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									Chapter 5: Civil Rights and Public Policy (pp 134-171)
Case Name:                 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) [x3]
Issues:                    Civil Rights, Sex Discrimination, First Amendment, Freedom of Association Sexuality
Facts of the Case:         The Boy Scouts of America revoked former Eagle Scout and assistant scoutmaster James
                           Dale's adult membership when the organization discovered that Dale was a homosexual and
                           a gay rights activist. In 1992, Dale filed suit against the Boy Scouts, alleging that the Boy
                           Scouts had violated the New Jersey statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
                           orientation in places of public accommodation. The Boy Scouts, a private, not-for-profit
                           organization, asserted that homosexual conduct was inconsistent with the values it was
                           attempting to instill in young people. The New Jersey Superior Court held that New Jersey's
                           public accommodations law was inapplicable because the Boy Scouts was not a place of
                           public accommodation. The court also concluded that the Boy Scouts' First Amendment
                           freedom of expressive association prevented the government from forcing the Boy Scouts to
                           accept Dale as an adult leader. The court's Appellate Division held that New Jersey's public
                           accommodations law applied to the Boy Scouts because of its broad-based membership
                           solicitation and its connections with various public entities, and that the Boy Scouts violated it
                           by revoking Dale's membership based on his homosexuality. The court rejected the Boy
                           Scouts' federal constitutional claims. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. The court
                           held that application of New Jersey's public accommodations law did not violate the Boy
                           Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association because Dale's inclusion would not
                           significantly affect members' abilities to carry out their purpose. Furthermore, the court
                           concluded that reinstating Dale did not compel the Boy Scouts to express any message.
Question:                  Does the application of New Jersey's public accommodations law violate the Boy Scouts'
                           First Amendment right of expressive association to bar homosexuals from serving as troop
                           leaders?
Finding:                   Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that
                           "applying New Jersey's public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to admit Dale
                           violates the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association." In effect, the
                           ruling gives the Boy Scouts of America a constitutional right to bar homosexuals from serving
                           as troop leaders. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, "[t]he Boy Scouts asserts
                           that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill," and that a gay
                           troop leader's presence "would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message,
                           both to the young members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct
                           as a legitimate form of behavior."



Case Name:                 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [x3]
Issues:                    Civil Rights, Desegregation, Education, Federalism, Race Discrimination, Segregation
Facts of the Case:         Black children were denied admission to public schools attended by white children under
                           laws requiring or permitting segregation according to the races. The white and black schools
                           approached equality in terms of buildings, curricula, qualifications, and teacher salaries. This
                           case was decided together with Briggs v. Elliott and Davis v. County School Board of Prince
                           Edward County.
Question:                  Does the segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprive the
                           minority children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment?
Finding:                   Yes. Despite the equalization of the schools by "objective" factors, intangible issues foster
                           and maintain inequality. Racial segregation in public education has a detrimental effect on
                           minority children because it is interpreted as a sign of inferiority. The long-held doctrine that
                           separate facilities were permissible provided they were equal was rejected. Separate but
                           equal is inherently unequal in the context of public education. The unanimous opinion
                           sounded the death-knell for all forms of state-maintained racial separation.

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Case Name:                 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) [x3]
Issues:                    Civil Rights, Sex Discrimination, Equal Protection, Fourteenth Amendment
Facts of the Case:         An Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2 percent beer to males under the
                           age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Curtis Craig, a male then between the ages of
                           18 and 21, and a licensed vendor challenged the law as discriminatory.
Question:                  Did an Oklahoma statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by
                           establishing different drinking ages for men and women?
Finding:                   In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the statute made unconstitutional gender
                           classifications. The Court held that the statistics relied on by the state of Oklahoma were
                           insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the law and the maintenance of traffic
                           safety. Generalities about the drinking habits of aggregate groups did not suffice. The Court
                           also found that the Twenty-first Amendment did not alter the application of the Equal
                           Protection Clause in the case.



