Hands-on Elections

Document Sample
Hands-on Elections Powered By Docstoc
					    Hands-on Elections:
            An Informational Handbook for
                Running Real Elections,
               Using Real Paper Ballots,
               Counted by Real People




              Lessons from New Hampshire



written by Nancy Tobi
edited by Sidney Hall
on behalf of
NH Fair Elections Committee and
Election Defense Alliance
We the People
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are en-
dowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.
~The Declaration of Independence

[T]he Declaration of Independence is the ring-bolt to the chain of your nation’s destiny. . . .
The principles contained in that instrument are saving principles. Stand by those princi-
ples, be true to them on all occasions, in all places, against all foes, and at whatever cost.
~Frederick Douglas

Openness in the conduct of public business is essential to a democratic society.
~Preamble, New Hampshire Right to Know Law (Chapter 91-A:1)

All power residing originally in, and being derived from, the people, all the magistrates and
officers of government are their substitutes and agents, and at all times accountable to
them. Government, therefore, should be open, accessible, accountable and responsive. To
that end, the public’s right of access to governmental proceedings and records shall not
be unreasonably restricted.
~New Hampshire Constitution, [Art.] 8.

Politics should be the part-time profession of every citizen who would protect the rights
and privileges of free people and who would preserve what is good and fruitful in our na-
tional heritage.
~Lucille Ball

All men are born equally free and independent; therefore, all government of right origi-
nates from the people, is founded in consent, and instituted for the general good.
~New Hampshire Constitution, Article 1

Suppose an article had been introduced into the Constitution, empowering the United
States to regulate the elections for the particular States, would any man have hesitated to
condemn it, both as an unwarrantable transposition of power, and as a premeditated en-
gine for the destruction of the State governments?
~Hamilton, Alexander, Federalist No. 59, 1788

Cautious, careful people, always casting about to preserve their reputation and social
standing, never can bring about a reform. Those who are really in earnest must be willing
to be anything or nothing in the world's estimation, and publicly and privately, in season
and out, avow their sympathy with despised and persecuted ideas and their advocates,
and bear the consequences.
~Susan B. Anthony

These [corporate CEOs] do not go around the world spreading peace, justice and democ-
racy. They spread credit card debt, cell phones, sweatshop conditions, factory farms for
hogs and not much better for people. They are in it for the money, and they want to eco-
nomically enslave people, not free them.
 ~Doris “Granny D” Haddock

There is one safeguard known generally to the wise, which is an advantage and security to
all, but especially to democracies against despots —suspicion.
~Demosthenes

It is not up to you to finish the work, but neither are you free to abstain from it.
~Rabbi Tarfon
Hands-On Elections                                                                     Page 2 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                               ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
CONTENTS
We the People .............................................................................................. 2
Introduction ................................................................................................. 5
About this Handbook .................................................................................... 6
  Download for Free and Distribute Freely ..................................................................................... 6
  About the Fair Elections Committee ............................................................................................ 6
  About Election Defense Alliance.................................................................................................. 6
  Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................ 6
  Learn More and See Hand Counting in Action ............................................................................ 6
Legal Disclaimer........................................................................................... 7
The New Hampshire Tradition of Democratic Elections ................................ 8
Hand Counting in the Nation ...................................................................... 10
  Disaster Recovery Planning....................................................................................................... 10
  National Political Geography Is Bursting With Hand Counting .................................................. 11
The Trouble with Computerized Voting Machines ....................................... 13
  California’s Top To Bottom Review............................................................................................ 13
  How Diebold Optical Scanners Were Approved For Use in New Hampshire Elections............ 15
New Hampshire Constitution Guarantees Voting Rights ............................. 21
  NH Constitution Guarantees Citizen Oversight and Observable Vote Counting....................... 21
New Hampshire Polls and Ballot Counting Choices..................................... 23
  Citizens Gone Wild: Taking Control of our Democracy ............................................................. 24
    Concentric Circles of Community ........................................................................................... 24
    Taking Local Control of Voting System Decisions ................................................................. 25
    Sample Template for Town Meeting Warrant Article ............................................................. 27
    References from Warrant Article Template............................................................................ 29
NH Pollworker Requirements ..................................................................... 31
Observable Elections are Important to 92% of Americans ......................... 33
Hand Count Basics...................................................................................... 35
  Management Considerations ..................................................................................................... 35
  Methods for Hand Counting Paper Ballots ................................................................................ 35
  Why Hand Counting on Election Night is Better then Post Election Audits............................... 35
  Foundations for Hand-counted Paper Ballot Elections.............................................................. 36
    Legal Infrastructure: Elected (not appointed) Election Officials ............................................. 36
    Legal Infrastructure: Voter Intent............................................................................................ 37
    Legal Infrastructure: Paper Ballot is Vote of Record.............................................................. 37
  Challenges to Running Hand Count Elections........................................................................... 38
  Support for Hand-counted Paper Ballot Elections ..................................................................... 38
    Community ............................................................................................................................. 38
    Training................................................................................................................................... 40
    Recruiting Counters................................................................................................................ 40
    Hand Counting Large Numbers of Paper Ballots, even Complex Ballots.............................. 41
    Hand Count Systems as Self-authenticating Systems for Election Integrity.......................... 42
    Feasibility of Hand Count Elections ....................................................................................... 43
  Manual Central Tabulation......................................................................................................... 43
Lessons Learned from New Hampshire*..................................................... 45


Hands-On Elections                                                                                                            Page 3 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                                                    ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
  Counting in New Hampshire ...................................................................................................... 45
  A Wide Range Of Situations Calls For Different Solutions ........................................................ 45
  The New Hampshire Secretary of State’s position .................................................................... 45
Hand Count Methodology* ......................................................................... 46
  Elements in Hand Count Elections ............................................................................................ 47
  Recruiting Counters & Observers .............................................................................................. 47
Management of Hand Count Elections* ...................................................... 49
  Calculating Contests per Ballot.................................................................................................. 49
  Team Availability on Election Night ........................................................................................... 49
  Estimating Hand Counting Staff................................................................................................. 49
  Calculating Staff ......................................................................................................................... 50
The Sort and Stack Method for Hand Counting* ......................................... 51
  Overview of Sort and Stack Method .......................................................................................... 51
  Advantages of Sort and Stack Method ...................................................................................... 51
  Rule of Thumb for Sort and Stack.............................................................................................. 52
  Choosing Number of Sort and Stack Observers........................................................................ 53
  Organizing For the count ........................................................................................................... 53
  Oath of Office ............................................................................................................................. 55
  Training ...................................................................................................................................... 55
  Steps to Implement Sort and Stack Method .............................................................................. 56
  Counting ballots ......................................................................................................................... 58
Election Night Reconciliation*.................................................................... 63
  Election Night Ballot Count Reconciliation................................................................................. 63
  Ballot Inventory .......................................................................................................................... 64
  Ballots Used ............................................................................................................................... 65
  Counting Number of Voters Voting ............................................................................................ 65
  Total Votes Counted .................................................................................................................. 66
  Votes Cast For an Office............................................................................................................ 66
  Predictable Undervote ............................................................................................................... 67
  Secure Enough Assistance to Keep the Process Manageable ................................................. 67
  Why Reconcile on Election Night............................................................................................... 67
Securing the Ballots* ................................................................................. 69
Financially Feasible and Accessible Recounts for Checks and Balances in the
  Voting System ......................................................................................... 70
Read and Mark Method for Hand Counting* ............................................... 73
Nationwide Costs to Replace DREs with Paper Ballot Voting Systems ........ 76
  Replacing the Nation’s DREs with Optical Scanners................................................................. 76
  Replacing the Nation’s DREs with HCPB Elections .................................................................. 77
Supporting Information for the Elimination of DREs .................................. 78
  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Study 2006 ......................................... 78
  Election Science Institute Study 2006 ....................................................................................... 79
Resources .................................................................................................. 81
Table of Figures ......................................................................................... 83




Hands-On Elections                                                                                                              Page 4 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                                                      ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Introduction
Do you believe in secret vote counting?

If you don’t believe secret vote counting belongs in the greatest democracy on earth, and want to do
something about it, then this handbook is for you.

We all know that secret vote counting doesn’t belong in a democracy. We know that free and fair
democracies depend on open, fully observable elections, to protect and preserve the records of our
votes.

Computerized voting equipment began to be used in America's elections in the mid-1960s; it ex-
ploded in use after the 2000 election, and now counts the lion’s share of America’s total ballots. With
computerization came privatization of our elections as well. Your ballot and votes—the mechanism
by which all your other rights are secured—have been claimed as the private property and trade se-
crets of corporate computerized voting machine industrialists. These private for profit corporations
seize our ballots, count them in secret, tell us what the results are, and then lock away the records,
denying citizens and even candidates access to inspect and verify our own votes in our own elec-
tions.

We owe it to our country to protect the foundations and the integrity of our democratic proc-
esses.

Fortunately for us, it turns out it’s pretty easy to do this. Nearly 100% of America’s polling jurisdic-
tions have hand-counted paper ballot elections within living memory. And nearly 27% of America’s
polling jurisdictions are already doing it: hand-counted, paper ballot election administration. It’s sim-
ple, it’s cost effective, and eminently do-able in every polling place in the country. The New Hamp-
shire experience, described in detail in this Handbook, proves this out.

Publicly observable hand counting works in large precincts. The average number of ballots
processed through any polling place in the country is under 1000. But New Hampshire towns hand
count up to 3,600 ballots on any given Election Night! And at a cost less than the average cost paid
to private corporations to program a single machine in a single election. The costs of printing paper
ballots, hiring local community hand counters, and even bringing in a specialized manager, if need
be, are much lower than the investment into computerized voting equipment requiring continual up-
grades, maintenance, and specialized storage space.

Transparent hand counting works with complicated ballots. New Hampshire’s ballots are among
the most complex ballots in the nation, because we have the largest citizen legislature and many
multi-member districts. But we still manage to hand count 3-4 times the national average of ballots in
any given polling place, and wrap up the counting to announce our results on Election Night.

If New Hampshire can do this, with our large polling places and our complex ballots, then any
place can.

This handbook provides information to help you run hand count elections. We include cost estimates,
staffing guidance, and methods for counting and reconciling ballots, voters, and votes.

In New Hampshire, we’re counting the votes. With the information provided in this handbook,
you can too.




Hands-On Elections                                                                       Page 5 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                   ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
About this Handbook
DOWNLOAD FOR FREE AND DISTRIBUTE FREELY
This Handbook is freely available for download and distribution here:
http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/HCPB_election_admin_primer

ABOUT THE FAIR ELECTIONS COMMITTEE
The New Hampshire Fair Elections Committee is dedicated to protecting, preserving, and enhancing
those aspects of the NH election system that are unique, transparent, secure, and exemplar. The
FEC aims for open and accessible election processes, while implementing processes to prevent,
pursue and prosecute proven instances of election fraud.

For more information, contact us at fec@DemocracyForNewHampshire.com

ABOUT ELECTION DEFENSE ALLIANCE
The purpose of EDA is to help build and coordinate a comprehensive, cohesive national strategy for
the election integrity movement, in order to regain public control of the voting process in the United
States, and to insure that the process is honest, transparent, secure, verifiable, and worthy of the
public trust. To accomplish this purpose, EDA will provide resources, strategic planning and coordi-
nation opportunities for a nationwide network of citizen electoral integrity groups and individuals al-
ready working at the national, state, and local levels. The urgent goal of these activities is to rapidly
expand and multiply the effectiveness of the election integrity movement by connecting existing
groups and encouraging the creation of new ones. EDA seeks to provide connection, coordination,
and focus, to eliminate duplication of efforts, to create a clearinghouse for the sharing of materials
and other resources, and to facilitate coordinated decision-making about strategic priorities and tacti-
cal approaches in the election integrity movement.

