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Table of Contents

WITHDRAW TROOPS 1AC—INHERENCY                                            4

WITHDRAW TROOPS 1AC—TURKEY-GREECE CONFLICT                               5

WITHDRAW TROOPS 1AC—TURKEY-GREECE CONFLICT                               6

WITHDRAW TROOPS 1AC—TURKEY-GREECE CONFLICT                               7

WITHDRAW TROOPS 1AC—US-GREECE RELATIONS                                  9

WITHDRAW TROOPS 1AC—US-GREEK RELATIONS                                  11

WITHDRAW 1AC—US-GREEK RELATIONS                                         13

WITHDRAW TROOPS 1AC—TURKISH POLITICS                                    15

WITHDRAW TROOPS 1AC—US-GREEK RELATIONS                                  16

WITHDRAW TROOPS 1AC—TURKISH POLITICS                                    17

WITHDRAW TROOPS 1AC—TURKISH POLITICS                                    18

WITHDRAW TROOPS 1AC—TURKISH POLITICS                                    19

WITHDRAW TROOPS 1AC—TURKISH POLITICS                                    21

WITHDRAW TROOPS 1AC—PLAN                                                22

WITHDRAW TROOPS 1AC—SOLVENCY                                            23

US-GREECE RELATIONS HIGH NOW (1/ 2)                                     25

US-GREECE RELATIONS LOW (1/2)                                           28

US-GREECE RELATIONS GOOD – TERRORISM AND DRUG TRAFFICKING               30

US – GREECE RELATIONS GOOD – PROLIF AND EUROPEAN STABILITY              31

US – GREECE RELATIONS GOOD – AFGHANISTAN AND AGEAN                      32

US-GREECE RELATIONS GOOD- TERRORISM                                     33

US-GREECE RELATIONS GOOD – ENERGY DIVERSITY                             35

US- GREECE RELATIONS GOOD – RUSSIAN OIL                                 36

RELATIONS ZERO SUM (1/4)                                                37


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TENSION HIGH NOW                                                       41

GREECE TURKEY WAR INEVITABLE                                           42

GREEK-TURKISH WAR  MIDDLE EAST WAR                                    44

GREEK-TURKISH WAR  DESTABILIZED EUROPE                                45

GREEK-TURKISH WAR  NATO COLLAPSE                                      46

TURKEY ACTING UNILATERALLY - AEGEAN                                    47

TURKEY ACTING UNILATERALLY – AEGEAN                                    48

US SHOULD WITHDRAW TROOPS                                              49

US SHOULD WITHDRAW TROOPS                                              50

REMOVING TROOPS GOOD                                                   51

REMOVING TROOPS GOOD                                                   52

AKP-US RELATIONS LOW                                                   53

AKP –OPPOSITION NOW                                                    54

AKP – TAKING ANTI-ISLAMIC ACTIONS                                      55

TURKISH PUBLIC DISLIKES – US                                           56

TURKISH DISLIKES US                                                    57

US PRESENCE DECREASES RELATIONS                                        60
U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE UNDERMINES RELATIONS WITH GREECE              60

US PRESENCE DECREASES RELATIONS                                        61

US PRESENCE – CAUSES TURKISH VIOLENCE                                  62

US PRESENCE – CAUSES TURKISH VIOLENCE                                  63

AKP MAINTAIN RELATIONS WITH IRAN – TRADE                               65

AKP MAINTAIN RELATIONS WITH IRAN – ECON                                66

AKP MAINTAINS RELATIONS WITH IRAN – ENERGY                             68

TURKEY INCLUSION OF KURDS  DEMOCRACY                                  70

AKP LOSING NOW                                                         71



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REMOVING TROOPS POPULAR                                 72

ANTI-AMERICAN POLICY  AKP VICTORY                      73

FOREIGN POLICY/ANTI-AMERICANISM KEY TO AKP              74

ERDOGAN KEY TO NABUCCO                                  75

AKP KEY TO FINANCIAL REFORM                             76

AKP – KEY TO ENERGY COOPERATION (1/2)                   77

AKP –KEY TO ENERGY COOPERATION (2/2)                    78

NO ACTION ON KURDS BEFORE ELECTION                      80

AT: MILITARY COUP DISAD                                 81

NEG—COUP  INSTABILITY                                  82

AKP - PUBLIC UNHAPPY WITH RELECTION                     83

WINNING ELECTION KEY TO DEMOCRACY                       84

AKP LOSE ELECTION                                       85

PLAN UNPOPULAR – PUBLIC                                 86

PLAN UNPOPULAR-CONGRESS                                 90

PLAN POPULAR – CONGRESS                                 95

*2AC BLOCKS*                                            96

2AC TURKEY GREEK WAR EXT                                97

2AC US GREEK RELATIONS EXT                              98

2AC AKP POLITICS EXT                                    99

WITHDRAW TROOPS AFFIRMATIVE IMPACT CALC                100

2AC POLITICS PLAN POPULAR                              101

2AC: TROOP WITHDRAW UNPOPULAR                          102




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                                       Withdraw Troops 1AC—Inherency
Advantage one: Greece-Turkey War

The U.S. maintains around 5000 troops in Turkey.
Lale       Sariibrahimoglu,      staff    writer,      9-6-2007.     [Journal      of    Turkish       Weekly,
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/48156/us-congress-should-weigh-importance-of-incirlik-base.html]
     The US also has a very large presence at İncirlik and İskenderun, with around 5,000 men in total,
     including some engineers and workers. US C-17 cargo planes have been flying in and out of İncirlik
     carrying military equipment to Iraq while using the base as a depot for various goods to be carried to
     the region.

This troop presence is emboldening Turkish aggression in the Aegean.
Panayotis A. Yannakogeorgos, graduate student at the Division of Global Affairs, Rutgers University,
February            2007.          [Hellenic         Appeasement             and          its       Consequences,
http://files.mgkworld.net/cipt/docs/CIPTYannakogeorgosHelAppeas.pdf]
     Whenever Turkey perceives strong American support, it tends to act unilaterally. This is observed in
     cases of its relations with countries aside from Greece. In 1998, when American-Turkish relations were
     at a high point, Turkey instigated hostilities against Syria, ignoring Israeli and American warnings not
     to do so. Turkey acted unilaterally without regarding the stability of an already volatile region, and a
     full scale Mid-East war almost broke out. After the incident, no embargo or military sanctions were
     enacted against Turkey. Such inaction on the part of America serves to embolden the Turks in their
     unilateral objectives.Former US Ambassador Monteagle Sterns suggests that America seeks to assist
     Greece and Turkey in resolving their differences in order to assure that American interests in the
     region are protected.76 These interests are summarized as “secure access to Middle Eastern oil
     supplies; unimpeded rights of navigation in the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean.”77 Stearns
     further argues that the current status quo in the Aegean does not benefit anyone since the resources
     beneath the sea are in areas that are in constant dispute and neither Greece nor Turkey are able to
     exploit the resources for their economic gain. His solution to the problem is for Greece to sign a treaty
     with Turkey that conciliates the Turkish demand prohibiting the extension of territorial so that Turkey
     can have access to explore and exploit the resources of the Aegean.78 There are two problems with
     this.The First being that the Kemalist government in Turkey has no credibility when it comes to
     signing treaties. Based on past evidence, if Greece did take Stearn’s advice, there would be no
     guarantee that Turkey would honor the agreements. Secondly, this would further reward Turkey’s
     aggressive challenging of the status quo. The consequence of this would be that it might send a signal
     to other governments that seek to tilt the balance of an existing status quo in their favour by pursuing
     expansionist policies. This would result in local conflicts throughout the world. Evidence for this is
     observed when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait; he justified his action by citing the Turkish invasion
     of Cyprus and the international community’s lack of insistence that Turkey leave. Since Turkish
     actions have been used to justify expansionist policies by other countries in the past, it might happen
     again in the future. Hence, supporting Turkish challenges to the status quo, America could provoke
     conflicts in other countries that might consider it acceptable to challenge international law.




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                                  Withdraw Troops 1AC—Turkey-Greece Conflict
Greece is responding to Turkish infiltrations with a massive military buildup.
ASSOCIATED PRESS, news service 05-28-2010 “Despite crisis Greece continues weapons purchases”
http://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.aspx?id=176792
     Greek arms expenditure highest in EU due to tension with Turkey. ATHENS, Greece — Turkish
     fighter jets streak past remote Greek islands, shattering the calm of sleepy villages and alarming
     residents and beach-going visitors alike. Greek warplanes are scrambled to intercept them, fighting
     mock air battles over the Aegean Sea. The violation of Greek airspace by Turkish warplanes is the
     most tangible — and frequent — indication of the long-standing tensions between neighbors Greece
     and Turkey. Although it has waned recently, it is this tension, which brought the two NATO allies to
     the brink of war three times since 1974, that Athens cites as the reason behind its massive military
     spending. RELATED: Greece agrees to bailout plan But under its current financial crisis, there are
     increasing calls for this spending to be slashed. Ironically, some of the countries which have provided
     rescue loans to prevent Athens from being unable to pay back its debts — and who have been pushing
     for Greece to implement harsh austerity measures — also want the country to buy their expensive
     warplanes and ships. Athens came within a hair's breadth of defaulting this month, thanks to a last
     minute injection of cash in the form of rescue loans extended by the International Monetary Fund and
     other EU countries that use the euro as their currency. But the rescue wasn't for free. It came at high
     interest rates of about 5 percent and only after the government pushed through harsh austerity
     measures that slash salaries and pensions, hike taxes and curb public spending. With the crisis hitting
     pensioners and workers across the board, the country's spending on its military often rankles. Greece
     funnels billions of euros (dollars) into its military, spending more of its gross domestic product — 2.8
     percent in 2008 — on it than any other European Union country, and second only in NATO to the
     United States. Turkey, by comparison according to the most recent NATO figures available, spent 1.8
     percent of its GDP on military expenditure in 2008.

Tensions will escalate and make war inevitable
F. Stephen Larrabee, Ph.D., Distinguished Chair in European Security at RAND, 2010. [RAND, Troubled
Partnership     U.S.-Turkish     Relations      in    an     Era      of    Global      Geopolitical    Change,
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG899.pdf]
    This shift in Greek policy toward Turkey’s EU membership has contributed to overall improvement in
    Greek-Turkish relations. However, there has been little progress in resolving differences over the
    Aegean, especially over air space. In the last several years, the number of violations and incidents has
    increased to a dangerous degree.15 In 2006, a Greek pilot was killed when his F-16 collided with a
    Turkish jet in an area where dogfights between Greek and Turkish aircraft often take place. This
    incident highlighted the dangers of leaving the outstanding differences over the Aegean unresolved. As
    long as these issues remain unresolved, there is a danger that an incident could escalate and lead to a
    military confrontation, as nearly happened in 1996 over the islets of Imia/Kardak.




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                                  Withdraw Troops 1AC—Turkey-Greece Conflict
A Greece-Turkey war causes Middle East war.
Gerolymatos, Director of the Research Institute on Southwestern Europe at Simon Fraser University, 1997
(The Aegean Sea after the Cold War, pg. 58)
    The speed of modern communications and fast reaction time of advanced weapons systems means that
    any crisis in the Aegean or Cyprus has a strong probability of degenerating into a full-scale conflict by
    accident. It is not inconceivable that a Greek-Turkish war could invite a Syrian attack against Turkey
    and expand the conflict beyond the Aegean or Cyprus. The defeat of Turkey, even on a limited scale,
    would also cause internal unrest and bring that country close to a muslim fundamentalist social and
    political regime. Under these conditions, and taking into account the escalating arms race between
    Greece and Turkey, the security of the Eastern Mediterranean is tenuous at best, and could easily and
    quickly become a theatre of war that could spread to the Middle East.

Global nuclear war
John Steinbach, researcher, Center for Research on Globalization, March 2002. [CRG, Israeli Weapons of
Mass Destruction: a Threat to Peace, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html]
    Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has
    serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of
    nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any
    Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except
    as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President
    said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia
    and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is
    widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish
    satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting
    strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.)
    Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control
    negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously
    destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war.
    In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction
    with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict
    could trigger a world conflagration." (44).




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                                  Withdraw Troops 1AC—Turkey-Greece Conflict
Greek-Turkish confrontation causes European war.
Lesser, Larabee, Zanni 2001 (Ian O., F. Stephen, Michele, “Greece's New Geopolitics”,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1393/)

      The dangers of Greek-Turkish confrontation, apart from the obvious human costs, are truly strategic.
      Conflict would undermine stability across southeastern Europe and further complicate the settlement of
      disputes elsewhere in the Balkans, jeopardize the broader Western strategy of enlargement (both
      NATO and EU) in the east, and introduce new and damaging variables in relations with Russia and the
      Muslim world. At a minimum, the environment of brinkmanship that almost led to war over Imia-
      Kardak in 1996 could have led to the permanent estrangement of Turkey and permanent foreign and
      security policy costs for Greece. NATO adaptation, especially in the Mediterranean region, would
      have been difficult or impossible, and the EU’s nascent common foreign and security policy would
      have been mired in Aegean problems.

That spills over to nuclear war, bringing in the US.
John S. Duffield, Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, Winter
1994-95. [Political Science Quarterly 109(5), NATO’s functions after the cold war, p. Academic Search
Premier]
    In all these ways, NATO clearly serves the interests of its European members. But even the United
    States has a significant stake in preserving a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition to strong
    transatlantic historical and cultural ties, American economic interests in Europe-as a leading market for
    U.S. products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable direct foreign
    investment by American companies remain substantial. If history is any guide, moreover, the United
    States could easily be drawn into a future major war in Europe, the consequences of which would
    likely be even more devastating than those of the past, given the existence of nuclear weapons.[11]




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                                       Withdraw Troops 1AC—US-Greece Relations

Advantage Two: US-Greece Relations

Greece’s perception of U.S. unwavering support for Turkey undermines relations
Kurdistan Observer News Service 4 8 2006 “Free Kurdistan (Kurdistan, an ideal ally of US and Israel in the
Middle East)” http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1611696/posts
   The majority of the thirty million or so Kurds, however, live in Turkey – almost one quarter of the
   population of Turkey. That, more than anything else, has stayed our hand so far. Kurdistan with the
   southeast quarter of Turkey, is a fairly large nation. Traditionally, Turkey has been an ally of America,
   but that has been changing fast and Turkish support for American policies has always been based
   entirely on cynical self-interest. We owe Turkey – neutral in World War Two and our enemy in World
   War One – nothing. Our support for Turkey costs us the goodwill of Greeks, Armenians and other
   European nations that suffered through centuries of Turkish oppression. It also has cost of much of the
   goodwill of Kurds, who would otherwise welcome the presence of a superpower that was not
   intolerant, not Arab, and sought nothing but friendly relations with it.




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                                       Withdraw Troops 1AC—US-Greece Relations
U.S. military presence makes U.S. look biased towards Turkey, undermining our cooperation with
Greece.
Kirisci, 2002 ( Kemal is a Professor of International Relations, Department of Political Science and
International Relations, Boðaziçi University, “The "enduring rivalry" between Greece and Turkey: can
'democratic peace' break it?” http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume1/number1/kririsci.htm )
        The logic of 'prisoner's dilemma' suggests that after repeated 'games' the players will go through a
     learning process and recognise that the best pay-off, getting off the hook, can only be arrived at by
     cooperating, in this case by remaining silent under police interrogation, and not defecting. In other
     words the nature of the game associated with 'prisoner's dilemma' is such that in the long run rational
     thinking will prevail. Furthermore, in 'prisoner's dilemma' third parties can play an important role too
     by encouraging the two parties to better communicate and help them cooperate by changing their cost-
     benefit calculations. Hence, in the case of Greece and Turkey one would have expected that after
     almost half a century of conflict both sides would have discovered that cooperation promises better
     pay-offs for both sides. Furthermore, a long string of third parties such as the United States and the
     European Union have tried to mediate and nudge the parties towards cooperation. Neither process have
     worked in the case of Greece and Turkey. Why?
     A number of interrelated reasons could be cited. Firstly and most importantly, 'prisoner's dilemma'
     assumes the nature of the conflict to be a 'non-zero sum' game. That is a conflict where both sides
     could win, that is 'get off the hook'. In the case of Greece and Turkey the socialization process of
     decision-makers and often the society at large is such that the conflicts between the two countries are
     seen as part of a 'zero-sum' game. If one side wins the other side inevitably looses. This has also been
     reinforced by the fact that as the nature of the 'game' between the two countries forced decision-makers
     to defect, they have justified the defection by blaming the other side for not giving in, in other words
     for not accepting to 'loose'. This has had the effect of reinforcing mutual mistrust and lack of
     confidence as well as seeking evil intensions in any positive move (in terms of breaking out of the
     'prisoner's dilemma) that the other side might make. Such a process in turn has prevented a
     constructive 'communication' to develop. A kind of communication that could first help to transform
     the game from a 'zero-sum' game to a 'non-zero sum' one but also one that would help both sides
     appreciate that cooperation could benefit both sides. Simultaneously, this also has a tendency to
     strengthen the socialisation process that creates constituencies that depict the game as a 'zero-sum'
     game and police anyone who might attempt to defect from their ranks. The behaviour of the other side
     is always filtered through the lenses that this socialisation process creates.
     The involvement of third parties to break the dead-lock has not worked either for similar reasons.
     Often such an involvement aiming to alter the pay-off matrix in a manner to encourage cooperation at
     best has not been credible or at worst has had the effect of aggravating the conflict. The United States
     has been an ally of both countries at least since the days of the declaration of the Truman Doctrine in
     1947. Both during the Cold War as well as after it American foreign policy makers have considered the
     conflicts between Greece and Turkey to be detrimental to U.S. interests. They have initiated many
     efforts to reconcile both parties but the most they seem to have achieved is to keep the two parties from
     becoming actually involved in a war. One major reason is that the two parties have not seen the U.S. as
     an 'honest broker'. Greece has often viewed the U.S. with suspicion and feared a U.S. bias for Turkey
     because of the strategic importance attributed by U.S. decision-makers to Turkey and its military
     capabilities. Likewise Turkish decision-makers have also suspected the U.S. for favouring the other
     side. They have viewed the U.S. executive as being controlled by the 'Greek lobby' in the American


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      Congress.




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                                       Withdraw Troops 1AC—US-Greek Relations
US-Greek relations are key to stability in the Balkans.
Daniel Speckhard, U.S. Ambassador to Greece, 3-26-2009. [Wilson Center, Resilience and Transition:
Resetting                                            U.S.-Greece                                         Relations,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=109941&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=51286
2]
     In turn, the previous administration was sometimes frustrated by the lack of support of Greece for its
     top foreign policy priorities, leaving both sides in the end questioning the strength of the longstanding
     partnership and alliance. However, the world changed on November 4th. Greeks who had lost their
     faith in America and defined us as a nation by our policies of the time rather than our enduring values
     and principles were once again reminded of what has bound us together over all these years. The
     inauguration of the new President has given us a rare opportunity to fundamentally alter the course of
     our relations with Greece and that could have longstanding benefits to both our nations.
     Why is this important? Well, in spite of the changes in the world since the end of the Cold War, Greece
     remains fundamentally a geostrategically important country at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle
     East, and the Muslim world. Our interests are shared ones in today’s globally interconnected world.
     If you’re interested in anchoring Turkey in the family of democratic nations and see it as an example
     for modern, moderate Islamic countries, Greece’s role in supporting Turkey’s EU accession and in
     maintaining good neighborly relations is critical.
     If you’re worried about the continuing threat of international terrorism, cooperation with Greece is key.
     It’s a front line border country for the entry to European visa free Schengen zone and it had 140,000
     known illegal immigrants just last year -- 50,000 alone from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Iraq.
     If you care about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Greece is an important maritime
     country central to implementing UN Security Council resolutions. In addition to its naval forces
     supporting the NATO non-proliferation mission in the Mediterranean, its government is helping and
     working with Greek ship owners that control one-sixth of the world’s merchant marine fleet to stop
     ships carrying UN-sanctioned materials.
     If you believe that maintaining the nation’s stability in the Balkans is essential to Europe’s peace and
     prosperity, Greece is a vital anchor for the region and a partner for economic development.
     And as we prepare to celebrate the 60th Anniversary of NATO, Greece has always been and remains
     an important NATO and military ally in international efforts providing support in Suda Bay;
     contributing troops and missions in Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and UNIFIL, and working together
     to counter piracy efforts off of Somalia.
     So this relationship is of vital importance to both our countries. The new administration recognizes this
     and has, as the President has said, put an emphasis on renewing old alliances and forging new
     partnerships. It has set a new tone in our international approach emphasizing dialogue and listening to
     our partners, engagement, and the role of multilateral institutions. These are key points our Greek
     friends have been asking for over the past years.

The Balkans are a powder keg—results in great power wars.
Nikolaus Blome, staff writer, 4-3-1999. [Text of a report by Die Welt, Translated by BBC Monitoring Europe –
Political, “The new NATO, quite the same,” p. ln]
     Ultimately, for peace in Bosnia, NATO employed its military power for the first time, with
     surprisingly rapid success. But the return of order comprising all of Europe is still far away; that is the
     lesson not only from the war over Kosovo. Many powder kegs with frightfully short fuses still stand


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      in the Balkans. In the North of the continent, the Baltic states lie in a zone which Russia is still
      claiming, but can no longer dominate. Even the alliance at heart does not yet know whether, in the end,
      the Balts will be allowed into the West.
      The war in the Balkans teaches NATO on its 50th anniversary one thing above all: its mission is the same. However, the one key to the continent's security
      and order no longer exists. Because NATO has held its ground for 50 years, the terror of the one, all-destructive strike fortunately is gone.
      The price for it is wars as in Kosovo and the insight that NATO, in view of many and ever new crises,
      has become fallible. In future, it may fail at one time or another, but it would not be its end - from now
      on, it will always have the freedom of another attempt.




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                                       Withdraw 1AC—US-Greek Relations
Removing U.S. military support for Turkey restores US-Greek and Greek-Turkish relations.
Speros Vryonis, Jr., Ph.D., Director of the Speros Basil Vryonis Center for the Study of Hellenis, authority on
Greek and Byzantine history and has served as director of the Alexander Onassis Center of New York
University, former professor of history at UCLA, Summer 1997. [2 UCLA J. Int'l L. & For. Aff. 69, POINT-
COUNTERPOINT: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE ONGOING GRECO-TURKISH CRISIS AS A
CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO DESTABILIZATION, p. ln]
    Greece is the sole remaining politically and economically stable country in the Balkans, and its
    stability is vital to the interests of the U.S. and other countries in the region. The most obvious solution
    to preserve Greek stability is the cessation of the heavy arming of Turkey. Turkey is already
    overarmed far beyond its defensive needs. Greece, which desperately desires peace, has expressed no
    territorial designs upon its neighbors. Ending the flow of arms to Turkey will help restore normal
    relations between the two countries, and could help lead to the stabilization of Turkish economic,
    social, and political life. The immense funds presently spent on military spending could be redirected
    into the Turkish economy to serve the Turkish people.
    The reorientation of the Turkish economy from its present military focus to one of internal
    development will redress the internal political balance, allay the rising threat of the Refah party, and
    curb the rapid Islamization of Turkish political life. In addition, the end of Turkish heavy military
    spending may lessen fears of an increasingly large arms stockpile falling into the hands of an Islamic
    fundamentalist government. n46 [*89]
    V.
    Conclusion
    U.S. foreign policy has contributed heavily to the destabilization of Turkey, and has also sacrificed a
    stable democratic ally in Greece. A policy which has resulted only in placating the Turkish military
    caste is a short-sighted foreign policy. The military caste will not "save" Turkey from the growing
    internal tensions within Turkish society.
    When one nation in a conflict is given preferential treatment over another with respect to the acquisition of
    weapons, that nation will build up its military. The nation which establishes such military superiority
    will use its advantage to settle the conflict in its favor, often violating the sovereignty of the weaker
    nation in the process. One wonders how this simple proposition has "escaped" the notice of all those
    who formulate and enforce American policy in Greco-Turkish affairs. When the U.S. places no
    restraints on the use of Turkey's military weaponry, it rewards Turkey for its aggression. It becomes an
    inescapable conclusion that the present arms imbalance and the threats created by the Turkish military
    will result in war. This would be an unqualified disaster for the region and, ultimately, for U.S.
    national security.

      The crises which have been initiated by the stronger party, Turkey, should be settled in favor of the
      security interests of the U.S. and, more generally, the interest of the Balkan region. There are two parts
      to the solution to this impending crisis: ending the flow of arms to Turkey; and halting Turkey's
      expansionist aggression.
      Peace is an admirable goal. However, when a foreign policy favors one side of a conflict, a lopsided
      result is inevitable. Turkey should not be allowed to use its U.S.-supplied weapons to attack an
      American ally and member of NATO. The executive branch of the U.S. should act responsibly to
      prevent adding fuel to the tinderbox which characterizes the current Greco-Turkish state of affairs.




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                                           Withdraw Troops 1AC—Turkish Politics
Advantage 3 - Turkish Politics

Turkey will hold early elections this fall.
Goksel Bozkurt, staff writer, 6-11-2010. [Hurriyet Daily News, THE CORRIDOR - Elections in fall?,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=the-corridor-2010-06-11]
     If the elections are held on time, they have to be taken care of until July 22, 2011 at the latest. However,
     the government tends to hold elections before July due to an expected hot summer season. The spring
     of 2011, April or May in particular is being considered for that.
      A month ago Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan insisted for the elections to be held on schedule. Then, has anything changed at this point? What does
      the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, parliamentary group think about rescheduling the elections? Could the AKP possibly seek a rush
      election in the fall of 2010, right after a possible popular vote as the opposition asserts?
      The CHP and the Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP, backstage expect an early election in the fall.
      Comments have it that the AKP, following the Constitutional Court decision in particular, may go for
      an election. Close circles with Erdoğan and his team, their old political allies the Saadet Party, or SP,
      chairman Numan Okutmuş think that if the Court annuls the constitutional amendment package as a
      whole, the possibility of a popular vote will vanish, and under these circumstances the AKP may seek
      an election. Otherwise, voting will be held as scheduled.

The ruling Justice and Development Party—the AKP—will lose when elections are held.
Gil Ronen, staff writer, 6-6-2010. [Israel National News, Erdogan Poised to Lose Next Election, Expert Says,
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/news.aspx/137906]
     Turkey's foreign policy shift away from friendship with Israel and the West may be a ploy by the
     country's prime minister to gain popularity for his party, which stands to lose the next election in July
     2011, says a top expert on the region.
     The hostile stance taken by Turkey towards Israel is part of a major transformation of Turkey’s foreign
     policy, according to Begin-Sadat Center Director Prof. Efraim Inbar. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
     Erdogan is turning away from the West, he explained, and moving closer to countries such as Sudan,
     Syria and Iran.
     However, “it is not a foregone conclusion that Turkey will persist in this direction,” Inbar said in a
     position paper: “Among Turkish society many still support the secular parties, which are far from
     pleased with the rush towards the Muslim world. Even among moderate Muslim quarters there is a
     sense of unease regarding the government’s policy pushing Turkey to join radical Islamic elements
     such as Hamas and Iran. One should also recall that Shiite Iran was an historic rival of the Sunni
     Turks.” (For an article on Turkey under Erdogan written by an Iranian freedom activist, click here.)
     Public support for the ruling Islamic party is in decline, the expert added, mostly due to corruption and
     abuse of civil rights. “Were elections held last week, the Islamist party would lose many seats, and two
     secular parties would possibly have made up the coalition. If current public opinion is held till the next
     elections, scheduled for July 2011, it is likely that Turkey will emerge with a new prime minister. It is
     possible that precisely due to his domestic situation as reflected in the polls, Erdogan has decided to
     exacerbate his relations with Israel in order to gain public support.”