Case Name:                 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) [x3]
Issues:                    Federalism, Race Discrimination
Facts of the Case:         Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in Illinois (a free state)
                           and in an area of the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by the Missouri
                           Compromise of 1820. After returning to Missouri, Scott sued unsuccessfully in the Missouri
                           courts for his freedom, claiming that his residence in free territory made him a free man.
                           Scott then brought a new suit in federal court. Scott's master maintained that no pure-
                           blooded Negro of African descent and the descendant of slaves could be a citizen in the
                           sense of Article III of the Constitution.
Question:                  Was Dred Scott free or slave?
Finding:                   Dred Scott was a slave. Under Articles III and IV, argued Taney, no one but a citizen of the
                           United States could be a citizen of a state, and that only Congress could confer national
                           citizenship. Taney reached the conclusion that no person descended from an American
                           slave had ever been a citizen for Article III purposes. The Court then held the Missouri
                           Compromise unconstitutional, hoping to end the slavery question once and for all.



Case Name:                 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
Issues:                    Civil Rights, Affirmative Action
Facts of the Case:         In 1995, Jennifer Gratz applied to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science
                           and the Arts with an adjusted GPA of 3.8 and ACT score of 25. In 1997, Patrick Hamacher
                           applied to the University with an adjusted GPA of 3.0, and an ACT score of 28. Both were
                           denied admission and attended other schools. The University admits that it uses race as a
                           factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving
                           diversity among its student body." In addition, the University has a policy to admit virtually all
                           qualified applicants who are members of one of three select racial minority groups - African
                           Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans - that are considered to be "underrepresented"
                           on the campus. Concluding that diversity was a compelling interest, the District Court held
                           that the admissions policies for years 1995-1998 were not narrowly tailored, but that the
                           policies in effect in 1999 and 2000 were narrowly tailored. After the decision in Grutter, Gratz
                           and Hamacher petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 11 for a writ of certiorari
                           before judgment, which was granted.

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Question:                  Does the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions
                           violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil
                           Rights Act of 1964?
Finding:                   Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the
                           University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violates both
                           the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI. While rejecting the argument that diversity cannot
                           constitute a compelling state interest, the Court reasoned that the automatic distribution of 20
                           points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single
                           "underrepresented minority" applicant solely because of race was not narrowly tailored and
                           did not provide the individualized consideration Justice Powell contemplated in Regents of
                           the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote,
                           "because the University's use of race in its current freshman admissions policy is not
                           narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted compelling interest in diversity, the
                           admissions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause."



Case Name:                 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
Issues:                    Civil Rights, Affirmative Action
Facts of the Case:         In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of Michigan, applied for admission to the
                           University of Michigan Law School. Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an
                           LSAT score of 161. She was denied admission. The Law School admits that it uses race as a
                           factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving
                           diversity among its student body." The District Court concluded that the Law School's stated
                           interest in achieving diversity in the student body was not a compelling one and enjoined its
                           use of race in the admissions process. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Justice
                           Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978),
                           constituted a binding precedent establishing diversity as a compelling governmental interest
                           sufficient under strict scrutiny review to justify the use of racial preferences in admissions.
                           The appellate court also rejected the district court's finding that the Law School's "critical
                           mass" was the functional equivalent of a quota.
Question:                  Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student
                           admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of
                           the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
Finding:                   No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Equal
                           Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in
                           admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits
                           that flow from a diverse student body. The Court reasoned that, because the Law School
                           conducts highly individualized review of each applicant, no acceptance or rejection is based
                           automatically on a variable such as race and that this process ensures that all factors that
                           may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race. Justice O'Connor
                           wrote, "in the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all
                           applicants, the Law School's race-conscious admissions program does not unduly harm
                           nonminority applicants."



Case Name:                 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
Issues:                    Civil Rights, Desegregation, Commerce Clause, Discrimination
Facts of the Case:         Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade racial discrimination by places of public
                           accommodation if their operations affected commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel in Atlanta,
                           Georgia, refused to accept Black Americans and was charged with violating Title II.
Question:                  Did Congress, in passing Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, exceed its Commerce Clause
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                           powers by depriving motels, such as the Heart of Atlanta, of the right to choose their own
                           customers?
Finding:                   The Court held that the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to regulate local incidents of
                           commerce, and that the Civil Right Act of 1964 passed constitutional muster. The Court
                           noted that the applicability of Title II was "carefully limited to enterprises having a direct and
                           substantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and people. . ." The Court thus concluded
                           that places of public accommodation had no "right" to select guests as they saw fit, free from
                           governmental regulation.