For more information, contact us at info@ElectionDefenseAlliance.org

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We acknowledge and honor the steady and wise leadership, openness, accessibility, and integrity of
the office of our New Hampshire Secretary of State, as well as the dedicated and hard working elec-
tion officials, workers, and community volunteers in the Granite State. We also acknowledge the as-
sistance and editing from countless election officials and citizen voting integrity activists, such as
Betty Hall, Dave Berman and the Humboldt County Voter Confidence Committee, Chuck Garner
and the Lassen Progressives, Nashua City Clerk Paul Bergeron, Patrick Arnold, Paul Lehto, Rady
Ananda, Sid Hall, the New Hampshire Departments of State and Justice, some activists on the Peo-
pleCount list serv, and many others, all of whom contributed their time to review and comment on
make this Handbook.

LEARN MORE AND SEE HAND COUNTING IN ACTION
Please contact us to receive a DVD that shows the two typical ballot counting methods used for hand
counting, as filmed during the 2004 election in the New Hampshire towns of Lyndeborough, Walpole,
and Wilton, as well as a statewide manual recount conducted in Concord by the New Hampshire
Secretary of State.

To download these videos, go to the Democracy for New Hampshire website at:
http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/2648

Or order the DVD online at www.democracyfornewhampshire.com



Hands-On Elections                                                                       Page 6 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                   ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Legal Disclaimer
The information provided by the New Hampshire Fair Elections Committee and Election Defense
Alliance is not intended to be legal advice, but to merely convey general foundational information
related to legal and practical election issues of interest to our community. Although we have sought
to ensure that the information is correct, complete, and current, we make no warranty about the ac-
curacy or reliability of the information in our documentation or on our website.




Hands-On Elections                                                                   Page 7 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                               ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
The New Hampshire Tradition of Democratic Elections
New Hampshire has many decades of experience with hand-counted paper ballot election admini-
stration and management. This document shares some information from the New Hampshire ex-
perience. Even with our robust tradition of hand-counted elections, New Hampshire has approved
the use of some computerized vote counting machines (Diebold optical scanners). And, supported
by our laws recognizing local control of the mechanics of vote tabulation, the citizens and officials of
some 55% of our polling places have chosen that method to tabulate their votes. The decision mak-
ing process for this is further explained in the chapter New Hampshire Polls and Ballot Counting
Choices.

New Hampshire citizens, election officials, and elected officials, are in a continuing process of evalu-
ating these different methods and their place in our elections. We, like the rest of the nation, continue
to work to improve our systems, and have a lot of work ahead of us to improve and sustain our de-
mocratic elections.

New Hampshire’s long-standing tradition of grassroots democracy holds us in good stead as we
work on these issues. Our proud and honored traditions of hand counted elections have been en-
riched through the years by a continuous line of patriots, from our local election officials on up to our
legendary Secretary of State, the Honorable William Gardner, currently serving his 16th term in that
office. In June, 2007, Democracy for New Hampshire recognized Secretary Gardner’s lifelong contri-
butions to the spirit and cause of grassroots democracy with its National Hero of Grassroots De-
mocracy award.




                               Figure 1: NH Secretary of State William Gardner
These traditions enrich our community experience in New Hampshire and deserve to be shared. This
is what this document is intended to do.

Although some of the qualities of our traditions and culture described herein may seem provincial
and regionally wedded, these are simply local manifestations of universal concepts and principles
relating to American ideals of democracy, accountability, and civic responsibility to uphold the Con-
stitution and defend the American Republic through a rigorous application of free, fair, open, and
honest elections.




Hands-On Elections                                                                          Page 8 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                      ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
            Figure 2: Election 2004, Bake Sales and Community in the Old Town Hall, Lyndeborough, NH


Based on the diversity of our experience in New Hampshire, we believe that these general principles,
and the manner in which we apply them to our New Hampshire system of elections, can be
easily translated to any other state in the nation.

New Hampshire state officials from the Departments of State and Justice have been generous in
providing valuable training materials that describe the logistical management details necessary for
conducting successful hand count elections. Some of this information is included in this document,
and additional resources from these public servants are listed here as well.




                  Figure 3: Distributing ballots for recount, State House, Concord, November 2004




Hands-On Elections                                                                              Page 9 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                          ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Hand Counting in the Nation
DISASTER RECOVERY PLANNING
At the turn of the 21st century, Y2K planning was in full swing. The federal government estab-
lished guidelines and procedures to protect the nation, including, but not limited to, protecting our
national security, in the event of failure or breakdown of the nation’s critical computerized sys-
tems. In 2002, the E-Government Act was passed to establish requirements for disaster recov-
ery planning for all critical governmental functions dependent on computerized systems. Obvi-
ously, elections are a critical function.

Pursuant to this Act (E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 44 U.S.C. 3531 et seq.,
Title III, Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)), all states must have viable
disaster recovery plans for information technology-based (IT) systems.

Title III in this Act spells out its purpose as follows:
                • provide a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of information
                    security controls over information resources that support Federal operations and
                    assets;
                • provide for development and maintenance of minimum controls required to pro-
                    tect Federal information and information systems;
                • to identify and provide information security protections commensurate with the
                    risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from the unauthorized access, use, dis-
                    closure, disruption, modification, or destruction of—
                         o ‘‘(A) information collected or maintained by or on behalf of an agency; or
                         o ‘‘(B) information systems used or operated by an agency or by a contrac-
                             tor of an agency or other organization on behalf of an agency;
                         o ‘‘(C) coordinating the development of standards and guidelines

Federal elections clearly fall within the charter and intent of FISMA, and protection and disaster
recovery planning for any computerized voting system should be part and parcel of responsible
election administration.

Just as other information technology systems require paper backup recovery plans, so must our
elections. Paper ballots for all voting systems, and a defined plan for tabulating those paper bal-
lots without the use of technology, should be developed for all jurisdictions using computerized
voting systems, in order to comply with existing federal law regarding information technology dis-
aster recovery plans.




                               Figure 4: Paper ballots designed for use with
                              computerized vote tabulation optical scanners


Hands-On Elections                                                                       Page 10 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                    ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
An election disaster recovery plan would need to provide for the continuous functioning of elec-
tions in the event of IT failure. Such a plan might include the following elements required for
proper paper ballot hand count election administration:

    •    Planning (staffing, cost, methods, management)
    •    Recruiting and maintaining a list of community members for hand counting and other poll
         worker responsibilities
    •    Hand count methodology and procedures
    •    Hand count management
    •    Training
    •    Printing and distribution of paper ballots
    •    Voting booths
    •    Preliminary organizational work
    •    Oath of office for community poll workers handling ballots
    •    Working with paper ballots
    •    Reconciliation of checklists, votes, ballots
    •    Supporting laws for paper ballot elections
    •    Uniform procedures for determining voter intent
    •    Uniform procedures for dealing with discrepancies
    •    Routine test of disaster recovery plan implementation

The National Institute of Standards and Technology maintains a robust website with information
and checklists to aid you in designing and developing a disaster recovery plan to comply with
FISMA. Their website is here: http://csrc.nist.gov/

NATIONAL POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY IS BURSTING WITH HAND COUNTING
Today’s electoral news is always full of stories about computerized voting. We hear about legisla-
tive proposals in Congress to expand the use of computerized voting equipment. We hear about
battles between the citizenry who want to eliminate or reduce the use of computerized voting and
public officials who want to keep it. We hear countless news stories of election outcomes called
into question because of computerized voting equipment failure, or worse, suspicions of tamper-
ing and fraud. We hear how many millions and billions of American taxpayer dollars have already
been spent, and continue to be spent, on computerized voting equipment.

What we don’t hear a lot about is major problems happening on the hand count election front.

So it may be surprising to learn that a significant percentage of the nation’s polling jurisdictions
still enjoy hand-counted paper ballot elections. The Election Assistance Commission’s 2004 Elec-
tion Day Survey reports the following data regarding national use of hand counting on election
night.

    •    1,734 hand count jurisdictions among 6,568 jurisdictions (defined as "administrative unit
         for managing elections”) nationwide (26.4%)
    •    2% of the nation’s counties
    •    Hand counting is used for about 1% of ballots in the nation




Hands-On Elections                                                                    Page 11 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                 ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
                              Figure 5: Sorting and stacking ballots for hand counting
Significant hand count states include the following:
   • Wisconsin
   • Maine
   • Vermont
   • New Hampshire
   • Texas
   • Massachusetts
   • Nebraska
   • Montana
   • Kansas




                Figure 6: States (in gray) with significant implementation of hand count elections




Hands-On Elections                                                                                 Page 12 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                              ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
The Trouble with Computerized Voting Machines
CALIFORNIA’S TOP TO BOTTOM REVIEW
In July 2007, California's Secretary of State, Debra Bowen, released a report on testing that she
had ordered for computerized voting machines used in California elections. The testing included
Diebold optical scanners like those used in 55% of New Hampshire polling places.




 Figure 7: California Secretary Bowen, announcing her decision to decertify e-voting equipment, August 3, 2007
California ran "red team" tests, meant to expose vulnerabilities in the face of intended tampering
and fraud. From the report:

         Each "red team" was to try to compromise the accuracy, security, and integrity of the vot-
         ing systems without making assumptions about compensating controls or procedural
         mitigation measures that vendors, the Secretary of State, or individual counties may have
         adopted. The red teams demonstrated that, under these conditions, the technology and
         security of all three systems could be compromised.

California's tests proved the computerized voting equipment used in our elections pose a security
risk to our democracy and our elections. These tests clearly showed that the software in these
machines was designed very poorly on the architectural levels, and even with dangerous back
doors that actually facilitate election tampering.

Where there are elections, there are many voters and often high stakes in the elections. Where
there are many voters choosing sides, and high stakes, there are many motives and incentives to
commit fraud, whether it be for financial, political, career or ideological motives.

While the high stakes of elections ensure there is always at least some threat to every type of
voting system, the threat of computerized systems is exponentially increased. The difference be-
tween hand count and computerized elections is the unprecedented scale and opportunity to
commit fraud. The old saw about the ballot boxes that end up in the harbor, sometimes used to
discredit hand count paper ballot procedures, doesn't acknowledge that where hand count
elections provide opportunities for retail fraud, computerized elections offer one-stop shopping
for mass scale or wholesale fraud. Numerous credible studies conducted by computer security
experts at Stanford, University of Connecticut, Dartmouth, Princeton and other research centers


Hands-On Elections                                                                             Page 13 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                          ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
establish that as little as one minute of access to one machine is all it can take to insert code that
changes elections.

In New Hampshire we learned the hard way from the 2002 phone jamming scandal that election
fraud is typically executed by insiders with easy access to election systems, often at a high level,
by those with access to both money and control. California's red team tests and Top to Bottom
Review proved the ease with which this can occur with computerized technology:

         Consider an attack that replaces the firmware of a voting system with firmware that is ma-
         licious. Developing the malicious firmware, and building the software mechanism to install
         it, requires an expert or team of experts. But carrying out the attack requires only access
         to a voting system (i.e., someone voting) and not technical expertise.

With the development of computerized voting, critical elements of our voting systems, such as
counting and even the marking of ballots, have been privatized. The e-voting industry claims that
keeping secret the technology counting our votes "protects" the vote count. California's report
puts this myth soundly to rest:

         [T]he red teams wish again to emphasize the inadequacy of "security through obscurity"
         as a key defensive mechanism. No security mechanism should ever depend on secrecy.
         At best, secrecy should be a single security mechanism in a layer of defensive security
         mechanisms.

The Executive Summary of California’s Diebold report reads as follows:

         Our analysis shows that the technological controls in the Diebold software do not provide
         sufficient security to guarantee a trustworthy election. The software contains serious de-
         sign flaws that have led directly to specific vulnerabilities that attackers could exploit to af-
         fect election outcomes.