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                                         Withdraw Troops 1AC—US-Greek Relations
The AKP needs to divert attention from bread and butter issues to win the election.
Semih Idiz, staff writer, 6-14-2010. [Hurriyet Daily News, Erdogan fans anti-Israeli, Anti-American sentiments
for political gain, p. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=erdogan-fans-anti-israeli-anti-american-
sentiments-for-political-gain-2010-06-14]
     This card is gender paraphrased
     Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appears set to milk the popularity he gained in the streets of
     Turkey and the Middle East after the Marmara crisis in which nine Turks were killed by Israeli forces
     in a seriously botched up military operation.
     It is almost as if he was waiting for a new crisis with Israel to be able to work the streets in order to
     regain some of the political ground his ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, has been
     loosing over bread and butter issues at home.
     He and his party executives are clearly worried that the reinvigorated Republican Peoples Party, or
     CHP, may make headway given the successful manner in which its new leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu,
     has been hitting at the government over topics that really matter for the average [person] on the street.
     He is also concerned that the Saadet (Felicity) Party, the other Islamist party, may steal votes from the
     AKP given the rising dissatisfaction among the public.
     Turks are fickle though, and easily swayed emotionally even if this means that the bread and butter
     issues of vital importance to them are pushed to the background. It is clear that there is great public
     animosity towards Israel today. As for the almost endemic anti-Americanism among Turks, this is also
     adding grist to Erdogan’s populist mill.
     So we see him increasingly turning up the volume of his demagoguery, and hitting at Israel and the
     United States at every opportunity that presents itself. No doubt he is keeping a close eye on the
     “political rating meter” as he sends his crowds to paroxysms of delirious applause with his remarks,
     some of which smack openly of anti-Semitism and reflect a growing anti-Western tendency.
      After the Marmara incident he was not only quick to use the harshest and most insulting adjectives when referring to Israel, but also had thinly veiled
      warnings to Washington, suggesting openly that those who stood behind Israel were also culpable in the crimes committed by that country.
      Over the weekend he went further and openly named the U.S. this time, thus revealing what lies in his heart-of-hearts. This is what he had to say while
      addressing an adoring crowd in Rize, on the Black Sea coast, where people are not only religious but also ultra-nationalist.
      “They are asking us what Turkey is doing in the Middle East, in Palestine. Why is Turkey bothered about Gaza? But could they not be asked in return
      what America is doing in Iraq? What is it doing in Palestine? Could it not be asked what is it doing in Afghanistan? What are France, Britain, and Holland,
      and so on, doing in these places?”
      Erdogan went on threateningly to say, “I am calling on the Israeli supported international media and their subcontractors at home: Turkey is not like other
      countries.” His only tribute to sophistication during this show of demagoguery was his reference to “the Israeli supported international media.”
      Previously he had made references to the “Jewish controlled international media” but must have been warned by his advisors that this was too overtly
      “anti-Semitic,” and thus politically incorrect. This no doubt forced him to make a slight modification in his nevertheless anti-Semitic reference to the
      international media.
      What is worse, however, is that Erdogan is set to raise the volume of his bellicosity in coming weeks
      and months, given that Turkey will, for all intents and purposes, be moving into “election mode.” We
      had an opportunity to talk to Hikmet Cetin, a highly respected veteran politician and former Foreign
      Minister, the other day.




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                                       Withdraw Troops 1AC—Turkish Politics
A victory on foreign policy is key to an AKP victory.
Ali Aslan Kilic, staff writer, 6-14-2010. [Today’s Zaman, Foreign policy and upcoming general elections,
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-213044-foreign-policy-and-upcoming-general-elections.html]
     We discussed with political analysts debates on whether Turkey was changing its axis in foreign
     policy. The opposition front reckons the government has gone too far with its rapprochement with Iran,
     Russia and the Arab world. But they also know that they cannot use this notion as a direct tool of propaganda. A
     friend of mine who is a deputy from the opposition said: “`. But we can’t use it to strengthen our hand.
     What would we say to the voters? Are we supposed to say, ‘Vote for us so that we can stop the AK Party from
     moving away from the West and turning towards the East?’ Implying this, let alone voicing it, would mean
     another election victory for the AK Party.”
     Executives from the ruling party believe they will have the upper hand in the election if they pursue
     foreign policy debates. Prepared to complain to the public about the impairment of the legal reform,
     the ruling party is going to ask the people, “Do you want friendship and peace, which is a guarantor of
     tranquility and prosperity, to become stronger?”
     It is clear that foreign policy is going to be an effective argument in the general elections.

The plan provides the win—it gives a huge popular boost to the AKP
Lesser, Ian O. Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington
DC, and President, Mediterranean Advisors, LLC. He is a former member of the Policy Planning Staff in the
US Department of State. Survival vol. 48 no. 3 Autumn 2006
    In Turkey, domestic and regional factors have driven policymakers and the public toward a more wary
    and ambivalent approach to relations with the United States. Some of these elements may be transitory,
    but others are likely to prove durable. First, public opinion now counts in Turkish foreign
    policymaking, and as polling results suggest, this opinion has turned distinctly anti-American in recent
    years. Recent surveys indicate that Turkish public attitudes toward the United States are now the most
    negative in Europe. This marked deterioration in perceptions of the United States has special
    significance for relations between Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP)
    government and the George W. Bush administration. An avowedly populist government with Islamist
    roots must deal with a more active and interventionist leadership in Washington, one that confronts
    Turkey with multiple policy dilemmas in its neighborhood. It is a challenging mixture, and one that is
    not, of course, unique to Turkish–American relations. Indeed, Turkish public opinion, sensitive to both
    European and Muslim concerns (e.g. Palestinian aspirations), has multiple sources of pressure when it
    comes to attitudes toward the United States. To this must be added the tendency of some American
    foreign- and security-policy elites to ignore the changes that have taken place on the Turkish scene
    over the last decade, in particular the greatly increased role of public opinion and the emergence of
    new actors in the Turkish policy debate. In this as in other key areas, relations suffer from ‘deferred
    maintenance’, with only limited attempts to engage new constituencies beyond traditional bilateral
    partners on the Turkish side. Indeed, even the traditional partners, such as the Turkish military and
    security establishment, appear ambivalent regarding strategic cooperation with the United States (this
    was also the case in the early 1990s).




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                                       Withdraw Troops 1AC—Turkish Politics
AKP victory is key to Turkey-Iran energy cooperation.
Elin Kinnander, Assistant Editor, The Turkey Analyst, January 2010. [Oxford Institute for Energy Resources,
The Turkish-Iranian Gas Relationship: Politically Successful, Commercially Problematic]
    The next Turkish general elections will be held in 2011, which will constitute another crucial point in
    the future gas cooperation between Turkey and Iran. As has been discussed above, current Turkish
    foreign policy differs very much from previous traditions. With a new party in office the relations
    between Turkey and Iran could very well change with obvious implications for gas cooperation. In
    late 2009, survey results suggested declining support for the AKP government82. A different
    parliamentary constellation after the 2011 general elections, in terms of a coalition or a single party
    government (and in that case not the AKP), would most likely see a change in foreign policy. This
    policy change would most likely also concern Iran, since it represents one of the most controversial
    aspects of Turkish foreign and economic policy. Much also depends on European and US policy
    towards Iran since, in particular the main opposition party CHP would try to follow a similar policy to
    that of those countries.

Specifically, Iranian cooperation with Turkey is key to ensure gas supply for the Nabucco pipeline.
Saban Kardas, Research Assistant, Departments of International Relations, Middle East Technical University
and Sakarya University, 9-14-2009. [Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 167,
Davutoglu's         Visit       to       Iran       Highlights       Ankara's          Regional        Diplomacy,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35490]
     Turkey seeks to deepen its energy partnership with Iran, especially considering its efforts to become a
     major energy hub. Indeed, one of the biggest obstacles before the Nabucco project, which Turkey
     considers as a strategic priority, is finding suppliers, Iran is the most likely alternative, since it
     possesses the second largest gas reserves in the world. Turkey indeed has been eager to act as a bridge
     connecting Iranian gas to the European grid through Nabucco. Although Ankara signed a major energy
     cooperation deal with Iran in 2007, it had to suspend those plans due to American objections. U.S.
     sanctions toward Iran prevent the development of the Iranian gas sector and the export of its gas to
     Western markets. Since its fields are underdeveloped and it needs immense transportation
     infrastructure, Iran has not emerged as a major player in gas markets, and even has been forced to
     import gas from Turkmenistan to meet its domestic demand. Prior to the signing of the Nabucco inter-
     governmental agreement in Ankara, Turkish officials, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
     emphasized their willingness to tap into Iranian gas, but U.S. officials reiterated their objection to the
     Iranian option (EDM, July 14). However, Davutoglu said that Turkey would work to help Iran export
     its gas to European markets.




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                                       Withdraw Troops 1AC—Turkish Politics
The nabucco pipeline’s key to Europe’s energy independence—allows diversification from Russian gas.
Jelena Vukotic, security analyst, 9-10-2009. [Roubini, Turkey’s EU Dreams and European Energy Security: In
the                        Pipeline?                             ,                         http://www.roubini.com/euro-
monitor/257663/turkeys_eu_dreams_and_european_energy_security_in_the_pipeline]
    Turkey is geographically well positioned to become a regional energy hub. It could link producers in the Caspian
    and the Middle East regions with the energy-hungry European markets, which by 2020 will import
    roughly 77% of the natural gas they use. However, conflicting visions of who will lay the pipelines
    and provide the gas complicate the issue. The EU is pushing for the Nabucco pipeline project, aimed
    at cutting European dependence on Moscow, which has a nasty habit of turning off gas supplies to
    Europe whenever disputes arise with transit countries. Russia, on the other hand, has a pet project of its
    own - the South Stream gas pipeline, designed to cement Russia’s position as the key European energy
    supplier.

Overreliance on Russian gas ensures economic collapse—price gouging and supply disruption
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security
at Heritage, 11/5/07 (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bg2083.cfm)
    Third, European leaders are partly responsible for growing gas demand. Europe, led by Germany and
    the United Kingdom, has made a conscious choice to rely on gas as its main new source of energy at a
    time when domestic supplies are declining. Europe has encouraged the construction of gas-fired plants,
    feeding the
    demand for more gas. Implications for European Energy Security These developments have dire
    implications for European energy security. First, Europe should expect higher prices in the coming
    decades, especially because its supply is becoming concentrated in Russian hands. Moscow has
    already demonstrated its willingness to raise oil and gas prices and to use energy as a foreign policy
    tool, as recent incidents in the Baltic States, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia have clearly
    shown. Second, Europe should expect increasing disruptions of its energy supply. The long and intense
    cold wave in 2006 increased Russian demand for gas and strained Gazprom's delivery capability.[52]
    Another cold wave could knock refineries and pipelines off-line. Such disruptions would impose
    economic costs and could cost lives. In the future, because of insufficient production, Russia may be
    unable to satisfy Europe's growing demand for gas. Output from Gazprom's three giant fields in West
    Siberia, which account for three-quarters of its production, is declining by 6 percent to 7 percent per
    year, and the output from a gas field brought on-line in 2001 has already peaked.[53] Gazprom has
    decided to develop a field on the Yamal peninsula, but it will take years for that field to start
    producing. Gazprom has been reluctant to invest in new fields. Many hopes are connected to
    exploration of the Shtokman gas field, which is over 550 kilometers offshore in the Barents Sea and
    under 300 meters of water.[54] After many delays, Gazprom reconsidered its decision to "go it alone"
    and on July 13, 2007, signed a framework agreement with France's Total for the first phase of
    Shtokman development. However, under the agreement, Gazprom retains full ownership rights to the
    gas through its subsidiary Sevmorneftegaz.[55] Gazprom's choice of a partner was politically mo-
    tivated, and it took a phone conversation between French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Russian Pres-
    ident Putin to clinch the deal. Total is cash rich but has no experience working in Arctic
    conditions.[56] The chances that this joint venture will succeed are unclear. In late October 2007,
    recognizing that it cannot launch Shtokman even with Total, Gazprom sold another 24 percent of the
    project to StatoilHydro, a Norwegian state-controlled company, which reportedly will pay $800


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      million for its stake.[57] Meanwhile, Russia's own demand for gas is growing by over 2 percent per
      year. Comparing Russia's uncertain supply with Europe's growing demand, a senior European
      Commission official estimated that the EU's annual energy needs will increase by 200 million metric
      tons of gas by 2020, while Russia envisions expanding its gas exports by just 50 million metric
      tons.[58] In this scenario, even Russia may be unable to meet European demand.[59]




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                                         Withdraw Troops 1AC—Turkish Politics
European economic decline causes mass conflict across the continent
Friedman, Ph.D., Chair and founder of Stratfor, security analyst, 7/18/01 (The Record)
   The creation of a trans-European entity after the massive European bloodletting in the first half of the
   20th century has been an extraordinary event. The founders of the European Community, later the European Union, explained
    it as a rational response to that bloodletting, based on two assumptions: First, leaders on the continent agreed that another round of fighting
    could annihilate European civilization. Second, they assumed Europe is an inherently prosperous region. If the Europeans succeeded in
    building institutions to exploit their resources, they could create unprecedented and lasting affluence. As the European Community
    demonstrated the success of the transnational experiment, more and more states would wish to join in the prosperity and the relationship
    would deepen. More important, as the price for membership required that minor nationality issues, both internal
    and external, be set aside, it was assumed that nationality issues plaguing individual states would subside.
    Whether this theory has been confirmed or not is more than a theoretical question. It goes to the heart of the European question
    and in turn to the future of the world. Recent signs of economic downturn in the economies of Western Europe indicate the
    long-term viability of the EU will be tested sooner rather than later. The ongoing nationalist insurgencies such as the Irish
    RIRA and Basque ETA stem from internal ethnic and political struggles more than from the economic prosperity that has
    defined most of the past decade. But the indirect connection is still relevant: If it was the prosperity facilitated by EU
    membership that helped marginalize these groups, a significant economic downturn could lead to their
    resurgence. Indeed, recent events in Italy, a member nation, and in Ireland and Austria, EU observer nations, suggest that
    both economic and political pressures are building against the EU goals of monetary and political integration. Individual
    European states today are prepared to subsume their national aspirations for economic benefit. But if
    those benefits cease to exist, what will hold the union together? When the monetary policy being pursued by the
    European Central Bank imposes austerity, as likely will happen sometime, that austerity will not be equally distributed. A
    monetary policy that benefits one European nation need not benefit others, and it is unlikely that it would. That will be the
    point at which European nationalism, currently limited to policy disagreements between national governments and
    the EU headquarters in Brussels, will become significant again. History shows that secession is the natural tendency during
    times of economic stringency. It will be at that moment that the ETAs and RIRAs of Europe will blossom again,
    combining primordial national sentiment with economic policy.

US gets drawn into the resulting nuclear war.
John Duffield, Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, 1994
[Political Science Quarterly 109:5, p. 766-7]
    Initial analyses of NATO's future prospects overlooked at least three important factors that have helped to
    ensure the alliance's enduring relevance. First, they underestimated the extent to which external threats
    sufficient to help justify the preservation of the alliance would continue to exist. In fact, NATO still
    serves to secure its members against a number of actual or potential dangers emanating from outside
    their territory. These include not only the residual threat posed by Russian military power, but also the
    relatively new concerns raised by conflicts in neighboring regions. Second, the pessimists failed to consider
      NATO's capacity for institutional adaptation. Since the end of the cold war, the alliance has begun to develop two important new
      functions. NATO is increasingly seen as having a significant role to play in containing and controlling militarized conflicts in Central and
      Eastern Europe. And, at a deeper level, it works to prevent such conflicts from arising at all by actively promoting stability within the
      former Soviet bloc. Above all, NATO pessimists overlooked the valuable intra-alliance functions that the alliance has always performed
      and that remain relevant after the cold war. Most importantly, NATO has helped stabilize Western Europe, whose states had often been
      bitter rivals in the past. By damping the security dilemma and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of common
      security policies, NATO has contributed to making the use of force in relations among the countries of the region virtually inconceivable.
      In all these ways, NATO clearly serves the interests of its European members. But even the United States has a significant stake in
      preserving a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition to strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties, American economic interests
      in Europe— as a leading market for U.S. products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable direct foreign
      investment by American companies — remain substantial. If history is any guide, moreover, the United States could
      easily be drawn into a future major war in Europe, the consequences of which would likely be even
      more devastating than those of the past, given the existence of nuclear weapons.


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                                       Withdraw Troops 1AC—Plan
The United States federal government should withdraw most of its troops from Turkey.




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                                       Withdraw Troops 1AC—Solvency
Solvency

Incirlik is becoming obsolete, making withdrawal inevitable.
F. Stephen Larrabee, Ph.D., Distinguished Chair in European Security at RAND, 2010. [RAND, Troubled
Partnership      U.S.-Turkish     Relations      in    an      Era      of    Global      Geopolitical      Change,
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG899.pdf]
    Another important source of strain has been U.S. access to Turkish bases and facilities. In recent years,
    the United States has faced increasing restrictions on its ability to conduct operations out of İncirlik Air
    Base. Although Turkey has allowed the United States to use İncirlik to transport personnel and
    materiel to Afghanistan and Iraq, it has refused to permit the United States to permanently station
    combat aircraft there or to use the base to fly combat missions in the Middle East or Persian Gulf
    region.9 Thus, in the future, the United States cannot automatically assume that it can use İncirlik for
    purposes beyond those spelled out in the 1980 Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement,
    particularly combat missions in the Middle East.
    To hedge against a serious deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations that could result in severe constraints
    on the use of Turkish bases or denial of their use altogether, the United States could gradually reduce
    its military presence in Turkey and conduct some of the missions currently carried out in Turkey from
    other friendly or allied countries in the region, such as Kuwait or Qatar. Doing so could have several
    benefits. It could reduce popular Turkish resentment against the U.S. military presence and diminish
    anti-Americanism in Turkey, while still allowing the United States to continue to carry out most of the
    current missions being performed at İncirlik and other facilities in Turkey. Such a move could be
    portrayed as an adjustment to the new security requirement arising after the end of the Cold War and as
    part of the overall Global Posture Review initiated by the Bush administration.

The U.S. is already looking for alternatives to Incirlik—it’s easy to replace.
Frank Hyland, lecturer at the American Public University System, served in the National Security Agency and
the CIA’s Counter-Terrorist Center, 12-19-2007. [Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Focus 4.42, U.S. Air Base
at             Incirlik          Faces             Political            and           Security            Threats,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4619]
     Mindful of the vagaries of international events and shifting alliances, the United States is reported to
     have already been searching for alternatives to Incirlik Air Base for some time. Candidates to the south
     in the Middle East include Qatar’s al-Udeid Air Base, which has served in the past as a headquarters
     for the U.S. Central Command’s air arm. Qatar has also housed U.S. logistical supplies. Kuwait,
     Bahrain, Oman, Iraq and Saudi Arabia also have airfields proven capable of supporting U.S. operations
     in the area. None, of course, has the track record of the reliably secular Muslim nation that is Turkey.
     Northward, within newly-friendly Bulgaria and Romania, other airfields and bases are candidates. The
     United States currently operates Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan and Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan.
     Tajikistan has a major civilian/military air base at Dushanbe and also hosts an Indian military air base
     at Farkhor/Ayni.




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                                       US-Greece Relations High Now (1/ 2)

US-Greek Relations Increasing
Marios      Efthymiopoulos,      writer     for    Europe's      world       June      23      2010
http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/CommunityPosts/tabid/809/PostID/1518/GreecesPolicyat
NATO.aspx

      Greece’s time has come to change, in the level of political implementation. We are soon to expect a
      turning point in its external relations agenda with more initiatives closer to the US needs. What is to be
      said is that Greece’s credibility and sustainability not only financially, but also politically (e.g. NATO
      level) but also socially is at stake. If therefore NATO is therefore looking for initiatives, Greece is
      getting ready to do just this. NATO’s interests are of sudden high national interest to the state. Greece
      is expected by the time of the summit meeting in November 2010, to have discussed bilateral and
      multilateral relations on NATO issues between member-states, they will discuss further enlargement of
      NATO in South-Eastern Europe, one of which however the country seems to keep a stable but
      sensitive position vis a vis known issues in the region, but yet seems keen in resolving as well. Greece
      will re-draw its relations with the United States and will finally re-draw post NATO’s Strategic
      Concept, its national strategic dogma; one that will however be surely affected by the current financial
      recession of the country. Greece will concentrate on multilateral cooperation for the long term and the
      willingness of the state to attract world attention by being more involved in operations of strategic
      importance, such as naval protection against international piracy, international issues of terrorism
      linked with drugs and migration affairs, policy application in cyber-defense issues, and protection of
      passages, while international organizations operate under mandates. Concentrating towards the U.S.-
      EU-Greece relations, it is estimated that all sides will be positively affected. There is a new sense of
      co-operation and sustainability of support to each other. Greece as a member of the EU, will portray a
      clearer sense of pure Euro-Atlantic, South-Eastern European co-operation and willingness for
      integration of countries willing to join NATO. The United States' support toward this aim will greatly
      enhance Greece’s ability and willingness for further effort, to overcome all obstacles and at the same
      time re-draw Greece-U.S. relations, for an even further and exclusive practical way of co-operation.




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                                       US-Greece Relations High Now (2/ 2)
Greece-U.S. Relations good after leaders met.
Greek         Embassy          in         Washington      D.C.       March         10          2010
http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/AuthoritiesAbroad/North+America/USA/EmbassyWashington/Articles/en-
US/Prime+Minister+Papandreou%E2%80%99s+visit+to+Washington+%28March+7-10+-+2010%29.htm

      Prime Minister George Papandreou’s recent visit to Washington was by all accounts a great success, as
      it not only included meetings with President Barack Obama, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton,
      Secretary of the Treasurer, Timothy F. Geithner, Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi and members of
      Congress, but also offered the opportunity for the Prime Minister to set out his ambitious program in
      dealing with a financial crisis, unprecedented in Greece’s modern history. The Prime Minister was
      accompanied by Minister of Finance, George Papaconstantinou, Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs,
      Dimitris Droutsas and Government’s Spokesman, George Petalotis. Mr. Papandreou’s trip to
      Washington came following visits to Germany and France, where he had meetings with Chancellor
      Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, respectively. On Tuesday March 9, the Greek
      Prime Minister met with U.S. President Barack Obama. During this meeting, Mr. Papandreou urged
      that the U.S. work with the European Union to regulate the international financial system, so as to
      curtail the activities of the speculators, which increase instability in the global markets and undermine
      the recovery efforts of countries with troubled economies. The two leaders also discussed foreign
      policy issues, such as the Cyprus issue, the “Agenda 2014”, a Greek-Austrian initiative for the
      integration of Western Balkans into Euro-Atlantic institutions, as well as Turkey’s European
      perspective. President Obama also expressed US appreciation for Greece’s development assistance and
      other contributions to Afghanistan, especially at this particular economic juncture. During the meeting
      of the two leaders, President Obama announced that Greece will be included in the 'visa waiver'
      program, thus making it easier for Greek citizens to travel to the US. Mr. Papandreou termed the visa
      waiver "a vote of confidence" to Greece and noted that the Greek government is determined to respond
      to its obligations and cooperate closely at international level in the fight against terrorism. Later on that
      same day, Prime Minister Papandreou joined President Obama in the annual White House celebration
      of Greek Independence, in the presence of H.E. Eminence Archbishop Demetrios, prominent members
      of the Greek American community and friends of Greece.

U.S.-Greece becoming closer through economic and social policies
Invest in Greece Agency May 2010 may newsletter outreach American-Hellenic Enterprise Initiative—Vision
2020 http://www.investingreece.gov.gr/default.asp?pid=127&nwslID=13&sec=9&la=1

      On April 15, 2010, the American-Hellenic Chamber of Commerce, as lead partner, officially
      announced the formation of the American-Hellenic Enterprise Initiative Vision 2020 (AHEI). US
      Ambassador Daniel Speckhard, Minister of Economy, Competitiveness and Shipping, Louka Katseli
      and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Spyros Kouvelis addressed the launch event. Following the
      meeting between Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou and U.S. President Barack Obama in
      March, the American-Hellenic Enterprise Initiative was announced with the intent to stimulate, propel
      and incentivise Greece-U.S. commercial and investment relations. Invest in Greece is a Founding
      Member of the Initiative. The mission of the American-Hellenic Enterprise Initiative (AHEI) is to
      develop and implement Greece-U.S. actions that further bi-national trade, investment, technology
      transfer, green energy solutions, R&D, and entrepreneurship through the combined efforts of AHEI


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      Partners. AHEI focuses on the challenges of the 21st Century and is an initiative to respond to those
      challenges with solutions derived from Greece-USA synergies. A key component of AHEI is to tap
      into the power of the young generation of Greeks, Greek Americans, and Americans to generate new
      trans-Atlantic partnerships and new administrative models and tools.




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                                       US-Greece Relations Low (1/2)

Greek Visa Waiver shows U.S. commitment to Greece
Greek         Embassy          in         Washington        D.C.       April       5           2010
http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/AuthoritiesAbroad/North+America/USA/EmbassyWashington/Articles/en-
US/Prime+Minister+Papandreou%E2%80%99s+visit+to+Washington+%28March+7-10+-+2010%29.htm

      As of April 5, 2010, Greece joins the VWP. This decision is a major milestone reflective of the strong
      and enduring relationship between the U.S. and Greece. This program will make it very convenient for
      most Greek citizens to travel to the United States, strengthening the long-standing family, educational,
      social and business ties between the two countries. The Visa Waiver Program enables Greeks
      travelling to the U.S. for tourism or some business purposes to stay in the United States for up to 90
      days without a visa, though travelers will have to complete some information online prior to traveling.