Case Name:                 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)
Issues:                    Discrimination, Due Process, Labor, Sex Discrimination
Facts of the Case:         Oregon enacted a law that limited women to ten hours of work in factories and laundries.
Question:                  Does the Oregon law violate a woman's freedom of contract implicit in the liberty protected
                           by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Finding:                   There was no constitutional violation. The factory and laundry owners claimed that there was
                           no reasonable connection between the law and public health, safety, or welfare. In a famous
                           brief in defense of the Oregon law, attorney Louis Brandeis elaborately detailed expert
                           reports on the harmful physical, economic and social effects of long working hours on
                           women. Brewer's opinion was based on the proposition that physical and social differences
                           between the sexes warranted a different rule respecting labor contracts. Theretofore, gender
                           was not a basis for such distinctions. Brewer's opinion conveyed the accepted wisdom of the
                           day: that women were unequal and inferior to men.



Case Name:                 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) [x3]
Issues:                    Equal Protection, Race Discrimination, Segregation
Facts of the Case:         The state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate railway cars for blacks and
                           whites. In 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy--who was seven-eighths Caucasian--took a seat in a
                           "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. He refused to move to the car reserved for blacks and
                           was arrested.
Question:                  Is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains an unconstitutional infringement
                           on both the privileges and immunities and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
                           Amendment?
Finding:                   No, the state law is within constitutional boundaries. The majority, in an opinion authored by
                           Justice Henry Billings Brown, upheld state-imposed racial segregation. The justices based
                           their decision on the separate-but-equal doctrine, that separate facilities for blacks and
                           whites satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment so long as they were equal. (The phrase,
                           "separate but equal" was not part of the opinion.) Justice Brown conceded that the 14th
                           amendment intended to establish absolute equality for the races before the law. But Brown
                           noted that "in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions
                           based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a
                           commingling of the two races unsatisfactory to either." In short, segregation does not in itself
                           constitute unlawful discrimination.



Case Name:                 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) [x3]
Issues:                    Equal Protection, Gender Discrimination, Civil Rights, Fourteenth Amendment
Facts of the Case:         The Idaho Probate Code specified that "males must be preferred to females" in appointing
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                           administrators of estates. After the death of their adopted son, both Sally and Cecil Reed
                           sought to be named the administrator of their son's estate (the Reeds were separated).
                           According to the Probate Code, Cecil was appointed administrator and Sally challenged the
                           law in court.
Question:                  Did the Idaho Probate Code violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
                           Amendment?
Finding:                   In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the law's dissimilar treatment of men and
                           women was unconstitutional. The Court argued that "[t]o give a mandatory preference to
                           members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of
                           hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by
                           the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .[T]he choice in this context
                           may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex."



Case Name:                 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) [x3]
Issues:                    Civil Rights, Affirmative Action, Discrimination, Education, Race Discrimination
Facts of the Case:         Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the
                           University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school
                           reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as
                           part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair
                           minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test
                           scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's
                           applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the
                           Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race.
Question:                  Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause,
                           and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by practicing an affirmative action policy that resulted in the
                           repeated rejection of Bakke's application for admission to its medical school?
Finding:                   No and yes. There was no single majority opinion. Four of the justices contended that any
                           racial quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice
                           Lewis F. Powell, Jr., agreed, casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit
                           Bakke. However, in his opinion, Powell argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as
                           employed at the school violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
                           The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in
                           higher education was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well,
                           contending that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria. So, the
                           Court managed to minimize white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke)
                           while extending gains for racial minorities through affirmative action.



Case Name:                 Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
Issues:                    Civil Rights, Affirmative Action
Facts of the Case:         In 1983, the City Council of Richmond, Virginia adopted regulations that required companies
                           awarded city construction contracts to subcontract 30 percent of their business to minority
                           business enterprises. The J.A. Croson Company, which lost its contract because of the 30
                           percent set-aside, brought suit against the city.
Question:                  Did the Richmond law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Finding:                   In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that "generalized assertions" of past racial discrimination
                           could not justify "rigid" racial quotas for the awarding of public contracts. Justice O'Connor's
                           opinion noted that the 30 percent quota could not be tied to "any injury suffered by anyone,"
                           and was an impermissible employment of a suspect classification. O'Connor further held that

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                           allowing claims of past discrimination to serve as the basis for racial quotas would actually
                           subvert constitutional values: "The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where
                           race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of
                           shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs." The court
                           established five procedures for evaluating the legitimacy of affirmative action programs: (1) A
                           scrutiny test evaluates programs based on racial classification; (2) Congress has more power
                           than the states through the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce equal
                           protection provisions; (3) When the state takes action, it must do so based on evidence tha
                           past discriminatory practice existed; (4) Affirmative action remedies must be specific and
                           apply to past injustices; (5) States may develop affirmative action programs “narrowly
                           tailored…necessary to break down patterns of deliberate exlclusion.”