         These vulnerabilities include:

         Vulnerability to malicious software The Diebold software contains vulnerabilities that
         could allow an attacker to install malicious software on voting machines or on the election
         management system. Malicious software could cause votes to be recorded incorrectly or
         to be miscounted, possibly altering election results. It could also prevent voting machines
         from accepting votes, potentially causing long lines or disenfranchising voters.

         Susceptibility to viruses The Diebold system is susceptible to computer viruses that
         propagate from voting machine to voting machine and between voting machines and the
         election management system. A virus could allow an attacker who only had access to a
         few machines or memory cards, or possibly to only one, to spread malicious software to
         most, if not all, of a county's voting machines. Thus, large-scale election fraud in the Die-
         bold system does not necessarily require physical access to a large number of voting
         machines.

         Failure to protect ballot secrecy Both the electronic and paper records of the Diebold
         AV-TSX contain enough information to compromise the secrecy of the ballot. The AV-
         TSX records votes in the order in which they are cast, and it records the time that each
         vote is cast. As a result, it is possible for election workers who have access to the elec-
         tronic or paper records and who have observed the order in which individuals have cast
         their ballots to discover how those individuals voted. Moreover, even if this vulnerability is
         never exploited, the fact that the AV-TSX makes it possible for officials to determine how
         individuals voted may be detrimental to voter confidence and participation.

         Vulnerability to malicious insiders Although we present several previously unpublished
         vulnerabilities, many of the weaknesses that we describe were first identified in previous

Hands-On Elections                                                                         Page 14 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                      ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
         studies of the Diebold system. Our report confirms that many of the most serious flaws
         that these studies uncovered have not been fixed in the versions of the software that we
         studied.

         Since many of the vulnerabilities in the Diebold system result from deep architectural
         flaws, fixing individual defects piecemeal without addressing their underlying causes is
         unlikely to render the system secure. Systems that are architecturally unsound tend to
         exhibit "weakness in- depth"—even as known flaws in them are fixed, new ones tend to
         be discovered.

         In this sense, the Diebold software is fragile.

         Due to these shortcomings, the security of elections conducted with the Diebold
         system depends almost entirely on the effectiveness of election procedures. Im-
         provements to existing procedures may mitigate some threats in part, but others
         would be difficult, if not impossible, to remedy procedurally. Consequently, we
         conclude that the safest way to repair the Diebold system is to reengineer it so that
         it is secure by design.

On August 2, 2007, Secretary Bowen, decertified Diebold optical scanners for use in California
elections. These are the same machines used in New Hampshire. Bowen provided clear criteria
by which she would consider recertification of this equipment.

As of August 2007, none of California’s criteria for recertifying Diebold optical scanners are in
place in New Hampshire.

California’s findings and subsequent decision to decertify Diebold optical scanners raise uncom-
fortable and disturbing questions about the continued use of this equipment in our New Hamp-
shire elections, as well as everywhere else in the nation.

HOW DIEBOLD OPTICAL SCANNERS WERE APPROVED FOR USE IN NEW
HAMPSHIRE ELECTIONS
In New Hampshire, all voting equipment must be approved by the Ballot Law Commission. Once
approved, every city and town in New Hampshire has the legal right and responsibility to choose
its method of state-approved vote counting. In New Hampshire, we have only two approved
methods: hand (citizen-controlled) count or Diebold (trade secret corporate-controlled) count.

In March, 2006, roughly 100 New Hampshire citizens showed up on a rainy Friday morning at 9
AM to ask the New Hampshire Ballot Law Commission to not approve the computerized Diebold
voting equipment for use in New Hampshire elections.




Hands-On Elections                                                                  Page 15 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                               ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
 Figure 8: Roughly 100 New Hampshire citizens showed up to protest the approval of Diebold voting equipment
Their concerns were based on the findings of numerous scientific reports, including a February
2006 report conducted for then California Secretary of State, Bruce MacPherson. That report,
named the “VSTAAB Report” (for “Voting Systems Technology Assessment Advisory Board”)
validated by the latest July 2007 Top to Bottom Review, testified to the fundamentally fatally
flawed software architecture used in the Diebold equipment.

In fact, every single study conducted on this equipment reaches the same conclusion:
unless the software is completely redesigned, it can never be improved to reach the levels
of security, accuracy or reliability required for running elections.

The VSTAAB findings presented to the New Hampshire Ballot Law Commission, made the follow-
ing conclusions about the Diebold optical scanners the Commission was evaluating for approval:

              In the longer term, or for statewide elections, the risks of not fixing the vulnerabilities
              in the AccuBasic interpreter [Diebold optical scanner] become more pronounced.
              Larger elections, such as a statewide election, provide a greater incentive to hack the
              election and heighten the stakes. Also, the longer these vulnerabilities are left un-
              fixed, the more opportunity it gives potential attackers to learn how to exploit these
              vulnerabilities. For statewide elections, or looking farther into the future, it would be
              far preferable to fix the vulnerabilities discussed in this report.
              The FEC [Federal Election Commission] 2002 Voluntary Voting System Standards
              expressly forbid interpreted code. The inclusion of interpreted languages* in a voting
              system causes great burdens on examiners and code reviewers, who have to be
              highly skilled and do considerable analysis of the compiler and interpreter in order to
              verify that it does not present security vulnerabilities or permit malicious code to go
              unnoticed.
              All of this information on the memory cards is critical election information. If it is not
              properly managed, or if it is modified in any unauthorized way, the integrity of the en-
              tire election is possibly compromised. It is therefore vital, as everyone acknowledges,
              to maintain proper procedural control over the memory cards to prevent unauthorized
              tampering, and to treat them at all times during the election with at least the same
              level of security as ballot boxes containing voted ballots.
              There are serious vulnerabilities in the AV-OS (Diebold AccuVote optical scanner)
              and AV-TSx interpreter that go beyond what was previously known. If a malicious in-
              dividual gets unsupervised access to a memory card, he or she could potentially ex-
              ploit these vulnerabilities to modify the electronic tallies at will, change the running
              code on these systems, and compromise the integrity of the election arbitrarily.
              None of the vulnerabilities we found would have been found through standard test-
              ing, so testing is not the answer. This is a long-term problem with the use of inter-

Hands-On Elections                                                                           Page 16 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                        ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
               preted code on removable memory cards, and with the failure to use defensive pro-
               gramming and other good security practices when implementing the interpreter.
               The consequence of these vulnerabilities is that any person with unsupervised ac-
               cess to a memory card for sufficient time to modify it, or who is in a position to switch
               a malicious memory card for a good one, has the opportunity to completely compro-
               mise the integrity of the electronic tallies from the machine using that card.
               The attack could manipulate the electronic tallies in any way desired.
               The attack could print fraudulent zero reports and summary reports to prevent detec-
               tion.
               The attack could modify the contents of the memory card in any way, including tam-
               pering with the electronic vote counts and electronic ballot images stored on the card.
               The attack could erase all traces of the attack to prevent anyone from detecting the
               attack after the fact.
               It is even conceivable that there is a way to exploit these vulnerabilities so that
               changes could persist from one election to another. For instance, if the firmware or
               software resident on the machine can be modified or updated by running code, then
               the attack might be able to modify the firmware or software in a permanent way, af-
               fecting future elections as well as the current election. In other words, these vulner-
               abilities mean that a procedural lapse in one election could potentially affect the in-
               tegrity of a subsequent election.
               It is conceivable that the attack might be able to propagate from machine to machine,
               like a computer virus.
               The attack could affect the correct operation of the machine. For instance, on the AV-
               OS, it could turn off under- and over-vote notification. It could selectively disable
               over-vote notification for ballots that contain votes for a disfavored candidate, or se-
               lectively provide false over-vote notifications for ballots that contain votes for a fa-
               vored candidate.
               In addition, most of the bugs we found could be used to crash the machine.
               It is important to note that even in the worst case, the paper ballots cast using an AV-
               OS remain trustworthy; in no case can any of these vulnerabilities be used to tamper
               with the paper ballots themselves.
               Our analysis also confirmed that the AV-OS fails to check that the vote counters are
               zero at the start of Election Day.

*”Interpreted languages” refers to software code that relies on the execution of the code to occur through the “interpreta-
tion” of one code by another. With Diebold optical scanners, the removable media (the memory cards) “talk to” the code in
the machine itself, which executes commands told it by the memory card. Since memory cards are not tested in standard
machine certification labs, or in election day machine testing, the interpreted code represents a huge security hole. The
untested code on a memory card might be programmed in such a way to be “interpreted” by the machine to execute mali-
cious election programming, which would never be detected through any form of testing on the machine itself.

More information on reports provided to the Ballot Law Commission as testimony in that hearing
may be found here:
http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/files/blc/election-report-findings.pdf

Despite these reports and more than four hours of public testimony, the New Hampshire Ballot
Law Commission re-approved Diebold optical scanning machines for use in the Granite State. In
its decision, the Commission applied no apparent legal standard for approval other than their
stated and unproven fear that New Hampshire could not run our elections without using these
machines.

Only two city clerks testified in favor of approving the machines, giving the same reason: fear of
running elections without them.

With their decision, the Commission approved unaccountable vote counting technology that is
protected by trade secrecy laws; even election officials are not allowed to see, and in fact can’t
see, how our votes are being counted. They approved secret vote counting technology, even af-



Hands-On Elections                                                                                       Page 17 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                                   ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
ter they were presented with countless reports and the vendor's own admission of known defects
and risks from using the equipment.




                         Figure 9: New Hampshire Ballot Law Commission March 2006
Here is the testimony given at the Ballot Law Commission hearing, March 10, 2006, by John
Silvestro, President of LHS Associates, New England distributor of Diebold computerized voting
machines.




  Figure 10: John Silvestro, President, LHS Associates, New England distributor of Diebold election equipment


         Commissioner Martin: Do you know whether Diebold has responded to the [California]
         report of Feb. 14th?

         John Silvestro: Yes, they have responded, and there is, they are going to address all of
         the concerns that are identified in there. There will be a new release of the firmware,
         which will address all of the concerns, with digital encoding and the arithmetic problem
         that's on the memory card. The issue you have before you, and someone might, you
         might ask your follow up question would be why don't we wait till that, so I'm gonna give
         you the answer, before you ask that, I'll even answer it. Here's why you can't wait. I might
         actually have a product in sixty days, okay, and we may actually talk to the Secretary of
         State about coming back in to do this whole process again. The problem that we have is,
         is that we have all the machines we need to replace the firmware with. And no-one con-
         trols those independent test laboratories. So before those fixes will be put in the field,
         they need to go through the independent test laboratories and all of the software and all

Hands-On Elections                                                                             Page 18 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                          ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
         of the source coding needs to be verified. That might take 30 days, might take 60 days,
         might take 90 days. We are under a timeline in that we have a November election. So we
         might well be back in here with a version of the firmware that Diebold has addressed all
         of the identified items in that report prior to November if time constraints allow for us to go
         out and replace the firmware. We may not be. So I think we need, to be prudent, it would
         be to go forward from here, and then evaluate the situation and keep in contact with the
         Secretary of State's office and let them know where we are in the process.

         Commissioner Martin: So Diebold has acknowledged that these are legitimate bugs?

         John Silvestro: Yes. Diebold is not, I mean, they understand. You know there is a big
         difference between, in the business world, the guy down the street coming to tell you, you
         have a problem and the Secretary of State's office in California. Okay? The Secretary of
         State's office in California tells you, you have a problem, you pay attention. The Secre-
         tary of State's office in New Hampshire tells you, you have a problem, you pay attention.
         And they acknowledge them, and they are being addressed.