Turkey patching up relations with Greece in visit
Agence France Presse (AFP) on the Daily Star May 14, 2010 “Davutoglu sees 'revolution' in relations with
rival                                                                                           Greece”
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=114830#axzz0s6BfYEbp
 


      ANKARA: A visit to Greece starting Friday by Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will
      mark a “revolution” in ties between the long-time rivals, Turkey’s foreign minister said. The two-day
      talks in Athens would resemble “a joint cabinet meeting” between the Turkish and Greek governments,
      Ahmet Davutoglu said in an interview with the Haberturk news channel. Erdogan is to be accompanied
      by 10 ministers on the landmark trip. “The visit is in a sense a revolution … We have to move to a new
      psychological stage” after decades of hostility, Davutoglu said, adding that the talks “will lead to a
      change in the minds” of the Turkish and Greek people. “We have to not only minimize tensions, but
      also maximize areas of cooperation so that the notion of ‘tension’ is eradicated from the minds of the
      parties,” he said. Turkey’s improving ties with Russia, a Cold War enemy, and a flourishing
      partnership with Syria, an arch-foe until a decade ago, proves that progress is possible with Greece, he
      said. Erdogan and his Greek counterpart George Papandreou will co-chair the first meeting of a
      consultation platform comprising 10 ministers from each side, conceived as an annual event to forge
      closer ties between the two troubled NATO allies, who came to the brink of war as recently as 1996. In
      remarks to the Greek daily Ta Nea Monday, Turkey’s chief EU negotiator Egemen Bagis called for
      mutual cuts in military spending, pointing at the severe financial crisis shaking Greece. Despite a
      marked improvement in bilateral ties since 1999, the neighbors remain at loggerheads over territorial
      rights in the Aegean Sea and the Cyprus conflict. – AFP




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                                       US-Greece Relations Low Now (2/2)
The Greek people hate Americans because of poor foreign intervention
Carol Migdalovitz Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs December 16, 2009 congressonal research service
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21855.pdf

      Although official U.S.-Greek relations are generally cordial, there is a strong strain of anti-
      Americanism in Greece, stemming from U.S. support for the Greek military junta that ruled from
      1967-1974 and perceptions of U.S. failure to prevent the Turkish invasion of/intervention in Cyprus in
      1974, among other issues. Unsupported allegations of U.S. interference in domestic Greek political
      affairs surface regularly. Anti-American sentiment is manifest in periodic mass demonstrations
      mobilized by Communists, anarchists, unions, antiwar activists, and antiglobalization forces, whose
      influence is disproportionate to their numbers in society


Greece wants Turkey’s troops out of Cyprus, and thinks the US should take a stand [1AC if we don’t find
another]
Larigakis, 2010 (Nick, Executive Director of AHI, May 10, 2010, One Year After Obama: What Has
Changed on Our Issues?
”, http://www.ahiworld.com/press_releases/2010_032.html

      The removal of Turkey’s troops, colonists and barbed-wire fence would end the Turkish Cypriot’s
      economic isolation caused by Turkey and go a long way to solving the Cyprus problem because the
      Greek and Turkish Cypriots could then work out a fair and effective agreement. Advocating these
      policy decisions would underscore support for the rule of law and respect for international law. This
      would illustrate that the United States truly wishes to advance the cause of solving the 35-year-old
      Cyprus problem. Continuing former failed policies that promote a double standard in applying the rule
      of law to Turkey and the continuing appeasement of Turkey does not serve U.S. interests.



US Greek relations are dependent on the US’ stance in Cyprus
Larabee and Lesser, 2003 (F. Stephen and Ian O., “Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty”,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1612/ )

      However, the perception in Greece is quite different. U.S. “even- handedness” is seen in Athens as an
      example of Washington’s willingness to overlook Turkey’s violations of international law, especially
      Turkey’s occupation of Cyprus. As Dimitrios Triantaphyllou has noted, “As long as Greeks perceive
      the United States to be a biased interlocutor between Greece and Turkey and over the Cyprus question,
      U.S.-Greek relations will continue to be viewed with suspicion in Athens.




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                        US-Greece Relations Good – Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Good U.S.-Greece relations would help to combat drug trafficking, terrorism, international crime, and
environmental destruction [ 1AC] – should this be split to multiple cards?
NICHOLAS BURNS U.S. Ambassador to Greece. October 13, 2000 Speech “Greece-U.S. Relations: The
Generation                         Ahead”                            http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm
fuseaction=events.event&event_id=121578&doc_id=121581

      The second challenge concerns transnational issues, such as international crime, narcotics,
      environmental damage, and terrorism. These issues are coming to the fore as significant threats to the
      national securities of all countries around the world. These issues know no borders and boundaries, and
      cannot be combated on a national level. They have to be combated on an international level. There are
      major international crime rings in the United States and in Greece. Sometimes they emanate from the
      same source, such as the former Soviet Union. We cannot hope to combat these crime rings in the
      United States without the help of countries like Greece, and Greece cannot hope to combat them
      without the help of countries like the United States. The effort against narcotics trafficking is an area
      where the United States and Greece have enjoyed substantial cooperation with great success. Greece is
      a transit country for cocaine and other illicit narcotics coming from the East and going to the rich
      markets in Western Europe. In the last year, the Drug Enforcement Agency of the United States and
      the Greek narcotics police have twice made major cocaine hauls. That's a good record of cooperation.
      Terrorism is a neuralgic, sensitive issue in this relationship. If you read the press and watch recent
      television news broadcasts in the United States, you will see how terrorism issues are handled, or not
      handled, in a proper way and will realize that terrorism is perhaps the most sensitive issue in this
      relationship. I'm looking forward to the panel discussion on transnational issues and terrorism. It is
      important for Americans to communicate to Greeks that terrorism is a phenomenon that truly cannot be
      combated on a national level. Terrorism is, by definition, international in its roots and in its operation.
      The only way it can be defeated in the United States is to have the cooperation of 100 countries around
      the world. As the U.S. looks toward the Salt Lake City Olympics, it is building an international
      consortium of security experts to help combat the potential for terrorism in Salt Lake City. Sydney did
      the same thing. The U.S. is offering Greece its help. Australia has also offered its help, and other
      countries will help the Greek people prepare for these challenges. The third challenge is the role of the
      media. I'm particularly interested in the panel on this issue, having been the State Department's
      spokesman for three years and having been a participant, sometimes an unwitting one, in many of the
      media wars here in Greece. If you look at the U.S.-Greece relationship, the most complicated part of it
      is how the media talks about this relationship on both sides. Having traveled to 80 countries and having
      seen how the media operates around the world, I think the media in the United States and in Greece
      could do better to have a more productive, more objective, less cynical, and less histrionic view of each
      other. The Greek people whom I have met from all walks of life have a much more positive view
      toward the United States than you would read about in the Greek papers. I'd be interested to find out if
      people agree or disagree with that proposition. There are some media organs in the United States that
      do not give Greece the benefit of the doubt on issues like terrorism and who have been rather one-sided
      in their treatment of this issue, which I think is unfair to Greece. Obviously, we can't control the media,
      nor do we seek to in a democratic society. But we do have the right as citizens of these societies to ask
      the media to reflect upon objectivity and upon a dispassionate discussion of issues rather than an
      emotional discussion.




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                         US – Greece Relations Good – Prolif and European Stability
Greek-U.S. Relations solve terrorism, prolif, and European stability due to Greece's location
Daniel Speckhard: foreign Ambassador March 26 2009 Southeaster Europe project: Resilience and transition,
resetting                          U.S.                         Greece                          relations
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=109941&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=51286
2

      n turn, the previous administration was sometimes frustrated by the lack of support of Greece for its
      top foreign policy priorities, leaving both sides in the end questioning the strength of the longstanding
      partnership and alliance. However, the world changed on November 4th. Greeks who had lost their
      faith in America and defined us as a nation by our policies of the time rather than our enduring values
      and principles were once again reminded of what has bound us together over all these years. The
      inauguration of the new President has given us a rare opportunity to fundamentally alter the course of
      our relations with Greece and that could have longstanding benefits to both our nations. Why is this
      important? Well, in spite of the changes in the world since the end of the Cold War, Greece remains
      fundamentally a geostrategically important country at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and
      the Muslim world. Our interests are shared ones in today’s globally interconnected world. If you’re
      interested in anchoring Turkey in the family of democratic nations and see it as an example for
      modern, moderate Islamic countries, Greece’s role in supporting Turkey’s EU accession and in
      maintaining good neighborly relations is critical. If you’re worried about the continuing threat of
      international terrorism, cooperation with Greece is key. It’s a front line border country for the entry to
      European visa free Schengen zone and it had 140,000 known illegal immigrants just last year -- 50,000
      alone from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Iraq. If you care about the proliferation of weapons of
      mass destruction, Greece is an important maritime country central to implementing UN Security
      Council resolutions. In addition to its naval forces supporting the NATO non-proliferation mission in
      the Mediterranean, its government is helping and working with Greek ship owners that control one-
      sixth of the world’s merchant marine fleet to stop ships carrying UN-sanctioned materials. If you
      believe that maintaining the nation’s stability in the Balkans is essential to Europe’s peace and
      prosperity, Greece is a vital anchor for the region and a partner for economic development. And as we
      prepare to celebrate the 60th Anniversary of NATO, Greece has always been and remains an important
      NATO and military ally in international efforts providing support in Suda Bay; contributing troops and
      missions in Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and UNIFIL, and working together to counter piracy efforts
      off of Somalia. So this relationship is of vital importance to both our countries. The new administration
      recognizes this and has, as the President has said, put an emphasis on renewing old alliances and
      forging new partnerships. It has set a new tone in our international approach emphasizing dialogue and
      listening to our partners, engagement, and the role of multilateral institutions. These are key points our
      Greek friends have been asking for over the past years.




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                              US – Greece Relations Good – Afghanistan and Agean

Working with Greece allows for solvency on Afghanistan, proliferation, an Aegean stability. [1AC]
Daniel Speckhard: foreign Ambassador March 26 2009 Southeaster Europe project: Resilience and
transition,                resetting               U.S.                 Greece                  relations
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=109941&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=51286
2

      It’s equally important as we reinvigorate this relationship that Greece also examines the way it engages
      the United States and that we together review our agenda. We need to take a global view of our shared
      strategic interests. The issues of the Aegean, Cyprus and the name issue remain important for stability
      in the region and its future prosperity and development, and we need to continue to focus energetic
      diplomatic efforts and attention on solving them. But we need to be equally interested in engaging on
      Afghanistan where Greece’s interests equal our own with 25,000 illegal Afghan immigrants entering
      Greece in just the last year. We need to work together as we reach out to the Muslim world to break
      down the barriers and build bridges for the future. We need to cooperate to find new ways to ensure the
      success of efforts to counter the proliferation of WMD. We need to coordinate our economic policies
      to ensure that we overcome the global economic crisis. And we share a common interest in having
      much higher on the agenda our concerns for the environment, renewable energy and global poverty.
      This is a tall order, but essential to taking our relationship to a new level where it is not evaluated
      solely on a few very important and significant regional issues, but expanded to include a broader
      common agenda. It’s important that we not let our relationship be defined by our problems or
      comparisons to our relationships with others. This is no longer a zero sum world and both countries
      stand to benefit from the engagement and dialogue that the new administration has embraced and the
      Greeks have been long promoting




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                                       US-Greece Relations Good- Terrorism
Greece is a key ally to combat terrorism

GUS BILIRAKIS. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS NOVEMBER 14, 2007 HEARING BEFORE
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/38937.pdf

      As you know, Greece has been a consistent steadfast ally of the United States since the beginning of
      our Republic. Greece’s response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on American soil were
      swift and unequivocal. Greece provided strong political support as well as the military assets and use
      of airspace for United States and coalition forces as we launched Operation Enduring Freedom
      throughout the Taliban and al-Qaeda from Afghanistan. Indeed, Greece’s participation still persists in
      the war against radical Islam. Greece continued to provide peacekeeping forces and support operations
      throughout the world as we fight terrorist elements. Greece has been diligent and persistent in
      combating home-grown terrorism in her own country. Greek authorities have dismantled two main
      domestic terrorist groups, November 17 and the Revolutionary Popular Struggle.




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                                              US-Greece Relations Good – Terrorism
U.S.-Greek relations allow for combined efforts that can solve terrorism and energy security

Robert Wexler, chairman of the subcommittee NOVEMBER 14, 2007 HEARING BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/38937.pdf
      It is a special honor to have the Under Secretary here to discuss United States-Greece relations, a relationship I know he cares so deeply about. As the
      former American Ambassador to Greece, Nick Burns is the foremost expert on Hellenic issues in the Bush administration. No one has greater knowledge
      about United States- Greece relations, and there is no one better to lead a discussion about further strengthening this long-standing partnership. Like the
                                        United States-Greece relations, which were forged during World War
      Under Secretary, I am also a strong supporter of
      II, the Cold War, in the Balkans, in operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and now grow
      stronger as we face common challenges to our security in the form of terrorism, a resurgent al-Qaeda,
      the proliferation of WMD and the possibility of nuclear weapons in the hands of a rogue Iranian
      regime. Mr. Under Secretary, as you know, we have a robust economic, political and security
      relationship with our NATO ally Greece that 2 is built on shared democratic values and a common
      commitment to peace and security. This partnership is bolstered greatly by millions of Greek-
      Americans who remain the bedrock of the unbreakable bond between the United States and Greece.
      Over the past several months, we witnessed an outpouring of American support and financial
      assistance for Greece following horrific wildfires that swept across that nation in August, growing
      United States-Greek counterterrorism cooperation, positive movement forward on Greece’s
      participation in the Visa Waiver Program— which I strongly support—and Athens’ increasing role as a
      nexus in providing greater energy security for the United States, Greece and Europe. As it relates to
      counterterrorism cooperation, I want to highlight the extraordinary efforts of Greek authorities to
      dismantle two terrorist groups, the Revolutionary Organization 17 November and Revolutionary Popular Struggle. In addition to bilateral
      relations, it is critical that we address important regional issues, including further integrating the Balkans into NATO and EU, resolving the status of
      Kosovo, the continuing improvement in Greece-Turkey relations, moving the process forward between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and resolving the
      ongoing name dispute between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). We hope for their success in a way that will be
      beneficial both to Greece and the people of Greece as well as the government in Skopje, the Government of Macedonia. I would be happy to talk about
      this issue. It is a very complex issue, but I wanted to giveyou the position of our Government. Congressman Poe asked about counterterrorism. I have
                                             when I was arrived as an Ambassador, 10 years ago this month, the
      commented upon that. This once was, 10 years ago
      most important divisive issue. It is now a source of cooperation. We have close relations between our
      Federal Bureau of Investigation and other intelligence agencies of our Government with the Greek
      Government. Greece has been a good partner in recent years. We do know that the Greek Government
      has made a supreme effort to break apart these terrorist groups. Now, as in the United States, there is
      still a terrorist threat, as in most countries of the world. But I think we have seen a dramatically better
      effort in the last 4 or 5 years than we had seen previously. I thought I should say that as a way of
      responding to the comments you made, Congressman, but I am happy to discuss that in greater detail
      should you wish. It is also important that we work together in Afghanistan. Greece is a NATO ally;
      Greece has contributed troops and equipment to the effort. We would hope that Greece could do more.
      We are asking Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Greece to contribute a greater number of troops to
      the NATO mission, and a greater level of equipment, such as helicopters. We would like Greece to
      lead a provincial reconstruction team in 2009. One of the problems we have, Mr. Chairman, is that the
      great majority of the fighting in Afghanistan is taking place in the eastern and southern parts of the
      country. That is where al-Qaeda and the Taliban are. We need our west European allies and Greece to
      deploy southward and eastward over the next couple of years




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                                       US-Greece Relations Good – Energy Diversity
Greek cooperation key to energy diversity
Nicholas Burns, under secritary for political affairs, U.S. department of state. november 14, 2007 HEARING
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/38937.pdf

      Finally, one more issue to put on the table, Mr. Chairman, would be to say that energy has become an
      important issue between Greece and the United States. Now we understand that Greece is an importer
      of Russian oil and gas. But we also know that on November 18, in just a couple of days, the Greek
      Government and the Turkish Government and the Azeri Government will inaugurate the
      interconnector gas pipeline that emanates, that begins, in Azerbaijan and extends through Turkey,
      through Greece, to Italy and then up to the Netherlands. This is an important source of diversification
      of energy supplies for the European countries, important because we don’t believe that any country,
      most notably Russia, should be in a dominating position in controlling energy supplies and transit
      points to our allies and NATO. Diversifying sources and supply is very important, as well as pipeline
      diversification. Greece has taken a step in that direction, will take a step in 4 days’ time, and we
      congratulate the Greek, Turkish and Azeri Governments for the work they have done on this
      interconnector gas pipeline.




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                                       US- Greece Relations Good – Russian Oil
Greece critical to severing Dependance on Russian oil
NICHOLAS BURNS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE NOVEMBER 14, 2007 HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/38937.pdf

      We have had a very active discussion with the Greek Government about diversifying energy supplies
      and energy pipelines. Now we understand that Greece is an importer of Russian oil. Many countries in
      Europe are. But we don’t want to see, as an ally to Europe, Russia be in a dominant position in terms
      of its energy supplies. And so we have long championed, as did the Clinton administration, a
      multiplicity of pipelines. We saw the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline opened and now we are seeing, 4 days
      from now on November 18, there will be the inauguration of the interconnector gas pipeline from
      Azerbaijan, through Turkey, through Greece, to Italy and up to the Netherlands. And that is going to be
      a very important pipeline to affirm the independence of these countries and the fact that multiple
      sources of energy are our country’s best long-term assurance for security.




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                                                             Relations Zero Sum (1/4)
Greek-Turkey relations are zero-sum, removing US balances relations [1AC]
Kirisci, 2002 ( Kemal is a Professor of International Relations, Department of Political Science and
International Relations, Boðaziçi University, “The "enduring rivalry" between Greece and Turkey: can
'democratic peace' break it?” http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume1/number1/kririsci.htm )

      The logic of 'prisoner's dilemma' suggests that after repeated 'games' the players will go through a learning process and recognise that the best pay-off,
      getting off the hook, can only be arrived at by cooperating, in this case by remaining silent under police interrogation, and not defecting. In other words the
      nature of the game associated with 'prisoner's dilemma' is such that in the long run rational thinking will prevail. Furthermore, in 'prisoner's dilemma' third
      parties can play an important role too by encouraging the two parties to better communicate and help them cooperate by changing their cost-benefit
      calculations. Hence, in the case of Greece and Turkey one would have expected that after almost half a century of conflict both sides would have
      discovered that cooperation promises better pay-offs for both sides. Furthermore, a long string of third parties such as the United States and the European
      Union have tried to mediate and nudge the parties towards cooperation. Neither process have worked in the case of Greece and Turkey. Why? 
 A number
      of interrelated reasons could be cited. Firstly and most importantly, 'prisoner's dilemma' assumes the nature of the conflict to be a 'non-zero sum' game.
                                                                      In the case of Greece and Turkey the socialization
      That is a conflict where both sides could win, that is 'get off the hook' .
      process of decision-makers and often the society at large is such that the conflicts between the two
      countries are seen as part of a 'zero-sum' game. If one side wins the other side inevitably looses. This
      has also been reinforced by the fact that as the nature of the 'game' between the two countries forced
      decision-makers to defect, they have justified the defection by blaming the other side for not giving in,
      in other words for not accepting to 'loose'. This has had the effect of reinforcing mutual mistrust and
      lack of confidence as well as seeking evil intensions in any positive move (in terms of breaking out of
      the 'prisoner's dilemma) that the other side might make. Such a process in turn has prevented a
      constructive 'communication' to develop. A kind of communication that could first help to transform
      the game from a 'zero-sum' game to a 'non-zero sum' one but also one that would help both sides
      appreciate that cooperation could benefit both sides. Simultaneously, this also has a tendency to
      strengthen the socialisation process that creates constituencies that depict the game as a 'zero-sum'
      game and police anyone who might attempt to defect from their ranks. The behaviour of the other side
      is always filtered through the lenses that this socialisation process creates. 
 The involvement of third
      parties to break the dead-lock has not worked either for similar reasons. Often such an involvement
      aiming to alter the pay-off matrix in a manner to encourage cooperation at best has not been credible or
      at worst has had the effect of aggravating the conflict. The United States has been an ally of both
      countries at least since the days of the declaration of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. Both during the
      Cold War as well as after it American foreign policy makers have considered the conflicts between
      Greece and Turkey to be detrimental to U.S. interests. They have initiated many efforts to reconcile
      both parties but the most they seem to have achieved is to keep the two parties from becoming actually
      involved in a war. One major reason is that the two parties have not seen the U.S. as an 'honest broker'.
      Greece has often viewed the U.S. with suspicion and feared a U.S. bias for Turkey because of the
      strategic importance attributed by U.S. decision-makers to Turkey and its military capabilities.
      Likewise Turkish decision-makers have also suspected the U.S. for favouring the other side. They have
      viewed the U.S. executive as being controlled by the 'Greek lobby' in the American Congress. 
 The European Union too has attempted on
      numerous occasions to play the role of an 'honest broker' however so far has failed to achieve much. Primarily, because Turkish decision-makers and the
      public at large have viewed the EU to favour Greece. The fact that Greece is a member of the EU and is actually part of its decision-making process has
      reinforced this view. Many in Turkey have seen Greece using the EU against Turkey. Hence, the EU rather than having a positive role is seen as being a
                                     has an effect of aggravating the situation as the pressure to close ranks
      co-conspirator with Greece. This in turn
      against a perceived threat from a world in which 'Turks have no friends other than Turks' mount.
      Therefore both in the case of the U.S. as well as the EU third party intervention has not had the effect
      of altering pay-off calculations in a manner that gives cooperation a chance. On the contrary it could be
      argued that it has had the opposite effect of making the parties even more suspicious of each other and
      become even more entrenched in their positions.


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                                           Relations Zero Sum (2/4)
Turkey- Greece Relations are influenced by the US, current policy focuses on Turkey
 Larabee and Lesser, 2003 (F. Stephen and Ian O., “Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty”,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1612/ )

      Turkey’s relations with Greece have been—and will continue to be—significantly influenced by U.S.
      policy. In general, the United States has tried to avoid taking sides in the dispute between Greece and
      Turkey and to act instead as an honest broker. Its primary concern has been to prevent an escalation of
      tensions between two allies that could weaken NATO’s cohesion and military effectiveness. These
      efforts at mediation, however, have often aggravated relations with either Greece or Turkey—and in a
      number of instances with both. The 1963–1964 Cyprus crisis provides a good example. President
      Johnson’s letter to Prime Minister Inönü—in which he warned that the United States and NATO might
      not come to Turkey’s aid if a Turkish invasion of Cyprus provoked Soviet intervention—succeeded in
      preventing a Turkish invasion. But it created a furor in Turkey and prompted Turkey to reduce its
      dependence on the United States and diversify its foreign policy, including undertaking a major effort
      to improve relations with Moscow. Similarly, U.S. sanctions imposed following the Turkish invasion
      of Cyprus in 1974 led to a sharp deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations. When the U.S. Congress
      imposed an arms embargo on Turkey, Turkey responded by temporarily suspending U.S. access to key
      facilities on Turkish soil. Many Turks regarded the embargo as an unfair slap in the face of a loyal ally
      and its memory still rankles in many Turkish quarters today. In addition, Greece temporarily withdrew
      from the military wing of NATO to protest the Turkish intervention and the weak U.S. and NATO
      reaction to the Turkish invasion. Although the United States has tried to pursue an even-handed policy
      and avoid choosing sides, Turkey has always been regarded as the strategically more important ally.
      During the Cold War, Turkey served as an important bulwark against the expansion of Soviet power
      into the Mediterranean and the Middle East, tying down some 24 Soviet divisions. It also provided
      valuable communications and intelligence assets for monitoring Soviet troop movements and verifying
      arms control agreements. With the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s strategic importance in U.S. eyes has
      increased.22 Turkey is at the nexus of three areas of increasing geostrategic importance to the United
      States: the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Balkans. In each of these areas, Turkey’s cooperation
      is critical for the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Moreover, Turkey’s strategic weight
      has increased in U.S. eyes as a result of the war on terrorism. This limits the degree to which the
      United States is willing to exert pressure on Turkey over issues such as Cyprus and the Aegean.




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                                           Relations Zero Sum (3/4)
Balancing Greek –US- Turkey relations makes the Mediterranean more stable.
Sitilides 2009 (John is Chair of the State Department's Advanced Area Studies program on Greece and Cyprus
at the Foreign Service Institute; Executive Director, Western Policy Center; selected by the Department of
State; member of the Department of Commerce Joint Science and Technology Cooperation Advisory Council;
regular speaker on foreign policy at the Pentagon's National Defense University and the National Foreign
Affairs    Training     Center,    “Resilience   and     Transition: Resetting    U.S.-Greece   Relations”,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=109941&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=51286
2)

      So this relationship is of vital importance to both our countries. The new administration recognizes this
      and has, as the President has said, put an emphasis on renewing old alliances and forging new
      partnerships. It has set a new tone in our international approach emphasizing dialogue and listening to
      our partners, engagement, and the role of multilateral institutions. These are key points our Greek
      friends have been asking for over the past years.
 
 Five weeks from the start of the new
      administration, the Greek Foreign Minister met with Secretary Clinton in Washington, one of the first
      ministers to visit the capitol. And the President reaffirmed the importance of this relationship just
      yesterday in his remarks at the White House ceremony honoring Greek Independence Day where he
      said, “Greece stands as a testament of the unflinching character, as does the steadfast allegiance
      between our two nations.”
 
 It’s equally important as we reinvigorate this relationship that Greece
      also examines the way it engages the United States and that we together review our agenda. We need
      to take a global view of our shared strategic interests. The issues of the Aegean, Cyprus and the name
      issue remain important for stability in the region and its future prosperity and development, and we
      need to continue to focus energetic diplomatic efforts and attention on solving them. But we need to be
      equally interested in engaging on Afghanistan where Greece’s interests equal our own with 25,000
      illegal Afghan immigrants entering Greece in just the last year. We need to work together as we reach
      out to the Muslim world to break down the barriers and build bridges for the future. We need to
      cooperate to find new ways to ensure the success of efforts to counter the proliferation of WMD. We
      need to coordinate our economic policies to ensure that we overcome the global economic crisis. And
      we share a common interest in having much higher on the agenda our concerns for the environment,
      renewable energy and global poverty.
 
 This is a tall order, but essential to taking our relationship to
      a new level where it is not evaluated solely on a few very important and significant regional issues, but
      expanded to include a broader common agenda.
 
 It’s important that we not let our relationship be
      defined by our problems or comparisons to our relationships with others. This is no longer a zero sum
      world and both countries stand to benefit from the engagement and dialogue that the new
      administration has embraced and the Greeks have been long promoting.





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                                                 Relations Zero Sum (4/4)
US must balance relations to achieve peace
Panayotis A. Yannakogeorgos, graduate student at the Division of Global Affairs, Rutgers University,
February          2007.          [Hellenic      Appeasement          and   its        Consequences,
http://files.mgkworld.net/cipt/docs/CIPTYannakogeorgosHelAppeas.pdf]

      Should Greece not reevaluate its stance towards Turkey soon, only warfare will reverse territory lost to
      Turkey’s expansion. The incidents described in this paper indicate that behind Turkey’s superficial
      agreements to cooperate with Greece exist expansionist ambitions that are ultimately harmful for
      Greece and the stability of the greater Balkan region. It has been argued that the Greek government’s
      cooperative intentions are instances of appeasement, not rapprochement, since Turkey often fails to
      reciprocate Greek concessions. The U.S.’s current policy towards the two countries is not as fair and
      balanced as may seem. This does not contribute to the establishment of peace and security in the region
      since it has exhibited to Turkey that there will be no punishment for unilateral actions against
      American interests. For the benefit of both Greece and America, the U.S. government should find ways
      to bring the Turks in line with international law. In doing so, American democratic values will be
      practiced by the Turkish government and the current deep state will cease to exist. If Greece follows
      the proposed course of action and Turkey changes its policies, peace may finally be attained.

