in their best interest.(2) Burghers would be won over to the principle
of reform, rather than it being forced apon them.
The most important roleplayer was Andries Stockenstrom. As a young
man of eighteen he was in a meeting with his father (days before he was
killed) with Jacob Cuyler, the landdrost of Uitenhage, over the demands
of the missionaries Van der Kemp and Read, that the Khoikhoi have
equal rights to burghers in every facet of life. He took a stand in defence
of the missionaries – though not quite as ultra-philantropic as Read who
would later declare himself a Hottentot – but certainly in terms of
equality of all men before the law. He held to that view throughout his life
and applied it later, when attempting to mend the relationship between
the burghers and Xhosa. 'Strict and equal justice at all costs was the
only safe course,' he once remarked. (2)




        Sir Andries Stockenstrom (Cape Town, 6/7/1792 – London, 16/3/1864)

He identified himself as an Afrikaner and a Boer, unlike most of the well-
educated colonists of his day, and often found himself defending the
honor of this society of people. Voortrekker leader Andries Pretorius
called him his “best friend and father.”

Stockenstrom's first challenge was another revolt started by pretty much
the same group of people responsible for the Van Jaarsveld Revolt and
very much a continuation of it. The main trouble maker was Hendrik
Prinsloo. He was the son of Marthinus Prinsloo, who had been one of
the main instigators in that revolt. Marthinus Prinsloo, you will recall, had
also started the first war with the Xhosa. At least one contemporary
observer said that Marthinus Prinsloo was 'the principle promoter of the
late [Slagtersnek] disturbances.' All his sons participated. Of the thirty-
nine who were arrested afterwards, seven bore the name of Prinsloo
and a further five were married to Prinsloo women. (2)
Others involved were men like Coenraad Bezuidenhoudt and Cornelis
Faber, who had fled persecution after the Van Jaarsveld Revolt and
found refuge across the Fish River, living in close proximity to Ngqika.
The main grievances were, (A) in the words of Hendrik Prinsloo, that
“the Hottentots [were] preferred to the burghers” (As evidence they
pointed to the Black Circuit) and (B) shortage of land. ( By 1798, 39
percent of the male burghers in Graaff Reinet owned land; by 1812 the
percentage had shrunk to 25. (2))
The Slagtersnek Revolt began in 1813, when a Khoikhoi laborer, named
Booy, complained to Stockenstrom (then, deputy landdrost of Cradock)
that his master had withheld his wages and severely assaulted him. The
master was Freek Bezuidenhout, brother of Coenraad Bezuidenhout. He
lived with a mixed-race woman, and his mixed-race son would call him
“baas” – “boss,” the term non-whites used for a white master.
Bezuidenhout ignored Stockenstrom's summons to appear in court. A
company of two British officers and twelve Khoikhoi troops arrived at
Bezuidenhout's farmstead with an arrest warrant. A brief battle ensued
and Bezuidenhout was killed. At his funeral, a brother, Hans
Bezuidenhout, swore revenge and Hendrik Prinsloo immediately began
to enlist support. Cornelis Faber went twice to Ngqika with a proposal:
Ngqika would help to drive away the Cape Regiment and expel all
government officials from the frontier. He would then receive the entire
Zuurveld, whilst allowing the burghers to occupy the fertile Kat River
valley, well east of the border. One rebel leader proposed a plan to
“maintain a certain understanding with the Kaffirs,” whereby they would
cross the border and settle in an area towards the east of the Xhosa as
an independent Union. One of the Bothma brothers told fellow rebels
that Ngqika's people were unanimous that “they would fight for the
Zuurveld and we would fight for our land.” As in the Van Jaarsveld
Revolt, but this time more directly, a threat was made to burghers who
refused to join that they would be attacked by the Xhosa and their
property handed over to them.

Stockenstrom saw the whole issue as a clear-cut case of order vs
anarchy. At a crucial point in the rebellion, he rode in unarmed among a
group of disaffected rebels and persuaded them to stand down. He also
convinced influencial farmers to stand with the government. The
rebellion was crushed without a single shot being fired. Five of the
ringleaders were hanged.
     Slagtersnek was a critical turning point in establishing the
government's control of the frontier... Governors began to comment
favorably on the human quality of the people who had settled the
frontier. While never truly trusting the British rulers, most burghers had
accepted the fact that obeying the government and its laws was in their
best interests. In 1833 the governor, Sir Lowry Cole, not overly
sympathetic to the burghers, wrote with reference to them: 'Such is their
dread of criminal laws that many are afraid to defend their persons and
property even in a lawful manner.' (2)

In 1817, after visiting the border and witnessing that most frontier
farmers had fled or were preparing to flee, Governor Lord Charles
Somerset announced strict measures to deal with livestock theft. He told
Ngqika, whom he indifferently assumed to be the supreme Xhosa chief,
that he would hold him personally accountable for all future livestock
theft. Ngqika had already become sidelined among the Xhosa and with
the added pressure, many of his followers joined his rival Ndlambe.
When Ndlambe attacked him, Ngqika appealed to the colony for help.
A military force under Colonel Thomas Brereton, with British and
Khoikhoi troops and a commando under Stockenstrom was sent to his
assistance. They defeated Ndlambe, and then did something drastic:
British soldiers backed by burghers, blasted the wooded valleys, driving
out some 23 000 head of cattle.

December 1818 to January 1819 saw Xhosa reprisal in the first phase of
the Fourth Frontier War. One burgher wrote from his laager: “God alone
will know what will become of us … One can have no idea but that the
whole of Kaffirland is here. For God's sake please come to our
assistance.”
During the second phase (Fith Frontier War) the “war doctor”, Maqana
Nxele (or Makanda) attacked the garrison town of Grahamstown with six
thousand men. The garrison with the aid of Khoikhoi marksmen, averted
defeat and then rode out after Nxele, who subsequently surrendered.

The government now moved the border with the Xhosa even further
eastwards to the Keiskamma. Four thousand British immigrants were
settled in 1820 in the Zuurveld (once, the neutral zone). It became the
Albany district, with Grahamstown as its seat of landdrost and
heemraden. To its east, a new neutral zone was established, ranging
from the Fish River up to the Keiskamma. Even Ngqika was ordered to
leave, and soon afterward the “neutral territory” became Ceded or
Conqured Territory, named Victoria Province.
Five years later another district, Somerset, was created to the northwest
of Albany. (See map)
Stockenstrom had serious doubts about the wisdom of intervening in the
conflict between Ngqika and Ndlambe and the capturing of such a large
amount of cattle. He believed in swift justice, had favored coming down
very hard on marauders, murderers and stock thieves, and believed that
military campaigns, when called for, should be carried out with
conviction and never in a halfhearted manner. But he denounced
encroachment and the destruction of peoples, and raiding the Xhosa's
cattle did not sit well with him. He wrote later of 'populous tribes driven
to desperation by being deprived of all their cattle.' He said that
'revenge, starvation and desperation' had sent Ndlambe's men on
reprisal raids in the colony. Had Nxele taken Grahamstown,
Stockenstrom believed the frontier would not have survived without
overwhelming reinforcements from Britain. (2)
   3. STOCKENSTROM AND THE MISSIONARIES

In a 1770 judgment, British judge, Lord Mansfield called slavery “too
odious an institution to exist in England without specific legislation
sanctioning it.” In 1787, the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the
Slave Trade was founded. In 1793 France abolished slavery in all its
colonies. Word spread to the slaves in the Cape. Colonists started to
fear rumors of slave uprisings and Khoikhoi attacks on the “farms of
Christians.”
The British government initially moved slowly with slave reforms in the
Cape, fearing destabilizing the colony and many excuses were held up
by Company officials to justify upholding the slave trade.
Leading burghers like Landdrost Van der Riet of Stellenbosch, feared
that tampering with the master-slave order in the Cape could lead to a
second Saint-Dominigue.
But senior Cape-born officials like Landdrost Andries Stockenstrom and
Chief Justice J.A. Truter and F.W. Reitz (senior) knew the old order
could not continue in the light of the Enlightenment insistence on the
freedom and dignity of all people. For their own sake, burghers would
have to change the way they viewed slaves and servants.
    The Cape-born officials challenged the burghers' conviction that most
of the Khoikhoi servants were too backward and depraved to enjoy the
same liberties as the burghers, and that their word had to be given
lesser weight in the courts. Stockenstrom argued that the old system of
oppression had not been 'productive of one single beneficial effect.' It
had 'degraded the moral character of the natives' and had given rise to
the view that they 'were too miserable a species' to enjoy any rights.
Hence he did not doubt that a new system resting on personal liberty
and security of property could only be an improvement. Truter wrote that
'the [Hottentots] are, and remain, people, and free people at that.' (2)

One of the charges the London missionaries held against burghers, was
the low rate of Christian baptism among slaves and Khoikhoi servants.
The Dutch Reformed Church also had low levels of non-white attendants
and the burghers seemed to prefer having their own churches as cultural
institutions. Afrikaner Protestantism had been a major factor in ethnic
identity formation of Afrikaners, and for many, having passed catechism,
represented the height of their education. Their Christian culture was
fundamental to upholding their European civilization against an alien,
and what they considered heathen, indigenous culture. In a way, it was
unethical Christianity, so a compromise developed. The Afrikaner
churches (Calvinist and Lutheran denominations) founded their own
missionary society, the ZAZG which established separate denominations
for slaves and Khoisan. Two ZAZG directors in 1851 regretted the 1819
decision to have separate congregations, calling it an unwise decision
and stating that, 'all illiterates and heathen [should] be instructed and be
prepared to become members of established Protestant churches.' (2)
But by that time, the pattern had been set.
It was thought, a major reason for the low baptism among slaves, was
that owners could not sell confirmed slaves, and they had to be
manumitted on the owner's death. When Britain ended the slave trade in
1808, the value of Cape slaves increased dramatically. Fearing it would
further discourage owners from having their slaves confirmed, Fiscal
Daniel Denyssen, a Cape-born public prosecutor advised Governor
Cradock to abolish the ban on selling Christian slaves, while granting
baptized and confirmed slaves some privileges, as legal marriage, the
right to have their children legalized and freedom to attend church
services at certain times. The move did not increase slave baptisms. (2)

The London Missionary Society (LMS) often accused burghers of bad
treatment of Khoikhoi and slaves. The burghers countered by noting the
stark contrast between the indolence of the Khoikhoi at the LMS station
at Bethelsdorp, with the discipline and cleanliness at the Morawian
station at Genadendal.
The Morawian missions in South Africa had taken up work in 1792,
begun by by Georg Smidt in 1737–1744. Their approach was quietistic
with a strong emphasis on discipline and social behavior. (2)
The liberal LMS missionaries Johannes van der Kemp and James Read
who had founded the Bethelsdorp station, were more focused on
individual liberties. Both had also married Khoikhoi women and Read
would later declare himself a Hottentot.
They came in for some fire in 1819 from Read's replacement as resident
director of the LMS in South Africa, John Philip. He said Van der Kemp
had “begun at the wrong end with the Hottentots, that he spoiled them.”
Of Read he said, that he “would have brought disgrace and ruin upon
the cause of missions across the world,” had he remained in control.
However, after further investigation, he supported Read's accusations
against Landdrost Jacob Cuyler of Uitenhage and defended Van der
Kemp's accusations of atrocities committed by trekboers (nomadic
farmers on the outskirts of the colony) against the Khoisan people. (2)

In 1824, Chief Justice J.A. Truter, in an address to the annual meeting of
the ZAZG pointed to the important role the Christian church had played
in Europe in the abolition of slavery, and suggested the Cape church
should play an important role in smoothing the transition to a new labor
dispensation. The ZAZG and other Christian institutions had a Christian
obligation to work towards a future order in which the ex-slave would
serve his master 'out of love for his duty', while the master treated the
slave 'as someone of the same nature as himself.' (2)
Landdrost Stockenstrom and the Graaff Reinet heemraden wrote in a
1826 letter: '[The] more [the slaves] made religious principles their own,
the better they would be as servants and the greater the benefits to their
owners.' Stockenstrom also wrote in the same year, that some slave
owners 'had gone to great expense, others have engaged in personal
activity in order to make the slaves better members of society.' (2)

The British government began to strengthen the English character of the
Cape colony and consolidating the eastern border with the Xhosa. They
encouraged settlement of poorer British citizens in the colony. In 1820
an initial group of four thousand English settlers, arriving in sixty parties,
were settled on farms and the town of Bathurst in the Zuurveld-district of
Albany, on the eastern frontier. Many were skilled in trades, and sold
their farms for the settlements of Grahamstown, Port Elizabeth and East
London. Some trekked to Natal province where they made a land
agreement with Zulu king Shaka. (13)

Scottish-born, Dr John Philip, new superintendent of the LMS in South
Africa, took a strong stand against slavery and maltreatment of Khoisan
in the colony. The British government had prohibited the British settlers
from owning slaves from the start. Colonial encroachment on Khoisan
land and unethical labor practices by Boers, were placed in stark
contrast with British standards of “humanity and justice.” (2)
Philip drew inspiration from Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations,
describing a vision of economic success created by free trade and free
people. Most of the British merchants in the Cape colony shared his
views and were keen to see consumer markets expand into the interior,
including indigenous peoples. The classic statement of the new
mercantile interests was these words of John Fairbairn: 'To stimulate
Industry, to encourage Civilization, and to convert the hostile Natives
into friendly Consumers is a more profitable speculation than to
exterminate or reduce them to slavery.' (2)
Fairbairn had founded the colony's first newspaper, The South African
Commercial Advertiser, in 1824. In 1827, he married one of John Philip's
daughters.
A two-person Commission of Inquiry sent to the Cape by the British
Parliament, found the Dutch colonists to be the chief obstacles to human
progress, underscoring the views of Philip and Fairbairn.
They proposed liberating the Khoisan and emancipating the slaves.
Besides being just, it would also root out the 'indolence and indifference'
of the Dutch colonists and infuse a 'spirit of active industry and
intelligence in their life.' They found the legal and administrative system
influenced by 'local partialities, of hereditary prejudices, and of family
connections.' They recommended that lawyers be compelled to qualify
in England –             One commissioner observed that color prejudice
made it impossible for aspirant lawyers at the Cape to attain judicial
impartiality, a quality that 'constitutes the brightest excellence of the
English judicial character.' (2)
Between 1825 and 1834 the British government abolished virtually all of
the existing colonial structures: The Court of Justice (Legal system), the
Orphan Chamber (Social services), the colleges of landdrost and
heemraden in the interior districts and the Burgher Senate of Cape Town
(Local government structures). British structures replaced them, English
Law replaced existing criminal law, and the government announced the
Anglicization of the administration. Free enterprise was promoted by
abolishing Company-era monopolies. Stockenstrom did not oppose
these measures, but in a 1851 speech, called the abolition of the
colleges of landdrost and heemraden a “great mistake.” “[All] confidence
between the Government and the masses ceased, and many of the evils
which have retarded an advancement and disturbed our peace may be
traced to misunderstandings which the executive had not the means nor
the channels of clearing up.” (2)

In a Graaff Reinet meeting in 1825, Stockenstrom discussed their
grievances concerning the oppression of the Khoisan and Xhosa, with
the missionaries John Philip and William Wright of the LMS and citizen
activist Thomas Pringle (John Fairbairn's associate editor of The South
African Commercial Advertiser). Stockenstrom noted that all decent and
respectable “Boers” agreed that the Khoisan had been cruelly
dispossessed and suffering harsh legal discrimination. He felt however,
that Philip had downplayed Xhosa and Khoisan responsibility for the
cattle raids and singled out burghers for atrocities, rather than the British
military and British settlers, in order to advance his argument in London.
   Philip was the principle spokesman for the LMS. He saw missionary
work as a vehicle for promoting both the liberties and rights of the
indigenous population as well as British cultural, social and political
interests. If there was a clash between the two he did not detect it, and if
he did detect it he did not tell. (Andrew Ross, John Philip, 1775-1851,
Aberdeen University Press, pp 140-141) (2)
Philip did not trust Stockenstrom. He once observed to fellow Scotsman,
the Rev. Andrew Murray (Sr) of Graaff Reinet: Stockenstrom is a “good
fellow”, but one who remained a “Dutchman”, naturally prejudiced in
favor of the old system of oppression of the natives. (2)
Stockenstrom ended the discussion with: “My system is to do my best to
get the white man hanged who murders a black, but I also do my best to
root out the gang of robbers and murderers among the blacks who
cannot otherwise be reclaimed.”

On 17 July 1828, the Council of Advice in the Cape, passed Ordinance
50. Stockenstrom outlined Ordinance 50 as placing 'every free
inhabitant in the colony on a level, in the eye of the law, as to the
enjoyment of personal liberty and the security of property.' (Afrikaner
Political Thought, p. 95)(2) Ordinance 50 removed inequalities suffered
with respect to marriage and testimony, abolished passes for the
Khoisan and the indenturing of Khoisan children. It prohibited employers
from inflicting corporal punishment on their workers or punishing stock
thieves themselves.
Burghers complained, not about the law itself but its applications.
   Stockenstrom reported in 1828 from Grahamstown that the new laws
for the Khoikhoi and the pending emancipation of the slaves were
'merely occasionally talked of and commented on.' (2)
Burghers asked for a vagrancy law and protection from stock theft. Philip
blocked the vagrancy law and denied abuses resulted from Ordinance
50, but on one occasion did request “more prisons, magistrates and
constables.” (2)
Stockenstrom supported the vagrancy law. He said of the Khoikhoi:
“They should be made to work unless they can prove that they can live
without it, and in this respect should be closely watched, for in a country
where property, particularly large flocks of sheep and cattle, are so much
exposed, it is easy to live by theft.”
Of the burghers' resistance to Ordinance 50 he said: “I deny that there
was a general feeling against the freedom of the Hottentots. The clamor
was about their depredations, which acquired in the eyes of the ignorant
(and not unnaturally) the appearance of being warranted by [Ordinance
50].”
Some farmers still held to a paternalistic view: “I continue daily to
provide the living [on the farm] with cattle and provisions”, wrote one
N.T. Van der Walt in a letter to Stockenstrom, requesting compelling
Bushmen in the vicinity to work on farms. Stockenstrom answered the
farmer that if wages were paid, “not according to the will of the master
but according to the demand of the servant,” it would not be necessary
to force Bushman workers to stay on farms. Stockenstrom wrote to the
governor that farmers were still paying “three to twelve goats and four
shillings and sixpence to eighteen shillings annually”, and that he would
not support a vagrancy law if its purpose was to tie people down and
force them to work for miserable wages. “I have never believed, [that
civilization consisted] in one man being forced to serve another who had
deprived him of his country, his game, his all, under a severe lash for
four shillings and sixpence per annum.” (2)

Ordinance 50 could do little to end the Khoisan's life of servitude as long
as they owned virtually no land. Philip tried, without success, to obtain
more land for mission stations. The most Stockenstrom could achieve
(“for the purpose of frontier defense”), was the establishment of the Kat
River settlement for small scale Khoikhoi farmers in the northeastern
Zuurveld. It provided 4–5 acres of land and rights in common pasture for
recipients. 2114 Khoisan and Basters settled there. Andries Stoffels of
the Kat River settlement said: “The 50 Ordinance came out, then we first
taste freedom that other men eat so sweet and now it is mingled with
Water and Ground, it is twenty times sweeter than forced labor.” In
answer to complaints over “irregularities” arising from the new found
Khoisan freedom, they replied: 'Give us more land.' (2)

In 1826, Stockenstrom commented that there was 'so liberal a sentiment
among the inhabitants of [Graaff Reinet] in respect to the slave question
that they – instead of opposing themselves to the measures which the
Government had in mind for bringing about a gradual but complete
emancipation – were prepared to go ahead of the Government and
would gladly stipulate a time ... after which all female children would be
born as free people.' John Philip favored the gradual emancipation,
while Stockenstrom wanted slavery ended as soon as possible. “The
evils connected with too much power in the hands of the master are
inseparable from slavery and this is the principle reason why I wish to
have that state extinct in the present or at least the following
generation.”
Slave owners in the western Cape also supported abolition, provided the
right of property and “fair compensation” was respected. There were
also the usual Doomsayers, who sketched nightmarish scenarios of
rampant retribution. Governor, Sir Lowry Cole noted in 1832 the financial
plight of farmers as a result of plummeting slave and wine prices, and
wrote that “the ruin of the farmers seemed to be sealed by the necessity
of their keeping up a large establishment of slave labor for which no
profitable employment can be found.”

In 1831 a regulation limiting corporal punishment of slaves was issued.
The Dutch (Afrikaner) newspaper, De Zuid Afrikaan, made an issue out
of the autocratic way in which the regulation had been issued while
meetings against the regulation were banned. The fuss fed John
Fairbairn's suspicions that Afrikaners and De Zuid Afrikaan were not
really committed to abolition, and supplied ammunition for his fight
against self-government for the (Afrikaner-dominated) colony.
   In the meantime, (John) Philip's 'Researches of South Africa' had
appeared with few good words for the Afrikaner colonists. (2)
De Zuid Afrikaan hit back at Fairbairn's perception that he was master of
the free press and his Commercial Advertiser, the only independent
newspaper. De Zuid Afrikaan declared that, in future, it would focus on
four “humbugs”: “Free Press humbug, Independent Newspaper humbug,
Missionary humbug and the most extreme of all humbugs, Philipish
humbug.” The newspaper denounced “English hypocrisy”, reminding
abolitionists of the huge profits their own forbears had made from the
slave trade.
Fairbairn countered that while he disliked the autocratic rule at the
Cape, the despotism of fifty Koeberg Boers was 'fifty thousand times
worse.' 'At least John Bull has been awakened from his dream of
confidence in the Afrikaners.' Because of this, 'all danger of Dutch
domination' was now over. The imperial government took the
controversy seriously enough to delay granting self-government for more
than two decades, not only for fear of leaving slaves and Khoisan at the
mercy of the colonists, but also because it feared confrontation between
the Dutch and English speaking colonists. (Ross, Status and
Respectability in the Cape Colony, p 48)(2) Solidarity between the two
white groups arose from the fact that they were a small minority in a
colony with a large slave population and an insecure frontier in the east.
In the 1830s the imperial government decided on rapid abolition with
monetary compensation to owners. Fairbairn's Commercial Advertiser
wrote: “What no man can have hoped for, time has brought out of its
own accord. The vineyards can attract...no more capital and the money
sunk in the labor is about to be recovered by the colonist...through the
justice and generosity of the mother country.”
The squabble between De Zuid Afrikaan and Fairbairn, had detracted
from the efforts of Stockenstrom, Truter and others to rid the colony of
the system. The result was that Afrikaners received little credit for the
abolition of slavery.
Slave owners accepted the inevitable, but were taken aback by the low
compensation (about half of what was promised) and the fact that the
compensation had to be collected in London. Few farmers were able to
travel to an office in London, so claims were handed to agents who took
a hefty slice. To ease the transition, slaves had to continue working four
years as apprentices for their masters before final emancipation.
Emancipation in 1838 went smoothly, most slaves from Stellenbosch
attending worship services at the Rhenish missionary station there.
Wheat and barley production were initially down, but soon recovered to
pre-emancipation levels. (2)

Self-government for the Cape colony was rejected by the imperial
government colonial secretary, Lord Stanley, as he did not want to turn
the Cape over to the Afrikaners, whom he considered inferior to English
speakers 'in all respects except in numerical strength.' (2)
In 1837 the government allowed for election in the colony, of municipal
councils by British subjects of all colors on a low franchise qualification.
Later, when the issue of parliamentary elections came up, the colony
found itself divided into two main factions: a conservative and a popular
faction. The conservatives in the eastern Cape were a minority fraternity
of British settlers under Robert Godlonton, editor of the Grahamstown
Journal. They rejected a system based on universal franchise with low
property qualification. Godlonton and secretary to the governor, Richard
Southey, preferred Imperial rule to the prospect of an 'unprogressive
majority.' In the words of Southey, they would be “swamped by the Dutch
and coloreds” if an excess of democracy were allowed. (2)
The popular faction, in the west, were a loose coalition of Afrikaner and
English economic middle classes and Afrikaner farmers. In the east,
Andries Stockenstrom emerged as their leader. He had support of the
farmers and the Kat River Khoikhoi. When another war with the Xhosa
broke out in 1846, the frontier burghers refused to fight in a commando
under British command, and did so only when Stockenstrom was placed
in charge. The British settler faction on the frontier were as fiercely
opposed to him as ever. (2)

A draft-bill backed by the popular party became the framework for a new
constitution. The property franchise of £25 it proposed for voters to both
chambers of the elected parliament would counter the influence of the
very wealthy (who tended to be staunch imperialists) as well as the
working class of all colors. (2)

The Kat River residents, previously siding with the colonists on the
frontier, had progressively become alienated and suspicious of colonial
intentions. The Grahamstown Journal was leading a campaign, strongly
backed by land speculators, to break up missionary stations. An attempt
was also made by Government to enact vagrancy legislation.
In the 1850–1851 war they joined forces with residents of missionary
stations and some landless farm workers and aligned themselves with
the Xhosa as representatives of a “colored nation” committed to regain
their independence. They announced their fight was not with the Boers,
but with the British. When Stockenstrom's farmstead was the only one
left in an area devastated by Xhosa invaders, some English settlers
burned it down.
Cape Afrikaners, like their English counterparts, learned to court the
colored vote. F.W. Reitz told a colored audience that he supported the
idea that 'the simplest farmer and the simplest Hottentot' were able to
judge who would best defend them. A delegation of farmers from the
northwestern Cape district of Clanwilliam told the governor that they
shuddered at the idea of any distinction in political rights 'between rich
and poor, white and colored.' Stockenstrom wrote to the delegation, 'as
a countryman and as a boer like yourselves' of his pride in their 'noble
generosity.' He expressed his admiration for the way the delegation had
upheld the interests of the weaker and colored classes 'in defiance of
the machinations and intrigues of those who always boasted of their
superior education, liberality and philanthropy.' (2)

Colored people did not welcome the non-racial franchise as warmly as
they had Ordinance 50. They would have preferred the colony remain
under the Queen and the British Parliament. Their suspicions of the new
democratic order was justified in 1856 when the new colonial parliament
passed the Masters and Servants Act, providing harsh penalties for
desertion, absenteeism and breaches of discipline. Verbal contracts
were once again considered legal, as they had been before 1809. (2)
        4. THE EATERN FRONTIER – PART II

In 1825 Ordinance 9 reigned in the right of farmers to fire on suspected
vagrants, deserters or escaped convicts. In 1828, Attorney-General A.
Oliphant wrote: “In no case should deadly weapons be used until all
other means have proved abortive... Patience and forbearance ... ought
always to be exercised when a life ... is at stake.” The problem with the
ordinance was that it left the burghers uncertain as to what was
permissible in defense of their property; made worse by the fact that the
landdrost and heemraden had been abolished. They felt left in the dark
on legal matters. Stockenstrom was also now the only Dutch-speaking
official with influence on frontier policy. Stockenstrom himself expressed
concern that government policy had swung from great severity to
'sacrificing the safety of [His Majesty's] subjects' and 'paralyzing their
efforts to defend their lives and property.' (2)

British military officers on the frontier, aligned with British merchants and
speculators based mainly in Grahamstown, exerted influence through
the Grahamstown Journal. The newspaper propagated colonial
expansion into Xhosa territory and the complete subordination of the
Xhosa with a large military presence. In 1837, Governor Napier referred
to the Grahamstown Journal and the merchant lobby in Grahamstown
as those “most clamorous against the Kaffir nation.” (2)
An unexpected mingler with the Grahamstown crowd was a burgher and
former field commandant, Piet Retief. Born in 1782, he was the son of a
wealthy western Cape wine farmer. He had lost all his property on
speculation deals. He arrived penniless on the eastern frontier in 1811,
as part of the reserve force for the Fourth Frontier War. Three years
later a favorable marriage improved his financial situation (2), but again
he lost everything through reckless speculative ventures. He then
attempted viticulture, but it failed. He obtained a license to sell liquor, but
could not meet supplier debts. In the early 1820's he received twenty-
four summonses for debt. One of his creditors was a slave girl, from
whom he had bought a herd of 141 sheep and 30 goats. (15)
During his service as field commandant he was under strict instructions
not to enter Ngqika's territory. He had once lost four hundred sheep in a
Xhosa raid and soon afterward had tracked stolen stock up to the
border, from where he got a clear view of the animals. He expressed his
frustration that, “I was not permitted to cross the border with my troops
as I was not trusted”, and added, “As long as neither the Landdrost nor
the Commandant of the Frontier is permitted to change [the order not to
cross the border] no commando carried out will ever have success.”
By 1824 Retief's shady business ethics had led to his dismissal as field
commandant, despite a strong letter of support from frustrated farmers.
(2) He had also alienated officials by bypassing his Graaff Reinet
landdrost (not Stockenstrom at that occasion) to signal his frustration,
sending Governor Somerset a list of murders and thefts committed by
the Xhosa over the previous five years inside his area of responsibility.
Somerset wrote a comment in the margin of the letter that he could not
act independently from the landdrost.

Ngqika's eldest son, Maqoma bitterly resented having been forced from
their home in the Kat River Valley after the previous frontier war. He
despised his father for a coward who drank too much. Early in 1821
Stockenstrom reported that Maqoma's followers were starting to re-
occupy the upper Kat River Valley. The government ignored them at first,
and a serious of raids by Maqoma and counter-raids by small
unauthorized burgher-commandos followed.
In charge of the British military on the frontier, was Colonel Henry
Somerset, the son of Governor Lord Charles Somerset, with whom
Stockenstrom had an earlier fall out, resulting in a serious breach
between Stockenstrom and the governor. In one of Colonel Somerset's
first actions, he led a force of Khoikhoi troops and mounted burghers
against Maqoma. Women and children got shot with Maqoma's warriors,
and seven thousand cattle were taken, a quarter of which were
distributed to colonists who had suffered losses.
In 1828 a force of burghers, settlers and soldiers led by a British
landdrost, William Dundas, and assisted by Thembu warriors, attacked a
tribe he called the “Fetcani” and captured 25 000 head of cattle and a
hundred people who were then indentured. Later Colonel Somerset led
a motley army of more than a thousand men, consisting of: soldiers,
settlers, burghers and mounted Khoikhoi mercenaries, in alliance with
Thembu, Mpondo and Gcakela warriors.(2,17) They attacked Matiwane's
Ngwane, refugees of the Mfecane wars, near the present town of
Umtata in the Transkei. Somerset claimed he was countering an
invasion of the colony by the armies of Shaka. The sleeping camp was
attacked. Howitzer fire killed more than four hundred Ngwane hiding out
in a forest. Somerset reported his African auxiliaries killed thousands
and captured all their victims' stock. The colonial army returned with
about one hundred women and children and indentured them to farms.
Dundas and Somerset came off scot-free and there was no recorded
response from British missionaries or journalists.
Referring to these attacks on the 'Fetcani' or 'Ficane', one burgher
remarked to Thomas Pringle, a Scottish settler: 'We are living in a state
of bitter feud and constant warfare with the natives, and both parties
were intent on mutual extermination. But what had your Ficane done
when they were destroyed by wholesale slaughter by your British
commanders?... Here we had a massacre in all its horrors by
Englishmen in authority and does not tell against us unfortunate Boors
[sic].' The burghers resented such double standards and Retief would
articulate their sentiments in his manifesto, in which which he set out the
causes for emigration of burghers from the colony in the mid-1830s. (2)

The entire movement of emigrating from the colony in what was to
become known as the Great Trek, originated in the initiative and
organizational ability of a small group of Afrikaner farmers in the central
region of the eastern frontier. (the region between the upper Fish and
the Koonap rivers, sandwiched between Albany district and the Kat
River region.) (Muller, C.F.J., Die Oorsprong van die Groot Trek, p.383,
Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1974) (2)
Burghers in the central region felt more insecure than elsewhere. The
government had given out farms to burghers and settlers on condition
that they did not keep slaves. But in 1826 the Imperial government
decided to delay transfer of land pending a decision about the future of
the zone. The secretary of state for colonies in London did not hide his
opinion that it would be better to settle English-speaking colonists there.
The government ordered the burghers to leave the territory, but most
decided to sit tight. The area was becoming steadily more insecure with
the influx of Mfecane refugees. (2)

One of Stockenstroms first duties in his office as commissioner-general
of the eastern province was to impose government policy more strictly.
After Maqoma had raided cattle from the neighboring Thembu people,
Stockenstrom and Somerset in 1829 expelled Maqoma from his home
territory in the neutral belt.
Stockenstrom asked that the seized land be made a Khoikhoi
settlement. His primary objective was to create a defensive barrier
against invaders, and then also giving the opportunity for the Khoikhoi to
become small-scale farmers. The new residents claimed allegiance to
the London Missionary Society and successfully obtained James Read
as their minister. By the second half of the 1830s the Kat River
settlement housed some five thousand people.
The burghers felt envious that the most fertile land in the neutral belt
had been given to the Khoikhoi. Rumors of the imminent transfer of
burghers' land to Khoikhoi and English farmers began doing the rounds.
According to Stockenstrom, some burghers lamented: “The Englishman
is very learned and we are very stupid. They and the Hottentots will
squeeze us all out by degrees.” (Stockenstrom, Autobiography, vol. 1,
p.391) (2)

Stockenstrom sought to curb the worst excesses of the reprisal system
which kept the Xhosa in a constant state of alarm: surprise attacks, firing
at random, burning huts and seizing cattle. Colonel Somerset was
determined to drive the Xhosa and other Bantu out of the neutral
territory. Sometimes patrols and commandos went out every week.
Stockenstrom began to suspect that this was part of a sinister agenda to
force the Xhosa on the border into a desperate incursion into the colony,
which would then be used as a pretext for a further colonial land grab.
He wrote of people 'desiring a chain of sanguinary wars' that would cost
vast amounts of money, but which 'would popularize themselves by
bringing enormous fortunes to some dozens of speculators and
overwhelm headquarters with patronage.' (2)
  Colonel Somerset appealed over Stockenstrom's head to the governor
and continued his aggressive patrols. In 1833 Stockenstrom traveled to
London to seek more power for his post, and resigned when it was
denied. He decided to leave the Cape permanently for Sweden, the
country of his father's birth. After his departure the government's frontier
policy lost the little credibility it still had in the eyes of the burghers and
the Xhosa. (2)

The government allowed some chiefs to return, including Maqoma, but
he was expelled again in 1833 to land he described as 'without a morsel
of grass ... as bare as a parade.'
In an attempt to curb the supply of guns to the Xhosa by English traders,
the government limited the supply of guns and ammunition to the public
in 1833, by making it only available through government stores. Field
cornets and field commandants, used to buying supplies for the
burghers in their commandos, where also severely restricted. Again, it
left the burghers with the impression that the government did not trust
them enough to defend themselves.
When a new governor, Sir Benjamin D'Urban started his commission in
1834, John Philip outlined the causes of the conflict as he saw it. He
blamed 'the effect of the commandos and patrols as hitherto practiced'
and 'unscrupulous colonists and bad men [who] were attracted to the
frontier by the opportunities of plunder.' He suggested policies be put in
writing so 'that there might be an end to the fluctuations of frontier policy
universally complained of.'
Cattle theft by the Xhosa continued, as did patrols, harassing even
chiefs that tried to maintain peace. An English surveyor wrote in his
journal: “The year 1834 may be described as one of unremitting plunder.
The patrols were constantly making seizures of cattle belonging to the
Caffres, and every month – almost every week – they are injuring and
provoking that miserable people... [It] seems to be that it was the
expressed object of some persons in the colony about this time to
provoke the Caffres to a war.” (2)

Maqoma had come to the same conclusion as Stockenstrom, and
shared with the other chiefs, including with the Xhosa paramount,
Hintsa, his suspicion that the colonial raids were a 'prelude to other
measures, which would not only endanger their independence, but lead
to a complete subjugation of their country.' (Peieres, House of Phalo,
p.91) (2) Hintsa lived beyond the Kei River, well east of the traditional
conflict zones. He was especially troubled at the news that the colonial
soldiers did not respect the sanctity of chiefs – in Xhosa custom a chief
was never threatened in a war. The harassment of the Xhosa in the
neutral zone had forged among the Xhosa, a common will to resist.
The colonists were oblivious that the Sixth Frontier War was about to
dawn. The general belief was that the Xhosa were now too afraid of the
English to pose any serious danger. Grahamstown was unprepared,
with only 755 men stationed at the frontier and delivery of ammunition at
an all time low in 1834, when Maqoma and Tyhali attacked with a force
of 12–15 000 men. The attacking force had split up into numerous
smaller detachments, bypassing the soldiers stationed on the frontier,
instead of massing in a single body to be decimated by the enemy guns.
(2)
James Read witnessed the invasion from his Kat River station: 'The
Boors to the north and the south have been plundered almost to a beast
... The Boors will be left in destitution and want.'
   Twenty whites and about eighty Khoikhoi were killed, 455 homesteads
burned and thousands of horses, cattle and sheep carried off. Colonial
losses were set at £300 000. The Xhosa once again occupied the
Zuurveld. (2)
Reinforcements arrived, and D'Urban visited the stricken colonists.
D'Urban was moved by the plight of both burghers and settlers, and now
felt that Philip and other critics had grievously misrepresented the
farmers and that the Xhosa were 'savage and irreclaimable.' (2)
He now considered the policy of the imperialists in the colony to boldly
expand the colony into Xhosa territory. The counter-attack of British
soldiers, Khoikhoi troops and settler- and burgher commandos, pushed
deep into Xhosa territory, well beyond the Kei River, to capture Hintsa,
the Xhosa paramount. He was killed by an officer in an apparent attempt
to escape, and his body was mutilated. The circumstances of his death
were a topic for discussion at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
in 1995, 1996.
In 1835 Governor D'Urban extended the eastern border of the colony to
the Kei River, the newly acquired territory becoming the Province of
Queen Adelaide. In London, John Philip and other missionaries were
testifying before a select parliamentary committee on the treatment of
indigenous peoples in the colony. A key witness in the hearings was
Andries Stockenstrom, who had traveled from Sweden to London to
testify. Ironically he had just previously written a letter in which he
recalled how he had been insulted and belittled by Philip over the
Bushmen question, and commented grimly: 'Thank God, I have nothing
more to do with these Cape and Kaffir affairs', referring to the Cape as
'that devoted, that doomed Colony.' (2)
In his testimony before the committee, Stockenstrom blamed much of
the violence on the reprisal system and on compensation exacted from
the Xhosa for cattle theft. He said that many of these actions were
based on fraudulent claims and a desire to grab more land from the
Xhosa. He proposed a treaty system to settle future conflicts. On 26
December 1835, British colonial secretary, Lord Glenelg, reversed
D'Urban's decisions. Glenelg declared that the Xhosa had been driven
'by a long series of acts of injustice and spoliation' and had 'ample
justification' for invading the colony. The Province of Queen Adelaide
was to be abandoned and the colonial boundary moved back from the
Kei to the Keiskamma, Tyhume and Gaga rivers, with colonial control
over the neutral belt between the Fish and the Keiskamma. The
government would allow chiefs to 'rent' land in the neutral belt on
condition of good behavior. Glenelg asked a surprised Stockenstrom to
return to the Cape, with a promotion to lieutenant governor. (2)

     When, in early September 1836, Stockenstrom arrived in
Grahamstown, he found many burghers already leaving the colony or
preparing to leave. A mass emigration of frontier farmers was well under
way. For Stockenstrom, this emigration was a huge setback to his plans
for a more orderly form of colonization, which he saw as essential for
Afrikaner survival. (2)
The Trekboers, was a name for semi-nomadic pastorial farmers who had
steadily been moving outwards from the heartland of the Cape colony
(Paarl, Stellenbosch and Franschhoek) since Company rule in the
1700s. The eastern frontier had largely been a Trekboer settlement.
From the 1820s the Trekboers were mainly migrant farmers from the
eastern frontier. They initially requested temporary permits from the
landdrost to pasture livestock outside the northern and northeastern
borders of the colony, on condition that they were not to cultivate the
land or to erect buildings. By the latter 1820s they simply informed the
Graaff Reinet authorities that they were crossing the border. They
systematically moved inland towards the Orange River, some had
crossed into the current land of Namibia and settled there. The
Voortrekkers would also encounter Trekboers as far as Transorangia,
the later Orange Free State.




         Aquatint by Samuel Daniell from around 1804 of camped Trekboers.

Other than the conflict with the Bushmen, the Trekboers in the interior
did not clash with African tribes, and there is little evidence that they
added to the pressure of the Mfecane. Timothy Keegan says Trekboers
in Transorange added to the destabilizing influence already caused by
Griqua-Bergenaar raiders and Mfecane refugees converging on the
area.(3) Some Mfecane refugees, called Mantatees, became indentured
workers on frontier farms. Farmers initially gave food aid to refugees, but
soon the influx became a burden to them. (C.F.J. Muller, Die Oorsprong
van die Groot Trek, Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1974, p.94) (2)
The Mfecane (the crushing) (Nguni) or Difaqane (Sotho), called the
“Kaffer wars” by Afrikaners, were a series of tribal wars in Natal and the
Highveld, driven by drought and overcrowding, giving rise to heightened
competition for land. The ivory trade also played a role. A South African
historian, Julian Cobbing advanced a theory that Portuguese slave
traders' raids had set off the Mfecane, while another historian, Elizabeth
Eldridge cast doubt on the theory, pointing out that there was no
Portuguese slave trade out of Delagoa Bay (Maputo in Mozambique) at
that stage.(18) Some of the refugees of the Mfecane, like Shoshange,
fled to and settled in Portuguese regions, where they had their own
reign of terror, and might have been role players in an informal slave
trade. The Zulu king Shaka's mobilization of the Zulus as the cause of
the Mfecane has been well documented: by the Zulus themselves and
the tribes that lived in fear of them, as well as by European witnesses
(like Lt Francis Farewell and, more infamously, Henry Francis Fynn and
Nathaniel Isaacs) and also backed up by some archeological evidence.
Notable effects of these wars for the Voortrekkers were: the rise of the
Ndebele (a breakaway group from the Zulus under Mzilikazi), the rise of
Dingane (Zulu) and Moshweshwe (Basotho) and, most importantly, large
tracts of fertile land in the interior of South Africa had been vacated (at
least temporarily) giving Voortrekker scouts the impression that the land
was open for the taking.