However, California Secretary Bowen’s July 2007 report proves that none of the identified prob-
lems were ever addressed by Diebold, which is why Mr. Silvestro never returned to request ap-
proval of newly fixed software. Diebold is disputing the California Secretary of State’s experts and
her report, not paying attention to them, and the numerous problems remain unaddressed. In
part, this may point to the unacceptable consequence of delegating governmental, public func-
tions to profit-seeking businesses, with the justifiable expectation that the systems simply must
work correctly, even if it’s unprofitable to do so.

The Ballot Law Commission approved technology that is defective but apparently provides some
perceived ease or convenience in running elections. However, such perceived convenience is
poor compensation for the lost accountability and loss of local control and community benefits of
running transparent, open and honest elections.

The standard for democratic elections is not ease of use.

California’s July 2007 Top to Bottom Review revealed that the Diebold optical scanners have
fraud-by-design technology, so any insider can flip an election faster than you can say "I want my
democracy back".

Fully 45% of New Hampshire polling places hand count our votes. We know how to do it. We
are already doing it. Most other places around the country have, within living memory, hand count
election experience. In New Hampshire, we have developed effective and efficient hand count
methodologies. We find many community volunteers who are honored to be ballot counters in the
grand traditions of democracy in our state. In addition, hand-counted elections comply with the
New Hampshire Constitutional requirement to "sort and count" our votes in "open meeting," in
stark contrast to the proprietary Diebold secret vote counting technology.

But frankly, it doesn’t seem that New Hampshire’s hand counting practices have been compelled
by the NH Constitution; it’s more a sense that “this is how we do democracy in our town.”

While New Hampshire's hand count towns successfully apply time honored, fully observable,
methods of vote counting, at the same time the New Hampshire Ballot Law Commission ap-
proved vote counting machines because they feared the change or the perceived work to hand
count our elections. But it’s not just “work.” It’s the checks and balances and the accountability
that are the real keys to a working and proper elections system.


The New Hampshire legislature can provide better guidance to the Ballot Law Commission for
approving vote counting methods, and it can and should legislate against secret vote counting
technologies, particularly since those technologies are used to count the votes in any elections for

Hands-On Elections                                                                        Page 19 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                     ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
the legislature itself. We hope to see some real movement in this direction in the coming legisla-
tive session.

Our elections are the security fence around our democracy. Running fair, open, and ob-
servable elections is a better defensive strategy than going to war. With hand-counted,
paper ballot elections, as one New Hampshire counter says, “it may take longer, but it’s
right.”




Hands-On Elections                                                                   Page 20 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
New Hampshire Constitution Guarantees Voting Rights
At the time of the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, all of the original states except Delaware
placed the right to vote and thus our elections beyond the power of the state legislatures to sig-
nificantly experiment with, because these rights were in the Constitutions of the respective states.
For example, the New Hampshire Bill of Rights in our State Constitution has guaranteed the right
to vote since 1784. Various Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the Voting Rights Act
(“VRA”) guarantee the right to the voting franchise, guarantee that it may not be administered in a
discriminatory fashion, and by statute in the VRA as well as in the New Hampshire Constitution,
provide certain rights as well related to observable vote counting.

         [Art.] 11. [Elections and Elective Franchises.] All elections are to be free, and every
         inhabitant of the state of 18 years of age and upwards shall have an equal right to vote in
         any election. Every person shall be considered an inhabitant for the purposes of voting in
         the town, ward, or unincorporated place where he has his domicile. No person shall have
         the right to vote under the constitution of this state who has been convicted of treason,
         bribery or any willful violation of the election laws of this state or of the United States; but
         the supreme court may, on notice to the attorney general, restore the privilege to vote to
         any person who may have forfeited it by conviction of such offenses. The general court
         shall provide by law for voting by qualified voters who at the time of the biennial or state
         elections, or of the primary elections therefor, or of city elections, or of town elections by
         official ballot, are absent from the city or town of which they are inhabitants, or who by
         reason of physical disability are unable to vote in person, in the choice of any officer or
         officers to be elected or upon any question submitted at such election. Voting registration
         and polling places shall be easily accessible to all persons including disabled and elderly
         persons who are otherwise qualified to vote in the choice of any officer or officers to be
         elected or upon any question submitted at such election. The right to vote shall not be denied
         to any person because of the non-payment of any tax. Every inhabitant of the state, having
         the proper qualifications, has equal right to be elected into office.

NH CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES CITIZEN OVERSIGHT AND OBSERVABLE
VOTE COUNTING
The New Hampshire Constitution reflects a healthy distrust of centralized power, and finds nu-
merous opportunities to remind us that our American Republic places all power in the hands of
the people, for whom the government is a mere instrument of service. It reinforces the U.S. Con-
stitutional guarantee of a republican form of government, in which citizens are understood to pos-
sess inalienable rights and to be the ultimate source of all legitimate power, i.e. citizens are “sov-
ereign” and not any king. Article 8 of the New Hampshire Constitution expresses this precept as
follows:

         All power residing originally in, and being derived from, the people, all the magistrates
         and officers of government are their substitutes and agents, and at all times accountable
         to them. Government, therefore, should be open, accessible, accountable and respon-
         sive. To that end, the public's right of access to governmental proceedings and records
         shall not be unreasonably restricted.

Article 32 of the New Hampshire Constitution guarantees observable vote counting as a mecha-
nism for ensuring that our elected public servants receive the consent of the governed via open
and honest elections administered under full citizen control and oversight:

         [Art.] 32. [Biennial Meetings, How Warned, Governed, and Conducted; Return of
         Votes, etc.] The meetings for the choice of governor, council and senators, shall be
         warned by warrant from the selectmen, and governed by a moderator, who shall, in the
         presence of the selectmen (whose duty it shall be to attend) in open meeting, receive
         the votes of all the inhabitants of such towns and wards present, and qualified to
         vote for senators; and shall, in said meetings, in presence of the said selectmen,

Hands-On Elections                                                                        Page 21 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                     ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
         and of the town or city clerk, in said meetings, sort and count the said votes, and
         make a public declaration thereof, with the name of every person voted for, and the
         number of votes for each person; and the town or city clerk shall make a fair record of the
         same at large, in the town book, and shall make out a fair attested copy thereof, to be by
         him sealed up and directed to the secretary of state, within five days following the elec-
         tion, with a superscription expressing the purport there of.

Computerized voting equipment using secret and proprietary software to count our votes fails to
meet the NH Constitutional requirement for sorting the votes and for counting the votes in open
meeting.

Vote counting machines using proprietary software are also by their very nature invisible and se-
cret, or “black box” technologies. How can they create a count in “open meeting” under any
common sense or constitutional interpretation of this provision?

This provision in the New Hampshire state Constitution represents a constitutionalization of what
was, not long ago, a tradition of democracy nationwide. Such traditions can and do inform court
holdings on what constitutes the historical “fundamental rights’ of citizens, so if your state does
not have a parallel provision, it does not mean that your state’s courts would not find open count-
ing to be protected under what’s known as “fundamental rights” jurisprudence.




Hands-On Elections                                                                    Page 22 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                 ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
New Hampshire Polls and Ballot Counting Choices
New Hampshire elections are held, and our votes are counted, at the town and city level. Cities
and towns decide their polling places, and may, if they choose, create new polling places to re-
duce the number of voters and ballots in any given polling place (to facilitate election administra-
tion).




                 Figure 11: Lyndeborough Old Town Hall at night, polls closed, counting begins
The NH Secretary of State has implemented an important standard that no voter should be made
to wait longer than ten minutes before being able to cast their vote, and our polling places should
be configured to conform to this standard. Reports from around the country indicate that comput-
erized voting machines act as bottlenecks, creating lines such that it can take hours to vote.
Voter disenfranchisement in this manner, is equally abhorrent to the tenets of free and fair, de-
mocratic elections, as the potential for wholesale fraud in the vote counting conducted by these
computerized voting machines.




                                  Figure 12: Voting in Wilton, November 2004
Each city and town has the individualized legal right to decide which State-approved voting sys-
tem it will use. Currently, other than the statewide disability solution mandated by the Help Amer-
ica Vote Act, the two approved voting systems available to New Hampshire cities and towns are
the paper ballot hand count system and the paper ballot optical scan system. In 2006, owing to a
statutory ballot redesign, those cities and towns choosing to use optical scanning machines may
use only the computerized Diebold Accuvote Optical Scan voting system.



Hands-On Elections                                                                               Page 23 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                          ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
All of our elections are paper-based because New Hampshire law has long held that no machine
may be used in the State unless it reads the voter’s choice on a paper ballot, as described in NH
Election law shown below.

         656:41 Approval by Ballot Law Commission. The ballot law commission shall act as a
         board to examine voting machines and devices for computerized casting and counting of
         ballots. The commission shall, whenever requested, examine any voting machine or de-
         vice which may be capable of meeting the requirements for elections held in this state.
         The commission shall approve such voting machine or device in its discretion, and no
         voting machine or device shall be used in any election in this state unless it reads
         the voter's choice on a paper ballot and is of a type so approved by the ballot law
         commission. Any voting machine or device that is altered must be re-approved before it is
         used in any election in this state. For the purposes of this section, a machine shall be
         considered altered if any mechanical or electronic part, hardware, software, or program-
         ming has been altered.

For a variety of reasons, roughly 55 percent of our polling places have decided to use vote count-
ing machines, leaving around 45 percent of our polling places counting their ballots by hand. The
hand count polling places account for between 20 and 25 percent of our total ballot volume.

Towns and cities using optical scanners also have the option to hand count ballots if they choose.
Some New Hampshire moderators, such as Wally Fries in Danville, choose to conduct Election
Night parallel hand counts of selected races as a partial check and balance against the machine
count.




     Figure 13: Optical scan combined with parallel hand count on election night, Danville, November 2006


CITIZENS GONE WILD: TAKING CONTROL OF OUR DEMOCRACY
Concentric Circles of Community
In his book Summer Meditations, Vaclev Havel, poet and former Prime Minister of the newly-
liberated Republic of Czech, described what he called the concentric circles of community. Start-
ing with ourselves, we expand out to our families, our neighborhoods, our towns, our states, and
our nation. Within these circles of community we expand ourselves out to make connections on
an ever-widening scale of responsibility and interaction.

In New Hampshire, our grassroots political structure allows us to expand ourselves into our com-
munities in particularly meaningful ways.




Hands-On Elections                                                                            Page 24 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                         ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
When it comes to defending our democracy, we have several options for making our views known
within each of these circles of community.

Starting at the state level, we have the Ballot Law Commission, which is the appointed govern-
mental body responsible for approving voting equipment for the state. If we don’t like what is go-
ing on with our approved voting systems, we can ask for a hearing of the Commission.

Moving closer in the circles of community, we have the largest citizen legislature in the nation.
One state representative for every 3,089 citizens. This grassroots representation in the State
House means that every New Hampshire citizen can reach out and touch a state representative
pretty easily. If we don’t like the laws affecting our voting systems, then we can call our state rep-
resentatives and ask for better laws.

As we move even closer inward, we have our uniquely New England manifestation of participa-
tory democracy: the Town Meeting. If we don’t like what is going on with the voting system in our
town, we can petition for an article for change on the Town Warrant, and argue it out in the Town
Meeting.

And finally, coming to the singular circle of self, as voters, we can elect or unelect the eight
elected local election officials who control our town or city ward voting system. If we don’t like the
way things are being run, we can vote a change of personnel in the voting booth. Better yet, we
can run for office ourselves and become a local election official.




                         Figure 14: Concentric Circles of Community Voting Decisions


Taking Local Control of Voting System Decisions
Because the decision over which voting system to use is a local decision in New Hampshire, citi-
zens have an important tool with which they can guarantee citizen control over vote counting. It

Hands-On Elections                                                                           Page 25 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                        ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
takes only 25 signatures to place an article, in their own words, on the annual Town Meeting war-
rant.