United States actions towards Turkey key to shaping Greek – Turkish relations
Tsakonas, 91 (Panyotis J is Associate Professor, Department of Mediterranean Studies, University of the Aegean ,
http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/fellows/papers/1998-99/tsakonas.pdf)

      At the systemic level, the main issue hindering the development of a security regime between Greece
      and Turkey is one of the legitimacy of external actors; more specifically, the ability mainly of the
      United States, as the sole systemic protagonist in the post-Cold War era, to act as an “honest broker” in
      the Greek-Turkish conflict. However, the ability of the sole remaining superpower to act as an honest
      broker is not simply a matter of the confidence, or the lack thereof, of the two countries in its role as
      mediator; it is also related to the disposition and ability of the US to spend limitless time and effort so
      that a rapprochement of the two countries can be achieved, at a time when matters of much greater
      importance, such as the expansion of NATO to the east, are much higher on the US security agenda. In
      addition, Greece views the role of the US and NATO in the Greek-Turkish conflict as primarily
      determined by Turkey’s geostrategic importance. These include the strategic interests of the sole
      superpower concerning access to the energy sources of the Middle East, the preservation of free and
      unimpeded navigation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean, the implementation of the Dayton
      Agreement, the “salvation” of the peace process in the Middle East, and the containment of Islamic
      fundamentalism. In the pursuit of these goals, which extend to the three regional subsystems
      contiguous to Turkey’s geographic position (the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central
      Asia/Caucasus), Turkey’s strategic importance for American interests is more than obvious, while a
      series of developments in the area (e.g., the Gulf War, Operation Provide Comfort in Bosnia) have
      rendered the value and importance of the American cooperation with Turkey even greater. However,
      the US also has to promote stability and development in the Aegean region with a view to rendering it
      a bridge, as well as a barrier, to the Middle East. This fact mandates that the American superpower
      maintain strong ties with both Greece and Turkey, as well as constant vigilance, as it is concerned that
      the deteriorating Greek-Turkish relationship will make these goals unattainable.5



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                                              Tension High Now

Greek-Turkish tensions are rising—conflict and escalation are inevitable.
F. Stephen Larrabee, Ph.D., Distinguished Chair in European Security at RAND, 2010. [RAND, Troubled
Partnership   U.S.-Turkish     Relations   in     an    Era     of    Global  Geopolitical  Change,
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG899.pdf]

      This shift in Greek policy toward Turkey’s EU membership has contributed to overall improvement in
      Greek-Turkish relations. However, there has been little progress in resolving differences over the
      Aegean, especially over air space. In the last several years, the number of violations and incidents has
      increased to a dangerous degree.15 In 2006, a Greek pilot was killed when his F-16 collided with a
      Turkish jet in an area where dogfights between Greek and Turkish aircraft often take place. This
      incident highlighted the dangers of leaving the outstanding differences over the Aegean unresolved. As
      long as these issues remain unresolved, there is a danger that an incident could escalate and lead to a
      military confrontation, as nearly happened in 1996 over the islets of Imia/Kardak.


Tensions with Turkey prompt Greece to spend more than any other EU nation on its military

ASSOCIATED PRESS, news service 05-28-2010 “Despite crisis Greece continues weapons purchases”
http://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.aspx?id=176792
Greek arms expenditure highest in EU due to tension with Turkey. ATHENS, Greece — Turkish fighter jets
streak past remote Greek islands, shattering the calm of sleepy villages and alarming residents and beach-going
visitors alike. Greek warplanes are scrambled to intercept them, fighting mock air battles over the Aegean Sea.
The violation of Greek airspace by Turkish warplanes is the most tangible — and frequent — indication of the
long-standing tensions between neighbors Greece and Turkey. Although it has waned recently, it is this tension,
which brought the two NATO allies to the brink of war three times since 1974, that Athens cites as the reason
behind its massive military spending. RELATED: Greece agrees to bailout plan But under its current financial
crisis, there are increasing calls for this spending to be slashed. Ironically, some of the countries which have
provided rescue loans to prevent Athens from being unable to pay back its debts — and who have been pushing
for Greece to implement harsh austerity measures — also want the country to buy their expensive warplanes
and ships. Athens came within a hair's breadth of defaulting this month, thanks to a last minute injection of cash
in the form of rescue loans extended by the International Monetary Fund and other EU countries that use the
euro as their currency. But the rescue wasn't for free. It came at high interest rates of about 5 percent and only
after the government pushed through harsh austerity measures that slash salaries and pensions, hike taxes and
curb public spending. With the crisis hitting pensioners and workers across the board, the country's spending on
its military often rankles. Greece funnels billions of euros (dollars) into its military, spending more of its gross
domestic product — 2.8 percent in 2008 — on it than any other European Union country, and second only in
NATO to the United States. Turkey, by comparison according to the most recent NATO figures available, spent
1.8        percent        of       its       GDP        on        military        expenditure       in        2008.




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                                       Greece Turkey War Inevitable
Greece Turkey war is inevitable. [1AC]
Panayotis A. Yannakogeorgos, graduate student at the Division of Global Affairs, Rutgers University,
February          2007.          [Hellenic      Appeasement          and   its        Consequences,
http://files.mgkworld.net/cipt/docs/CIPTYannakogeorgosHelAppeas.pdf]

      Greece and Turkey do not officially discuss topics of territorial integrity during the exploratory talks
      mentioned above. Greece argues that such matters should be dealt with in the context of international
      law while Turkey contends that third parties or organizations should not be involved in such matters
      since these are bi-lateral political issues, and thus not international issues. Having ceded to these
      demands in order to avoid irking the Turkish military, the Greeks contrary to their interests, do not
      demand that Turkey must resolve the territorial issues at the International Court (after expanding their
      territorial waters to twelve nautical miles) or otherwise face a Greek veto during the E.U. membership
      process. Appeasement is short sighted and opportunistic in the sense that although it may stave off
      conflict and create political heroes today, tomorrow Turkey may seek to unilaterally fulfill its long
      term objective of expanding its territory into the Aegean. War will then be the only viable option to
      prevent Turkish appropriation of Greek territory. This has been the state of relations since Mustapha
      Kemal Ataturk founded Modern Turkey.

A GREECE TURKEY WAR IS INEVITABLE
Speros Vryonis, Director of the Center for the Study of Hellenism, Spring/Summer 97 (UCLS Journal of
International Law and Foreign Affairs, pg. 86) (HARVUN0912)

      A Greco-Turkish War Seems Inevitable Turkey is violating Greek national borders after having
      recognized them for seventy-two years. Any further Turkish effort to abrogate Greece's borders is
      likely to precipitate a violent and destructive armed conflict in an area extending from the Greek and
      Turkish borders in the Balkans throughout the Aegean and western Turkey to Cyprus. Such a conflict
      could potentially spread to neighboring countries. Given Greece's expressed determination to preserve
      its territorial integrity, the likelihood of an armed conflict becomes even stronger. The Greek Prime
      Minister Constantinos Simitis does not have the complete support of the Greek voters with respect to
      his austere economic policies aimed at bringing the Greek economy within European Union standards.
      But he has unified the Greek people regarding relations with Turkey, and Greek voters have not
      objected to the large military budget of $25 billion through 2004. In response to Turkish aggression,
      Prime Minister Simitis has brought forceful character and decisiveness to the management of Greek
      foreign affairs. His handling of the Imia crisis, combined with the efforts of President Clinton,
      prevented armed conflict. The Prime Minister expressed his views concerning the direction of Greece
      in a July 2, 1996 reply to President Clinton, where he displayed his quiet but firm intentions: Much of
      the tension in the Aegean is the direct result of massive and intentional violations of Greek airspace
      and Greek territorial waters by Turkey. Our air force and navy are obliged to respond to these
      violations, a task hitherto undertaken with exemplary restraint. I am sure you understand, Mr.
      President, the reasons for which our responsible attitude must not lead to the interpretation that
      restraint is the only possible response of Greece to persistent and flagrant provocations regarding
      Greek sovereignty. There is no longer a doubt as to the inevitability of the outbreak of a Greco-Turkish
      war. Faced with an arms race between Greece and Turkey, the U.S. government has favored one side


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      in the conflict, ignoring the axiom that superior military power will tend to violate the weaker side.




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                                       Greek-Turkish War  Middle East War


A GREEK/TURKISH WAR CAUSES MIDDLE EAST WAR
Gerolymatos, Director of the Research Institute on Southwestern Europe at Simon Fraser University, 1997
(The Aegean Sea after the Cold War, pg. 58) (HARVUN0914)


      The speed of modern communications and fast reaction time of advanced weapons systems means that
      any crisis in the Aegean or Cyprus has a strong probability of degenerating into a full-scale conflict by
      accident. It is not inconceivable that a Greek-Turkish war could invite a Syrian attack against Turkey
      and expand the conflict beyond the Aegean or Cyprus. The defeat of Turkey, even on a limited scale,
      would also cause internal unrest and bring that country close to a muslim fundamentalist social and
      political regime. Under these conditions, and taking into account the escalating arms race between
      Greece and Turkey, the security of the Eastern Mediterranean is tenuous at best, and could easily and
      quickly become a theatre of war that could spread to the Middle East.




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                                       Greek-Turkish War  Destabilized Europe
Greek-Turkish confrontation undermines European stability.
Lesser, Larabee, Zanni 2001 ( Ian O., F. Stephen, Michele, “Greece's New Geopolitics”,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1393/)

      The dangers of Greek-Turkish confrontation, apart from the obvious human costs, are truly strategic.
      Conflict would undermine stability across southeastern Europe and further complicate the settlement of
      disputes elsewhere in the Balkans, jeopardize the broader Western strategy of enlargement (both
      NATO and EU) in the east, and introduce new and damaging variables in relations with Russia and the
      Muslim world. At a minimum, the environment of brinkmanship that almost led to war over Imia-
      Kardak in 1996 could have led to the permanent estrangement of Turkey and permanent foreign and
      security policy costs for Greece. NATO adaptation, especially in the Mediterranean region, would
      have been difficult or impossible, and the EU’s nascent common foreign and security policy would
      have been mired in Aegean problems.




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                                       Greek-Turkish War  NATO Collapse
A GREEK-TURKISH WAR COLLAPSES NATO
Robert Schmitt, Professor of International Law, Fall 1996 (Roger Williams University Law Review, Pg. Lexis)
(HARVUN0913)

      Not surprisingly, both NATO and the United States are extremely anxious over this state of affairs.
      Whereas, the southern region used to be of secondary concern to a NATO facing a massive Soviet
      presence across central Europe, today the southern region is the front. NATO forces are engaged in
      peace enforcement operations in the former Yugoslavia, and nowhere is the likelihood of out of area
      operations for NATO greater than on Turkey's southern and eastern borders. A Greek-Turkish dispute
      could easily split the alliance, just as its search for a new identity is maturing. Further, the loss of either
      Greece or Turkey from NATO, a la the Greek withdrawal following the Cyprus invasion, would have
      dire operational and planning consequences. The impact of Greek-Turkish hostilities was aptly
      illustrated in 1995 when NATO sought to establish a regional NATO headquarters in Greece. Reacting
      to the proposal, Turkey immediately moved to block the NATO budget, a response mirroring an earlier
      Greek veto of funding for the NATO headquarters at Izmir, Turkey. Though these issues have since
      been resolved, they illustrate the alliance's susceptibility to internal disputes.




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                                       Turkey Acting Unilaterally - Aegean

Current U.S. commitment to Turkey will embolden unilateral expansionism in the Aegean that’s modeled
globally.
Panayotis A. Yannakogeorgos, graduate student at the Division of Global Affairs, Rutgers University,
February          2007.          [Hellenic      Appeasement          and     its       Consequences,
http://files.mgkworld.net/cipt/docs/CIPTYannakogeorgosHelAppeas.pdf]

      Whenever Turkey perceives strong American support, it tends to act unilaterally. This is observed in
      cases of its relations with countries aside from Greece. In 1998, when American-Turkish relations were
      at a high point, Turkey instigated hostilities against Syria, ignoring Israeli and American warnings not
      to do so. Turkey acted unilaterally without regarding the stability of an already volatile region, and a
      full scale Mid-East war almost broke out. After the incident, no embargo or military sanctions were
      enacted against Turkey. Such inaction on the part of America serves to embolden the Turks in their
      unilateral objectives.Former US Ambassador Monteagle Sterns suggests that America seeks to assist
      Greece and Turkey in resolving their differences in order to assure that American interests in the
      region are protected.76 These interests are summarized as “secure access to Middle Eastern oil
      supplies; unimpeded rights of navigation in the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean.”77 Stearns
      further argues that the current status quo in the Aegean does not benefit anyone since the resources
      beneath the sea are in areas that are in constant dispute and neither Greece nor Turkey are able to
      exploit the resources for their economic gain. His solution to the problem is for Greece to sign a treaty
      with Turkey that conciliates the Turkish demand prohibiting the extension of territorial so that Turkey
      can have access to explore and exploit the resources of the Aegean.78 There are two problems with
      this.The First being that the Kemalist government in Turkey has no credibility when it comes to
      signing treaties. Based on past evidence, if Greece did take Stearn’s advice, there would be no
      guarantee that Turkey would honor the agreements. Secondly, this would further reward Turkey’s
      aggressive challenging of the status quo. The consequence of this would be that it might send a signal
      to other governments that seek to tilt the balance of an existing status quo in their favour by pursuing
      expansionist policies. This would result in local conflicts throughout the world. Evidence for this is
      observed when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait; he justified his action by citing the Turkish invasion
      of Cyprus and the international community’s lack of insistence that Turkey leave. Since Turkish
      actions have been used to justify expansionist policies by other countries in the past, it might happen
      again in the future. Hence, supporting Turkish challenges to the status quo, America could provoke
      conflicts in other countries that might consider it acceptable to challenge international law.




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                                                 Turkey Acting Unilaterally – Aegean
Turkey’s increasing militarism in the Aegean—tensions are rising.
Aggeliki Spanou, staff writer, Athens News, 7-27-2009. [Athens News, Is Turkey Becoming a Military
Threat?, p.
http://www.americanhellenic.org/articles/turkey_becoming_a_military_threat.php]

      Turkey's emphasis on military programs aimed at improving and enhancing its landing capabilities in
      tandem with the aggressive deployment of the 4th Army - known as the Aegean Army - have
      generated serious questions among staffers at the Greek ministry of defence. The same staffers are
      extremely concerned about the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations, which could lead to
      extraordinary tension between the two countries. Those in relevant diplomatic and military circles in
      Athens told the Athens News that Ankara’s acquisition of 100 landing ships and amphibious tanks, in
      parallel with the addition of thousands of Turkish marines to its existing force, are part of Turkey’s
      psychological war against Greece.
      The same sources believe the Turkish military leadership wants to broadcast the message that it stands
      ready for all eventualities, a confrontation in the Aegean included. This perception is reinforced by the
      fact that this year’s 4th Army’s annual exercise, codenamed EFES, includes training to land on and
      occupy islands. This development takes on particular interest in light of continuing overflights by
      Turkish combat aircraft of the islands of Agathonissi and Farmakonissi. Turkish combat aircraft
      continue to overfly islands that are not explicitly named in international treaties.
      Greece insists that international treaties guarantee its sovereignty over these islands. Turkey regards these islands as grey zones, with Ankara proposing
      dialogue with Greece to clarify sovereignty. The 42nd round of the exploratory Greek-Turkish talks regarding the Aegean was concluded on July 22, but
      discussions reached an impasse again owing to the Turkish diplomacy’s insistence on disputing Greece’s national sovereign rights.
      Two conflicting schools of thought prevail in the Greek government. The first holds that the current Turkish provocativeness is not unprecedented and is
      connected with both the internal Turkish conflict between secularist Kemalists and political Islam, and the burgeoning feeling of insecurity Turks have in
      connection with their EU accession. The second holds that the Greek government’s low-key approach towards Turkey has convinced Ankara that it can
      advance Turkish interests unilaterally. According to the second school of thought, Turkey’s political leaders have concluded that Greece’s political fluidity
      and the Karamanlis government’s plight permit them to redefine the rules of the game. Diplomatic sources think that behind-the-scenes consultations have
      already taken place between Turkey and the American side, which adheres to an attitude of strict neutrality towards questions over the Aegean.
      The Turkish strategy appears to be multifaceted: - Turkey is trying to create the impression, through
      overflights of Greek islands, that the Aegean’s status is obscure and has to be clarified through Greek-
      Turkish bilateral negotiations - Turkey wants to brief European and Nato audiences on Turkish
      positions unilaterally by publicising, on the website of the Turkish General Staff, alleged violations of
      Turkish airspace by Greek aircraft - By announcing “geophysical exploration” on the Greek
      continental shelf, Turkey has expressed its determination to co-manage and co-rule the Aegean - By
      insisting on the Annan Plan for Cyprus, Turkey promotes the Yes vote of Turkish Cypriots in the 2004
      referendum to apportion responsibility to Nicosia - By continuously boosting its defence infrastructure
      and landing capabilities, Turkey has expressed its everlasting readiness to seek “dynamic solutions” if
      Athens does not agree to dialogue Greek diplomats believe that if their country continues to back
      Turkey’s aspiration for EU membership, then relations between the nations will, sooner rather than
      later, normalise. However, another dilemma looms. When Turkey’s ships set sail to look for oil off the
      island of Kastelorizo, Greece will have to either halt the effort, and risk a confrontation, or ignore it,
      thus recognising that Turkey has “vital interests” in the Aegean.




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                                          Dartmouth 2K9
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                                             US Should Withdraw Troops
U.S. should withdraw troops from Incirlik—its easily replaceable and Turkey’s too unreliable. [1AC]
Panayotis A. Yannakogeorgos, graduate student at the Division of Global Affairs, Rutgers University,
February            2007.           [Hellenic            Appeasement             and              its           Consequences,
http://files.mgkworld.net/cipt/docs/CIPTYannakogeorgosHelAppeas.pdf]
     Today, the U.S.’s strategic interests in the region require it to maintain relations with both Greece and
     Turkey. U.S. foreign policy towards these countries is formed with the sensitivities of both countries in
     mind instead of an independent policy for each. The U.S. depends on Greece’s strategic position in the
     Aegean to support CENTCOM in the Middle East.72 Hosting the largest U.S. naval facility after Pearl
     Harbor, Souda Bay in Crete, Greece, offers a forward logistics base of operation for the U.S. military
     operating in Iraq. The base also plays an important role in the war on terror since operations against
     suspect vessels in the Mediterranean can be conducted from Souda Bay. Overall, Souda Bay is an
     indispensable facility to the U.S. since military objectives appear focused on the Middle East.
     The U.S.’s present-day interest in Turkey stems from its well marketed location in the Middle East.
     Turkey borders notable global hot spots such as Iraq, Iran and Syria. America maintains the Incirlik
     Air Force base whose importance is marked by the increase of military personnel from 1,400 Air Force
     prior to September 11, 2001 to 4,000 today.73 However, Turkey has demonstrated in the past that it is
     not a reliable ally. During Operation Enduring Freedom, Greece permitted the USAF to fly sorties out
     of Souda Bay, whereas the Turks did not allow American ground forces to open a northern front in Iraq by
     allowing them to enter Iraq from Turkey. With this in mind, one might question if America really has a
     strategic interest in Turkey. Why should the USAF operate out of Incirlick when British bases in
     Cyprus would offer the USAF the same coverage over Iraq? Essentially, using the British bases on
     Cyprus would be no different than using bases in Turkey since from neither Turkey nor Cyprus is the
     U.S. guaranteed land access into Iraq. Turkey might be situated in a strategic location in the Middle
     East, but it has not in the past acted as a reliable ally that works to aid American military objectives, In
     contrast, Greece in the past and present is ready to stand by the U.S. as a historic ally. Therefore, the U.S. seems to
      be facing the same problem that Greece has been facing with Turkey. The unreliability of the Turkish government to act on
      guarantees they make with Western nations.




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                           Dartmouth 2K9
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                                       US Should Withdraw Troops
Turkey Public and Military want US troops to withdraw
Lesser, Ian O. Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington
DC, and President, Mediterranean Advisors, LLC. He is a former member of the Policy Planning Staff in the
US Department of State. Survival vol. 48 no. 3 Autumn 2006

      In Turkey, domestic and regional factors have driven policymakers and the public toward a more wary
      and ambivalent approach to relations with the United States. Some of these elements may be transitory,
      but others are likely to prove durable. First, public opinion now counts in Turkish foreign
      policymaking, and as polling results suggest, this opinion has turned distinctly anti-American in recent
      years. Recent surveys indicate that Turkish public attitudes toward the United States are now the most
      negative in Europe.
      This marked deterioration in perceptions of the United States has special significance for relations
      between Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) government and the George
      W. Bush administration. An avowedly populist government with Islamist roots must deal with a more
      active and interventionist leadership in Washington, one that confronts Turkey with multiple policy
      dilemmas in its neighborhood. It is a challenging mixture, and one that is not, of course, unique to
      Turkish–American relations. Indeed, Turkish public opinion, sensitive to both European and Muslim
      concerns (e.g. Palestinian aspirations), has multiple sources of pressure when it comes to attitudes
      toward the United States. To this must be added the tendency of some American foreign- and security-
      policy elites to ignore the changes that have taken place on the Turkish scene over the last decade, in
      particular the greatly increased role of public opinion and the emergence of new actors in the Turkish
      policy debate. In this as in other key areas, relations suffer from ‘deferred maintenance’, with only
      limited attempts to engage new constituencies beyond traditional bilateral partners on the
      Turkish side. Indeed, even the traditional partners, such as the Turkish military and security
      establishment, appear ambivalent regarding strategic cooperation with the United States (this was also
      the case in the early 1990s).




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                                           Removing Troops Good
Ircirilik is becoming obsolete and won’t be used in the future. And US-Turkey relations will decline
inevit due to bases. [1AC]
F. Stephen Larrabee, Ph.D., Distinguished Chair in European Security at RAND, 2010. [RAND, Troubled
Partnership       U.S.-Turkish     Relations      in    an      Era      of    Global      Geopolitical      Change,
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG899.pdf]
     Another important source of strain has been U.S. access to Turkish bases and facilities. In recent years,
     the United States has faced increasing restrictions on its ability to conduct operations out of İncirlik Air
     Base. Although Turkey has allowed the United States to use İncirlik to transport personnel and
     materiel to Afghanistan and Iraq, it has refused to permit the United States to permanently station
     combat aircraft there or to use the base to fly combat missions in the Middle East or Persian Gulf
     region.9 Thus, in the future, the United States cannot automatically assume that it can use İncirlik for
     purposes beyond those spelled out in the 1980 Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement,
     particularly combat missions in the Middle East.
     To hedge against a serious deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations that could result in severe constraints
     on the use of Turkish bases or denial of their use altogether, the United States could gradually reduce
     its military presence in Turkey and conduct some of the missions currently carried out in Turkey from
     other friendly or allied countries in the region, such as Kuwait or Qatar. Doing so could have several
     benefits. It could reduce popular Turkish resentment against the U.S. military presence and diminish
     anti-Americanism in Turkey, while still allowing the United States to continue to carry out most of the
     current missions being performed at İncirlik and other facilities in Turkey. Such a move could be
     portrayed as an adjustment to the new security requirement arising after the end of the Cold War and as
     part of the overall Global Posture Review initiated by the Bush administration.

U.S. already looking for alternatives to Incirlik—many strategic options.
Frank Hyland, lecturer at the American Public University System, served in the National Security Agency and
the CIA’s Counter-Terrorist Center, 12-19-2007. [Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Focus 4.42, U.S. Air Base
at             Incirlik          Faces             Political            and           Security            Threats,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4619]
     Mindful of the vagaries of international events and shifting alliances, the United States is reported to
     have already been searching for alternatives to Incirlik Air Base for some time. Candidates to the south
     in the Middle East include Qatar’s al-Udeid Air Base, which has served in the past as a headquarters
     for the U.S. Central Command’s air arm. Qatar has also housed U.S. logistical supplies. Kuwait,
     Bahrain, Oman, Iraq and Saudi Arabia also have airfields proven capable of supporting U.S. operations
     in the area. None, of course, has the track record of the reliably secular Muslim nation that is Turkey.
     Northward, within newly-friendly Bulgaria and Romania, other airfields and bases are candidates. The
     United States currently operates Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan and Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan.
     Tajikistan has a major civilian/military air base at Dushanbe and also hosts an Indian military air base
     at Farkhor/Ayni.




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                                           Removing Troops Good
Incirlik’s unimportant to the U.S.
Selin M. Bolme, Research Analyst at SETA Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research, Lecturer
at Ankara University, July 2007. [Insight Turkey, The politics of Incirlik Air Base,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7057/is_3_9/ai_n28498510/]

Although there is a possibility to legally restrict the use of the Incirlik base by the US, one has to consider the
effectiveness of this decision. Such a threat was effective in 1975 as it led to the lifting of the arms embargo on
Turkey. But today, the Incirlik base has lost the importance it has had during the Cold War. In spite of offering
many benefits in the implementation of US military plans, Incirlik base can no longer be considered vital for
the U.S




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                                           AKP-US Relations Low
AKP-US relations bad, anti-Western sentiments within Turkish politics prevent strong ties
Soner Cagaptay, Director of Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute, December 3 2009,
http://www.google.com/search?aq=f&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8&q=soner+cagaptay
     Though the AKP has maintained cooperation with the United States in the Iraq and Afghanistan
     campaigns, the party's foreign policy appears corrosive for U.S. interests in the long term. As noted,
     the AKP encourages anti-Western rhetoric and views ever more in line with Islamism, thereby helping
     stir similar anti-Westernism among the populace. Meanwhile, anti-Americanism is fast becoming
     internalized within Turkish society.




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                                              AKP –Opposition Now
AKP faces opposition, rising CHP has a new leader and more secular values
Soner      Cagaptay,          Director     of    the     Turkish     Research    Program,     June     4,    2010,
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/06/04/who-s-afraid-of-turkey.html
     But for the first time in years, the AKP faces a real challenge. Turkey’s main opposition, the Republican
     People’s Party (CHP), lately has been a mere shadow of the secular force that once ruled the country
      and made it a staunch NATO ally. Now the resignation of CHP leader Deniz Baykal over an alleged sex-tape scandal
      has ushered in a new boss, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, a charismatic people’s man who is committed to Western
      values. He might be the one to rebuild an effective opposition and redirect Turkish foreign policy
      toward the West.

AKP unpopular
Bremmer and Gordon January 19, 2010 (Ian Bremmer and David Gordon, is an American political scientist
specializing in US foreign policy, states in transition, and global political risk. He is the president and founder
of Eurasia Group, a leading global political risk research and consulting firm, firm's head of research, Top Risk No.
10: Turkey, http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/19/top_risk_no_10_turkey)
     Domestically, an increasingly unpopular AK party, facing popular fallout from the economic
     downturn, is embroiled in intractable and increasingly interlinked fights with the judiciary,
     industrialists, and the military. The party's experiment with trying to buy some support from Turkey's
     Kurdish population failed, which not only loses them the Kurds but many Turks if there's further social
     instability as a consequence -- as seems likely. Meanwhile, there's growing political pressure within the
     AK party to keep would-be splinter Islamist forces onside and to formulate policies that appeal to more
     emotive calls from that base.

AKP opposition gaining support- 2011 election will be a fight
Kenner June 22, 2010 (David Kenner, assistant editor of foreign policy.com, Can the Turkish opposition kick
out Erdogan?, http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/22/can_the_turkish_opposition_unseat_erdogan)

      Just as importantly, the Turkish opposition seems to have gained new life. Two recent polls found that
      the CHP was polling at its highest level in years, now receiving the support of approximately 30
      percent of Turks. There are a variety of possible reasons for this improvement in the party's fortunes:
      the new leadership of Kilicdaroglu, Turkish anger that the AKP's much-celebrated "Kurdish opening"
      failed to achieve results, discontent over Erdogan's Middle East adventurism, and double-digit
      unemployment in a job market that still has not turned the corner following the international recession.
      Whatever the reason for the CHP's revival, its newfound strength makes it unlikely that there would be
      political space for a nascent party such as TDH to establish a foothold.




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                                       AKP – Taking Anti-Islamic Actions
 AKP’s Islamist actions grow, anti-Western stance during air force exercise proves
Soner      Cagaptay,       Director    of    the    Turkish  Research     Program,     October     26,     2009,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65661/soner-cagaptay/is-turkey-leaving-the-west
     In early October, Turkey disinvited Israel from Anatolian Eagle, an annual Turkish air force exercise
     that it had held with Israel, NATO, and the United States since the mid-1990s. It marked the first time
     Turkey's governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) let its increasingly anti-Western rhetoric
     spill into its foreign policy strategy, and the move may suggest that Turkey's continued cooperation
     with the West is far from guaranteed.