Case Name:                 Romer v. Eans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
Issues:                    Civil Rights, Discrimination, Equal Protection, Fourteenth Amendment, Sexuality
Facts of the Case:         Colorado voters adopted Amendment 2 to their State Constitution precluding any judicial,
                           legislative, or executive action designed to protect persons from discrimination based on their
                           "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships." Following
                           a legal challenge by homosexual and other aggrieved parties, the state trial court entered a
                           permanent injunction enjoining Amendment 2's enforcement. The Colorado Supreme Court
                           affirmed on appeal.
Question:                  Does Amendment 2 of Colorado's State Constitution, forbidding the extension of official
                           protections to those who suffer discrimination due to their sexual orientation, violate the
                           Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?
Finding:                   Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that Amendment 2 of the Colorado State
                           Constitution violated the equal protection clause. Amendment 2 singled out homosexual and
                           bisexual persons, imposing on them a broad disability by denying them the right to seek and
                           receive specific legal protection from discrimination. In his opinion for the Court, Justice
                           Anthony Kennedy noted that oftentimes a law will be sustained under the equal protection
                           clause, even if it seems to disadvantage a specific group, so long as it can be shown to
                           "advance a legitimate government interest." Amendment 2, by depriving persons of equal
                           protection under the law due to their sexual orientation failed to advance such a legitimate
                           interest. Justice Kennedy concluded: "If the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of
                           the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare desire to harm a
                           politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."



Case Name:                 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)
Issues:                    Criminal, Equal Protection, Jury, Race Discrimination, Trial by Jury
Facts of the Case:         A West Virginia law declared that only whites may serve on juries.
Question:                  Does the state law barring blacks from jury service violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
                           Fourteenth Amendment?
Finding:                   Yes. Strong, writing for the majority, declared that to deny citizen participation in the
                           administration of justice solely on racial grounds “is practically a brand upon them, affixed by
                           law; an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an
                           impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to
                           secure to all others.”



Case Name:                 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) [x2]
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Issues:                    Civil Rights, Desegregation, Education, Equal Protection, Race Discrimination
Facts of the Case:         After the Supreme Court's decision in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education, little progress
                           had been made in desegregating public schools. One example was the Charlotte-
                           Mecklenburg, North Carolina, system in which approximately 14,000 black students attended
                           schools that were either totally black or more than 99 percent black. Lower courts had
                           experimented with a number of possible solutions when the case reached the Supreme
                           Court.
Question:                  Were federal courts constitutionally authorized to oversee and produce remedies for state-
                           imposed segregation?
Finding:                   In a unanimous decision, the Court held that once violations of previous mandates directed
                           at desegregating schools had occurred, the scope of district courts' equitable powers to
                           remedy past wrongs were broad and flexible. The Court ruled that 1) remedial plans were to
                           be judged by their effectiveness, and the use of mathematical ratios or quotas were
                           legitimate "starting points" for solutions; 2) predominantly or exclusively black schools
                           required close scrutiny by courts; 3) non-contiguous attendance zones, as interim corrective
                           measures, were within the courts' remedial powers; and 4) no rigid guidelines could be
                           established concerning busing of students to particular schools.




I.         Two Centuries of Struggle (pp. 136-139)
           A.       Most Americans favor equality in the abstract, but the concrete struggle for equal
                    rights has been our nation’s most bitter battle.

           B.       The real meaning of equality is both elusive and divisive.
                    1.    Civil Rights are the policies that extend basic rights to groups historically
                          subject to discrimination.
                    2.    The modern civil rights movement began in 1965 when Rosa Parks
                          refused to give up her seat in the front of a Montgomery, Alabama bus
                          (where only whites were permitted to sit); the boycott that followed her
                          arrest is often seen as the beginning of the African-American civil rights
                          movement.