New Hampshire law, Title III, Towns, Cities, Village Districts, and Unincorporated Places, Chapter
39, Time for Holding Town Meetings and Warning thereof Section 39:3
(http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/III/39/39-3.htm ) states the requirements as follows:

         39:3 Articles. – Upon the written application of 25 or more registered voters or 2 percent
         of the registered voters in town, whichever is less, although in no event shall fewer than
         10 registered voters be sufficient, presented to the selectmen or one of them not later
         than the fifth Tuesday before the day prescribed for an annual meeting, the selectmen
         shall insert in their warrant for such meeting the petitioned article with only such minor
         textual changes as may be required. For the purposes of this section, the number of reg-
         istered voters in a town shall be the number of voters registered prior to the last state
         general election. The right to have an article inserted in the warrant conferred by this sec-
         tion shall not be invalidated by the provisions of RSA 32. In towns with fewer than 10,000
         inhabitants upon the written application of 50 or more voters or 1/4 of the voters in town,
         whichever is fewer, and in towns with 10,000 or more inhabitants upon the written appli-
         cation of 5 percent of the registered voters in the town, so presented not less than 60
         days before the next annual meeting, the selectmen shall warn a special meeting to act
         upon any question specified in such application.

Citizens wishing to protect their rights to have their votes sorted and counted in open meeting as
required by the New Hampshire Constitution may, with 25 signatures, add an article to their Town
Meeting warrant stating so. An example of wording that might be used is:

         The Town of ___________ prohibits delegating to private corporations the public gov-
         ernmental function of sorting and counting votes in an election. The Town of
         ______________ requires that all methods used for sorting and counting the votes in an
         election must be open and observable for full citizen oversight of the entire voting system.

Senate Bill 2 (SB2) towns follow the same process for getting your article on the Town Warrant,
but it is discussed at the town’s deliberative session and voted on during the town election, as
opposed to discussion and vote occurring at the Town Meeting.

While you are busy collecting your 25 signatures to get your article on the Town Warrant, you
might begin your volunteer roster of those willing to help out as ballot counters during your town’s
next hand count election!

The New Hampshire Local Government Center has information on Town Meeting Warrant articles
here:

http://www.nhlgc.org/LGCWebSite/InfoForOfficials/townandcityarticles.asp?TCArticleID=48

For New Hampshire citizens living in cities, the decision making process regarding voting equip-
ment is somewhat different. Depending on the specific city's charter, in lieu of Town Meeting,
some official or entity is authorized to make this type of decision. This entity might be the Mayor,
a City Manager, or the representative body of City Council or Board of Aldermen.

The decision to use voting equipment in either case, Town Meeting or via a city entity, is associ-
ated with the budget and appropriation process, and may even simply be represented through a
budgetary appropriation for the purchase or lease and maintenance of voting machines.

Citizens of cities wishing to affect or have a say in decisions regarding the use of computerized
voting machines should look to the methods by which their specific city makes these decisions
and act accordingly.


Hands-On Elections                                                                      Page 26 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                   ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Sample Template for Town Meeting Warrant Article
The following template can be used or simplified for collecting signatures to place an article on
your town meeting warrant.




Hands-On Elections                                                                     Page 27 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                  ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Petition for Town Warrant Article regarding the counting of votes:

         To see if the Town of _________________ will prohibit delegating to private corpo-
         rations the public governmental functions of sorting and counting votes in an elec-
         tion and, further, will require that all methods used for sorting and counting the
         votes in an election must be open and observable for full citizen oversight of the
         entire voting system.

Whereas the Declaration of Independence secures the right of the citizenry to a republican form
of government deriving its powers from the consent of the governed:

Whereas the U.S. Constitution Article One, Section Four and all of the original states except
Delaware placed the right to vote and thus our elections beyond the power of the state legisla-
tures to significantly experiment with, because these rights were in the Constitutions of the re-
spective states.

Whereas the Voting Rights Act Section 8 stipulates that vote tabulation must be observable:

Whereas the New Hampshire Bill of Rights and our State Constitution have guaranteed the
right to vote since 1784, guaranteeing that it may not be administered in a discriminatory fashion.

Whereas the New Hampshire Constitution reinforces the U.S. Constitutional guarantee of a
republican form of government, in which citizens are understood to possess inalienable rights and
to be the ultimate source of all legitimate power, i.e. citizens are “sovereign” and not any king, as
defined in Article 8 of the New Hampshire Constitution.

Whereas Article 32 of the New Hampshire Constitution guarantees observable vote counting
as a mechanism for ensuring that our elected public servants receive the consent of the governed
via open and honest elections administered under full citizen control and oversight:

Whereas New Hampshire elections are held, and our votes are counted, at the town and city
level, and whereas cities and towns decide their polling places, and may, if they choose, create
new polling places to reduce the number of voters and ballots in any given polling place (to facili-
tate election administration).

Whereas each New Hampshire city and town has the individualized legal right to decide which
State-approved voting system it will use, and whereas currently, other than the statewide disabil-
ity solution mandated by the Help America Vote Act, the two approved voting systems available
to New Hampshire cities and towns are the citizen-controlled, publicly observable, paper ballot
hand count system or corporate-controlled, trade secret, proprietary, paper ballot optical scan
system.

Therefore we, the undersigned citizens of the town of _____________________ determine to
protect our rights to have our votes sorted and counted in open meeting as required by the New
Hampshire Constitution by adding the following article to our town warrant:

         Shall the Town of _________________ prohibit delegating to private corporations
         the public governmental functions of sorting and counting votes in an election
         and, further, require that all methods used for sorting and counting the votes in an
         election must be open and observable for full citizen oversight of the entire voting
         system?




Hands-On Elections                                                                     Page 28 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                  ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
References from Warrant Article Template
Declaration of Independence

         That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
         powers from the consent of the governed.

U.S. Constitution Article One, Section Four

         The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives,
         shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof;

Voting Rights Act Section 8

         Whenever an examiner is serving under this Act in any political subdivision, the Civil Ser-
         vice Commission may assign, at the request of the Attorney General, one or more per-
         sons, who may be officers of the United States, (1) to enter and attend at any place for
         holding an election in such subdivision for the purpose of observing whether persons who
         are entitled to vote are being permitted to vote, and (2) to enter and attend at any place
         for tabulating the votes cast at any election held in such subdivision for the purpose of
         observing whether votes cast by persons entitled to vote are being properly tabulated.

New Hampshire Bill of Rights and State Constitution

         [Art.] 11. [Elections and Elective Franchises.] All elections are to be free, and every
         inhabitant of the state of 18 years of age and upwards shall have an equal right to vote in
         any election. Every person shall be considered an inhabitant for the purposes of voting in
         the town, ward, or unincorporated place where he has his domicile. No person shall have
         the right to vote under the constitution of this state who has been convicted of treason,
         bribery or any willful violation of the election laws of this state or of the United States; but
         the supreme court may, on notice to the attorney general, restore the privilege to vote to
         any person who may have forfeited it by conviction of such offenses. The general court
         shall provide by law for voting by qualified voters who at the time of the biennial or state
         elections, or of the primary elections therefor, or of city elections, or of town elections by
         official ballot, are absent from the city or town of which they are inhabitants, or who by
         reason of physical disability are unable to vote in person, in the choice of any officer or
         officers to be elected or upon any question submitted at such election. Voting registration
         and polling places shall be easily accessible to all persons including disabled and elderly
         persons who are otherwise qualified to vote in the choice of any officer or officers to be
         elected or upon any question submitted at such election. The right to vote shall not be denied
         to any person because of the non-payment of any tax. Every inhabitant of the state, having
         the proper qualifications, has equal right to be elected into office.

New Hampshire Constitution, Article 8

         All power residing originally in, and being derived from, the people, all the magistrates
         and officers of government are their substitutes and agents, and at all times accountable
         to them. Government, therefore, should be open, accessible, accountable and respon-
         sive. To that end, the public's right of access to governmental proceedings and records
         shall not be unreasonably restricted.

New Hampshire Constitution, Article 32

         [Art.] 32. [Biennial Meetings, How Warned, Governed, and Conducted; Return of
         Votes, etc.] The meetings for the choice of governor, council and senators, shall be
         warned by warrant from the selectmen, and governed by a moderator, who shall, in the
         presence of the selectmen (whose duty it shall be to attend) in open meeting, receive

Hands-On Elections                                                                        Page 29 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                     ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
         the votes of all the inhabitants of such towns and wards present, and qualified to
         vote for senators; and shall, in said meetings, in presence of the said selectmen,
         and of the town or city clerk, in said meetings, sort and count the said votes, and
         make a public declaration thereof, with the name of every person voted for, and the
         number of votes for each person; and the town or city clerk shall make a fair record of the
         same at large, in the town book, and shall make out a fair attested copy thereof, to be by
         him sealed up and directed to the secretary of state, within five days following the elec-
         tion, with a superscription expressing the purport there of.




Hands-On Elections                                                                    Page 30 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                 ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
NH Pollworker Requirements
We all need to pitch in to keep our elections running under citizen oversight and control. Follow-
ing are the legal requirements to be a pollworker in New Hampshire.

   State Registration Requirement
   (Exceptions may be found in Student Election Assistant category)
   Must be a registered voter.
   N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 658:3

   Age Requirement
   18 years of age for inspectors and assistant election officials in general.
   N.H. Const. part. 1, Art. 11

   17 years of age for assistant election officials appointed to central polling place in State elec-
   tions.
   N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 658:7-a; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 658:7

   Residency Place and Term Required for Voter Registration
   State. N.H. Const. part. 1, Art. 11
   Must establish domicile. An inhabitant's domicile for voting purposes is that one place where a
   person, more than any other place, has established a physical presence and manifests intent
   to maintain a single continuous presence for domestic, social, and civil purposes relevant to
   participating in democratic self-government.
   N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 654:1

   Note: College students may choose as his/her voting domicile either the domicile he/she held
   before entering college or the domicile he/she has established while at college. Most other
   voters are only allowed to vote in the one municipality where he/she has the domicile where
   he/she spends most of his/her time and where he/she participates in civic activities and par-
   ticipates in government.
   http://www.sos.nh.gov/college%20student%20letter.doc.

   Residency Requirement for Service (State, County or Precinct) Voting district (polling place).
   N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 658:3; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann § 658:11 – 14

   Affiliation with Political Party Requirement and Process for Nomination as Poll Worker
   Affiliation required for inspectors; not required for assistant moderators and assistant town
   clerks. Moderator is the chief election officer in charge of the polls (elected position).
    N.H. Constitution, Part 2, Art. 32; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:9

   For help in central polling place in state elections, moderator may appoint an assistant mod-
   erator and such other election officials as he deems necessary. Town clerk, upon request of
   the moderator, may appoint an assistant town clerk.
   N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 658:7 97

   For each additional polling place, moderator shall appoint an assistant moderator and the
   town clerk shall appoint an assistant clerk.
   N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 658:14

   The town or ward political committee for the two political committees which cast the largest
   number of voters for governor in the last general election may appoint two or three inspectors
   between September 15th and October 15th of each general election year (depending on size
   of polling place). Additional inspectors may also be appointed, equally divided between the
   two political parties, as the moderator finds necessary.
   N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 658:2


Hands-On Elections                                                                         Page 31 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                      ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
   Term Requirements
   Two years from November 1st in the year in which the Inspector is appointed or until a suc-
   cessor is appointed and qualified.
   N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 658:4

   The term of office of assistant election officials appointed to central polling place shall expire
   at the termination of the proceedings at the election for which he was appointed.
   N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §658:8

   Training, Certification and Oath Requirements
   The Secretary of State shall prepare, by June 1st preceding each State general election, an
   up-to-date manual on the New Hampshire election laws and procedures for conducting elec-
   tions. The manual shall be distributed free of charge to each moderator, board of selectmen,
   city council, board of supervisors of the checklist and to each town, city and ward clerk.
   N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 652:22

   Oath required.
   N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 42:1; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 658:4 & 7

   Elected Public Officials Prohibited
   There are several offices in town government for which a person may not serve while holding
   another office. The relevant ones are:

        • No person shall at the same time hold any two of the following offices: town treasurer,
          moderator, trustee of trust funds, selectman, and head of any police department on
          full time duty.
      • No selectman, moderator, town clerk or inspector of election shall at the same time
          serve as supervisor of the checklist.
   N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 669:7 98

   Candidates Prohibited
   No candidates other than election officials who are running for a position as an election offi-
   cial.
   N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 658:24

   The Effect of Felon Status on Participation
   Prohibited from the time of sentencing until discharge or parole.
   N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 607-A: 2

   Any person convicted of bribery or intimidation relating to elections or any willful violation of
   the election law is forever disqualified from voting, seeking or holding public office, except that
   the supreme court may, on notice to the attorney general, restore the privileges of a voter to
   any person who may have forfeited them by conviction of such offenses.
   N.H. Const. part 1, Art. 11; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 654:6

   Student Election Assistant Statute
   Assistant election official must be 17 years of age and appointed to central polling place in
   State elections.