The causes for what became the Great Trek were:
  1. Losses incurred in The Sixth Frontier War (1834-1835). Piet Retief
     had lost all his livestock and his farm was sacked. Gert Maritz'
     brother suffered near-fatal stab wounds. An English speaker wrote
     in 1836 from the Lower Fish River that Afrikaners had little hope for
     the future, adding: 'One said that in his father's life time and his
     own they had five times been swept out by the Kaffirs ...' (2)
  2. Lack of land. By 1812 only 40% of married burghers in Graaff
     Reinet district were property owners. By 1832 no more crown land
     was available. (2)
  3. Lack of reliable cheap labor. After Ordinance 50 most Khoikhoi left
     for the missionary stations or became squatters. Louis Tregardt
     and Gert Maritz were motivated by emancipation of the slaves.
     Tregardt had ten skilled slaves which had disqualified him from
     obtaining land in the neutral territory and Maritz suffered financial
     loss through emancipation. Some historians have tended to
     overstress the dissatisfaction of the paternalistic Boers over the
     emancipation of the slaves, as the root cause for the Great Trek.
     Issues with slaves featured among the general dissatisfaction, but
     was not the major cause. Piet Retief had been in trouble for
     maltreating two of his slaves and Hendrik Potgieter appeared in
   court on a charge that he made his slave work at night. His
   defense was that the slave was 'holding dance parties and playing
   the fiddle at night', and thus too tired to do his work in the day. The
   court rejected the slave's complaint. Piet Uys first became
   interested in the Trek as a means to spread the Gospel. His
   motives became political when his wife was arrested on charges,
   which he considered malicious, brought by an indentured slave. He
   longed for the old paternalistic order with vagrancy laws and
   'domestic right' (huijs reg) to keep slaves in line in one's own
   household, as was to be expected from the head of the household.
   However, other than Tregardt's ten slaves, the other twenty-nine
   families in his party owned a total of only five slaves among them.
   Also, only a fifth of the colony's slaves were owned in the districts
   from which the greatest number of Voortrekkers came. Many
   Voortrekkers also managed to persuade their ex-slaves and
   servants to accompany them. (2)
4. Insecurity on the frontier: Bushmen continued to steal cattle on the
   northeastern border. The large number of Mfecane refugees
   flooding into the frontier became a nuisance as they roamed from
   farm to farm in search of food. In the central and southern sections
   of the frontier, wandering parties had crossed over the border,
   stealing and begging for food. Xhosa congestion in the neutral
   territory was also becoming acute. In September 1836 a well-
   educated English farmer wrote from Fort Beaufort, some hundred
   kilometers from the sea: 'The principle grievance of the Farmers in
   my Neighborhood, is ... their having to support such incredible
   numbers of Hottentots, Bechuanas and Fingoes that daily
   vagabondize the Country and I do myself declare that at no period
   within the past fifteen years have I ever seen them in such
   numbers as they are at present ... ten or fifteen idle vagabonds in a
   day.' Field Cornet Carel Buchner reported in 1837 from the
   Zuurveld: 'The unbridled conduct of the Blacks around here goes
   against the marrow of the Africanders and that and nothing else is
   the cause of the emigration.' (2)
5. The lack of government control was worst in the northeastern
   Tarka district from which a third of the 12 000 Voortrekkers came.
   A justice of the peace stationed in Cradock, assisted by a single
   constable had to maintain order in an area covering 44 200 square
   kilometers. Most people had to travel two or three days to the
   drostdy to lay a complaint or appear before a court to testify or to
   answer a summons. Consequently many burghers preferred not to
   file complaints. Responding to Stockenstrom's remark that they
   intended to leave the colony in order to lead a lawless existence,
   some prospective Voortrekkers in the northeastern divisions
   replied: 'It is the contrary, we leave the Colony because we know of
   neither Government nor Law – of the Government we know
   nothing nothing except when we have money to pay and the law
   never reaches us except to fine or otherwise punish, often for acts
   we did not know to be wrong. Our Field Cornets can give us no
   assistance, as they are as much in the darkness as ourselves. We
   are like lost sheep.' (1, 2)
6. Still, the above reasons do not fully explain why some fairly
   wealthy farmers sold their farms cheaply, just to leave. Many
   departed without bothering to wait for their due compensation for
   freed slaves, for stores and provisions supplied to the armed
   forces, or for losses sustained in the war. Stockenstrom noted the
   burghers had told him they no longer felt at home in their own
   country. Olive Schreiner, a feminist writer with strong liberal
   convictions, who had lived among the people in the frontier districts
   of Colesberg and Cradock wrote: 'But that which most embittered
   the hearts of the colonists was the cold indifference with which they
   were treated, and the consciousness that they were regarded as a
   subject and inferior race ... [The] feeling of bitterness became so
   intense that about the year 1836 large numbers of individuals
   determined to leave for ever the Colony and the homes which they
   had created.' (Olive Schreiner, Thoughts on South Africa, Jhb: Ad
   Donker, 1992, p.205)(2) Hendrik Potgieter wrote to the governor in
   December 1838: 'We do not intend to do anything illegal and we
   consider ourselves as free burghers who can go where they wish.'
   Three years later he wrote: 'I do not wish to submit myself to any
   British or to any other power in the world, and I am not British and I
   hope and trust never to become that.' Andries Pretorius wrote to
   the Rev. G.W.A. Van der Lingen of Paarl, whom he called 'a true
   Afrikaner', that the trekkers 'presently wandering around will still
   become a volk and live in His honor.' The burghers had also noted
   how John Philip and other LMS missionaries had made them the
   transgressor and the indigenous peoples always the victim. There
   was even a suspicion, though unfounded, that John Read had
   connived with the Xhosa invaders of the Sixth Frontier War. Piet
   Retief wrote of 'dishonest persons who were believed to the
   exclusion of all evidence in our favor.'
       This sense of marginalization and disaffection developed within
   the context of a government that introduced a social revolution at
   the same time as removing virtually all the local government
   institutions with which the burghers had identified. (2)
7. Another motive to leave British rule was the fear of being drafted
   into the British army. After the Sixth Frontier War the government
   announced plans to enroll the burghers as a militia to provide a
   more modern (professional) system of frontier defense. Colonel
   Harry Smith had suggested that they could consider themselves
   'very lucky' to be released from their military duties after the last
   war, when they were allowed to return to their farms 'only on
   condition of serving the Government when called upon.'
   Stockenstrom may have had Smith in mind when he expressed
   anger about the 'designing miscreants' who had revived 'the old
   stupid suspicion that the British Government intends by degrees to
   make Soldiers and Sailors of the redundant population.' (2)
8. The idea held by some trekkers that Afrikaners were a “Chosen
   People” had likely originated from the turbulent history of Afrikaner-
   protestants in Africa, who were for ever at war with the local people
   (traditionally considered to be heathens) since the Khoikhoi wars in
   the earliest days of settlement. The combination of war and religion
   would have gone a long way towards creating the “Chosen People”
   culture, because in wartime people tend to huddle around the
   security that their religion offers. The burghers did not have a
   British military presence or a government that cared about their
   needs under Company-rule. They relied on their own commandos
   and the laagers and a few representative government structures.
   They also had their Christian faith. In 1798, 20 000 of the fewer-
   than 22 000 'Christians' in the colony were Europeans. The Dutch
   Reformed synod of 1829 prohibited the continuation of the hitherto
   practice of separate Communion for slaves, free blacks, Basters
   and Khoikhoi from that of Afrikaners. It is against this backdrop that
   Piet Retief's niece, Anna Steenkamp once commented that she
   had found the idea objectionable that slaves had been 'placed on
   an equal footing with Christians, contrary to the laws of God, and
   the natural distinction of race and religion ... wherefore we rather
   withdraw in order to preserve our doctrines in purity.' A Graaff
   Reinet government official, J.N. Boshoff wrote that the trekkers
   were aggravated that 'blacks were encouraged to consider
   themselves on an equal footing with the whites in their religious
   exercises in the church though the former are heathens and no
   members of such community.'
               5. PIET RETIEF'S MANIFESTO
During the 1830s three reconnaissance parties, called commission
treks, were sent to investigate options for settlement. One went to
Damaraland in present Namibia, another to the present Mafikeng and
Gaborone in Botswana and the third to Natal. The third trek returned
with glowing reports of fertile land with abundant pastures. As a result of
the Mfecane wars, large areas in the interior were temporarily
depopulated and seemed to be there for the taking. Also as a result of
the wars, some greatly strengthened African polities, especially the Zulu
and Swazi states, were much more powerful than fifty or sixty years
earlier. (2)

Piet Retief, in spite of his failed ventures and debt problems, was hugely
popular with Afrikaner burghers and English settlers alike. During the
Xhosa invasion, Retief and his stepsons had taken the lead in defending
their Winterberg district, making it virtually the only district to have made
a stand to the invasion. He had drawn together a large group of
Winterberg people, including more than two hundred women and
children. The curbs on the supply of ammunition had almost cost them
their lives and he believed that they would have been overrun, had the
attacks gone on for much longer. A week into the attacks he was
appointed provisional field commandant. The governor would later
mention Retief's 'excellent character' and his 'active and judicious
conduct.' He had lost forty-eight head of cattle, four horses and three
hundred sheep in the cattle raid, while creditors letters piled in.
Retief and Stockenstrom could not see eye to eye though.
Stockenstrom took his new post in Grahamstown on September 1836
finding the eastern frontier in a state of turmoil. Stockenstrom was
suspicious that Retief had been conspiring with the expansionist clique
in Grahamstown. Ever-since his receiving news of Stockenstrom's
appointment, Retief had attempted to discredit him.
   Stockenstrom assumed office in Grahamstown on September 3, 1836
in an atmosphere of crisis and confusion. On his way there, the Graaff
Reinet and Cradock burghers had received him warmly and had
outlined their grievances soberly in a document. Grahamstown itself
was hostile; the expansionists among the British settlers had long
considered Stockenstrom their main enemy. They presented a
disrespectful address referring to his evidence in London, which he
refused to accept. (2)
Stockenstrom had decided on a policy of fair and just protocol to
stabilize the frontier. He wrote to Lord Glenelg: 'The colonists [have to
be] allowed to protect their property and lives against plunderers and
marauders, even if it be necessary to shoot the assailants. This in the
actual state of things cannot be prevented. The vacillating and
contradictory doctrine which has been held forth on this point, rushing
from one extreme to the other, has been one of the main causes of our
misfortune.'
'To enable the neighboring tribes to leave us in peace our people must
positively remain within the limits of the colony and not molest them.'
Until reprisals and commandos ceased, no 'civilization' could take root
among them. Stockenstrom also recommended prompt action to
redress other grievances, amongst them payment by the government of
what it owed burghers for provisions in the latest frontier war, and
immediately issuing the long-delayed transfer of land deeds. (2)

In a carefully worded address, called the Winterberg address, Piet Retief
sought to incite the burghers in the district against Stockenstrom, by
suggesting that Stockenstrom had presented them to the Aborigines
committee in London as 'Monsters of cruelty and barbarism.'
Stockenstrom responded that Retief considered him deluded to sign
such a “ridiculous” document.
On September 20, 1836 Retief and Stockenstrom met at the Kat River
settlement. Retief complained that the country was swarming with
plundering blacks and the frontier system afforded no protection.
Stockenstrom reiterated his stance: “strict justice to all parties” and
“equal rights to all classes without distinction.” If they thought they would
be happier in another country, he would advise them to leave. Retief had
not been intent on leaving at that stage. The first Voortrekkers had
already left in late 1835. During Retief and Stockenstrom's meeting in
September 1836, Gert Maritz' trek was underway from Graaff Reinet. A
month later Retief wrote to military officers stationed nearby, expressing
his dissatisfaction over immunity from arrest enjoyed by blacks with
government passes, suggesting that burghers were suspicious of
irregularities with the issue of passes. He could not fathom how the
Xhosa 'who had deprived us of our goods and blood are allowed to
come in among us to deprive us of the little we still have to live on, but
also to deride us in our impoverished state ... Kaffers with passes ... in
my ward [are] ... congregating with not the least purpose than to live
solely on plunder ... Must I not arrest such and send them to [you]?'
Stockenstrom warned Retief that if he arrested a person with a pass he
would have to face the consequences: 'Until the law is altered you must
abide by it.' He threatened to dismiss him as field commandant if he
continued to 'trample existing regulations under foot.'
By end 1836 Retief had resolved to leave. He disappeared from the
scene for a while and it is thought that he was visiting trekkers already
beyond the border and that it was then that they had first requested that
he lead them. In January 1837 he went to Grahamstown to bid
Stockenstrom farewell. Stockenstrom was still opposed to the trek. He
mocked that Retief seemed to prefer the protection of governance
afforded by Dingane and Mzilikaze over that which the British
government offered. He did give his blessing though, reminding Retief,
“Wherever you may wander do not forget and remind your fellows that
you are Christians and as such have enduring obligations.”

On February 2, 1836 Retief published his famous manifesto in the
Grahamstown Journal, aided by his friend and the editor, Louis Henry
Meurant.




          Corner guard statue of Piet Retief at the Voortrekker monument

The document sought to dispel the impression that the trekkers were
anarchic frontiersmen intent on escaping the restraint of laws. (2)
Moreover, it carefully tested the government's reaction, or rather,
attempted to prime its thinking towards accepting the concept of a
separate and independent Afrikaner republic in the interior.
'We despair of saving the colony from those evils which threaten it by
turbulent and dishonest conduct of vagrants.' The trekkers had decided
'to quit this colony with a desire to lead a more quiet life than we have
heretofore done ... under the full assurance that the British government
had nothing more to require of us, and will allow us to govern ourselves
without its interference in the future.' The manifesto listed the pervasive
lack of security, especially the losses incurred during the last frontier war
and the conduct of vagrants, 'vexatious' laws made with respect to
slaves and the financial losses sustained in the emancipation process. It
deplored the 'unjustifiable odium under the cloak of religion' that
missionary propaganda cast upon the frontier burghers. It emphasized
that the emigrants did not intend to enslave anyone, but would seek to
restore “proper relations” between masters and servants. They would
not deprive others of their property, but would defend themselves
against attacks on their lives and property. They would make their
intention to live in peace clear to the black tribes amongst whom they
settled. They would make laws to govern themselves and forward copies
to the colony for its information. The last passage expressed a 'firm
reliance on an all-seeing, just and merciful Being whom it will be our
endeavor to fear and humbly obey.' (2)
The manifesto: http://husky1.stmarys.ca/~wmills/retief_manifesto.html
On the day the manifesto appeared in the Grahamstown Journal,
Stockenstrom dismissed Retief as field commandant.
    In a letter of July 1837 Retief again assured the British government
that no enmity was intended towards the 'British nation.' Leaving the
colony had occasioned the trekkers 'enormous and incalculable losses.'
He even requested British help to prevent hostilities against African
tribes who had been enlisted against them. But he also struck a new
note: '[We] desire to be considered a free and independent people.' (2)

Stockenstrom would continue to implement a solution for the conflict on
the frontier. He had already a clear mind as to the best route to take. He
believed in a treaty-system between the colony and the Xhosa, similar to
the international treaties between independent nations.
In November 1836 he wrote: 'We must have either extermination
[vergelden means retribution or expulsion] or conciliation and justice. A
middle course is ruin.' Stockenstrom expected resistance to his idea of
treaties as in international relations. He wrote in another letter, people
thought it absurd to apply the rules of intercourse between civilized
nations to the colony's dealings with 'savages' ... [However] 'I believe the
principles of truth and justice to be universal, as well as eternal ... with
nations as well as with individuals. I believe them to bind the mightiest
power as well as the most insignificant community.' To dismiss the whole
issue by calling the Xhosa 'a gang of thieves' did not reflect well on the
colony. '[We] have been beaten in the field, as well as in the cabinet, by
a gang of thieves,' an obvious reference to the reversal of D'Urban's
policy. (2)
Stockenstrom had little faith in Philip's vision of imperialist expansion
with the agenda of culturally assimilating blacks. He did not believe it
was wise to interfere with the way in which native peoples ordered their
lives or disputes. 'I do not see how the introduction of the English laws is
at all practicable. The prejudices of a nation however absurd they may
appear are not easily removed or discarded.' There is no sense in
undermining the chief's authority. '[By] means of these chiefs... the
colony would soonest succeed to secure peace and promote
civilization.' Without the chiefs, he believed no peace was possible. (2)
The treaty system allowed recovery of lost cattle only via a councilor
who had the trust of the local chiefs. The system worked, it seems,
where the will to make it work was strongest, as in the 100 percent rate
of successful settlements achieved by the mediator C.L. Stretch. The
influential lobby of British officers, expansionists and land speculators
undermined the system however. A rumor began to do the rounds that
back in 1813 Stockenstrom had shot a Xhosa in cold blood to avenge
his father's death. This eroded his authority so much, that he sued
Duncan Campbell, civil commissioner of Albany, for libel. The Supreme
Court, with some of his enemies sitting as judges, found insufficient
evidence against Campbell. A subsequent hearing vindicated
Stockenstrom, but his reputation had been damaged to the extent that
the new governor, Sir George Napier pressed for his dismissal. Lord
Glenelg rejected the recommendation, but his successor removed
Stockenstrom from his post in 1839. Five years later, Maqoma
commented: 'I will hold by Stockenstrom until I die ... If the treaties are
forced from us, nothing can preserve us from going to war.' (2)

After 1839 cattle thefts by the Xhosa increased. Napier noted 'the
complaints and grievances under which the border farmers labor, as
regards the constant plunder of their flocks and cattle and the slaughter
of their armed herdsmen.' J. Hare, new lieutenant-governor of the
eastern province wrote to the governor in 1842: 'I have talked till I am
tired with the chiefs; on every occasion they make me fair promises
which are never performed.' The government again allowed farmers to
cross the border and look for their cattle in a way that resembled the old
reprisal system. The government started to change the treaties
unilaterally and soon scrapped them. (2)
The colonial government were not tenaciously committed to seeing
Stockenstrom's treaty system through. Pressure on the government by
English land speculators intensified and Sir Peregrine Maitland
reintroduced the old spoor law which Stockenstrom so despised.
Hermann Giliomee writes:
    Would Stockenstrom's treaty system, if properly applied, have had a
chance of providing stability? Stockenstrom had weaknesses, but he
was not naïve. The Xhosa were not 'mild, gentle shepherds', he once
wrote. 'Vigor is as necessary as justice in your dealings with them, and if
you allow them to become masters you must give up the colony.' He
recognized that treaties in themselves could not maintain political
equilibrium; ultimately the colonial government would have to enforce
them through its own 'irresistible power.' The government lacked the
vision and will to do so. (2)

In 1846 the Seventh Frontier War broke out after the slaying of a white
frontier farmer and construction of a military fort in Xhosa territory. John
Philip now remarked that the frontier colonists had given the Xhosa no
reason for making war. He wrote that he could not help describing the
spirit of the colonist as 'being of a more Christian character than
appeared on any former occasion.'
Stockenstrom came out of retirement after the burgher commando
refused to serve under any other commander. Stockenstrom wrote in
1847: “... The frontier farmers have been taunted with having clamored
for war, and now having got it to their hearts content... We have amongst
us foolish and violent men, as in every community, but we have also our
due of the rational, honorable, well-disposed; and I am bound to declare
upon personal observation that at the period referred to the fears and
complaints were perfectly just.” He also wrote in a more despondent
tone regarding a possible solution to the crisis: “Such is the double evil
of injustice that it often makes justice inexpedient if not ruinous. But
matters are coming to such a pitch that it may soon be doubtful which
side shall dictate the terms of peace! ... Since the mandate of
'Extermination' has gone forth, all parties think it is better to exterminate
than to be exterminated, and it is questionable which side is likely to be
most successful at the game.” (1)
Sir Harry Smith, the new governor, reverted to D'Urban's policy of twelve
years earlier, annexing the area between the Keiskamma and the Kei
rivers. The chiefs became mere functionaries, many Xhosa were pushed
out and the government sold their land to English-speaking speculators
to fill its own coffers.
The Xhosa invaded again in 1850, rallied by the sangoma Mlanjeni.
Some Kat River Khoikhoi and farm workers joined them, announcing
their fight was against the British; not with the Boers. The burghers did
not want to be involved. Sir Harry Smith wrote to the Colonial Secretary
that the Boers were 'indifferent' and 'apathetic.' A British settler
expressed surprise at how 'anti-English' the frontier Afrikaners had
become. A notable event in naval history took place during the Eighth
War. It was the 1852 wrecking of the HMS Birkenhead at Gansbaai,
whilst underway with reinforcements ordered by Harry Smith during the
invasion. The incident gave rise to the Birkenhead Drill: “Women and
children first!”

1856 to 1858 saw a further massive setback for the troubled Xhosa,
when a sixteen year-old igqirha (diviner), Nongqawuse, announced a
supernatural provision of bounty, and victory over the settlers, provided
all the cattle in the land were sacrificed to the ancestors. On 18 February
1857 the ancestors would return. Some powerful chiefs, mainly Sarhili of
the Gcalekas believed her and killed all their cattle, and forced lesser
tribes to follow suit. This act led to mass starvation and spread of
disease from the large amount of carcasses. The Xhosa had now
become fully surrendered to the power and mercy of the colony.
Stockenstrom, testifying in London, laid the blame for the war squarely
upon the aggressive local governor and rapacious speculators. He
asked: 'What single benefit have the colonists derived from any Kaffir
war?' He called for representative government in the colony.
Representative government was duly introduced in 1853. By now most
Afrikaner leaders in the western part of the colony strongly opposed any
further conquest of land beyond the border.




                “The Wreck of the Birkenhead” by Thomas M Hemy
                      6. THE GREAT TREK
Between 1835 and 1845 some 2 308 families, or 12 000 Afrikaners,
accompanied by 4–5000 servants departed from the colony. Officials
generally condemned the trek. Andries Stockenstrom expressed
concern that the trekkers would encroach on and subject the indigenous
peoples. He advised the government to reject any land deal made by
the trekkers that smacked of exploitation (where 'such bargain or right
can evidently only be extorted by violence and fraud in most cases.')
Gideon Joubert, a prominent frontier colonist, expected the trekkers to
be destroyed speedily and the survivors forced to return, or degenerate
into a state 'worse than that of the heathen.' The Cape synod of 1837
expressed its concern over the 'departure into the desert without a
Moses or Aaron' by people looking for a 'Canaan' without having been
given a 'promise or direction.' De Zuid Afrikaan was concerned that the
Voortrekkers had removed themselves from British authority, but its
editor Christoffel Brand (first Speaker of the House of Assembly after
Stockenstrom got his representative government in 1853) wrote to
Andries Pretorius in 1839: 'You must never forget that I am an Afrikaner
and hence have an interest in my countrymen who have emigrated.' The
Rev. G.W.A. Van der Lingen of Paarl gave advice to Andries Pretorius
before he departed, but declined to join the trek as its minister. (2)

In May 1835 the first company left under Louis Tregardt (his son
switched to Trichardt, a Dutch form of the Swedish family name.)
Tregardt was a wealthy eastern Cape farmer who, in 1833 had settled
deep inside Xhosa territory with twenty-nine other families after reaching
an agreement with Xhosa paramount Hintsa. Colonel Harry Smith had
accused Tregardt of conspiring with Hintsa at the outbreak of the Sixth
Frontier War and wanted to arrest him. The charges of inciting Hintsa
were unsubstantiated and charges of cattle theft were found to be false.
(19) He moved outside the colonial border in 1835 from where he
intended to coordinate his trek with that of close friend Hendrik Potgieter.
His trek of nine families was joined by that of Lang Hans Janse van
Rensburg, another exiled farmer, at the Vaal River. Tregardt kept a diary
of his trek, which led first to the Limpopo region in the far north (border
province between South Africa and Zimbabwe). Tregardt parted ways
with the trek of Janse van Rensburg after arguments over which routes
to take and Janse van Rensburg's wasting of ammunition on ivory
hunting. Janse van Rensburg's trek of forty-nine persons were
extirpated shortly afterward in a night-long assault by the Shoshangane.
Two young children survived, concealed by a merciful attacker under his
shield. They sadly died a year later from Malaria. Tregardt sojourned in
the Soutpansberg with a forward party of Potgieter's trek in August 1836.
They were to join up soon afterward, but Potgieter became engaged in
conflicts. Tregardt then headed south-east to the Portuguese territory of
Lorenco Marques (Maputo in Mozambique). They found a way over the
forbidding northern slopes of the Drakensberg, at times, partially
dismantling their wagons and hauling them on branches in a two-and-a-
half month feat. They maintained good relations with the Pedi and
Gwamba people. Before reaching Lorenco Marques in 1838, members
of the trek had already died from malaria and Tregardt lost three children
to unknown causes. In Lorenzo Marques he was welcomed by the small
Portuguese community, but most of the remaining fifty-two members
(including seven colored servants) quickly succumbed to Malaria.
Tregardt died within six months of his wife. The twenty-six survivors
were transported by schooner to Port Natal.




                     Louis Tregardt (10/8/1783 – 25/10/1838)

Tregardt comes across in his diary as a calm level-headed man with a
good sense of humor, who maintained good relations with the tribes he
encountered.

Andries Hendrik Potgieter (Hendrik Potgieter) trekked out of the Tarka
region in late 1835 early 1836. Gerrit Maritz' trek left Graaff Reinet in
September 1836 with more than seven hundred people. Piet Retief's
party of a hundred men, women and children departed from Albany
district in February 1837. Hendrik Potgieter's trek started with only thirty-
three fighting men, along with women and children, and increased to two
hundred after the parties of Sarel Cilliers (the Voortrekkers' spiritual
leader) and Casper Kruger joined the trek. Potgieter, an energetic,
active man with a taciturn temprament, concluded agreements with
African chiefs to live in peace.(2) But in August 1836, Mzilikazi's Ndebele
attacked the camps of the Liebenberg and Erasmus families, part of
Potgieter's trek, and killed twenty-four trekkers, including six children.
Three more children were abducted and never again seen, while
another was recovered from a fleeing warrior. (19) Then, on October, 20
1836, an Ndebele army of four thousand to six thousand men attacked
Potgieter's laager, well fortified on a slope, and, during the Battle of
Vegkop, thirty-five trekkers beat off the massive attack with loss of only
two lives (his brother Nicolaas and a son-in-law). The Ndebele did
succeed though, in carrying off almost all the trekkers' cattle. In January,
commandos went out to punish Mzilikazi. The first, headed by Potgieter
and Gerrit Maritz, consisted of hundred armed trekkers in alliance with
forty Griqua and !Koranna, and sixty members of the Baralong tribe.
They killed four hundred Ndebele, sacked Mzilikazi's village at Mosega
and took seven thousand cattle. In November, another commando under
Potgieter and Piet Uys, forced Mzilikazi to flee to the present Zimbabwe.

Internal divisions, schisms and squabbles nearly ended the Trek. They
wanted a settlement with access to a harbor. Retief wanted Natal where
he would negotiate with the British. Potgieter wanted the Highveld, with
a route to Delagoa Bay (Maputo in Mozambique). Hendrik Potgieter was
a patriarchal personality with an autocratic streak. This would later have
huge implications for the fledgling Boer republic. While Potgieter and
Maritz were at Thaba Nchu, the trekkers elected a Burgerraad (Burgher
Council) to supervise the making and enforcement of laws, with Maritz
as civilian president and Potgieter as military commander. Maritz and
Potgieter soon fell out and the Burgerraad was split. When Piet Retief
arrived at Thaba Nchu the next April, he was unanimously elected
governor of the trekkers and took over as military commander from
Potgieter. Maritz became judge-president of the Council of Policy and
deputy governor. Potgieter's exclusion was confirmed two months later
at a meeting in Winburg, where nine articles were adopted, setting up
the 'Free Province of New Holland in South East Africa' with Retief as
overseer of the “company”. When Piet Uys' trek arrived soon afterward,
he refused to accept resolutions in which his own trek had not been
consulted. Also, Maritz, increasingly suspicious of Retief's autocratic
tendencies, warned trek parties that Retief had appropriated
'unprecedented power and dominion.'(2) Potgieter and Maritz now
continued north, while Retief moved eastward. However, Maritz then
decided to rejoin Retief in Natal. Potgieter followed reluctantly.
Retief and a forward party reached the Zulu king Dingane's capitol of
Ungungundlovo in October 1837. There he met with Francis Owen, a
local missionary who had assisted him in arranging the visit, and a
young man named William Wood and his father and uncle, traders from
Port Natal. Wood acted as interpreter. Dingane promised land between
the Mzumvuba and Tugela rivers, on condition that Retief recovered
cattle stolen from him by the Tlokwa chief, Sekonyela. Although Retief
had been warned against Dingane's treacherous nature, he was now
under so much pressure that, almost as in his business ventures in the
colony, he risked all against impossibly long odds. (2) Francis Owen
warned him that the deal he was trying to pull off was a 'mad enterprise.'
Retief reportedly replied: 'It takes a Dutchman, not an Englishman to
understand a Kafir.' Retief's men recovered the cattle for a few men
wounded. On their return, Dingane signed the land treaty which Retief
had prepared. He had already decided to murder the hundred men, as
he was insistent they part with their weapons when entering the kraal.
At the command, “Bambani, bulala aba Tagati!” (“Grab and kill the
wizards!”) the Boers were seized and taken to their place of execution.
Sources agree that Retief was killed last. Some say all the men were
clubbed, others maintain the men were impaled on stakes and Retief
clubbed. A week later, when the first opportunity presented itself, Francis
Owen and the Wood family fled.

In the ensuing grim days, six to seven thousand Zulu impis attacked the
unsuspecting Boer settlements at Blaaukranz and Weenen (“Weeping”).
They massacred five hundred Boer trekkers and servants, not
discriminating between man, woman or child. At least two hundred of the
slain were children. (185 were white Boer children.) Babies' heads were
smashed against wagon wheels and corpses of men and women were
mutilated.(19) The Zulu force carried off 20 000–25 000 head of cattle
and left many families destitute. Two women, having received more than
twenty stab wounds each, were among the survivors.
In early April 1838, a two-pronged commando totaling about 350 men
led by Hendrik Potgieter and rival Piet Uys, was ambushed by 6 500
Zulus at Talana Hill after they crossed the Buffalo River. Afterward
Potgieter was criticized for his actions in the fight and even blamed for
the deaths of Uys and his eleven year-old son. Potgieter subsequently
left Natal for good.
                   Mass grave for Piet Retief's murdered party.

The Natal Voortrekkers' position looked hopeless when Gerrit Maritz
died. On his deathbed, Maritz said: “It was with me as with Moses; I
have seen the promised land but will not call it my home.” The trekker
leader Karel Landman, who had covered the retreat of the “Flight
Commando” when Piet and Dirkie Uys had been killed, took temporary
leadership. Two months later, things took a turn for the better with the
arrival in November 1838 of a commando dispatched by the trek of
Andries Pretorius, in response to Maritz' earlier plea for assistance.
 ... Andries Pretorius arrived with a party of sixty and a fine bronze
cannon. A tall, robust man with an impressive bearing, Pretorius had a
degree of self-confidence that shaded into arrogance, but he was, as
Stockenstrom observed, 'no fool' and a brilliant military and political
strategist besides. (2)
Pretorius was appointed commandant-general of the new commando.
Joined by Karel Landman and Sarel Cilliers, the commando had the
strength of 470 men with sixty-four wagons and two cannons. Strict
discipline was maintained, a fortified laager drawn at the end of each
day, and regular reconnaissance patrols sent out. Pretorius encouraged
the idea of a vow and his commandants and men agreed. On Sunday,
December 9, 1838, Sarel Cilliers officially prayed for divine favor. If God
granted victory, they and their descendants would commemorate the
day of the battle and would build a church. They repeated the prayer
every evening until the battle of Blood River on the morning of
December, 16. On that fateful day, 468 trekkers, three Englishmen and
sixty blacks faced between ten thousand and twelve thousand Zulu.
            Position of the Boer laager at the Battle of Blood River. (19)

After a reconnaissance party detected the Zulu force on 15 December, a
laager was drawn, covered from two sides by the Ncome River (a
tributary of the Buffalo River) and a natural trench or donga. That
evening the prayer was repeated for the last time. The Zulu attacked on
the Sunday morning of December, 16. Pretorius used a tactic of
purposely dividing his defense, allowing the Zulu regiments to mass in
front of the cannons, decimating them with every shot. The Boers' front
loaders became so hot from the continuous firing that it was feared they
would explode, making reloading a treacherous affair. Three thousand
Zulu fell around the laager, their blood flowing red in the Ncome River,
hence the name Blood River. When they retreated, commandos rode out
after them, engaging them with fire from the saddle. Only three Boers
were wounded, including Andries Pretorius. The commando was
henceforth called the “Victory Commando.” The crippling blow to
Dingane's power base, saw the Zulu nation split, with Dingane's half-
brother Mpande, aligning him with the trekkers. He sent ten thousand
men to support a follow-up expedition against Dingane after Dingane
would not return four thousand stolen cattle and failed to adhere to
stipulations of a British brokered treaty. The “Cattle Commando”
returned 41 000 head of cattle. Dingane was assassinated by Zulu rivals
and Pretorius proclaimed Mpande king of the Zulu, and vassal of the
Natal republic. A church was built in Pietermaritzburg to honor the vow,
but public celebration of the day was not continued after 1839. It was
Paul Kruger, who had been a teenager in a family on Potgieter's trek,
who made the day an official day of remembrance in 1880.
  Geloftekerk (“Church of the Vow”): Andries Pretorius , Jacobus Burger and Johannes
 Maritz led the campaign to generate funds for construction in 1839. C.J. Brand, editor of
          De Zuid Afrikaan in the Cape Colony helped with the fund-raising effort.

In 1839 a republic was established with Pietermaritzburg the capitol, and
two towns, Congella near Port Natal and Weenen. The Volksraad
(Peoples' Council) consisted of twenty-four representatives, with local
government consisting of a landdrost, assisted by a local council of
burghers (heemraden). In the districts, field cornets represented the
government. All burghers were eligible for commando duty under
direction of the field cornets and district commandants. At the head was
a commandant-general appointed by the Volksraad, for all practical
purposes, the head of state, who was Andries Pretorius. In 1841 the
republic was enlarged to include the Potgieter-trek communities of
Winburg, south of the Vaal and Potchefstroom, north of the Vaal, adding
a representative for each of these three communities on the Volksraad.
(2) Hendrik Potgieter was given the position of commandant-general for
the area west of the Drakensberg.




                     Andries H. Pretorius (27/11/1798 – 23/07/1853)
Among a section of the trekkers, there was an increasing tendency to
see all trekkers as a united society of burghers with a right to make their
own laws in the settlement they had founded. This section, known as the
Volksraad party, strongly opposed unchecked personal power. In 1840
the party abolished the post of commandant-general for times of peace.
It introduced a radical form of self-rule with annual elections, Afrikaner
male franchise, and frequent appeals to the Volksraad. (2)

The Natal Volksraad wrote in 1841 to Governor Napier at the Cape that
they saw themselves as an instrument in God's hand to promote
Christian civilization and to protect blacks from internecine 'murder,
pillage and violence.' The Cape government was keeping a close eye on
developments.
In the “Cattle Commando” expedition of 1839 against Dingane, the
military council had authorized every commando member to seize four
“orphaned children”, to be formally registered and indentured by officials
of the republic, with boys released at the age of twenty-five and girls at
twenty-one. A French naturalist who had accompanied the commando,
Adulphe Delegorgue, later reported that some children had died from
exposure after their capture, when they helped to drive the captured
cattle. [ My source, J.C. Van der Walt (The Witness, 27 Jan 2010):
children “died from cold and exposure”, but the commando had taken
place in February 1839, summer in tropical Natal.] Pretorius seized
eight children, between the ages of five and thirteen, but took nearly four
years to get them registered with the secretary of the Volksraad. Trade
in children was forbidden by the Volksraad. In 1841 the Volksraad
expressed dismay over a reported trade in Zulu children, but said it
lacked the power to stamp it out. In 1842 the Volksraad wrote to
Governor Napier in Cape Town: “[We] formed a Government of our own,
prosecuted wars that came upon us unexpectedly and made peace, we
took possession of uninhabited tracts of country acquired by friendly
treaties, as well as with our blood and treasure.”
After some cattle thefts, the Volksraad asked Pretorius to lead a
commando. Pretorius operated in a way reminiscent of Colonel Henry
Somerset's reprisal patrols on the eastern frontier, where commandos
acting on sparse evidence, had intentioned to intimidate all the chiefs in
the vicinity to refrain from stealing, rather than punish the guilty. (2)
Pretorius led a commando in a surprise-attack against a Bhaka chief,
Ncaphayi, accused by Pretorius of cattle theft. The commando killed
thirty people, abducted seventeen children for distribution as
apprentices and took three thousand head of cattle. Pretorius also
wanted to force serfdom onto Zulu men. The Zulu did not appreciate the
idea. News of the attack on Ncaphayi and abduction of children,
reached the colonial government via missionaries working in the area.
Ncaphayi had been under colonial government protection at the time.
The Volksraad also engaged in forced removals of “surplus Zulu” inside
Natal, settling them at the southern border with the colony. (2)

In 1838 a small British force had briefly occupied Port Natal, around the
time that the Battle of Blood River occurred. They negotiated the truce
between the Voortrekkers and Dingane after the Battle of Blood River.
In 1842, following the above-mentioned events of social disruption, the
government sent an occupying force of 250 men to Port Natal under
Captain T.C. Smith. Pretorius set up camp at Congella, as a base from
which he intended to negotiate with Smith. Shortly after midnight of 24
May, Smith launched a surprise attack on the camp of Pretorius, but
Petrorius' men hit back with such overwhelming fire that the British
retaliated. Pretorius laid siege to the British camp. Dick King escaped
the siege, and after a long flight on horseback, managed to reach the
colony to summon help. British re-enforcements arrived by ship and
Pretorius was forced to withdraw. Henry Cloete, an anglicized Afrikaner,
was instated as commissioner of the annexed territory. The Volksraad
was allowed to continue administering the interior of the republic,
pending a British decision.
In July 1842 the Volksraad invited Henry Cloete to Pietermaritzburg for
negotiations. A hostile crowd gathered outside the Volksraad building
while deliberations continued inside, but the Volksraad decided to
submit to British authority. Most vociferous in their opposition to the
British were the poor and illiterate. Women were staunchly pro-freedom
and pro-republican. In this instance, Susanna Smit, sister of the late
Gerrit Maritz and Stephanus Maritz (a Volksraad member) and the wife
of Erasmus Smit, a former LMS missionary, took the lead, voicing a
determination to not yield to British authority, but to “rather walk barefoot
back across the Drakensberg to die in freedom”, holding death dearer
than loss of liberty. Afrikaner women had been a driving force behind the
Trek. A British settler on the frontier wrote while the Trek was underway:
'They fancy they are under a divine impulse ... the women seem more
bent on it than the men.' In 1838 a British commander noted of the
trekker women in Natal, that despite suffering great difficulty, 'they all
rejected with scorn the idea of returning to the Colony ... if any of the
men began to droop or lose courage, they urged them on to fresh
exertions and kept alive the spirit of resistance in them.' (2) During one of
the Zulu attacks in Natal, an attack lasting two days and nights on the
laager of Hans De Lange, the women were reloading the red-hot Ou
Sanna flintlock muskets, amidst a rain of throwing spears, while the men
kept firing, eventually succeeding in chasing off the attackers. Years
later, during the Anglo-Boer War, it was again the women who urged
men to keep fighting. It was said that men who had surrendered without
a fight (called hensoppers, a play on the English phrase Hands up!)
requested to be kept separate from the women in the concentration
camps on account of their scornful rebuke.
Cloete was dismayed by the women's fury, calling it 'a disgrace on their
husbands to allow them such a state of freedom.' (2)

The British administered the territory on the terms of equality for all
before the law, aggression against indigenous tribes were prohibited and
slavery illegal. A second trek followed, though not as dramatic as the
first, occurring in different migrations out of Natal, towards the Highveld
regions of Transoranje (Transorange) – the later Orange Free State
(OFS) and Winburg-Potchefstroom – the settlements founded by
Hendrik Potgieter in what later became the Transvaal Republic (ZAR).
            7. THE BOER REPUBLICS – PART I
Hendrik Potgieter governed the trekkers of the Potchefstroom-Winburg
area on the Highveld. He notified Henry Cloete that his people did not
consider themselves bound by the Pietermaritzburg Volksraad's
submission to British authority and that they wished to continue running
their own affairs. In 1844 they established their own Burgerraad
(Burgher Council) and accepted a constitution of thirty-three articles with
provision for annual elections. The following year, Potgieter moved his
capitol from Potchefstroom to the eastern Transvaal bushveld. He
established the town of Andries Ohrigstad within a two-weeks ride of
Delagoa Bay which would serve as a port. The area was infested with
tsetse fly though and the farmers' stock were decimated. Many farmers
gave up cattle farming for ivory hunting and the surrounding tribes were
increasingly hostile.
Potgieter had an agreement with the Pedi leader, Sekwati, that he would
protect the Pedi from future Swazi hostilities in exchange for land.
Potgieter became increasingly autocratic, announcing the Burgerraad
would meet in future wherever he and his immediate followers were
settled. When the trekkers from the ultra-democratic Volksraad party
from Natal, under leadership of J.J. (Kootjie) Burger, moved into the
area, conflict developed immediately.(2) They set up a Volksraad in
Ohrigstad in 1845 with Burger as Secretary. They considered Potgieter's
political system an autocracy and wanted an orderly farming-settlement.
They accused Potgieter of being too harsh on black people and of
'lusting after their cattle and elephant tusks.' Potgieter operated as a
barterer, nomadic farmer, hunter, ivory trader and power broker who
cultivated links with African auxiliaries, including the half-caste tribe
founded by Coenraad De Buys (p.15), dealing in raiding chiefdoms,
extorting tributes, seizing cattle and also women and children.
In 1846, Potgieter asked the Volksraad's permission to send a
commando against Mzilikazi's Ndebele, whom he had resented since
they attacked his trek a decade earlier. His reason for the request was to
search for some trekker children they had abducted. Burger insisted on
strict instructions to be given to the expedition leaders not to attack
innocent kraals and to refrain from shedding innocent blood. When
Potgieter failed to find Mzilikazi, he attacked another chiefdom, capturing
a large number of stock and four hundred prisoners. He attacked the
Transvaal Ndebele under Langa unprovoked, killing many and taking
women and children, separating them from one another and allotting
each commando member three or four children. Some kept them, some
exchanged or sold them for between £7 and £15, while others were
revulsed and left the commando. The Volksraad had enough; Adriaan de
Lange called for action against Potgieter for plunging the land into crisis
from which it would take years to recover. Some shots were apparently
exchanged and the community disintegrated. Potgieter and his followers
found the small settlement of Zoutpansbergdorp (Schoemansdal) in
1849. A number of African chiefs who held him in high regard came to
pay their respects before he died in 1852. His opponents founded the
town of Lydenburg (“Place of Suffering”) in the eastern Transvaal.

Trekboers had been living in peace with the Griqua and Sotho nations in
the land of Transorange. The Griqua were an Afrikaans-speaking semi-
autonomous mixed-race people living on the northern and northeastern
outskirts of the Cape colony. They had a council that had established its
own code of laws, with field cornets acting as officials of the council.
They had two provinces or captaincies recognized by the colonial
government, one west of the Orange River governed by Andries
Waterboer and one east of the Orange (inside Transorange) under
Adam Kok III. When the Voortrekkers joined the trekboers in
Transorange, John Philip started to fear for the independence of the
Griqua as well as for that of the Basotho nation under Moshweshwe.
Philip persuaded Governor Napier to sign formal treaties with the Griqua
and Basotho in 1843. Potgieter had signed a treaty with Adam Kok as
well, and reminded him that they were both fairly recent occupants of the
land of Transorange, asking him to be regarded as “neither more nor
less than your fellow-emigrants, inhabiting the country, enjoying the
same privileges with you.” Both trekboers and Voortrekkers would
quickly protest though, whenever the Griqua authority would arrest
whites. Kok feared confrontation with the Boers and backed off when
conflict erupted.

By the end of 1847, Andries Pretorius and a large number of the
remaining Natal-contingent of trekkers decided to leave. They were tired
of the insecurity of living under the British and facing threats from
Bushmen and blacks. Pretorius had even contemplated fighting the
British with Zulu allies. In 1848 they abandoned their farms and trekked
over the Drakensberg. By coincidence, during the trek over the
inhospitable mountain in torrential rain, they ran into Sir Harry Smith,
who ordered them to return to their farms. When they refused, Smith
informed them that Britain would annex both the Transorange and
Transvaal as British territories. Smith wrote later: 'I was almost
paralyzed to witness the whole of the population with few exceptions
trêking [sic]. Rains on this side of the mountains are tropical ... and
[these] families were exposed to a state of misery which I never before
saw equaled.' In 1848 Governor Harry Smith annexed the area between
the Orange and the Vaal rivers as the Orange River Sovereignty.

Andries Pretorius wrote a manifesto, signed by nine hundred burghers.
He compared the Afrikaners, who were not allowed self-governance, to
the Griqua who were allowed 'self-government with all the privileges of
liberty.' Pretorius wrote: '[Had] we perhaps been colored, it might
perhaps be possible, but now we find it impossible, because we are
white African Boers.' He told the governor how, when they were children
there was “a Kaffir War in the old colony, and now we are men with gray
hairs and there is still a Kaffir war ... a war caused under British rule.”
“How did we obtain possession of [Natal] – unjustly or easily? No; we
obtained it justly from a sovereign power; and subsequently it cost us
the blood of dearest wives and children, and we will never refrain from
exclaiming it before the great Creator and before the world. And were is
the country now? Still in possession of the owners? ...” (1, 2)
In a brief but sharp battle, Governor Smith defeated Andries Pretorius'
force at Boomplaats. Pretorius fled to the vicinity of the current Pretoria.
Because of the rivalry with Potgieter, he organized trekkers outside
Potgieter's sphere of influence, and in 1849 established a Volksraad for
the entire Transvaal region. A commandant-general was appointed for
each of the four main regions (Soutpansberg – north, Lydenburg – east,
Marico – west, and the central and southern region.) The Volksraad
gave Pretorius a mandate to negotiate a political settlement with Britain
for the Transvaal trekkers. (2)

British control in the Transorange Sovereignty consisted of Resident
Henry Warden, four magistrates, five clerks, eight constables, one Dutch
Reformed minister, four schoolteachers and 250 troops. Fixing the
borders was entrusted to Richard Southey, secretary to Sir Harry Smith.
A large number of English settlers arrived in the Sovereignty. A lobby of
English-speaking settlers again clamored for a tough policy against
Mosheshwe and obtaining the fertile Caledon River valley. English
farmers tended to appeal to the British imperial state for land titles,
infrastructure and administration, security and providing markets for their
produce. Voortrekkers did not want to be part of an English state and
many declared their refusal to pay taxes to the British Sovereignty. They
also did not want expulsion of the Sotho, or severing of contacts with the
Sotho. Some made their living by exchanging Sotho wheat for powder
and leadshot. The Sotho also profited from having a market for their
wheat. Many Afrikaners were happy to have Chief Moshweshwe ratifying
their land claims. (2)
Josias Hoffman, who would later become the first Free State president,
objected to a plan to expel some three thousand Sotho from the
Caledon River valley: 'The natives will not consent to remove and will
revenge such unjust treatment...If Southey thinks that he can bind the
Boers to the British government by giving them all the land he is
mistaken and knows neither the Boers nor the natives.'
After a spate of stock theft, Warden attempted to enforce the boundary
that excluded the Sotho from a large part of the valley. The unsuccessful
attempt coincided with the Eighth Frontier War in 1851. The English-
language newspaper, The Friend, in Bloemfontein wrote: 'We see a war
of races ... the declared aim and intention of the black man being to
drive the white man into the sea.' It said an 'extensive conspiracy' across
South Africa of Africans against whites existed. How was the white man
to respond? 'We answer in one word: UNION. Let the white man in
South Africa be united, and at the same time let them be just.' (2)
    In 1852 a large force under a new Cape governor, Sir George
Cathcart, attacked Mosheshwe in an offensive that soon faltered.
Mosheshwe sued prematurely for peace to help the British force to save
face, but it was a hollow victory for the British. Cathcart advised the
imperial government to set up a permanent garrison of two thousand
men to reinforce British authority in the Sovereignty. But British policy-
makers in London were unwilling to be sucked into the quagmire of the
deeper interior of South Africa ... (2)
The liberal John Fairbairn in Cape Town changed his negative view of
the Boer trekkers. He and others were now preoccupied with opening up
the interior and 'civilizing' the natives. Fairbairn wrote: 'It is now clear
that the destruction of Matsilikatzi (sic) and the overthrow of Dingaan
were steps in the Providential Scheme of tranquilizing Southern Africa.'
De Zuid-Afrikaan compared the Trek with Israel's exodus from Egypt
and as a means of bringing the Gospel and civilization to the 'wild
national tribes into the deep interior of South Africa.' (2)

At the Sand River Convention of 1852, Britain gave Transvaal Afrikaners
the right to govern themselves and purchase ammunition from the
British colonies. It also promised to disclaim all prior alliances with the
'colored nations' north of the Vaal, and to prohibit arms trade with the
local tribes. It's main condition was that slavery would not be permitted.
Andries Pretorius and Hendrik Potgieter had reconciled their differences
before Potgieter's death in 1852.
The British also decided to leave the Orange River Sovereignty. Their
negotiator shunned a group of loyalist trekboers, and negotiated the
Bloemfontein Convention with a group of burghers in 1854. The trekkers
between the Orange and Vaal could form their own government and
purchase ammunition from the Cape Colony and Natal. Britain still
recognized its treaty with Adam Kok, but in the early 1860s he sold his
land and trekked across the Drakensberg to found East Griqualand. (2)
Thus were formed the two Boer republics: In the Transvaal, the Zuid-
Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) established in 1852 after the Sand River
Convention and two years later, the land of Transorangia became the
Orange Free State Republic (OFS). There were some twenty thousand
burghers in the ZAR north of the Vaal River and fifteen thousand in the
OFS between the Orange and Vaal rivers. Some OFS burghers kept
alive the idea of incorporating their state into the Cape Colony until the
late 1860s, but the great majority of burghers became staunch
republicans. (2)

Andries Pretorius had strongly favored a united Boer state. After his
death in 1853 he was succeeded by his eldest son, Marthinus Wessel
Pretorius, as head of the ZAR Volksraad. The OFS sent a delegation to
the ZAR and the matter of a united Boer state was considered. But the
ZAR became divided by internal strife and religious dissent after the
arrival of Rev. Dirk van der Hoff as the ZAR's Dutch Reformed minister,
sent by the Cape DRC on condition that the ZAR church joined the
synod of the Cape Colony. The old east-west factions from the days of
conflict between Hendrik Potgieter and the Volksraad party were
revived. The Potchefstroom faction opposed incorporation with the Cape
synod, while the Lydenburg Volksraad-faction favored inclusion. Van der
Hoff himself, supported by M.W. Pretorius in this, did not favor a non-
racial church as stipulated by the Cape synod. (2)
Shortly afterward, the ZAR saw a war with indigenous tribes flare up
(Siege of Makapan's Cave) after the murders of some burghers and
Field-cornet Hermanus Potgieter, who was in command of the
Soutpansberg area founded by Hendrik Potgieter. People throughout the
ZAR gathered in laagers for safety and to complicate matters, an
outbreak of lung sickness paralyzed normal transport, making meeting
of the Volksraad impossible and, for all intents and purposes, leaving the
ZAR temporarily without government. In 1855 a draft constitution for the
ZAR was accepted though, and the Volksraad founded a new village on
two farms Marthinus Wessel Pretorius had previously bought, stipulating
that it be named after his father. Thus, Pretoria was born. Pretorius was
sworn in as ZAR president on 6 January 1857, with Stephanus
Schoeman of the Soutpansberg as commandant-general. On the same
day, the Vierkleur, designed by Rev. Van der Hoff was officially hoisted
for the first time. (20) In 1859 a group of ZAR burghers formed their own
church, the morally and theologically conservative Gereformeerde Kerk
(Dopper Church). One of the founders was the future state president,
Paul Kruger.

In the Free State, a constitution was drawn up by J. Groenendaal, a
Dutch teacher and A. Coqui and J.M. Orpen, members of the English-
speaking party in the OFS. The franchise, though not specifically based
on race, was racial in practice as it only applied to burghers of the
republic. (The idea that tribes like Mosheshwe's Basotho would want
representation on the burghers' representative body, just seemed
illogical.) All church parishes in the OFS were absorbed into the Cape
synod of the DRC. The first president of the Free State was J.N.
Boshoff.

M.W. Pretorius made a huge diplomatic blunder with awkward attempts
at incorporating the OFS into the ZAR. President Boshoff, becoming
suspicious of Pretorius' intents, made an equally clumsy attempt at
isolating him in his own country from the Soutpansberg and Lydenburg
factions. Matters came to a head with a standoff between the armies of
the two republics at the Renoster River on 25 May 1857. Common
sense prevailed though and war was prevented.
Pretorius managed to reunite his own country and was reelected ZAR
president. When the OFS saw crisis erupt with a major war with the
Basotho, a union between the two republics became a strong possibility,
but was prevented by Sir George Grey who threatened to suspend the
Sand River and Bloemfontein conventions.
On 12 December 1859, after the resignation of President Boshoff,
Pretorius was elected with an overwhelming majority as president of the
Free Sate. The new post caused so much instability in the factional ZAR
though, that he held the post for only three years. In this time however,
he managed to stabilize relations in the Free State with the Basotho and
other chiefs, and ratified a boundary with Mosheshwe that was
advantageous to the OFS. After concluding that the Transvaal did not
favor his dual presidency, he obtained an honorable discharge from the
OFS presidency.
The ZAR had become increasingly unstable and matters escalated to
the point of imminent civil war with all the hallmarks of a failed state. A
state army (Staatsleger) was at odds with a “peoples army” (Volksleger).
Pretorius stabilized the situation and was again asked to take up the
presidency in the Free Sate. Again, matters in the ZAR boiled over and
Pretorius resigned from the OFS presidency for a second time in 1863.
A special court in the ZAR called for an election. Pretorius was
nominated but W.C. Janse van Rensburg was elected. After irregularities
were discovered, a reelection was held and Janse van Rensburg
reelected. Rumors of ballot tampering continued and an army under
Commandant Jan Willem Viljoen clashed with the Staatsleger on the
Crocodile River on 5 January 1864. After blood was shed all parties
came to their senses and, again, M.W. Pretorius was elected president
of the ZAR. The conflict had left the ZAR in an economic crisis, and
Pretorius was forced to print paper money to honor commitments
(mandaten) that were issued in this period.