           C.       Today’s debates over inequality in America center on (1) racial discrimination, (2)
                    gender discrimination, and (3) factors such as discrimination based on age,
                    disability, and sexual preference.

           D.       The Constitution and Inequality (pp. 137-139)
                    1.   The delegates to the Constitutional Convention came up with a plan for
                         government, not guarantees of individual rights: the word equality does not
                         even appear in the original Constitution.
                         a.      Even the Bill of Rights does not directly mention equality, but it does
                                 have implications for the principle of equality since it does not limit
                                 the scope of its guarantees to any specified groups.
                         b.      The only place in which the idea of equality clearly appears in the
                                 Constitution is in the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits the
                                 states from denying “equal protection of the laws” to any person.
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                    2.        What does equal protection of the laws mean?
                              a.     Presumably, it means, as one member of Congress said during the
                                     debate on the amendment, “equal protection of life, liberty, and
                                     property” for all.
                              b.     Shortly after the amendment was ratified in 1868, Strauder v. West
                                     Virginia (1880) invalidated a law barring African Americans from jury
                                     service. However, the Court refused to extend the amendment to
                                     remedy more subtle kinds of discrimination.
                    3.        The Court has developed three levels (standards of review) of judicial
                              scrutiny (or classifications).
                              a.     Inherently Suspect (difficult to meet) – they are presumed to be
                                     invalid and are upheld only if they serve a “compelling public interest”
                                     that cannot be accomplished in some other way.
                                     1)      Based on Race
                                     2)      Burden of proof is on the state
                                     3)      May be acceptable IF the law is made to remedy previous
                                             discrimination.
                              b.     Intermediate Standard (moderately difficult to meet) – Relationship
                                     to an important legislative purpose (and is sometimes called
                                     “medium scrutiny”).
                                     1)      Based on Gender
                                     2)      Fit somewhere between “reasonable” and “inherently suspect”
                              c.     Reasonableness (easy to meet) – bear a rational relationship to
                                     some legitimate government purpose.
                                     1)      Based on EVERYTHING ELESE; i.e., age, wealth.
                                     2)      The person who challenges these classifications has the
                                             burden of proving that the laws are arbitrary.

II.       Race, the Constitution, and Public Policy

          A.        Three eras define African-Americans’ struggle for equality in America: the era of
                    slavery, from the beginnings of colonization until the end of the Civil War; the era
                    of reconstruction and resegregation, from the end of the Civil War until 1954; and
                    the era of civil rights, from 1954 to the present.

          B.        The era of slavery (1600s – 1865).
                    1.    The most infamous statement in defense of slavery occurred in Dred Scott
                          v. Sandford (1857), in which Chief Justice Taney declared that an African-
                          American man was “chattel” and had no rights under a white man’s
                          government; Congress had no power to ban slavery in the western
                          territories (thereby effectively invalidating the Missouri Compromise).
                    2.    The Union victory in the Civil War and the ratification of the Thirteenth
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                              Amendment ended slavery. “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
                              except as a punishment for crime where of the party shall have been
                              duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
                              subject to their jurisdiction.”

          C.        The Era of Reconstruction and Resegregation (End of Civil War to 1954)
                    1.    After the Civil War ended, Congress imposed strict conditions on the former
                          Confederate States before they could be readmitted to the Union.
                    2.    As soon as they regained power, white Southerners imposed a code of
                          “Jim Crow Laws” or Black Codes (segregation laws that required African-
                          Americans to use separate public facilities and school systems); although
                          not required by law, segregation was also common practice in the North.
                    3.    In the era of segregation, housing, schools, and jobs were – in one way or
                          another – classified as “white” or “colored.”
                    4.    The Supreme Court provided constitutional justification for segregation in
                          Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) when it held that segregation in public facilities
                          was not unconstitutional as long as the facilities were substantially equal
                          (the “separate but equal” doctrine, though subsequent decisions paid
                          more attention to the “separate” than to the “equal” part).
                    5.    Some limited progress was made in the first half of the twentieth century,
                          including executive orders (such as desegregation of the armed forces) and
                          court decisions (including Guinn v. United States, 1915, which banned the
                          grandfather clause in voting; Smith v. Allwright, 1944, overturning all-white
                          primaries; and Sweatt v. Painter, 1950, which held that blacks are entitled
                          to the same professional and graduate education as students of other
                          races).