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                                                                         Dartmouth 2K9
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                                                         Turkish Public Dislikes – US
Turkish public strongly oppose US – Iraqi invasion
(WorldPublicOpinion.org, 9/05/10, “Why Turks Feel Threatened                                                                    by         the   US,”         WPO,
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/393.php)

      Which Middle Eastern public has the largest percentage of people naming the United States as the country
      that poses the greatest threat? The answer, according to the most recent Pew Global Attitudes Project survey, is Turkey, a NATO ally and a
      country that is generally touted as the type of secular, multi-party democracy the United States should foster in the Middle East.
      Nearly two-thirds (64%) of Turkish respondents name the United States, which guarantees Turkish security as a NATO ally
      and has urged the EU to accept Turkish membership, as the country that poses the greatest threat to Turkey in the future, Pew found. Among the Middle
      Eastern publics asked the open-ended question by Pew, only in Turkey did a majority name the United States.
      Turkey is also the Middle Eastern country where public opinion toward the United States has slipped furthest in recent years. Fewer than one in 10 Turks
      (9%) have a positive view of the United States, a drop of 21 points from the already low level in Pew's 2002 survey. More than four out
            (83%) say their attitude is unfavorable, including 75 percent who feel very unfavorably.
      of five
      That's one of the highest negative percentages among the eight Middle Eastern countries surveyed by
      Pew in 2007, second only to the Palestinian public with 86 percent unfavorable. But unlike the Palestinians (whose attitudes toward the United States
                                                                                  have remained as negative as they were in March
      worsened after the 2003 invasion but have improved slightly since then), Turks
      2003 (84%). Moreover, not only do most Turks view the United States unfavorably, more than three out of four (77%) also look on Americans that
      way. The deterioration of the United States' image in Turkey has coincided with the increasing power of the Islamist-
      leaning Justice and Development Party (AKP). With the parliamentary election of Abdullah Gul as president, the AKP has won control of a post that
      wields important veto powers and considerable prestige, as the position once held by Kemal Ataturk, the secular Turkish republic's founding father.
      But Dr. Emre Erdogan, a political scientist and partner of Infakto Research Workshop, a major polling firm based in Istanbul, says Turkish views of the
      United States have deteriorated largely because of security concerns, not religious ones. "This sudden and rapid decrease in positive attitudes towards the
      US is an outcome of the invasion [of Iraq]," Erdogan said, adding that polls in Turkey show that the public thinks that the invasion has "led to increasing
                               "Turkish public opinion perceives the US as the worst enemy of Turkey as a
      terrorist threats toward Turkey."
      result of the intensifying terrorist activities of the PKK," he said, using the acronym for the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which
      has been fighting for autonomy in southeast Turkey since 1984. According to Erdogan, Turks believe that separatist guerrillas operating out of bases in
      Iraq's northern mountains have grown stronger since the fall of Saddam Hussein and Turkish media frequently air evidence of alleged US collaboration
      with the PKK. Some 80 Turkish soldiers have been killed in rebel attacks so far this year and the Turkish government
      has threatened to launch cross border raids into Iraq to root them out if the US and Iraqi armies fail to
      do so."Consequently, this intolerance and antipathy towards the PKK become converted to the perception of
      the US as the major enemy of the country," Erdogan said. "Before the invasion of Iraq, the worst enemy of the country was stated as
      Greece or Armenia, which are eternal enemies of Turkey, rather than the US." A June 2007 poll by the International Republican Institute found that a third
      of Turks (30%) blame "foreign governments trying to divide our country" for the problems in the Southeast, up from 24 percent in 2006. Foreign
      interference is the most widely chosen of the seven "reasons for the problems in the Southeast" offered. Though economic explanations are also widely
      cited (26 percent choose economic underdevelopment and 11 percent lack of government investment), these responses have together declined by 13 points
      over the past year.A 2005 poll by Infakto found that 71 percent of Turkish respondents agreed with the argument that "the West has helped separatist
      groups in Turkey--such as the Kurdish PKK--gain strength." Sixty-six percent think that "Western countries want to divide and break Turkey like they
      divided and broke the Ottoman Empire in the past." The declining support among Turks for the EU and NATO is consistent with such convictions. The
      ratio of Turks who see membership in the EU as a "good thing" fell from 73 percent in 2004 to 54 percent in 2006, according to the German Marshall
      Fund. And the numbers saying NATO is essential for Turkey's security fell from a bare majority in 2004 (53%) to 44 percent in 2006, though this remains
                                                                                                                                                  A
      the largest percentage of respondents.These attitudes seem to be reflected in Turkey's growing opposition to American counter-terrorism policies.
      majority of Turks (58%) already said that they opposed "the US-led efforts to fight terrorism," in Pew's 2002
      survey. That jumped to 79 percent in 2007. Not only do Turks express more negative opinion about Western political
      entities, they also express such feelings about Western values. The Pew survey found that Turkish respondents register more
      unfavorable attitudes toward American democracy, business, and culture--even about its science and technology:• 81 percent of Turks say they
      "dislike           American                ideas       about           democracy,"               up        31       points      since    2002.
      •        83         percent        dislike      "American       ways         of        doing        business,"           up       24    points.
      •       68       percent      dislike       "American     music,          movies           and         television,"         up     22   points.
      • 51 percent say they do not admire the United States for its "technological and scientific advances," up 27 points since 2002 when a majority of 67
      percent did admire such achievements.
                         recently even Turks who disliked the US government tended to appreciate Americans
      Erdogan says that until
      and their culture. Now he sees an "emerging antipathy towards the Americans and the US life style."


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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                                                                            Dartmouth 2K9
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                                                                  Turkish Dislikes US
Turkish dislike US – fear of US supporting creation of a Kurdish state
(Nasuh Uslu, associate professor of international relations at the Faculty of Economic and Administrative
Sciences at hte University of Kirikkale, Turkey, Metin Toprak, vice president of the Banking Regulation and
Supervision Agency of Turkey, Ertan Aydin, teachs at Cankaya University, and Ibrahim Dalmis, PHh.D. in
social psychology from the Middle East Technical Univerisity in Turkey, September 2005, “TurkishPublic
Opinion Toward the United States in the Context of the Iraq Question,” The Middle East Review of
International Affairs, Volume 9, Article 5, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue3/jv9no3a5.html)

      REASONS         FOR       THE      TURKISH         PEOPLE'S        NEGATIVE          APPROACH          TO      THE       AMERICAN           INTERVENTION
      Aside from U.S. motives,    Turkey's people were also critical of the way the policy had been conducted. Some 72
      percent held the opinion that the American action would render the U.N. useless in world
      politics.[9] Generally, the Turkish people believed that the United States violated international law,
      weakened international institutions, and harmed world peace.
      The Turkish people also opposed U.S. intervention in Iraq because of its possible negative ramifications for
      the Kurdish question. Over half (53.6 percent) believed that a U.S. intervention without a Turkish military
      occupation of northern Iraq would result in the establishment of a Kurdish state.[10] To make matters worse,
      the majority of the Turkish people (60.5 percent) believed that the United States favored the establishment of a
      Kurdish state in northern Iraq.[11] In fact, one of the most important reasons for the Turkish nation's opposition to the U.S. intervention
      was this belief. The close relations between the United States and Kurdish groups, including U.S. protection
      for a northern Iraq enclave outside Iraq's central authority, were taken as evidence of such a goal.
      In contrast, 33.1 percent did not believe the United States would establish a Kurdish state. [12]And very few (0.08 percent) thought that creating such a
      state was the primary reason for the U.S. intervention. Still, some of those rejecting the idea of an American-backed Kurdish state might also have viewed
      the American presence in Iraq as encouraging Kurdish problems for neighboring countries, including Turkey. [13] The perceived high likelihood of
      American intervention resulting in the establishment of a Kurdish state caused the Turkish people to adopt extremely anti-American views.
      Another reason for Turkish attitudes was certain reverberations from Turkey's own history. For example, 74.3 percent of those polled opposed the
      appointment of an American general as the highest authority of the new Iraqi rule. [14] The situation was too reminiscent of the occupation of Turkey
      under a military governor after World War I, which eventually sparked a nationwide resistance under Kemal Ataturk. Also in this context, 73.3 percent
      were disappointed by Iraq's quick surrender without more fighting.[15] Such memories also gave rise to the concern by 83.7 percent that the United
      States would have too much power in the region by permanently stationing its armed forces there. [16] Another issue, which worried the majority (69.5
      percent) of the Turkish nation, was the possibility that the American administration might not limit its intervention to Iraq and might intervene in other
      regional countries.[17]
      In addition to factors cited for this tendency to reject any connection with the Iraq war, was the fear of losing international prestige, since other countries
                       the fear that Turkish participation in the Iraq war would be a violation of the Turkish
      opposed the operation;
      principle to avoid conflict with neighboring states; and the lack of perceived gain for Turkish interests.
      This view was held despite the fact that Turks thought their country's refusal to cooperate would not
      stop the war. Only 5.4 percent believed that their parliament's refusal to cooperate would persuade the
      Americans                  not                to                launch               a               war.




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                                                                       Dartmouth 2K9
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                                                                Turkish Dislikes US
Turks opposed US intervention despite economic aid
(Nasuh Uslu, associate professor of international relations at the Faculty of Economic and Administrative
Sciences at hte University of Kirikkale, Turkey, Metin Toprak, vice president of the Banking Regulation and
Supervision Agency of Turkey, Ertan Aydin, teachs at Cankaya University, and Ibrahim Dalmis, PHh.D. in
social psychology from the Middle East Technical Univerisity in Turkey, September 2005, “TurkishPublic
Opinion Toward the United States in the Context of the Iraq Question,” The Middle East Review of
International Affairs, Volume 9, Article 5, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue3/jv9no3a5.html)

      Indeed, despite Turkey's economic hardships at the time,    72.3 percent opposed allowing the American forces to open a
      second front by using Turkish territory, even if that would result in significant amounts of financial
      aid.[25]Some 34.7 percent of the Turkish people believed that the Turkish economy would be negatively
      affected if their government refused to cooperate in the war, resulting in greater inflation and higher
      taxes.[26] In March 2003, 58.2 percent thought that there was a connection between the introduction of new taxes and the Turkish parliament's refusal
      to allow American troops to use Turkish territory for the war. [27]
      By April 2003, the percentage of Turks who supported the decision not to extend help to the Americans during the Iraq crisis had decreased to 57.8
      percent, although it remained a majority.[28] However, a month later, the number who believed that Turkey acted correctly during the Iraq war by not
      supporting the American war effort climbed back up to 71.7 percent.[29] Almost half, 46.8 percent, of the Turkish people even opposed the use of the
      Turkish ports and airports by the Americans for humanitarian purposes in June 2003. In contrast, 42.3 percent supported this restricted type of
      activity.[30]
      So intense was the overall opposition to the war, that the Turkish people criticized their own government, led by an Islamic-oriented party, as being too
                      The majority of the Turks (55.9 percent) did not approve of government policies, because they
      soft on the issue.
      viewed them as hesitant or ambiguous rather than just firmly rejecting the American demands from the
      beginning.[31] The level of approval for the AKP government's policies on the Iraq crisis decreased further with the course of time (33.1 percent in
      March and 25.9 percent in July 2003).[32] In August 2003, the mark the government obtained even from its supporters was considerably low. (64
      percent). [33]




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                                                                     Dartmouth 2K9
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                                                                  Turkish Dislikes US
US unpopular - doubts
(Nasuh Uslu, associate professor of international relations at the Faculty of Economic and Administrative
Sciences at hte University of Kirikkale, Turkey, Metin Toprak, vice president of the Banking Regulation and
Supervision Agency of Turkey, Ertan Aydin, teachs at Cankaya University, and Ibrahim Dalmis, PHh.D. in
social psychology from the Middle East Technical Univerisity in Turkey, September 2005, “TurkishPublic
Opinion Toward the United States in the Context of the Iraq Question,” The Middle East Review of
International Affairs, Volume 9, Article 5, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue3/jv9no3a5.html)

      Cooperation                   with                    the                   United                   States                   in                   Iraq
      The great majority  of the Turkish people (73.5 percent) believed that the United States would not be able to establish
      a stable regime in Iraq.[45] By the same token, 64 percent of Turks did not have a positive view of the interim
      Iraqi government.[46] One of their greatest concerns was that the new Iraqi state would be a federation-
      - to which 50 percent were opposed-- which could lead to national disintegration and Kurdish
      separatism. Another 36 percent of Turks did not oppose a federation, partly due to the view that this was up to the Iraqis
      themselves.[47]Thereafter, the proportion approving a federal regime in Iraq gradually increased until Turks were close to an even split on the
      issue.[48]
      Yet despite the Turks' deep antagonism toward U.S. policy to attack Iraq, opinions began to change in the summer of 2003. The United States had won the
                                                   If Turkey were going to have influence in the new Iraq,
      war and Saddam Hussein's overthrow was an established fact .
      prevent the creation of a Kurdish state, prevent Iraq from becoming a base for the anti-Turkish PKK
      Kurdish group, and preserve good relations with the United States, a new approach was needed. Thus, in July
      2003, an increased number of Turks, 41.5 percent, supported the idea of cooperating with Washington in Iraq, though 45.9 percent were still against
      it.[49]
      There was also an increasing interest in the idea of Turkey benefiting from Iraqi reconstruction. Some 42
      percent thought Turkish businessmen could play an active role in the reconstruction of Iraq, whereas 45.8 percent held the opposite view.[50] Those
      doubting Iraq provided an economic opportunity thought the Americans would not welcome a Turkish
      role, though this seemed rather unlikely.




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                                       US Presence Decreases Relations
U.S. military assistance undermines relations with Greece

Tamar Gabelnick May 21, 1999 Acting Director of the Arms Sales Monitoring Project of the Federation of
American Scientists.
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Turkey%3A+Arms+and+Human+Rights.%28Brief+Article%29-a055682997

      The U.S. government believes large quantities of arms sales buy political influence in addition to
      providing economic benefits. In reality, Washington has held little sway over Ankara's behavior in
      such key foreign policy areas as promoting human rights and democracy, preserving regional stability,
      keeping Turkey tied to Western Europe Western Europe The countries of western Europe, especially
      those that are allied with the United States and Canada in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
      (established 1949 and usually known as NATO). , and promoting economic growth. Additionally,
      Turkey has only reluctantly accepted the embargo against Iraq and is pursuing a natural gas pipeline
      deal with Iran in defiance of the U.S. embargo. U.S. arms sales actually undermine many U.S. foreign
      policy goals by providing physical and political support to the Turkish military at the expense of
      democratically elected leaders and civil society. The Turkish military's 15-year war against the rebel
      Kurdistan Workers' Party Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) Militant Kurdish nationalist organization.
      Founded in 1978, the group sought to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey.
      (PKK PKK Player-Killer Killer (multiplayer gaming) PKK Partiya Karker Kurdistan (Kurdistan
      Worker's Party) PKK Kudistan Isci Partisi (formerly Kurdistan Workers Party, now KADEK)) in
      southeast Turkey has involved severe violations of international human rights and humanitarian law,
      including indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force. The war has served as an excuse to repress
      U.S. arms sales and continued conflict in Turkey also damage Turkey's economy and prospects for
      economic cooperation with the West. The 1998 CIA CIA:see Central Intelligence Agency. (1)
      (Confidentiality Integrity Authentication) The three important concerns with regards to information
      security. Encryption is used to provide confidentiality (privacy, secrecy). Factbook states that Turkey
      spends about $7 billion a year on the war with the PKK, which contributed to a 99% inflation rate for
      1998 and a national debt equal to half the government's revenue. War-related political and financial
      instability has discouraged foreign investment. A U.S.-backed plan would route a Caspian Sea oil
      pipeline through territory where the PKK operates, leaving it susceptible to rebel attacks. An end to the
      war and improvements in human rights are also necessary preconditions for Turkey's entry into the
      European Union European Union (EU), name given since the ratification (Nov., 1993) of the Treaty of
      European Union, or Maastricht Treaty, to the European Community (EU), which the U.S. believes
      would draw Turkey closer to the West. Turkey's ceaseless provocation of Greece, again using U.S.
      arms, is another barrier to EU entry.




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                                       US Presence Decreases Relations
U.S. support for Turkey during the cold war caused the U.S. to overlook the harm it did to U.S. Greek
relations.
Speros Vryonis, Jr.*    UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 1997 “POINT-
COUNTERPOINT: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE ONGOING GRECO-TURKISH CRISIS AS A
CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO DESTABILIZATION” https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app
action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=2+UCLA+J.+Int%27l+L.+%26+For.+
Aff.+69&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=d538e245fd3185c74cadf69739ecf4a6

      The American media deals with Greco-Turkish relations only tangentially. This treatment is
      overshadowed by U.S. political and economic interests in the region, causing Americans to view the
      tensions in the relations between Greece and Turkey as a phenomenon explained only by a centuries-
      old history of hatred and warfare. This parochial view has led to a simplified understanding of the
      etiology of the ongoing Greco-Turkish crisis, and in turn, to an American policy which has further
      deteriorated relations between Greece and Turkey and undermined the measure of stability Greece
      provides in the region. The realities of the Cold War, which pitted the United States and the Soviet
      Union against one another, produced an arrangement of hierarchical priorities among America's allies.
      In this hierarchy, Turkey's safety and stability were of primary importance due to its proximity to the
      Soviet Union. Turkey's location in a strategic area crucial to U.S. interests allowed American
      intelligence to monitor the Soviet Union closely and to check Soviet aggression. Turkey's membership
      in NATO was therefore considered essential to American strategy in dealing with the perceived Soviet
      threat. The vital role which Turkey played in American Cold War posturing caused the U.S. and its
      allies to perceive the tension between Greece and Turkey as secondary to the immediate threat of
      Soviet communism. Yet even in the post-Cold War era, American governmental circles still fail to
      appreciate the tension between Greece and Turkey, both of which are NATO allies. There...”




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                        Dartmouth 2K9
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                                       US Presence – Causes Turkish Violence
US presence gives Turkey the ability to lash out against Greece with out consequence.
Yilan, 2010 ( Staff writer for Turkish and Macedonian Friendship, “Greece                           in danger”,
http://turkeymacedonia.wordpress.com/2010/03/28/greece-in-danger/ )

      The trouble started in the 1990s when the American air force blasted Yugoslavia supposedly to protect
      Yugoslavian Moslems from Yugoslavian Christians. The first product of the dismemberment of
      Yugoslavia was the independence of a Yugoslavian province neighboring Greek Macedonia. Most of
      the people of this province are Bulgarians and Albanians. Yet they have been calling themselves
      “Macedonians” and their tiny country “Macedonia.” In addition, this small country has the audacity of
      claiming the Greek province of Macedonia. Its anti-Greek slogans and the rewriting of history,
      memorized during its communist past, have outraged the Greeks but don’t seem to bother America or
      the countries of the European Union, which recognized it as “Macedonia,” the name it stole from
      Greece. This American and EU indifference towards the theft of Creek culture makes mockery of
      Western civilization, which came into being from the ancient Greek legacy of science, democracy and
      the arts of civilization. Starting during the Renaissance of the fifteenth century, Westerners
      incorporated the Greek legacy into the pillars of their own culture. Second and no less menacing,
      Turkey provokes Greece almost on a daily basis, its warplanes flying over the Aegean. Again,
      Turkey’s blatant and provocative violations of international law at the expense of Greece cause no
      problems to America or its NATO partners or to the 27 countries of the EU. All these countries are
      officially allied to Greece with Greece being a member of both NATO and the EU. This is another
      example where America and EU operate beyond Western civilization, burying the common culture
      they share with Greece for the “strategic” delusion they have invented for Turkey. Despite the 400-
      year occupation of Christian Southeastern Europe by this Moslem country, her genocides against
      Greeks and Armenians, America and EU have been rewarding Turkey for decades.




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                          Dartmouth 2K9
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                                       US Presence – Causes Turkish Violence
Washington’s policy towards Turkey, gives them a sense of stability that encourages violent responses
Carpenter 99 ( Ted Galan is Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.,
http://www.hri.org/forum/intpol/carpenter.html )


      A Foolish, Myopic Policy The strategy of making Turkey a keystone American ally is myopic and
      potentially very dangerous. U.S. policymakers have been down a similar path before--with disastrous
      results. During much of the Cold War, Washington treated Iran as an indispensable ally and an
      important stabilizing force in the region. President Jimmy Carter's infamous 1977 New Year's Eve
      toast praising the shah for making Iran "an island of stability" in a turbulent part of the world
      encapsulated long-standing U.S. assumptions.21 Washington had used the Central Intelligence Agency
      to orchestrate a coup to oust Iran's democratic government in 1953 and put the shah back on his throne.
      Thereafter, it appeared that the shah's regime could do no wrong in the eyes of U.S. policymakers. Not
      only did Washington ignore Teheran's massive human rights abuses, but it remained silent as the shah
      systematically suppressed democratic opponents. Washington's indulgent policy toward the
      authoritarian behavior of Turkey's military is eerily reminiscent of the U.S. policy toward Iran under
      the shah. We are still paying a steep price for the latter folly. Perhaps even worse, Washington's
      incessant courtship of Ankara is giving Turkey an inflated sense of its own strategic importance. That
      courtship is also encouraging (one assumes inadvertently) abrasive, indeed aggressive, behavior on the
      part of Turkey. Turkey's assumption that it is Washington's essential ally could cause Ankara to
      provoke a war with Greece over Cyprus or over control of islands in the Aegean.22 Likewise, the
      perception of U.S. acquiescence, if not outright support, might encourage Turkey to seek a new
      confrontation with Syria or one of its other neighbors over some other issue. For example, Ankara has
      already imposed a brutal economic blockade against Armenia because of that country's armed struggle
      with Azerbaijan over control of the latter's predominantly Armenian enclave of Nakorno-Karabakh. A
      scenario in which Turkey might choose to escalate its coercion against Armenia is hardly fanciful.




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Turkey’s leadership qualities show the possibility of violent outcomes because the US doesn’t speak
against them
Carpenter 99 ( Ted Galan is Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.,
http://www.hri.org/forum/intpol/carpenter.html )

      Finally, the worst fallacy is the pervasive assumption of U.S. policymakers that Turkey is a stabilizing
      regional power that will help the United States to maintain a relatively benign status quo in the region.
      To the contrary, Turkey shows signs of being a revisionist--and perhaps an aggressively revisionist--
      power. Several of its actions in recent years--especially those directed toward Greece, Syria, and
      Armenia--are typical of a country that has ambitions to become a regional hegemon. Even its behavior
      regarding the crises in the Balkans, although somewhat less aggressive, is consistent with that pattern.
      Washington apparently assumes that its policy agenda and Ankara's are compatible, if not congruent.
      But U.S. leaders must consider the very real possibility that Ankara may have ambitions that would be
      disruptive to the region and undermine U.S. objectives. Washington's indulgent double standard
      toward Turkey is objectionable on the grounds of hypocrisy, but there is a more pragmatic reason that
      it should be abandoned forthwith. By treating Turkey as an indispensable ally, the United States may
      be sowing the seeds of regional disorder and perhaps even armed conflict that might otherwise be
      avoidable. It is not America's responsibility to preserve peace and stability throughout the eastern
      Mediterranean and the Middle East, but Washington should at least not pursue policies that increase
      the prospect of tragedy.




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                             Dartmouth 2K9
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                                       AKP Maintain Relations with Iran – Trade
AKP will trade with Iran in order to retain high relations

 Meliha Benli Altunisik Professor and Chair at the Department of International Relations, Middle East
Technical University, Ankara, Turkey 4-29-2010 “Turkish Policy towards Iran: What is at Stake?”
http://www.mei.edu/Portals/0/Content%20Edition%20P&E/Turkey%20an %20Iran_Altunisik_04292010_1.pdf

      In the wake of the recent Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC, Turkish-Iranian relations once
      again came under scrutiny. As the US and the EU have intensified their efforts to impose sanctions on
      Iran through the UN Security Council, Turkey's role in this issue has come into question.
      Notwithstanding Turkish temporary membership in the Security Council, the Turkish position will be
      critical for any effective implementation of sanctions. Some in the US try to cast this “vote” as a litmus
      test to see whether Turkey, more specifically the AKP government, aims to steer Turkey away from a
      Western orientation to the East. Clearly it is very difficult today to predict how Turkey will act when
      the issue is brought to the Security Council. By that time, Turkey's decision will be based on the
      evolution of the issue and on how Turkish policy makers evaluate the developments with respect to
      their national interests. However, it is equally important to understand the basic premises of Turkish
      policy toward Iran, in general, and the Iranian nuclear issue, in particular. Turkish-Iranian relations
      have been quite complex and marred with geopolitical and ideological competition. Particularly in the
      1990s, relations deteriorated amid the crisis over Turkey’s accusations that Iran was supporting the
      PKK and Islamic radicalism in Turkey. The two countries also engaged in geopolitical competition
      over Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as in Iraq. In recent years, however, Turkish-Iranian
      relations have improved through enhanced security cooperation and economic ties. First, the two
      countries began to cooperate against the PKK and its Iranian counterpart, PJAK. To reflect the new
      level of cooperation, the Turkey-Iran High Security Committee, which was established in 1988, but
      largely remained ineffective in its early years, was revived. In the meantime, Turkey and Iran started to
      deepen their energy partnership. The natural gas pipeline from Tabriz to Ankara has made Iran
      Turkey’s second largest natural gas supplier after Russia, with a 20 percent share. Turkey also wants to
      expand energy cooperation with Iran as it sees its neighbor as an important source for the planned
      Nabucco project. Two factors particularly affected improvement of Turkish-Iranian relations. First,
      the new strategic context that emerged in the wake of the 2003 Iraq War created common threat
      perceptions and contributed to a rapprochement on security issues. Second, the general evolution of
      Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East under the AKP government led to the improvement of
      relations with Iran as well. The AKP government’s comprehensive policy on the Middle East included
      the desire to have “zero problems with neighbors” as well as an emphasis on diplomacy and economic
      interdependence. Thus, Turkey started to adopt a policy of engagement and dialogue with Iran. Efforts
      were also made to improve economic relations. As a result, Turkey's exports to Iran reached $2 billion
      by 2008.