It is interesting to note that amidst all the turmoil in the ZAR, there was a
strong sense of being a proper secular republic. In 1859, probably with
political motives, the Committee of the Evangelical Association in Port
Elizabeth, representing the Anglican Church and the DRC, wrote the
Lydenberg Volksraad-faction (at that stage having formed its own short-
lived republic separate from the Potchefstroom-Soutpansberg faction).
They were basically trying to pull rank and criticized the republic on
religious issues, such as the Voortrekkers not having been good
missionaries. The response was drafted by a Dutch immigrant to the
ZAR, T.A. Bührmann. He wrote: '...We form part of that people whom
you so misjudge ... and to whom you have addressed your open letter ...
We all belong to that people whom you have attacked and held in
contempt. This people have sacrificed all their possessions and set out
with apprehension and concern in order to acquire and establish their
own country and their own form of government, just as was done by
your forefathers and ours and all European nations before us. In this
way we hoped, and still do, to free ourselves from all the laws and
customs of other nations which are contrary to our consciences and our
national sentiments and seem to us improper ...” [the Lydenberg faction
did not have objections to racial equality in Church and were not
referring to British colonial racial equality as “laws and customs of other
nations” that “seemed improper” to them. (2)]
The letter goes on: “You refer to our departure from the colony and our
withdrawal from civilized life ... you would have rejoiced in this and
thanked God without cease, if we had done this with the purpose of
bringing Christ's gospel to an ignorant people in the wilderness.
Truly brothers, to hear such language from learned people is
incomprehensible to us. Where, in the history of the world, have you
heard of a people that left its own fatherland, its own happiness,
sacrificing peace and property, with the sole purpose of all becoming
missionaries, and of forcing a savage people to accept civilization and a
religion which they do not desire? We are aware, and we thank God for
it, that exceptional people are often aroused to devote themselves to the
cause of the gospel, but if whole nations were to do this, they would
probably fail in the purpose for which God has called them ... You ask
whether the Almighty said to our Commander-general, 'Arise and take
possession of the land!' We answer that He did not, but that the largest
part of this country north of the Vaal River, as well as a large part of
what is now the British colony of Natal, and the Orange Free State was
lawfully purchased by the Dutch emigrants from its previous owners –
the Kaffir tribes who lived there – and a part was acquired by rightfully
waged wars, caused by unwarranted attacks of the natives of that
country. Thus we have in our opinion acquired the lands by right and in
accordance with the tenets in God's Word...” (1)




  Marthinus Wessel Pretorius (Graaff Reinet, 17/09/1819 – Potchefstroom, 19/05/1901)


M.W. Pretorius had managed to get the ZAR recognized as a state by
Holland, France, Belgium, the U.S.A. and Germany in the years of 1869
to 1871. Basically all the important powers with the stark exception of
Great Britain. Britain had come to regret its conventions with the Boer
republics, and was beginning to search for routes to place diplomatic
and economic pressure on the republics. Britain refused the republics'
request to share in customs duties on goods imported to the republics
via the harbors of Cape Town and Natal. Pretorius looked to Delagoa
Bay in Portuguese territory and laid claim to a strip of land that extended
the ZAR border to Delagoa Bay. Britain clamored for an international
incident, but Portugal responded to the contrary. On 29 July 1869,
Portugal concluded a “treaty of peace, friendship, trade and frontiers”
with the republic. (20)
When diamonds were discovered in Griqualand, the ZAR was one of the
interested parties. Pretorius was accused of allowing the opportunity to
slip out of reach when he, acting without consulting the Volksraad,
conceded to British arbitration, and the diamond rights were
subsequently lost to the ZAR. Under criticism, Pretorius was no longer
sure whether he had done the right thing, and in his bewilderment
admitted that he no longer felt confident in dealing with such matters. He
disappeared from public life, but made a powerful comeback after British
annexation of the Transvaal in 1877. During the period of passive
resistance he was elected chairman of the committee of Boer leaders,
was a member of the committee that negotiated with Sir Bartle Frere at
Hennops River in April 1879, and acted as chairman of the national
assembly at Wonderfontein on December 15, 1879 during the First
Anglo-Boer War. He was arrested by the British for treason for
involvement in the national assembly, but quickly released. After
retirement from politics, he took the role of historian of the ZAR,
although his archives were largely destroyed during the Second Anglo-
Boer War. He was kept under British watch, and on a cold night in 1901
while staying with a friend, some British troops aroused him from his
sleep and interrogated him for hours outside. The next day he fell ill and
died a few days later. (20)

In 1868, due to pressures of encroachment on the Basotho in the OFS,
and when it seemed imminent that the OFS would conquer it, Britain
annexed Basotoland as a protectorate on behalf of the Sotho king.
Then, rich diamond fields were discovered west of the OFS border, in
Griqua territory. A British arbitrator accepted the claims of the Griqua
and the Thlaping over that of the OFS. Losing the diamond fields turned
out to be a blessing in disguise and a turning point in the history of the
OFS. It had brought to its border (onto its doorstep so to speak) a large
market without the disadvantage of having to extend the vote to large
numbers of immigrants. (2)
   Jan Brand, president from 1864 -1888 handled the issue well from a
diplomatic point of view, and succeeded in getting Britain to pay £90 000
as compensation. Brand was a gifted leader and instilled new political
confidence. He spent the money on a state bank that enhanced the
state's financial autonomy, and, by the early 1880s, had established the
basic framework of a remarkably stable state. The state was by no
means rich or modern, however ... [There existed little infrastructure].
Some wool was exported, but wheat had to be imported from
Basotuland until the 1890s. Still, Brand had his priorities right. He put
special emphasis on establishing a sound legal system in order to
attract trade and other forms of business, and he stamped out
corruption. (2)

In the ZAR, M.W. Pretorius, after resigning in the face of the diamond
claim issue, was succeeded by Thomas François Burgers, a former
liberal DRC minister who had been suspended by the Cape synod for
heresy. He was the last thing the religiously conservative ZAR needed at
that stage. He was an idealist with grand visions. He sponsored balls
and other lavish forms of entertainment in Pretoria, and issued bonds
that the ZAR could not honor. To issue hard currency he borrowed the
substantial sum of £66 000 from the Cape Commercial Bank.
He reformed the education system and called for a nationalist form of
history to be taught in schools instead of the imperialist version.
He became ever unpopular when he attempted to ban religious
instruction during school hours, on the grounds that the Bible did not
belong in school, since school was a place where science had to be
taught. He proposed that church membership should no longer be a
requirement for teachers and education officials. (2) This was the last
straw for many in the ultra-conservative ZAR, and would usher in untold
misery to a large group who could stand his leadership no longer, and
literally trekked into the desert in three phases, from 1874 to 1880.
He applied for a grand loan of £300 000 from banks in Europe to build a
railway line to Delagoa Bay, but the Cape Bank, fearing ZAR default,
blocked it and he received £90 000, spending most on railway materials
which ended laying rotting in Delagoa Bay after the railway scheme had
collapsed. Kruger made the cruel but apt comment about all his
ambitious schemes: 'Burgers wanted to fly, but his wings were clipped in
time. Now he has to crawl along with us.' (2)
Burgers also had attempted to get Afrikaner and English diamond
diggers to shun their ethnic identities to form a single white nation. 'We
should be only one nation, and know only one nationality – the
Afrikaansche.' (2)
In 1875, F.W. Reitz became Judge President (Chief-Justice) of the OFS,
and later succeeded Jan Brand as OFS president. His son, Deneys,
wrote in No Outspan how the Thirst-land Trek had come about:
     When the Transvaal republic was established in 1852 the Bapedi
refused to accept its jurisdiction, and when Secocoeni in 1875 became
their paramount chief he began to raid and harass the European
settlers.
Thomas Burgers was president at the time. He owed his position to the
fact that he had been a clergyman of the Dutch Reformed Church in the
Cape Colony and the Boers thought it would be a sort of fire insurance
to have as head one who stood under Divine guidance.
On assuming office he had acquired an uneasy inheritance. The Boers
of those days were rugged unbending Calvinists and when they found
that instead of the stern sectarian they had applied for they had saddled
themselves with a President who held a broad interpretation on religious
subjects, there was trouble. He was a Freemason, he traveled on the
Sabbath and he even attended dances when any were given in Pretoria.
His conduct was regarded with such horror that a large party of Boers
from the Western Transvaal abandoned their farms and trekked away
across the Kalahari desert rather than submit to so impious a ruler.
What was still worse, Secocoeni was marauding and looting from his
stronghold at Tjadi and to crown it all, the British Resident at Pretoria
intimated that this defiance was causing unrest among the Zulus in
Natal and that unless he was brought to book Her Majesty's
Government would be forced to annex the Transvaal.
Poor Thomas Burgers did not know which way to turn. He had found no
favor in the eyes of his people, his coffers were empty, discontent was
rife and he had no option but to take the field against the recalcitrant
chieftain. He could raise only eight or nine hundred men for most of the
Boers refused to serve under one whose dogma was suspect. Even
Paul Kruger made it known that he would not be answerable for an
expedition led by one of the ungodly and he stayed at home, so Burgers
took command in person and he led his half-hearted army against
Secocoeni. He found him down the Steelpoort valley and ordered an
attack. The men were lukewarm and the attack failed. Other attempts
were made, but Secocoeni held his own and after eight months of
desultory fighting the campaign was abandoned.
With difficulty the President extricated his force. The enterprise had cost
him dear, for the British government carried out its threat, and using the
unsuccessful issue as an excuse, troops entered Pretoria, the Queen's
sovereignty over the Transvaal was proclaimed, and the republic for the
time being ceased to exist.
Secocoeni, having defied the Boers and having helped to bring about
their downfall, now defied the British. Two punitive expeditions were
sent against him without success and it was not until 1879 that Sir
Garnett Wolseley marched in with a strong force of infantry and guns
and aided by five thousand Swazi levies he stormed Tjadi and captured
Secocoeni.
Now followed the (First) Boer War of 1881. Under leadership of Paul
Kruger and Piet Joubert, the Transvalers rose in arms against Great
Britain. They inflicted a succession of reverses on the troops sent
against them and after the disaster of Amajuba, peace was made and
Transvaal regained its independence. Paul Kruger was made President.
He respected Secocoeni for his courage, and finding him still a prisoner
he released and placed him at the head of the tribe once more. (4)

Deneys Reitz once went on an expedition to Namibia to find out what
had become of the Thirstland Trek survivors:
      They issued a statement that they were leaving the Transvaal
because they looked on President Burgers as the anti-Christ; he was a
freemason, he had been seen at dances, and he travelled on the
Sabbath; but the real propelling power was the old unconquered fever,
the wanderlust that had started them on their fateful path so many years
before. About three hundred families shook off the dust of the Transvaal
republic from their feet and in May 1874 set out on what was practically
a continuation of the Great Trek. The survivors and their descendants
are still to this day trekking somewhere in the interior of Africa. After four
years of dangers and hardships they had crossed the Kalahari desert
and the intervening wastes and what was left of them reached the
Kaokoveld in desperate condition. They had lost more than half their
number from thirst and disease, and word of their awful plight ultimately
filtered down to the Cape. (4)
Then he found some of them:
     As I sat cogitating on the front seat I saw smoke rising about a mile
ahead and walked tither to find out what it meant. Fortune had
unexpectedly smiled on me. Camped by a waterhole I found an old man
named Van der Merwe who, with his wife and son, were halted here with
their sheep and cattle. This was a lucky encounter without which I would
never have succeeded in entering the Kaokoveld. Van der Merwe senior
had actually been a member of the Thirstland Trek of 1874. He was a
youth of fourteen at the time and he gave me an absorbing account of
the trials and dangers they had endured in the Kalahari desert, the
'Great Thirst' (Groot Dors) as he called it. He witnessed many terrible
sights of men, women and children dying of thirst and of cattle licking
the wagon tyres because they gleamed like water. He had settled in the
Koakoveld with the other survivors and then trekked with them into
Angola. (4)

They founded a settlement in Namibia, but were chased off into Angola
by the Damara and Nama peoples. They remained nomads in Angola as
the Portuguese had attempted to convert them to Catholicism and would
only allow schooling in Portuguese, though some settled down. Some
returned to Namibia but their communities were unsuccessful. In 1928
the South African government settled the remnants of the Thirst-land
trekkers in Outjo in Namibia.




          Memorial amidst the ruins of a Thirst-land settlement in Namibia.
                     The pyramid masonry structure is ironic.

In 1876 Lord Carnarvon instructed Theophilus Shepstone, Native
Administrator in Natal to annex the ZAR with all of twenty-five British
troops. At that stage the state could no longer pay its civil servants. Land
pledged for public and private debt was largely unsaleable. On April 12,
1877 Shepstone proclaimed the Transvaal a British colony. Burgers
returned to the Cape Colony, but the rest of the executive, including
Kruger, kept their seats. Most civil servants took an oath of loyalty to the
new government. Shepstone promised self-rule and the use of Dutch as
a second official language.
British administrators reformed the chaotic finances and defective
administration. A separate Department of Native Affairs introduced a
uniform hut tax of ten shillings and clear pass regulations. (2)
                8. THE RISE OF AFRIKAANS

Afrikaners in general, and especially in the Boer republics, were not
renowned for being a very learned people. In the Cape Colony, the
education system was an English one. Attempts were made to create an
English colony, in terms of language usage, as well as culturally.
Afrikaners were not eager to learn the language, never-mind be
educated in it, but in the Cape Colony it was catching on, mostly for
pragmatic reasons. The Afrikaner majority in the Cape electorate meant
little in terms of the colony's “representative government”; in practice the
Cape was governed by the British governor and his London-nominated
executive. Afrikaners formed only a third of the representatives in the
Cape legislature. A canvasser in 1869 found that in his area, nine in ten
young Afrikaners had not bothered to register to vote. (2)
Afrikaners generally lagged behind their English-speaking counterparts
in terms of education levels. The reason for this has much to do with the
development of Afrikaans. Afrikaans developed from several influences
in the Cape colony, but is still very much a Germanic language, quite
close to Flemish. Because the regions in Europe where mutual
understanding with Afrikaans are the highest, tend to be areas
sandwiched between Dutch and French-speaking regions, it is thought
that the arrival of the Huguenots played an important part in the
development of the Afrikaans language.(21) Dutch and Afrikaans are
generally somewhat mutually understandable, and then more so in
written form.
Afrikaans was not a formal language though; for all formal and
administrative purposes Dutch was the language of use. Afrikaans was
a “spoken language” but not a “written language.” Many Afrikaners had
lost the ability to write in Dutch, and reading it was difficult. At the same
time they saw no point in acquiring fluency in the Dutch language.
The result was a literary dark ages for Afrikanerdom that lasted until
Afrikaans was formally recognized as Taal (language). In Transvaal only
8 per cent of white children of school-going age were at school in 1877
and in the OFS, 12 per cent. Paul Kruger's education was based on the
Bible, and there is reason to suspect he actually believed the earth was
flat.
Another group, finding themselves in a similar situation to Afrikaners,
was the Cape Malay community. Many of the Malay political prisoners
whom Holland had deported to the Cape, were schooled, both in terms
of the Islamic religion and literature, as well as being artisans. They
spoke Afrikaans and influenced its development in many ways. One
such way was being pioneers in writing the language. They simply
translated religious and cultural treasures into their new language.

Afrikaners, often finding themselves in frontier situations, had developed
some unique characteristics. Family on the farm was the center of
frontier life. People tended to marry early – Paul Kruger's mother
married at fifteen and died at twenty-seven after giving birth to seven
children. Family loyalties and obligations took precedence over other
commitments. Lack of land and fear of attacks by blacks often
compelled several related families to live on the same farm, forming an
extended family. The custom developed of people addressing each
other in familial terms such as “Oom”, “Tante” (“Tannie”), “Niggie” or
“Neef” (Uncle, Aunt (Auntie), Niece or Nephew), even if not related, but
the nuclear family remained the core of frontier life. (2) Afrikaners still use
“Oom” and “Tannie” to address older people. Apart from the church,
there was little institutional life outside the capitol that could foster
political integration. A traveler once wrote: 'They were a slow, quiet, well-
meaning people, extremely conservative, very sparing because they
have little ready money, very suspicious because afraid of being
outwitted by English traders.' (2)
    Few in numbers, frontier Afrikaners feared blacks, but not all blacks.
In her reminiscences of her youth as a young child with the Voortrekkers
in Natal, the wife of Commandant-general Piet Joubert told of the
trekker community's great fear of blacks after the massacres in Natal in
1838. For months the trekkers slept with their shoes on because they
feared a Zulu night attack. Yet she did not think that all blacks were
hostile. Almost in the same breath she mentioned a tribe who wished to
trade and wanted to work for the trekkers... The author of the principal
Afrikaans biography of Paul Kruger wrote that after his traumatic
experiences as a young boy in Natal, he 'learnt never to trust Africans.'
(Kruger, D.W., Paul Kruger, vol. 1, p.15) Yet in his own account he
ventured, unannounced and accompanied by only one burgher, into an
assembly of African chiefs at a time of hostilities on the far northern
frontier. 'without displaying the least distrust, I dismounted in their town,
and they all kept quiet. They greeted me with the words, “When it is
peace, it is peace; and when it is war, it is war”, which implied that my
arrival without escort showed them that my disposition towards them
was friendly, that I expected the same from them, and that therefore
they must keep the peace.' (Paul Kruger, The Memoirs of Paul Kruger,
NY: The Century, 1902, p.115) (2)
 By the beginning of the 1830s the ideology of free trade and progress
was becoming dominant in the British Empire and in the Cape Colony
as part of it. Based on the key belief that the application of rationality
and scientific examination would free mankind from the shackles of
tradition and superstition, it was essentially a secular religion. In the
Cape Colony it was the British settlers who embraced the gospel of
progress with the greatest fervor. A commitment to free enterprise and
free trade, along with proficiency in English, were considered essential
for any 'progressive' person. Once the Cape had been granted
representative rule in 1853, the idea of British non-racial democracy was
presented as an essential part of this secular religion. (2)

Christoffel Brand's De Zuid-Afrikaan wrote in 1835: 'It is an error that we
have frequently opposed, to suppose that as British subjects we are
compelled to adopt a British nationality. A colonist of Dutch descent
cannot become an Englishman, nor should he strive to be a Hollander.'
John Fairbairn and Thomas Pringle's The South African Commercial
Advertiser on the other hand, called for and end to 'national distinctions
and loyalties' and for the 'cordial and complete amalgamation of the
Dutch and English colonists which is so ... essential to the interests of
the well-being of both.' (2)
In 1821, Henry Ellis, deputy colonial secretary called for the
proclamation of English as the language of government. The next year
the government announced that over the following five years English
was to be phased in as the only language permitted in the courts and
government offices. Free government schools offered education through
the medium of English alone. Afrikaner parents, eager to have their
children learn English, but resisting the displacement of Dutch, called for
schools offering bilingual education. (2)
Some well-educated colonial Afrikaners were in the process of being
anglicized. Henry Cloete declared in 1831: 'The Cape Dutch were
essentially English. Their habits, their intermarriage, their general
improvements, all exhibit and prove this fact.' (1,2)
Others sought to promote Cape Afrikaner identity, and in 1832 was
founded the Maatschappy ter Uitbreiding van Beskawing en
Letterkunde, an Afrikaner cultural organization, which began preparing a
history of the settlement. Cape professionals who were not willing to
accept a denigration of their cultural standing and history, included
lawyers like Christoffel Brand, D.F. Berrangé, Daniël Denyssen, J.H.
Neethling and Johannes de Wet, the Reverends Van Oosterzee and Van
der Lingen, and the surveyor W.F. Hertzog. (2)
Lord Charles Somerset called on the Cape clergy, half of whom were
Scots, though able to speak Dutch, to use English in the church, since
proficiency in English would benefit the youth who had hopes on
employment in the government and administration. The DRC found any
pressure to anglicise unacceptable. The synod refused a request by the
Scottish clergy to offer some of their services in English. Christoffel
Brand's De Zuid-Afrikaan wrote in 1834: 'Members of the Synod consult
ancient history to persuade yourselves that to change the language of
your religion you would be taking the first step to betray your belief and
religion.' (a reference to the experiences of the Israelites in Babylon.)
During the 1830s and 1840s the Rev. G.W.A. Van der Lingen of the
Paarl DRC parish almost single-handedly held the fort against the British
gospel of progress and anglicization.(2) He was widely read with a huge
collection of books – a quarter of the books held by the South African
library at the time (as well as a collection of some thirty thousand high-
quality cigars.) (2)




                    Gottlieb Wilhelm Anthonie van der Lingen
                 (“A true Afrikaner”, A.W.J. Pretorius called him.)

Van der Lingen was everything the stereotype-conservative calls for:
He believed secularization had destroyed the glory of the seventeenth
century Dutch Empire, which no British achievement could hope to rival.
He considered European civilization as superior to the savagery of
'Africans'. He was strongly outspoken against liberal theologians, and he
considered the major external dangers, the democratic spirit, marked by
the revolutions that flared up in Europe in 1848 (22), and materialistic
British imperialism. During the 1860s, he and his Paarl followers
launched a campaign against trains running on Sundays. The campaign
was almost successful, but he overplayed his hand, arguing for a
complete boycott of trains until the unequivocal subjugation of the
colony to the value system of the Reformed faith. The struggle of Van
der Lingen and his Paarl conservative followers against progress had
now become an object of derision. (2)

In 1865 English became the only medium for instruction in government
schools. At least 70 per cent of Afrikaners in the Cape Colony during the
1860s could not understand English. The few top schools attended by
children of the white elite became bastions of English cultural influence
– Diocesan College (1849, Cape Town), St Andrews (1856,
Grahamstown), Grey Institute (1856, Port Elizabeth) and Stellenbosch
Gymnasium (1866), but even in small towns English and Scottish
teachers attempted to enforce English medium. Afrikaner children were
fined for speaking Dutch and taught to act in the way of British ladies
and gentlemen. (2)
Van der Lingen, at considerable personal expense, established the Paarl
Gymnasium in 1857 as a Dutch-medium private school under church
control. It was the only school in the Cape Colony that stood
unequivocally for Cape Dutch culture and language, and for the
Reformed religion. It was a harbinger of what later would be called
Christian-National education.

M.E. Rothman (p.169) wrote of British domination in her hometown of
Swellendam: 'Of all the groups of people the following were English or
Scottish: all the shopkeepers except two ... the most senior shop
assistants, the magistrate, the doctor, the postmaster, the attorneys, all
the teachers except a few assistants, later also the bank manager and
his clerks and the few policemen... Barry and Nephews controlled the
biggest commercial concern in the town and district. The Anglican and
Wesleyan ministers were English, and the Dutch Reformed minister, in
the person of Dr Robertson, was also British.' (2)
She noted with resentment how the English-speaking Victorians would
use social etiquette and other ways to demonstrate their superiority as a
nation and as a class. To them, rural Afrikaners were ignorant,
superstitious and conservative. They were hospitable, but notorious for
their heavy use of coffee and brandy and the men's incessant chewing
of tobacco, and their refusal to 'improve' themselves. The English writer
Olive Schreiner (sister of Cape PM William Schreiner), upon reflecting
on her early years spent living among Afrikaners in the Karoo, wrote how
as a girl she thought it was 'not quite just of God to make us so much
better than all the other nations.' She remembered how it would have
been absolutely impossible for her to eat sugar that had been touched
by a Boer child or to sleep between sheets a Dutchman had slept
between. (2)

The Cape Argus newspaper expressed a militant cultural imperialism
and had no sympathy for those who bemoaned the loss of Dutch in the
colony. It called Afrikaans 'a miserable bastard jargon' not worthy of
being called a language.
Christoffel Brand's De Zuid-Afrikaan conceded that the Dutch nationality
in the colony was bound to disappear completely, but looked towards the
possibility of a composite 'nationality' from the fusion of the two white
groups, rather than having the English nationality absorb the Dutch one.
In this sense, De Zuid-Afrikaan sometimes used the term “Afrikaner” in a
way that sought to include white English-speaking countrymen. The
paper committed itself to resist the eclipse of the Dutch heritage and
denounced those who in order to present themselves as 'civilized'
abandon their 'ancestral language, morals, outlook; their own nationality
and eventually also, their own religion.' (2)

As a student of theology in the Netherlands, Van der Lingen had been
shocked by the state of the Christian religion, largely brought about by a
liberal theology that set great store on rationality and advocated the
critical questioning of the Bible, particularly the orthodoxy on original sin
and the biblical miracles. Equally horrified by the predominance of liberal
theology in the Netherlands were Andrew and John Murray (the sons of
Andrew, senior), N.J. Hofmeyr, the leading proponent of missionary work
and J.H. Neethling. In a key speech at the 1857 synod, N.J. Hofmeyr
pleaded for a local seminary to keep young candidates from the Cape
from the 'pernicious sphere of influence' of theological schools in the
Netherlands which denied the divine nature of Christ and the Holy Spirit.
Dr A.N.E. Changuion who had founded an institute for the promotion of
liberal theology in Cape Town, and regularly shared his liberal views in
De Zuid-Afrikaan, predictably campaigned against a local seminary. He
wrote of the danger that it would turn out 'reactionary theologians, semi-
enlightened people and semi-civilized members of society.' (2)
The support for a local seminary was overwhelming though. At its
inauguration in 1859, the synodal moderator P.E. Faure made it clear
that it would be expected to teach the 'true Reformed, Christian religion.'
Two members of the orthodox party, John Murray and N.J. Hofmeyr,
became the first professors. Van der Lingen was offered a chair, but he
withdrew after his proposal that the seminary be sited in the
conservative heartland of Paarl was turned down in favor of
Stellenbosch, which offered the imposing drostdy building as a campus.
His proposal that the professors be obliged to speak Dutch, both in class
and at home, was narrowly defeated, but the synod decided that a
proper study of the Dutch language and culture would be an essential
part of the syllabus.
An outraged Argus reacted: 'It was intended only to foster by such
means a spirit of spurious nationality, calculated to produce the most
mischievous results in the minds of unthinking persons who may be
weak enough to be led away by such a delusion.' (2)




          Theological seminary of the Dutch Reformed Church (23)

The establishment of the theological seminary in Stellenbosch led to
Stellenbosh becoming home to a complex of Afrikaans academic
institutions: The Rhenish Girls' School (1860), Paul Roos Gymnasium
(1866), Bloemhof Girls' School (1875), and Stellenbosch College
(Victoria College) became Stellenbosch University.

     There is no evidence that the liberals in the church were more
tolerant than the conservatives on racial matters. Both groups accepted
or accommodated themselves to the de facto racial division, but did not
turn it into a principle. The Volksvriend, founded to express the
conservative view, declared in 1865 that there was no reason to deny
the son of any black man access to any educational institution if the
father could pay his son's way. (Jan H. Hofmeyr Autobiography, Cape
Town, 1913, pp 85-91) Since few could do so, this was not much more
than a refusal to make an issue out of race or color. (2)

The liberals considered the battle far from over though. They now turned
to the courts to establish a foothold in the Reformed Church. Their first
attack was to cry foul that Reformed churches in the Boer republics were
included in the membership of the Cape synod. Those members were
largely staunchly orthodox. The Supreme Court ruled that the
representatives from parishes outside the colony's borders had to be
excluded from the Cape synod. This greatly strengthened the liberals'
position in the Cape synod. The second prong of the attack was against
the “guardians” inside the churches. Reformed church councils tended
to have an oligarchical structure. Although it was already an established
Reformed Church principle that lay members had a say in the election of
church councils, liberals clamored for free elections for church councils
and a liberal church member sought government intervention. The
government refused to intervene. In 1864 the synod suspended two
liberal ministers for heresy, J.J. Kotzé and Thomas François Burgers
(the later disastrous ZAR president.) They appealed to the courts and
their cases were referred to the Privy Council in London, which ruled in
their favor. They were reinstated in the synod membership. The liberals
were not yet finished. Their next target was state subsidies for churches
while the state had little control in the affairs of the churches. Thomas
Burgers wrote an open letter to Andrew Murray that there was never 'a
more anomalous claim than this demand for state support but without
state control ... You want to serve one Lord, but receive wages from
two.' The church in the end lost its government grant, not due to the
efforts of the liberals, but Saul Solomon, a Congregationalist who
successfully fought church grants in Parliament. Solomon came from a
Jewish family and was a member of the Congregational Church; greatly
influenced by Rev. Dr John Philip. His main issue (he was a very
outspoken MP) with state aid to churches, was that it discriminated
against other religions. (In 1849 he subscribed to a fund to establish the
first synagogue in the Cape and in 1856 helped to bring from England,
Rabbi Joel Rabinowitz.) (24, 25)
The future of the DRC would henceforth rest with the number of
Afrikaner members who could make a contribution to its coffers.
The liberal theologians advanced their ideas through Onderzoeker
(“Investigator”) a monthly theological journal, and a widely read
newspaper, De Volksblad. De Zuid-Afrikaan tried to uphold a neutral
stance but tended to veer towards the liberal side.
Hofmeyr and fellow conservatives established De Volksvriend, as a
'religious and social paper' but it was deadly dull (2). It seemed headed
for failure when Prof N.J. Hofmeyr, at the end of 1862 appointed a
nephew, Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, then only seventeen years old, as editor.
He turned the journal around, created a lively and lucid style, improved
news coverage, championed the orthodox issue and raised issues like
Dutch culture and nationality.(2) He took over De Zuid Afrikaan in 1871
and in 1880 would assume leadership of the Afrikaner Bond, the first
Afrikaner political organization.

Andrew Murray personified a pronounced evangelical movement in the
Cape Colony. Traditionally the Calvinist doctrine emphasized the
sovereignty of God who intervened in all matters, and a covenant
theology which included the practice of infant baptism. Emphasis on
rituals (baptism, confirmation and Communion) seemed to affirm
membership of an ethnic rather than a confessional group.
Evangelicalism stressed, in addition to orthodoxy, also a 'vital religion of
the heart', central elements of which were conversion, divine atonement
and the winning of souls for the Kingdom of God. (2)
The 1860s saw the Great Revival sweeping the western Cape, led by
DRC Reverend Andrew Murray, son of the Scottish-born minister. On
some occasions the revival was accompanied by extreme emotional
outpourings, sometimes bordering on hysteria, which many mature
Evangelical and Charismatic churches are still cautious about. In the
town of Worcester for instance, some ex-slave women gave expression
to outbursts of great emotion. Murray tried to restrain them by saying,
'God is a God of order, but this is disorder', but he later supported it as a
positive development. In Paarl, even Van der Lingen fell down in a
trance during celebration of Pentecost.
The fervor generated a newfound enthusiasm for missionary work,
which in the western Cape would soon give rise to efforts to make the
Bible available in a language that was simpler than Dutch, which many
Afrikaans speakers struggled to fully comprehend. This would be the
initial impetus behind the first Afrikaans language movement.

Afrikaners were slowly starting to organize on the ground. During the
1869 election campaign it was reported: 'On the hustings and at some of
the meetings men of position and ability stated amid the applause of
their hearers that they or their candidates were Afrikanders.'
(McCracken, The Cape Parliament, p.109)(2) Afrikaner farmers formed
boereverenigings (farmers' societies) to push for protection of colonial
products and to promote farming interests. English-speaking farmers
tended to form their own associations.
Afrikaner farmers were experiencing many of the pangs of a newly
introduced free market economy. All vestiges of protection of Cape
wines had been removed from the London market. Cape wines had to
compete on equal terms with countries like France. As a result, Cape
wine exports fell more than 80 per cent between 1863 and 1875. In
1860, the Supreme Court raised the historic ceiling of 6 % interest on
mortgages and financial transactions. Farmers increasingly found
themselves in vassalage to profit-driven banks exporting dividends to
London, while numerous local banks, many based on Afrikaner capital
had failed. Most prominent among the new 'imperial banks' based in
London, now dealing directly with farmers, was Standard Bank, which
rapidly increased its footprint in the colony. In times of recession,
imperial banks called up their credit, causing a chain reaction that
bankrupted many farmers. Strong resentment developed against the
'imperial banks'. Until the 1870s the interests of Afrikaner wine and
wheat farmers, and merchants (either British or European Jews), largely
converged, with the merchants marketing the farmers' products both
locally and abroad. Relations soured when the merchants started to
import increasing quantities of wine, spirits and wheat. Farmers began to
wish for local protection like import tariffs. No one seemed to have their
interests in mind. Since the opening up of the diamond fields the colony
had undergone dramatic economic growth and broadening. (2)
Gordon Sprigg became prime minister of the Cape Colony in February
1878. An avowed imperialist who championed 'British supremacy in
Africa',(2) Sprigg formed a cabinet with not a single Afrikaner or western
Cape politician. To cover the cost of new railways and colonial
intervention in a war between Xhosa factions, the Sprigg cabinet
decided to impose a tax on brandy producers; almost all western Cape
farmers. Ignoring their protests, Sprigg steamrollered the bill through
Parliament. Jan Hofmeyr of De Zuid-Afrikaan recommended
parliamentary action and formed the Zuid-afrikaansche Boeren
Beskermings Vereeniging (BBV) to appose the excise law. The BBV was
reasonably successful and Hofmeyr (“Onze Jan”) won the important
Stellenbosch parliamentary seat in 1879, where-after members'
enthusiasm waned. Cecil John Rhodes considered Jan Hofmeyr the
most capable politician in South Africa. He was nicknamed 'The Mole' for
his preference to avoid the limelight and apply his political skills behind
the scenes. (2)

Stephanus Jacobus du Toit, called 'SJ', attended the Paarl Gymnasium,
the Dutch-medium school founded by Van der Lingen. Du Toit was an
admirer of Abraham Kuyper, the great Dutch neo-Calvinist thinker whom
he had met on an 1880 visit to the Netherlands. They remained in close
contact until Du Toit had a fall-out with him, as he had with almost
everyone. Du Toit studied at the theological seminary at Stellenbosch
and became involved in the leadership struggle that followed after Van
der Lingen's death. Du Toit's supporters were pitted against a faction
that wanted to do away with Van der Lingen's legacy. They wanted a
modern dominee, and do away with Dutch-medium private Paarl
Gymnasium. Du Toit formed his own conservative Northern Paarl DRC
parish. Its members included an extraordinary number of poor people,
mostly coloreds. Against this humble backdrop SJ Du Toit would become
the driving force behind the first Afrikaans language movement that
spanned the years 1875–1890. (2)

Johannes Brill, a Dutch educationist in Bloemfontein noted that the
'Zuid-Afrikaansche taal [Afrikaans]' was 'the unofficial language that was
not written but spoken from Cape Town to deep in the interior of South
Africa.' A German traveller, Henry Lichtenstein spoke of an 'abbreviated
forcible Afrikaans Dutch' spoken by the children of German immigrants.
In the 1860s and 1870s Afrikaans appeared in newspapers often in
poems (ditties) with the intention of achieving a humorous effect. The
first serious editorial in Afrikaans was by Louis Henri Meurant in Het
Cradocksche Nieuwsblad, about cessation of the eastern Cape from the
western Cape. Meurant knew that many eastern Cape farmers
understood Afrikaans better than Dutch. Some status-conscious
Afrikaners in towns and cities, seeking to win acceptance in a society
dominated by English-speakers, were embarrassed by Afrikaans.
According to J.H.H. De Waal, they disdained it as an impoverished
dialect, degenerate Dutch, an incomprehensible Creole tongue, a
'Hotnotstaal' (Hotnot is a derogatory term derived from Hottentot) without
any future. Other, more reasonable Afrikaners like Chief Justice Lord
John Henry de Villiers, felt that Afrikaans was too poor in vocabulary and
structure, primitive in accuracy of meaning and incapable of expressing
ideas connected with higher spheres of thought. De Villiers felt
Afrikaners' energies would be better spent embracing the richness of the
English language.
In the early 1870s Dutch immigrant Arnoldus Pannevis proposed in De
Zuid-Afrikaan that the Bible be translated and printed in Afrikaans,
primarily for the sake of the great mass of illiterate or semi-literate
colored people. Another Dutch immigrant, Casper Peter Hoogenhout,
argued an Afrikaans Bible would also help many whites 'who did not half
understand Dutch.' De Kerkbode, voice of the DRC, noted such
proposals but argued the solution was better education to make children
proficient in Dutch.
    In 1874 S.J. Du Toit entered the debate in De Zuid-Afrikaan under the
name 'Ware [True] Afrikaander', and took the debate to a new level of
sophistication. A mother tongue, he said, was a person's most precious
possession. 'The language of a nation expresses the character of that
nation. Deprive a nation of the vehicle of its thoughts and you deprive it
of the wisdom of its forefathers.' He deplored the great damage done to
Afrikaner colonists by the policy of English as the sole official language.
In an obvious dig at Andrew Murray and his allies, he criticized the DRC
hierarchy for allowing 'unnecessary' English sermons and for promoting
English in the schools it had founded. He refuted the argument that
Afrikaans could not be considered a proper language since it
supposedly lacked a grammatical structure and was composed of
different linguistic elements. He also denied that Afrikaans was the
language of the colored people; instead, the 'Hottentots had abandoned
their language and had adopted ours.' Afrikaans was a white man's
tongue, 'a pure Germanic language', one of purity, simplicity, brevity and
vigor. Afrikaners must be taught that Afrikaans was their mother tongue,
and that their duty was to develop Afrikaans as a [national language],
along with Dutch. In a subsequent exchange of letters in De Zuid-
Afrikaan, Du Toit formulated one of the main spelling rules of the
language: 'We write as we speak.' (2)

Arnoldus Pannevis continued to push for an Afrikaans translation of the
Bible. In a letter to the British and Foreign Bible Society, he suggested
SJ Du Toit as translator. He noted in his letter that the English and Dutch
Bible were incomprehensible to many in the Cape Colony. An official of
the Society subsequently contacted Du Toit. Du Toit called together a
task group for this purpose. They met at the house of Gideon Malherbe,
the son-in-law of Van der Lingen. The group founded an organization
called the GRA (Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners; Society of True
Afrikaners.) Six of the eight founders were younger than thirty, including
Du Toit, and six of the founders were members of Du Toit's Northern
Paarl congregation.(2) They concluded that the time was not ripe for a
Bible translation and informed Rev. Morgan of the Society. They agreed
though, on an urgent need to persuade Afrikaans-speaking white people
of the importance of Afrikaans in their national life and to see
themselves as a distinct community, called Afrikaners.
The GRA launched the first Afrikaans newspaper, Di Afrikaanse Patriot,
its first issue appearing on 15 January 1876, under the editorial alias
“Oom Lokomotief”. Circulation began at fifty copies and stood at 3 700 in
the early 1880s, surpassing De Zuid-Afrikaan. SJ Du Toit, it seems, had
turned the original agenda of a Bible that simple white and colored
people could read, into a movement that promoted Afrikaner nationality.
It would appear that he had dishonored the original agreement with
Arnoldus Pannevis, and misused a religious need for advancement of a
nationalist agenda. Nonetheless, Pannevis supported what he was
doing. In fact, Pannevis wrote that it was not sufficient to write and read
'Hottentot Afrikaans'; the time had come to discover how the 'civilized
part of our people' speaks Afrikaans, and having established that, to
formulate rules for the language. He was referring to the dialect spoken
by Afrikaners in the western and eastern Cape as opposed to the
“Hottentots Hollands” dialect. His letter was probably part of a game-
plan to address certain perceptions of Afrikaans as an unsophisticated
and uncultured language. Clearly the Afrikaans Bible remained on the
horizon as a primary motive. But who would sponsor a translation of the
Bible in a lingo that its own speakers had not yet properly established?
Bible translation was after all an exact science; it was a meticulous
process that would take years to accomplish, and publication would
require serious financial commitment from sponsors who demanded a
thoroughly professional end-product. Du Toit was open about his
nationalist passion from the start, and Pannevis was well aware of this
when he suggested Du Toit for the Bible project. Du Toit kept to his
word, although it was his son, the famous Afrikaans poet Totius, who
would complete the enormous task of an Afrikaans translation of the
Bible.




                  Stephanus Jacobus (“SJ”) du Toit (1847-1911)

To cultivate a feeling of nationality, Du Toit tried to counter the great
emphasis on British history in schools. In 1877, with Du Toit as the main
author, a nationalist history in Afrikaans, called, Die Geskiedenis van
ons Land in die Taal van ons Volk (The History of our Land in the
Language of our People) which sketched the history of the colonial
Afrikaners in heroic terms: 'They were oppressed throughout their
history, it said, but nevertheless they remained true to their Christian
faith and lived honorable lives. It called the executed Slagtersnek rebels
(p.21) martyrs, and painted the role of the British government and 'the
English' invariably in a negative light. Other publications of the GRA
included Eerste Beginsels van die Afrikaanse Taal (First Principles of the
Afrikaans Language), an anthology of Afrikaans poetry and a picture
book for children, a work particularly close to Du Toit's heart. Du Toit also
felt very strongly about Christian-National education, that was strongly
propagated by neo-Calvinists like Abraham Kuyper in the Netherlands.
Du Toit took up the issue in an 1876 pamphlet, in which he protested
against the colony's education system which after 1865 was almost
completely secular. He believed that parents had the right to insist that
their children receive religious instruction and be taught national history
of which they themselves approved. (2)

Jan Hofmeyr, editor of De Zuid-Afrikaan, had aided Di Afrikaanse Patriot
in its start-up phase, arranging for publication of the first issues and
printing Du Toit's version of Afrikaner history, but wrote in 1876 that 'the
men of Patriot were waging a hopeless battle.' De Zuid-Afrikaan,
representing the upper-class Afrikaner, still felt Du Toit was on Van der
Lingen's anti-progress path leading nowhere.
In the Boer republics Patriot was a hit. The Free State newspaper, The
Friend, wrote of Patriot : 'It is not only the lowly bywoners [poor
Afrikaners living in workers' quarters on farms] who read it, but also the
civilized people among us.' When Theophilus Shepstone annexed the
ZAR in 1877, interest in the paper quickened among Afrikaners, most of
whom rejected the annexation. (2)
SJ Du Toit now made a succession of bold moves that can only be
called: “Seizing the initiative” to raise a powerful anti-Imperialist
sentiment. In 1880, in the face of the annexation of the ZAR, Patriot
pushed for active resistance. Some Transvaal leaders would later claim
this had been a decisive spur for them to take up arms. An unimpressed
Cape synod called for condemnation of the paper. Du Toit had begun to
wage his own nationalist war, criticizing the church for encouraging
submission to the colonial and imperial government, English in schools
and the new emphasis on revivalism. When the Cape synod formally
denounced Patriot, its sales only increased. Then, the ZAR revolt
achieved a series of military victories over British forces, culminating in a
decisive victory at Majuba on 27 February 1881. Cape Afrikaners now
united in solidarity with their brothers in arms in the Transvaal; the revolt
became a struggle that affected everyone 'with a true Afrikaans spirit.'
Jan Hofmeyr of De Zuid-Afrikaan said the struggle filled Cape
Afrikaners, 'otherwise groveling in the mud of materialism, with a
national glow of sympathy for their brothers in the Transvaal.' (2)

Jan Hofmeyr supported Dutch culture, but also supported capitalism, a
system largely supported by English-speakers. SJ Du Toit showed signs
of both nationalist and populist (protesting against the concentration of
capital (2)) responses to modernity. In an editorial on 20 June 1879, he
proposed the formation of a public organization, an Afrikaner Bond
with the slogan 'Afrika voor de Afrikaners'. Du Toit explained the aim of
the organization was to stand for more than 'Afrikaners with Afrikaner
hearts' as the GRA had done. It would be an organization in which 'any
Afrikaner can feel at home and work together for the good of a united
South Africa', a body in which 'no nationality divides us from each other,
but in which everyone who recognizes Africa as his Fatherland can live
together and work as brothers of a single house, be they of English,
Dutch, French or German origin.' It would be the aim of the Bond to
withstand 'the sacrifice of Africa's interests to England and those of the
Farmer to the Merchant.' Trade and industry had to be developed to
benefit the land, 'not to fill the pockets of speculators' and the money
'must not be dominated by English banks.' The editorial also demanded
equal recognition for Dutch as public language and protested the large
sums spent on education for English-speakers. (2)
SJ Du Toit's Patriot targeted Standard Bank which repatriated a large
part of its dividend to its London office, accusing it of conspiring to bring
about the collapse of numerous small banks. It called Standard Bank a
'gigantic devil fish', and called for amalgamation of the local banks and
eviction of Standard Bank, as was done in the Free State in the mid-
1860s. The paper also suggested that Afrikaner boerewinkels (co-
operative stores) be founded in every town and called it a duty of 'every
true Afrikaner not to spend a copper at an Englishman's shop if he can
avoid it.'
Jan Hofmeyr on the other hand wanted an organization that would unite
Afrikaner and English farmers, and would benefit both the farmers and
the merchants. He was keen to attract well-educated Afrikaners; at the
same time Hofmeyr was careful not to alienate the church or English
population. (2)
    Hofmeyr cared about the culture of the colonial Afrikaners but did not
want to elevate it to a divisive issue. He identified with the Afrikaners in
the Boer republics and would on occasion stress that 'blood was thicker
than water', but he also wanted the colonial Afrikaners to be loyal to the
Empire and the Colony, though at the same time, he saw no need to
glorify the Empire. He defined the commitment of colonial Afrikaners to
the Empire in purely pragmatic and material terms. Cape Afrikaners
were 'as loyal British subjects as any other people' but were not
prepared to become Englishmen. (2)
In a 1878 editorial, Hofmeyr's De Zuid-Afrikaan declared that the (Cape)
Afrikaners did not want 'republican freedom, equality and fraternity.' If
aggrieved, they would be happy to send a petition to the Queen.
SJ Du Toit was becoming increasingly radical, pushing the anti-liberal,
neo-Calvinist line of Abraham Kuyper. In February 1882 Du Toit left the
Cape to become head of the education department of the ZAR. Du Toit
declared that the Afrikaner Bond had found its roots on Majuba. The
Boer had become “self-aware.” (28)

At a Bond congress held in Cradock, Jan Hofmeyr who had become a
member of the Bond, told the audience a united South Africa would only
come about after a 'sane feeling of nationality had developed.' The two
white groups did not require a common language to bind them in such a
nationality, but mutual respect between the two groups and their ability
to act as a cohesive force.
After a congress in Richmond, the Bond of SJ Du Toit amalgamated with
Hofmeyr's BBV. Jan Hofmeyr managed to become head of the Bond,
and would henceforth define the Afrikaner Bond. Hofmeyr's inclusive
Afrikaner definition now became the “Afrikaner” in the constitution of the
Bond: 'The Bond knows no nationality at all except that of the Afrikaners
and regard as belonging thereto anyone, of whatever origin, who strives
for the welfare of South Africa.' Hofmeyr envisaged a new composite
nationality that recognized each-others language, culture, education and
religion. Unlike the secretive GRA, the Afrikaner Bond was an open
political party. Colored votes were welcomed but political membership
not encouraged.
In 1882 Hofmeyr won the right for Dutch to be used in Parliament; in
1883 knowledge of Dutch became compulsory for some civil servants
and became a compulsory subject for civil service applicants in 1887. It
was also permitted in the higher courts since 1884. In his parliamentary
career Jan Hofmeyr, affectionately known as “Onze Jan”, fought for the
wine and wheat farmers and the financial and legal professionals in
towns. His agenda included protective tariffs, attracting foreign
investment for the sake of infrastructure development, opening markets
for Cape wine and brandy, control over labor and higher franchise
qualifications. He supported secular education but did not oppose
Christian-National education; instead convincing Parliament to introduce
legislation that left the decision over religious instruction to the discretion
of the school committees. (2)
The Afrikaner Bond in the second half of the 1880s held half the seats in
the Cape Parliament, but Hofmeyr would not form a government and
refused to become Prime Minister, for fear that holding office would
cause divisions in his own camp and upset English speakers. In 1887
the Afrikaner Bond still expressed their undivided loyalty in an address
to Queen Victoria.
In the ZAR, SJ Du Toit was behaving in a pattern contrary to his
character. It seems likely that he had been trapped into investing in a
dud gold speculation venture. He went bankrupt as a result. It would not
be the first time an elaborate plot was arranged against him. (29)
As Paul Kruger's representative dealing with land disputes, he rashly
annexed disputed territory to the ZAR, causing great embarrassment for
the republic. He also failed the ZAR in his post as superintendent of
education. His disillusionment (discouragement) with Afrikaner
nationalism grew as his relationship with President Kruger cooled.
He returned to the Cape in 1890 embroiled in personal feuds and
nourishing a bitter resentment of Kruger.(2) Out of the blue he favored
unification of the states in South Africa under British protection and
became loyal to Arch-imperialist Cecil John Rhodes. It is likely that he
was receiving financial assistance from Rhodes. (2)
As a result his relationship broke down with his brother D.F. Du Toit and
C.P. Hoogenhout, co-founders of the GRA and Patriot.
By the 1890s Oom Lokomotief was running low on steam. The novelty of
the Afrikaans Patriot was wearing off, in part because it printed
everything the public sent in and its content was becoming repetitious,
and the ultra-phonetic spelling they used emphasized the western Cape
dialect of the movement's founders. Du Toit's fundamentalist approach
did not help, nor did the secret meetings of the GRA. (Membership was
secret and members signed an oath to keep till death, the secrets of the
GRA.) But the major reason it seems for the demise of the movement,
was Du Toit's association with the betrayers of the ZAR. (29) Jan Hofmeyr
irrevocably broke with SJ du Toit after the Jameson raid. (2)
Hofmeyr supported the establishment in 1890 of the Zuidafrikaanse
Taalbond (ZA Language Society) which committed itself to promoting the
volkstaal and awakening of a developed feeling of nationality. With 48
votes to 37, the Taalbond opted for High Dutch rather than Afrikaans as
volkstaal. It hoped to revitalize Dutch by simplifying its spelling. But
Dutch was dying in South Africa with fewer people able to speak it. Paul
Kruger, in a visit to Rotterdam in 1884 as part of a Transvaal delegation,
switched over during a speech from using his broken Dutch to Afrikaans.
A Dutch report noted the difference: in his own language the speech was
'lively, glowing and spirited.'