Hands-On Elections                                                                      Page 32 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                   ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Observable Elections are Important to 92% of Americans
In the summer of 2006, Democracy for New Hampshire co-sponsored a Zogby poll on voter atti-
tudes about electronic voting. This poll revealed that, across the board, American voters indicated
an overwhelming 92% preference for publicly observable vote counting as well as the public’s
right to obtain information about such vote counting. Michael Collins1 reported on the poll in
Scoop News:

         A recent Zogby poll documents ground breaking information on the attitudes of American
         voters toward electronic voting. They are quite clear in the belief that the outcome of an
         entire election can be changed due to flaws in computerized voting machines. At a stun-
         ning rate of 92%, Americans insist on the right to watch their votes being counted. And, at
         an overwhelming 80%, they strongly object to the use of secret computer software to
         tabulate votes without citizen access to that software.

         The American public is clear in its desire for free, fair, and transparent elections. An 80%-
         90% consensus on the right to view vote counting and opposition to secrecy by voting
         machine vendor is both rare and remarkable in American politics.

Collins goes on to identify who are these 92% of Americans:

         Four fifths of respondents within every demographic group selected the right for citizen
         review and access, Statement A. This includes overwhelming majorities of both Kerry
         (92.8%) and Bush supporters (90.8%); independents (96.9%); Catholics (92.8%), Protes-
         tants (90.8%), Jews (87.2%), and those with no religious affiliation (93.3%); and two
         points above the average, NASCAR fans, 93.9%.




                              Figure 15: Zogby Poll Results: Observable vote counting
Americans know intuitively that free and fair elections must be 100% observable, and they are
basically unanimous in knowing what they want when it comes to vote counting.



1
 Also contributing to the cost of the Zogby poll were Michael Collins of electionfraudnews.com and Paul
Lehto, election law attorney, of www.psephos-us.org
Hands-On Elections                                                                                Page 33 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                             ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
The Zogby poll result is no small thing, it’s one of the highest polling numbers ever obtained in the
history of polling. Let's look at what 92% means in polling terms:

    •    It's higher than the percentage of people who wouldn't mind a free tax cut.
    •    It's higher than any Bush approval rating immediately after 9-11.
    •    It's higher than all available approval ratings of any dead President no matter how fa-
         mous.
    •    It's higher than the percentage of people who can get a basic math multiplication problem
         right.
    •    It’s higher than the 91% who reported in an Opinion Dynamics poll in 2003 that they be-
         lieved in God or a higher power.




                          Figure 16: NH State recount: every ballot is seen by everyone
An observable vote count is the indispensable check and balance in the elections process that
ensures that the will of the public can be properly assessed in an election. This right, the right to
“kick the bums out,” is probably America’s most revered right in elections, and yet that right is
clearly both unsecured and unavailable whenever a criminal incumbent decides to use privileges
of insider access to alter secret vote counting proprietary technology.

Americans pride themselves on peaceful changes of power, but ultimately that can only be as-
sured when Americans are clearly provided with what they demand in such large percentages:
observable vote counting. It’s not so much a question of counting by “hand” or of using “paper” –
the counting method could be any visible method, and the ballots any tangible visible substance
that accepts a voter’s mark. In early days in New Hampshire, the sorting and counting of votes in
open meeting amounted to citizens standing on one side of the room or the other to express their
will in any given contest.

The indispensable element in free, fair, and democratic elections is observability, which enables
the critical checks and balances that are the true keys to free, open, honest and citizen-controlled
elections.




Hands-On Elections                                                                              Page 34 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                           ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Hand Count Basics
MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Running a hand count paper ballot (HCPB) election involves good management:

    •    YOU MANAGE PROCESS
    •    YOU MANAGE PEOPLE
    •    YOU MANAGE PAPER
    •    YOU MANAGE NUMBERS

With the right methodology and management in place, the costs come down; the integrity of the
election goes up.




   Figure 17: Managing a lot of process, people, papers, numbers at NH State recount: 22,024 ballots counted
                                          manually for a single contest


METHODS FOR HAND COUNTING PAPER BALLOTS
New Hampshire has identified two accepted and widely used methods for hand counting paper
ballots. The sort and stack method is considered more effective and efficient than the read and
mark method. This document describes the sort and stack method.

When you have 2-4 people on a team you have built in double checks. You don't necessar-
ily need to rely on post count audits because you are doing simultaneous verification then
and there on election night.

In New Hampshire, we have very liberal recount laws, and our manual recounts are integrated
into the election system as a natural check and balance on the first counts. The recounts effec-
tively serve as random audits, in this way. But rather than following a statistical formula, the re-
counts operate under intelligent selection. If a candidate feels something should be double
checked, then it is.

WHY HAND COUNTING ON ELECTION NIGHT IS BETTER THEN POST
ELECTION AUDITS
There are legitimate concerns about chain of custody if you allow the counting to go past election
night, and if you rely on post election “audits” rather than election night first count verification to
ensure the integrity of election results.



Hands-On Elections                                                                             Page 35 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                          ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
In New Hampshire, our laws require all counting to be concluded on election night and local elec-
tion officials may not leave the polls until this is done and the results reported to the Secretary of
State. Ballot boxes are then sealed and signed by election officials and stored locally unless col-
lected for a recount.

Checks and balances are facilitated by the candidate-requested recounts, which begin the
Wednesday of the week following Election Day, and are conducted centrally by the Secretary of
State’s office; these are manual counts in full public observance.

You can see a state recount online at the Democracy for New Hampshire website:
See our “We're Counting the Votes and You Can Too” videos:
http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/2648

New Hampshire has some of the most liberal recount laws in the country, and conducts 10-30
recounts every election cycle. Typically at least one outcome is changed in the recount because
we tend to have close races – mostly due to the structure of our government, which includes a
very large 400+-person citizen legislature (1 state representative for every 3089 voters). This is
the largest state legislative body in the nation, and provides a fertile ground for our grassroots,
participatory culture of democracy.

FOUNDATIONS FOR HAND-COUNTED PAPER BALLOT ELECTIONS
Legal Infrastructure: Elected (not appointed) Election Officials
In the Granite State all election night counting is done at the city ward or town polling places. It is
all local. By law, local election officials and jurisdictions make decisions about which State-
approved method of counting they will employ.

Each jurisdiction has 8 constitutionally defined elected election officials. The election (rather than
appointment) of community election officials responsible for managing elections results in a fairly
intimate grassroots democratic election administration. In this environment neighbors are be-
holden to each other in the conduct of their elections.

Our elected election officials include the Moderator, Clerk and Selectmen and Registrars of the
Checklist. Additionally, there are a number of appointed election officials including, but not limited
to, assistant moderator, moderator-clerk-or selectmen pro tem, deputy voter registrars, and ballot
clerks (ballot inspectors). The introduction of additional counters to assist at the end of the night
would bring more appointed election workers into the polling place and would likely cause the
appointed election officials to significantly outnumber the elected election officials.

For this reason, it is worth trying to recruit workers for appointed positions in such a way that
hand count teams are representative, including members from both of the major political parties
as well as independents and other parties that may be represented on the ballot.

Nonetheless, the management of elections by local community members, elected by their
neighbors, has a distinct leavening effect on the integrity of our elections.




Hands-On Elections                                                                       Page 36 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                    ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
      Figure 18: Lyndeborough Moderator Walter Holland welcomes newly registered voters with applause
This is quite different from some of the bureaucratic management of elections seen outside of
New England. This community-based election system is very supportive of grassroots democ-
racy, and is one of the reasons visitors to the Granite State often remark that "democracy works"
here.

Legal Infrastructure: Voter Intent
New Hampshire has more than 200 years of case law relating to voter intent. With solid legal
protection of voter intent, New Hampshire’s election system comfortably lends itself to hand
counting. Voters expressing their political intent with their hand marked ballots, can rest assured
that each voter has equal protection under our laws to ensure that their intent is listened to.




                     Figure 19: Listening to the voter’s intent by reading their marked ballot
The State Election Procedure Manual (http://www.sos.nh.gov/HAVA/Procedure%20Manual-
90403.pdf ) prescribes legally accepted protocols for determining voter intent in disputed cases.

Legal Infrastructure: Paper Ballot is Vote of Record
New Hampshire state law recognizes the paper ballot as the vote of record, and mandates all
recounts to be manually counted.

The NH Constitution requires that our votes be “sorted and counted” in “open meeting.”

55% of our polling places use Diebold optical scanners and 45% use the hand count method for
counting. The New Hampshire legislature, citizen advocacy groups, and the New Hampshire


Hands-On Elections                                                                                Page 37 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                             ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
HAVA State Plan Committee, are currently researching questions around the constitutionality of
using different vote counting technologies.

In 1994 New Hampshire passed the first paper ballot law in the nation, which states that “no vot-
ing machine or device shall be used in any election in this state unless it reads the voter's choice
on a paper ballot” (RSA 656:41).

CHALLENGES TO RUNNING HAND COUNT ELECTIONS
Staffing is a significant challenge for election officials wanting to run hand count elections. The
following observation is offered by an election official in a large New Hampshire city:

         “The reality is that we have trouble staffing our polling areas with 9 election officials
         (moderator, clerk, 3 selectmen, and 4 ballot inspectors). Because these officials are all
         elected or appointed by the parties, there is little accountability if someone chooses to no-
         show or call in that they will be absent at the last minute. Implying that it would be "easy"
         to line up 24 people to work each polling area is simply unrealistic. (That would require
         that [our city] find an additional 135 people to assist at our nine polling places.) It would
         take the 9 election officials in one of our city wards, where 5,000 ballots may be cast;
         about 3 hours to hand count their ballots. Add another hour for paperwork, packing, lock-
         ing up the polls, and returning everything to City Hall, and these folks will be making their
         returns around midnight. (Our polls are open 6 a.m. - 8 p.m.) I might suggest, how-
         ever, that there would be value in building a list of the names and telephone numbers of
         individuals who are willing to volunteer at the polls and to make that list available to the
         community's chief election official. It would take a lot of non-partisan, discreet manpower,
         and money, to implement these ideas.”

SUPPORT FOR HAND-COUNTED PAPER BALLOT ELECTIONS
Community
The Online Etymology Dictionary tells us that the word “vote” is derived from the Latin “votum”
meaning “a vow, wish, promise, dedication.” This is not surprising. When we vote, we are ex-
pressing our commitment to our community. When our community reads our voter intent on our
hand marked ballot, it is expressing its commitment back to us. This is the heart and soul of a
healthy democracy.