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                               Dartmouth 2K9
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                                       AKP Maintain Relations with Iran – Econ
Turkey will trade with Iran through sanctions due to the prospect of economic backlash
Meliha Benli Altunisik Professor and Chair at the Department of International Relations, Middle East
Technical University, Ankara, Turkey 4-29-2010 “Turkish Policy towards Iran: What is at Stake?”
http://www.mei.edu/Portals/0/Content%20Edition%20P&E/Turkey%20an %20Iran_Altunisik_04292010_1.pdf

      From the beginning Turkey has been stating that it supports Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear program
      under the NPT. Since the 1990s, Turkey has reiterated its position that the Middle East should be free
      of WMDs. It is clear that Turkey does not want a nuclear Iran as this would alter the traditional balance
      between the two countries. Turkey seems to be not entirely convinced of the military nature of the
      Iranian nuclear program. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s speeches and interviews in recent months
      have demonstrated this clearly. This perspective seems to be the most important divergence between
      Turkey and its Western allies. In order to resolve the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program, Turkey has
      been calling for the continuation of diplomacy before resorting to other means. Within this context,
      Turkey has been calling on Iran to enter into full and transparent cooperation with the IAEA. At the
      same time, Ankara has many times offered to mediate on this matter. Foreign Minister Davutoglu has
      once again visited Iran to discuss diplomatic solutions, such as a “fuel-swap,” with the Iranian
      authorities. Turkey is concerned about possible Security Council sanctions on Iran. First, it is argued
      that as a neighbor with extensive energy and trade relations with Iran, Turkey would also suffer
      immensely from sanctions. This situation would be déjà vu for Turkey as it went through a similar
      ordeal with the imposition of sanctions on Iraq in the years after the Gulf Crisis of 1990. Second,
      Turkey is skeptical about the utility of sanctions. Again, the Iraqi case is an example to demonstrate
      that sanctions rarely work. Although there is talk of “smart sanctions” that would mitigate the harm to
      ordinary people, these are very difficult to achieve. Finally, Foreign Minister Davutoglu complained
      after the Nuclear Security Summit that as a temporary member of the Security Council they were not
      informed about the proposed content of the sanctions regime. He also said that Turkey could not be
      expected to approve a sanctions package in advance unless the details of the package are revealed
      beforehand. Turkey is all the more concerned about any possible military action against Iran. It fears
      that this could spread the same chaos that was witnessed in Iraq to a number of countries in the region.
      This could also upset the already fragile political situation in Iraq with direct repercussions to Turkey.
      It would have been very difficult for any government in Turkey to jump on the bandwagon of the pro-
      sanctions position at this point because of the concerns about the possible negative impact of such a
      policy on Turkey. Additionally for the AKP government and particularly Foreign Minister Davutoglu.,
      the escalation of the crisis and Turkish support of tougher policies on Iran would clearly undo the
      policies that the government has been implementing in the Middle East. It is safe to argue that the
      government would do all that is possible to ease the crisis by brokering a deal. If all else fails, then the
      Turkish government could turn to the Turkish public, as well as the regional actors, and say that it tried
      its utmost to defuse the crisis. It is clear that there has been a growing convergence between the US
      and the EU on this issue. The expansion of this consensus to include other members of the Security
      Council will also be the key to influence Turkey's ultimate position. In any case the failure to resolve
      the crisis would mean that Turkey has to pay a price whether it ultimately decides to support a tougher
      policy toward Iran or not.




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                   Dartmouth 2K9
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                                       AKP Maintains Relations with Iran – Econ

The AKP supports Iranian energy due to its dependance on it
Tuncay Babali Middle East Quarterly Spring 2009 http://www.meforum.org/2108/turkey-at-the-energy-
crossroads “Turkey at the Energy Crossroads” http://www.meforum.org/2108/turkey-at-the-energy-crossroads

     Turkey is increasingly at the crossroads of the world energy trade. Because of tanker traffic
  through the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, Turkey has become an important north-
  south oil transit route. The Baku-Tbilisi- Ceyhan (BTC) oil and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum
(BTE) natural gas pipelines make Turkey an important east-west route as well. Economic
 opportunities, however, can present diplomatic liabilities. As the importance of Turkey's
energy sector has grown, Turkey has come under increasing pressure. Turkey finds itself caught
   between competing U.S. and Russian interests as a result of the August 2008 Georgia
  conflict. Turkish-Iranian energy trade has also brought Washington's ire down on Turkey. Turkey's
 efforts to minimize problems with its neighbors may make it popular with some, but it has led others to
 question the strength of the U.S.-Turkish strategic partnership. Analysis of Ankara's options show
 that it has little choice besides greater caution and engagement, and that energy concerns rather than a
    reassessment of its Western ties motivate its outreach to Russia and, to a certain extent, Iran.




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                               Dartmouth 2K9
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                                       AKP Maintains Relations with Iran – Energy
Turkey will trade with Iran through sanctions due to the prospect of economic backlash
Meliha Benli Altunisik Professor and Chair at the Department of International Relations, Middle East
Technical University, Ankara, Turkey 4-29-2010 “Turkish Policy towards Iran: What is at Stake?”
http://www.mei.edu/Portals/0/Content%20Edition%20P&E/Turkey%20an %20Iran_Altunisik_04292010_1.pdf

      From the beginning Turkey has been stating that it supports Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear program
      under the NPT. Since the 1990s, Turkey has reiterated its position that the Middle East should be free
      of WMDs. It is clear that Turkey does not want a nuclear Iran as this would alter the traditional balance
      between the two countries. Turkey seems to be not entirely convinced of the military nature of the
      Iranian nuclear program. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s speeches and interviews in recent months
      have demonstrated this clearly. This perspective seems to be the most important divergence between
      Turkey and its Western allies. In order to resolve the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program, Turkey has
      been calling for the continuation of diplomacy before resorting to other means. Within this context,
      Turkey has been calling on Iran to enter into full and transparent cooperation with the IAEA. At the
      same time, Ankara has many times offered to mediate on this matter. Foreign Minister Davutoglu has
      once again visited Iran to discuss diplomatic solutions, such as a “fuel-swap,” with the Iranian
      authorities. Turkey is concerned about possible Security Council sanctions on Iran. First, it is argued
      that as a neighbor with extensive energy and trade relations with Iran, Turkey would also suffer
      immensely from sanctions. This situation would be déjà vu for Turkey as it went through a similar
      ordeal with the imposition of sanctions on Iraq in the years after the Gulf Crisis of 1990. Second,
      Turkey is skeptical about the utility of sanctions. Again, the Iraqi case is an example to demonstrate
      that sanctions rarely work. Although there is talk of “smart sanctions” that would mitigate the harm to
      ordinary people, these are very difficult to achieve. Finally, Foreign Minister Davutoglu complained
      after the Nuclear Security Summit that as a temporary member of the Security Council they were not
      informed about the proposed content of the sanctions regime. He also said that Turkey could not be
      expected to approve a sanctions package in advance unless the details of the package are revealed
      beforehand. Turkey is all the more concerned about any possible military action against Iran. It fears
      that this could spread the same chaos that was witnessed in Iraq to a number of countries in the region.
      This could also upset the already fragile political situation in Iraq with direct repercussions to Turkey.
      It would have been very difficult for any government in Turkey to jump on the bandwagon of the pro-
      sanctions position at this point because of the concerns about the possible negative impact of such a
      policy on Turkey. Additionally for the AKP government and particularly Foreign Minister Davutoglu.,
      the escalation of the crisis and Turkish support of tougher policies on Iran would clearly undo the
      policies that the government has been implementing in the Middle East. It is safe to argue that the
      government would do all that is possible to ease the crisis by brokering a deal. If all else fails, then the
      Turkish government could turn to the Turkish public, as well as the regional actors, and say that it tried
      its utmost to defuse the crisis. It is clear that there has been a growing convergence between the US
      and the EU on this issue. The expansion of this consensus to include other members of the Security
      Council will also be the key to influence Turkey's ultimate position. In any case the failure to resolve
      the crisis would mean that Turkey has to pay a price whether it ultimately decides to support a tougher
      policy toward Iran or not.




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                             Dartmouth 2K9
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                                       AKP Maintains Relations with Iran – Energy

The AKP supports Iranian energy due to its dependance on it
Tuncay Babali Middle East Quarterly Spring 2009 http://www.meforum.org/2108/turkey-at-the-energy-
crossroads “Turkey at the Energy Crossroads” http://www.meforum.org/2108/turkey-at-the-energy-crossroads

      Turkey is increasingly at the crossroads of the world energy trade. Because of tanker traffic through
      the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, Turkey has become an important north-south oil transit route.
      The Baku-Tbilisi- Ceyhan (BTC) oil and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) natural gas pipelines make
      Turkey an important east-west route as well. Economic opportunities, however, can present diplomatic
      liabilities. As the importance of Turkey's energy sector has grown, Turkey has come under increasing
      pressure. Turkey finds itself caught between competing U.S. and Russian interests as a result of the
      August 2008 Georgia conflict. Turkish-Iranian energy trade has also brought Washington's ire down on
      Turkey. Turkey's efforts to minimize problems with its neighbors may make it popular with some, but
      it has led others to question the strength of the U.S.-Turkish strategic partnership. Analysis of Ankara's
      options show that it has little choice besides greater caution and engagement, and that energy concerns
      rather than a reassessment of its Western ties motivate its outreach to Russia and, to a certain extent,
      Iran.




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                             Dartmouth 2K9
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                                       Turkey Inclusion of Kurds  Democracy
Turkey must include the Kurds to form a democracy
Gresh and Chorev, 2006 (Geoffrey Gresh is a graduate student at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Tufts University and former Rotary Ambassadorial Scholar to Turkey. Matan Chorev, also a graduate student at
the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, is the co-founder of the New Initiative for Middle
Eastern Peace, Tufts University., “TURKISH-KURDISH RECONCILIATION: PROMISE AND PERIL”,
http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_71.pdf)

      Turkey and its Kurdish population have a long and complex past. But if Turkey is not able to better
      include the Kurdish population in its currently centralized form of government, there is very little hope
      for the formation of a stable and lasting democracy. The Republic’s identity under Atatürk was shaped
      by the idea of a “Turkish” citizenship that included a “Turkish” language. Moreover, in a post-Atatürk
      era the existence of Kurds in Turkey was systemically denied by successive governments, the
      bureaucratic and security establishment. To complicate matters, the country fought against the PKK
      from 1984 to 1999. Thus, since the formation of the modern Republic of Turkey until approximately
      2000, the rhetoric imposed was that ethnic origin should not play a role in identity, but all should unite
      under a cohesive national identity. Such rhetoric has had a residual effect on society today and
      continues to pose major obstacles for the current government as it proceeds with democratic reforms
      to align itself with the EU




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                        Dartmouth 2K9
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                                            AKP Losing Now
Turkish opposition is gaining ground on the AKP.
Jorge Benitez, staff writer at the Atlantic Council, 6-23-2010. [ACUS, Can the Turkish opposition kick out
Erdogan?, p. http://www.acus.org/natosource/can-turkish-opposition-kick-out-erdogan]
    From David Kenner, Foreign Policy: Today, party leader Mustafa Sarigul announced that he was
    abandoning his plans to establish TDH as an independent political party, and would throw his support
    behind the CHP in Turkey's 2011 general election.
    Sarigul suggested that international and domestic developments -- a reference to Prime Minister
    Erdogan's vociferous criticism of Israel in the wake of the Gaza flotilla disaster and the recent flare-up
    of Turkish-Kurdish tensions -- were the reason TDH leaders had to "act as statesmen and unite" with
    opposition groups. The real reason, however, probably has more to do with changes in the CHP, and
    within Turkey's political climate. After the resignation of CHP leader Deniz Baykal following a sex
    scandal, his replacement, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, has mended bridges with Baykal's old rivals -- including
    Sarigul.
    Just as importantly, the Turkish opposition seems to have gained new life. Two recent polls found that
    the CHP was polling at its highest level in years, now receiving the support of approximately 30
    percent of Turks. There are a variety of possible reasons for this improvement in the party's fortunes:
    the new leadership of Kilicdaroglu, Turkish anger that the AKP's much-celebrated "Kurdish opening"
    failed to achieve results, discontent over Erdogan's Middle East adventurism, and double-digit
    unemployment in a job market that still has not turned the corner following the international recession.

New leadership means CHP can challenge the AKP.
David Gardner, staff writer, 6-28-2010. [Financial Times, Politics: Hopes for a credible opposition are rising,
p. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3adb7a62-7fe8-11df-91b4-00144feabdc0.html]
     Mr Baykal, 71, who had led the CHP to a series of crushing defeats and had turned the party of
     Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the revered founder of the republic, into a shrinking cult, was finally pushed
     aside to make way for new leadership that might conceivably mount a credible challenge to the ruling
     Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
     By the time of next year’s general elections, Turks may just get the opposition party they need and
     deserve.




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                                           Removing Troops Popular
Turkish public opposes U.S. military presence.
Claudine Lamond and Paul Ingram, security analysts at BASIC, 1-23-2009. [BASIC Getting to Zero Papers,
No. 11, Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states, p. www.atlantic-
community.org/app/webroot/.../CLamondTNWinNATO.pdf]
    There have been public expressions of resentment towards the US military presence in Turkey ever
    since the lead up to the US war with Iraq. The United States insisted on the government allowing
    American troops to use Turkey as a staging post, despite overwhelmingly antiwar Turkish public and
    political opinion. Limited permission was granted after heavy debates and delay in the Turkish
    parliament.




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                                       Anti-American Policy  AKP Victory
Anti-American policies bolster the AKP.
Steven Cook, Ph.D., Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 6-1-2010.
[Foreign         Policy,      How         Do           You       Say        "Frenemy"          in      Turkish?,
p.http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/01/how_do_you_say_frenemy_in_Turkish?page=0,0]
     Moreover, Ankara's approach has proved enormously popular in Turkey and among average Arabs.
     This is why Erdogan seems all too willing to discuss Turkey's newly influential role in the Middle East
     at even the most mundane ribbon-cutting events, from Istanbul to the Armenian border. Indeed, it is
     abundantly clear that Erdogan and his party believe they benefit domestically from the position Turkey
     has staked out in the Middle East. Yet, it is lost on Washington that the demands of domestic Turkish
     politics now trump the need to maintain good relations with the United States.




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                                       Foreign Policy/Anti-Americanism Key to AKP
Tapping into Turkish anti-American sentiment would win Erdogan the election.
Omer Taspinar, staff writer, 6-14-2010. [Turkish Press, A New Era In Turkish Foreign Policy, p.
http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=352779]
     If we scratch the surface of what seems to be a secular versus Islamist divide in Turkish attitudes
     toward the West, we quickly see that both the so-called Islamist and secular camps embrace the same
     narrative vis-a-vis Europe and America: nationalist frustration. New obstacles to European Union
     accession, perceived injustice on Cyprus, growing global recognition of the Armenian 'genocide,' and
     Western sympathy for Kurdish national aspirations are all major factors forcing Turks to question the
     value of their long-standing pro-Western geostrategic commitments. Until a couple of years ago, I used
     to argue that Western-oriented Kemalist elites had traded places with the once eastward-leaning
     Islamists on the grounds that it was the AK Party that seemed more interested in maintaining close ties
     with Europe and the US. The AK Party, in my eyes, needed the West more than Turkey's Kemalist
     establishment for a simple reason: It needed to prove to the Turkish military, secularist Turks, and
     Western partners in the international community that it was not an Islamist party.
     Now, however, I increasingly believe that the AK Party, too, has decided to jump on the bandwagon of
     nationalist frustration with the West. After all, this is the most powerful societal undercurrent in
     Turkey, and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan needs to win elections. As the events of the last
     couple of weeks have shown, America and Europe should pay attention to Turkey's Gaullist
     inclinations. In the past, Americans and Europeans would often ask whether Turkey had any realistic
     geopolitical alternatives and complacently reassure themselves that it did not. But today such
     alternatives are starting to look more realistic to many Turks. The rise of Turkish Gaullism need not
     come fully at the expense of America and Europe. But Turks are already looking for economic and
     strategic opportunities in Russia, India, China and, of course, the Middle East and Africa. It is high
     time for American analysts to stop overplaying the Islamic-secular divide in Turkish foreign policy and
     pay more attention to what unites both camps: Turkish nationalism.




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                                           Erdogan Key to Nabucco
Erdogan’s key to Nabucco progress.
Carter Tellinghuisen, staff writer, 4-27-2009. [International Oil Daily, Sofia Energy Summit Underlines EU-
Russia Gas Pipe Tensions, p. ln]
    European officials touted the credentials of the planned Nabucco gas pipeline at an energy summit in
    the Bulgarian capital, Sofia , on Friday. They said the line -- planned to carry Caspian gas to Europe --
    will give Europe the supply security it needs and spark a new round of Caspian gas exploration.
    But the absence from the gathering of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin highlighted the tensions
    building between Nabucco and Russia 's proposed South Stream gas pipeline. Moscow bills South
    Stream as an added security measure for European consumers, but it has been less warmly received in
    the West after a bruising gas supply row with Ukraine in January left much of Europe without gas for
    weeks ( IOD Apr.24 ,p1 ).
    The summit brought together suppliers from the Caspian region, Central Asia and the Middle East ,
    leaders of Balkan transit countries, and top officials from the European Union.
    But another conspicuous absentee was Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, whose support for
    Nabucco is key to its moving forward. Turkey would be the first major transit state for the line, to
    bring Caspian gas to Austria, and Turkey is believed to be using that position to gain support for its bid
    to join the EU.




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                                                      AKP Key to Financial Reform
AKP victory is key to Turkish financial reform.
Hürriyet Daily News 6-16-2010. [Turkey needs fiscal reform, but also ‘EU carrot’,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-needs-fiscal-reform-but-also-8216eu-carrot8217-2010-06-
16]
     Turkey's reform process needs more support and incentives from the European Union than is available
     at present, participants at the Turkey Finance & Investment Forum 2010 said Wednesday in Istanbul.
     Participants also noted there is an urgent need for the government to refocus on fiscal reform.
     Tolga Ediz, portfolio manager at Ashmore Investment Management, said the second term of the ruling
     Justice and Development Party, or AKP, has been "somewhat disappointing in terms of reforms."
     "Turkey is at present too dependent on income tax... and the big social security gap is a major problem,
     too. The reform process on these issues has been slapping. Maybe we need an election to get a new
     wave of reforms," Ediz said.
      Ayşe Botan Berker, managing director of Fitch Ratings Turkey, on the other hand noted the lack of incentives from the European Union has contributed to
      Turkey's "reform fatigue." "The fatigue is more related to the response from the EU. Turkey has done many reforms especially in the past years with the
      single party government, but response has never been positive from the EU. We also need some sweetener from Europe, which we haven't had. On the
      contrary, the positive mood from the EU has faded away. The coming-into-power of Angela Merkel in Germany and Nicholas Sarkozy [who oppose the
      full EU membership of Turkey] has a lot to do with the reform fatigue as well," she said.
      "If Turkey had had any incentive from Europe, there would be better consensus among parties to go ahead with reforms. But there hasn’t been any, and
      this has caused some stagnation in the process," Berker added.
      Fitch foresees an increase in Turkey’s rating in the “long term” provided it continues to implement prudent fiscal and monetary policy, Berker said in an
      interview with Bloomberg HT television earlier on Wednesday.
      Fitch raised Turkey two levels to BB+, one level below investment grade, in December. The rating is a notch ahead of that of Standard & Poor’s and
      Moody’s but one notch below investment grade.
      Asaf Savaş Akat, a renowned economist and columnist, agreed. On the other hand, he also noted that
      there is hardly any country that is content with its fiscal balance. "This is a serious problem not only in
      Turkey. In fact, I would like you to show a country that is happy with its taxation and quality of
      budget. There is none. Labor market reforms are easier said than done, for instance," Akat said.
      Ediz, however, noted Turkey should refocus on the reform process for its own sake. "One should
      forget about Angela Merkel, read the negotiation chapters and the demands imposed by them, and just
      get them done. Not for the EU's sake but for Turkey's own sake," Ediz said.




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                                                AKP – Key to Energy Cooperation (1/2)
AKP is key to Turky-Iran cooperation on the Nabucco pipeline
Gregor, 2010 (Diana earned her Ph.D. in journalism and communications from Vienna University in
Austria. Diana Gregor has been researching, writing and publishing on Iran, its diplomatic and economic ties to
Europe and its terrorist activities throughout the Middle East., “Strengthening Turkish-Iran Relations Risk UN
Sanctions            Against             the          Islamic           Republic”,           http://www.realite-
eu.org/site/apps/nlnet/content3.aspx?c=9dJBLLNkGiF&b=2315291&ct=8104207 )

      On March 5, 2010, Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
      expressed satisfaction over increasing bilateral ties between Turkey and Iran. Turkey attaches high importance to strong relations with Iran and is eager to
      have consultation with Iran about regional and international developments, President Gul said. He further called for deepening brotherly ties between the
      two countries in different fields and said Turkey defends Iran’s rights in all international communities. [6]   Turkey, which has strengthened
      its ties with Iran since the AKP took power in Ankara,                                  has offered to be a mediator to solve the dispute between the Islamic
      Republic and the West over Iran's nuclear program. However analysts say that Turkey has so far failed to deliver the strong message the West was
      expecting of it by appearing too sympathetic towards Iran. [7] Tehran today is cooperating with Ankara on a military and an intelligence level in its fight
      against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party). Experts say that the Turkish government’s Islamic roots are seen as a "driving force behind its efforts to avoid
      confrontation over Iran". [8] After Ahmadinejad's disputed presidential re-election in June 2009, Erdogan and his ally, President Abdullah Gul were
      among the first foreign leaders to make congratulatory phone calls, ignoring the mass protests and concerns of Western leaders over the result’s
      legitimacy. Erdogan justified the move as a "necessity of bilateral relations." [9] In February 2010, Turkey again praised Iran’s presidential elections
      despite ongoing unrest. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu reiterated Turkey's position vis-à-vis the nuclear standoff with Iran by saying that the
      dispute should be resolved through dialogue by using diplomatic means instead of tough tension and threats. [10] Economic Relations Turkey is
      positioning itself as a major transit hub hosting various oil and gas pipelines. [11] Erdogan has noted that trade between Iran and Turkey surpassed $10
      billion last year and stated that the two countries are determined to increase it to $30 billion. [12] Turkey and Iran plan to set up a joint industrial zone in a
      border area. [13] On February 3, 2010, Turkish and Iranian officials met at the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) meeting, where Turkish State Minister
      Cevdet Yilmaz said Turkey to open a "golden age" in Turkish-Iranian relations. He further stated that Turkey and Iran were two "friend and brother"
                Iran supplies Turkey through a pipeline carrying an average volume of 18-25 million cubic
      countries. [14
      meters of gas per day. [15] On March 2, 2010, Turkey and Iran signed a memorandum of
      understanding boosting industrial and commercial relations between the two countries. Turkish
      Industry and Trade Minister Nihat Ergün and Iranian Minister of Industries and Mining Ali Akbar
      Mehrabian, who met in Tehran for the Development Eight Muslim countries (D-8, includes Iran,
      Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey), signed the document. [16]
      Turkey and Iran are determined to strengthen and diversify their bilateral relations. Iranian Foreign
      Minister Manouchehr Mottaki in February 2010 said: "Opening new phases in the South Pars Natural
      Gas Fields, solving issues regarding a sales agreement and the establishment of a joint refinery are
      important projects." [17] Turkish State Minister Cevdet Yilmaz said: "Projects such as the
      transportation of Turkmen and Iranian natural gas to Europe over Turkey will bring our relations to a
      much higher level. We do attach great importance to our cooperation with Iran on this issue as well as
      to our cooperation in the Nabucco project." [18]




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                                       AKP –Key to Energy Cooperation (2/2)
AKP is causing Turkey to cooperate with Iran on energy sources.
Migdalovitz, 2008 (Carol Migdalovitz Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division,     “Turkey:      Selected    Foreign            Policy      Issues     and       U.S.      Views”,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34642.pdf)

      During a period of domestic political turmoil in spring and summer 2008, the ruling Justice and
      Development Party (AKP) government of Turkey continued to conduct a very active foreign policy
      aimed at portraying the country as a regional power and at improving relations with its neighbors. It
      has engaged Iraq in order to fight the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated Foreign
      Terrorist Organization (FTO); prevent the emergence of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq;
      and ensure the development of a stable neighbor. This engagement includes advances in both political
      and economic bilateral relations. Turkey also has been facilitating indirect Israeli-Syrian peace talks
      and improving political and economic ties to Syria. More controversially, the AKP has drawn closer
      to Iran, partly because Turkey believes that it would be harmed by a possible conflict over Iran’s
      nuclear program and partly because it seeks to diversify its sources of energy. The AKP has continued
      to act on its EU ambitions and offers Turkey as a bridge between its neighbors and Europe. However,
      Turkey’s policy toward Cyprus may impede progress toward EU membership, and its approach to the
      Cyprus settlement talks may not be as constructive as it was in 2004. Finally, Turkey’s relations with
      Armenia have been troubled, mainly because of its refusal to recognize the Armenian “genocide” of
      the           early       20th         century         and           Nagorno-Karabakh           issues.




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     CHP BAD
CHP is pro-Islamist – can’t solve.
Bedien, 6.13.10 (David, Middle East Correspondent. “Turkey Divided Over Next Step Against Israel”,
http://www.thebulletin.us/articles/2010/06/13/news/world/doc4c14764a2318e092083692.txt )

      Opposition sources said Mr. Erdogan has been discussing the feasibility of moving up elections,
      scheduled for July 2011, to capitalize on the crisis with Israel. They said the prime minister, who has
      proposed that the government hire 50,000 people over the next year, hoped that his Islamist
      constituency would mobilize behind the ruling Justice and Development Party. The opposition charged
      that Mr. Erdogan sought a confrontation with Israel when he supported a Turkish-sponsored flotilla to
      break the Egyptian and Israeli siege of the Gaza Strip. Opposition deputies said Ankara could have
      defused the situation through diplomacy with Jerusalem. “He [Erdogan] almost declared war against
      Israel in his party’s meeting [on June 1],” Mr. Kilicdaroglu said. “The Turkish Foreign Ministry should
      publicly disclose correspondence made with Israel so that we may all learn whether Israel warned
      Turkey or not. Nothing should remain secret.” Mr. Erdogan also faced criticism for his anti-Israeli
      policy from pro-Kurdish constituents. At one forum, the prime minister was asked how he could
      condemn Israel for the bloody naval interception of a Turkish-flagged ship to the Gaza Strip when
      Ankara was killing Kurdish insurgents. “How can you compare the two?” Erdogan asked.The Turkish
      prime minister has accused the opposition Republican People’s Party of supporting Israel. Mr. Erdogan
      said the opposition wanted to limit the pro-Islamist government to conventional diplomacy. “Some
      people speak in the name of Tel Aviv, advocate for Tel Aviv,” Mr. Erdogan said. “They question our
      way of diplomacy. The way you did things put us in this dire situation. As I said earlier, we do not
      work as the ‘mon cher’ diplomats do.”




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                                       No Action on Kurds Before Election
The AKP will wait till after the election to deal with the Kurds.
Ozgehan Senyuva, works at the International Relations Department, Middle East Technical University and is
affiliated with Center for European Studies, December 2009. [Middle East Review of International Affairs,
Opposition for the Sake of Opposition? Polarized Pluralism in Turkish Politics]
      The mounting tension on many fronts has generated increased talk of possible early elections in late
      2010, a year earlier than scheduled. As political analyst Adil Gur suggests, there are four possible
      factors that could lead to early elections.3 The first is the Kurdish initiative. By launching a debate on
      the issue, the AKP has raised expectations that would be difficult to meet without extensive reforms
      and even constitutional changes. Yet considering the harsh criticism from the CHP and MHP on the
      issue, and the pro-Kurdish DTP’s constant demands, it is unlikely the AKP will undertake any radical
      changes--which could prove unpopular--before the elections. On the one hand, significant elements in
      the ethnic Turkish majority could view concessions to the Kurds as giving up more than they want and
      might shift to the CHP or MHP. On the other hand, Kurdish voters--who constitute an important part
      of the AKP majority--could view such reforms as insufficient and could opt to vote for the DTP
      instead. The AKP might thus prefer winning another election victory before moving forward with such
      reforms.