By the end of the nineteenth century the future of Afrikaans did not look
rosy. English politicians like Cape Prime Minister Cecil John Rhodes
lauded loyal Cape Afrikaners, who loved to display their proficiency in
English. Many young Cape Afrikaners considered it progressive to speak
English; informal correspondence, even between lovers, was in English
and it was fashionable to give children, especially daughters, English
names.
Jan Hofmeyr's Afrikaner Bond had a working relationship with Rhodes
before a sheep farmers revolt over disease control methods, and the
Jameson Raid wrecked it, and SJ du Toit was more-or-less sorted.
Even Paarl Gymnasium felt compelled to accept government support,
forfeiting its status as private Dutch-medium non-secular school. (2)
   The British had given up attempting to murder Dutch as a language
and were willing to allow the Afrikaners to commit the foul deed
themselves. Nor were they disappointed. Considering English the
symbol and measure of success, a growing number of the Afrikaner elite
used English, even in the privacy of their homes. It was with some
despair that Hofmeyr in 1890 cried: 'Do not ask for rights in Parliament
and school which you do not wish to have in your home. The language
question is a matter of life and death. Despise your language and you
despise your nationality.' (2)
      9. THE FIRST WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE
                    (1880-1881)

In 1867 diamonds were discovered in the Northern Cape, in West-
Griqualand, on the western borders of the Transvaal and Free State.
Overnight, speculators flocked to the region from all over the world. The
town of Kimberly was founded and it boasted a population of 50 000
within five years. British imperialists became interested, and in the
1870s Britain annexed West-Griqualand.
In 1875, British Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, approached the
OFS and ZAR about the possibility of a federation with the Cape and
Natal colonies to be modeled after the 1867 federation of the English
and French-speaking provinces in Canada. The Boers turned down the
request, not trusting British intentions. In 1877 Theophilus Shepstone
annexed the ZAR. (p.73) Paul Kruger went to London twice as a
member of a three-man delegation to persuade the British government
to permit a referendum on Shepstone's claim that the majority in the
Transvaal favored annexation.
In 1877 Sir Bartle Frere was sent to the Cape Colony as governor and
high commissioner, with instructions to unite the two colonies, the two
Boer republics and native states in South Africa into a Confederation. (31)
He agreed with Shepstone's arguments that the strong Zulu army
Cetshwayo had been building up, and his alliances with other tribes,
were a threat to general security. Shepstone was previously Native
Affairs Secretary in Natal and the Zulus had him nervous for some time.
Also nervous was the Transvaal, who would be happy if the British
would address the threats from both the Zulus and Sekhukuni's Pedi
tribe. Gold and diamond speculators were increasingly flocking to the
Transvaal following some initial discoveries there. They were also
frequently being raided by Pedi tribesmen and petitioned Shepstone for
British protection. In December 1878, Frere presented Cetshwayo with
an ultimatum to disband the Zulu army and to accept a British resident.
Cetshwayo did not want to lose his throne and played for time. On
January 11, 1879 the British army under Lieutenant-General Lord
Chelmsford invaded Zululand with 7 000 regular troops,7 000 black
'levees' and 1000 white volunteers from the colonies. (7)
On the morning of January 22, 1879, scouts from one of the three
columns almost ran into a Zulu army of 20 000 impis. They charged
back to the column to warn them. The Zulu attackers were on their way.
Most of the black 'levees' fled back to Natal when they saw the masses
of oncoming Zulu, leaving the column with about one thousand soldiers
of the 24th Regiment of Foot, and some Natal Carbineers. At the Battle of
Isandlwana that ensued, the column was wiped out, the British losing
1 600 men. A second Zulu attack at the military outpost at Rorke's Drift
was fought off. By July 1879 the British had taken the Zulu capitol
Ulundi. Sir Garnett Wolseley also defeated the Pedi in 1879. (pp.71-72)

On December 13, 1880 at a meeting at Paardekraal, a resolution was
adopted by the Boer leadership to restore the independence of the ZAR
under the triumvirate of Paul Kruger, Piet Joubert and M.W. Pretorius.
First shots were exchanged in Potchefstroom when General Piet Cronje
attempted to print a proclamation announcing the restoration of the
republic.
Major-General Sir George Pomeroy Colley, newly arrived governor for
the eastern part of South Africa, was taken by surprise when Transvaal
Administrator, Sir Owen Lanyon requested reinforcements. British
garrisons were besieged at Potchefstroom, Pretoria, Lydenburg,
Rustenburg and Marabastad and reinforcements were forced to dig in at
Standerton. On December 20th, the 94th Irish Regiment under Colonel
Anstruther was ambushed with heavy casualties at Bronkhorstspruit by
the commando of Commandant Franc Joubert. Meanwhile, General Piet
Joubert occupied Laing's Neck, the passage between Transvaal and
Natal, and Paul Kruger set up a temporary capitol at Heidelberg. The
Boers were excellent marksmen, used to firing from cover due to their
dependance on hunting. Most were armed with single shot breech
loading rifles like the Martini Henry.
General George Pomeroy Colley led a force of 1 200 soldiers of the 58 th
Regiment, 3rd Batallion, the 60th Rifles, the Mounted Squadron, a party of
Navy sailors and four artillery pieces against Piet Joubert's 2 000
entrenched Boers at Laing's Neck. The foot soldiers of the 58 th Regiment
advanced with difficulty over the broken terrain and saw heavy
casualties inflicted by Boer snipers; the cavalry charged a hill, only to be
picked off by Boer snipers entrenched on an opposing slope.
Boers moved to intercept the remainder of the 58 th advancing up Table
Mountain. Their retreat was covered by two companies of the 60 th Rifles.
The Boers also attacked the Naval Brigade near Mount Prospect but
were kept back by heavy return fire.
The British lost 84 killed, including some high ranking officers, 113
wounded and two captured. Boer losses were 14 killed and 27
wounded. At the Ingogo River-crossing, Boer forces attacked a British
mail convoy, a major line of communication, with losses of 139 British
troops and officers.
Paul Kruger sued for peace, but Colley attempting to outflank the Boers,
ascended Majuba Hill during a night march with 360 men, probably with
the intention of scoring a victory that would allow Britain to negotiate
from a position of strength. They were spotted by the Boers who
immediately started scaling the hill on two sides, making maximum use
of natural cover afforded by the terrain. Colley was hit above the left eye
by a sniper and felled with his revolver still clutched in his hand, leading
some to believe he had committed suicide. British losses on Majuba
were 100 killed, 134 wounded and 60 prisoners. The Boers suffered only
three dead and five wounded.
The sieges of the British garrisons throughout the Transvaal generally
saw few casualties, except at Potchefstroom where twenty-four British
soldiers were killed and seventeen in Pretoria, as a result of attempts to
raid the Boer positions.

The British government of William Gladstone ordered a truce, and took a
conciliatory stance towards the ZAR, not wanting to get bogged down in
a protracted and costly war. On March 23, 1881 an agreement was
reached (the Pretoria Convention) of self-government for the ZAR with
nominal British oversight (suzerainty), specifically pertaining to African
and native matters. (31)




      (32) General Piet Joubert, pivotal figure in the First War of Independence.
    During the Second, he would find his Christian principles in conflict with his role
                              as military commander.
          10. THE BOER REPUBLICS – PART II

The period immediately following the First War for Independence, saw a
surge in republican sentiment in the ZAR. Kruger saw the Battle of
Blood River of 1838 and the vow made before the battle, as symbolic of
the will of the Transvaal burghers to survive as an independent people
against overwhelming odds.(2) The commemoration of the battle
became a grand political and religious occasion. A festival at the end of
1881 at Paardekraal drew a crowd of twelve to fifteen thousand people.
Similar festivals followed every three years, with Kruger's speeches,
emphasizing a link between national and Christian identity, marking the
climax. (2)
When Kruger was elected president in 1883, he led a delegation to
London, where Abraham Kuyper, leader of the neo-Calvinist movement
in the Netherlands, joined them as adviser, to re-negotiate the terms of
the Pretoria Convention with Britain. They secured some major new
terms through the London Convention. Transvaal again became entitled
to call its state the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek. A resident in Pretoria
would no longer have the final say in 'native affairs' of the state. The
reference to British suzerainty was removed, although Kruger agreed to
the ZAR not entering into treaties with other countries without British
permission. This clause meant that, like the Orange Free State, the ZAR
was technically not free from British control under international law.
During the 1890s some British politicians argued the clause offered
grounds for Britain's right to intervene in the ZAR's internal affairs. (2)

The Boers were again represented by an elected Volksraad (People's
Council). Kruger said that the Volksraad 'represents the volk; if the voice
of the majority is not heeded, the State becomes impure.'
    Kruger, President of the ZAR (1883-1900) and Jan Brand, President
of the OFS (1864-1888), could prevail over their Volksraad by virtue of
their strong personalities and great political acumen. (2)
Kruger tended to meddle in the affairs of the otherwise independent
courts of law, though this was not foreign to the traditional role of the
Boer leaders as arbitrators. In this sense, Kruger tended to capture the
popular imagination as a Biblical type figure. The story was told of two
brothers who inherited their father's farm. The will specified the farm was
to be divided precisely in half; the elder brother acting as executor. He
divided the farm in such a way however, that he would receive the best
grazing and water, while his brother would receive largely in-arable
parts. The younger brother seeked the council of the wise Kruger. He
heard the case on his porch and, after a few contemplating puffs from
his pipe, turned towards the elder brother and asked: “Did you divide the
land in two as your father had specified in his will?” “Yes Oom, I did”, the
brother answered. Whereupon Kruger turned towards the younger
brother: “Your brother said he divided the land as your father had asked
him to do. Now, it is your turn. Choose your half.”

The ZAR Volksraad introduced a conservative Christian-based, Dutch-
medium education system. To Kruger, the Bible was 'the foundation for
educating children at school ... it [was] the foundation for everything.' (2)
From 1882 the state would only give grants to schools if Dutch was the
medium of instruction, and in 1895 opposed attempts to increase the
amount of English taught in state schools. Kruger held that 'every
attempt to expand education in English will help towards the destruction
of the landstaal (ZAR's official language).' (2)
In 1884, following the successful re-negotiations in London, Kruger had
addressed a crowd, estimated at 100 000, in Amsterdam to strengthen
ties and invite Dutch immigration to the ZAR. He told the crowd: 'We
have kept our own language, the language of the Netherlands people ...
Our people in the wilderness have kept their language and their faith
through every storm. Our whole struggle is bound up in this.' In
response, between five thousand and six thousand Dutch immigrants
came to the ZAR over the following fifteen years. They greatly
strengthened the state's administrative capability and civil service. There
were some initial tensions as Dutch immigrants competed for posts with
educated Transvaal burghers, and some were considered arrogant. The
newspaper Land en Volk persistently attacked undue Dutch influence in
the administration. (2)

Kruger believed in stable relations with African tribes, and preferred
negotiated settlements to war. An example of these relations was his
relationship with Magato (Mokgatle Thethe) of the Bafokeng tribe. Since
1837 when the Voortrekkers had freed the Bafokeng from the tyranny of
the warmongering Mzilikazi, relations between the two groups had been
good, except for a brief time during the First War for Independence,
when Magato displayed loyalty towards Britain. When the Netherlands
offered the Transvaal a scholarship program for four bright students to
study in the Netherlands, Kruger selected: Nicolaas Smit, son of General
Nicolaas Smit, hero of Amajuba, Sarel Eloff, a grandson of Kruger, and
Bloemhof and Paul Magato, two sons that Magato had preferred to take
over his rule. The move created conflict among the Bafokeng people, as
the populist and first-in-line for the throne, Tumagolê had been
overlooked by his father. Tumagolê would not accept the Christian faith
and his father had considered him a scoundrel and a troublemaker.
Under custody of a supervisor from Kruger's Dopper church, Rev.
Leendert van der Valk, the Magato brothers were schooled in Tswana
(their native language), Sotho, English and Dutch as well as religious
studies. They were subsequently sent for university training in the
Netherlands, Paul Magato in missionary work and Christian education,
and Bloemhof Magato in carpentry, wagon-making and draughting.
On the successful completion of their studies they returned to their tribe,
but the tribe demanded Tumagolê as leader over the Christianized
Bloemhof. The ZAR's commissioner of native affairs instructed the tribe
to settle the conflict through an election. Tumagolê won, and the
brothers left with some followers.(9) In 2006 the Bafokeng tribe listed
their appreciable resources on the JSE as the investment and holdings
company Royal Bafokeng Holdings (Pty) Ltd. (JSE: RBH). (27)
While some Transvaal burghers opposed native reserves, which housed
a considerable portion of the black population of Transvaal, considering
tribalism a threat to their republic, Kruger argued for tribes willing to live
in peace to have their own land so that they would not feel oppressed,
asking the simple question: 'Was it fair and Christian to drive them off
their land?' (36, 2)
Many blacks in the republics made their living on farms by
sharecropping, where they worked farmers' land, turning a portion of the
yield over to the farmer. Blacks preferred sharecropping to wage labor
as it gave them considerable freedom and an opportunity to acquire
large herds of cattle. Also working the farms, were poor Afrikaner
tenants called bywoners. They mostly only managed to sustain their own
families, and farm owners (both individuals and companies) increasingly
preferred the more productive sharecroppers over bywoners. Fearing
encroachment and displacement of bywoners, the ZAR government
attempted to limit sharecroppers to five families per farm, but with little
success. (2)

Kruger had accepted a plan for industrialization for the predominantly
agrarian ZAR. It gave exclusive rights with protective tariffs to individuals
and companies, to produce articles like liquor, soap, bricks, leather and
dynamite. The plan was not tailored to the unexpected rapid economic
expansion of a major gold industry.
Before 1886, gold speculators had been congregating in the northern
Transvaal towns of Baberton and Pilgrim's Rest after some significant
gold discoveries there. But in 1886 the mother load of the Witwatersrand
reef on the central high veld of the Transvaal was discovered. The first
find was reputedly made by an Australian speculator, George Harrison,
who sold his claim for less than ten pounds, not realizing the
significance of his find. An international gold rush followed, backed by
large scale investment, particularly from Britain. By the end of the
century the Witwatersrand mines were producing a quarter of the world's
gold. In the early 1890s the industry was employing more than 100 000
men. Johannesburg had a white population of 50 000, of which a mere
6 000 were Afrikaners. The great majority of the rest were British. The
capitol of Pretoria was completely overshadowed by Johannesburg,
one of the most dynamic and volatile places in the world. (2)
     The gold mines drew avaricious moneymen, schemers, and criminals
along with miners, white and black. There was a virtual explosion of
industrial enterprise. At the top of Johannesburg's social pyramid were
the mining house magnates, the so-called Randlords, and at the bottom,
the flotsam and jetsam. In the city there were nearly three hundred bars,
almost all with back premises that catered to commercial sex. The
streets teemed with with diggers, prostitutes, gamblers, saloonkeepers,
washerwomen and domestic servants. (Charles van Onselen, Studies in
the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914;
London: Longman, 1982.) (2)
By the end of the century, foreign monopolies owned between thirty and
fifty percent of the land in the Transvaal. They preferred black labor, and
black migrant workers' crowded compounds sprang up around the cities.
Poor Afrikaners migrated in a steady stream to Johannesburg to take
jobs as brickmakers, transport riders, etc. Kruger set aside the suburb of
Vrededorp for them.
After a visit to the ZAR, the young Cape lawyer Jan Smuts, wrote that
the economic revolution was undermining the old farming and burgher
community in a more dangerous way than English supremacy itself was
capable of. President M.T. Steyn (OFS president from 1896 to 1902)
commented that the struggle to survive had become fiercer: 'Capitalism
had appeared in South Africa, the enemy of labor had slung its octopus
legs over all forms of labor.' (2)
Kruger did not trust the Uitlanders ('Outlanders' or aliens) who were
streaming into the republic. He considered them as a fifth column lying
in wait for the first opportunity to overthrow the state.
Kruger was resented by those frustrated by his economic and political
policies, which focused on protecting the interests of the ZAR burghers.
     Kruger soon acquired strong enemies and aroused dismay in the
Cape Colony, which he shut off from the booming market. The mining
industry, intent on holding down costs, complained vociferously about
the high railway rates, the price of dynamite, corruption, and the scarcity
of African labor, all of which were estimated to cost the mining industry
more than £2 million a year. Kruger's proclivity for giving concessions
and posts to incompetent family, friends and supporters made matters
worse. (2)

The ZAR managed remarkably well though with the great urban influx. It
devised an efficient local administration for Johannesburg and other
towns. There were no restrictions on foreign investments in the republic,
and a low tax of five percent on declared profits, and an efficient mining
code was enacted. Within two years 44 mines produced a gold output of
£1.3 million and after ten years output increased to £32 million. The ZAR
used its gold revenue to build infrastructure and linked Johannesburg to
ports. Enough food reached Johannesburg to feed the burgeoning
population. After 1895 Kruger made impressive progress with
administrative reform, including strengthening the administration with
Dutch immigrants. By 1897, out of 1 958 ZAR civil servants, 306 were
Dutch immigrants, 478 were from the Cape and 682 from the Transvaal.
(2)
The principle Opposition in the ZAR Volksraad, commanding about a
third of the electorate in both houses, were the Progressives, under
leadership of Piet Joubert and including Louis Botha, J.H. (Koos) De la
Rey, Carl Jeppe, Ewald Esselen and Schalk Burger. (It is surprising to
find religious conservatives like Commandant-general Piet Joubert and
Koos De la Rey as prominent leaders of this group.) They urged more
rapid modernization of the republic, attacked maladministration,
corruption, the conservative educational system and Kruger's
parochialism. Piet Joubert is said to have favored a South African
confederacy with self-ruling provinces under English protection. In the
1893 presidential election, Kruger defeated the popular Joubert only
narrowly. (2)

To prevent the Uitlanders from winning power through the ballot box, the
Kruger government in 1890 extended the franchise qualification period
from one year to fourteen years and created a separate legislative
council to represent Uitlander interests. In the franchise issue, the
Uitlanders had now found a unifying focus for their frustrations, and
Imperialists again had a target to make into a cause for British integrity.
The Progressives called for a lowering of the franchise qualifications,
believing the Uitlander demand for the franchise was only a bluff.
Ludwig Krause, a Cambridge graduate, believed that only those 'who
really meant to join the Republic and to stand by it would have availed
themselves of the privilege [to take up citizenship]; no loyal Englishman
would have renounced his Queen and country [in order to vote].'
Kruger refused to budge on the issue. He saw 30 000 enfranchised
burghers pitted against 60 000 to 70 000 'newcomers' (including
immigrants from the Cape and Natal) that could potentially vote if all
requirements were waived. (2)
      Bold reform of both the severe franchise qualification and a
concession on the price of dynamite would have eased much of the
agitation against the ZAR. But Kruger obstinately refused to change his
position until it was too late. Jan Smuts noted at Kruger's death that 'he
typified the Boer character both in its brighter and darker aspects.' (2)
     Kruger's reluctance to reform the franchise became the pretext for
British aggression, led by Camberlain and Milner. But they wanted war
not so much because Kruger was obstinate and blocked modern
development, but because he was flexible and pragmatic on most
issues and was succeeding in modernizing the ZAR. Left alone, the
ZAR would soon dominate South Africa. This was a prospect that Milner
had to prevent even if it meant war. (2)

Andrew Murray believed in the concept of liberal imperialism, stressing
the common, non-racial rights of all British citizens, including the right to
democratic government. It promoted social and industrial progress,
offered the protection of the British fleet, whilst interfering little with
colonies' affairs; while English missionaries spread Christianity. These
“ties that did not chafe” benignly bound South Africa to Britain. Liberal
idealism was the redeeming face of British Empire. In an anguished
open letter just before the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War in 1899,
Andrew Murray, then moderator of the Cape synod of the DRC, would
implore Britain, the 'the noblest, the most Christian nation in the world'
not to go to war against the republics. He would appeal to those liberal
values he believed in – the fervent belief in Britain as one of the most
benign forces in the world; working for order, liberalization,
modernization and the rehabilitation of subject peoples.(2) (After the war
Murray would increasingly identify with Afrikanerdom.) His appeals went
unanswered, for the other face of British imperialism was aggressive,
authoritarian and condescending towards other cultures. It emphasized
the autocratic values of hierarchy, obedience and order, and sanctioned
ruthless aggression on their behalf. (2) Such Anglo-supremacism was
called jingoism. Chief exponents of jingoism in South African relations
were Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary in the Unionist
government that came to power in Britain in June 1895, and Lord Alfred
Milner, High Commissioner for South Africa from 1897-1905. Lord Milner
believed in British racial superiority. He called himself a 'British Race
Patriot', tied by 'common blood, a common language, common history
and traditions.' He considered the bond to be 'deeper, stronger, more
primordial than maternal ties.' He described the 'true jingo' as being one
who believes in 'limited [British] expansion but unlimited tenacity.' His
phrase 'damn the consequences' made it into an edition of the Oxford
Dictionary of Quotations. On one occasion, he admitted, that when he
thought of the great service Britain had rendered to humanity, he
touched his hat 'with confirmed reverence to the Union Jack.' (2)
Cecil John Rhodes was, he confessed, an out-and-out jingo, when he
came to South Africa in 1870 at the age of seventeen. Ten years later,
at twenty-seven, he had amassed a fortune in the diamond fields of
Kimberley. At twenty-eight he was elected to the Cape Parliament as a
member for the Barkly West constituency of the newly annexed
Griqualand West. At thirty-seven he founded De Beers Consolidated,
which controlled 90 percent of South Africa's diamonds and the bulk of
the world's output. A little more than ten years later he would become
the dominant figure in Consolidated Gold Fields, one of the largest gold
mining companies in Johannesburg, as well as the British South African
Company, with a royal charter for developing the land north of the
Limpopo River, which was to become Ian Smith's Rhodesia, and later
Zimbabwe. Rhodes developed a sub-imperialism whereby the Cape
Colony would be semi-autonomous in ruling itself and colonizing new
territories to bring about a federation in Africa under the British flag.
Rhodes began to rally the Cape Afrikaners behind this cause. The
Afrikaner Bond was a natural ally. They already saw the Afrikaner's
future within the British imperial system of trade and finance, and would
accept the idea of a South African federation under British control. (2)




                             Cecil John Rhodes
Rhodes courted the affection of Cape Afrikaners through a hitherto
unrivaled charm-offensive. He generally respected Cape Afrikaners as a
people and appreciated their Cape Dutch culture. He openly spoke of
his admiration for Cape Dutch architecture and furniture, and
commissioned the design of a mansion in Cape Dutch style, with the
Dutch name Groote Schuur.
    In the placid atmosphere of Cape Town Rhodes set out to woo
Hofmeyr and the Afrikaner Bond with all the skill of a confident suitor,
with an almost irresistible mix of dynamism, power, humility and
charisma. (2)
Rhodes began referring to himself as an Afrikaner, in line with the
inclusive Bond definition.
    Soon the pro-Rhodes editor of the Cape Times, the brilliant Edmund
Garrnett, used the term 'John Bull Afrikander' in asserting that Britain
and Rhodes in particular were acting in the interests of South Africa as a
whole. Jan Smuts later described the spell that Rhodes wove over the
colonial Afrikaners between the mid-1880s and mid 1890s: 'He had
become the national idol of the Dutch Afrikanders. The Dutch are
perhaps a suspicious people, but when they do come to put their trust in
a man ... then the trust becomes almost absolute and religious; such
was their faith in Rhodes.' (2)
Rhodes followed a strategy that would allow the convergence of his own
policies with that of the Afrikaner Bond. He backed the Bond's demand
for the official recognition of Dutch, its opposition to Sunday trains, and
its insistence on introducing religious instruction in state schools. He
helped to get the brandy tax repealed, supported protection of Cape
wheat and wine from cheap imports, a limit on compulsory dipping of
sheep to control scab pest (some Afrikaner farmers were paranoid that
petty government officials were making regulations to gain control over
their farms; others had religious objections to the practice.) Rhodes also
supported the exclusion of traditional Africans from the franchise.(He
fought the 'blanket vote' which allowed communal land ownership of
tribes to qualify their members for voting.)
One has to wonder how things might have turned out for the Afrikaner,
had the Boer republics, and Kruger in particular, been less stubborn.
De Zuid-Afrikaan had openly criticized his stubbornness, noting that the
Transvaal needed someone more competent than Kruger at the helm.
The Bond wanted to see the Boer republics join the colonies in the
imperial system of free trade and finance. The Bond did however feel a
strong solidarity with the republics. Hofmeyr wrote to William Gladstone
that the Cape Afrikaners were 'connected to the Boers of the Transvaal
by the ties of descent, language, religion and – for many of us – of inter-
marriage and friendship; we feel that their wrongs are our wrongs and
services rendered to them are services rendered to us.' (2)

When the First Boer War drew to a close in 1881, the entire area to the
west of the two republics was under British authority. Griqualand-West
had been annexed prior to the war, and to its north the land was the
British protectorate of Bechuanaland. In a small pocket of
Bechuanaland, on the disputed western border of the Transvaal, a chief
favored by Britain, Mankoroane of the Batlapin tribe (a Tswana tribe) and
Montisoa, were at war over grazing land with Moshette, aided by the !-
Koranna Khoe, an armed and mounted Khoikhoi-Griqua tribe. Various
white mercenaries sided with both protagonists. Some Boer and English
mercenaries joined the !Koranna after their leader, David Massouw
(David Mossweu) had promised them land in exchange for their effort.
To circumvent a Transvaal proclamation forbidding its citizens to be
involved in native wars, the mercenaries from the Transvaal had given
up their ZAR citizenship. Mankoroane was beaten and the ZAR stepped
in to broker a treaty whereby the mercenaries received a large part of
his land. On 26 July 1882, the white settlers declared their land an
independent republic named Stellaland (Stellar land) after a comet that
was visible in the sky at the time, and a neighboring republic named
Goshen. On 6 August 1883, Stellaland and Goshen united to form the
United States of Stellaland. Many white immigrants, both Boers and
English, moved to the new republic. It was home to some 38 000
people, 5 000 of which were of European origin. The republic
announced a tax levy on all trade going through its territory.




                           Location of Stellaland.
It lay inside a major British trade route, the Great Road to the North and
threatened Rhodes' mining industry. The British also feared that the ZAR
might annex the republic in an effort to circumvent the Pretoria
Convention (and the 1884 London Convention) that prohibited Boer
expansionism. The small republic was torn by internal conflict, between
whites and between white settlers and native tribes. Montsioa asked the
ZAR for protection. On 10 September 1884, the ZAR annexed the
republic under SJ du Toit, now Commissioner entrusted with the
Western Border. Du Toit had not realized that Montsioa was already
under British suzerainty. (36)
In December 1884 a British force under Sir Charles Warren invaded the
area and abolished the republic. It was subsequently included into
British Bechuanaland.(33) Kruger's main concern was establishing order
and security on the Transvaal's western border, and he was prepared to
abandon territorial expansion to the west. (2) Meanwhile, David Massouw
had become a voluntary vassal of the ZAR. For unclear reasons he
refused to pay tax and assumed, in Kruger's words, ''a very threatening
attitude”, and raided cattle in the area. In a clash in December 1885 with
a Boer-commando and artillery under General Piet Joubert, David
Massouw was killed along with many !Koranna at their capitol, Mamusa
Hill. Also killed were fourteen ZAR commando members, including a
Captain Schweizer and a Field-Cornet Reneke, in whose honor the town
Schweizer-Reneke was named. (34, 36, 66)

In 1884 Germany proclaimed a protectorate over South West Africa. The
possibility of the ZAR linking up with the German territory was not far-
fetched.
In the early 1880s when the Boer republics had wanted to form a
customs union, the Cape rejected the plan. Political and economic
power had however shifted in Kruger's favor after the gold boom, and
now the Cape was very eager to form a customs union that would join
the colonies and republics in an economic union. A customs union would
be the first vital step for a united South Africa under the British flag, with
the Cape as senior member. Kruger realized this, and rejected a
customs union and imposed heavy duties on Cape goods. He also
blocked the extension of railway lines into the Transvaal before the
completion of the railway line linking the ZAR with Delagoa Bay.

Kruger called on Cape Afrikaners to support the ZAR as the
representative of a pure Afrikaner spirit. But Hofmeyr considered
Kruger's rejection of a customs union a mistake. In 1887 Hofmeyr and
three fellow Cape Bondsmen informed Kruger that their own attachment
'to the cause of our Transvaal brothers' had cooled, and warned that
once 'a division arises between kinsfolk, one cannot foresee where it will
end, and the Africander cause is far from being strong enough to be able
to face division between the Transvaal and Colonial sons of the soil.'
The ZAR was growing more powerful economically and in 1890 Kruger
announced a claim to Swaziland, which lay between the ZAR, Delagoa
Bay (to the east) and Natal (to the South). Hofmeyr traveled to Pretoria
to tell Kruger he could not claim Swaziland without joining the existing
customs union. An irate Kruger thundered at him in public: 'You are a
traitor, a traitor to the Africander cause!' (2) The ZAR stayed out of the
trade union that was formed, and annexed Swaziland anyway. (37)
In 1890 Rhodes became prime minister of the Cape Colony with the aid
of the Bond. Succumbing to Rhodes' blandishments that expansion
was an Afrikaner as well as a British imperial project, De Zuid-Afrikaan
wrote in 1890: 'Under the British flag and with the help of the British
capital we are marching to the north.' (2) By the end of 1893, a force of
Rhodes' British South African Company (BSA) had occupied large parts
of Rhodesia (Mashonaland and Matabeleland). Britain had now
effectively encircled the economically powerful ZAR. Still the ZAR
refused to join a customs or railway union. In 1894 it completed the
Delagoa Line and immediately diverted most of its foreign trade away
from the Cape. To add to British chagrin, Germany backed Kruger's
rejection of the customs union. (2)

Rhodes now embarked on a reckless gamble to overthrow the ZAR.
High-ranking British officials who shared in his plot, or had prior
knowledge of it, included Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary in
Lord Salisbury's cabinet, Sir Graham Bower, Imperial Secretary in Cape
Town and Sir Hercules Robinson, High Commissioner in Cape Town.
On December 29th, 1895, Leander Starr Jameson led some five hundred
men from the private army of the BSA on an invasion of the ZAR, intent
on sparking an Uitlander rebellion on the Witwatersrand. The rebellion
would serve as a pretext for the British High Commissioner in Cape
Town to intervene and proclaim British sovereignty over the Transvaal.
The plan failed and the raiders were quickly rounded up. The scandal
led to Rhodes' resignation as Colonial Prime Minister and ended his
friendship with Hofmeyr, who all along had made it clear that he would
not tolerate any aggression against the republics.
    The Jameson Raid revealed that Rhodes, the man Hofmeyr had
promoted as a genuine ally of Afrikaners, had, and in a cold and
calculating way, deceived them. Even the conservative establishment in
Britain was embarrassed. Openly contemptuous of it, Rudyard Kipling,
bard of the jingoes, wrote his famous poem 'If' to defend Chamberlain,
widely suspected of complicity in the Jameson Raid. (2)
F.S. Malan, who was to become a leading liberal leader of the next
century, wrote as editor of the widely read Cape Dutch newspaper, Ons
Land : 'Once again one writes our history with blood. The monster of
jingoism has again shown its abhorrent face. The affairs of South Africa
are again arranged from Downing Street.' (2)
Rhodes showed no remorse over the Raid and re-entered politics as a
supporter of the Progressive government headed by Sir Gordon Sprigg.
The Bond found help from an unexpected quarters. Cape Liberals, like
John X. Merriman and Jacobus W. Sauer who had previously opposed
the Bond over its 'native policy', helped it to win the 1898 election by
narrowly defeating Rhodes' Progressives. The new prime minister was
William Schreiner, who criticized the Sprigg government for not showing
'any sympathy or conciliatory approach' to 'the sister republic [ZAR].'

In 1895 Kruger turned seventy. Certain that Britain would soon embark
on further acts of aggression, he began to arm the ZAR. In the Orange
Free State, Jan Brand's successor, F.W. Reitz, resigned the Free State
Presidency in 1896 due to ill-health. He was succeeded by M.T. Steyn.
When he recovered, he took up the post as Kruger's Secretary of State
in the ZAR. Some years later his son, Deneys Reitz, would reminisce of
those days:
  Our small country [OFS] was a model one. There were no political
parties, nor, until after the Jameson Raid of 1895, was there any bad
blood between the Dutch and the English... in our quiet way we were a
contended community, isolated hundreds of miles from the seaboard ...
(4)
    For the next two years [since moving to the ZAR] diplomatic relations
with Great Britain ran downhill and even in our classrooms we talked of
little else than the approaching conflict. (4)
Martinus Theunis Steyn was the first Free State born burgher to take up
the OFS-Presidency. He was a member of the Bloemfontein-elite, well-
to-do influential families who, like their counterparts among the Colonial
Afrikaners, spoke mostly English up until the Jameson Raid. He married
the English-speaking Tibbie Fraser. Steyn studied Law in the
Netherlands, but, struggling too much with the Dutch language,
completed his training in London at the Inner Temple. Deneys Reitz
described him as 'not brilliant, but possessed of a dogged courage.'
The OFS fit in neatly between the colonial Cape and the republican
Transvaal. It was aligned politically with the ZAR, yet culturally more in
tune with the Cape. Steyn sought not to alienate English-speakers, even
after the Jameson Raid. Yet he set in motion steps to make Dutch the
language of the Administration and pressurized schools to switch to
Dutch-medium education. Steyn had initially pressed for franchise-
reform in the ZAR, considering the fourteen-year franchise qualification
'in conflict with republican and democratic principles.' But from 1898 he
was convinced that British demands for franchise-reform in the ZAR was
a pretext. He considered Chamberlain's “suzerainty” a hollow concept
concocted by the British to seize control of the ZAR. Steyn told Kruger
he would go to war if Britain proved to be using the franchise as an
excuse to destroy the independence of the republics. In 1897 the ZAR
and OFS concluded a treaty pledging mutual assistance in case of war.
Britain warned the OFS shortly before the outbreak of the war to remain
neutral. Steyn told the Volksraad that he would rather lose the
independence of the Free State 'with honor than to to so in dishonour
and disloyalty.' (2)
At the outbreak of war, the two republics would fight together as one,
joined by six thousand Cape Afrikaners actively rebelling against Britain
amidst unthinkable oppression. The man who would most strengthen the
resolve of the Cape Afrikaners, would be Boer-General Jan Smuts.
Jan Smuts was born in the western Cape and studied at the Victoria
College in Stellenbosch. The studied law at Cambridge University and
was a top-class student. Smuts came from a Bond-supporting home and
came up for Rhodes in 1895 in his first political speech. In 1898 he gave
up his British citizenship and became State Attorney of the ZAR. Kruger
considered him as a 'man of iron will', destined to play a great role in
South Africa's future.
    Among Afrikaners the nickname 'Slim Jannie' stuck. The name meant
a mixture of being clever, smart, cunning, devious and persuasive. He
was undoubtedly the shrewdest white South African politician of the
twentieth century. (2)
        11. THE ANGLO-BOER WAR (1899-1902)

          PART I – THE CAPE COLONY FRONT

Lord Milner took it upon himself to increase British pressure on the ZAR
over the franchise issue. Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain was
more cautious so soon after the Jameson Raid. Milner struck up an
alliance with some of the gold magnates and mobilized the Uitlanders to
press their demands. He challenged Cape Afrikaners to choose sides
between Britain or Kruger. Britain would have thought twice if there
were a real prospect that the Cape Afrikaners would rise massively in
revolt. But the Cape Afrikaners were immobilized by their own multiple
identities. (2)
Milner entered into an informal secret alliance with the biggest gold
magnates, Alfred Beit – who had financed the Jameson Raid – and
Julius Wernher; Germans who had become naturalized British citizens.
They believed that through firm action Kruger could be weakened or
removed, making for a more efficient gold industry. Deep-level mining
that predominated on the Rand, entailed considerable investments to
cover production costs. These interests had little patience with Kruger's
industrial policy, and with his government's failure to implement the
recommendations of its own Industrial Commission to abolish
monopolies. Wernher said the magnates 'were quite prepared for war',
and that 'the situation must be terminated now.' Milner worked closely
with the magnates to create the impression in London that Kruger would
eventually buckle under diplomatic and military pressure and concede all
the franchise demands. Although they knew that the republics would
fight, the message they sent out was one that Rhodes also spread:
'Kruger will bluff up to the cannon's mouth.' (2)

In May 1899 M.T. Steyn hosted a meeting in Bloemfontein between
Kruger and Milner. Kruger was accompanied by Jan Smuts. Both Smuts
and Steyn felt that Milner was not negotiating in good faith and not
interested in the huge concessions Kruger was willing to make. Kruger
offered to reduce the fourteen-year bar to a seven-year residence
qualification with certain conditions. Miner insisted on a five-year
franchise which had to be immediately implemented retro-actively(!)
With tears running down his cheeks, Kruger exclaimed: 'It is our country
you want!' The later-writer John Buchan who was part of Milner's
entourage, described the encounter: 'There was a gnarled magnificence
in the old Transvaal President, but [Milner] saw only a snuffy,
mendacious savage.'
Eastern Cape-born W.P. Schreiner was prime minister of the Cape
Colony since the disbandment of the Rhodes cabinet. His cabinet
included moderates like John X. Merriman and J.W. Sauer. Schreiner
and Jan Hofmeyr had been invited to attend the Bloemfontein
Conference, but both succumbed to pressure from Milner to decline.




      Lord Alfred Milner, British High Commissioner and Cape Colonial Governor
                 between 1897 and 1899. Post-war Governor to 1905.

The Schreiner government intended to send a notice to London that it
would not under any circumstances condone British intervention in the
affairs of the Transvaal. They dropped the idea however for fear that
Milner would invite the Progressives, who staunchly supported him, to
form a new government.
In Britain, Lord Salisbury's government felt pressurized to go to war. It
came to power on the basis of being super-patriots and jingoes, but
were put off by the financial constraints of war in a distant corner of the
world. Jingoist newspapers like The Times, were continually taunting the
government to put its money were its mouth was. Salisbury made it
clear, '[We], not the Dutch, are Boss.' Even Henry Campbell-
Bannerman, liberal leader of the opposition, would not rule out war as a
means to address denial of the vote to British Uitlanders. George
Bernard Shaw described the Boers as being 'a small community of
frontiersmen totally unfitted to control the mineral assets of South Africa.'
Joseph Chamberlain explained what was at stake: 'the position of Great
Britain in South Africa and with it the estimate formed of our power and
influence in our colonies and throughout the world.' (2)
   This was the reason why early in September the cabinet agreed to a
request, engineered by Milner, from the colony of Natal to send ten
thousand imperial troops to defend it against an invasion by republican
forces. (2) Salisbury stated: 'We have to act upon a moral field prepared
for us by Milner and his Jingo supporters.'
It was the Boers that eventually issued the ultimatum, hoping on a quick
succession of spectacular victories before the main body of British
troops arrived, and in the process triggering an uprising of Cape
Afrikaners. The Boer forces numbered around 54 000, while Britain had
only 27 000 troops, most of them stationed at the Cape, when the war
broke out.

Sympathy for the Boer-cause was widespread in Europe and Russia.
Even in Britain amongst liberal circles arose a sizeable pro-Boer lobby.
Active support was offered by volunteers and mercenaries from across
Europe, although the republics paid no compensation, and only supplied
rations, horses, weapons and ammunition to foreign volunteers.
Their numbers included: 2 000 Dutch, 550 Germans, 400 French, 300
Americans, 250 Italians, 225 Russians, 200 Irish, 150 Scandinavians,
100 Polish and an unknown number of Australians. Kruger insisted that
the Irish volunteers take up ZAR citizenship as they would be executed
as traitors to the Crown if they fell into British hands. The Australian
Colonel Arthur Lynch almost met with such a fate, but, following a
widespread outcry, was released after a year in military prison and
pardoned in 1907 by King Edward VII. The foreigners at first operated as
separate commandos or legions, but after disaster had struck the
Scandinavians and the French, the foreign volunteers were placed
under command of General De la Rey. (38)
The Russian tzar and Sweden also supplied field ambulances and the
German military trained the ZAR artillery.
Other assistance came from African laborers employed as grave
diggers, and agterryers (“rear riders”), unarmed servants who tended the
horses and did the cooking.

First shots were fired on October 12 th, 1899 after Britain rejected the
Boer ultimatum. The 50 000 – 60 000 strong Boer forces fought on two
fronts: to the west and southwest of the republics inside the Cape
Colony and Cape Midlands, and to the southeast in Natal. British
reinforcements by sea were arriving almost daily at Cape Town and Port
Natal (Durban). British troop strength peaked at a quarter-million at one
stage. By wars-end Britain would have committed half-a-million Imperial
troops and £230 million to this war.
28 November 1899 on the western front saw the Battle of Twee Riviere
(Battle of Modder River) after initial battles at Graspan and Belmont.
General De la Rey instructed his forces to dig in at a distance of 50-100
meters from the river bank rather than on the hillsides to the rear where
he believed they would make easy targets for British artillery. The
combined force of General De la Rey and General Piet Cronjé were
3 500 - 4 000, with six Krupp guns and four pom-pom machine guns,
facing 10 000 British troops under Lord Methuen with three batteries of
artillery and four twelve-pound naval guns.
Methuen marched for the hills where he expected to find the Boer
entrenchments. His troops were exposed in the open when the two
groups engaged. In the ten-hour shoot-out that followed, the British lost
70 dead and 413 wounded to the Boers losing 16 dead, 66 wounded
and 13 captive. De la Rey's son, Adriaan was one of those killed.
December, 10th saw fighting in the Stormberg region in the Cape
Midlands towards the south of the Free State border. Major General
William Forbes Gatacre lost some ninety men killed or wounded and
over six hundred captured after they had become isolated around the
Kissiesberg area.
The next battle on the western front was fought on December 11 th, as
Lord Methuen's troops moved to lift the siege of Kimberley. Cecil John
Rhodes was among the civilians besieged in the town. They ran into
General De la Rey's line at Magersfontein. Again, De la Rey had
prepared well-concealed trenches in front of the hills rather than on the
slopes where he expected they would make an easy target for British
artillery. President Steyn had paid a visit to the trenches, following De la
Rey's criticism of the vulnerability of Piet Cronjé's troops and general
complaints about poor performance of Marthinus Prinsloo's OFS men at
the previous battle.
Methuen was frustrated by lack of intelligence, although he had a
balloon section at his disposal. Maps were inadequate and scouts could
not move freely on account of barbed wire fencing of the farms and Boer
sniping. Methuen had 15 000 men in three columns. The first column,
consisting of the Highland Brigade, the 9 th Lancers, the 2nd King's Own
Yorkshire Light Infantry and supporting artillery, engineer and balloon
sections, would attack Magersfontein Hill from three sides after a night
march to get close enough to storm the objective, while artillery pounded
the Boer positions. The artillery opened fire on the afternoon of 10
December with 24 field guns, four howitzers and a 4.7 inch naval gun.
By midnight, amidst heavy rains, the leading elements of the
Highlanders under Major-General Wauchope, were approaching their
objective at the southern ridge of Magersfontein. The Boers, alerted to
the impending attack by the artillery barrage, were lying in wait. The
thunderstorm and the high iron ore content of the surrounding hills were
playing havoc with the compasses of the advancing troops. Wauchope
fearing that his men would lose direction, retained them in tight
formation, not realizing that he was almost upon the Boer trenches. The
Boers opened fire at close range as the Highlanders struggled to
change their formation. Wauchope was one of the first killed. The Black
Watch, storming the hill, were decimated by their own artillery barrage
and the rearward forces of Piet Cronjé. Arthur Conan Doyle pointed out
that 700 of the British casualties occurred in the first five minutes of the
battle. The Highlanders found some relief when several guns moved
forward to give fire support, although most of the artillery were still
directed at the hills behind the Boers. As General Cronjé attempted to
encircle the remaining Highlanders, reinforcements moved up in the
Gordon Highlanders and Coldstream Guards as well as the Grenadier
Guards. The Seaforth Highlanders, attempting to stem Cronjé's attack,
ran into the isolated Scandinavian Corps. The Scandinavians were part
of an extra Boer flank located between the entrenched line of De la Rey
and the mobile line of Cronjé. The entire flank had been ordered to
abandon their position, but the command had not reached the
Scandinavians in time. In the process of denying the Seaforth
Highlanders access to the Boer guns, the isolated one of two sections of
the Scandinavian Corps was decimated, with 49 dead or taken prisoner,
leaving only seven wounded survivors.(39) In a subsequent letter to
Kruger, Cronjé wrote: 'next to God, we can thank the Scandinavians for
our victory.' (40)
By 16h00 on the afternoon of the 11 th, the Boers called for a cease fire to
allow the British to collect their wounded from the trenches. There were
moments of pandemonium when the big naval gun opened fire, Captain
(RN) Bearcroft having been unaware of the truce. After the British sent
their apologies the truce recommenced. British withdrawal commenced
to beyond range of the Boer artillery. When the Boers did not withdraw
that night as Methuen had anticipated, he withdrew his troops.
British losses at Magersfontein were two hundred killed (including 22
officers), 675 wounded and 63 missing in action. Boer casualties are
placed at about 250, of which 105 were fatalities. The battle heralded in
the “Black Week” for the British – the period from 11 to 15 December
during which the British lost some 7 000 men on the two main fronts,
without any major advances. In addition to the fighting, a typhoid
epidemic broke out at this time among British troops.