          D.        The Era of Civil Rights (1954-present)
                    1.    During the period leading up to the civil rights movement, segregation was
                          legally required in the South (de jure) and sanctioned in the North (de
                          facto).
                          a.       De Jure Segregation – Segregation by law
                          b.       De Facto Segregation – Segregation through circumstances with no
                                   law supporting it
                    2.    Brown v. Board of Education (1954) marks the beginning of the era of
                          civil rights.
                          a.       The Supreme Court used Brown to set aside its earlier precedent of
                                   Plessy v. Ferguson.
                          b.       In a landmark decision, the Court held that school segregation was
                                   inherently unconstitutional because it violated the Fourteenth
                                   Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection
                          c.       In 1955, the Court ordered lower courts to proceed with “all
                                   deliberate speed” to desegregate public schools; however,
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                                     desegregation moved very slowly.
                    3.        The Civil Rights Act of 1964 made racial discrimination illegal in hotels,
                              motels, restaurants, and other places of public accommodation; it also
                              forbade many forms of job discrimination, and Congress cut off federal aid
                              to schools that remained segregated.
                              a.     The law was affirmed by the landmark Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
                                     United States (1964) involving an Atlanta motel on the interstate
                                     highway that serviced a majority of travelers but discriminated
                                     against African Americans claiming the Civil Rights Act
                                     unconstitutional. In a unanimous decision the Court used the
                                     interstate commerce provision to uphold the legality of the law.
                              b.     Desegregation proceeded slowly in the South and some federal
                                     judges ordered the busing of students to achieve racially balanced
                                     schools (upheld by the Supreme Court in Swann v. Charlotte-
                                     Mecklenberg County Schools, 1971).

          E.        Getting and Using the Right to Vote
                    1.     The early Republic limited suffrage (the legal right to vote) primarily to
                           property-holding white males.
                    2.     The Fifteenth Amendment (1870) guaranteed African-Americans the right
                           to vote, but full implementation did not occur for another century.
                           a.     Grandfather Clause – exempted persons whose grandfathers were
                                  eligible to vote in 1860 from taking literacy tests in order to vote; the
                                  exemption obviously did not apply to grandchildren of slaves
                                  (declared unconstitutional in Guinn v. United States, 1915).
                           b.     Poll Tax – small taxes levied on the right to vote; the taxes often fell
                                  due at a time of year when poor sharecroppers had the least amount
                                  of cash available.
                           c.     White Primary – permitted political parties in the heavily Democratic
                                  south to exclude blacks from primary elections, on the pretext that
                                  political parties (and primaries) were private and not public
                                  institutions; this device deprived blacks of a voice in the primaries,
                                  where the real contest occurred (declared unconstitutional in Smith
                                  v. Allwright, 1944).
                           d.     Many areas in the South employed voter registration tests
                                  (sometimes called voter literacy tests) in a discriminatory manner;
                                  some of the tests checked for an understanding of the Constitution.
                    3.     The civil rights movement put suffrage high on its political agenda, and
                           many barriers to African-American voting fell during the 1960s.
                           a.     Poll taxes in federal elections were prohibited by the Twenty-fourth
                                  Amendment (1964); poll taxes in state elections were invalidated
                                  two years later in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections.
                           b.     The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibited any government from
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                                        using voting procedures that denied a person the vote on the basis
                                        of race or color.
                                        1)     Federal election registrars were sent to areas that had long
                                               histories of discrimination, and many African-Americans were
                                               registered in southern states as a direct result.
                                        2)     The Voting Rights Act produced a major increase in the
                                               number of African-Americans registered to vote in the
                                               southern states, and in the number of African-Americans who
                                               held public office.

III.      Native Americans:
          A.     The oldest minority group in America, but they were not made U.S. citizens until
                 1924.
          B.     The Indian Claims Act of 1946 settled financial disputes arising from land taken
                 from the Indians.

IV.       Asian Americans:
          A.    The fastest growing minority group and faced immediate discrimination with the
                Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.
          B.    During WWII, the U.S. government rounded up more than 100,000 Americans of
                Japanese descent and placed them in internment encampments known as “war
                relocation centers.”
          C.    The Supreme Court upheld the internment as constitutional in Korematsu v.
                United States (1944), but Congress later provided benefits for the former
                internees (which still have not been distributed).