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                                           AT: Military Coup Disad
Army won’t stage a coup—democracy checks.
James Joyner, managing editor of the Atlantic Council, 3-2-2010. [ACUS, Erdogan vs the Generals: Turkey's
Political Future in the Balance, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/erdogan-vs-generals-turkeys-political-
future-balance]
     For the generals, much of what Erdogan has done is nothing short of an assault on the foundations of
     modern Turkey. He eliminated the notorious state security courts, allowed the Kurds to use their own
     language, pledged to resolve the dispute with Greece over Cyprus, and even had a draft constitution
     written up that would subject the military to civilian control.
        But what could the military do to turn the tide? The generals quickly recognized that the legal and
     political tools for removing Erdogan were limited and that attempting to acquire power the old-
     fashioned way was no longer an option these days. The reputation of the Turkish army was on the
     line. "The days when the army would stage a coup are gone," General Ilker Basbug conceded.

Turkish military isn’t powerful—can’t force its will.
Steven A. Cook, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, 3-1-2010. [Council on Foreign
Relations,              The                Weakening                  of             Turkey's                Military,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/21548/weakening_of_turkeys_military.html]
     Although the arrest of the forty-nine officers is big news, the fact remains that the popular perception
     of an all-powerful Turkish military is largely incorrect. The officers regard themselves as the keepers
     of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's principles of secularism and republicanism. Yet, Kemalism--at least the
     officers' interpretation of Ataturk's ideas--demands a drab political conformity that never
     accommodated Kurds, pious Muslims, Armenians, the small Greek community, and, as Turkish
     society has become more modern and complex, those who want to live in a more democratic political
     system.
     The fact that the officers have had to intervene four times in five decades demonstrates their inability
     to force the military's political will on society. To be sure, the coups of 1960, 1971, 1980, and the
     "blank" or "post-modern" coup of 1997 reflect the awesome firepower at the General Staff's disposal,
     but coercion is the least efficient means of political control. Indeed, in the aftermath of each
     intervention, the military sought to ensure that it would not have to intervene again by writing,
     rewriting, and amending Turkey's constitutions to safeguard the Kemalist political order, yet each time
     the reengineering of Turkey's political institutions failed to prevent challenges to the political system.




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                                           Neg—Coup  Instability
Another coup would destabilize Turkey.
Steven A. Cook, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, 3-1-2010. [Council on Foreign
Relations,              The              Weakening                of             Turkey's               Military,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/21548/weakening_of_turkeys_military.html]
     Although the Obama administration has identified Turkey as a strategic partner in the Middle East,
     Central Asia, the Caucasus, and South Asia, Washington must recognize that Turkey's internal political
     turmoil could undermine Ankara's capacity to be a useful ally in these critical areas. A military
     backlash in the form of a coup, or if the AKP uses the arrests to engage in a political witch hunt, will
     destabilize Turkish politics and markets for the foreseeable future. Washington must continue to
     emphasize the importance of the rule of law and the importance of Turkey's democratic transition to
     put both sides--the military and the government--on notice that the stakes in this situation for both
     Ankara and Washington are high.




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                                       AKP - public unhappy with relection
Public unhappy with AKP getting re-elected
AK      News    6/26/10    AKP      stresses          solution     to     Kurdish     issue     is      democracy:
http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/4/158668/

      Erbil, June 26 (AKnews) Turkey's governing party, the Justice and Development Party, or AKP's Suat
      Kilic reacted saturday to the calls of early elections and the implementations of extraordinary
      conditions administration.
 
 Kilic attending a meeting of northeastern Samsun city's Chamber of
      Commerce commented on Turkey's Kurdish question claiming that there were ill-intended circles
      trying to keep Turkey in trouble all the time, warning that this has to be seen. 
 
 "Those who are
      afraid of Turkey's potential of being a global major power in foreign policy have started to move
      again by promoting terrorism, creating chaos and trying to block Turkey's way of moving forward .
      Our people have to be united and act accordingly in such a difficult period." Kilic said.
 
 "Fighting
      against terrorism and developing the democratic opening should be administrated and executed
      separately. The democratic opening project has been discussed in the National Security Council and
      due to the decisions taken there it is being executed as a State Policy" he explained.
 
 Kilic reacting
      to Nationalistic Movement Party (MHP) calls for extraordinary conditions administrations said the
      measure was not an appropriate solution to the terrorism which is threatening the Turkish state and the
      welfare of the nation, but democracy is.





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                                       Winning Election Key to Democracy
Winning the 2011 elections is key for the AKP to remain democratic
ÜMİT ENGİNSOY 6/8/2010 NKARA - Hürriyet Daily News: Israeli conservatives hope for AKP defeat in
polls http://hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=israeli-conservatives-hope-for-akp-fall-in-polls-2010-06-08

      Two prominent conservative Israeli intellectuals have said they hope Turkey’s government is unseated
      in 2011 elections, accusing the ruling party of turning Turkish foreign policy away from the West.
      “Only a change of government in Ankara can bring Turkey back into the Western fold and restore the
      partnership between Ankara and Jerusalem,” Efraim Inbar wrote in an article released Monday by the
      Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies in Israel, which he heads. “Turkey [is sliding] away from the
      West into an independent posture largely colored by the Islamist tendencies of the current
      government,” Inbar wrote, referring to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and
      Development Party, or AKP. “The next elections in July 2011 provide the Turkish citizens an
      opportunity to remain democratic and part of the West,” he said. Inbar’s comments, as well as those of
      Barry Rubin, director of the Global Research in International Affairs Center in Israel, come amid
      ongoing and unprecedented tensions over last week’s Israeli raid on a pro-Palestinian aid flotilla
      dispatched by a Turkish humanitarian group. “The [Turkish-Israeli] relationship breakdown was
      already clear – and in private every Israeli expert dealing seriously with Turkey said so – well over two
      years ago,” Rubin wrote in an article published Sunday on his center’s website. “The current Turkish
      government hates Israel.” Both Inbar and Rubin said they hope for a government change in Turkey in
      parliamentary elections planned for the summer of 2011. Election woes “Lately, for the first time, the
      [AKP] government has begun to run into domestic problems. The poor status of the economy, the
      growing discontent of many Turks with creeping Islamism in society and the election for the first time
      of a popular leader for the opposition party began to give hope that next year’s elections might bring
      down the regime,” Rubin said, referring to the election of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as the new leader of the
      Republican People’s Party, or CHP. “Elections are the only hope of getting Turkey off the road to
      Islamism,” he said. In his article, Inbar called on the West to back the Turkish opposition. “Only the
      Turks can determine their future, but the opposition to the Islamist regime deserves Western assistance.
      The strategic consequences of Turkey becoming a part of an anti-American axis are far reaching,” he
      said. “For the sake of the free world, but mostly for their own sake, let us hope that the Turks will
      choose democracy and progress and not the poverty, ignorance and authoritarianism offered by
      Islamist regimes,” Inbar said.




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                               Dartmouth 2K9
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                                              AKP Lose Election
AKP not expected to win 2011 elections.

DJ McGuire 6/29/10 (Bearing DraftHave Turkish voters had                               enough     of     the    AKP?
http://bearingdrift.com/2010/06/29/have-turkish-voters-had-enough-of-the-akp/

      In all of the outrage, counter-outrage, and the rest of the discussion surrounding the “Gaza flotilla,”
      one group has gone largely unnoticed – the Turkish electorate. It has become conventional wisdom that
      the rise of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey (AKP) has been an inevitable result of
      Turkey’s transition from a military-dominated secular republic to a more democratic one, and as such,
      the AKP has carte blanche from the Turkish people to move in a more Islamist and anti-Western
      direction. There’s only one problem: the voters have’t weighed in yet, and if recent polls are any
      indication, they are not happy. In order to understand why, we have to go back to how the AKP was
      elected in the first place. The 2002 elections in Turkey (AKP’s first win) were held amidst a revulsion
      against elite corruption. Of the five parties who held seats in Parliament (the smallest had 85 seats),
      none elected a single MP. Under Turkish election rules, a party must win at least 10% of the vote to get
      seats, which are than allocated basically under proportional representation. Only two parties passed the
      threshhold in 2002 – the AKP and the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the party of secularist founder
      Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Thus, the AKP was nearly two-thirds of the seats despite scoring less than
      35% of the vote. Given the freakish nature of the election, most assumed it was a one-off. However,
      the AKP, apparently well aware of its precarious position, played their cards close to the vest in
      government. Any movement away from secularism was portrayed as a move toward religious freedom,
      not the imposition of Wahabbist-like Islam. While the Turkish parliament refused to allow the
      American military to launch the liberation of Iraq from Turkey (whether due to incompetence or
      design, the AKP MPs split on the measure, allowing the CHP to defeat it), the use of airspace was
      OKed. In 2007, the AKP got the mandate it wanted, scoring an impressive 47% of the vote. While its
      majority in MPs was reduced (the nationalist MHP became the third party to get more than 10%), the
      AKP also had far more political capital – which it has since used to move away from the West
      (culminating, so far, in the Gaza flotilla) and to crack down heavily on the Turkish military. However,
      while all this was going on, the CHP changed leaders, picking corruption battler Kemal Kilicdaroglu to
      lead them. Almost immediately after that decision, the CHP became more competitive. Three polls
      taken after the change showed that the CHP and MHP would have enough support to block the AKP
      from power (Angus Reid, Fresno Bee, and Zalman); Sonar Arastirma (cited by Angus) even had the
      CHP in the lead. Now, the next election isn’t for a year, which is several lifetimes in politics.
      Moreover, while the CHP is a secular, Western-oriented party, it is also a left-wing one which led the
      opposition to the liberation of Iraq. It is clear however that, for now, the new direction in which Turkey
      is headed does not yet have the support of the people in whose name it has been taken, and come this
      time next year, another election may lead to a swift reversal.




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                                                                         Dartmouth 2K9
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                                                             Plan Unpopular – Public
Turkish public strongly oppose US – Iraqi invasion
(WorldPublicOpinion.org, 9/05/10, “Why Turks Feel Threatened                                                                    by         the   US,”       WPO,
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/393.php)

      Which Middle Eastern public has the largest percentage of people naming the United States as the country
      that poses the greatest threat? The answer, according to the most recent Pew Global Attitudes Project survey, is Turkey, a NATO ally and a
      country that is generally touted as the type of secular, multi-party democracy the United States should foster in the Middle East.
      Nearly two-thirds (64%) of Turkish respondents name the United States, which guarantees Turkish security as a NATO ally
      and has urged the EU to accept Turkish membership, as the country that poses the greatest threat to Turkey in the future, Pew found. Among the Middle
      Eastern publics asked the open-ended question by Pew, only in Turkey did a majority name the United States.
      Turkey is also the Middle Eastern country where public opinion toward the United States has slipped furthest in recent years. Fewer than one in 10 Turks
      (9%)   have a positive view of the United States, a drop of 21 points from the already low level in Pew's 2002 survey. More than four out
      of five (83%) say their attitude is unfavorable, including 75 percent who feel very unfavorably.
      That's one of the highest negative percentages among the eight Middle Eastern countries surveyed by
      Pew in 2007, second only to the Palestinian public with 86 percent unfavorable.
      But unlike the Palestinians (whose attitudes toward the United States worsened after the 2003 invasion but have improved slightly since then),   Turks
      have remained as negative as they were in                         March 2003 (84%). Moreover, not only do most Turks view the United States
      unfavorably, more than three out of four (77%) also look on Americans that way.
      The deterioration of the United States' image in Turkey has coincided with the increasing power of the Islamist-
      leaning Justice and Development Party (AKP). With the parliamentary election of Abdullah Gul as president, the AKP has won control of a post that
      wields important veto powers and considerable prestige, as the position once held by Kemal Ataturk, the secular Turkish republic's founding father.
      But Dr. Emre Erdogan, a political scientist and partner of Infakto Research Workshop, a major polling firm based in Istanbul, says Turkish views of the
      United States have deteriorated largely because of security concerns, not religious ones.
      "This sudden and rapid decrease in positive attitudes towards the US is an outcome of the invasion [of Iraq]," Erdogan said, adding that polls in Turkey
      show that the public thinks that the invasion has "led to increasing terrorist threats toward Turkey."
      "Turkish public opinion perceives the US as the worst enemy of Turkey as a result of the intensifying
      terrorist activities of the PKK," he said, using the acronym for the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which has been fighting for autonomy in
      southeast Turkey since 1984.
      According to Erdogan, Turks believe that separatist guerrillas operating out of bases in Iraq's northern mountains have grown stronger since the fall of
      Saddam Hussein and Turkish media frequently air evidence of alleged US collaboration with the PKK.
      Some 80  Turkish soldiers have been killed in rebel attacks so far this year and the Turkish government has
      threatened to launch cross border raids into Iraq to root them out if the US and Iraqi armies fail to do
      so.
      "Consequently, this intolerance and antipathy towards the PKK become converted to the perception of the
      US as the major enemy of the country," Erdogan said. "Before the invasion of Iraq, the worst enemy of the country was stated as
      Greece or Armenia, which are eternal enemies of Turkey, rather than the US."
      A June 2007 poll by the International Republican Institute found that a third of Turks (30%) blame "foreign governments trying to divide our country" for
      the problems in the Southeast, up from 24 percent in 2006. Foreign interference is the most widely chosen of the seven "reasons for the problems in the
      Southeast" offered. Though economic explanations are also widely cited (26 percent choose economic underdevelopment and 11 percent lack of
      government investment), these responses have together declined by 13 points over the past year.
      A 2005 poll by Infakto found that 71 percent of Turkish respondents agreed with the argument that "the West has helped separatist groups in Turkey--such
      as the Kurdish PKK--gain strength." Sixty-six percent think that "Western countries want to divide and break Turkey like they divided and broke the
      Ottoman Empire in the past."
      The declining support among Turks for the EU and NATO is consistent with such convictions. The ratio of Turks who see membership in the EU as a
      "good thing" fell from 73 percent in 2004 to 54 percent in 2006, according to the German Marshall Fund. And the numbers saying NATO is essential for
      Turkey's security fell from a bare majority in 2004 (53%) to 44 percent in 2006, though this remains the largest percentage of respondents.
      These attitudes seem to be reflected in Turkey's growing opposition to American counter-terrorism policies.           A majority of Turks         (58%)
      already said that they opposed "the US-led efforts to fight terrorism," in Pew's 2002 survey. That jumped to 79 percent in
      2007.
      Not only do Turks express more negative opinion about Western political entities, they also express
      such feelings about Western values. The Pew survey found that Turkish respondents register more unfavorable attitudes toward
      American democracy, business, and culture--even about its science and technology:




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                                                                        Dartmouth 2K9
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                                                            Plan Unpopular – Public
      •   81 percent of    Turks say they "dislike American ideas about democracy," up 31 points since 2002.
      •        83        percent     dislike     "American     ways  of    doing   business,"    up    24  points.
      •       68      percent   dislike      "American     music,   movies     and  television,"    up  22 points.
      • 51 percent say they do not admire the United States for its "technological and scientific advances," up 27 points since 2002 when a majority of 67
      percent did admire such achievements.
                         recently even Turks who disliked the US government tended to appreciate Americans
      Erdogan says that until
      and their culture. Now he sees an "emerging antipathy towards the Americans and the US life style."
      "Our previous research [indicated] that the climate of Turkish public opinion was 'anti-Bushism' rather than 'anti-Americanism,' " he said. "Nevertheless,
      recent findings indicate a change of the climate towards anti-Americanism."




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                                                                           Dartmouth 2K9
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                                                             Plan Unpopular – Public
Turkish public opposes US – US only seems concerned about US interests
(Nasuh Uslu, associate professor of international relations at the Faculty of Economic and Administrative
Sciences at hte University of Kirikkale, Turkey, Metin Toprak, vice president of the Banking Regulation and
Supervision Agency of Turkey, Ertan Aydin, teachs at Cankaya University, and Ibrahim Dalmis, PHh.D. in
social psychology from the Middle East Technical Univerisity in Turkey, September 2005, “TurkishPublic
Opinion Toward the United States in the Context of the Iraq Question,” The Middle East Review of
International Affairs, Volume 9, Article 5, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue3/jv9no3a5.html)

                                               certain events, notably Washington's 2003 military intervention in
      Turkey is a traditional ally of the United States, however,
      Iraq and the Turkish response to this, have soured Turkish-American relations. Based on opinion polls, this article
      analyzes and explains the Turkish people's perceptions of the United States during the period between December 2002 and September 2003. The
      Turkish were displeased by what they saw as an American attitude of pursuing unilateral policies
      aimed solely at protecting American interests. The Turkish people believed that the U.S. decision on
      Iraq was taken without regard for Turkey's national interests or bilateral relations. In their eyes, the
      American intervention, and Turkey's possible participation in it, would be harmful for Turkey,
      especially in the context of the Kurdish question. Therefore, it was not surprising that the Turkish nation opposed supporting the
      Americans in Iraq.
      After World War II, Turkey's main goal was to establish an alliance and to cooperate with the West, the United States in particular, in every regard. Until
      1964, maintaining close relations with the United States was the central theme of Turkish foreign policy and was backed by public opinion. The Turkish
      people considered the United States the sole guarantor of Turkey's security and the sole source of the development of the Turkish economy. The clashes in
      Cyprus began at the end of 1963, and the United States took a neutral stance between Turkey and Greece. This demonstrated that pursuing policies based
      solely on the United States was insufficient to protect Turkey's interests.
      Consequently, the United States experienced suffered a major loss of prestige in the eyes of Turkish rulers, and anti-Americanism soared among the
      Turkish people. Problems such as Washington's use of Turkish military bases, Turkish opium exacerbating drug addiction among American youth, the
      1974 Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, and the American arms embargo on Turkey cooled Turkish-American ties until 1980.
      While relations between the two countries were generally cordial during the 1980s, despite some significant problems, the end of the Cold War in the early
      1990s once again forced Turkey to make a choice in its foreign relations. Turkish leaders decisively chose to stay in the Western camp and to act with the
      United States in world politics. In fact, in the new era, the Turkish ruling elite feared that Washington would leave Turkey due to the decrease in its
      strategic importance. Therefore, considerable efforts were made to prove Turkey's strategic value for the West and the United States. As part of the new
      Turkish attitude, Turkey lent full support to Washington's policies during the 1991 Iraq crisis, in order to use every opportunity to increase Turkey's value
      in the eyes of American leaders. Turkish leaders approached the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States in the same way,
      emphasizing Turkey's alliance with the United States in its war against new threats.
      However, the U.S. decision to intervene in Iraq militarily and the subsequent demand for Turkish assistance brought a new turning point in Turkish-
      American relations. Turkey's full support for Washington's 1991 war with Iraq did not further Turkish interests as was expected. In fact, as a result of the
      economic embargo on Iraq, Turkey lost a huge amount of revenue due to lost trade and investment opportunities.
      The new conflict with Iraq was seen the Turkish people and leaders as harmful to its vital national interests, especially with regards to the Kurdish
      question. Although the Turkish government felt compelled to support the American action and launched some initiatives in this direction, the Turkish
      nation was overwhelmingly opposed to lending any kind of support to the Americans. In this new atmosphere, the Turkish parliament rejected the proposal
      to allow U.S. forces to use Turkish territory for the war.
      This article analyzes and explains Turkish public opinion concerning the United States during the critical period of December 2002 through September
      2003. These analyses are based on the opinion polls conducted by two Turkish public surveying companies: Anar and Pollmark. The Turkish nation's
                                                                                          people's opinion of
      perception of the United States is an important factor in the future of Turkish-American relations. Moreover, the Turkish
      Washington's war against Iraq is an important indicator as to the perceived legitimacy of U.S. actions,
      a problem it has faced elsewhere in the world.




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                                                                           Dartmouth 2K9
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                                                             Plan Unpopular – Public
Turkey public opposes US – questionable motives for war and insulting to Turkey
(Nasuh Uslu, associate professor of international relations at the Faculty of Economic and Administrative
Sciences at hte University of Kirikkale, Turkey, Metin Toprak, vice president of the Banking Regulation and
Supervision Agency of Turkey, Ertan Aydin, teachs at Cankaya University, and Ibrahim Dalmis, PHh.D. in
social psychology from the Middle East Technical Univerisity in Turkey, September 2005, “TurkishPublic
Opinion Toward the United States in the Context of the Iraq Question,” The Middle East Review of
International Affairs, Volume 9, Article 5, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue3/jv9no3a5.html)

      THE         TURKISH             PEOPLE'S           OPINIONS            ON        AMERICAN       MILITARY           INTERVENTION            IN       IRAQ
      The Turkish government of the Islamic-oriented AKP party did not take a hard line against cooperation. It signed an agreement to modernize military
      bases for this purpose and persuaded the Turkish parliament to ratify the governmental decree, which authorized the government to take necessary
      measures on this program. It did not object to the arrival of American weapons and soldiers in Turkish ports for future deployment in Iraq. Furthermore, it
      proposed a resolution in parliament to allow U.S. forces to operate from Turkish territory during the attack. The government may not have pushed this
      initiative with all its power, but it certainly did not incite public opinion against the idea.
      In addition, reports that the United States would provide Turkey with significant financial aid in return for
      its participation in the war might have been expected to mobilize public support. But this exchange
      was seen as an insult to Turkey's national honor, as if it were a puppet or mercenary of the world's
      superpower. Therefore, 59.2 percent of the Turks expressed negative opinions on the bilateral negotiations
      regarding Turkey's contribution to the war.[1]In December 2002, 86.7 percent of Turkish people opposed the
      intervention.[2] A month later this figure rose to more than 90 percent. This was an extremely high rate given the alliance
      relationship between the two countries.[3]It was also striking that 74.9 percent of the Turkish people thought Iraq to be right in the conflict, compared to
      only 7.2 percent who supported the U.S. side.[4]
      Turkish public opinion continued to oppose U.S. intervention after the war began. (80.6 percent opposed the intervention in May 2003).[5] The fact that
      the United States won the war easily did not change the Turkish people's negative view. In August 2003, the American intervention in Iraq was still at the
      top of the agenda for the Turkish nation because of the serious problems it incurred for Turkey. [6]
                        the Turkish people did not believe the reasons for launching a war against Iraq that were
      According to polls,
      put forth by the American administration were the true motives behind the war. The Turkish
      population did not believe in the sincerity of the Americans, even though they were their political
      allies.[7] In their opinion, American leaders had other, evil intentions for military intervention in Iraq. Ironically,
      though, 45.6 percent believed that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons. However, this seemed to cause people to oppose the war since they worried
      Turkey might suffer if such weapons were used in an armed conflict. [8]
      According to the majority of the people (74.4 percent), the real purpose of the United States was to gain
      control over oil resources in order to remain a superpower and to strengthen its hegemony over the
      world. Few thought the United States' was simply flaunting its power by the operation (6.9 percent) or seeking colonies to exploit (only 5.1 percent).
      Remarkably, only 2.3 percent of Turks believed that overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime was the real reason for the attack, and just 0.6 percent
      believed the war was in retaliation for the September 11, 2001, attacks. On the other hand, only 5 percent thought that the United States was seeking to
      conquer the entire Middle East. In short, the main view was that America sought control of the oil rather than territorial conquest, to fight terrorism, or to
      eliminate a dangerous regime.
      Given the fact that Iraq was among the major enemies of Israel and that blaming the war on Zionism was a major theme in the Arab world, one might have
      thought that the Turkish people would embrace that theme. But just 3.6 percent held that view. It was also striking that only 0.8 percent of the Turkish
      people saw the U.S.-Iraq war as one of religion.




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                                                                          Dartmouth 2K9
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                                                            Plan Unpopular-Congress
Turkey unpopular in Congress – Gaza massacre turns Turkey into the next Hitler
(Philip Giraldi, recognized authority on international security and counterterrorism issues, 6/27/10, “Punishing
Turkey, Antiwar.com http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/index.php?q=node/10441)

      The Turkish prime minister’s Hitler-like leanings first appeared when he dared confront Israel’s President Shimon Peres at an international meeting in
      Davos in January 2009. Referring to the slaughter of Gazan civilians earlier that month, Erdogan told Peres "…you know well how to kill." But if there
                        Erdogan definitely became Hitler through his support of the flotilla that sought to bring
      was any lingering doubt,
      aid to Gaza three weeks ago followed by his denunciation of the massacre initiated by Israeli
      commandos. His diabolical intent was made manifest when he then demanded justice for the nine
      Turkish citizens who were murdered. Hitlerization is the price one inevitably pays for criticizing Israel or
      opposing its policies.
      Whenever Israel discovers that yet another foreign nation has turned Nazi and is intent on recreating the Holocaust, the
      American lap dog soon picks up the scent. Andrew Sullivan has recently described the phenomenon as "Israel Derangement
      Syndrome," which he describes as a "…form of derangement, or of such a passionate commitment to a foreign country that any and all normal moral rules
      or even basic fairness are jettisoned. And you will notice one thing as well: no regret whatsoever for the loss of human life, just as the hideous murder of
      so many civilians in the Gaza war had to be the responsibility of the victims, not the attackers. There is no sense of the human here; just the tribe."
      The Gaza flotilla has been handled by the mainstream media in precisely that fashion – blaming the victim with a unanimity that overwhelms both justice
      and fairness. No humanity, no mention of the deliberate attempt to starve Gaza most recently endorsed by alleged United States Senator from New York
      Charles Schumer who said "strangle them economically." Or, if one prefers the wisdom of Representative Eliot Engel, also from New York, the flotilla
      was "filled with hate-filled provocateurs bent on violence." Confronted by such hatred it is surprising that the Israeli commandos were so restrained,
      killing only nine passengers and wounding about forty more.
                                          Turkey was the aggressor and Israel yet again the victim. Turkey now
      As the popular narrative in the media has unfolded,
      has to be punished. Congress is already considering passing the frequently shelved Armenian Genocide
      resolution and Representative Mike Spence warns "There will be a cost if Turkey stays on its present
      heading of growing closer to Iran and more antagonistic to the State of Israel." Representative Shelley
      Berkley agrees, saying that she would actively oppose Turkey’s attempt to join the European Union. Just exactly
      how she will do that is not completely clear.
                                                     has obediently been lining up to condemn Ankara, using two basic
      The American media and the punditry in Washington
      arguments. The first contention is that Turkey has become a stronghold of Islamism, is edging towards a
      political and economic alliance with Iran, and is even acting friendly to terrorism-supporting neighbors
      like Syria. The second narrative is that Turkey is no longer reliable due to its support of initiatives like
      the flotilla and also its bid to negotiate a solution to the Iranian nuclear program dilemma.