Following heavy British setbacks in Natal, British Field Marshall Lord
Roberts replaced Sir Redvers Buller as Commander in South Africa.
Lord Roberts initially wanted to follow Buller's strategy of marching for
the Boer capitols of Bloemfontein and Pretoria, using the railway line
from Cape Town for logistical support. Strong public pressure led him to
change his attention to relieving the siege of Ladysmith (in Natal) and
Kimberley and Mafikeng (northwest Cape). Roberts left Buller to deal
with Natal, while he massed the recently arrived reinforcements from
Cape Town to lift the siege of Kimberley. Roberts had just lost his son
Freddy, at Colenso in Natal.

After the Battle of Magersfontein, Piet Cronjé's forces were withdrawing
towards Bloemfontein after he had been outflanked by Major-General
John French, while General De la Rey's forces had left for Colesberg
further to the south, to strengthen the Boer forces that were struggling to
hold back a British advance on the Free State. At Jacobsdal, Cronjé's
commando was joined by many non-combatants, greatly impairing his
mobility.
Methuen's First Division held the attention of the Boer line that remained
at Magersfontein, while Major-General Hector MacDonald moved
around their right flank. Meanwhile Lord Roberts' large force of the 6 th
and 7th infantry divisions, secretly advanced towards Kimberley. Major-
General John French's division encountered little resistance from the
Boers and on February, 15th was met by cheering crowds in Kimberley.
Instead of calling on Lieutenant Colonel Kekewich, the commander of
the besieged garrison, French met with Cecil John Rhodes at the town's
largest hotel. At this time French's force was succumbing to the long and
hot forced march, and the horses of the mounted divisions were not
acclimatizing well. He was left with two regiments of Australian and New
Zealand light horse, and two battalions of mounted infantry. He further
wore down his men by fruitless efforts to capture one of the Boers' Long
Toms (Creusot 40-pounder siege gun) which was being withdrawn to the
north.
Cronjé's slow moving convoy of fighters and civilians had vacated their
laager at Jacobsdal and reached the Modder River at Paardeberg Drift,
with the British 6th Division on their heels. French unexpectedly began
attacking them from the north after another of his forced marches (40
miles out of Kimberley.) The British cavalry was not on full strength and
tired after the long march. General De Wet's commando was only 30
miles to the southeast and Chief Commandant Ignatius Ferreira a similar
distance to the north. But instead of attempting to meet up with them,
Cronjé drew a laager, making a sitting target for a siege. Lieutenant
General Kelly-Kenny of the 6th Division proposed laying siege to the
laager and bombing them into submission. Lord Roberts was ill, and his
Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Herbert Kitchener, in overall
command of the British forces, overruled Kelly-Kenny. Kitchener ordered
his infantry and mounted troops into a series of uncoordinated frontal
attacks against the laager, despite the preceding months' repeated
demonstrations of the high cost of frontal attacks on entrenched Boer
positions. This time proved no different. By nightfall, 280 soldiers of the
Highland Brigade and Royal Canadian Regiment were killed, including
24 officers and some nine hundred wounded. 18 February 1900 became
known to the British as “Bloody Sunday.” Roberts retook command that
evening and immediately ordered digging of trenches and bombardment
of the Boer positions, which continued for the next nine days at great
cost to the besieged Boers. The Boer scouts of Captain Daniël Theron
sneaked many civilians and combatants safely through the British lines.
On 27 February the surviving Boers surrendered after the Royal
Canadian Regiment had the previous night dug in on the high ground
only 65 yards from their positions. Boer casualties amounted to 1 000
dead and 4 000 taken captive. (41, 42)
The surrender of Piet Cronjé at Paardeberg had a huge impact on the
Boer morale and was a major turning point of the war. It coincided with a
series of setbacks for the Boers in Natal, following an initial spirited
campaign. (4)

The Boers saw another setback in this time when the siege of Mafikeng
that had gone on since the war broke out on 13 October 1899, was lifted
in May 1900, largely due to the perseverance of Colonel Robert Baden-
Powell. Baden-Powell had been recruiting civilians, mostly from
Rhodesia, and enlisted the Barolong tribe; his primary objective being to
maintain the appearance of a strong British presence on the
northwestern border of the Transvaal for its psychological effect on the
civilian population, and secondly, to divert Boer forces from Natal to
allow the British landings in Durban to continue unmolested. During
the siege of his garrison in Mafikeng, Baden-Powell's daring actions
included building an armored train in the Mafikeng railway yard, and
sending the train packed with riflemen firing away into the heart of the
Boer camp, and returning it again to Mafikeng using the railway line
which the Boers had left intact. On 19 November, 4 000 Boers were
withdrawn to be used elsewhere in the war.
Colonel B.T. Mahon, on orders from Lord Roberts, lifted the siege on 17
May 1900. British casualties were about eight hundred with 212
fatalities. Boer casualties were in the region of 2 000. The sieges of
Mafikeng and Kimberley had also caused a marked increase in the
infant mortality rate due to malnutrition among blacks in the towns.
                PART II -- THE NATAL FRONT
At the start of the war, the British forces in Natal were concentrated at
Dundee and Ladysmith. The Transvaal commandos of about 11 000
men marching on Natal, were under Commandant-General Piet Joubert,
who had been the pivotal military commander during the First War for
Independence. A further 4 000 men from the Free State were stationed
west of the Drakensberg. Joubert first had to destroy the British forces at
Dundee (they were fairly isolated in the far northern region of Natal) and
then move on to Ladysmith where the railway connections of the
Transvaal and Free State met with that of Dundee, and where a large
British garrison was stationed. Jan Smuts had suggested that the ZAR
force push all the way to Durban and take the port to prevent further
landing of British troops.
The Battle of Talana (Battle of Glencoe) on 20 October 1899 was the
first of the Natal campaign and, for that matter, the first major clash of
the Second Boer War.
Lieutenant-General Sir William Penn-Symons was in control of the
troops at Glencoe. Penn-Symons' brigade consisted of four infantry
battalions, part of a cavalry regiment, three companies of mounted
infantry and three field artillery batteries. They occupied the important
coal mining town of Dundee. Coal was of vital strategic importance as it
powered the railways. On the evening of October 19, two Boer forces
numbering 4 000 each, under General Lukas Meyer and General
“Maroola” Erasmus closed on Dundee.
Erasmus' force on Impati Hill effectively did not take part in the battle as
the hill was shrouded in a thick mist giving them almost zero visibility.
Meyer's men on Talana Hill were stormed by the Royal Dublin Fusiliers,
King's Royal Rifle Corps and Royal Irish Fusiliers. The British forces
became pinned down by Boer fire and Symons was mortally wounded
when he moved forward to spur them on. British artillery drove the Boers
off Talana Hill but also hit soldiers of the KRRC. A group of British
soldiers, attempting to cut off the retreat of Meyer's men from Talana Hill,
strayed onto Impati Hill and were pinned down and captured by the men
of “Maroola” Erasmus, offering a young Deneys Reitz his first taste of
battle, in what was to become a very long war for him. As the British line
of supply and retreat had been cut off by Boer forces at Elandslaagte,
they fell back cross-country to Ladysmith to join the rest of their garrison.
English losses were 41 killed, 185 wounded and 220 captured or
missing. The Boers lost 23 killed, 66 wounded and 20 missing.
The Boers holding Elandslaagte station were mainly the Johannesburg
commando with several detachments of foreign volunteers. General Sir
George White sent Major-General John French to recapture the station.
After evaluating the situation French telegraphed Ladysmith for
reinforcements which arrived duly by train. The Boer positions were
pounded by three batteries of artillery, while a battalion of the
Devonshire Regiment advanced frontally and Colonel Ian Hamilton with
a battalion each of the Manchester Regiment, Gordon Highlanders and
the dismounted Imperial Light Horse moved around the Boers' left flank.
Some Boers were already holding up white flags when General Kock led
a counter-charge driving the British back temporarily. They recovered
quickly and Kock and his companions were killed. The rest of the Boer
forces attempted to flee but two squadrons from the 5 th Lancers and 5th
Dragoon Guards got among them and began to cut them down with
sabers and bayonets. Sir George White ordered his troops on to
Ladysmith where he feared an attack by the OFS Boers. British
casualties were 55 dead and 205 wounded. The Boers lost 46 killed,
105 wounded and 181 MIA. (43)

October 24, 1899 saw the Battle of Rietfontein when White gathered his
men to guard the retreat of the Dundee men under Brigadier-General
James Yule to Ladysmith against the OFS commandos under Marthinus
Prinsloo. The Boers were entrenched in an amphitheater in the hills
above Rietfontein. White led part of his force consisting of cavalry from
the 5th Lancers, 19th Hussars, Imperial Light Horse and Natal Mounted
Rifles, infantry from the 1st Gloucestershire, 1st Devonshire, and 1st
King's Liverpool Regiments and 2nd King's Royal Rifle Corps, supported
by guns of the 42nd and 53rd Field Batteries and Royal Artillery. From
8 am. to 3 pm. the two sides were locked in a rifle and artillery duel, with
White unable to get close enough for a charge. (44) British casualties
were 12 killed, 103 wounded and 2 MIA. Boer losses were 9 killed and
21 wounded. (45)

The next major action in Natal was the Battle of Ladysmith. White
continued to build up the garrison at Ladysmith although the town was
surrounded by high ground from which the Boers could strike or lay
siege to it. On 29 October, the Boers placed artillery on Pepworth Hill,
consisting of a 155 mm Creusot Howitzer and some Krupp guns. The
Boer forces entrenched in the hills were under command of Generals
Louis Botha and Christiaan De Wet, under overall command of an
ageing Commandant-General Piet Joubert.
The British frontal attack on Pepworth Hill was led by Colonel Ian
Hamilton and consisted of a battalion each of the Devonshire Regiment,
Manchester Regiment, Gordon Highlanders and the Rifle Brigade.
Another column under Colonel Grimwood intended to attack the Boers'
left flank from Long Hill, 1.5 miles (2.4 km) east of Pepworth Hill. It
consisted of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the King's Royal Rifle Corps and
a battalion each from the Leicestershire Regiment, King's Liverpool
Regiment and Royal Dublin Fusiliers. The bulk of the mounted troops
under French were stationed in reserve or to Grimwood's right. They
consisted of the 5th Lancers, 5th Dragoon Guards, 18th Hussars (less a
squadron lost at Talana Hill), 19th Hussars, several companies of the
Mounted Infantry, the Natal Carbineers and Imperial Light Horse. Six
batteries of 15-pounder guns of the Royal Artillery would support the
attack. A detachment was sent to capture the crucial Nicholson's Pass,
which would cut off an advance of the Free State Boers and prevent a
Boer retreat directly to the north. The detachment consisted of the 1 st
battalion of the Royal Irish Fusiliers and half a battalion of the
Gloucestershire Regiment, backed up by number 10 Mountain Battery
with RML 2.5 inch Mountain Guns. It was led by Lieutenant-Colonel
Carleton of the Royal Irish Fusiliers.
Grimwood's brigade, underway to take Long Hill, became separated on
Lombard's Kop and Farquhar's Farm and saw fratricide from its own
right flank. French's troops were behind schedule. The Boer artillery
opened fire from Pepworth Hill on the town and British artillery answered
by opening fire on both Pepworth Hill and the desolate Long Hill.
Although the Boer artillery was generally more accurate than the British
artillery, the gun crews on Pepworth Hill took heavy casualties. Deneys
Reitz described the scene: Six or seven dead artillerymen, some
horribly mutilated were laid out on a square of canvas to which they had
been carried from above, and Ferdinand Holz, the German military
doctor, was attending a number of wounded also brought down from the
emplacements. An ambulance van was standing nearby with several of
its mule team dead in their traces, and in the distance the native drivers
were running wildly to the rear. At the guns above twenty to thirty shells
at a time were busting with terrific noise... More dead lay about and
wounded men were sheltering with the rest in the lee of the parapet.
I liked the spot so little that I tried to persuade my brother to return with
me to our commando, but, although he was somewhat shaken by his
ordeal, he refused to come, and I had to admit that he was right. As
there was no object in my remaining I bade him good-bye, and taking
advantage of a slackening in the British gun-fire I made my way down.
Below I found Dr Holz, lying in a heap, struck dead by a shell while
helping the wounded... (4)
When White had not received word from Carleton who was supposed to
occupy the vital Nicholson's Pass, he called off the attack and ordered a
retreat as opportunity presented. Two batteries of field artillery supported
the retreat, each successively providing covering fire while the other
limbered up and fell back.
Deneys Reitz described what ensued: Towards noon as we were
increasingly hustling our opponents, we heard a bugle ring clear above
the rifle-fire, and at the same time a white flag went up. Hundreds of
khaki-clad figures rose from among the rocks and walked towards us,
their rifles at the trail. We stood up to wait for them. The haul was a
good one for there were 1 100 prisoners, mostly Dublin Fusiliers. The
commando responsible for this came from Heilbron in the northern Free
State. They were led by Commandant Mentz, but the man who chiefly
urged on the fight was Field-Cornet Christiaan De Wet, afterwards the
redoubtable guerrilla leader. I saw him here for the first time as he made
his way from point to point during the action, and I well remember his
fierce eyes and keen determined face.
Shortly after the surrender I was talking to some of the captured officers
when I heard one of them exclaim: 'My God: look there!' and turning
around we saw the entire British force that had come out against us on
the plain that morning in full retreat to Ladysmith. Great clouds of dust
billowed over the veld as the troops withdrew, and the manner of their
going had every appearance of a rout. There were about 10 000
soldiers, but General Joubert had far more than that number of
horsemen ready to his hand, and we fully looked to see him unleash
them on the enemy, but to our surprise there was no pursuit. I heard
Christiaan De Wet mutter: 'Los jou ruiters; los jou ruiters' ('loose your
horsemen; loose your horsemen'), but the Commandant-General
allowed this wonderful opportunity to go by, a failure that cost us dear in
the days to come.
Judging by the disorderly appearance of the retreat he could have
driven the English clean through Ladysmith and out beyond, and he
would have lost fewer men in doing it than we lost in the subsequent
siege, but the English went hurrying back unmolested, save for the
occasional shell from Pepworth Hill, where our guns had sprung into life
again, and, with the whole Boer army looking on, no attempt was made
to exploit the victory that had been gained... (4)
(The prisoners that were taken were from Carleton's force that never
made it to Nicholson's Pass and became pinned down by De Wet's
forces on Nicholson's Neck.)
The Boer Long Tom came back into action and briefly harassed the
retreating soldiers. A detachment of British naval guns that had just
arrived by train opened fire on Pepworth Hill and finally silenced the
Boer gun. Casualties of the battle fought are approximate: on British
side, 400 killed and wounded and 800 taken prisoner. Boers, 200 killed
and wounded.(46)
     There was on this day, and for long after, much acrimonious
discussion regarding the Commandant-General's failure to pursue when
the English turned back, and I was told by old Maroola himself, that
when officers came up to implore Piet Joubert to follow he quoted the
Dutch saying: 'When God holds out a finger, don't take the whole hand',
meaning the Almighty had sufficiently aided us for one day, and that it
did not behove us to presume upon His bounty, a view which Isaac
Malherbe said might be sound theology but no good in making war. (4)

The aftermath of the battle saw a protracted blockade. During the
blockade, demoralization began to set in among the Boers and some of
the men's families joined them with ox-wagons and servants.             .
Commandant General Piet Joubert's officers petitioned for permission to
dynamite the British trenches around Ladysmith. He refused the request,
considering such an act unchristian.(2) General Louis Botha attempted to
persuade him to take Durban but we would have none of it.
On December 9th, a group of three hundred soldiers from the besieged
Ladysmith garrison managed to blow up the Boers' Long Tom gun
stationed on Lombaardskop. The following day the daring action was
repeated on Surprise Hill; this time suffering over sixty casualties and
twenty prisoners taken, but also inflicting many casualties on the Boers.
One of the guns later came back into action; with the damaged end of its
muzzle sawed off, it was nicknamed Die Jood (“The Jew”).

After the Battle of Ladysmith, the next major battle in Natal was the
Battle of Colenso fought on 15 December 1899, marking the end of the
British “Black Week”. General Sir Redvers Buller was determined to lift
the siege of Ladysmith. The Boers were dug in at Colenso, north of the
Tugela River, blocking the road and railway line to Ladysmith. The Boers
were under the command of General Louis Botha, after Commandant
General Piet Joubert had been incapacitated after falling from his horse.
Buller intended to outflank the Boers, crossing the Tugela at Potgieters
Drift some 50 miles (80 km) upstream of Colenso. There he was out of
range of communications, and when he learned of the defeat of
Methuen and Gatacre at Stormberg and Magersfontein on the western
front, he considered that he might be expected to take overall command
of British forces, which he could not do without a telegraph connection.
He also feared becoming isolated and trapped by the Boers cutting him
off. He thus decided on a frontal attack following two days of artillery
bombardment commencing on December 13. Botha had nine
commandos and the Swaziland police available, a total of 4 500 men.
Against this, Buller had 14 000 infantry, 2 700 mounted troops and 44
guns.
Botha's plan was to cover the crossings of the Tugela River head-on,
while simultaneously attacking the flank of the crossing British troops
with commandos stationed further upstream, as well as their rear with
commandos being posted on Hlangwane Hill.
The Middleburg and Johannesburg commandos and a contingent of the
Free State commando were posted at Robinson's Drift, 8 miles (13 km)
upstream of Colenso, the Ermelo commando at Bridle Drift, 3 miles (4.8
km) upstream of Colenso and the Zoutpansberg commando and
Swaziland police at Punt Drift, at the end of a loop in the river to the east
of Bridle Drift. The main force of the Heidelberg, Vryheid and
Krugersdorp commandos were entrenched in a range of low hills
(kopjes) and the river bank at Colenso itself. The Wakkerstroom and
Standerton commandos were stationed on Hlangwane Hill.
Buller had five brigades and additional cavalry and mounted troops. The
5th Irish Brigade under command of Major General Fitzroy Hart would
cross Bridle Drift. The 2nd Brigade under Major-General Henry J.T.
Hildyard would occupy the village of Colenso itself – there was another
ford and one surviving bridge over the Tugela. His attack would be
supported by two Field Batteries of the Royal Artillery and a battery of
six naval 12-pounder guns under Colonel C.J. Long. A regiment of
cavalry, the 7th Dragoon Guards under Colonel J.F. Burn-Murdoch
protected the left flank. On the right flank, Buller intended a brigade of
colonial light horse and mounted infantry under Lord Dundonald would
capture Hlangwane. Buller anticipated the Boers on Hlangwane would
abandon their position for fear of being cut off once Hart and Hildyard
had established bridgeheads on the north bank of the Tugela.
In reserve were the 4th (Light) Brigade under Major-General Neville
Lyttelton and the 6th (Fusilier) Brigade under Major General Geoffrey
Barton. Buller also had three more batteries of field artillery and another
battery consisting of eight naval 12-pounder guns and two 4.7 inch naval
guns ready to support the flanking mounted troops if needed.
The battle as usual, did not go as planned. Hart's troops marched
towards Bridle Drift, but sketchy maps and a guide who could not speak
English, led them to the wrong ford, Punt Drift at the end of a loop in the
river. Although Botha had ordered his troops to hold fire until the troops
began crossing the river, the entire brigade jammed into the loop was
too tempting a target and the Boers commenced fire. The battalions
repeatedly attempted on their own initiative to extend to the left to Bridle
Drift, but Hart kept recalling them back into the loop. They suffered over
500 casualties before they were extricated. Meanwhile Hildyard
advanced towards Colenso. Two field batteries of Colonel Long forged
ahead of them and deployed in the open, well within rifle range of the
nearest Boer trenches. The Boers opened fire and after heavy
casualties the gunners eventually stopped fighting and seeked shelter in
a donga (dry river bed). Meanwhile, Dundonald's light horse became
pinned down at the foot of Hlangwane. Buller decided to call off the
attack even though Hildyard had just occupied Colenso. Buller called for
volunteers to recover Long's guns. Two teams of volunteers moved
forward with horses and managed to bring away two of the guns. In this
action, Lieutenant Freddy Roberts, the only son of Field Marshall Lord
Roberts was killed. He was awarded the Victoria Cross posthumously.
Three of his fellow volunteers also received the Victoria Cross.
Other attempts to recapture the guns were unsuccessful. The British
withdrew to their camp in the afternoon, leaving behind several wounded
gunners and some of Hildyard's men who were subsequently captured,
as well as ten guns.
Of Buller's reserve forces, Lyttelton committed some of his troops to aid
Hart's withdrawal but Barton was too cautious to risk his troops in
support of the hard-pressed Dundonald and Hildyard.
Buller's army lost 143 killed, 756 wounded and 220 captured. Louis
Botha's Boers saw 50 killed or wounded. (Unofficial claim: six killed and
27 wounded.)
Lord Roberts replaced Sir Redvers Buller as Commander in Chief in
South Africa, but Buller remained in command of the Natal forces. The
Natal campaign saw one more major battle at Spioenkop. Thereafter,
several more days of heavy fighting began taking a toll on Botha's forces
and saw their retreat. (47)

The last major battle in Natal was at Spioenkop (“Spy Hill”), known in
English as the Battle of Spion Kop after the Dutch spelling, fought on 23-
24 January 1900.
Since the battle at Colenso, Buller's army had been strengthened by
reinforcements and additional transport teams to make him less
dependent on the railway line. He now decided to make another push to
relieve the besieged Ladysmith. The Boers were still entrenched on the
northern banks of the Tugela River. Louis Botha's 8 000 men with four
field guns and two pom-poms faced Sir Redvers Buller's 30 000 men
with 36 field guns. Buller's commanders were General Sir Charles
Warren (former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, in which
capacity he investigated the “Jack the Ripper” murders), Major General
Neville Lyttelton, Major General Edward Woodgate, and Lt-Col
Alexander Thorneycraft (He was one of six “special service” officers, like
Robert Baden-Powell and Herbert Plumer, who had been dispatched to
South Africa before the war broke out to recruit local irregular troops.)




                             General Louis Botha

Buller intended to cross the Tugela at two points to establish a
bridgehead. After the Boer line had been broken, Buller would push
through to Ladysmith. Buller delegated control of his main force to
General Sir Charles Warren to cross at Trikhardt's Drift, while a second
smaller force under Major-General Neville Lyttelton would attack as a
diversion at Potgieters Drift, east of Warren's force. Warren's force
numbered 11 000 infantry, 2 200 cavalry and 36 field guns. On January,
23rd they marched westward to cross the Tugela under sight of the
Boers. Movement was slowed by the mass of baggage carted along for
the officers. Warren's included a cast-iron bathroom and well-equipped
kitchen. By the time they reached the Tugela, the Boers had dug new
trenches to cover their exposed positions. British mounted troops under
Lord Dundonald had reached the Boers' extreme right flank on their own
initiative, but Warren recalled him to guard the force's stores. Once all
his forces had crossed the Tugela, Warren sent part of an infantry
division under Lieutenant General Francis Cleary to attack the Boers'
right flank positions on a plateau called Tabanyama. Cleary's attack
made no progress as the Boers had dug new trenches on the reverse
slope of the hill. Meanwhile Lyttelton's attack at Potgieter's Drift had not
fully got underway.
If the British could capture Spioenkop, the high hill in the middle of the
Boer-line, they could bring up artillery and put the entire line under shells
from the hill. On the evening of 23 January, Warren sent the larger part
of his force under Major General Edward Woodgate to take Spioenkop.
Lt.-Colonel Alexander Thorneycraft was to lead the initial assault.
Thorneycraft surprised and drove a small picket of fifteen Boers off the
hill amidst a thick mist, killing one of them. He had mistakenly only taken
one part of the hill and his men were digging in within shooting range
from surrounding high ground held by Boers. The Boers realized though
that from their current vantage point, the British could take nearby
unoccupied hillocks from where their artillery could endanger the Boer
positions on Tabanyama. Boer artillery from Tabanyama began raining
on the British positions on the hill. Commandant Hendrik Prinsloo
secured two vulnerable unoccupied hillocks, Aloe Knoll and Conical Hill
with 88 men from the Carolina commando, while 300 members of mainly
the Pretoria commando attacked the the British entrenchments on the
crest of the hill in a typical British-style frontal charge, only without
bayonets, which the Boers did not use. The Boers were also not used to
the hand-to-hand combat that followed, the British soldiers wielding fixed
bayonets against the Boers' drawn hunting knives. The Boers could not
drive the British off the hill in this way, but the Boers on the nearby Aloe
Knoll and Conical Hill were in range to enfilade the British position while
the artillery pounded them. Major General Woodgate was killed in the
barrage. He was replaced by Colonel Blomfield of the Lancashire
fusiliers, who was subsequently wounded. Also killed were the sappers'
Major Massy and Woodgate's Brigade Major, Captain Vertue.
Major General Talbot Coke's brigade, sent as reinforcement, would not
risk an attack on Tabanyama and did not fire on Aloe Knoll, believing it to
be occupied by British troops. (48)
Deneys Reitz describes a peculiar incident that played off among the
Boers scaling the hill towards the British entrenchments amidst heavy
fire from the British Lee-Enfield Rifles: Near me was a German named
von Brusewitz. He had been an officer in the German army, but the year
before he had run a civilian through with his sword during some scuffle
in a Berlin café. There was a great outcry over the incident, and to allay
a popular clamour the German Emperor broke him from his regiment.
They say that in Germany the word 'Brusewitzerei' is still used to denote
the arrogance of the officer caste. However that may be, von Brusewitz
was now on top of Spion Kop, where he seemed bent on getting killed,
for, although we warned him not to expose himself too recklessly, he
paid no heed, and repeatedly stood out from the rocks to fire. As the
English soldiers were so close to us this was sheer folly, and after he
had tempted Providence several times the inevitable happened. I saw
him rise once more, and, lighting a cigarette, puff away careless of the
flying bullets until we heard a thud, and he fell dead within a few feet of
me, shot through the head. Not long after this, something similar
happened. An old Kaffir servant came whimpering up among us from
below, looking for his master's body. I advised him to be careful, as he
went from rock to rock peering over to examine the dead men lying in
the open, but he would not listen, and soon he too had a bullet through
his brain. (4)
Some of the Lancashire Fusiliers attempted to surrender amidst the heat
and lack of water. As the Boers advanced to round them up,
Thorneycraft shouted: ‘I'm the Commandant here; take your men back
to hell sir! I allow no surrenders.” At this point British reinforcements
arrived on the scene and a vicious point-blank firefight ensued, saving
the British position. The Scottish Rifles drove the Boers back with a
bayonet charge. In the morning, Lyttelton sent two battalions to
Spioenkop. One battalion, the King's Royal Rifle Corps attacked Twin
Peaks. After losing Colonel Riddell killed and hundred more casualties,
they broke through the Boer line and took the double summit at 5 pm.
The Boers abandoned Spioenkop. Almost simultaneously, Thorneycraft
ordered his troops to abandon their positions. With no water and no
counter to the Boer artillery he saw no point in holding the position any
longer. The British lost 243 killed and 1 250 wounded or captured. The
Boers lost 68 dead among 335 casualties. Commandant Hendrik
Prinsloo's commando suffered 55 casualties out of 88 Carolina men.
Ghandi was decorated for heroic action as a stretcher bearer in the
Indian Ambulance Corps which he had organized. (48)
14-27 February saw continued intense fighting called the Battle of
Tugela Heights. The Boers were driven from the southern bank of the
Tugela by the Earl of Dundonald's mounted brigade, Major-General
Neville Lyttelton's 4th Infantry Division, Major-General Henry Hildyard's
2nd Brigade and Major-General Geoffrey Barton's 6 th Brigade outflanking
the Boers on Hlangwane. From Hlangwane a pontoon bridge over the
Tugela allowed the British to cross. Major-General Arthur Wynne's 11 th
Brigade captured Boer positions at Horseshoe Hill and Wynn's Hill, 3
miles (4.8 km) north of Colenso, but Major-General Fitzroy Hart's 5 th
Irish Brigade took heavy casualties to the northeast. On 25 February a
six-hour armistice was called to collect the many British casualties.
A combined attack on the Boers' left and right flanks by Lieutenant-
General Charles Warren's 5th Infantry Division and Major-General Neville
Lyttelton's 4th Infantry Division under artillery cover, saw heavy Boer
resistance from Railway Hill until it fell to Colonel Walter Kitchener's 5 th
Brigade. The period saw 2 300 British killed, wounded and MIA. Louis
Botha's men lost 200 killed. (49) Ladysmith was relieved and the Boer
offensive was finally over, and the conventional phase of the war
beginning to draw to a close, although the war itself was far from being
fought.

At this stage morale was low among the Boers, as they were
systematically being driven back to the Free State and beyond. Many
openly deserted. The Free State commandant-general excused his men
from an attack as they wanted to attend a cattle sale. Bloemfontein fell
on 13 March, Johannesburg on 5 May and Pretoria on 6 June. Between
March and July 1900, twelve to fourteen thousand burghers
surrendered. General Christiaan De Wet described Lord Roberts'
invitation to Boer combatants to return to their farms after swearing an
oath of neutrality, as 'worse than the murderous lyddite bombs in
shattering Afrikanerdom.' Those who refused to sign the oath were sent
to prisoner-of-war camps. Many of the others would lose their farms
anyway during the scorched-earth campaign that was to ensue, and
most would rejoin the commandos during the guerrilla phase (50) while
some ended in concentration camps. Towards the end of the war some
were persuaded to join the British army as scouts. Called “Joiners”, they
were resented by many Boers. A British army claim estimates nearly five
thousand republican burghers among its ranks in 1902. The brothers of
Generals Piet Cronjé and Christiaan de Wet played leading roles in
trying to get the Boers to accept the hopelessness of their cause and
see surrender as the only option for survival. (2)
Had the Anglo-Boer War ended in 1900, it would have gone into the
history books as another colonial war and would most likely not have
conjured up such strong feelings as it continues to do. But the two years
that were to follow saw suffering beyond imagine: 33 000 farms were
burned down in the republics (even the chickens were bayoneted) and
water sources poisoned with animal carcasses. Some nine thousand
Boer-combatants died in all of the Anglo-Boer War; Boer-civilian deaths
in the two years to follow came to three times that number: 4 177
women, 1 500 (mostly elderly) men and 22 074 children died in the
camps, and a further 4 000 civilians succumbed in the open veld. In the
Cape Colony, Cape rebels, as young as fourteen, were executed as
traitors; their families forced to attend their execution. Sometimes they
were presented with a bill for the ammunition used. Families of rebels on
farms in the Cape Colony, and those suspected of aiding guerrillas were
harassed and brutally attacked on their farms by native gangs. (60)
              PART III – TO THE BITTER END
President Steyn made General Christiaan de Wet Chief commandant of
the Free State, but with the Boers struggling to reorganize to make a
proper stand, Bloemfontein fell on 7 March 1900. On 17 March Boer
leaders met at a joint council of war at Kroonstad. De Wet disbanded the
commandos with instructions to reassemble at Sand River on 25 March.
Non-combatants and wagons would no longer accompany them and
strict military discipline would be adhered to. The burghers who had
sworn an oath of neutrality were called up again. A new spirit prevailed
among the reassembled burghers. Though strict, they trusted De Wet.
(50)




                           General C.R. De Wet

On 31 March 1900 De Wet's force dealt the British a severe blow by
defeating Brigadier-General Broadwood's forces at Sanna's Post (Koring
Spruit).
Broadwood's men were moving towards Bloemfontein following attacks
on Boer forces at Thaba n'Chu. The force consisted of Q and U
Batteries of the Royal Horse Artillery, a composite regiment of the
Household Cavalry, the 10th Hussars, the New Zealand and Burma
Mounted Infantry and Roberts' Horse and Rimington's Guides (light
horse units raised from English-speaking South Africans).
De Wet had 2 000 men at his disposal. He sent a force of 1 600 men led
by his brother Piet, to attack Broadwood from the north, while he
occupied Sanna's Post to intercept Broadwood's retreat. Sanna's Post
also had strategic value as it housed Bloemfontein's waterworks.
An ambush was prepared for the British at Modder River, while Piet de
Wet's artillery opened fire on the British troops as they were striking
camp. The British retreated as expected towards Christiaan de Wet's
waiting force of entrenched riflemen. The civilian wagon drivers that first
reached the ravine where the Boers were entrenched, were seized by
the Boers and warned that they would be shot if they alerted the British
to their presence. Unsuspecting British soldiers approaching the ravine
in small groups were ordered to surrender. About two hundred were
captured along with six guns of U-Battery.
An alert officer realized what was happening and ordered Q-Battery
away. The British fell back to the cover of a railway station, while Q-
Battery under Major Phipps-Hornby and one gun from U-Battery that
managed to get away from De Wet's force, deployed in the open and
opened fire. Along with fire from the railway station, the Boers were
pinned down in the ravine, but Piet de Wet's men stepped up pressure
and Broadwood elected to fall back to the south. British troops under fire
managed to retrieve five of the seven captured guns, many felled while
crossing open terrain. Three hours after contact was broken, Major
General Sir Henry Colville arrived to reinforce Broadwood's brigade, but
by then De Wet's men had returned to well defended positions across
the Modder River.
British casualties were 155 killed or wounded, and 428 captured along
with field guns and wagons. The Boers suffered three killed and five
wounded. With Bloemfontein's water supply cut off, an epidemic of
enteric fever, dysentery and cholera broke out among the occupying
British garrison in April 1900, leading to 2 000 fatalities.

A last desperate stand for Pretoria was made on 11 to 13 June at
Donkerhoek (Diamond Hill). Lord Roberts' troops had marched into the
capitol on 5 June. 4 000 Boers (some sources 6 000) entrenched in the
hills east of Pretoria faced 14 000 men led by General Ian Hamilton.
The British attacked from the front and on both flanks. Lieut.-Gen. Sir
John French attacked the northern flank with 1 400 riders supported by
artillery, but was stopped by General De la Rey on Day 1. Hamilton,
attacking the right flank encountered strong resistance from General Piet
Fourie. Roberts contemplated a costly frontal charge, but based on
reports received that evening decided to support Hamilton's effort
against the strong-point of Diamond Hill. Five battalions attacked the
western slope of Diamond Hill and, although driving the Boers back to
defensive positions, became pinned down themselves with covering fire
from both flanks, with heavy fire coming from Rhenosterfontein Hill.
Colonel S. De Lisle concentrated his attack on Rhenosterfontein Hill, an
eastward extension of Diamond Hill. His force consisted of a battalion of
British mounted infantry and the New South Wales Mounted Rifles from
Australia. As Hamilton began to drag his artillery up the plateau, Louis
Botha ordered his men to quietly disperse during the evening of the 12 th.
They were pursued the next day by Major Hatherly Moor with 150
Australian troops and some minor skirmishes followed. In all the British
saw less than two hundred casualties. The Boers lost at least 24 killed
and wounded. (51)

Shortly afterward a meeting of Transvaal military leaders including Jan
Smuts, Louis Botha and J.H. De la Rey, recommended immediate
surrender to avoid disaster. Kruger, supporting their recommendation,
cabled M.T. Steyn. But Steyn furiously replied that the Transvaal had got
the Free State and the Cape rebels involved in a ruinous war in which
the Free State had been laid waste. Was the ZAR now to conclude
'a selfish and disgraceful peace' the moment the war had reached its
borders? Whatever the Transvaal intended to do, the OFS would fight to
the bitter end. Steyn was now the rallying point of the republican
resistance; in the words of Smuts, 'the most heroic figure of the war.' (2)
  Chastened, the Transvaal burghers decided to continue fighting to the
'bitter end' – until they were utterly crushed in defeat or had won the
battle and restored the republics' independence. The last stage of the
war continued until May 1902. (2)




                     OFS President Martinus Theunis Steyn
                          ZAR President Paul Kruger

Using the Delagoa line, the war cabinet headed by Paul Kruger with his
Secretary of State, F.W. Reitz operated out of railway cars temporarily
stationed at Machadodorp in the eastern Transvaal. Due to Kruger's frail
health, they moved to Waterval-onder were the winter was less harsh.
Deneys Reitz described the last time he saw him:
   At Waterval-onder we had our last sight of President Kruger. He was
seated at a table in a railway saloon, with a large Bible open before him,
a lonely, tired man. We stood gazing at him through the window, but as
he was bowed in thought, we made no attempt to speak to him. He left
for Portuguese territory not long after, and I never saw him again, for he
was taken to Holland on a Dutch man-of-war, and he is still in exile.
(He died in Switzerland in 1904.) (4)
Lord Roberts was intent on closing the Boers' access to Delagoa Bay for
good. At the same time his net was closing around them, because what
seemed like the entire remnant of the Boer army was steadily being
corralled to the Machadodorp area on the Delagoa line in the eastern
Transvaal. Along the path of retreat, groups of Boers made courageous
stands, then fell back after suffering losses. A force of 19 000 troops
under Sir Redverse Buller with 82 guns closed on Louis Botha's line of
7 000 with 20 guns dug in near the town of Belfast. The brunt of the
battle was born by the Johannesburg section of the ZAR Police, dug in
on a hill on the farm Bergendal. The 74 men were attacked by 1 500
troops on foot of the Inniskilling Fusiliers, 1st Battalion, the Devonshire
Regiment and Gordon Highlanders following an artillery barrage. Twenty
ZARP men were killed and nineteen including their commander Cmmdt.
Oosthuizen taken prisoner. The remainder escaped with the rest of the
retreating Boers towards Nelspruit. British casualties were fifteen killed
and 107 wounded.
Deneys Reitz vividly captured the essence of the final retreat, before
Lord Roberts, on September 1st, declared the entire ZAR British territory:
   Beyond Machadodorp a single road climbs the last range, and from
here one can look down on upon the low country. As this was the only
avenue of retreat, we soon found ourselves traveling among a medley of
burghers, guns, wagons, and a great crowd of civilian refugees fleeing
with their flocks and herds and chattels. It was pitiful to see the exodus,
for the English brought their guns up with great speed and the road was
heavily shelled over at times, as the wagons with women and children
came under fire, but on the whole their behavior was good, and in the
end the shelling proved more unpleasant than dangerous.
After a while the Transvaal Artillery managed to get a battery of Creusot
guns into action, which held up the advance sufficiently long to enable
the non-combatants with their wagons, carts and animals to get out of
range, after which we too moved slowly up the mountain...
Next day the Boer forces retired still farther down the valley to
Nooitgedacht, where about two thousand English prisoners were
confined in a camp. They were lining the barbed-wire enclosure beside
the railway line to watch us go by, and were in high spirits, for they knew
that they were to be liberated that day. They exchanged good-natured
banter with us as we passed, although one of them, less amiable than
the rest, said to me: 'Call this a retreat? -- I call it a bl—dy rout!' I must
say it looked like it, for by now the English advance was on our heels
once more, and the narrow valley road was thronged with horsemen,
wagons and cattle, all moving rearward in chaos. With the Boers
however, appearances are often deceptive – what might seem to be a
mob of fugitives one day, might well prove to be a formidable fighting
force on the next, and the soldier who spoke to me little thought that the
men pouring in by disorderly flight were yet to test the endurance and
patience of Great Britain to its utmost. (4)

On 6 November 1900 Christiaan De Wet was camped with 800
members of the Free State Commando at Bothaville in the Free State. In
their company was President M.T. Steyn. They were surprised by an
attack by an advanced guard of 600 men from a British force of Mounted
Infantry under Major-General Charles Knox. De Wet's forward look-outs
at his main outpost had fallen asleep. The advanced guard led by Lt.Col.
Le Gallais, were 300 yards away when first spotted. The majority of De
Wet's men fled on horseback with Pres. Steyn. But a core of 150 men
remained behind to fight the MI. An intense close-range firefight with
rifles and field guns ensued. After four hours that saw 38 English killed
or wounded, and 25 Boers killed and a further 30 wounded, Knox
showed up with his large infantry force. One surviving officer of the
advance guard, Major William Hickie led the MI in a bayonet charge,
producing a Boer surrender of the remaining 130 men. Hickie wanted to
execute three of the men for being found in possession of dum-dum
bullets, but Knox humanely stopped this. De Wet abandoned four Krupp
field guns, a pom-pom, and two artillery pieces previously captured from
the British at the Battles of Colenso and Sanna's Post. The British Lt.Col
Le Gallais died that night of his wounds and Lt.Col. Wally Ross of the 8 th
MI was severely wounded in the face. Of Knox's failure to pursue the
rest of De Wet's men, Hickie wrote: 'The general is an old woman...If
Knox had the same dash as Le Gallais we should have taken the whole
lot, bagged the whole crowd.' Despite his losses of weapons,
ammunition, clothing and other supplies, De Wet remained in the field
and within a fortnight struck back at the British.

On 5 September 1901 in the Battle of Groenkloof, a British column
under Colonel Harry Scobell defeated an outnumbered commando of
Cape rebels led by Commandant Lotter. Major General Sir John French
had a three-point strategy to deal with guerrilla commandos: Prevent
them from forming, keep chasing them to prevent them from collecting
supplies and new followers, and tire them down so they can be hunted.
Scobell's force which included the 9 th Lancers, Cape Mounted Rifles and
Imperial Yeomanry, was in pursuit of Lotter's commando in the
Tandjiesberg mountains after receiving intelligence from their African
spies. (53)
 Scobell followed Lotter to the farm Groenkloof were he believed they
were holed up in the farmhouse; but they were spending the night in a
nearby sheep shed. At dawn a squadron of Lancers went to investigate
the sheep shed. As Lord Douglas got of his horse to retrieve a dropped
pistol, the men in the shed opened fire, killing six men in his party.
Immediately a thousand rifles opened fire on the sheep-house. Thirteen
were killed and 46 wounded, while 61 unwounded were taken into
captivity. Lotter and seven others were later executed for high treason.
This was a huge blow to the northern Cape rebels, and their elite
commando at that. Jan Smuts, whose theater of operations had become
the northern Cape, would take revenge twelve days later at Elands
River.
                             General Jan Smuts

At this time, about a thousand Boers had penetrated the Cape Colony.
The commandos of Generals De Wet and J.B.M. Hertzog had suffered
such losses during their respective stints in the Cape, that they returned
to the Free State. The commandos in the Cape Colony were joined by
Cape rebels who were operating under the knowledge that they would
be executed as traitors to the Crown if caught. Practically the entire rural
Afrikaner population known as the Cape Dutch, supported the guerrilla
forces operating in the colony. Generally English farmers and “colored”
communities and farm workers were aligned with the British and the
forces needed to be on their guard to the possibility that their
movements could be reported at any moment. (4)
On 17 September the commando of Jan Smuts, desperate for supplies,
horses and ammunition, received word from a local farmer about a
British camp in the Elands River Poort. The men of the Smuts
commando surrounded the camp of C squadron of the 17 th Lancers
under Captain Sandeman in thick mist. Some of the Boer advanced
party attacking the camp from the front, were wearing British uniforms
which added to the bedazzlement of the British soldiers. Deneys Reitz
stressed that men wearing British uniforms did so not intent on deceiving
the enemy, but because they had nothing but raided uniforms to wear.
Reitz himself had been wearing a grain sack for a shirt at that stage. Nor
were the men aware of the decree issued by Lord Kitchener that any
Boer caught wearing a British uniform was to be executed. (Wikipedia
states the decree was issued just after this incident.) The Lancers lost
29 killed including four officers and 41 wounded before surrendering.
Boer losses were one killed and six wounded. Captain Sandeman's
lieutenant, Lord George Vivian, pointed Deneys Reitz to his bivouac tent
and suggested he take his personal uniform.
During the following months many members of the commando went
about bragging with their English uniforms, and were perplexed as to
why the English were executing their men when caught. On learning of
the decree they quickly discarded the uniforms.   (4, 53)

As Jan Smuts was raiding in the Cape Colony and gaining supporters
among the Cape Dutch, Louis Botha attempted to do the same in Natal.
British intelligence became aware of the plan and military columns
moved to intercept his commando, but he managed to evade them. On
14 September 1901 Botha's 1000 man commando camped near
Utrecht, in order to rest their horses from exposure to the cold spring
rains. After further intelligence information, Major Hubert Gough took a
train with the 24th Mounted Infantry, from Kroonstad in the OFS to
Dundee in Natal. Gough marched his men from Dundee to De Jaeger's
Drift (A drift is a ford in a river) on the Buffalo River. During a
reconnaissance patrol on 17 September, Gough observed through his
field glasses, 300 Boers dismounted on a farm near Blood River Poort.
Leaving Lieutenant Colonel H.K. Steward with 450 of the MI in the rear,
Gough proceeded with the rest of his men into a plain that afternoon
intent on launching a surprise attack on the farm. Unbeknown to him,
Botha was moving around his right flank with seven hundred men.
Botha launched a mounted attack on the exposed men, killing 23 and
wounding 21. 241 men and two guns were captured. Boer casualties
were light. The captured men were stripped of their weapons, useful
gear and clothes and allowed to walk to the nearest British post.
Botha could not find a crossing on the Buffalo River that was not blocked
by British forces. On the Zululand border he attacked a British camp
named Fort Itala. He lost 56 men killed or wounded in the process, and
aborted his plan and turned back to Transvaal. (54)

The Battle of Bakenlaagte took place on 30 October 1901. Colonel G.E.
Benson's British No 3 flying column specialized in night raids and were
terrorizing Boer commandos on the Highveld. Louis Botha's commando
joined up with those of Generals Grobler, Brits and Viljoen to attack the
rearguard of the column while it was in marching formation to its base
camp. On 30 October No 3 flying column was returning to base after
“farm clearing operations”. It was raining and the column was spread out
into small clusters of marching men. Small groups of Boer snipers were
harassing them. Botha arrived with 800 men after a 40 km continuous
ride and went straight into action as the strung out column presented a
unique opportunity for his numerically superior force. The column's rear
guard of 210 Commonwealth men made a defensive stand on Gun Hill
against 900 Boers. After a close quarter 20 minute fight the rear guard
was annihilated. They suffered 73 killed and 134 wounded. Colonel
Benson, a veteran from Magersfontein (p.112), died the next morning of
his wounds. The Boers lost 14 killed and 48 wounded. The Boers were
unable to take the entire column as they had planned, because the fight
with the rear guard allowed it time to deploy in defensive positions under
Lt Colonel Wools-Sampson. (55)

By this time the scorched earth policy was laying waste to most of the
farms in the republics. Lord Roberts had destroyed only the surrounding
farms if the railway line had been sabotaged, but Kitchener stepped up
the policy to a general campaign designed to terrify the Boer guerillas
and deprive them of supplies. By the end of 1900 the British had begun
destroying Boer homesteads and putting the families in concentration
camps.
   The British anti-Boer propaganda that preceded the war created the
conditioning that was necessary for treating harmless civilians callously.
A British writer wrote: 'We have conjured up for ourselves a fantastic
and outrageous image which we call a Boer. This savage being was
hideous in form, unkept and unwashed, violent, hypocritical, a
persecutor and assassin of the English.' Once the Boers had been
defined in derogatory terms, it was not too difficult to put Boer women
and children in camps in shocking conditions. (2)
Historian Thomas Pakenham remarked: '[The plan for concentration
camps] had all the hallmarks of Kitchener's famous shortcuts. It was big,
ambitious and simple – and extraordinarily cheap.' The British military
under whose responsibility the 150-200 000 Boer and African civilians in
the camps fell, considered the well-being of the inmates a low priority. (2)




Lizzie van Zyl died in 1901 in Bloemfontein camp. 50 percent of the Boer child-population
  of the two republics died in the camps. 25 percent of the Boer-inmates died. Children
                        accounted for 81 percent of camp deaths.
Without any proper sanitary conditions, the condition of the underfed
inmates quickly deteriorated. Many died, mainly of typhoid and measles,
partly because the Boers as a rural people had not built up immunity to
diseases and partly because of their weakened condition. It was Emily
Hobhouse, who brought the matter to British public attention. She had
been organizing protests against the war in Britain, and received
permission to visit South Africa and to inspect some of the camps.
On her return in May 1901 she laid her findings before the British public.
By October the death rate had soared to 344 per thousand. Children
under five had virtually no chance of surviving. (2)
Towards the end of 1901 a commission of women who supported the
war, visited the camps. The Fawcett commission, while investigating
only the “white camps” (camps where white women and children
constituted the majority inmate population) – there were also more than
21 000 (as calculated by Stowell V. Kessler) displaced African civilians in
separate camps, with an imprecisely recorded death toll of 12 per cent
(the lower death-toll could be due to the African camps containing a
greater proportion of adult males who were more resilient than children)
– made some valuable recommendations which saw the death rate drop
sharply.(2,61) The recommendations included providing facilities for
boiling drinking water, that rations be improved with vegetables added
and sending more nurses from England.
[The Boer concentration camps were not the same as the Boer POW
camps. 25 600 of the 28 000 Boer prisoners were sent overseas to
camps like St' Helena and Bermuda.]
Many women had managed to avoid capture by forming small bands
called vrouwen laagers, that wandered the land and hid in mountains,
forests and reed beds. Boer women's resolve was again a major factor
in the continuation of the war. After the British had overrun the Free
State in mid-1900, a Boer woman said: '[We] think the men should be on
commando instead of meekly giving up their arms to, and getting passes
from, the English.' In one camp the British considered separating the
Hensoppers (men who had surrendered) from the women to spare them
their bitter reproaches. In another, a Hensopper wrote of being
'unmercifully persecuted by the anti-British sex.' A British visitor, J.R.
MacDonald wrote after the war in What I Saw in South Africa (London:
The Echo, 1902): 'It was the vrouw who kept the war going on so long.
It was in her heart that patriotism flamed into an all-consuming heat,
forgiving nothing and forgetting nothing.'
A Free State woman stated what separated her from the English:
republicanism, history, the taal (language) and 'hatred of the [British]
race.' (2)
In the Cape Colony the governor, Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, believed
that half of the white population was more-or-less pro-Boer and that the
greater part of the colony was in a 'half suppressed state of rebellion.'
The Bond-backed Schreiner government was attempting to walk an
impossible tight rope, constantly clashing with Milner over his demands
to declare martial law in affected districts. In June 1900 the government
split over the imperial government's demands that the Cape rebels be
disenfranchised. In the wake of Schreiner's resignation, Milner
appointed Gordon Sprigg in his place and suspended Parliament for the
rest of the year. It would not reconvene for nearly two years. (2)

By the end of 1901 Kitchener decided to send no more civilians into
concentration camps, and to turn all those who wished to leave over to
the commandos. Due to the scarcity of food this placed an impossible
burden on the commandos. In Transvaal alone, 2 540 families were now
dependent on the commandos. By March 1902, with winter
approaching, large tracts of farmland had been occupied by Africans.
In the southeastern Transvaal a Zulu force, retaliating against theft of
their cattle, attacked a Boer laager and killed 56 burghers.
By the start of 1902 republican forces in the Transvaal constituted
10 000, and in the Free State a combined force of 6 000 Freestaters and
3 000 Cape rebels. Early in 1902 the British high command allowed
delegates of the republics to deliberate over the war. Steyn continued to
stress the necessity of the Boers not losing self-respect by suing for
peace. Kitchener remarked: '[Steyn] is head and shoulders over the rest
and has great influence.' (2)
Movement of the Boer guerrillas had become greatly restricted by Lord
Kitchener's block house system. Lines of block houses interspersed with
barbed wire entanglements armed with trip wire alarms lined the
railways and carved up the countryside. The system was designed to
allow the guerrillas to become trapped by British columns. One line in
the Free State reached from Harrismith to the Tradoux farm, 25 miles
(40 km) east of Bethlehem. The line under construction was guarded at
four points by forces under Major-General Sir Leslie Rundle. Rundle with
330 men and one gun guarded the wagon road, the end of the
blockhouse line was guarded by 150 infantry, a 400-man regiment of the
Imperial Light Horse lay 13 miles (21 km) to the east at Elands River
Bridge, and Major Williams with 550 men, mainly of the 11 th Battalion,
Imperial Yeomanry held the hill Groenkop with a 15-pounder gun and a
pom-pom.
General De Wet scouted the British positions on Groenkop for three
days and noticed it was possible to scale the western side of the hill
using the cover afforded by the trace of a gully. On Christmas day his
forces were silently scaling the hill after removing their boots. Halfway
up they were spotted by a look-out who fired a few shots to make alarm.
De Wet shouted 'Stormt Burgers!' the men charged over the crest and
fired down into the British tents. The British surrendered after 40 minutes
of fighting. British casualties were about 300 and those on the side of
the Boers, light. The 250 unwounded British prisoners were stripped
naked and turned loose the next day.
By 5 February 1902 the blockhouse system was complete and Kitchener
sent 9 000 men on a sweep through the countryside, netting 285 Boers,
although De Wet and President Steyn escaped the snare. The second
drive lasted from February 16-28. Again De Wet got away but had
abandoned most of his cattle. On 27 February the column of Col. Henry
Rawlinson encircled and captured a 650 man commando at Lang Reit,
near Tweefontein. The next drive from 4-11 March by Major Elliott's
division could net only hundred Boers and allowed De Wet to escape to
join the fighting Koos de la Rey in the Western Transvaal. (56)
Kitchener's block houses did not extend into the Western Transvaal due
to insufficient water supplies. Instead he deployed nine columns to
sweep the region and hunt down De la Rey and other Boer operatives.