Just as we would not use computers to sign a marriage contract, our hand-marked, hand-
counted, paper ballot voting system is as close as we can get to sign and seal our com-
mitment to each other in our communities.




                              Figure 20: Wilton Town Hall where voting takes place

Hands-On Elections                                                                             Page 38 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                          ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
The introduction of cold, computerized, machines into this arrangement is intuitively unsettling.
We have no “relationship” with these things. They take no oaths of allegiance to us. They can’t sit
in a jail cell if they defraud us. These computers, with their complexities, their secret vote counts,
their private allegiance to their programmers, their potential for insidious tricks, come between us
and our community.

When you remove community from the act of voting, something ineffable is lost. People
sense this, and their civic participation in voting declines.

New England in general has long standing traditions of grassroots democracy, from the traditional
Town Hall Meeting, to the New England states’ original Constitutions, such as in New Hampshire
and in Massachusetts, which prescribe the sorting and counting of our votes in open meeting. We
New Englanders are used to coming together to slug it out in public, open meeting. We are used
to looking our neighbour in the eye while we debate the purchase of a new police cruiser, the
opening of a new school, the hiring of a road agent, all these important decisions that we must
make together for the collective good of our community.

Communities in New Hampshire often make a celebration out of Election Day. They hold quilt
raffles, bake sales, and other sundry events. Adults and children alike invariably find something of
interest at the local polls on Election Day, irrespective of their feelings for the candidates and their
campaigns in the electioneering zones outside the polling place.




Figure 21: The Lyndeborough Artillery, the longest continuous artillery in the nation, holds their regular Election
                                                Day Bake Sale
In New Hampshire, volunteering to be a vote counter is considered a great community honor in
the hand count election towns. Volunteers are sworn in on Election Day, and they take their oath
of office seriously.




Hands-On Elections                                                                                Page 39 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                             ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
                              Figure 22: Lyndeborough counters take oath of office
Lyndeborough election official Walter Holland, when training his volunteer hand counters,
reminds them to “handle their neighbors’ votes with care.”




                    Figure 23: Lyndeborough, NH Moderator Walter Holland, November 2004


Training
The State invests heavily into poll worker and election official training, and the State also holds
forums for our election officials to facilitate information sharing and transmission of local tradi-
tions, lessons learned, and what not. The ongoing training and information sharing allows local
election officials to learn from the State and from each other, and to continuously improve their
skills in election administration. This is critical because of the nature of local elections, which in-
volves citizen officials, all of whom have other jobs, and for whom the election work is primarily a
labor of love and virtual volunteerism, undertaken in the election cycle timeframe.

Recruiting Counters
Many local election officials are afraid to give up their machines because they fear they will not
have enough help to hand count our elections. Or they fear even if they have enough people,
they will be the “wrong” kind of people. But our communities are filled with the “right” kind of peo-
ple. We just need to reach out to them.




Hands-On Elections                                                                             Page 40 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                          ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Many of our communities have built-in recruitment centers. Think about the community organiza-
tions in your part of town. Church groups, Rotary Clubs, Neighborhood Watch groups, PTA’s,
High School social action or community service groups, these are just a few that come to mind.

Do you think you can come up with 25 people to help volunteer in your polling place? That’s usu-
ally all it takes. Piece of cake, right?

Americans as a whole are generous, good-hearted, community spirited, and civic minded people.
We step up when asked. The key is we just need to ask.

Here is what one civic minded reader had to say in response to an article about hand counting on
the newsblog OpEdNews.com
(http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_joan_bru_070814_first_in_the__22fooled.htm ):

         "I'm 67. I'm one of the youngsters in my senior building and at my senior center. We are
         the ones who usually are pollworkers, although in the last few years I've been pollwatch-
         ing instead. We all remember hand-counted paper ballots, none of us have forgotten how
         to count, most of us do not like the machines, very few of us have ever figured out how to
         make the machines work (at the last election where two precincts voted downstairs in my
         building, one precinct inspector only managed to print out and post 4 of the 5 machine
         tapes, and the other didn't manage to post any tapes at all), and we'd be happy to go
         back to HCPB (hand-counted paper ballots).

         Rumors of our incapacity are probably sponsored by vendors and officials and are, in any
         event, greatly exaggerated. As for hostile elections officials, many of us have canes and
         know how to use them on young whippersnappers trying to steal elections. I don't have a
         cane myself, but I know how to post reports to websites keeping track of election prob-
         lems.

         All you have to do is announce that there will be hand-counted paper ballots, and we sen-
         iors will march en masse down to our local elections officials and train them. We potty
         trained the snivelling little brats in the first place and it's time they learned some respect.

Hand Counting Large Numbers of Paper Ballots, even Complex Bal-
lots
One of our hand count towns counts up to 3600+ ballots on election night. This is an impor-
tant data point because the national average number of ballots in any precinct is less than 1000.
In other words, New Hampshire hand count towns can manage up to 3 or 4 times the national
average of ballots processed in any given precinct. Because of our large legislature, we also have
some of the more complex ballots in the nation (many multi-member districts).

For instance, a New Hampshire multimember House district might have up to 26 candidates run-
ning for 13 seats in a single district! This is an extreme circumstance resulting from the large leg-
islature in New Hampshire, more than likely not reproduced anywhere else in the world. Many, if
not most, of our districts are multimember races with 2,3, 4 or more seats per district in a single
contest, with typically at least twice as many candidates (if both the major parties run a candidate
Democrats and Republicans).

In a district with four representatives, there will likely be at least eight candidates running in that
race. So to count using sort and stack, you'd have to count this single race eight times plus the
write ins, overvotes, and undervotes. So you would count 11 stacks for this single race. This gets
complicated, and is the reason many of our towns fall back to the read and mark method, which
procedures can easily be found in the New Hampshire Secretary of State’s Election Procedure
Manual, referenced in the Resources section of this handbook.

We have spoken with, and filmed, the moderator of at least one hand count town that success-

Hands-On Elections                                                                       Page 41 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                    ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
fully employs the sort and stack method even with a multimember race consisting of three seats
for that single district.

New Hampshire has applied for a grant to study both methods of hand counting, and our multi-
member districts make it a perfect place for such a study because of the challenges posed by
counting these races.

At close of the count and reconciliation, local jurisdictions communicate their numbers to the Sec-
retary of State's office for centralized tallying, where the reported results from each city and town
are manually entered into a spreadsheet.




 Figure 24: Central recount vote totals tallied and projected for public observation at NH State House, November
                                                        2004


Hand Count Systems as Self-authenticating Systems for Election In-
tegrity
With proper management, you can hand count your ballots using teams of 2-4 people, meaning
2-4 sets of eyes on every count, every tally mark, every contest, every ballot. Using the sort
and stack method, this means that 3-4 sets of eyes have the chance to see every mark on every
ballot twice: once during the sorting process and once again during the counting process. The
ballot markings, therefore, are seen 4-8 times under this system. This means that even a two-
person team has an opportunity to review the ballot markings four times, making the sorting and
counting members of the team simultaneous observers.




         Figure 25: State recount: 2-person counting team, seven observers, Concord, November 2004

Hands-On Elections                                                                              Page 42 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                           ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
This is a self-authenticating system. Complex audit protocols, as defined in proposed federal leg-
islation and in some state laws, are moot in this type of system. Because we have identified
methodologies that integrate reconciliation into the process of counting, the self-auditing mecha-
nisms are quite advanced and ensure a high level of integrity for the system overall.

In this way, the "auditing" occurs during the first count itself, when it matters, because
this, after all, is the count that declares the winner (as opposed to machine "audits" pro-
moted in some national legislative proposals, and in various state laws, which are in-
tended, albeit weakly, to identify problems with the system but not intended to affect out-
comes).

Feasibility of Hand Count Elections




                              Figure 26: Wooden ballot box, Wilton, NH, November 2004
Five or so well managed self-auditing teams of 2-4 people can count roughly 1000 ballots
in less than 2 hours.

All told, with final reconciliation of registration checklists, number of ballots in and out, etc. the
whole process is complete in less than 3 hours on election night. Many New Hampshire counters
are community volunteers (all sworn in to office on election night).

New Hampshire has found the local hand count method - using teams of three - costs 7 cents per
contest on a ballot, meaning $1.05/ballot for a typical 15 contest general election ballot.

The State of NH, which conducts 10-30 manual recounts every election cycle, estimates cost for
hand counting at around 7 cents per race on the ballot. This assumes 3-person teams, each per-
son getting paid $10/hr.

What this means is that it doesn't matter how large is the population of a state or county, it
matters how many ballots are processed in any given polling place, and whether or not
there is the political and community will and the infrastructural integrity to conduct hand
count, observable, self-authenticating, elections.

MANUAL CENTRAL TABULATION
On the day after Election Day in New Hampshire, results are tabulated manually by the Secretary
of State’s office. The State Police pick up the signed Return of Votes from each town and carry
them in manually to the Secretary of State's office by around 8 AM in the morning after the elec-
tion. The results are then entered manually to a spreadsheet program, and aggregated. In the
case of city wards, the signed Return of Votes from the Wards are manually carried to City Hall


Hands-On Elections                                                                                Page 43 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                             ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
and the city results are then aggregated there. The city results are manually carried to the Secre-
tary of State's office.




Hands-On Elections                                                                    Page 44 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                 ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Lessons Learned from New Hampshire*
*From the NH Department of State: Hand Count Methods and Costs
Address to Democracy Fest Annual National Convention, June 10, 2007
Sheraton Wayfarer, Bedford, NH, By Anthony Stevens, Assistant Secretary of State,
New Hampshire
http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/files/Hand_count_training_D-
fest_July_5_2007.pdf

In New Hampshire, decisions regarding vote counting methods are locally-based, often as in-
cluded in a town meeting warrant article.

The decision to use a vote counting machine is subject to NH Ballot Law Commission approval.
Following are some facts about New Hampshire elections, perhaps shedding light on how the
state provides fertile ground for hand-counted election administration.

COUNTING IN NEW HAMPSHIRE
In New Hampshire, approximately 80% of our ballots are counted using optical scan machines,
and 20% are hand counted.
    • 139 polling places (45%) in NH rely on hand counting
    • 170 polling places (55%) in NH rely on optical scanning machines
    • 138 jurisdictions (58%) in NH rely on hand counting
    • 98 jurisdictions (42%) in NH rely on optical scanning machines

NH has perhaps the highest volume of hand recounts conducted at the state level in the nation.
   • 10-32 recounts per election cycle
   • 50-136 candidates involved in recounts per cycle (due to the large legislature and multi-
       member districts)
   • Current Secretary of State has been involved in over 300 hand-counted recounts.
   • In the 2004 general election, there were 7 hand counting polling places with over 2,500
       persons registered to vote.
   • Each counted over 2,000 ballots, or over 3 X the ballots cast in an average-sized U.S.
       precinct.

A WIDE RANGE OF SITUATIONS CALLS FOR DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS
New Hampshire jurisdictions vary widely in their needs.
   • Individual New Hampshire polling places served as few as 18 registered voters and as
      many as 18,974 registered voters in 2006.
   • New Hampshire has 7 polling places with over 10,000 registered voters, which is over 6
      times the national average polling place size.
   • The size of the polling place affects decisions regarding counting methods.
   • One size does not fit all.

THE NEW HAMPSHIRE SECRETARY OF STATE’S POSITION
    •    Supports hand counting and optical scanning counting methods.
    •    Seeks to identify best practices, recognizing that all ballot counting methods are under
         scrutiny and will need improvement over time.
    •    Continues to learn from local officials and promote best practices in counting using hand
         counting and optical scanning methods.
    •    Recognizes that there is probably more than one way to count ballots correctly.