V.        Women, The Constitution, and Public Policy
          A.  The struggle for women’s equality has emphasized legislation over litigation.

          B.        The Battle for the Vote
                    1.    The first women’s rights activists were products of the abolition movement.
                    2.    The legal doctrine of coverture deprived married women of any identity
                          separate from that of their husbands.
                    3.    The Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions (signed
                          on July 19, 1848) was the beginning of the movement that would culminate
                          in the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment (1920), which gave
                          women the right to vote.

          C.        The Brandeis Brief, a friend of the court opinion offered by Louis Brandeis in
                    Muller v. Oregon (1908), which spoke about inherent differences between men
                    and women in the workplace, was the prevalent viewpoint.

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          D.        Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)
                    1.    Authored by Alice Paul, it claimed that the real result of protectionist law
                          was to perpetuate sexual inequality; but most people in the 1920s saw the
                          ERA as a threat to family.
                    2.    The ERA was revived when Congress passed it in 1972 and granted a
                          three-year extension six years later; the ERA fell three states short of
                          ratification.
                    3.    One of the arguments used against is passage was that eh amendment
                          was not necessary because the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
                          Amendment already existed.

          E.        The Second Feminist Wave (1950s-present)
                    1.    Groups like the National Organization for Women (NOW) and the National
                          Women’s Political Caucus were organized in the 1960s and 1970s.
                    2.    Judicial development
                          a.     In Reed v. Reed (1971), the Court ruled that any “arbitrary” sex-
                                 based classification violated the equal protection clause of the
                                 Fourteenth Amendment (marking the first time the Court applied the
                                 Fourteenth Amendment to a case involving classification by sex).
                          b.     In Craig v. Boren (1976), the Court established a “medium scrutiny”
                                 standard, under which sex discrimination would be presumed to be
                                 neither valid nor invalid.

          F.        Women in the Workplace
                    1.  The traditional family role of father at work/mother at home is becoming a
                        thing of the past.
                        a.      The civilian labor force includes 64 million women (74 million males).
                        b.      There are 30 million female-headed households; about two-thirds of
                                American mothers who have children below school age are in the
                                labor force.
                    2.  Some important process was made through congressional legislation:
                        a.      The Civil Rights Act of 1964 banned sex discrimination in
                                employment.
                        b.      In 1972, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                (EEOC) was given the power to sue employers suspected of illegal
                                discrimination in hiring, firing, promotions, pay, and working
                                conditions.
                    3.  In Dothard v. Rawlinson (1977), the Court struck down an Alabama law
                        forbidding women from serving as prison guards in all-male prisons.
                    4.  In UAW v. Johnson Controls (1992), the Court ruled that Johnson
                        Controls could not prevent women from working in a battery factory, even if
                        the work caused infertility in women.
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          G.        Title IX of Education Act of 1972 forbade sex discrimination in federally
                    subsidized education programs, including athletics.

          H.        Wage Discrimination and Comparable Worth
                    1.   The Equal Pay Act of 1963 required employers to pay men and women the
                         same wages for doing the same job.
                    2.   However, the U.S. Supreme Court has remained silent so far on the issue
                         of “comparable worth,” which refers to the fact that traditional women’s
                         jobs often pay much less than men’s jobs that demand comparable skill.
                    3.   Median annual earnings for full-time women workers are only about two-
                         thirds those of men.

          I.        Women in the Military
                    1.  Women have served in every branch of the armed services since WWII
                        (originally in separate units, but now as part of the regular service).
                    2.  Women comprise 11 percent of the armed forces, and compete directly with
                        men for promotion.
                    3.  There are still two important differences between the treatment of men and
                        women in military service.
                        a.      Only men must register for the draft when they turn age 18 (upheld in
                                Rostker v. Goldberg, 1981).
                        b.      Statutes and regulations prohibit women from serving in combat.