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                                                                                Dartmouth 2K9
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                                                             Plan Unpopular-Congress
Turkey unpopular in Congress – Turkey is distancing itself with the West and Gaza incident spurs more
support for Israel
(Hilary Leila Krieger, Washington correspondent for the Jerusalem Post, 6/17/10, “US Congressmen Express
Ire Toward Turkey,” Jerusalem Post, http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=178687)

      The Obama administration, in keeping with past administrations, has opposed the resolution moving to the full chamber for a vote because of Turkish
      sensitivities. Many Jewish lobbies in Washington opposed the resolution on the same grounds.
                                                                                                          was now
      That argument also resonated in the past with Rep.Peter King (R-NY), another participant in the press conference who said he
      likely to switch positions – as were many other of his colleagues.
      King stressed that this wasn’t just about Turkey’s support of the Gaza flotilla and its heavy criticism of
      Israel, but the government’s move toward Iran and its turn away from running a secular democratic
      state.
      “This is a clear effort, I believe, by Turkey to distance itself from the West, and there have to be
      consequences for that,” he said.
      Indeed, Adam Schiff (DCalifornia) cited Turkey’s opposition to sanctions against Iran in circulating a letter
      Tuesday calling for his colleagues to take up the Armenian genocide resolution.
      “Now is the time to recognize the Armenian genocide.
      As Turkey sides with Iran, why defend its campaign of genocide denial?” asked Schiff, who sponsored the resolution.
      At this point, Capitol Hill watchers don’t see enough momentum to force a floor vote, given how explosive the resolution would be in the current state of
      tension between the US, Turkey and Israel. But that could change, and insiders did see dissatisfaction with Turkey pushing forward initiatives to
      investigate the country’s connection to the flotilla and other moves opposed by Ankara.
      The shift in tone, at least, was also evident in a letter Gary Ackerman (D-New York) sent to the Woodrow Wilson Center Tuesday afternoon calling on the
      think tank to rethink honoring Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu with its public service award.
      “Publicly honoring Foreign Minister Davutoglu at this time is absolutely inconsistent – absolutely inconsistent – with the mission of the WWC and the
      ideals that animated President Wilson’s administration and foreign policy,” he wrote in a letter to the center.
      At the same time, members of Congress are reaffirming their strong support of Israel and calling on the White House/administration to do the same.
      A letter collecting signatures among members urges US President Barack Obama “to remain steadfast
      in the defense of Israel in the face of the international community’s rush to unfairly judge and
      condemn Israel in international fora such as the United Nations Security Council.” The letter has the support of many
      American Jewish groups, including the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, which put out a statement strongly backing the measure
      Wednesday.
      But some have taken issue with it. The progressive J Street lobby urged senators and representatives to amend the letter, or write their own.
      “The sign-on letters now circulating in the House and Senate, while expressing strong American
      support for Israel – a position we endorse – fail to address the impact of the present closure of Gaza on
      the civilian population, the deep American interest in resolving this conflict diplomatically, or the
      urgency of moving forward with diplomacy before it is too late,” J Street writes. “By ignoring these critical issues in favor
      of a simplistic statement that supports Israeli policy and actions, Congress is serving neither the best interests of the United States or of Israel.”


      \




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                                                                              Dartmouth 2K9
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                                                             Plan Unpopular-Congress
Congress opposes Turkey – transition in focus toward the Middle East and Gaza
(The World Tribune, 6/15/10, “Congress Calls on Obama to Challege Turkey on Ties with Iran, Hamas, “ The
World Tribune http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/ss_turkey0524_06_15.asp)

      Leading members of   Congress have expressed concern that Turkey was drifting away from the United States and
      NATO and toward such adversaries as Iran and Syria, Middle East Newsline reported. They said Obama, regarded as close to
      Prime Minister Recep Erdogan, has refused to take a position regarding Turkey's alliance with Iran and Hamas
      as well as Ankara's hostility toward Israel.
      "We can not allow these same old tactics to prevent us from taking the right position," Rep. Frank The concern in Congress has
      been bipartisan. Leading Republicans said Turkey's hostility toward Israel raised questions regarding whether
      Congress should continue to support Turkey, a leading client of U.S. combat platforms such as the F-16 multi-role fighter.
      In a letter to Obama in June, Pallone cited Ankara's decision to organize a flotilla to break the Israeli and Egyptian siege on the Gaza Strip. The
      representative said Turkey, in wake of the bloody Israeli interception of the flotilla, has resorted to threats against Israel and formed an alliance with forces
      that threaten the West.
      "Rather than engaging in an open dialogue, Turkey has chosen to recall their ambassador from Israel
      and disrupt diplomatic relations," Pallone said in the letter. "Turkey has chosen to ignore the facts and force its
      own view of events through threat."
      Some of the representatives, including Pallone, demanded that Obama condemnTurkey's IHH, the Islamist organizer of the
      flotilla. IHH has been linked to Al Qaida and Hamas and was said to have recruited scores of fighters to
      resist the Israel Navy. Nine people, eight of them Turks, were killed in the Israeli seizure of the Turkish-flagged
      Hava Marmara on May 31.
      "I also ask that you condemn Turkey's reaction to the incident involving the flotilla," Pallone said.
      "The complicity of Turkey in launching a flotilla to challenge the blockade in Gaza, the ensuing violence that occurred, the grievous loss of life is deeply
      troubling to those of us who have supported the U.S. Turkish alliance in the past," Rep. Mike Pence, a leading Republican and member of the House
      Foreign Affairs Committee, said. "Turkey needs to decide whether its present course is in its long-term interest."
      Rep. Peter Hoekstra, a former chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, said Ankara's drift from NATO has been encouraged by Obama. Hoekstra
      cited Obama's counter-terrorism adviser, John Brennan, who has repeatedly expressed support for so-called moderate elements in the Iranian-sponsored
      Hizbullah.
      "Obama  over the last 18 months has sent a clear signal to people in the Middle East that it's okay to
      reach out to these organizations, Hamas, Hizbullah," Hoekstra told The Washington Times. "I think Turkey believes,
      watching Obama, this is not necessarily inconsistent with the Obama administration."
      On June 14, a Turkish parliamentary delegation left for the United States for talks with Congress and the administration. The delegation from Turkey's
      ruling Justice and Development Party, known by its Turkish acronym, AKP, intended to allay fears that Ankara was moving away from the West.
      "The AKP has no agenda of shifting its axis or of Turkey becoming Middle Eastern," party deputy chairman and
      delegation chief Omer Celik said. "This is just rhetoric."
      Still, administration officials said Washington has become heavily dependent on Turkey for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. They said
      Ankara, the only NATO ally to vote against United Nations sanctions on Teheran, has exploited this to develop a strategic relationship with neighboring
      Iran and Syria.
      "I'll be honest," Defense Minister Robert Gates said. "I was disappointed in Turkey's decision on the Iranian sanctions. That said, Turkey is a decades-long
      ally of the United States and other members of NATO. Turkey continues to play a critical part in the alliance. We have a strong military-to-military
      relationship with Turkey. We obviously have facilities in Turkey. So allies don't always agree on things."




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                                                                         Dartmouth 2K9
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                                                         Plan Unpopular – Congress
Congress opposes Turkey – poor relations with Israel and increased relations with Iran trade off with US
relations and could have catastrophic results
(Ariel Cohen, Ph. D Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security
in the Dougas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby
Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at the Heritage Foundation, 6/21/10, “Congressmen Talk
Turkey,” The Heritage Foundation, http://blog.heritage.org/2010/06/21/congressmen-talk-turkey/)

                                                                                 Turkey received its taste of changing
      At a Washington, DC, press conference held by Members of Congress in support of Israel,
      attitudes on Capitol Hill after sponsoring a flotilla to breach Israel’s blockade of the terrorist
      organization Hamas-run Gaza strip.
      Congressmen warned that Turkey’s break from its traditionally warm relations with Israel in exchange
      for cozying up with the United States’ public enemy number one – Iran – could result in a chill in its relations with
      the American government, according to The Jerusalem Post.
      At the same time, Turkey pulled out all the stops in its diplomatic and media attacks on Israel, recalling their
      ambassador, reducing their diplomatic representation, freezing the implementation of past Turco-
      Israeli economic agreements, and placing an embargo on Israeli weapons – all of which took a serious
      toll on Turkey’s most reliable partner in the Middle East. Turkey-Israel relations, warm and cozy until the Islamist
      AK Party came to power in 2002, are now in their terminal stage.
      While Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stirred the anti-Israeli sentiment since the 2002 election, and especially after the landslide victory in 2007,
      things really came to a head in January 2009. At the Davos Economic Forum , Erdogan attacked the 87-year-old president of Israel, Shimon Peres,
      calling him a “murderer” because of Israel’s anti-terrorist operation in Gaza. Erdogan then demonstratively stormed from the podium.
      Erdogan, of course, ignored the fact that Shimon Peres has always been a life-long dove who pushes for a peace settlement with Palestinians and a two-
      state solution, and also that the Israeli presidency is a ceremonial position. Erdogan’s attack, crass and unprofessional, nevertheless gained him a lot of
      voter support, with throngs of fans coming to the airport to greet him.
      The launch of the “peace flotilla” was Turkey’s deliberate move to send already bad relations with
      Israel into a death spin. Erdogan masterfully used the opportunity granted by Israeli marine commando’s inept attempt to take control of the
      MAVI MARMARA, to staunchly put Turkey into the camp of Hamas supporters – and Israel’s opponents. Having Ankara in the same camp as Iran and
      Syria will radically change the geopolitics of the Middle East.
      Turkey used to be a staunch member of NATO, a stalwart friend of the Israelis, a nation that aspired to join the European Union. But under Erdogan and
      his AK Party, its direction is quite different.
      Erdogan is buying Iran time to develop its nuclear program by negotiating the Iran-Turkey-Brazil enriched uranium deal, rejected even by Russia and
      China, and by voting against UN Security Council sanctions that even Moscow and Beijing supported.
      It does not have to be that way, U.S. Congressmen are saying to Erdogan. There is nothing wrong with Turkey wanting to develop ties with its Islamic
                                                   But if ties with Israel are worth sacrificing for Turkey,
      neighbors, especially as Iran becomes a dominant voice in the region.
      this sends an unmistakable message to Washington. The Ayatollah Khomeini-authored call of “Death to Israel” is heard in the
      street of Istanbul. It also has the second half: “Death to America.” And the United States and its moderate Arab allies will not sit idly if the Turks and
      Iranians are planning to divide up the Middle East.
                                                                           Congressmen are promising
      What the Turks did not predict, though, was the U.S. Congress backlash they’d received on Capitol Hill .
      Turkey that they would pass legislation blaming the Ottoman Empire for the Armenian massacres in
      1915-1923 and calling it a “genocide” – something all prior U.S. Administrations have opposed due to the warm relations and a strong alliance with
      Turkey. Is this the result Mr. Erdogan intended? The U.S. Congress won’t be alone: parliaments around the world, including France and Russia, have
      already recognized the genocide.
      Given that congressmen like Rep. Mike Pence (R-IN), Peter King (R-NY), Elliott Engel (D-NY), and
      other self-described friends of Turkey are concerned about the Turkish AKP government policy, and
      that Jewish and Armenian organizations may start working together on the genocide issue – it may be
      time for Turks to take a pause and think its policy through. While the relations between Turkey and the
      West is long and illustrious, the consequences for harming that relationship can also be difficult, if not
      tragic, for both sides.




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                                                                          Dartmouth 2K9
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                                                          Plan Unpopular- Congress
Congress opposes Turkey – US support for Israel is too strong
(CNN, 6/16/10, “Lawmakers Warn Turkey of Payback of Iran, Israel Politics” CNN wired,
http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/06/16/us.turkey.armenia/)

      Washington (CNN) -- Supporters of Israel in the U.S. House warned Turkey on Wednesday they might support a
      resolution recognizing the Armenian genocide that so far has failed to come up for a vote by the full chamber.
      Turkey opposes the resolution that would bring formal U.S. recognition of the 1915-1923 campaign by Turkey's
      Ottoman Empire against the Armenian population of eastern Anatolia region as genocide.
      The resolution passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee by a single vote in March, but so far has not come up for debate by the full House. Turkey
      called home its U.S. ambassador to protest the House committee vote.
             House members who have been unwilling to support the resolution now say they might change
      However,
      their minds due to Turkey's pro-Iranian moves and support for the recent effort to break Israel's
      blockade of Gaza.
      "There will be a cost if Turkey stays on its present heading of growing closer to Iran and more
      antagonistic to the state of Israel," Rep. Mike Pence, R-Indiana, told a news conference. "It will bear upon my view and I
      believe the view of many members of Congress on the state of the relationship with Turkey."
      In particular, Pence, said, "They need to understand going forward there's going to be a cost regarding the Armenian resolution."
      Rep. Peter King, R-New York, echoed Pence in saying he was reconsidering his past opposition to taking up the Armenian genocide resolution.
      King said he and "many" other House members believe there was an Armenian genocide, but have been reluctant to support the resolution due to the
      strategic U.S. relationship with Turkey.
      "I think that's about to change," King said.
      Turkey provided support to the recent flotilla of six ships that was stopped by the Israeli military from
      bringing aid to Gaza. Nine people -- all Turkish citizens -- died when Israeli commandos boarded the
      ships and violence ensued.
      In response, Turkey has condemned Israel and led calls for an international investigation of the
      incident.
      Turkey also has stepped up relations with Iran, joining Brazil recently in brokering an agreement with
      Iran intended to head off new U.S. sanctions over Iran's nuclear program.
      The U.S. questioned the agreement and proceeded to win U.N. Security Council approval for the additional sanctions.
                                   that such steps by Turkey must be opposed by the United States to
      Pence and others told the news conference
      demonstrate unwavering U.S. support for Israel.
      Rep. Eliot Engel, D-New York, called the actions by Turkey "disgraceful" because Turkey is a NATO ally, while Rep. Shelley Berkley, D-Nevada, said
      she would actively oppose Turkey's bid to become part of the European Union.
      "They don't deserve that recognition and they don't deserve to be a part of the EU until they start behaving more like European nations and a whole lot less
      like Iran," Berkley said.




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                                                                        Dartmouth 2K9
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                                                            Plan Popular – Congress
Obama administration doesn’t oppose Turkey – wants to fix relations between Israel and Turkey to move
forward
(Laura Rozen, foreign policy reporter for Politico, 6/21/10, “Obama’s Turkey Bind,” The Politico,
http://www.politico.com/blogs/laurarozen/0610/Obamas_Turkey_dilemma_.html?showall)

      Congress is expressing alarm and demanding that Turkey pay a price for its leaders’ increasingly anti-
      Israel rhetoric in the wake of Israel’s interception of a Gaza aid flotilla last month and Turkey’s recent vote
      against                  a                U.S.-backed                      Iran               sanctions        resolution.          ...
      But in a region where the U.S. is stretched thin and short of even semireliable allies, the Obama administration is keeping its public
      criticism              of            Turkey               muted              and            trying      to      move        forward.
      The Obama administration “is in the worst of all worlds,” Eric Edelman, former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, told POLITICO.
      “The fundamental problem, I believe, which hasn’t been addressed, is that at this stage, the Turks believe we need them more than they need us. But they
      need                 us                  for                 a                     lot                  of                things,                 too.”
      President Barack Obama and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will both attend the G-20 meeting in Canada later this week. But U.S.
      officials were still vague about whether the two will meet on the sidelines, saying no meeting had been firmed up.
                                 Obama administration might try to use the quiet visit of Israeli Defense
      Meanwhile, officials suggested that the
      Minister Ehud Barak to Washington this week as an opportunity “to try to patch things up,” if possible,
      between     Israel     and    Turkey,     which      have      had       strong     defense       ties.
      Turkey’s highly regarded envoy to Washington, Namik Tan, could be a constructive intermediary for Washington but may have limited room for
      maneuver given the government he serves. A veteran diplomat who served as Turkey’s ambassador to Israel from 2007 to 2009, Tan is a colleague and
      friend             to          many              senior            officials           in              Israel’s           Foreign                Ministry.
      In an interview with POLITICO, Tan described being on the phone with Israel’s ambassador to Washington, Michael Oren, late last month to arrange a
      meeting between Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that was supposed to take place in
      Washington on June 1. A few hours after they set up the meeting, and as Davutoglu was sitting on the tarmac in Brazil waiting for his flight to the United
      States, Israeli commandos intercepted the Gaza aid flotilla, in an operation in which eight Turks and one Turkish-American were killed. ....
      But Tan insisted there has been no breach in the U.S.-Turkey relationship in the wake of either the flotilla episode or Turkey’s vote against the Iran
      sanctions resolution. ...
      Tan said Turkey shares the United States’ concern about the prospect that Iran could get a nuclear
      weapon. But he said Turkey’s vote against the Iran sanctions resolution will allow Turkey to remain an
      intermediary with Iran and therefore enable the U.S. and the international community “to keep the door
      open        to”       Iran’s       returning       to       the        negotiating      table.      ...
      “We don’t doubt Turkey’s sincerity in trying to find a diplomatic way forward and a genuine way to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons,” a senior
      administration official told POLITICO. “And they assert that what they were doing is consistent with our objectives.”
      “You will see that we have not rejected the Tehran declaration or denounced it ,” the senior official continued. “We
      have said if Iran wants to transfer 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium to Turkey, that would be good. All we said was that it was not sufficient — it
      doesn’t deal with the problem and does not obviate the need for sanctions.” ....




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                                           *2AC BLOCKS*




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                                       2AC Turkey Greek War Ext
 The US troops in Turkey cause Turkish aggression—perception that U.S. has its back causes Turkey to
aggressively pursue energy ambitions Aegean at Greece’s expense. That’s Yannakogerogos 7. This angers
Greece, causing reciprocal militarization, that’s AP 5-28. Rising tensions guarantee war. That’s Larrabee
10. Escalates to global nuclear war, that’s Steinbach.




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                                       2AC US Greek Relations Ext
US troops in Turkey hurts US-Greece relations – makes the US look biased towards Turkey. That’s
Kirisci 2. Bad relations cause risk of instability in the Balkans. That’s Speckhard 9. This results in great
power wars, that’s Blome 99.




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                                           2AC AKP Politics Ext
 Currently the AKP is bound to lose the Fall elections, that’s Ronen 6-6. The plan increases the AKP’s
popularity, allowing the AKP to win. That’s Lesser 6. An AKP win is needed for Turkey-Iran energy
cooperation. That’s Kinnander 10. This is key for supply for the Nabucco pipeline – Iran is the best
supplier. That’s Kardas 9. This results in Europe energy independence from Russia, that’s Vukotic 9.
Dependence on Russia causes economic collapse – security and supply disruption. That’s Cohen 7. This
results in massive continental conflict – European resurgence. US will ultimately get involved, and this
results in nuclear war, that’s Duffield 94.




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                                       Withdraw Troops Affirmative Impact Calc
Our impacts outweigh the negative for a few reasons

1. We have the greatest magnitude because we access nuclear war. Turkish aggression angers Greece and
increases tensions, resulting in global nuclear war. Russia energy dependence leads to economic collapse,
reading to nuclear war as well.

2. We have the shortest timeframe because AKP elections are this fall. An AKP loss ultimately results in
nuclear war.

3. Our impacts are the most probable because Turkey-Greece relations have been bad for the past
decade. Right now it is on the brink, so our impacts are inevitable without the plan.

Prefer our impact evidence. They are specific to our case and scenarios.




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b614d592-be02-418b-abfc-9e18e7f835cd.doc                                                                                                        Dartmouth 2K9
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                                                           2AC Politics Plan Popular
1- Removing Troops in Turkey is popular in congress
(Laura Rozen, foreign policy reporter for Politico, 6/21/10, “Obama’s Turkey Bind,” The Politico,
http://www.politico.com/blogs/laurarozen/0610/Obamas_Turkey_dilemma_.html?showall)

      Congress is expressing alarm and demanding that Turkey pay a price for its leaders’ increasingly anti-
      Israel rhetoric in the wake of Israel’s interception of a Gaza aid flotilla last month and Turkey’s recent vote
      against                  a                U.S.-backed                      Iran               sanctions        resolution.          ...
      But in a region where the U.S. is stretched thin and short of even semireliable allies, the Obama administration is keeping its public
      criticism              of            Turkey               muted              and            trying      to      move        forward.
      The Obama administration “is in the worst of all worlds,” Eric Edelman, former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, told POLITICO.
      “The fundamental problem, I believe, which hasn’t been addressed, is that at this stage, the Turks believe we need them more than they need us. But they
      need                 us                  for                 a                     lot                  of                things,                 too.”
      President Barack Obama and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will both attend the G-20 meeting in Canada later this week. But U.S.
      officials were still vague about whether the two will meet on the sidelines, saying no meeting had been firmed up.
                                 Obama administration might try to use the quiet visit of Israeli Defense
      Meanwhile, officials suggested that the
      Minister Ehud Barak to Washington this week as an opportunity “to try to patch things up,” if possible,
      between     Israel     and    Turkey,     which      have      had       strong     defense       ties.
      Turkey’s highly regarded envoy to Washington, Namik Tan, could be a constructive intermediary for Washington but may have limited room for
      maneuver given the government he serves. A veteran diplomat who served as Turkey’s ambassador to Israel from 2007 to 2009, Tan is a colleague and
      friend             to          many              senior            officials           in              Israel’s           Foreign                Ministry.
      In an interview with POLITICO, Tan described being on the phone with Israel’s ambassador to Washington, Michael Oren, late last month to arrange a
      meeting between Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that was supposed to take place in
      Washington on June 1. A few hours after they set up the meeting, and as Davutoglu was sitting on the tarmac in Brazil waiting for his flight to the United
      States, Israeli commandos intercepted the Gaza aid flotilla, in an operation in which eight Turks and one Turkish-American were killed. ....
      But Tan insisted there has been no breach in the U.S.-Turkey relationship in the wake of either the flotilla episode or Turkey’s vote against the Iran
      sanctions resolution. ...
      Tan said Turkey shares the United States’ concern about the prospect that Iran could get a nuclear
      weapon. But he said Turkey’s vote against the Iran sanctions resolution will allow Turkey to remain an
      intermediary with Iran and therefore enable the U.S. and the international community “to keep the door
      open        to”       Iran’s       returning       to       the        negotiating      table.      ...
      “We don’t doubt Turkey’s sincerity in trying to find a diplomatic way forward and a genuine way to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons,” a senior
      administration official told POLITICO. “And they assert that what they were doing is consistent with our objectives.”
      “You will see that we have not rejected the Tehran declaration or denounced it,” the senior official continued. “We
      have said if Iran wants to transfer 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium to Turkey, that would be good. All we said was that it was not sufficient — it
      doesn’t deal with the problem and does not obviate the need for sanctions.” ....


2- Turkey opposes US military presence.
Claudine Lamond and Paul Ingram, security analysts at BASIC, 1-23-2009. [BASIC Getting to Zero Papers,
No. 11, Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states, p. www.atlantic-
community.org/app/webroot/.../CLamondTNWinNATO.pdf]
    There have been public expressions of resentment towards the US military presence in Turkey ever
    since the lead up to the US war with Iraq. The United States insisted on the government allowing
    American troops to use Turkey as a staging post, despite overwhelmingly antiwar Turkish public and
    political opinion. Limited permission was granted after heavy debates and delay in the Turkish
    parliament.




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                                       2AC: Troop Withdraw Unpopular
1- Extend the Larabee ’10 and Hyland 07 card from the 1AC saying US troop withdraw inevitable.
Congress already looking for other bases which should trigger the link.


2- Congress does not want to withdraw troops, views incirlik vital to operations.
Carol Migdalovitz, August 29, 2008, Specialists in Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division “Turkey:
Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S Views” CRS Report for Congress
      S. Res. 358, introduced on October 29, 2007, would acknowledge the importance of friendship and
      cooperation between the United States and Turkey. Incirlik is among the examples of the cooperation
      listed in the resolution




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                                           AT: consult NATO
   perm- do cp, textually and functionally plan plus

   perm- consult NATO and do plan regardless

   perms put the neg in a double bind- either cp solves 100% in which case it is plan plus, or the cp doesnt
       solve 100% in which case there is a solvency deficit and case becomes a da to cp because it doesn't
       solve for the impacts

   Consultation of NATO makes it look like we are at Turkeys beck and call, means that the consult
       doesn't solve for internal link to Greek relations


5. NATO doesnt want to get invloved in the Greek/Turkish issue, creates internal conflicts which turn the
net benefit


6. consult counterplans bad
          a. they steal 1AC – killing debatability because we can’t leverage our 8 minutes against
          anything
        b. Regressive – we could never prepare for all possibilities – crushing predictability which
 is the
gateway to fairness and education. 190 some countries, thousands of international
 organizations, and
billions of humans could all be consulted about the plan. s
        c. Reciprocity – For the purposes of disads, the plan has no contingency, but the aff gets   the
right to alter only the nature of the implementation of the plan only to match neg
    counterplans.
       1. Solves their moving target argument
 2. Forces the aff to defend the plan
       3. Maintains
a balance of aff and neg ground
 4. Generates aff predictability which is predicated on the plan.
       d. The counterplan isn’t real world – politicians don’t reject a policy because of the need     to
consult someone else

          e. anti-educational – real world consultation is never binding

      f. not textually or functionally competitive, just plan plus consult as per their solvency. If   theres
no competition, no reason to prefer the cp




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                                                                  AT: consult NATO
7. Turn—Heg—Consultation destroys heg
Charles Krauthammer, The National Interest, Winter, 2003
     America must be guided by its independent judgment, both about its own interest and about the global interest. Especially on
      matters of national security, war-making and the deployment of power, America should neither defer nor contract out decision-making, particularly when
      the concessions involve permanent structural constrictions such as those imposed by an International Criminal Court. Prudence, yes. No need to act the
      superpower in East Timor or Bosnia. But there is a need to do so in Afghanistan and in Iraq. No need to act the superpower on steel tariffs. But there is a
      need to do so on missile defense. The prudent exercise of power allows, indeed calls for, occasional concessions on non-vital issues if only to maintain
      psychological good will. Arrogance and gratuitous high-handedness are counterproductive. But we should not delude ourselves as to what psychological
      good will buys. Countries will cooperate with us, first, out of their own self-interest and, second,   out of the need and desire to cultivate
      good relations with the world's superpower. Warm and fuzzy feelings are a distant third. Take counterterrorism.
      After the attack on the u.s.s. Cole, Yemen did everything it could to stymie the American investigation. It lifted not
      a finger to suppress terrorism. This was under an American administration that was obsessively accommodating
      and multilateralist. Today, under the most unilateralist of administrations, Yemen has decided to assist in the
      war on terrorism. This was not a result of a sudden attack of good will toward America. It was a result of the war in Afghanistan, which concentrated the
                                                                                                               Coalitions are not made by
      mind of heretofore recalcitrant states like Yemen on the costs of non-cooperation with the United States.14
      superpowers going begging hat in hand. They are made by asserting a position and inviting others to join. What
      "pragmatic" realists often fail to realize is that unilateralism is the high road to multilateralism. When George
      Bush senior said of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, "this will not stand", and made it clear that he was prepared to act alone if
      necessary, that declaration-and the credibility of American determination to act unilaterally-in and of
      itself created a coalition. Hafez al-Asad did not join out of feelings of good will. He joined because no one wants to be left at the dock when
      the hegemon is sailing. Unilateralism does not mean seeking to act alone. One acts in concert with others if possible. Unilateralism simply means that one
      does not allow oneself to be hostage to others. No unilateralist would, say, reject Security Council support for an attack on Iraq. The nontrivial question
      that separates unilateralism from multilateralism-and that tests the "pragmatic realists"-is this: What do you do if, at the end of the day, the Security
                                                                                                          unilateralism
      Council refuses to back you? Do you allow yourself to be dictated to on issues of vital national-and international-security? The new
      argues explicitly and unashamedly for maintaining unipolarity, for sustaining America's unrivaled dominance for the
      foreseeable future. It could be a long future, assuming we successfully manage the single greatest threat, namely, weapons
      of mass destruction in the hands of rogue states. This in itself will require the aggressive and confident application
      of unipolar power rather than falling back, as we did in the 1990s, on paralyzing multilateralism. The
      future of the unipolar era hinges on whether America is governed by those who wish to retain , augment
      and use unipolarity to advance not just American but global ends, or whether America is governed by those who
      wish to give it up-either by allowing unipolarity to decay as they retreat to Fortress America, or by passing on the
      burden by gradually transferring power to multilateral institutions as heirs to American hegemony. The
      challenge to unipolarity is not from the outside but from the inside. The choice is ours. To impiously paraphrase Benjamin
      Franklin: History has given you an empire, if you will keep it.

8. Heg solves nuclear war
Zalmay Khalilzad, Former Assist Prof of Poli Sci at Columbia, Spring 19 95, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2; P. 84
      Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a
      return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a
      vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have
      tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values --
      democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing
      cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade
      states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival,
      enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a
      global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a
      multipolar balance of power system.




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