                           General Koos de la Rey

In 1902 there were 3 000 Boer fighters operating in three commandos in
the West Transvaal under the overall command of General De la Rey.
On 24 February De la Rey attacked a wagon convoy commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel S.B. Von Donop. De la Rey killed, wounded or
captured 12 officers and 369 men, for the loss of 51 Boers. Lord
Methuen vowed to track the Boer leader down. Less than two weeks
later, De la Rey ambushed Methuen's column at Tweebosch (De
Klipdrift) on the Little Harts River. The British force numbered 1 250,
including nearly 1000 mounted men and four guns. Methuen's force
contained largely green troops of whom many surrendered or fled. The
British regulars fought stubbornly from dawn till 9:30 am. British
casualties saw 200 killed and wounded and 600 surrendered plus all
four guns captured. Methuen was taken prisoner after being wounded
twice and breaking his leg when his horse fell on him. He was the only
general taken prisoner by the Boers during the war. De la Rey sent
Methuen to a British hospital in his own carriage under a flag of truce,
despite demands from his own troops that he execute him. De la Rey
was subsequently court marshaled by the Boers for freeing such a
valuable prisoner, but after convincing them that Methuen would
withdraw from the war, he was let off. When news of the disaster
reached Kitchener he withdrew to his room for two days, refusing to eat.
Methuen was replaced by Colonel Ian Hamilton, who would beat the
Boers at Rooiwal on 11 April, the final battle of the war. Questions were
asked as to why Methuen was not replaced after his defeat at
Magersfontein. Methuen escaped with his career intact, with the War
Office and Kitchener taking the blame for providing him with green
troops. (57)
On 6 April, Kitchener placed Colonel Ian Hamilton in charge of another
drive to attempt to capture De la Rey's fighters. They wanted to drive the
Boers against a line of blockhouses, entrenchments and mobile columns
at Klerksdorp. Hamilton ordered the column of Colonel Robert Kekewich
to dig in at Rooiwal. They dug in with 3 000 infantry, six field guns and
two pom-poms. The Boers were unaware of this new twist, having
scouted Rooiwal only recently, they believed it to be lightly defended.
Therefore, in an attempt to escape Hamilton's drive, a commando under
Commandant Potgieter and General Kemp tried to overrun the position
with 1 700 mounted riflemen on the morning of April 11. Firing from the
saddle, the Boer charge overran a British picket of forty mounted
infantry, inflicting twenty casualties. Some inexperienced British troops
and some Yeoman units fled in a panic. But the British line was too
strong and the Boer charge was stopped 30 meters from the line by a
combination of rifle and artillery fire. Fifty Boers were killed including
Commandant Potgieter, and many more were wounded. The rest fled.
British casualties came to 70 killed and wounded. Hamilton delayed
pursuit of the Boers, fearing ambushes. After 90 minutes he gave the
order to pursue. Fifty were captured and the artillery taken at Tweebosch
recovered.(58) This was the last major battle of the war.

The war saw atrocities on both sides. Gideon Scheepers became a hero
of the resistance in the Cape. He was executed after being harshly
treated while lying sick. His family was refused to bury him and his body
was subsequently buried at an unknown location. His adventures are
described at:       http://trailriderreports.blogspot.com/2010/12/on-trail-of-
gideon-scheepers.html
The execution of Abraham Esau by a Free State commando under
Charles Nieuwoudt in Calvinia was a Boer atrocity that also created a
martyr. Esau was trying to organize a colored army to fight the Boers in
the Northern Cape. For this the Boers flogged him repeatedly and tied
him to a pole in the hot sun for being an instigator. This already had
made him a martyr. When the Boers discovered that he had kept the
British updated on the activities of commandos in the region, he was
executed.(59) Another possible Boer atrocity against the colored
community of the Northern Cape committed by Manie Maritz is
described in Commando. There were no repercussions as Maritz would
become commander of a South African Defence Force unit in German
West Africa. In that capacity he committed treason by conspiring with the
Germans and leading his men into a trap during the First World War,
when South Africa under Jan Smuts and Louis Botha was at war on the
side of the Allies. He subsequently fled to Spain. Deneys Reitz:
     General Smuts and his staff travelled by a separate route to the
Leliefontein Mission Station, which we reached in six days.
We found the place sacked and gutted, and, among the rocks behind
the burnt houses, lay twenty or thirty dead Hottentots, still clutching their
antiquated muzzle-loaders. This was Maritz's handiwork. He had ridden
into the station with a few men, to interview the European missionaries,
when he was set upon by armed Hottentots, he and his escourt narrowly
escaping with their lives. To avenge the insult, he returned next morning
with a stronger force and wiped out the settlement, which seemed to
many of us a ruthless and unjustifiable act. General Smuts said nothing,
but I saw him walk past the boulders where the dead lay, and on his
return he was moody and curt, as was his custom when displeased. (4)
A footnote in Adrift in the Open Veld adds: Maritz responded to this
criticism in his book My Lewe en Strewe, asserting that he and his men
had to fight hard for their lives and that, had the Hottentots gained the
upper hand, they would have been mercilessly killed. Shortly before, he
wrote, the Hottentots had murdered two burghers by suffocating them
with sand in their mouths.
There was also the of execution of Boer captives which George Witton
claimed was widespread,(64,65) but it was generally known in the
republics that the British treated their prisoners well and the Boers had
no qualms about leaving their seriously wounded for the British who had
excellent field hospitals.
                        PART IV – PEACE
In May 1902 sixty Boer leaders (thirty each from the Transvaal and OFS)
gathered in Vereeniging under British auspices to discuss the issue of
peace. Any decision required a two-thirds majority among the sixty
delegates. Each delegate would vote as a plenipotentiary, that is, in
accordance with his own opinion after the debate was concluded, and
without consulting his men in the field. The Free State delegates
continued to resist the idea of surrender, but their resolve was
weakened when Steyn's declining health forced him to withdraw from
the discussions.
Proposals but forward at the meeting included that of a state within a
British protectorate. ZAR State Secretary F.W. Reitz, supported by Louis
Botha, proposed that they could cede Swaziland and dispose of the idea
of a state which maintained its own foreign affairs and military. They
could even give up the Witwatersrand with its gold mines, which would
simultaneously rid them of the money that soiled the Boer character and
all the drankjode (Jews engaged in the liquor trade). The British abruptly
rejected the idea.
Smuts believed the only realistic option was to accept the idea of a
united South Africa as part of the British empire. Smuts told them of a
private conversation he had had with Kitchener, who shared with him his
feeling that a Liberal government would soon come to power in Britain,
making self-rule for South Africa a distinct possibility. Steyn alleged after
the war that he had received a letter from Smuts which suggested that
Smuts may have proposed during his meeting with British leaders, the
possibility of South African military support should Britain ever find itself
in trouble.
The British offered to not treat the Cape rebels too harshly. They would
be disenfranchised for five years, an offer that might not be repeated
should the fighting continue. Milner for one would prefer, as he had
suggested, confiscation of property and banishment of the Bittereinder
leaders. But Kitchener was more forthcoming. Kitchener told the British
government that Britain would have to build South Africa on the whites,
and in particular the Afrikaners. He considered the Boers who fought
and those that supported them, as the best future British allies, rather
than the 'loyalists' Milner wanted to use as collaborators. (2)
The issue of the black franchise in the Transvaal and OFS came up as
early as February 1901 during talks held in Middelburg in the Transvaal
between Louis Botha and Kitchener. They agreed the issue would be
resolved when self-rule was granted to the territories some time in the
future. The British government commented on the issue a few weeks
later that the blacks would be restricted to the degree of safeguarding
the preponderance of whites.(2) Smuts deferred the issue in his draft
proposal at the 1902 talks: 'The question of granting the Franchise to the
Natives will not be decided until after the introduction of self-
government', in other words, ironing out details of the issue was beyond
the scope of the current talks.
Generals Christiaan de Wet and Jan Kemp expressed the view that the
republics were the very foundation of Afrikaner power and cultural
existence. If they were to disappear would Afrikanerdom itself not be
shattered? Louis Botha on the other hand argued for a pre-emptive
surrender, 'while we are still a nation, and before we have quite
vanished as such.' He personally could carry on, and he knew that his
family was well looked after, however, the Boer position was steadily
deteriorating. Britain was redoubling its efforts, the Cape was no longer
a factor, there was ever-increasing danger from blacks, and the enemy
would no longer look after the families in camps. 'It has been said that
we should fight to the bitter end, but nobody can tell me where the bitter
end is. Is it where every man is either buried or banished? Do not let us
regard a period of universal burial as the bitter end. If we do we shall be
to blame for national suicide.' De la Rey was prepared to continue
fighting if it held any hope of saving the volk (the people or nation) but it
would likely end in a dishonorable mass surrender. (2)
Smuts told the delegates that a point had been reached where
independence was no longer realistic. That avenue had now become
exhausted and a new way had to be found for the Afrikaner nation to
survive. '[We] must not sacrifice the Afrikaansche volk on the altar of
independence... We must not run the risk of sacrificing our nation and its
future to a mere idea which can no longer be realized.' He said, 'It has
not been a war for the freedom of all the Boers but for the freedom of all
the nations in South Africa.' As to how the Afrikaner nation would
maintain itself if not in an independent republic, one of the delegates,
Jozua François Naudé, later co-founder of the Afrikaner Broederbond,
suggested maintaining the Dutch language as a vessel to resurrect the
volk, since guarantee of the language right was one of the conditions set
by the Bittereinders in the veld. (2)
The terms of peace were:
unconditional surrender and recognition of the British sovereign,
all POWs would be repatriated provided they became British subjects,
a guarantee to Boers of personal freedom and liberty,
a pledge to end military rule promptly,
deferral of the issue of franchise of blacks until a South African
government was instated,
the allocation of a sum of £3 million as financial aid to the vanquished
Boers.
On 31 May 1902 the delegates elected to surrender with 54 votes
against six. Acting ZAR president S.W. Burger stressed the necessity for
Afrikaner unity in undertaking any future political action. He urged
Afrikaner loyalists not to shun those who were disloyal, but to forgive
and forget. When the Free State delegation told Steyn the final terms he
cried: 'You have sold out the volk for £3 million!' A seriously ill Steyn was
absent when the peace treaty was signed that same evening in Pretoria.
He had previously vowed, 'I shall never put my hand on a piece of paper
in which I sacrifice my people's independence.' (2)

The period following the peace treaty saw emigration of large groups of
Boers, known as the Boer diaspora. A group moved to Patagonia in
Argentina (62), another group under Ben Viljoen moved to Mexico, others
to Namibia and Angola. A large group moved to British East Africa. They
were mostly “Joiners” (who had sided with Britain during the war) and
their families who felt persecuted among Afrikaners. The treks took the
form of migrations, and began to dwindle in 1906 and 1907 when the
Transvaal and OFS were granted a measure of autonomy and the
British government stopped issuing cash grants to settlers in British East
Africa.

Trevor S. Emslie, involved with the publication of Adrift in the Open Veld
(4) wrote:
In 1902 the Boers lost the war, but won the peace on favorable terms –
by 1907 General Louis Botha was Prime Minister of a united South
Africa including the Cape and Natal. Yet the bitterness of reaction to the
suffering and loss of men, women and children in British concentration
camps – more than double the total number of fighting men lost on
commando – was to leave an indelible mark for decades to come. Who
can deny that past brutality gave birth to future oppression, and that the
wrongs of the second half of the twentieth century were closely bound
up with those of the first?
              12. POST-WAR SOUTH AFRICA

Lord Milner was now High Commissioner of the Cape Colony, as well as
Governor of the Transvaal Colony and Orange River Colony, with Natal's
support pledged. Aided in part by the extensive disenfranchisement of
the Cape Rebels, the Progressives won the 1904 election with Leander
Starr Jameson (protagonist in the Jameson Raid) at the helm. A
contingent of Oxford graduates, called Milner's Kindergarden, were
brought from England to oversee reconstruction and promote imperialist
goals, building the new union on capitalism and an efficient professional
bureaucracy. Milner put much effort into developing a single political
system, an overhauled civil service and integrated infrastructure.
£16 million was spent on getting the defeated Boers back to farming.
The peace treaty stipulated that Dutch would be taught in schools where
parents desired it, and would be allowed in courts. Milner frankly told
the Boer leaders he wanted only one public language in South Africa,
English. Milner proclaimed English the sole official language and the
sole medium for instruction in schools. Three hours a week would be set
aside for children to study the Bible in Dutch and the Dutch language, if
the parents had requested it. Schools had to spread the imperialist
creed: 'Language is important but the tone and spirit is even more
important ... Everything that cramps [South African scholars'] view to
South Africa only ... makes for Afrikanerdom and further discord.' (2)
Acting Director for Education, E.B. Sargent declared his intention to
infuse Afrikaner children with 'the greatness of the English Imperial idea.'
Six hundred young teachers from Britain and other parts of the Empire
were sent for. Sargent told his staff their function was to indoctrinate
children as comprehensively as possible: 'You ought to have a political
aim in all your school work and that aim should be to make political
parties unnecessary.' Milner wrote it was a complete illusion that
Afrikaners cared much about 'the great Afrikaner nation.' Smuts
commented: '[Milner] has dreamed a dream of a British South Africa –
loyal with broken English and happy with a broken heart.' (2)
Smuts wrote to the Free State leader Abraham Fischer: “[There] are
years of great danger before us – partly because people have fallen so
deep, so fathomlessly deep, into poverty and misery, partly because
everything will be done by the other side, through their education system
and otherwise, to anglicise the generation now growing up. It is our duty
to guard against this and that is why I am so strongly in favor of
ourselves, if necessary, providing the education for our children.”
Milner's policy towards native peoples was summarized in the statement
that blacks had to be governed well and justly, but ruled by the white
man since he was elevated 'many, many steps above the black man'
which the latter would take 'centuries to climb.' Pass laws controlling
movements of Africans were policed more strictly and strike action by
blacks was illegal. Afrikaners were allowed to take up arms for protection
of whites in areas with high concentrations of blacks; an Afrikaner
constabulary under Major-General Robert Baden-Powell disarmed rural
Africans. Louis Botha said during evidence at the Transvaal Labour
Commission in 1903: '... the Kaffirs are gradually beginning to see that
the Boers are just as much masters as the other white men, and that the
two races [Boer and British] are standing together.' (2)
Before the war, the British army had raised black expectations by
promising workers much higher wages. But gold mines were coming
under pressure as most of the richer reefs were exhausted and
dividends could be maintained only through lowered production costs,
which meant lower wages for workers. In December 1900 the Chamber
of Mines reduced black mineworkers' wages by nearly a quarter and
introduced, with Milner's backing, the Witwatersrand Native Labour
Association as a central recruiting agency through which mines
cooperated in imposing uniformly low wages for blacks, only slightly
higher than farm wages. Many blacks were not prepared to perform the
dangerous work with an average death rate of 70 per thousand workers
per month at such low wages. To remedy the labor shortage, Milner
agreed to the proposal by some mining directors to import Chinese
workers on short term contracts with temporary permits to stay in South
Africa. More than 63 000 Chinese laborers were brought in, forming a
third of the mine labor force at the end of 1905. They worked and were
housed in dismal conditions. Milner invariably sided with the employers
in industrial disputes, emphasizing the importance of rapid economic
growth.
Soon Milner's administration was accused of using Chinese 'slave labor.'
The Boer leaders used the Chinese issue with success against Milner
and the white English-speakers on the Witwatersrand found themselves
split into different camps over the issue: A faction of white laborers
fearing competition from low-wage Chinese labor and opposed to the
capitalist economic power of the industry, formed a workers' party.
Another faction called the Responsibles favored prompt introduction of
self-rule, while a third which included some of the mining magnates,
called the progressive faction, supported Milner. Milner also fell out of
favor with the Cape English-speakers. Milner had wanted to suspend
the Cape Constitution as part of the unification process which was to
create a new national constitution. His plan met with opposition from
John X. Merriman, calling it 'a raid upon the liberties of the country.'
Merriman was supported by staunch anglophile Gordon Sprigg, who
broke with his party over the issue.
With Milner growing unpopular, the Boer leaders now sent out a
message to English-speakers that they were keen to work towards
reconciliation of the two groups. The call for reconciliation made a great
impression on moderate English-speakers. Smuts had once written to
his wife: 'The curtain falls over the Boers as British subjects and the
plucky little republics are no more... Let us do our best to bind up the old
wounds and to forgive and forget...' (2)
The Afrikaner Bond had managed to get through the war relatively
unscathed, although three of its parliamentary members had lost their
seats as a result of their association with republican forces.
William Schreiner, still supported by the Bond, and including the likes of
liberal politicians like John X. Merriman and J.W. Sauer, formed the
South African Party. The SAP was to offer a more inclusive alternative to
the Bond. Its stated aim was, 'the development of a feeling of unity
among the different nationalities of British South Africa and the
unification of the British South African colonies in a Federal Union, with
consideration for the mutual interests of the colonies and of the superior
authority of the British Crown.'
Meanwhile the Boer leaders had made Afrikaner unity after the war, one
of their first priorities. Louis Botha addressed a secret meeting of the
Dutch Reformed synod, requesting that the National Scouts (Boers who
had joined the British military) be chastised, but accepted back into the
congregations, thereby making the church an instrument to promote
reconciliation among Afrikaners.
Milner had approached Botha, Smuts and De la Rey with the prospect of
seats in a nominated legislature. They declined the invitation and
rejected an initial British Constitutional offer which granted only limited
self-rule, while withholding the vote from the many landless Afrikaners.
In May 1904 the political party Het Volk, was established in the
Transvaal under the leadership of Louis Botha and his deputy, Jan
Smuts. In May 1906 the Free State Boers formed the Orangia Unie.

Milner's education policy had seen many school teachers from the ZAR
retrenched after the war; many of whom now poured their energy into
the establishment of Christian-National private schools, after the
education model developed by the Dutch neo-Calvinists Groen van
Prinsterer and Abraham Kuyper.
A second taalbeweging (“language movement”) was taking on form. The
first movement (Chapter 8) had centered around a conservative faction
of the Dutch Reformed Church in the town of Paarl. The Stellenbosch
theological seminary was also central to that struggle. A major role
player in that struggle had been Rev. SJ du Toit.
The new movement centered around the Reformed (Dopper) Church
and its theological school at Potchefstroom. The teachers and ministers
trained at the Potchefstroom seminary were the strongest supporters of
Christian-National schools. The central figures in the new struggle were
Willem Postma, a political columnist and later Reformed minister, his
brother Ferdinand, later rector of the Potchefstroom seminary, and a
theology professor and Afrikaans poet, J.D. Du Toit (son of SJ du Toit).
It was Jakob Daniël du Toit, well known as the Afrikaans poet Totius,
who was to complete the task his father had taken up, of completing the
Afrikaans translation of the Bible. J.D. Du Toit wrote contemplative and
sorrowful poetry, borne out of his experience of losing two children. His
little girl had been struck by lightening and literally fell dead into his
arms. He put much effort into producing poetic versions of the Psalms.

   The Doppers' influence was out of all proportion to their small
numbers. Taking 'In isolation lies our strength' as a motto, the Doppers
wove the strands of religion, language and nationhood into a nationalist
cloth. Willem Postma urged Afrikaners to protect their identity from being
destroyed by English-speakers and their culture. 'Our people are
Christian Afrikaners. This is our tradition. The whole development of our
people comes from and is the fruit of Christian principles.' To adopt the
mother tongue is a badge of identity and to give it a central place in the
school and the church was a way of building a strong, separate nation
and religious community. 'Take away our language and we will become
Englishmen and accept their religion.' He extended the principle of
separation between the two white groups to separation between whites
and blacks. He envisaged a piece of land for the black nations with their
own schools, churches, parliaments and universities; however if 'they
came here they must work and not play tennis.' Ferdinand Postma
urged the teaching of Afrikaner history to counter the imperialist history
taught in schools. (2)

Milner took note that the new wave of Afrikaner nationalism was being
driven by the Afrikaner Calvinist intelligentsia. He wrote in 1905 that the
influence of parsons, doctors, attorneys, law agents, journalists, and the
more educated and town-frequenting of their own class, were
responsible for 'pumping' the 'Afrikaner doctrine' into the more simple
country Boers. (2)
CNE-schools (Christian Nationalist Education), private schools
promoting the Calvinist value system and Afrikaner culture, rapidly
sprang up in the former republics as a result of Dutch aid and the
founding of the Commission for Christian National Education in the
Transvaal through the efforts of Jan Smuts and church leaders. The
schools used mother-tongue instruction, with English as second
medium. Many Afrikaner children were too poor to afford private schools
and went to missionary schools which offered mother-tongue education.
(in 1891 already, one out of three whites attended these schools with
black and colored pupils.) A large number of Afrikaner children dropped
out of state schools at an early age. By the 1890s there were more black
and colored pupils at school in the Cape Colony than whites. Cape
Afrikaners also did not attend industrial schools due to the stigma that
such schools existed to rehabilitate criminals and mentally handicapped
persons. (2)

In January 1906 the Liberal Party under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman
came to power and Smuts paid Campbell-Bannerman a visit in London,
to take up the case of the republics. As a result of the discussions, in
which Smuts painted the political conflict in Transvaal as a conflict
between the mining industry and 'the permanent population of the land,
English as well as Dutch', Britain granted self-government to the former
republics. Smuts considered this concession as a 'magnanimous
gesture'.
Het Volk won the 1907 Transvaal election, where Afrikaners formed no
more than 50 percent of the electorate, using the same formula used by
the SAP in the Cape – broadening its appeal to attract both Afrikaners
and moderates from the English-speaking white community. Louis Botha
formed a six-member cabinet with four Afrikaners and two English. The
party knew that it had to tread carefully on the issue of language of
instruction in schools, as English-speakers would be up in arms if their
children were expected to learn Dutch at school. Smuts now changed
his mind about the effectiveness of the CNE system, arguing for state
schools to foster reconciliation between the two white communities.
Reconciliation was indeed an urgent matter, as the ensuing years would
prove, with Afrikaners constantly on the edge of rebellion. But Louis
Botha was already talking of more than reconciliation, referring to a new
'single nation of whites'. Smuts felt strongly that education had to
prepare Afrikaner children for the job market, for which proficiency in
English was essential. After the war, more Afrikaners than ever before
were desperately poor and flocking to the cities. Not only were
Afrikaners not as well trained in the trades as their English counterparts;
there was also a closed-shop principle at work, whereby families and
communities like English-speaking mineworkers on the Witwatersrand
were looking out for their own.
Announcing Het Volk's withdrawal of its support for the CNE schools,
Louis Botha remarked: 'We have to make concessions in education. But
it is for no other reason than to realize one of our greater ideals, namely
to bring about in this country a single nation of whites.'
Smuts' school system allowed mother-tongue education until the sixth
school-year, with English progressively phased in and becoming the
medium for education from the sixth year, though two subjects could be
taken in Dutch if preferred.
Het Volk also appeased the mining industry. Smuts, who at one time had
considered capitalism as a new factor in the world that endeavored to
'gain political power and to make all other forms of government and
influence subservient to its own needs', now tolerated it and encouraged
industry for the sake of rapid economic development. Het Volk's leaders
assured the mining magnates of a stable and efficient environment in
which to operate. (2)
In the Free State, where Afrikaners constituted 90 percent of the white
population, Alfred Milner spent substantial amounts of funds on
expropriating farms and settling British immigrants on them. First to
express their disappointment with this tactic were the Afrikaners who
had sided with Britain during the war. The majority of Free State
Afrikaners remained tenaciously devoted to Boer-Afrikanerdom.
General J.B.M. Hertzog, backed by M.T. Steyn, formed the Orangia
Unie. They won 31 out of 38 seats in the Free State. Abraham Fischer
became PM, but Hertzog wielded most influence in the cabinet.




                 J.B.M. Hertzog, Judge, Boer general and leader.
Hertzog raised the issue of language policy to a central position in the
recovery of the Boer people. Hertzog and Steyn declared that the
respect the British displayed towards Dutch as a public language would
be the yardstick of the respect they had for the Afrikaner community.
Hertzog stated: “It is impossible to cooperate with someone who
displays contempt for the language. Someone who is lacking in respect
for the language in which I was brought up is lacking in his respect for
me.”
Their school system allowed mother tongue education with the second
language gradually phased in, but after the sixth year at least three
subjects had to be taught in Dutch and three in English. The English
community were in uproar that their children in the Free State had to
study in Dutch and the English media called Hertzog a 'racialist'.
A sharp division had been forming for some time between the Free State
leadership and the Botha-Smuts partnership. Strongest was the Free
Staters' resentment of Louis Botha, who had explored peace terms with
the British leaders during the war, without having consulted them. After
the war, Botha had sent the Free State leaders money to buy a
newspaper company, suggesting it was a personal gift when it had in
fact been acquired from an old ZAR government fund. In 1907, Botha's
Het Volk government presented the newly discovered, 3100 carat
Cullinan diamond to King Edward VII as a token of the Transvaal
people's 'loyalty and affection.' Steyn remarked: 'It would be better if
Botha did not lay the loyalty butter on so very thick.' (2)

Milner left South Africa in 1905, embittered by the Liberal government's
granting of self-rule to the republics. The Afrikaners were finally free;
though within the confines of the British Empire, they had for the first
time in their turbulent history the power to decide the future of South
Africa. At this stage a federation of states with equal weight for the black
nations might have been in the best interests of everybody living in
South Africa. Instead, they opted for a united South Africa under white
control.
               13. UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

The main factor affecting the decision to form a union rather than a
federation was conflicts among the four colonies over customs and the
railway system. The leading role players in crafting a political union of
the four colonies were Smuts in Pretoria and Merriman in Cape Town.
M.T. Steyn's blessing was also procured since he had emerged as an
influential Afrikaner leader. For a time the inclusive version of the
concept of an “Afrikaner” was again fashionable. At Smuts'
recommendation the four colonies sent delegates to a national
convention, the 1908-1909 National Convention, to draft a constitution
for a union. Chief Justice of the Cape Colony, Sir Henry de Villiers
presided over the talks. The British High Commissioner was excluded
and only white delegates attended. Three critical issues were concluded:
                     1. The native franchise.
                     2. The system of governance.
                     3. The official language.
The franchise issue:
John X. Merriman and Jan Smuts had been in contact over the issue
before the Convention. The first problem discussed surrounding the
issue, was the still lingering tensions between the two white
communities in the wake of the war, including English fears that
Afrikaners would use their numerical superiority over them to reinstate
what they had lost in the republics. The second was the numeric
difference between whites and the other South Africans. The 1910 Union
census showed a total population of 5.9 million people with an
approximate ratio of 1: 4 between whites and Africans. (Between the
1920s and early 1960s it grew to 1: 5 and in the 1990s, when whites
relinquished power, to 1: 7.) (2)
Merriman wrote to Smuts: 'above all we must constantly keep in mind
that as Europeans we are but a handful in the face of an overwhelming
mass of an inferior race.' He proposed a qualified franchise, but Smuts
rejected it on account of the large scale of poverty and illiteracy among
Afrikaners. Merriman reminded Smuts that Africans were 'numerous and
increasing in both wealth and numbers... They are the workers and
history tells us the future is to the workers.' Smuts responded: 'I don't
believe in politics for them... [It] will only have an unsettling influence.'
He preferred to shift 'the intolerable burden of solving that sphinx
problem to the ampler shoulders and stronger brains of the future.' The
next generation could consider extending the vote, but for now it was
'one of the most dangerous things' for the white race to do. (2)
At the Conference, F.S. Malan, parliamentary leader of the Afrikaner
Bond proposed a qualified vote. He pointed out that it had taken whites
a hundred years of strife and tears to achieve unification. If the country
did not settle the issue of black political rights it would once again head
for 'a struggle and tears and suffering.' A union based on black exclusion
was not a genuine union and the germs of discord would continue to
exist. Hofmeyr added his voice with the warning: 'It would be a bad day
if in addition to protecting our northern borders against the teeming
millions of Darkest Africa, we had to be continually on our guard against
a malcontent colored and native population in our midst, outnumbering
us by five or six to one.' The Bond prided itself in the fact that people in
the Cape were not barred from voting purely in terms of color.
Louis Botha rejected the Bond's proposal of a qualified vote on behalf of
the Transvaal. When the time was right he would be willing to consider a
non-white franchise safeguarded by proper qualifications, but added that
the people of South Africa were conservative and progress was bound
to be slow. (2)
In 1909 W.P. Schreiner led a multiracial delegation to London to request
that Britain override the constitution on the question of the political
exclusion of blacks in the Union. The British government turned down
their request.
System of governance:
Delegates opted for a unitary, largely flexible constitution modeled on
the British Westminster system which was not at all suited to a society
as diverse and torn as that of South Africa.
Official language:
Hertzog proposed 'equal freedom, rights and privileges' for English and
Dutch. Every civil service appointment had to be made 'with due regard
to the equality of the two languages, and the right of every citizen in the
Union to claim either language as the medium of communication
between himself and any officer or servant of the Union.' The statement
upset English speakers. Steyn called on the delegates to expunge 'the
devil of race hatred' (between the Boer and English races.) The way to
do that was to place the two languages on a footing of 'absolute equality
in Parliament, in the courts, in schools and public service – everywhere.'
Steyn's plea was accepted by the Convention and entrenched in Article
137 of the Union constitution, thus creating two official languages.

A draft constitution was approved by the four colonies and it passed
unaltered through British Parliament as the South African Bill. On 31
May 1910 the four colonies became the provinces of the Union of S.A.
For the first general election, Het Volk of the Transvaal and the Free
State's Orangia Unie amalgamated with the Bond and the South African
Party in the Cape to form the new South African Party (SAP) led by
Louis Botha. Their opposition was the Unionist Party, a party with similar
policies but more English-speaking and pro-Britain. The SAP won the
election and Botha became Prime Minister. (63)

A national education system developed that made mother tongue
education in either Dutch or English a right, instead of Hertzog's dual-
medium education system which was deemed a violation of the National
Convention. In Natal, language of instruction was chosen; in the other
provinces mother tongue education was made compulsory up to the
sixth school year, where-after the student chose one or both languages
for further instruction. The students' second language would be taught
as a subject only. English South Africans remained indifferent to the
Dutch language and Louis Botha's government would allow civil
servants to ignore the constitutional equality of both languages,
believing the language issues would sort themselves out. (2)

One of the few prominent figures from the Boer War to remain firmly
loyal to Botha and Smuts, was Deneys Reitz:
     I had returned from exile, not hating the British, but resenting the
enforced rule of any other nation. [Louis Botha and Jan Smuts] showed
me that only on a basis of burying past quarrels and creating a united
people out of the Dutch and English sections of the population, was
there any hope for white men in South Africa... (4)
    ... After many wanderings I reached the little town of Heilbron on the
northern Free Sate plains, and there cast anchor. The place had under
fifteen hundred inhabitants, but it was the centre of a sturdy Boer
peasantry who had fought bravely during the war, in the course of which
they had suffered great losses...
The Boers are an intensely race-conscious people, and before long they
began to say that General Botha's policy would lead to their being
swamped by the British element. Opposition spread, and General
Hertzog seceded from us with his followers. He formed the Nationalist
Party, with the object of keeping the Dutch apart as a separate entity, as
against General Botha's ideal of merging us all into one nation. These
differences rent South Africa and the struggle became an exceedingly
bitter one... The Free State Boers stood behind Hertzog almost to a
man. They thought he aimed at secession from the British Empire, and
the re-establishment of the republics... (4)
   14. RESISTANCE TO A WHITE SOUTH AFRICA

During the 1880s an informal group of liberal politicians in the Cape
Colony called the 'Friends of the Natives', had supported African rights
on issues like pass laws, residential segregation laws, laws restricting
access to liquor for Africans and the increasing anti-black tendency in
the Cape Parliament, like ending of the blanket vote during the Sprigg
government in 1887. The group was made up of Cape liberals like
William Schreiner, John X. Merriman, Jacobus Wilhelm Sauer, James
Rose Innes and C.W. Hutton, son-in-law of Andries Stockenstrom.
John X. Merriman had once remarked that South Africa could never be a
white man's country. The 'European race' had to see itself as 'the
garrison', holding the country 'in the interests of civilization and good
government and general enlightenment in South Africa' (i.e. “white
trusteeship”.) The organization found favor in the eyes of the Xhosa
newspaper, Imvo Zabantsundu, founded by John Tengu Jabavu, who
encouraged blacks who qualified to vote to strengthen the hand of such
white politicians. (2)
The Boers generally did not agree with the notion of white trusteeship.
They could not picture South Africa as a black man's country and often
would remind non-whites in urban areas to “know their place”. Perhaps it
was easier for members of the English community to think of South
Africa as a black man's country; defining their own nationhood within the
context of the Empire. Afrikaners feared being swamped by what they
called 'Kaffirdom'. The Bond criticized African traditions like polygamy,
which helped blacks to 'outbreed' whites. F.W. Reitz had called in 1891
in his capacity as Free State President for the breaking up of the urban
black settlements (slums) forcing the blacks living on urban land to
become workers; his justification being: 'Self-preservation is the first law
of nature and if the Caucasian must either remain the dominant race or
perish, then of the two evils let us choose the least.' The Glen Grey Act,
proposed by Rhodes with Bond support, seeked to break up the tribal
system by dividing the communally owned native reserves into
subsistence plots for families, with the eldest son entitled the inherit the
plot. The intention was to defer black political attention away from
Parliament to new institutions in the reserves: Location Boards elected
by registered plot holders, District Councils with elected members from
the Location Boards and Government-appointed members, to advise on
local issues like allocation of local levies for public works, schools and
clinics. The plan did not work because the chiefs were opposed to it. (2)
In 1899, Cape PM William Schreiner said it would be the best to have
migrant workers from the reserves 'compounded', while working for
wages in the urban areas, then 'at the end of their term... go back to the
place whence they came, to the native territories where they should
really make their home.' The opportunity to create such 'compounds' or
locations outside of towns presented itself with an outbreak of bubonic
plague in the large cities. Slums were torn down for reasons of public
health, and between 1902 and 1904 cities across South Africa passed
legislation compelling Africans to live in the new segregated locations. (2)

After the Union constitution had been accepted in 1910, blacks and
coloreds stood to lose the vote if a two-thirds majority in both houses of
Parliament ruled against it. Dr Pixley ka Izaka Seme, a Zulu relative of
the Swazi royal family, educated at Columbia and Oxford Universities
and called to the bar at the Middle Temple, organized a black political
movement in response to the Union. He called for an end to the
animosity between the black tribes and to forgive and forget ancient
grievances. In 1912 he called for a conference of African leaders in
Bloemfontein. The purpose was for delegates to 'devise ways and
means of forming a national union for the purpose of creating national
unity and defending our rights.' The conference ended with the formation
of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), later African
National Congress (ANC). They intended to further the interests of 'the
dark races of the subcontinent' through use of 'peaceful propaganda'
firstly and then 'passive action' or 'continued movement' (struggle) along
the lines advocated by Ghandi. (67)

Milner had once called the quest for a white man's country 'a root
principle.' He had struck a chord with Smuts with his argument that
South Africa could not become such a country if it was 'full of poor
whites.' Smuts had despaired over the vulnerability of Afrikaners after
the war, for 'having fallen so... fathomlessly deep into poverty' and once
remarked, 'Two such peoples as the Boers and the English must either
unite or they must exterminate each other.' In many ways, Smuts was a
paradox of political viewpoints. He was deeply moved by the plight of his
Afrikaner people, yet within a decade was aligning them with their former
enemy. He is considered a racist by some liberal activists, and a liberal
by some conservatives. He is blamed for having played a formative role
in apartheid, yet in his student days at Oxford, had confided in F.S.
Malan that he could picture all the nations in South Africa coming
together in a single new nation, 'by bringing civilization, education and
religion to Africans, uniting whites and blacks by common ideals and
hopes for the future.'(2) He had likely meant, “uniting in, and working
together for, a single federal South Africa”, a model that was obviously
functioning fairly well in the UK. This was a view in line with that held by
the Afrikaner Bond; Smuts came from a Bond-supporting family. All his
policies and views seem to fall in place in that particular context, under a
half mystical philosophical concept he called “holism”, which saw the
nations and communities of the world becoming a big family. ('The
driving force in this human world should not be morbid fears or other
sickly obsessions, but... [an] inner urge towards wholesome integration
and co-operation.') He was a founder of the League of Nations and
pushed for formation of the United Nations. He saw a place for every
people who wished to define themselves as a nation and therefore
supported the formation of the state of Israel. He considered Ghandi a
great leader, yet ironically defended white privilege in South Africa
against accusations brought by Ghandi and India. He pleaded for the
lifting of the humiliating terms imposed on Germany by the Treaty of
Versailles, warning of its potential dire consequences well into the
1930s. Hertzog once called Smuts “too big for South Africa.” His
admirers included Ghandi and Einstein. (69)

The term 'segregation' first appears in South Africa in a document by
R.W. Rose Innes, brother of the liberal politician James Rose Innes. He
envisaged more territories like Glen Grey as 'reservoirs of labor',
ultimately growing into 'great native states' enjoying large powers of self-
government and representation in a federal parliament. (2)
In 1903 Lord Milner had appointed the South African Native Affairs
Commission (SANAC) with chairman Sir Godfrey Lagden, to create a
coordinated and systematic native policy within a future federal South
Africa. The SANAC report warned against the practice of Africans
combining to buy pockets of land among white-owned farms and
recommended that Africans be denied access to 'white' land through
purchase, lease or sharecropping. The state had to reserve for Africans
the present 'locations' or other areas of concentrated African settlement.
It proposed segregated townships for blacks, and education appropriate
to lower level jobs. The Cape's non-racial franchise had to be abolished,
making way for a separate voters' roll through which blacks could elect a
limited number of white representatives in an envisaged federal
parliament.
The Botha government accepted the SANAC recommendation for black
locations when the Transvaal gained self-rule in 1906. In 1912 Hertzog,
as Native Affairs minister, proposed large territories for the black nations
and discussed the matter with Sol Plaatje of the SANNC. Political strife
within the SAP however, led to Hertzog losing his ministerial post. The
1913 Native Land Act confirmed the SANAC demarcated lands, leaving
blacks in South Africa in possession of a mere eight per cent of the
country,(67) although some SAP members had proposed doubling the
acreage of the reserves. Some political leaders also believed the
borders of South Africa had not been fixed, and expected that the British
Protectorates of Basutoland (Lesotho), Swaziland, as well as
Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Rhodesia, and potentially even
Mozambique and South West Africa could still be incorporated into
South Africa.(2) However, at the time it was acutely evident that land
shortages were forcing out increasing numbers of the inhabitants of the
reserves to seek work elsewhere. The Native Land Bill allowed only five
black families per farm in the Free State and prohibited sharecropping
and labor tenancy. In Transvaal and Natal sharecropping arrangements
remained though, because landlords and land companies were more
powerful. In the Cape Colony, arrangements were also unaltered as the
Bill's requirements would have contradicted the Cape Constitution. (2)
Due to the limited allocation of land for the black nations, one may
conclude that the primary achievements of SANAC and the Native Land
Act were the institutionalization of a caste-system under the pretext of
federalism. SANAC dealt primarily with the labor demands of large
employers like the mining companies. Smuts, writing to Merriman in
1906 distanced himself from the 'mine owner and exploiter...the real
slave driver in South Africa.' M.T. Steyn, who did not generally concern
himself with the issue of native rights, gave his input on the matter in
writing to Merriman: 'The question of native rights is to my mind a vital
question for all of South Africa unless we hold with the Magnates that
the natives have no other rights than to work for such wages as will
increase their already bloated dividends.' (2)

As a result of the Native Lands Act, thousands of blacks were evicted
from white farms and had to struggle on foot to locations and reserves.
The ANC sent a petition to PM Louis Botha and appealed again to the
British. But by 1913, Britain was preoccupied with the prospect of WWI
and the Botha government was facing rebellions and threats of civil war
from disgruntled Boer-Afrikaners who wanted their old republics. In this
atmosphere Botha had to convince Afrikaners to stand by their former
enemy, against Germany, a former ally. There were general strikes on
the Reef every year and these were tense affairs. Deneys Reitz wrote
regarding the 1913 strike:
    Our Heilbron commando was among those for service and I now
realized how deeply the political feuds had bitten. I found that our men
looked with suspicion upon instructions emanating from General Botha,
and as we rode towards the Vaal River on our way to Johannesburg,
there was a great deal of mutinous talk in the ranks. When we reached
the south bank, they refused to cross over into the Transvaal. As usual,
meetings were held and speeches were made, and some of the orators
said that instead of fighting the strikers, we should ride through the river
and fight Botha's men. Our commanding officer was David van Coller, a
brave soldier but a narrow man and a strong supporter of the Nationalist
Party. Nevertheless he did his best to talk reason into his followers, and
after two days of haranguing, the bulk of the men pocketed their political
scruples and we forded the river.
We found Johannesburg in a state of siege...
General Beyers came to address us. I had served under him when we
took the British camp below the Magaliesbergen in December 1900, but
I had never liked him. He had recently been appointed Commander-in-
Chief of all army forces in South Africa, and he rode up in full uniform
and be-feathered helmet and sword.
I sat my horse directly in front of him, so I heard every word he said. His
speech was a scarcely veiled attack on the Government and on Botha
and Smuts. He ended by saying that these English townspeople had
forgotten what a Boer commando looked like, and that it was time we
refreshed their memories. He then ordered us to follow him through the
streets of Germiston, a curious performance, I thought, for the head of
our army. Next day he told us to ride through the town again, and to
arrest every man who looked as if he were a striker. We galloped
alongside the houses, rounding up everyone, and by the time we were
finished, we had captured a member of Parliament, two Wesleyan
ministers, and several town councilors as well as many other perfectly
innocent citizens. There were curses and complaints, and fainting
women, and the incident aroused a great deal of resentment against
General Botha, who had nothing to do with it.
There were thirty thousand Boers under arms, many of them
Nationalists, and with political feeling running high, there were strange
rumors in the air. Our men said openly that Beyers should utilise the
commandos on the Reef to overthrow Botha's government, and I heard
talk of his intending to proclaim a republic... (4)

Hertzog realized how impractical the current social-political order was.
He said in 1922, 'One cannot deny a people political rights.' Africans
would quickly catch up with ordinary whites in terms of education and
earning respectable wages so that ultimately only skin color would
remain as difference. The continued denial of the vote in the northern
provinces could not occur 'without violating the conscience of the white
man.' Hertzog believed in the separate-but-equal concept of blacks
'developing along their own lines' in the reserves. But the reserves were
too small to sustain viable communities because the SANAC and Native
Land Act allocations had intended for the reserves to be small enough to
force Africans to work on the farms and mines.
In 1912 Hertzog, in his capacity as minister of Native Affairs, had
indicated that he wanted big reserves for blacks where self-government
for them was a more realistic proposition. He met with an African
delegation including Sol Plaatje, secretary of the SANNC (later ANC)
and proposed his envisaged black lands in the Union. It is likely that the
map he used included Bechuanaland, Basotuland and Swaziland as
part of the 'vast dependency of the Union'. In these areas the 'energies
and aspirations of black professionals could find their outlet with no
danger of competition from Europeans.' Plaatje considered his proposal
'a fair ground for discussion.' Hertzog was however dismissed as
minister of Native Affairs in December of the same year and went on to
form the National Party. Shortly afterward he made it known that he was
still vague on how the land should actually be divided and he was
unsure how much land blacks required. For now the priority was 'reserve
native camps' where whites could no longer purchase any land. (2)

The Cape liberal J.W. Sauer was described by his friend James Rose
Innes as follow: 'By birth a Dutch-speaking Afrikaner, his intellectual
qualities, his militant spirit, his debating power marked him out as leader
of the Afrikaner Nationalist Party. The prize was in his grasp had he
stooped to take it. But that would have involved a sacrifice of his views
on the Native question, and he put it aside.' Sauer did not favor
integration. He believed that if whites lived side-by-side with 'a race
largely in a state of barbarism', 'the more intelligent race' would go
down, leading to 'damnation' for the Europeans. He thought it best that
Africans developed as a separate people. He was against whites settling
in the Transkei, and for this reason supported the Glen Grey Act. Where
he differed from other Afrikaner leaders on the issue though, was that he
believed in social equality in the common area. He was opposed to the
oppressive segregation laws in the cities. In 1904 he had argued for a
future union, the extension of the Cape's non-racial franchise on a low-
qualification level to the rest of South Africa. (2)

The British government made transferring of the High Commission
Territories – Basutoland (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana) and
Swaziland, conditional on an acceptable South African racial policy. The
British government might have considered at this stage, a well-
developed black local government and councils as more significant than
the franchise. (2)
How to divide the land fairly between white and black was a complex
issue. Louis Botha wanted to appoint a commission with a mandate to
reach a compromise, but first priority remained that all SAP members
agreed with decisions taken to prevent a split in its ranks. Botha said if
the need for white-preservation was their first principle, the second was
to treat Africans as 'a great people.' Hertzog also wanted a policy that
worked 'fairly and justly', through arranging for reserves as separate
territories where Africans could 'grow stronger and stronger.' The
Beaumont Commission of 1916 recommended an extra eight million
morgen added to the existing native reserves. It added that it was
already 'too late in the day to define large compact Native areas or draw
bold lines of demarcation.' African land was 'hopelessly intermixed with
the lands owned and occupied by Europeans whose vested interests
have to be considered.' Sol Plaatje called the land allocation a travesty
of the plan that Hertzog had proposed.
With the law in the Free State limiting sharecroppers on farms to five
families, they migrated to the Transvaal where 90% of arable land was
being worked by sharecroppers in the 1920s. Both sharecroppers and
white tenants lost out though, when land prices and stock prices
increased dramatically. Increasingly farmers sought cheap black
laborers who worked more efficiently for less and were less demanding
about living conditions than whites.