          J.        Sexual Harassment can occur anywhere, but may be especially prevalent in
                    male-dominated occupations such as the military. Sexual harassment violates
                    federal policies against sexual discrimination in the workplace (although it was not
                    a violation of federal policy when Anita Hill worked for Clarence Thomas).
                    1.     In Harris v. Forklift Systems (1993), the Supreme Court held that no
                           single factor is required to win a sexual harassment case under Title VII of
                           the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The law is violated when the workplace
                           environment “would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile
                           or abusive.”
                    2.     In 1996 and 1997, a number of army officers and noncommissioned officers
                           had their careers ended, and some went to prison, for sexual harassment of
                           female soldiers in training situations.
                    3.     In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton (1998), the Supreme Court stated that
                           employers can be held liable for even those harassing acts of supervisory
                           employees that violate clear policies and of which top management has no
                           knowledge.

VI.       Graying of America

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          A.        People in their eighties comprise the fastest growing age group in this country.
          B.        In 1967, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
                    prohibiting employers from discriminating against individuals over the age of 40 on
                    the basis of age.
          C.        It is not clear what the fate of the gray liberation movement will be as its
                    members approach the status of a minority majority.

VII.      People with Disabilities
          A.    The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (twice vetoed by President Nixon as “too costly”)
                prohibited discrimination against people with disabilities in federal programs.
          B.    The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 guarantees that
                children with disabilities will receive an ‘appropriate’ education.
          C.    The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 requires employers and public
                facilities to provide “reasonable accommodations,” and prohibits employment
                discrimination against the disabled. The act created the Telecommunications
                Relay Service, which allows hearing and speech-impaired people access to
                telephone communications.
          D.    Questions have been raised over whether AIDS victims are handicapped and thus
                entitled to protection. So far, no case dealing with AIDS victims has reached the
                Supreme Court.

VIII. Gay and lesbian Rights
          A.        Homosexual activity is illegal in some states, and homosexuals often face
                    prejudice in hiring, education, access to public accommodations, and housing.
                    1.     Organizations such as the Gay Activist Alliance and Gay Liberation Front
                           began exerting pressure and influence on state legislatures to repeal laws
                           prohibiting homosexual conduct.
                    2.     In Romer v. Evans (1996), the Supreme Court ruled that a Colorado
                           constitutional amendment invalidating state and local laws that protected
                           homosexuals from discrimination was unconstitutional because it violated
                           the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

          B.        Societal Relationships
                    1.    In 1986, Bowers v. Hardwick dealt with the issue of the legality of a
                          Georgia antisodomy law. The Court upheld the Georgian law. However, in
                          2003, the Court reversed the decision in Lawrence v. Texas, ruling that a
                          Texas sodomy law was unconstitutional.
                    2.    In 1996, Clinton signed the Defense of Marriage Act allowing states not to
                          recognize gay marriages from other states and made illegal any federal
                          benefits to states that did allow gay marriages.

          C.        Employment Policies
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                    1.        In 1993, President Clinton announced a new policy that barred the
                              Pentagon from asking recruits or service personnel to disclose their sexual
                              orientation. Popularly known as the “don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue”
                              policy, it also reaffirmed the Defense Department’s strict prohibition against
                              homosexual conduct.
                    2.        In 2000, the Supreme Court ruled that a homosexual Boy Scout leader
                              could be barred from his position due to his homosexuality. The Boy Scouts
                              claimed that they had a right under the First Amendment’s freedom of
                              association to decide whom to exclude from membership in their
                              organization. (Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 2000)

IX.       Affirmative Action is a policy designed to correct the effects of past discrimination.
          A.     In 1978, the Supreme Court ruled in Regents of the University of California v.
                 Bakke that the affirmative action quotas used by the University of California in
                 their admissions policies were unconstitutional, and that Bakke had been denied
                 equal protection because the university used race as the sole criterion for
                 admissions.
          B.     In the more recent Hopwood v. Texas (1996) the Court struck down the
                 University of Texas Law School’s admissions program, stating that race could not
                 be used as a factor in deciding which applicants to admit to achieve student body
                 diversity, to prevent a hostile environment at the law school, to counteract the law
                 school’s reputation among minorities, or to end the effects of past discrimination
                 by institutions other than the law school.
          C.     In 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that universities within can use race as a factor
                 in admissions as long as quotas are not used (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003 and
                 Gratz v. Bollinger, 2003).
          D.     In recent court decisions the court seems to be taking a more conservative view of
                 affirmative action programs and many fear that affirmative action is on the decline.




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