Louis Botha died on 27 August 1919 and was succeeded by Jan Smuts.
By this time black migration to the cities had created sprawling
shantytowns housing 13 percent of South Africa's black population.
Diseases like TB were rife. Smuts said: 'The natives have come to our
towns unprovided for. They have picked up our diseases and have found
our white civilization a curse to them... the Native question is so large.
We know so little about it.' The state had to accept its obligation of
providing proper housing and proper control of Africans in the urban
areas, in order to address 'one of the biggest blots resting on our
civilization.' (2)
Smuts relied on the judgment of his friend, the Cape liberal F.S. Malan,
then Minister of Mines. His vision was one of 'villages' where Africans
who were 'civilized could feel at home and develop.' Smuts also felt that
if Africans had a stake in the status quo they could become a bulwark
against labor unrest and political agitation. In 1920 in a meeting with an
African delegation he promised better conditions for regular and reliable
black workers, better housing and exemptions from pass laws. By this
time Smuts was also stressing the importance of developing and
preserving African tribal life, calling it 'a distinct human type which the
world would be poorer without.' (2)
The Smuts government submitted the Native Urban Areas Bill in 1923 to
the Native Conference. It envisaged that settled Africans could acquire
freehold property and aimed to improve the administration of black
residential areas. Hertzog opposed the bill on the grounds that black title
deed owners in 'white land' would soon demand 'the white man's vote',
which would constitute a matter of life or death for white civilization.

In 1923 the Dutch Reformed Church organized a conference attended
by white and black church leaders, delegates from welfare societies, the
ANC and chiefs. Speaking on behalf of the blacks, Selby Msimang of
the ANC said they would be happy with territorial segregation if the
Natives Land Act would grant half of the country for black occupation.
The white leadership knew such a move would have severe political
costs; or perhaps, it was again the will and commitment to a satisfactory
solution that were lacking on their part. From now on native rights would
be dealt with, largely through stonewalling and ambiguity, although some
concessions were made, as were continual efforts to get agricultural and
industrial development projects off the ground in tribal areas.

In 1924 Hertzog's Nationalist Party won with an overwhelming majority,
largely as a result of Smuts' violent oppression of the 1914 rebellion
against the Union's sending “children of the concentration camps” to
fight England's war against Germany.
                15. THE 1914-15 REBELLION

In 1914 Britain declared war in Europe; it was the First World War. In
August 1914 Britain requested the South African government to seize
the southern part of German South West Africa. Even in the SAP camp
there was not a great deal of enthusiasm over the South West
campaign. Botha presented the issue as one of 'duty' and 'honor' to
meet South Africa's obligations to Britain. Former OFS President M.T.
Steyn remarked that South African forces were mobilizing against
Germany, which had shown sympathy for the Boer republics. “Never did
I think that any government, and least of all an Afrikaner government,
would use the children of the concentration camps against the [German]
nation.”
The old Boer generals were largely opposed to the campaign. Koos de
la Rey called a meeting of armed burghers. He had tremendous
influence still among the Transvaal burghers, although his son
considered him no longer accountable for his actions. He was also still
under the influence of the Boer mystic, Siener (Seer) Nicolaas van
Rensburg. Van Rensburg had told him God wanted the Boer people to
be free. Botha and Smuts met with De la Rey, and he would have
reminded them of an agreement among some bittereinder leaders to
restore the Boer republics. Botha answered him: 'Oom Koos, it may be
the will of God that this nation shall be free and independent. But
nothing will ever convince me that it is the will of God that it should be
brought about by treachery and dishonor.' A congress held by Hertzog's
Nationalist Party on 26 August, unanimously condemned the planned
South-West campaign. But in Parliament, Botha received a large
majority, including Koos de la Rey's vote, to invade German South West
Africa. A military force under Lieutenant-Colonel Manie Maritz was sent
to launch the invasion from Upington in the northern Cape. (2)
On 15 September De la Rey, underway with General Beyers to either
convince rebels to call off the rebellion or to incite the rebellion, was
accidentally killed at a police road block set up to capture a gang of
bank robbers. There were widespread rumors that it was a government
assassination. Although a subsequent inquest confirmed it was an
accident, at the time it caused dangerous rumors. Also on 15
September, General C.F. Beyers had resigned his commission as
commandant-general of the Active Citizen Force (ACF). Together with
the influential General Christiaan de Wet and General Jan Kemp, senior
ACF officer in the Transvaal, they published a document demanding that
no South African forces take part in the war. They believed Germany
would win the war, and any action on the side of Britain would be
detrimental to South Africa.
Early in October, Manie Maritz resigned his commission and had his
own men surrender on a parade ground. He gave them the option to join
the German side or to become POWs. Some joined the Germans but
according to Deneys Reitz, most, including one of his brothers marched
off to the POW camp. The rebellion is also sometimes called the Manie
Maritz Rebellion.
To stem growing dissatisfaction with the invasion plan, Botha announced
that only volunteers would be used for the South West campaign and
that he would personally lead it. Most of the Imperial troops stationed in
South Africa had been shipped off to Europe, leaving Botha only with the
ACF (Citizen Force). It was generally accepted that it would be sheer
folly to use English-speaking units against the Afrikaner rebels, thus the
government had to rely on the rural Afrikaner units. Most younger
Afrikaners stood by the rebels, but some of the older members still
remembered the heroism and dedication of Botha as well as that of Jan
Smuts during the Boer War and enlisted. General De Wet, who had a
community of poor Afrikaners under his wing on his farm, made
promises of financial rewards to those who stood by the rebels (obtained
from an assessment levied against the burghers who stayed at home,
the unfaithful who fought us and from the mines). De Wet, heading the
Free State outbreak was supported by the likes of District Commandant
David van Coller of the Heilbron commando. General Beyers headed the
Transvaal outbreak. A fierce battle seeing many casualties ensued when
six thousand government troops caught up with five thousand rebels of
Christiaan de Wet at Mushroom Valley.
Since the government troops were citizen force members and did not
wear a uniform and were also Boers, it was sometimes hard to tell which
side was government and which was rebel. Deneys Reitz described a
lighthearted scene as the government troops entered the little pro-rebel
town of Reitz (named after his father). The town expected government
forces to enter it that day, but they expected uniformed British soldiers,
not a Boer commando:
     This little 'dorp' that bears our family name was strongly rebel in
sympathy. One of the Transvaal men told me that when they entered the
town, some of the inhabitants expected to see Khaki-clad British
soldiers... whereas [Botha's] men were chiefly old-fashioned Boers from
the Eastern Transvaal. Thus it happened that when the advance guard
rode in, an ancient rebel dame rushed into the street, and seeing only
shaggy burghers, thought they were her own people and called out in
Dutch: 'But men, where are the bloody English?' (Waar is die verdomde
Engelse?) to which a young Boer scout replied in the same language:
'Old lady, we ARE the bloody English.' (4)
Reitz also wrote:
   I found my house pillaged, but no wanton damage had been done,
and, needless to say, every shop and warehouse had been cleared by
the rebels. In South Africa, however, the commandeering of supplies in
time of trouble is part and parcel of our military system, and the Heilbron
insurgents had at any rate shown a sense of humour, for most of their
requisition notes were endorsed: 'Payable to bearer by the winning
side.' (4)

In all, some 11 472 Afrikaners were estimated to have rebelled, 7 123
from the OFS, 2 998 from the Transvaal and 1 252 from the Cape. 190
rebels were killed and 132 government troops. The rebels were treated
leniently, but Jopie Fourie, an ACF officer who, without resigning his
commission, had led a rebel attack that inflicted casualties on
government forces, was sentenced to death. An Afrikaner delegation
including future PM D.F. Malan pleaded with Smuts to extend leniency,
but it was refused and Fourie was executed on a Sunday, requesting not
to be blindfolded. Fourie said before his execution: “I hope they do not
shoot me in the face” and, placing his hand on his chest, “Here is a big
Afrikaner heart, big enough to take all their bullets.”
Kemp was sentenced to six years imprisonment and a £1000 fine, De
Wet to five years and £1000. Beyers drowned while attempting to
escape. Between four and five thousand rebels received fines and
prison sentences, but most were released within a year and the leaders
the following year.

60 000 South African government forces invaded German South-West
Africa and took it from the Germans after some casualties on both sides.
In 1920 the League of Nations, of which Smuts was a founding member,
gave South Africa a mandate to govern the former colony and lead it to
independence.
South Africa saw some heavy losses in WW I. The Battle of Delville
Wood saw over 2 000 casualties of the 3 000 man brigade. On 21
February 1917 the troop ship Mendi went down after a collision with
another ship, taking the lives of 607 members (mostly Zulu) of the 802 nd
South African Native Labor Corps.
Jan Smuts and Louis Botha were vehemently opposed to the harsh
conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, warning against embittering
Germany after the war. Botha died shortly afterward.
        16. THE 1922 WITWATERSRAND STRIKE
The year 1921 saw an incident where a South African military force
violently suppressed an uprising of a group of Xhosa in the Transkei led
by a religious fanatic called Enoch. The sect referred to themselves as
the 'Israelites' and when the military force attempted to disperse the
group and arrest Enoch for advocating the defiance of authority, the
zealots charged the military, armed with crude swords and battleaxes.
The soldiers opened fire killing 163. There followed a public outcry. The
press and public accused the troops of using excessive force. The
incident served to further weaken Smuts' SAP. (2, 4)
In South West Africa, a South African protectorate following WW I, a
South African military force, summoned by the South West African
administration was responsible for the deaths of more than a hundred
members of the Bondelswarts tribe in May 1922. They had revolted over
a tax imposed on dogs. Some were armed, either because they wanted
to fight the authorities, or for the sake of defending themselves. Aircraft
bombing the tribe's flocks also killed women and children. (68) Smuts had
used similar forceful methods earlier that year, suppressing the 1922
mineworkers' strike, causing Hertzog to comment that his footsteps
'dripped with blood.' (2)

The 1920 election saw the Labor Party win 21 seats out of 134. Many
working-class Afrikaners supported the party due to its emphasis on
workers' rights. But it's appeal among Afrikaners was tarnished by its
dedication to the British Empire and an almost wholly English-speaking
leadership. Hertzog's Nationalist Party won 44, the Unionist Party (a pro-
British conservative party that started life as the official opposition to the
SAP; then became its ally after Hertzog's NP became a political force)
won 25, and Smuts' South African Party won 41.

1920 saw a strike by 71 000 black mineworkers over wages and the
color bar. Then the gold price dipped sharply from 130 shillings per fine
ounce at the beginning of 1920 to 95 shillings at the end of 1921, while
production costs rose dramatically. The Chamber of Mines, fearing mine
closures, recalled a previous agreement with white unions of a fixed
ratio between black and white workers. It also scrapped the color bar,
allowing black workers to do the type of semi-skilled work previously
reserved for white workers, which it hoped would drive down wages in
that job-level. It called the color bar an immoral practice. (2) The 1922
strike by white workers that ensued; accounted here from the Smuts-
government's point-of-view by Deneys Reitz:
    ...in January 1922, there arose the most serious crisis of our term of
office: for we had to face an armed revolt on the gold mines.
It began with a dispute on a colliery, the workers of which laid down their
tools. The strike spread to the Reef and the position became
aggravated, as the original leaders were superseded by extremists who
called a general strike and they resorted to violence.
At the head of the disturbances were Fisher and Spendiff, two
Australian communists, and the outbreak assumed alarming
proportions. The rank and file of the workers were mainly young
Dutchmen [Afrikaners] from the country districts, brave and reckless and
traditionally prepared to settle their quarrels with a rifle.
Revolutionary commandos sprang up overnight, and as many of the
insurgents had relatives and friends in the rural areas, there was the
danger that the conflagration might bring about a civil war.
In Johannesburg and along the Reef, anarchy reigned. A workers'
republic was declared; dissident rebel forces captured the outlying
suburbs and townships; police were shot at sight and their barracks and
stations were besieged and bombed while incendiarism and street
fighting were the order of the day. Johannesburg was completely
surrounded and our government troops with difficulty held the inner ring
of the city.
As the younger member of the Cabinet I bore less responsibility than the
others, but it was a trying time.
With Johannesburg and the gold mines practically in the hands of the
insurgents, General Smuts declared martial law. Fifty thousand mounted
burghers were called up and he made a dramatic dash through the rebel
lines into Johannesburg. He was fired on at close range, but he got
safely through and took command in person.
He attacked them next day with infantry and guns and he surrounded
their stronghold at Fordsburg with his horsemen. After causing leaflets
to be dropped from aeroplanes warning the women and children to
evacuate the town, the government commandos closed in under cover
of gunfire and Fordsburg was taken. As our men entered, Fisher and
Spendiff shot themselves and the rising collapsed.
It had been an expensive affair. More than seven hundred people were
killed and there was heavy material damage. Politically, the effects were
disastrous. Our opponents blamed us for having acted too harshly and
our supporters blamed us for not having acted quickly enough, so we
were ground between the upper and the nether millstone.
To add to our troubles came the trial of a number of ringleaders. They
were not prosecuted for high treason but for coldblooded murders of
civilians and for the shooting down of natives.
As always, a reaction set in. Thousands may lie unremembered on the
field of battle but the public blenches at executions. When five of the
worst offenders were sentenced to death, mass meetings were called,
petitions were signed, and reprieves were demanded. But we decided to
hang these men. They had committed atrocious murders, not in the heat
of action, but by deliberately killing non-combatants...
The hanging of a man named Taffy Long did us most harm. He was a
soldier with a good war record. He had served at Gallippoli and had
been decorated for courage. Every returned soldier in the Union
clamored for his release and Prince Arthur of Connaught (our Governor-
General) at first refused to sign the death warrant. Still, he had been
found guilty of a brutal murder and we felt that the better soldier he had
been the less justification was there for his conduct.
I regretted his fate though in Cabinet I voted for his death. He was a
brave man. The evening before he was to die he asked for something to
read and he was given a Bible. He looked at the sacred volume, read its
title, and sent it spinning through the open door of his cell into the
passage beyond. He said: 'Bible! Bible be damned, bring me one of Nat
Gould's novels.' He went to his doom next morning singing the Red
Flag. (4)

In the aftermath of the strike the government did not resurrect the color
bar. Minister of Mines and Industry, F.S. Malan explained to Parliament
in 1923 that the color bar was 'degrading to the white man to say that
[he] should be artificially protected against the native and colored man.'
He said white miners should rather have availed themselves to the
opportunities offered by the mines to undergo further training. Jan Smuts
was willing to accommodate white labor, but they could not 'tyrannize
everything.' He also noted that a legal color bar was an admission by
whites that they could not compete against blacks without taking
recourse to laws that violated right and fairness, and he said that 'no
stationary barrier should be placed on the native who wishes to to raise
himself in the scale of civilization.' He also wrote privately that he had no
objection to helping 'our poor whites', but it was important that 'no
injustice was done to any other section of the community.' (2)
In 1924 the government passed the Industrial Conciliation Act, allowing
trade unions to reach legally binding agreements with employer bodies
in industrial councils. The councils first had to attempt to resolve a
conflict before a strike is called. White and colored workers were favored
for membership of these unions, while 'pass bearers' (Africans) were
excluded. The state insisted that employers and trade unions played
their part in uplifting the poor whites, which in 1922 were estimated to be
120 000 in an economically active white population of 540 000. (2)
         17. THE NATIONALIST PARTY – PART I

Before the 1924 election, Hertzog's NP entered into an alliance with the
Labour Party, called the Pact. Both parties expressed sympathy for the
very low minimum wages earned by black workers at the bottom of the
labor ladder. In order to help attract black voters in the Cape, the NP
enlisted Clements Kadalie, a Malawian immigrant and founder of a black
trade union, the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) which
had 10 000 members by the end of the 1920s, but then fell apart.
Hertzog told Kadalie that their task was to establish 'between white and
black Afrikander that faith in and sympathy with one another which is so
essential for the prosperity of a nation.' (2) Note how the Hofmeyr-Bond's
Afrikander - “the patriotic African citizen” – had crossed the color line.
The Cape leader of the NP, D.F. Malan (not to be confused with F.S.
Malan) sent a message to a meeting of African leaders in Queenstown:
'No race has shown a greater love for South Africa than the native and in
that respect he is certainly an example of true patriotism. He should
therefore take his place alongside the nationalist in the same area.' (2)
The Pact alliance drew votes from all sections of South African life,
workers as well as farmers, and the pro-NP newspaper, Die Burger
noted that most coloreds voted for the Pact. Blacks were not so much
pro-Pact as they were anti-SAP. The African National Congress sent a
telegram to leaders of black and colored voters to cast their vote against
the SAP. Their problem with the SAP was that it lacked a clear racial
policy and the slogan went out: 'No policy, no vote.'
In reaction to a report in The Star, that some Communists had decided
to back the Pact, Smuts declared, 'the Red Flag has come to South
Africa'. (2)
In the 1924 election the NP won 63 out of 135 seats, its partner, Labour,
18 and the SAP, 52. Hertzog became PM of South Africa.

The Pact government was strongly committed to segregation though,
and, following some deliberation, decided to break off ties with the ICU.
Kadalie pleaded for an equal society. The communists also wanted an
equal society, and a socially integrated one at that. Bram Fischer called
in London in 1933, for an 'integrating' of not only 'the two different
European races, but [to] see that these two advance together with our
vast black population.' (2)

A fair franchise remained problematic. In the light of continued tensions
between the two white societies, the Cape Times wrote in November
1925 that expanding the African vote would lead to 'either a Parliament
dominated by black voters or the break-up of the Union, possibly by way
of a bloody civil war.' (2)
Hertzog announced plans to remove Africans from the voter's roll in the
Cape Province; however, extending the vote to women in 1930 gave
such a boost to white dominance on the Cape's qualified franchise
voter's roll (Cape blacks were migrant males mainly from the Transkei)
to make their place on the voters' roll insignificant. Blacks were removed
from the roll in 1936.

To stimulate industrial growth, South African companies were protected
by high import tariffs. Called, import substitution, local production of
imported goods was encouraged. The next step was protection of white
labor against numerically overwhelming black labor. Companies profiting
from import substitution were threatened with a relaxing of import duties,
unless they employed a certain percentage of whites. Ratio of white to
black unskilled workers increased dramatically, while the Apprentice Act
(stipulating eighth grade education as requirement to enroll in a trade)
and closed shop control by white unions kept blacks out of trades. (2)
The NP had promised in the run-up to the 1924 election that they would
treat white and colored people as people who belonged together
economically and politically. Nonetheless, government circulars called
on departments to employ as many white youths as possible to solve
what was known as the poor-white crisis, and colored workers under the
civilized labor policy earned half the wages of their white counterparts.
The civilized labor act protected the living standards of workers in the
types of jobs where white workers were protected, as above-mentioned.
In 1926, C.W. Malan, Minister of Railways and Harbors defended lower
wages for coloreds: 'The Colored man is different from the white man
in his standard of civilization... and must be treated accordingly.'
Systematically the civilized labor policy came to be interpreted as a
white-employment policy. (2)
A Mines and Works Amendment in 1926 reinforced the color bar and
excluded Indian miners from skilled jobs.
White-protectionist social engineering followed its course and in 1928
the government passed a law prohibiting marriages between white and
black people (though not between white and colored people.)

Poor suburbs and slums in the 1920s were racially mixed. The ACVV, a
Christian welfare organization with an Afrikaner nationalist agenda, had
been established in the aftermath of the Anglo-Boer War, in the wake of
the widespread poverty and suffering among Afrikaners. It now
concerned itself with the rapidly urbanizing Afrikaner poor. At the head of
the organization was Miems Rothman (writing as M.E.R.) who attempted
to persuade Afrikaner families to move out of these areas. Apart from
their concern that Afrikaner women were being exploited in these areas,
they feared for the loss of their Afrikaner identity. Rothman saw the
survival of the Afrikaner volk in its working class being consciously white
and consciously Afrikaner.

The 1930s saw a catastrophic drought and the Great Depression. The
government committed large scale loans to farmers and launched
several public works schemes.
In 1932 South Africa abandoned the gold standard. In the 1933 election
Hertzog's NP and Smuts' SAP formed a coalition-government under
pressure from lobbyists from the mining and farming industry. Soon
afterward the two parties fused to form a new party, the United Party
(UP) with Hertzog as leader. It drew support from Afrikaners, English
and Coloreds. Daniel François (D.F.) Malan, former Cape leader of the
NP, broke away with a faction of the NP to form his own party, the
Purified National Party, which became the official opposition. He
opposed the UP's emphasis on unification of English and Afrikaners,
calling it a bulwark of 'imperialism and capitalism', and insisted that
Afrikaners still needed a party of their own, dedicated to preserve their
language, faith and traditions. (2)
By the early 1930s racially integrated slums were again a dominant
feature of the urban landscape. Through the Slums Act of 1934, the UP
government gave city councils the power to break up the slums. The
black townships were established in Johannesburg and elsewhere, and
in the Cape, new colored townships, although the Cape had no
restriction on where people were allowed to live.

Spending on colored education under Hertzog increased by 60 percent,
seeing a 30 percent increase in colored pupils. (74) The DRC and Dopper
churches supported segregated communities. Regarding poor whites, it
meant reducing class cleavages within the Afrikaner community, while
the church's education policy held that it should be based on the group's
national culture, with a prominent place given to its language, history
and customs. In 1935 the DRC called for Africans and colored people to
be assisted in developing 'into self-respecting Christian nations.' J.G.
(Valie) Strydom, missions secretary for the DRC in the Free State,
strongly propagated Christian-National education to create in the black
child respect for the history, customs and culture of the ethnic
community in which they were born. In 1947, D.F. Malan would remark:
'It was not the state but the church who took the lead with apartheid. The
state followed the principle laid down by the church in the field of
education for the native, the colored and the Asian.' As a result, he said,
friction was eliminated.

Population numbers of South Africa spanning five decades
                          1930         1950/51       1970

White population        1 801 000          2 641689   3 835 000
Black population        5 585 000          8 556 390 15 918 000
Whites in manufacturing    91 024            191 093    276 900
Blacks in manufacturing     90 517           267 070    617 200
                                                                       (2)

In 1933 the Broederbond's Executive Council undertook the project of a
savings bank to mobilize Afrikaner capital, finance Afrikaner enterprises
and give jobs to the poor. The state denied permission to register a
commercial bank, and a cooperative was registered instead by
Broederbond treasurer J.J. Bosman and sixty fellow Broeders. It was
called Volkskas (Peoples' Bank.)(2) During the 1938 centenery of the
Great Trek, D.F. Malan and the Free State church leader, J.D. ('Father')
Kestell suggested that the best tribute to the Voortrekkers would be a
reddingsdaad (rescue act) to save poor Afrikaners. The state and
corporates would provide only limited support they warned. Their slogan,
a call by Kestell was, 'n Volk help homself (A people rescues itself). The
Afrikaner Broederbond assigned the FAK (a federation of Afrikaans
cultural institutions) the task of organizing a congress to discuss setting
up large peoples' funds for the rehabilitation of the Afrikaner poor. The
Broederbond decided against charity and opted instead for employing
Afrikaner savings and investments in enterprises that would 'rescue'
Afrikaner poor by employing them. The project had to make profit for the
shareholders, promote the collective advancement of Afrikaners and
help Afrikaners to escape from poverty, by Afrikaner employers offering
them respectable wages. The Broederbond entered into an alliance with
Cape Town based insurance company Sanlam. The concept of
volkskapitalisme (peoples' capitalism) was born at the congress when
L.J. Du Plessis defined the goal of mobilizing 'the volk to conquer the
capitalist system and to transform it so that it fits our ethnic nature.' The
Volkskongres created a finance house, a chamber of commerce and a
'rescue' organization. Afrikaners were encouraged to buy shares in
Afrikaner organizations. (2)
       18. THE SECOND LANGUAGE MOVEMENT

In 1890 the Zuid-Afrikaansche Taalbond elected to opt for the use of
Dutch with a simplified spelling, over Dutch or Afrikaans. A young
Hertzog, studying Law in Amsterdam at the time, wrote that it was 'total
arrogance' to try to maintain such a complex and 'synthetic' language as
Dutch. 'We can just as well expect that the stream of a river run
backwards.'(2) Yet in his early political career following the Boer War, he
placed his energies into fighting for the Dutch language as a tool to
guard the character of the Boer-Afrikaner against English cultural
assimilation. At a Stellenbosch student festival in celebration of the
constitutional recognition of language equality (a festival Louis Botha's
SAP considered 'too political') in 1913, having just left the SAP, Hertzog
read out a telegram from M.T. Steyn quoting Cicero in Dutch: 'The
language of the conqueror in the mouth of the conquered is the
language of slaves.' It made a powerful impact on the audience and is
said to have affected public use of English among Afrikaners. (2)
In the early political debates over the use of Dutch versus Afrikaans as
volkstaal (people's language or national language) Hertzog initially came
out strongly in defense of retaining Dutch and found himself opposed to
D.F. Malan on the issue. The reasoning of those who favored Dutch was
that it strengthened the Afrikaner nation by making them part of the
greater Dutch- and Flemish-speaking nations of Europe. Afrikaans would
isolate the Afrikaner as a small minority that would quickly be overrun by
English. Professor W.J. Viljoen (heading a Dutch literature society at the
Victoria College and Stellenbosch seminary) defended Dutch as the
“language of our fathers” and the “Afrikaner's holy birthright.”
In November 1906, D.F. Malan founded the Afrikaans Language Society
(Afrikaanse Taalvereniging ; ATV) together with J.H.H. De Waal in the
Cape, in the same vein as Gustav Preller's Afrikaanse Taalgenootskap,
created in Pretoria the previous year. The society's aim was the
promotion of Afrikaans as a language that belonged to the nation. Their
slogan was: 'Learn Dutch and speak Dutch if you can or want, but if you
cannot or want not, then do not write in English, but Afrikaans.' Malan
considered Dutch a foreign language which did not have a place in
South Africa. Hertzog and Malan incidentally also clashed over the
Afrikaans-speaking “coloreds”, whom Hertzog maintained should remain
on the voting role as “they speak our language and belong with us.”
Malan wanted the coloreds removed from the voting roll and succeeded.
(71)
The influential Reformed Church insisted on Dutch use in the Church
over Afrikaans. As late as 1912 the Afrikaans promoter, Rev. Willem
Postma noted that the time was not yet right for an Afrikaans translation
of the Bible, since the language was “still in the making”. The Dutch
Bible and Dutch sacraments were sacrosanct and guarded by the
greater Church-order of De Mist seated in the Netherlands. In 1919 the
Stellenbosch seminary announced their acceptance that Afrikaans be
recognized next to Dutch, and the synod accepted a resolution in favor
of an Afrikaans Bible translation. There was initial widespread opposition
to the synod's decision, but D.J. Du Toit's Afrikaans Translation was
launched in 1933, the Afrikaans Psalm-book followed in 1937 and the
Afrikaans Hymn-book in 1944.
Afrikaans literature dramatically developed through the likes of writers
and poets like D.J. Du Toit (Totius), Eugène Marais, C. Louis Leipoldt,
A.G. Visser, D.F. Malherbe, C.J. Langenhoven and N.P. Van Wyk Louw.
Eugène Marais' poem Wintersnag (Winter's Evening) is considered the
herald of this rich movement. Marais was a newspaper editor of Land en
Volk in the ZAR, critical of Paul Kruger's government. He had studied
Law at the Inner Temple, and made his way back to South Africa via
East Africa intent on joining the Boers in the Boer War, though it had
ended by the time he reached South Africa. He was an outspoken
supporter of Afrikaans, once branding in an editorial, 'Jingo-Afrikaners
who despise their mother-tongue' the greatest enemies of Afrikaans.
Like D.J. Du Toit (p.147), he was a somewhat tragic figure who lost his
wife with the birth of their son. He had many interests and was a keen
observer in the fields of psychology, natural sciences and medicine. His
pen saw several significant works of poetry and prose. He fought a
morphine addiction and committed suicide on 29 March 1936.




                       Eugène Marais, literary artist.(70)
Gustav Preller predicted if only a few lines of Afrikaans survived a
hundred or more years, the poem Wintersnag might be among them.
Cornelius J. Langenhoven was an attorney from the small town of
Oudtshoorn, who became one of the foremost champions of the
Afrikaans language and one of the more colorful characters of the
Afrikaans literary world. He is renowned for his wit which he applied so
well in his humorous and satirical works. As an MP he once made the
remark in Parliament: “Half of the honorable members are donkeys.”
When instructed by the Speaker to withdraw the statement, he replied,
“Half of the honorable members are not donkeys.”
As a SAP member of the Cape Provincial Council, he succeeded in
1914 to have Afrikaans instituted as alternative to Dutch-medium
instruction in primary schools. His Afrikaans articles made an invaluable
contribution to the Afrikaans daily, Die Burger, which had as its first
editor, D.F. Malan.
    His vigorous articles in newspapers, journals and books were written
in a supple and lucid Afrikaans. He reduced the language issue to a
concise and lucid question: 'If Dutch is our language we must speak it;
if Afrikaans is our language we must write it.' (2)
He said of Afrikaans: 'It is the medium of social intercourse, the channel
of expression for the deepest and tenderest feelings of the South African
Dutch. It is interwoven with the fiber of their national character, the
language they have learnt at their mother's knee, the language of the
last farewells of their dying lips.' (2)
In terms of its phasing in as a language of instruction, he told gradualists
in a speech in 1914 to the ZA Akademie voor Taal en Letterkunde in
Bloemfontein, that postponing Afrikaans introduction until it became a
so-called cultivated language would leave English in a dominant position
while Afrikaans children were being taught that they and their language
were not only 'uncivilized' but also incapable of becoming 'civilized'. (2)




       Langenhoven commemorative stamp marking the centenary of his birth .
Langenhoven wrote the Afrikaans lyrics to the South African anthem,
Die Stem.
In 1925, due in large to the contribution of Langenhoven, Afrikaans
became used in Parliament and in 1927 was recognized as official
language next to English. (72)

In 1925 a bill was introduced in Parliament to create a national flag for
the Union to replace the existing Union flag, the Red Ensign. There was
an uproar among English South Africans over the plan the replace the
Union flag, and Natal Province threatened to cede from the Union.
A compromise design of the replacement flag had the Princes' Flag
planted by the Dutch East India Company as it was said to not be tied to
any country in particular. In the center horizontal white stripe, were the
three flags of Britain, the Free State Republic and the Transvaal
Republic. The flag would always be hoisted together with the Union
Jack. It was first hoisted on 31 May 1928. From 1957 on the Union Jack
was no longer hoisted alongside the South African flag.




                      Flag of the Union: The Red Ensign




                   Controversial South African flag from 1928
        19. THE NATIONALIST PARTY – PART II
Hertzog suggested removing African voters from the voters' roll and
doubling the size of the reserves. In 1936 he obtained the necessary
two-thirds majority to launch the plan. Blacks in the Cape would be
placed on a separate voters' roll with three elected white representatives
in the House of Assembly. Blacks in the rest of South Africa would be
represented by four senators elected by electoral colleges. A Natives
Representative Council would discuss issues affecting Africans in the
reserves and in the common area. The reserves now constituted 13
percent of South Africa's land-area. (2)
Jan Hofmeyr (nephew of the Bond leader, “Onze Jan” Hofmeyr), the
leading liberal in Parliament, thought the system unjust and based on
fear. He said white civilization would endure in South Africa only with the
consent and goodwill of the non-Europeans within the borders. Another
liberal from the Cape, F.S. Malan held a similar view, holding that
peoples' interests had to be met equally, irrespective of color. Opposing
him was the other Malan, D.F. Malan, leader of the Purified NP
(henceforth called NP), the Opposition-party. The question remained
one of white survival against a scenario where, as qualified black voters'
numbers continued to increase to parity with whites, blacks would
without doubt demand a universal franchise over a qualified one.

In 1950, South African High Commissioner in London, Albert Geyer (who
in his capacity as editor of Die Burger, was the first to coin the phrase
'apartheid') proposed a 'central council' of Africans drawn from the
various councils in the reserves and 'machinery for close contact and
consultation between the Government and reserve Councils and
eventually the Central Council.' Hendrik Verwoerd, Minister for Native
Affairs, rejected his proposal, fearing such a council could challenge
Parliament. Geyer said in another public speech: 'Either the Bantu areas
become an independent state, or there will have to be some federal
union.' (2)
Apart from Albert Geyer, the other important figure in [D.F.] Malan's
[Cape] circle was Paul Sauer, his main confidant in the NP's
parliamentary caucus. Sauer was one of the main opponents of the
colored vote. He believed he had been defeated by the colored vote in
the Stellenbosch constituency in 1924. Afterwards he often said that as
long as the colored vote held the balance of power in elections, there
would be constant friction between Afrikaners and English-speakers.
There was however, no colored homeland to use as justification for
colored political exclusion. All the NP could offer was to rehabilitate
colored people more comprehensively than the system of segregation
was doing. (2)
An influential group in the NP were neo-Calvinists from Potchefstroom
like H.G. Stoker who held to the belief of different social spheres (such
as the family and the volk) that had their grounding in the ordinances of
God's creation. (2)
Another strand of NP-members openly subscribed to Naziism. Most
prominent among them was Nico Diederichs who had studied in
Germany in the 1930s.
Hendrik Verwoerd, editor of Die Transvaler, since 1937 formed a strong
bond with J.G. Strijdom, Transvaal leader of the NP. Verwoerd's parents
had immigrated to South Africa from the Netherlands when he was two.
He had spent time in Germany in 1926 and then moved to the United
States the following year, subsequently returning to Stellenbosch
University to pursue an academic career. He was not a Nazi supporter
and did not preach a message of superiority of one racial group over
another.(2) He did however single out Jews in the 1930s for dominating
and being over-represented in certain economic sections, namely the
wholesale and retail trade, and the Cape NP had called for a halt to
Jewish immigration, adding that trading and business licenses had to be
allocated to Jews on a proportional basis to the fraction they constituted
of the white population. Verwoerd was a social engineer who believed
strongly in the concept of using demographic and sociopolitical data to
order society for its own good. (2)
     Verwoerd's analysis of the reasons for the parlous state of things
was however , both contentious and erroneous. He claimed that blacks
pushing into the labor market had edged out colored people who, in turn
had squeezed out whites. It was in the country's interests to restore
whites and coloreds to their old jobs. He conceded that it might
'superficially' look like 'having the appearance of privilege', but assured
his audience that no privilege was at stake because the difficulties could
be surmounted by employing South African blacks on the mines in the
place of foreign blacks, or by stepping up the development of the
reserves. (2)

Afrikaners, while representing the vast majority of union membership in
the 1930s, made out only 10 percent of leadership positions in
organized labor; the positions being dominated by people of English and
Jewish descent. Solly Sachs, a prominent trade unionist remarked: 'The
workers' organizations looked on the Afrikaners with an air of disdain.
[They] failed almost entirely to appreciate fully the development,
tradition, sentiments and aspirations of the masses of Afrikaners as a
people who suffered cultural, economic and political oppression.'
A DRC study observed: 'A very great disadvantage of the South African
capitalist system is that those who represent it, and wield power in it, do
not belong to the [Afrikaner] people and feel nothing for our ideals,
language and religion...' (2)
Communists were actively trying to enroll working class Afrikaners. They
had some success, but were vastly more successful in their efforts to
recruit black workers to their cause, which the DRC charged was a bid
for revolution, atheism, equality and the abolition of private property.
On the other side was the Afrikaner Broederbond, a secretive Afrikaner-
nationalist organization with mainly NP membership; its chairman from
1938 being Nico Diederichs. It was not yet the mighty influence in the
ranks of Afrikaner political leadership that it was to become from 1948,
WWII being the catalyst for its rise. Hertzog did not belong to the
organization and Smuts called it a 'dangerous, cunning, political fascist
organization.' (73)

The election of 1938 saw the UP remain in power with 104 seats and
Hertzog as PM, while Malan's Purified NP remained the Opposition with
a slightly increased 29 seats. As war clouds were gathering in Europe,
Hertzog withdrew to the seclusion of his farm. (4)
Deneys Reitz: From the start the United Party had been united only in
name. The old Nationalist stalwarts who had joined the new party under
General Hertzog in 1933 had done so with mental reservations and we
on our side had entered the pact with misgivings... Now came the
crucial test. Earlier in the year when all could see that Europe would
soon be plunged in conflict, General Hertzog had repeatedly promised
that that he would summon Parliament before he decided on war. But
he never undertook to consult Parliament should he decide not to go to
war, and it never struck anyone to question him on the point. (4)
A technicality in the administration of Parliament which had to be
addressed, forced Hertzog to summon Parliament for a three-day
Session. It so happened that on the morning of Friday, September 1 st,
1939, the day before Parliament convened for the Session, Hitler
invaded Poland. It was expected that Britain and France would soon be
at war with Germany. It was impossible for Hertzog to avoid the issue.
On the Saturday, Hertzog promised an announcement on the Monday.
Hertzog called a special Cabinet meeting that same afternoon at
Grootte Schuur, his Ministerial residence.
Hertzog gave a speech in which he made his case for South Africa
remaining neutral. He argued that Hitler, who had greatly reconstructed
Germany, might win the war and that the British connection would
always drag South Africa into its wars. Smuts made his case for
standing by the Empire. Hertzog declared his intention to move a
Resolution for South African neutrality in Parliament on the Monday.
It was clear that the United Party would split into the old Smuts and
Hertzog camps. On the Monday, Smuts responded to Hertzog's
neutrality-resolution with a counter-resolution in a powerful speech.
Hertzog's supporters also had the 29 Opposition votes, while Smuts'
supporters could rely on the minority parties: 7 'Dominionites', 4 Labor
MPs and 3 Native Representatives. Smuts' counter-resolution was
carried with 80 votes against 67 in favor of Hertzog's neutrality-
resolution. After Hertzog resigned his Office, Jan Smuts became Prime
Minister for a second time. Smuts formed a new cabinet with the
following members:
Prime Minister and Minister of Defence: Jan Smuts
Deputy PM and Minister of Native Affairs: Deneys Reitz
Finance: Jan Hofmeyr
Agriculture: Colonel Collins (A Boer War veteran under the late General
Louis Botha)
Justice: Dr Colin Steyn (Son of M.T. Steyn)
Railways: Claude Sturrock (Called a canny Scotsman by Deneys Reitz)
Lands: Senator Conroy
Posts and Telegraphs: Mr Clarkson (from Natal)
Interior: Harry Lawrence
Commerce and Industries: Mr Stuttaford (Successful merchant from the
Cape)
Mines: Colonel Stallard (Leader of the Dominion Party)
Labor: Walter Madeley
Minister without Portfolio: Major Piet van der Byl (Had fought in WWI) (4)

In 1940 Hertzog and D.F. Malan joined forces to form the Herenigde
Nasionale Party (HNP)(Reformed Nationalist Party) or Volksparty, on the
same principles and policies of the former NP. In November of the same
year Hertzog retired from the HNP and D.F. Malan became leader.

South Africa's major contributions in WWII were in campaigns in Italy
and North Africa, notably the Battle of El Alamein and the fall of Tobruk.
South Africans served in the RAF and took Madagascar from the Vichy
French. 334 000 South Africans of all races served in WWII, which saw
11 900 killed, 35 percent of which were Afrikaners. (4) They had joined
mostly for socio-economic reasons.(2) Smuts served as field marshal in
the Imperial War Cabinet. Smuts was a co-signatory of the Treaty of
Paris, making him the only person to have co-signed the Treaties of both
World Wars.
A group of Nazi-sympathizers belonged to an ultra-nationalistic Afrikaner
organization called the Ossewa Brandwag (Ox-wagon Sentinel) which
was responsible for acts of sabotage in South Africa. The members were
rounded up and detained at a camp at Koffiefontein in the Northern
Cape. Among them were future PM in the Presidency of Nic Diederichs,
John Vorster and future Secret Police head, Hendrik van den Bergh.

In the 1943 election the HNP of Malan won 43 seats in Parliament. In
1947 he reached an alliance agreement with N.C. Havenga's Afrikaner
Party (AP) to partake in the 1948 election. The HNP won 70 seats and
the AP 9. D.F. Malan became Prime Minister. In 1951 the HNP and AP
united under the old name, National Party.




                           Daniël François Malan

In January 1944, D.F. Malan elaborated on why he had used the word
“apartheid” in Parliament: 'I do not use the term segregation, because it
has been interpreted as fencing off, but rather apartheid, which will give
the various races the opportunity of uplifting themselves on the basis of
what is their own.' Verwoerd would say something similar: “Every people
or nation is responsible for their own destiny.”

In 1942, Smuts declared that the policy to prevent black urbanization,
and to keep black and white apart had failed. 'Isolation has gone and
segregation has fallen on evil days.' The Smuts-government also began
reforming social policy. Provisions for old age pensions, grants for
invalids and unemployment services were improved and the principle
established that that Africans had to be included in any social security
scheme and in any legislation affecting such benefits. Africans would
also be allowed to qualify for many professions at white universities,
instead of only studying at Fort Hare College. During the ten years up to
Wars-end, government spending on black schooling increased 300
percent. Black wages in manufacturing were increasing sharply.

The Fagan Commission was appointed by the Smuts-government in
1946 to investigate changes to segregation. The Commission
challenged the development of a policy towards blacks solely in context
of the reserves. It noted that a stream of black labor was 'flowing into the
Union... as the most industrialized of all countries in Southern and
Central Africa.' The flow could be 'guided and regulated, and may
perhaps even be limited... but not stopped or reversed'. Any policy that
was based on the idea that blacks in the cities were all migrants rooted
in the reserves, would be a false policy. The commission outlined three
options: Total segregation was impractical. It also rejected equality (no
discrimination) and recommended a midway, a policy that whites and
blacks will develop side-by-side, economically intertwined as part of the
same big machine.(2) At the time the report was published, Smuts'
popularity stood at an all-time low. (75) The Nationalists responded with a
commission of their own, the Sauer Commission in 1947, headed by
Paul Sauer. The Commission called the influx of black workers into the
cities a 'problem'. The report made an ideological case for black
fatherlands, and called for 'total Apartheid between whites and
Natives...the eventual ideal and goal.' Black unions could not be allowed
'at this stage.' The report called for the removal of 'surplus' black labor
and the mobilization of sufficient labor to where it was required. (2)

In 1946 the Smuts government passed a Bill that separated white and
Asian areas. Asians (mainly Indians in Natal) had been successful far
beyond their 3 percent of the population of South Africa, owning 19
percent of retail enterprises by 1950 and buying up white land. Asians
would have to be represented by white delegates in Parliament and the
Provincial Councils. Hofmeyr wrote to Smuts: 'It is the last straw
breaking the camel's back and I cannot be party to it.' The Cape
coloreds were represented by the CAD (Coloured Affairs Department)
and CAC (Coloured Advisery Council) while Africans voted through the
NRC (Natives Representative Council.) The African National Congress
(ANC) supported the NRC in the 1930s, while the more radical All Africa
Convention (AAC) boycotted it. In colored circles, militancy was
increasing against the CAD and CAC. (2)
                 20. DEFENDING APARTHEID
N.P. Van Wyk Louw was an Afrikaans poet and scholar, one of the
foremost writers from the 1930s. He was a Nationalist, who defended
the concept of separate development as 'the typical tragic situation of
history: two “rights” [the white and the black right to self-determination]
which confronted each other implacably.' Blacks were numerically
superior while whites, Afrikaners in particular, held the upper hand
politically, economically and militarily. Either this 'stale-mate' could be
resolved by the 'ploughing under' of the less numerous group or by the
'separate development' of each,(2) which appeared to him the peaceful
solution.
He called Hofmeyr's proposal of 'going forward in faith' with steady
expansion of the franchise, as bordering on irresponsibility. He pointed
out that while Britain was an ethnically homogenous society, South
Africa was a heterogeneous society.
    He expressed his frustration in the following terms: abstractly
formulated, the demands for 'freedom, equal rights and equal
opportunities' were 'almost evidently fair.' However, applied to South
Africa, these demands would mean that 'a small, relatively highly
developed Afrikaner people and the English section would be reduced
to an impotent minority in a black mass.' Hence 'to be liberal in South
Africa looks to the Afrikaner – who unlike the English-speakers does not
have another country to flee to – like national suicide and individual
destruction.'... Afrikaners were not a small colonial group of 'officials and
merchants', like the whites in British and Dutch India, but a volk rooted
in the land. In a statement that went well beyond the conventional fears
of black rule he wrote that if the Afrikaners became a minority 'they
would be as helpless as the Jew was in Germany.' (2)

Afrikaner nationalists argued that their survival as a volk was
inseparable from maintaining racial exclusivity. Apartheid was the only
policy, they argued, that systematically pursued that end. Apartheid with
its racist outcomes was not a goal in itself; political survival was. In his
book, Het die Afrikaanse volk 'n toekoms? (Does the Afrikaans volk have
a future?) G.D. Scholtz, historian and editor of Die Transvaler, pointed
out that Afrikaners never had the luxury of 'safety in numbers.' (2)
Piet Cillié, next to Verwoerd the most articulate apartheid apologist,
wrote in 1952 that 'South Africa was remarkably free from racial
mythologies.' The Afrikaners' desire to survive was a far stronger and a
more indestructible feeling than race prejudice. 'Like the Jews in
Palestine and the Muslims in Pakistan, the Afrikaners had not fought
themselves free from British dominion only to be overwhelmed by a
majority of a different kind. Eventually we shall give that majority its
freedom, but never power over us... '(2)

L.E. Neame, liberal editor of The Cape Argus, took issue with the
argument that apartheid was based solely on the claim that the white
race was inherently superior to all others. An unreasoning prejudice
against color was not the root of the matter. The problem is 'national
rather than pigmental. Differentiation is not enforced as a brand of
inferiority but as a bulwark against the infiltration of people of another
civilization. The motive is not detraction but defense.' (2)

Geoff Cronjé, a sociologist had an obsession with racial purity. He used
interracial slums as an example where whites would lose their ethnic
ties, develop feelings of equality with those not white, and become
conditioned to blood mixing. He insisted on a legal ban on interracial
sex. (2)
In an 1939 lecture, Alfred Hoernlé outlined three possible futures for
South Africa.
   1. Parallelism: in which different races would be subjugated to a
      “master group.”
   2. Assimilation: in which all racial differences would be obliterated.
   3. Separation: total dissociation to render impossible the very
      possibility of domination of one over another. Like Hofmeyr,
      Hoernlé doubted if whites would be willing to make the enormous
      sacrifices that would be required to make it a reality. (2)

Van Wyk Louw considered Hoernlé's option of 'separation' as a possible
solution for South Africa. True nationalism would have to be true for
everyone. Hence, 'we [Afrikaners] should not speak of ourselves as the
volk [nation] of South Africa, but as one of the volke of South Africa.' (2)
Van Wyk Louw added an ethical dimension to Afrikaner survival through
the phrase voortbestaan in geregtigheid (“survival with justice” or “a just
existence”) – which insisted that national death might be preferable to
ethnic survival reliant on injustice. 'Can a small volk survive for long if it
becomes something hateful, something evil, in the eyes of the best in –
or outside – its fold?' (2)
Another scenario Van Wyk Louw envisioned was one where a great
number of Afrikaner people doubted in themselves 'whether we ought to
survive as a volk.' Afrikaners will continue to survive on an individual
basis and may even prosper, but no longer constitute a distinctive volk:
'they would be absorbed in either an Anglo-Saxon or Bantu-speaking
nation.'
Another scenario or crisis affecting survival of Afrikaners as an ethno-
national group, would be establishment of a great non-Afrikaner majority
by way of a state-sponsored mass-immigration, as was attempted by
Lord Alfred Milner [and in latter times, by the ANC-government through
its legal policy of representivity (representiveness) and integration, which
currently obligates every institution and business to reflect the racial
constitution of South Africa, and has relegated Afrikaners to a minority in
institutions which their forbears had founded to be an inheritance for
them, and which had maintained close ties to their culture.]

Several Stellenbosch academics and leaders of the Missions
Commission of the DRC in the Transvaal, suggested the idea of an
institute that would study the complex racial issue. Broederbond
delegates met with Stellenbosch academics, and on 23 September 1948
SABRA (Suid-Afrikaanse Buro vir Rasse-aangeleenthede) was founded
with one full-time organizer, H.B. Thom. SABRA emphasized the
importance of the homelands, and helped create the Thomlinson report
in the 1950s, which told Verwoerd it would take R10 billion (1998
currency value) to develop the reserves into self-sufficient economies.
In the mid 1970s, when it was becoming increasingly evident that
apartheid had failed, SABRA began to research the possibility of an
Afrikaner homeland. The research was led by the social demographer
Dr Chris Jooste. Dr Jooste's books, 'n Volkstaat vir Boere-Afrikaners
(a Nation-state for Boer-Afrikaners) and Lesse uit die Joodse Besetting
van Palestina (Lessons from the Jewish Settlement of Palestine) would
serve as inspiration for Missions-professor Carel Boshoff's Orania
settlement, which came into existance in the 1990s.




                        Chris Jooste, Architect of Orania.
The Smuts-government had moved financial responsibility for black
education onto the shoulders of central government. In 1948 the new NP
government established a commission of inquiry under Werner Eiselen,
into the needs of native education. The report expressed concern over
the lack of a 'group feeling' among blacks. It said that African cultures
were dynamic and could serve as the context for the modernization of
native peoples. Instead of imitating English culture, the system had to
instill pride in their own (volkseie) – that is: their own history, customs,
habits, character and mentality. The report strongly emphasized mother-
tongue education. As a result, ethnic language education became
compulsory in education. Verwoerd, in announcing the new system said
that the black child had been subjected to a school system 'which drew
him away from his own community and practically misled him by
showing him the green pastures of the European, but still did not allow
him to pasture there.' He would be facing a color bar or a ceiling below
that of whites in a white community; however, within his own community
'all doors are open.' In addition to serving his own community in the
envisaged black states, he could serve the black community in the
common area as teachers, nurses, policemen, etc. Verwoerd was
criticized for his statement that it would serve no purpose to teach a
black child mathematics if he or she would not utilize it. In the end
though, the syllabuses were largely the same for both black and white
schools. The majority of black schools wanted to have English- or
Afrikaans-medium education after the eighth year. Only one per cent
wanted their mother tongue. (2)
In practice government funding could not keep pace with the rapidly
growing black school population and per capita spending on black pupils
were about 10 per cent of their white counterpart. The government
located most of the new schools offering the highest standards of
education inside the reserves, frustrating urban blacks. The 1950s saw a
doubling of black pupils, while Westernized Africans continued to refer to
the system as 'gutter education', designed to prepare blacks for a
marginal place. Act 45 in 1959 made provision for universities in the
homelands offering mother-tongue tuition. Universities were also
segregated by race. Black or colored students could attend courses at
white universities only if their own universities did not offer it. One of the
main objectives of the policy was to remove black students from the
influence of liberal academics in the city environment. (2)
   Students at the 'bush colleges' did not become the leaders of their
respective ethnic communities, as the apartheid system envisaged, but
the most disaffected elements in the subordinate population. [It] failed to
produce the 'apartheid man' among the subordinates...(2)
In 1976 Carel Boshoff, a missionary and son-in-law of Hendrik
Verwoerd, in his capacity as chairperson of SABRA and Broederbond
member, led discussions aimed at developing a practical 'master plan'
for making the homelands feasible. Conservatives in the Bond
suggested linking up the townships and the homelands, and
consolidating patchworks of territories, as well as a rapid transit system
for homeland laborers. They realized it would take something
imaginative and drastic for the system to work. However economic
realities had made the Witwatersrand and other central areas the
industrial heartland of South Africa, which nothing that was conceivable
in the homelands at that time could match as a job-creating force. The
rapidly increasing numbers of the black population was also weighing
against the homelands-idea. (2)
    Government attention was increasingly directed to the common area.
It asked whites to hold back on demands and to accept reduced social
spending in order to reduce the gap between whites and blacks. The
assumption was that income gains would moderate black political
demands. (2)
     The subsistence crisis of the homelands sent desperate people
streaming to squatter camps in towns and cities, breaking down the
system of influx control with their feet and their numbers. Blacks took
heart from the collapse of the Portuguese empire in Mozambique and
Angola. Black schools and universities sent people out into the world
determined to challenge the basic assumptions of the system. (2)




                              Homelands map
   21. SOCIAL ENGINEERING GETS PERSONAL

The Population Registration Act of 1950 (the Bill was introduced by NP
Minister of the Interior Eben Dönges) classified every citizen into one of
four categories: white, colored, Asian or African, and further subdivided
Africans and coloreds into ethnological groups, like Zulu or Xhosa,
Griqua or Cape colored.
     The law transformed apartheid from a loose body of segregation
measures into a system, imposing a tight racial grid.
Putting colored people in a rigid statutory pigeonhole was particularly
difficult... Jan Smuts thought of them when he responded to the
Population Registration Bill. 'Don't let us trifle with this thing', he
pleaded. '[We] are touching on things which go pretty deep in this land.'
He called it an attempt to 'classify the unclassifiable' and reminded the
government that fifteen years earlier a commission had found racial
registration impractical... (2)
One's racial classification would fundamentally affect all aspects of one's
life, social, economic and political.
      ...every year Parliament experienced the absurdity of government
announcements of how many whites had been reclassified as coloreds
(or the other way round), and how many coloreds were now deemed to
be Africans.
A system of race classification had as a corollary a ban on sex between
whites and people who were not white... The Prohibition of Mixed
Marriages act of 1949 extended the 1927 ban on marriages between
whites and blacks to cover all marriages between white people and
those not deemed white. (2)
      Classification caused human tragedies of the cruelest kind. Some
lovers classified in different categories, on finding they could not marry
legally, committed suicide. (2)
   The Immorality Act of 1950 outlawed carnal intercourse between a
white and non-white. (2)
The Immorality Act was only erased from the books in 1985. By that time
it had caused much misery. 11 500 people had been convicted and
many charged. Offenders included ordinary people, church ministers,
school teachers and even a secretary to a prime minister. Facing
widespread ostracism, some white offenders committed suicide or
emigrated. (2)

Cape Town had been spared separate living areas by decree, until the
1950 Group Areas Act assigned people their neighborhoods by race.
The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act separated white and non-
white to separate public facilities, entrances, toilets, rail carriages etc.
    In adopting [residential segregation] the government, as earlier, had
greatly underestimated the scale of the undertaking. When the Act was
introduced, Dönges stated that persons of a single group occupied 80 to
90 per cent of the different residential areas in South African towns and
cities. Separation should not be difficult, therefore. But the law had a far
more drastic impact. When the government announced its detailed
proposals for Cape Town, the UP-controlled City Council was so
shocked that it boycotted the public hearings. Eventually one out of
every four colored people and one out of six Asian people (against only
one in 666 whites) across the country had to move. The most
controversial action occurred in the second half of the 1960s, with the
removal of 65 000 coloreds from District Six, a vibrant but crime-infested
inner city ward of Cape Town, where whites, many of them slumlords,
owned 56 per cent of the property. (2)
Residents were moved to the Cape Flats, Mitchell's Plain and Atlantis.

To curb the flow of blacks into the cities, a process called “influx control”,
Verwoerd proposed the industrialization of the border regions of the
homelands. Border-industries would allow migrants to return to the
reserves at day's end. Pass law compelled black men in the cities to
carry passes. The Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952 imposed
harsher influx controls, like obligating professional blacks to carry
passes like the day laborers, and giving jobless blacks in urban areas
only 72 hours to register at a labor bureau. From 1957 women also had
to carry passes.
    The permanently urbanized Africans were considered the apartheid
system's elite. They, too, had to carry passes, but they did not have to
register at a labor bureau and they were first in line for government
housing. At the bottom of the pile were black migrants and farm workers
with extremely limited chances...Black migrant workers had to accept
whatever contract they were offered by a labor bureau. They could not
go out and search for work on their own. Separated from their families
for the greatest part of the year, such workers lived in degrading
conditions in single-sex hostels. And, because of the absence of adult
men from the reserves, the agricultural land there were not worked
properly, in turn forcing more men to become migrants. (2)

The Sharpeville Massacre of 21 March 1960 resulted from a
demonstration against bearing of passbooks. 69 people were killed by
police when protesters converged on a police station. The 5 000–7000
strong crowd had grown to about 19 000 and the peaceful protest turned
hostile. Among the dead were eight women and ten children. Some of
the casualties had been shot in the back. A police report claimed that
young and inexperienced policemen had panicked and opened fire.
It pointed out that two months before, nine constables had been killed in
similar conditions in Cato Manor. The policemen also had no prior riot
control training. (76)

In January 1961, Dag Hammerskjöld, in his capacity as Secretary
General of the United Nations, paid an official visit to South Africa. He
had six off-the-record meetings with Verwoerd in six days. Verwoerd
considered the UN's expectation of speedy integration of South Africa
unacceptable. Hammerskjöld then posed the question if apartheid could
be made a feasible alternative to integration. For the homelands policy
to be the basis for that alternative, Hammerskjöld demanded that the
government set aside a sufficient and coherent territory for blacks,
publish a plan for their economic development, and introduce institutions
based on the will of the people that would lead to independence if the
people so desired. At the same time, Africans working outside the
homelands would have to be entitled to similar rights and protection as
in those Western countries that housed foreign workers, and in
particular, entitlement to full citizenship of South Africa after prolonged
residence.(2) Hammerskjöld was killed shortly afterward in a plane crash
in the Congo. The government introduced limited local government
structures to urban Africans later that same year, and the Transkei
received self-government with the prospect of independence.
On 31 May 1961, 59 years after the Treaty of Vereeniging brought an
end to the Boer War and 51 years after the Union was formed, South
Africa became a Republic. Verwoerd appointed a new Minister of
Justice, John Vorster, who made state security his highest priority. The
same year, the ANC under Nelson Mandela, formed an armed wing,
Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation)(MK). Leading members of
MK were rounded up in July 1963 at their hideout in the Johannesburg
suburb of Rivonia. Nelson Mandela was also arrested. They were
charged with 221 acts of sabotage and sentenced to life-imprisonment
during what became known as the Rivonia trial. Also arrested was well-
known communist Afrikaner Bram Fischer, who admitted preparations
had been underway for guerrilla warfare since 1962. In 1962 a UN
resolution was passed, calling on member states to impose diplomatic
sanctions on South Africa, while the Security Council agreed on an arms
embargo.
On 9 April 1960 at an agricultural show, a respected farmer, David Pratt
shot and wounded Verwoerd. He claimed he was shooting at the
'epitome of apartheid.' Pratt was declared 'mentally disordered and
epileptic'. On 1 October 1961 he hanged himself at Bloemfontein Mental
Hospital. On 6 September 1966, Verwoerd was assassinated in
Parliament by a parliamentary messenger, Dimitri Tsafendas. Tsafendas
was also declared insane. Verwoerd was succeeded by John Vorster.
Conspiracy theories centered around Vorster, whose acceptance
speech happened to be neatly typed and lying on his desk on the
morning of Verwoerd's murder, and who had close ties to the notorious
State Security Chief Hendrik van den Bergh, former fellow internee at
Koffiefontein. (77, 78)




                              H.F. Verwoerd

In 1973 the UN General Assembly declared apartheid a crime against
humanity. South African athletes had been barred from competing in the
Olympic Games and diplomatic sanctions and the arms embargo had
been extended to general economic and cultural boycotts. In 1974 PM
B.J. (John) Vorster's government passed the Afrikaans Medium Decree
proposed by Minister of Education, Andries Treurnicht, to compel black
schools in South Africa to switch to a 50:50 mix of English and Afrikaans
education. African languages would only be used for religious and social
studies instruction. It was another attempt to drive blacks into the
homelands by telling them that South Africa outside the confines of the
homelands was not their country. Pupils in Soweto boycotted school and
a mass rally was held on June 16. Police loosed dogs on the students
who responded by stoning the dogs to death. Also stoned to death was
Dr Melville Edelstein, a white man who had dedicated his life to social
uplifting of blacks. The mob that stoned him placed a sign around his
neck which read: “Beware Afrikaaners”. As the incident was a focus of
the propaganda war of the time, it is unclear how many people were
killed by police (anywhere between 23 and 600) and how many of those
were children. Thirteen year-old Hector Peterson became the symbol of
the uprising and his grave has been declared a national monument. (79)
The incident greatly underscored South Africa's pariah-status in the
world. When, in October 1976 Transkei was declared independent, no
country would recognize that status; instead deriding it as a 'puppet
state' of the apartheid regime.

Meanwhile the Cold War had come to South African shores. Operation
Savannah was underway in Angola, Rhodesia was locked in civil war,
with Ian Smith's prospects not looking up, civil war was erupting in
Mozambique and the ANC-Communist Party alliance were threatening
to take South Africa on the same path as its neighbors. All the turmoil
was supported by the Soviet Union. Fighters were armed with AK-47s
and RPG-7s and Soviet made mines, grenades, rockets and larger
weaponry.
              22. COLD WAR SOUTH AFRICA

In the 1920s the Comintern instructed the Communist Party of South
Africa to adopt its Native Republic thesis, which stipulated that South
Africa belonged to the Natives; that it was the black peoples' state. The
party was banned in 1950 and went underground. Inside the Soviet
Union and its loyalist regime in Cuba, human rights were not high on the
agenda. The saying goes: “Hitler killed millions, but Stalin killed tens of
millions.” Theirs was an oppressive system where persons were
incarcerated for subversive activity against the Communist State if
caught in possession of a Bible! All property were state-owned, all media
state-controlled, communist indoctrination was a normal part of everyday
life, government-critics often disappeared, there was corrective training
for those considered a subversive influence, military spending was huge
with compulsory military service, and WMD were stockpiled. It is safe to
say such a regime's interest in Southern Africa was strategic rather than
humanitarian. The importance of the Southern sea route around the
Cape did not escape attention.

Recent research by prof Stephen Ellis of Leiden University indicates that
even Nelson Mandela was a member of the SA Communist Party.
According to writer Mark Gevisser, who had been allowed access to
sensitive ANC-documents, 29 of the 30 senior leaders in the ANC's
national executive committee in the 1970s and 80s were secret
members of the SACP. Ellis claims it was the SACP that declared war
on Pretoria in 1960 and forced the fatal decision on the ANC. (80)

In the 1970s Angola was split into three armed factions, FAPLA (armed
wing of MPLA), UNITA and the FNLA of Holden Roberto. MPLA/FAPLA
(holding the coastal areas) was supported by the Soviet Union, while
UNITA (central-south) and FNLA (northern regions) had been befriended
by the CIA. Holden Roberto was a typical Third-world warlord who took
power by confiscating farms and killing everyone in sight. Under his
reign of terror a thousand whites had been killed, over which he
boasted: 'This time the slaves did not cower. They massacred
everything.'(81) FAPLA held the capitol Luanda, which Roberto's force
wanted to pry from them. FAPLA was organizing itself to defend its
position with aid of Cuban military instructors. South Africa, at that time
was fighting SWAPO (South West African People's Organization) in
South West Africa. SWAPO, led by Sam Nujoma, was founded in the
northern area of Ovamboland and saw itself as liberation force fighting
for freedom of South West Africa, which was under South African
administration at the time. SWAPO's armed wing was called PLAN –
People's Liberation Army of Namibia. After the Portuguese had given up
Angola, the Vorster-government feared that Angola would become a
refuge for PLAN-guerillas, where they could regroup, train and launch
insurgencies into South West Africa. Such insurgencies were marked by
mining of farm roads, murder of chiefs considered friendly to South
Africa and abduction of children for training as PLAN fighters. (82)
In August 1975 South African forces entered southern Angola to guard
the Ruacana-Calueque hydro-electric facility, which supplied electricity
to South West Africa, against the fighting. Soon afterward they formed
the mobile combat group Foxbat, to protect Unita against a FAPLA
offensive in the south. Liaising with the CIA, South African Task Force
Zulu launched Operation Savannah in October to drive FAPLA from the
south and assist Roberto in taking Luanda. Zulu advanced rapidly. Fidel
Castro sent a 652-strong battalion of Cuban Special Forces to assist
FAPLA. Roberto's FNLA, with assistance from Zairian troops and a 52-
man South African artillery contingent, was defeated in the north at the
Battle of Quifangondo. The South African WWII-era artillery were no
match for the modern Soviet BM-21 multiple rocket launchers. Twenty-
six South Africans were extracted via the coastal town of Ambrizete by
two South African navy frigates. Zulu's advance from the south became
bogged down by heavy rains which turned the dirt roads into slush. The
Eland armored cars (South African built Panhard AML) had almost no
mobility and FAPLA had destroyed all bridges that could assist the
South African advance. FAPLA's resolve strengthened and by
December they had assistance from about 3 700 Cuban troops. In
South Africa the seriousness of the situation began to be suspected
when the most extensive military call-up in its history was announced.
The South Africans withdrew after losing 49 men (listed at the time as
MIA) and a number of vehicles.(83) A number of the casualties resulted
when a Puma helicopter was brought down by friendly fire.

With an arms embargo in place, the last loopholes of which were in the
process of being closed, a local armaments industry became a priority
for John Vorster and his Defense Minister, P.W. Botha. Armscor was
founded as a parastatal arms manufacturer and the booming defense
industry sprouted many high-tech private contractors. In addition to
small arms and ammunition, the Ratel infantry fighting vehicle was built,
sporting long range six-wheeled mobility, land mine protection and a
host of gun turrets. The G5 and the mobile G6 howitzers, based on a
gun design by the infamous Gerald Bull, could fire a 155 mm projectile
out to 42 km (27 miles) with very high accuracy (84) and a multiple rocket
launcher, mortars and range of fragmentation and cluster bombs
rounded off the fire support arsenal. Plans were obtained for local
assembly of the Mirage III and F1 and Puma helicopter and the Italian
Aermacchi trainer. The WWII-era Centurion tank was upgraded to the
Olifant with a diesel engine, redesigned suspension and new gun and
computerized fire-control system, and the 8X8 Rooikat armored car was
developed. The industry focused on force-multiplication, giving a small
army the maximum advantage through high technology. This approach
included development (through clandestine international cooperation) of
modern jam-resistant frequency-hopping communications and radar,
electronic surveillance equipment, electronic fuses, guided bombs and
missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, the Cheetah upgrade of the Mirage
III and the Oryx upgrade of the Puma to the equivalent of Eurocopter
Super Puma; as well as an ambitious project to launch military satellites.
A number of naval vessels were built, including the sophisticated SAS
Drakensberg.(84) Remarkable projects, given that military spending
averaged well under five percent of GDP! In 1993 South Africa became
the first country to dismantle its entire nuclear arsenal and abandon its
military nuclear capability.




                          G6-Rhino mobile artillery

Another major operation that did not go as intended by the SADF, was
the intricately orchestrated attack on Cassinga in 1978, part of a greater
and largely successful operation against SWAPO called Reindeer.
Operation Reindeer entailed major assaults on SWAPO bases in
southern Angola. The Chetaquera and Dombondela bases were located
near the border with South West Africa, about 35 km inside Angola, and
were attacked successfully with a combination of air strikes and
mechanized infantry using the new Ratel IFV. But Cassinga (SWAPO
codename 'Moscow') was further to the north, 260 km from the border.
Intelligence had indicated it to be one of two SWAPO HQ's inside
Angola; the other being further north at Lubango. Photo reconnaissance
had shown a network of trenches, anti aircraft guns, a star shaped SA-2
type anti aircraft missile facility and other military infrastructure. It also
had shown a school bus, hijacked earlier in South West Africa. The
surprise attack entailed air strikes followed by an attack by airborne
infantry. Seventeen transport helicopters (Pumas and Super Frelons)
would be waiting at the extraction zone to extract the paratroopers after
the attack. General Constant Viljoen, who believed a general's place
was at the front line, flew in on board one of the helicopters. In
command at the SWA tactical HQ was Major General Ian Gleeson. The
composite parachute battalion of 2 and 3 Parachute Battalions, flying in
aboard four C-130 Hercules and five C-160 Transall transport aircraft,
was under command of Colonel Jan Breytenbach. The helicopter
extraction zone was guarded by two Hawk Groups (ten-man sections of
rapid-reaction paratroopers) from 1 Parachute Battalion. An airborne
reserve company from 2 Parachute Battalion in a C160 Transall stood
by, should reinforcements be required. There was also a mobile air
operations team under Commandant James Kriel, to set up and run a
Helicopter Administration Area. A Cessna light aircraft flew as
observation and radio relay (Telstar) aircraft and, in a holding pattern
over the SWA-Angola border, was a DC-4 Strikemaster EW and ELINT
aircraft, to intercept enemy communications and jam their networks at
the appropriate time. The jamming of communications was the reason
for the delay in response by the Angolan and Cuban forces.
The risky attack was led by four Canberra medium bombers carrying
300 Alpha anti-personnel bomblets each, and five Buccaneer bombers,
each carrying eight 1000 lb (450 kg) bombs. A sixth Buccaneer carried
seventy-two 68 mm rockets. Four Mirage III with two sidewinders and 30
mm cannon provided added security against Angolan intervention. One
Canberra crew was tasked with photo reconnaissance following their
attack to help plan the Buccaneer attack and to determine the drop zone
for the airborne assault. A potentially fatal error occurred at this stage.
Air-photo interpreters put the wrong scale on the images, despite the
altimeter readings clearly visible on the photographs. Compounding the
error, the lead aircraft, distracted by the bombing, issued the 'jump'
signal a few seconds late. The result was that many paratroopers
overshot their intended drop zone, some landing in a river, others on the
far side of the river. One missing paratrooper was presumed drowned.
With the element of surprise lost as the paratroopers struggled to
regroup on the ground, PLAN soldiers were able to prepare defensive
positions and PLAN leaders including Dimo Amaambo and Geenwell
Matongo, two principle targets, made their escape. Two rifle platoons
that landed in their intended drop zone attacked the northern part of the
base and sealed the northern escape route and D-company secured the
southern escape and prepared a tank ambush on the road to
Techamutete. A and B-companies attacked the base from the north
rather than from the east as planned. Inside the base they came under
heavy sniper fire, and B-10 gun fire. The aircraft had meanwhile
returned to their respective bases in SWA (Ondangwa and Grootfontein)
to refuel and rearm for a possible second strike. Of the thirty-two 1000 lb
(450kg) bombs dropped by the Buccaneers, 24 had scored direct hits on
hard targets, causing heavy destruction. The bombers were used later in
the day for the attack on the Chetequera complex. The sole rocket-
armed Buccaneer remained over Cassinga to provide close air support.
A and B-companies were now pinned down by close, accurate fire from
a number of ZPU-4 anti-aircraft guns directed at them. Two paratroopers
were seriously wounded. The CAS Buccaneer could not strike the guns
for fear of hitting the paratroopers. Colonel Breytenbach ordered his
mortar team to direct fire on the guns, while D-company was instructed
to fight their way through the trenches at the west of the base, towards
the guns. The men from D-company were surprised to find a number of
civilians inside the trenches. They took heavy fire from PLAN soldiers
and returned fire in what they described later as a mode of “kill or be
killed” in which hitting civilians caught in the crossfire could not be
prevented. 9-Platoon meanwhile entered the trenches from the north. By
the time the guns had been silenced, 95 SWAPO soldiers were dead in
the trenches and two paratroopers. As the base was being mopped up
and the wounded treated, a radio intercept indicated that the Cuban
force at Techamutete was underway. The CAS Buccaneer spotted thirty
AFVs and APCs advancing slowly up the road from Techamutete. The
Buccaneer attacked, destroying three BTR-152 APCs, before returning
to base to refuel and rearm. All that now held up the Cuban advance
were the 22 men of the anti-armor platoon deployed further up the road,
with ten RPG-7 rocket launchers and five mines they had planted in the
road. The extraction of the paratroopers was chaotic and improvised,
and there was some confusion among the commanders at the extraction
zone as to what the emergency was about. The first wave of the
extraction got underway though. The ambush in the road destroyed a
T-34 by landmine and four BTR-152s were taken out by RPG-7 fire,
before the ambushers retreated to the extraction zone. By the time the
armored column had come into hearing distance of the beleaguered
paratroopers, a Buccaneer and two Mirage IIIs appeared overhead. The
Buccaneer destroyed two tanks with its rockets, while taking fire from a
towed 14.5 mm anti-aircraft gun. It made two passes under continuous
fire, before being properly lined up to strike the gun with its rockets. The
Mirages strafed the convoy with their twin 30 mm guns and destroyed
ten APCs. At this time, General Constant Viljoen, still waiting to be
extracted with the remainder of the paratroopers, removed and hid his
beret and rank insignia. The seventeen helicopters now arrived for the
last wave of the extraction, but their arrival had betrayed the position of
the extraction zone to the armored column, which immediately made for
it. The men could see trees being flattened as the column approached.
The Cubans began firing their guns from two hundred meters away. The
Buccaneer pilot, having expended his rockets, swooped dangerously
low over the treeline in a series of dummy runs to distract the column.
Due to the chaotic first wave of the extraction, there was nearly not
enough room on the helicopters for all the men. Some equipment had to
be dumped, and 40 SWAPO prisoners were left behind. Ten minutes
after taking off, two Pumas were ordered to turn back and make a final
swoop of the area to make sure no paratroopers had been left behind.
They came under fire, a round from a tank barely missing one helicopter.
They could see only the SWAPO almost-prisoners still huddled together.
Buccaneers and a Mirage III returned later to further harass Cuban
armor in the area.
The casualties suffered by the SWAPO base at Cassinga were 624
dead and 611 injured. Among the dead were 167 women and 298
teenagers and children. Since SWAPO combatants included women and
teenagers, and since many combatants did not wear uniforms, it was not
clear which casualties were combatants and which civilians. SWAPO
claimed the South Africans had attacked a refugee camp. The
International Red Cross concluded that the camp was both a military
and a refugee camp. Two days later, on May 6 th, 1978, SWAPO-leader
Sam Nujoma addressed the United Nations at their invitation, before the
Security Council passed Resolution 428, condemning 'the armed
invasion of Angola carried out on 4 May 1978.' (85) Angola and Namibia
still remember the attack as the “Cassinga Massacre” and Namibia has
declared 4 May a public holiday, called “Cassinga Day”.
Civilians were not spared in Umkhonto we Sizwe and their comrades'
armed struggles. In 1978 and 1979, ZANU-Zipra fighters in Rhodesia,
close allies of MK, downed two Vickers Viscount passenger liners with
SA-7 missiles, and gunned down ten of the survivors in one of the
wreckages on the ground.(96) In the 1980s MK bombed several soft
targets in South Africa: In 1983 the Church Street bomb in Pretoria,
detonated near the SA Air Force Headquarters, caused 19 deaths and
217 injured, mostly civilians. In Amanzimtoti in Natal in 1985, a bomb
planted by Andrew Sibusisu Zondo in a shopping mall in retaliation for
an SADF raid in Lesotho, killed five civilians and injured 40. In 1986
Robert McBride planted a car bomb in front of the Magoo's Bar on the
Durban beach-front, killing three civilians and injuring 69. He later
received amnesty from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and
became a police chief. In 1987 a bomb outside a Johannesburg court
killed three people and injured ten. The previous year 24 civilians were
injured in a similar attack in Newcastle in Natal. In 1987 a military target
in Johannesburg was hit by Hein Grosskopf, killing one civilian and
injuring 68 military personnel. The bombing of a bank in Roodepoort in
1988 left four dead and 18 injured. A bomb outside a magistrate's office
caused three deaths. A bomb at the Ellispark rugby stadium killed two
people and injured 37. Wimpy Bar fast food outlets (the Wimpy-
bombings) and a grocery store were targeted for their perceived
enforcement of apartheid laws, causing several deaths and injuries. MK
also mined roads in Northern Transvaal which killed 23 or 25 people.
The ANC abandoned this strategy because black laborers were among
those killed.(86) The South African Security Forces allegedly identified an
MK weapons cache and covertly removed several of the limpet mines,
filed down a mechanism in the timer of the device, and carefully placed
them back as they had found them. As a result, several similar bombings
were prevented as the devices would explode in the hands of the
terrorists when the timer was set.
John Vorster's successor, P.W. Botha, declared his willingness to
negotiate with the ANC in the 1980s, but set the condition that they end
their campaign of violence. He was supported in this by Margaret
Thatcher, who took a similar stance towards the IRA at the time.

The Border War or Bush-war in South West Africa and Angola continued
throughout the eighties with some twenty-three major operations, all of
which the SADF dominated.(82,84) Amidst these operations against
SWAPO, FAPLA and Cuba, the SADF fought a hearts-and-minds
campaign in South West Africa through manning clinics, building roads
and building and maintaining water and other infrastructure.
The final phase of the war in Angola has been dubbed the Battle of
Cuito Cuanavale of August 1987 to April 1988. It actually consisted of
three South African operations called Modular, Hooper and Packer. The
original intention of these operations was not, as the MPLA and Cubans
maintain, the taking of any towns or Luanda for that matter, by the
SADF. The sole purpose was to block a FAPLA-Cuban advance on
UNITA's strongholds in southern Angola. (84)
Operation Modular aimed to halt the FAPLA advance on the UNITA
strongholds of Mavinga and Jamba. Operation Hooper intended to inflict
maximum casualties on the retreating FAPLA force. Operation Packer
aimed to force the retreat of the FAPLA force to the west of the Cuito
River.
Operation Modular began when Jonas Savimbi requested South African
assistance against the advance of FAPLA's 47-Brigade on UNITA's
stronghold at Mavinga. 61-Mechanized Battalion was dispatched to
intercept the advance of 47-Brigade. The two forces met at the Lomba
and Cuzizi rivers. Meanwhile UNITA repulsed an attack by 16-Brigade to
capture Cunjamba.
Colonel Deon Ferreira described the Battle at the Lomba to General
Jannie Geldenhuys: Our better equipment and soldiers apart, it was our
timing that made the day. I have never seen such timing before: 47
Brigade wanted to cross the Lomba from south to north to join up with
59 Brigade. We knew it beforehand and engaged them on the way. We
caught them in the open. They were totally destroyed by any definition.
(82)
The Ratel ZT-3 armed with laser-guided anti-tank missiles, was
introduced to battle for the first time. On 13 September 1987 a second
attempt by 47 Brigade and elements of 59 Brigade to cross the river was
frustrated. They suffered very heavy losses while the South Africans lost
two Casspir APCs and a Ratel IFV. From 14 to 23 September, 21-
Brigade made daily attempts to cross the Lomba, each time driven back
with losses. The South Africans made a tactical withdrawal once, when
two MIGs launched two bombs over the area which exploded high up in
the air, causing a thick smoke to drift down. Fearing it was chemical
dust, Deon Ferreira ordered his troops to evacuate the area. (82) Battles
on 9, 11, 13 and 17 November saw 525 FAPLA soldiers killed and 33 T-
55 and T-62 tanks destroyed.
Operation Modular flowed into Hooper. 61-Mechanized was reinforced
with elements of 4 SA Infantry, as well as a squadron of Olifant main
battle tanks, G6 self-propelled guns and additional 127 mm MRLs.
13 January 1988: FAPLAs 21 Brigade is attacked. They retreat to the
west of the Cuito River. 250 FAPLA soldiers are killed. Large quantities
of FAPLA arms are destroyed or captured including fourteen or eighteen
tanks, two SA-8 SAM systems and two SA-9 SAM systems, APCs, guns,
radar and logistics vehicles. 14 February 1988: Combined South African
and UNITA forces attack FAPLA's 59 Brigade, killing 230 FAPLA soldiers
and destroying nine T-55 and T-62 tanks. 25 February 1988: Combined
South African and UNITA force attack 25 Brigade south of the Tumpo
River. South African/UNITA force capture vital tactical high ground, but
an Olifant tank is destroyed, and a further two are abandoned in a
minefield. The fighting is part of Operation Packer. The South Africans
withdrew under political pressure, with US brokered peace talks already
underway. The FAPLA-Cuban-MK alliance claim the South Africans
were routed after failing to take Cuito Canavale (which was basically a
landing strip in the bush). As evidence they point to the captured Olifant
tanks. General Jannie Geldenhuys comments: The fact remains that
you can't score a try [goal] on your own half of the field!(82) In the fighting
between September 1987 and April 1988 (collectively called the Battle of
Cuito Canavale) FAPLA lost 4 785 soldiers killed in action. 31 South
Africans died in battle and six more died of Malaria. During this time
UNITA is said to have suffered 3 000 KIA. (88) The following military
hardware were lost at Cuito-Canavale:

                            Cuba-Fapla               SA Defence Force

Tanks                        94                       3
Armored troop
and combat vehicles         100                       3 Casspirs
                                                      5 Ratel IFVs
BM-21/ BM-14 MRLs            34
D-30/ M-46 guns               9
TMM mobile bridges            7
Artillery, rocket,
missile systems              15
Radars                        5
23mm anti-aircraft
guns                         22
Logistic vehicles           389                      1 Rinkhals, 1 Withings,
                                                     1 Kwêvoël
Combat aircraft                9 MIG 21 / 23          2 Mirage F1 (one lost
                                                      in an accident.)
Helicopters                    9                     1
Light aircraft                                       1                   (82)
After Cuito Canavale, some fighting continued in Angola before full
South African withdrawal. The Cubans turned their attention to the
Calueque water project. SADF artillery destroyed a Cuban air defence
and artillery network and the two sides clashed in southern Angola. In
the continued fighting the Cubans lost 302 soldiers, while the South
Africans lost about a tenth of that number. On 27 June, seven MIG 23s
attacked the wall of the Calueque dam. An eighth MIG veered off to
bomb the water pipeline to Ovamboland. One of its bombs landed
between a South African Buffel APC and Eland armored car, killing eight
men of 8 SA Infantry and three of 2 Special Service Battalion.
The last South African soldiers were withdrawn from Angola on
1 September 1988. On December 22nd, 1988 South Africa signed the
Tripartheid Accord with Angola and Cuba. As part of the accord, UN
Resolution 435 was accepted, granting independence to SWA –
henceforth Namibia. SWAPO won Namibia's first national election and
Sam Nujoma became president.

On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall was opened for civilian crossing.
In South Africa it was understood to hold major change. On 2 February
1990 the African National Congress, SA Communist Party and Pan
Africanist Congress were unbanned. Nelson Mandela was released from
Victor Verster Prison in Paarl on February 11 th. The period leading to
1994 saw increased violence in South Africa, in part from Mangosuthu
Buthelezi's Zulu nationalist Inkhata Freedom Party, whose militias had
been trained by the SA government in the eighties. Resistance to tearing
down the homelands saw the Boipatong Massacre and the Bisho
Massacre, and Right-wing violance including a half-hearted AWB
invasion of Bophuthatswana. Members of APLA, armed wing of the Pan
Africanist Congress, attacked a white church congregation in Kenilworth,
Cape Town with handgrenades and R4 fire. (Saint James Church
massacre)
In April 1994 the ANC won 62 percent of the vote in the general election
and Mandela became SA President.
                23. AN IMPOTENT MINORITY
When a survey among white students in 1986 asked how they would
respond to an ANC government, 44 percent of Afrikaners, as opposed to
10 percent of their English-speaking counterparts, said that they would
resist physically, while a further 32 percent said they would emigrate. (2)
A study by the SA Institute for Race Relations found in 2005 that a fifth
of white South Africans, mostly in the 20-40 age group, had indeed
emigrated in the decade from 1995. (90)

In 1989 at a SA Communist Party conference in Havana, chaired by
Nelson Mandela's future successor, Thabo Mbeki, the party rejected
'group rights' as 'fraught with the danger of perpetuating inequality'.
Charging at inequality has become the vision of the ANC government,
summed up by the National Democratic Revolution. Through harsh
affirmative action laws demanding representivity (“transformation of
society”) - the Employment Equity Act of 1998, and the Promotion of
Equality and Prevention of Unfair discrimination Act – every state
institution, public body and all private companies with greater than R5
million turnover, have become obliged to reflect the racial demographic
constitution of South Africa among its employees on a departmental
level, irrespective of local or provincial demographic differences.
(Disregard for local demographics in application of AA has come under
fire from within the ANC itself and its trade union partner, Cosatu.) An
example of the implication of AA for Afrikaners: Afrikaans welfare
organizations working among poor Afrikaners, had been informed by the
Department of Social services that they would lose their state subsidies
unless they immediately began working among blacks and made their
staff representative. (79% black, 10% white, 9% colored, 2.5% Asian.)
By 2002 the government had edged out 120 000 white civil servants.
Massive amounts of energy and money have been spent on eliminating
social differences and creating an homogenous society.
The centralist “National Democratic Revolution” plan of 2007 is outlined
in a Youth League training document which explains that “national” in
NDR entails: “...the task of Nation Building – consolidation of a single,
collective South Africanness – dispelling of narrow ethnic, tribal and
racial nations. Racism – ideological weapon for imperialism.” There are
other “dimensions” to the word like Revolutionary nationalism and
National consciousness... (89)
Thus, it appears that maintaining an Afrikaner identity is tantamount to
“group rights” which is “fraught with the danger of inequality.”
  Another document, 'The State, Property Relations and Social
Transformation', endorsed the notion that the state was 'an instrument in
the hands of the liberation movement' to transform South Africa. Soon a
National Deployment Committee was formed, which was charged with
the task of deploying ANC cadres in all areas of society that the
government considered necessary for transformation. (2)

Flip Buys became fascinated with trade unions while studying at
Potchefstroom University. He saw an irony in the fact that communists
worldwide had mobilized trade unions to promote their ideology and
anti-capitalism; yet, a small anti-communist trade union in Poland led by
Lech Walesa, could manage to spark a chain reaction leading to the
demise of communism. He also made a study of Christian trade unions
in the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada and Germany, noting how they
played a much broader role than that of trade union; and in Quebec and
Flanders, had become tools in the protection of the wider interests of
minorities. Also observing how the Israeli Histadrut movement had
developed an economy to the benefit of its members, he concluded that,
should a minority's civil rights become imperiled, their workers' rights
would follow suit. With academic knowledge of the dangers of
democracy without minority protection in multi-ethnic countries, and with
real-world experience of trade unionism, this fear unfolded as he
watched the credulous National Party negotiators at Codesa crumbling
before union-hardened ANC negotiators like Cyril Ramaphosa.
Buys subsequently led the conversion of the Afrikaner trade union,
Mynwerkersunie (Mine Workers Union), into one based on the Christian
trade union movement in Belgium, with an adapted version of the
Belgian and Israeli strategies, and gave it the name of the Polish trade
union, Solidarity. (91)

The middle class urban Afrikaner with double cab pickup and sport bar
has become king of his own castle. Politically Afrikaners back the
Democratic Alliance Opposition, which focuses on individual rights and
other carefully selected pragmatic issues, like fighting bureaucratic
inefficiency in municipalities and maladministration of taxpayers' rands.
The DA-government in the Western Cape have also recently begun
tackling pressing social issues at the root, like teenage-pregnancy and
high-school drop-out problems in the rural Western Cape. Carel
Boshoff's Orania settlement in the Northern Cape is still growing.
Though small, it has come to symbolize old-fashioned Afrikaner
republican faith and perseverance. With mining rights and many other
economic and political rights in the hands of the state, its prospects are
not easy. The town's purpose is to serve as a growth point for future
Afrikaner demographic consolidation. The point being, that Afrikaner
culture will disappear without social, economic, academic and political
institutions where Afrikaners are not negated to a minority by the new
anti-apartheid. Thus, these institutions are built on the principle of small
business ownership, cooperative investment and a touch of socialism.
The general calls of Afrikaners, no longer as hostile and cynical about
the project as they were in the 1990s, remain: “I cannot exercise my
profession there”, “I will never earn my current salary there”, “The ANC
will not allow it” and “Are only white people allowed there?” When asked
by reporter R.W. Johnson, 'What if an Afrikaans-speaking colored
applied to join Orania?', Carel (IV) Boshoff, son of Carel Boshoff (who
died in 2011), answered by outlining the Afrikaner's general disposition
in South Africa: 'Today's Afrikaner is a modern atomized individualist but
we still have an identity which is transmitted across generations. Here,
because we are succeeding, every day we face a bigger picture and we
have to be open to that.' Aware that he was dealing with the grandson of
the shrewd Hendrik Verwoerd, Johnson later pressed him again on the
issue, to which he responded, 'Look, we have made endless overtures
and initiatives towards the colored community. None have borne fruit. It
is not easy. What seems clear is that the colored masses of the Northern
Cape do not wish to become Afrikaners in the same sense as us, even if
they are partially our own blood, our own relatives.' Whether Orania
would join the DA in representing a successful white-colored alliance,
Boshoff carefully responded, 'We would like to make an alliance with the
coloreds, but it will not be a fusion. We will remain Afrikaners. We must
be careful, in any alliance, that we do not become a footnote to our own
project.' (92)




                          Carel and Carel (IV) Boshoff
 General Constant Viljoen negotiated section 235 into the constitution. It guarantees self-
   determination of any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage.

Government has shown some respect for the concept of diversity (non-
uniformity); even Mbeki had once challenged a Volkstaat-delegation to
“put something on the ground that Government cannot deny, before
negotiating over a Volkstaat”. Afrikaner political leader, Dr Pieter Mulder
has also taken the initiative to represent the Afrikaner people on the UN
body UNPO (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization). Other
communities from the region currently represented at UNPO, are the
Venda (Vhavenda or Tshivenda) residing in the northern region of the
former Transvaal, and the Rehoboth Basters residing in the land of
Namibia.




                              Language map of South Africa
In addition to being politically sidelined, Afrikaners have fallen victim to
what appears to be an orchestrated hate campaign. In twenty years from
1990 to 2010, more than 2 600 farms of members of the largely
Afrikaner agricultural union TLU / TAU have been attacked. In some
attacks all the victims survived, though often critically injured, while other
attacks involved multiple fatalities – often every member of the
household getting killed.(94) Dr Dirk Hermann of Solidarity points out that
this figure used in the book Land of Sorrows, by himself and Maj.-Gen.
Chris van Zyl, errs on the conservative side. “The publication describes
2 617 individual attacks. The actual number of people killed on farms
may be much higher in all likelihood.”(94) Journalist Adriana Stuijt has
published a list with the names of 3 775 farm murder victims for the
period 1994 to January 21st 2011. 96 percent of the names on her list
are rural white Afrikaners. (95)
Theft is seldom the motive. Roelien Schutte and Eileen De Jager have a
rather dark job. They clean up murder scenes and suicide scenes after
the police investigators have left. They discuss a farm murder case in a
documentary book:
 “...[The motive] was murder. You don't kill two elderly people in such a
cruel manner for a few articles”, says Eileen while she takes a deep
drag from her cigarette... “In a farm murder robbery is never the motive.
Theft is an incidental. Murder is the motive, revenge another element.
But actually, when we look around at the different scenes, we cannot but
think it is all about torture and murder.” They do not watch TV news
anymore. The violence they see in their daily jobs gets too watered
down and twisted. “We see the news as it happened. Not the one or two
sentences used to describe a farm murder. Everyone thinks they are in
and out, shoot the people and it's all over”, says Eileen irascibly.
“Nobody thinks of the hours of torture. We see it; it is what we find with
such a murder. An Old tannie (lady) raped in front of her husband whose
hamstrings have been cut so that he cannot walk...Thereafter he is
executed. It is the case with most men who die in farm murders. They
are shot execution style.” And women? “The attackers like to slit their
throats. Or shove broken bottles in their vagina.” Not even innocent pets
are spared. “Their throats are also slit. Or some are kicked to death. Or
their heads are squashed.... Roelien reckons 'farm murders' are not
sufficiently descriptive to bring home the cruelty and torment suffered. “It
should be farm tortures”...
Do only white farmers get murdered? “No, definitely not. We have
cleaned up scenes where black farmers had been killed. But the torture
is notably less. They usually just get shot, and more articles are stolen
from their homes.” “Which again makes us think that the motive in farm
murders is rather revenge. If it is not, then why the cruel torture? Why
kill an innocent child?” wonders Eileen. “Spare their lives please – what
can a baby or toddler do to an attacker?..” (93)

The book Bloed susters is available in Afrikaans only.
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93.      Bloedsusters, soos vertel aan Ilse Salzwedel. (LAPA, 2011.)
94.      Chris van Zyl and Dirk Hermann, Land of Sorrow, 20 years of farm attacks in
  South Africa. (Kraal Publishers, 2011)
95.      http://afrikaner-genocide-achives.blogspot.com/2011/01/farm-murders-
  victim-names-1994-2010.html
96.
   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zimbabwe_People's_Revolutionary_Army

				
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