Hands-On Elections                                                                            Page 45 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                         ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Hand Count Methodology*
*From the NH Department of State: Hand Count Methods and Costs
Address to Democracy Fest Annual National Convention, June 10, 2007
Sheraton Wayfarer, Bedford, NH, By Anthony Stevens, Assistant Secretary of State,
New Hampshire
http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/files/Hand_count_training_D-
fest_July_5_2007.pdf



The Secretary of State indicates a preferred method in the New Hampshire Election Procedure
Manual, which is the sort-and-stack method based on observation in recounts.




                                         Figure 27: Ballots sorted in stacks
In this method, many of the steps are similar to the read-and-mark method, also used heavily in
the Granite State. Generally, the sort-and-stack method is not used by the Secretary of State in
recounts for multi-seat races, although the method can be used by treating every candidate as a
separate contest. Local traditions reveal that the sort-and-stack method may not yet be used as
widely as the read and mark method in New Hampshire polling places on election night.




                               Figure 27: Tallying votes, Wilton, NH November 2004




Hands-On Elections                                                                             Page 46 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                          ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
ELEMENTS IN HAND COUNT ELECTIONS
Following are the foundational elements that come into play in hand-counted elections. These are
all described more fully below.
     • Planning
     • Recruiting
     • Knowing your method & how to present it
     • Preliminary organizational work
     • Training
     • Oath of office
     • Opening ballot box, counting and distributing ballots
     • Tallying votes in contests
     • Entering on tally sheet
     • Moderator (local election manager) review
     • Dealing with discrepancies

RECRUITING COUNTERS & OBSERVERS
Consider the following to help recruit poll workers for hand-counted elections.
   • Cost estimates of $10 per hour here are on the high side. Many counters in New Hamp-
       shire work for between $0 and $5 per hour and are justly proud of their contribution.
   • Locations paying $0-$5 per hour are some of the most effective at inspiring and recruiting
       good election night counters of all ages.
   • Plan on using a second shift for counting. This makes it easier to recruit people with day
       jobs
   • High school students are now required to contribute community service hours and log
       them. They are a good target group for recruiting as poll workers.
   • 17-year olds qualify as vote counters in New Hampshire & other states.
   • Seek a balanced mix.
       • Numbers person
       • Young people
       • Middle aged
       • Older people
       • Managers
   • Count your contest equivalents on the ballot, to get a sense of the work needs.
   • Know your method.
   • Estimate your target number of counters & observers at each table.
   • Estimate the number of sets of eyes per ballot.
   • Estimate the number of times each individual will look at each ballot.
   • Consider using people who have worked all day as observers rather than counters.




Hands-On Elections                                                                 Page 47 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                              ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
                              Figure 28: Four-person team, Wilton, NH, November 2004




Hands-On Elections                                                                               Page 48 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                            ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Management of Hand Count Elections*
*From the NH Department of State: Hand Count Methods and Costs
Address to Democracy Fest Annual National Convention, June 10, 2007
Sheraton Wayfarer, Bedford, NH, By Anthony Stevens, Assistant Secretary of State,
New Hampshire
http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/files/Hand_count_training_D-
fest_July_5_2007.pdf



CALCULATING CONTESTS PER BALLOT
    •    The number of contests per ballot varies widely.
    •    In NH, the typical range on a primary or general election ballot is 12 contests, plus ques-
         tions.
    •    The NH state representative contest normally is a multiple-seat race, with as many as 26
         candidates running for 13 seats in the same district.
             o We would count this example as 13 contest equivalents. When added to 11
                 other contests on the ballot, the contest equivalents on this ballot should be esti-
                 mated as 13 + 11 = 24 contests.

TEAM AVAILABILITY ON ELECTION NIGHT
The following estimates should be adjusted according to how many contests or contest equiva-
lents appear on the ballot.

    •    3 hours available (8 PM to 11 PM) X 60 minutes X 60 seconds = 10,800 seconds per
         team available in one night.

Assumptions:
   • Second shift (8-11 PM) brings in fresh counters.
   • 20 minutes of training and organization for the counting is included in 3 hours

ESTIMATING HAND COUNTING STAFF
Average U.S. precinct in 2006 = 936 registered voters X 67% turnout in general election = 627
ballots X 20 contests/ballot = 12,540 contests to count.

Assumption:
It takes approximately 6 seconds to hand count a contest on a ballot; this number is averaged
from the aggregate time for training, organizational working, sorting, stacking, counting and tally-
ing.
     • Distributing the ballots
     • Sorting the ballots
     • Counting the ballots
     • Tallying the ballots.

Experienced towns average 4 - 5 seconds to count each contest on a ballot, including training
time, sorting, stacking and counting.

This is based on:
    • Videos and interviews with towns that conduct hand counts efficiently
    • Secretary of State experience with hand counting




Hands-On Elections                                                                            Page 49 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                         ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
CALCULATING STAFF
    •    12,540 contests to count X 6 seconds for a team to count a contest in NH experience =
         75,240 seconds required on election night, divided by 10,800 (3-member) team seconds
         available per night = 7 teams needed.
    •    7 teams X (2 counters + 1 observer = 3 persons per team) = 21 counters/observers
         + 3 managers = 24 total staff

Estimated Staff Costs
21 counters/observers X 3 hours @ $10/hr = $630
3 managers X 4 hours @ $20/hr = $240
Total: $870

Using 3 person counting teams:
$870 per polling place/627 ballots counted @ 20 contests/ballot = $1.39/ballot, or $0.07/contest
on a ballot

Assumptions:
   • In NH, general election ballots may contain contests for as few as 12 positions per ballot
     and contests for as many as 25 position equivalents.
   • Multi-seat races are harder to count than races with single outcomes.




Hands-On Elections                                                                 Page 50 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                              ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
The Sort and Stack Method for Hand Counting*
*From the NH Department of State: Hand Count Methods and Costs
Address to Democracy Fest Annual National Convention, June 10, 2007
Sheraton Wayfarer, Bedford, NH, By Anthony Stevens, Assistant Secretary of State,
New Hampshire
http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/files/Hand_count_training_D-
fest_July_5_2007.pdf



Following are detailed instructions for hand counting using the sort and stack method.

OVERVIEW OF SORT AND STACK METHOD
I. Ballots are sorted into piles:
    1. One pile for different categories
    2. Each candidate or alternative on a question
    3. Overvotes (defective in that contest)
    4. Undervotes (skipped races)
    5. Write-ins
    6. Ballots requiring voter intent judgment calls for the moderator (local election manager)




                                Figure 29: Sorting ballots, Danville, November 2006


ADVANTAGES OF SORT AND STACK METHOD
Of the two commonly used hand-count methods (“sort and stack” and “read and mark”, the sort
and stack is favored for significantly reducing risks of human error. The reason for this is simple.
With the sort and stack method, physiologically, the eye is looking only at one place on the ballot;
it is trained on that spot both during the sort and during the count, effectively creating a double
check even by that one person doing the sorting and counting.

In contrast, marking tally sheets is an inherently error-prone task. Observers, readers, and mark-
ers alike, face challenges in the read and mark method. Going back and forth from one name to
another, to one spot on the tally sheet or the ballot to another, against the continuing drone of the
reader, who is reading off names aloud, creates a situation where all involved—the reader, the
marker and the observer—find their eyes, hands, and minds easily wander.

For checks and balances in hand counting, observers are a necessary component. Observing the
read and mark method is more difficult than observing the sort and stack. In the sort and stack,
the counters sort one contest into its piles, and then count one contest in its piles. This is simple.
On the other hand, in the read and mark, observers must listen to different names read aloud and
observe marks as they are made up and down and all over any given tally sheet. If the names

Hands-On Elections                                                                              Page 51 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                           ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
range from A to Z, the eyes of the observers and the markers are really jumping around, making
the process become confusing very quickly and very easily. When using the read and mark
method, however, having dual observers increases the ability to observe that both the reader and
marker are being accurate.

If counting teams are employing the read and mark method, they should have at least two ob-
servers: one to observe the reader and the other to observe the marker. Otherwise, it is impossi-
ble to observe that both the reader and the marker are being accurate.

With the read and mark method, it is easy to fall into a “counting trance” of a sort. Your mouth
becomes used to saying one name, and even if it's not the name you are looking at, it comes out
of your mouth anyway. This is the same with marking. Your hand and eye are used to going to
one place on the tally sheet no matter what. As an observer you fall into the same traps.

These are physiological and cognitive realities. The sort and stack method handily removes these
challenges, and therefore removes these high-risk avenues for human error.

    •    Counters and observers are looking at only one candidate or question on the ballot.
    •    Counters’ and observers’ eyes do not have to move to different locations on the ballot
         and on the tally sheet.
    •    Counters and observers have to focus on getting only one thing right. When looking for
         evidence of only one mark on one precise location on the ballot, it is harder to make mis-
         takes.
    •    Recording the number of votes for a candidate or question is done when the stack is
         counted.
    •    Other methods rely on a separate mark on a tally sheet being made with each ballot.
         This requires more sets of eyes to track accurately.

RULE OF THUMB FOR SORT AND STACK
    •    Aim for at least 2-3 sets of eyes on each ballot, and each vote recording.
    •    Using a 2-person team, that might mean that both members watch as one member sorts
         the ballots.
    •    At least one member checks the marks again when counting the number of ballots in the
         stack.
    •    Both members count each pile and record and check the sum on the tally sheet.




                    Figure 30: 2-person team of hand counters, Danville, NH November 2006




Hands-On Elections                                                                           Page 52 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                        ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
CHOOSING NUMBER OF SORT AND STACK OBSERVERS
    •    The more sets of eyes on a single ballot, the greater certainty in the results.
    •    Generally, this means the more observers, the greater degree of certainty in the results.
    •    (Still, using the sort and stack method, 2 counters (no observers) can apply 3-4 sets of
         eyes to each ballot, and still achieve accuracy.)
    •    An extra set of observers for 7 teams would cost $210 (7 observers X 3 hours X
         $10/hour) in an average U.S. polling place counting a 20-contest ballot without volunteer
         help.
    •    New Hampshire recounts rely on observers selected by the candidates, often resulting in
         tables with 4 or 5 persons – 2 counters and 2-3 observers.




        Figure 31: 3-person team (Democrat, Republican, Independent) using the read and mark method,




           Figure 32: Four person team, using the read and mark method,Wilton, NH, November 2004


ORGANIZING FOR THE COUNT
    •    Close the polls
    •    Verify all absentee ballots processed
    •    Rearrange the polling place for counting




Hands-On Elections                                                                           Page 53 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                        ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
                                    Figure 33: Room layouts for counting
    •    Have the checklist (pollbook) supervisors count the number of voters who are checked off
         as having voted.




               Figure 34: Reconciling checklist and counting ballots, Wilton, NH, November 2004
    •    Identify those who will be counting.
    •    Identify those counters who have not yet taken the oath of office.

Hands-On Elections                                                                            Page 54 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                         ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
OATH OF OFFICE
Swear in non-election officials as election officials

         “I, (state your complete name), do solemnly swear (affirm), that I will bear faith and true
         allegiance to the United States of America and the State of New Hampshire, and will
         support the constitution thereof. So help me God. This I do under the pains and penalties
         of perjury.

         Alternate language for those scrupulous of swearing, or mentioning God in this matter, is
         set forth in italics.

New Hampshire Constitution, Part 2, Article 84; RSA 42:1; RSA 21:24; RSA 21:25. All town offi-
cers must take the oath of office. RSA 669:9.




        Figure 35: Lyndeborough Moderator Walter Holland administers the oath of office, November 2004.


TRAINING
    •    Read the instructions for counting to all the election officials who will be counting.
    •    Provide clear directions regarding method to achieve consistency.




  Figure 36: NH Deputy Secretary of State Dave Scanlon explains method to counters and observers, State re-
                                       count, Concord, November 2004
    •    The moderator (senior local election official) has control and should exercise it.


Hands-On Elections                                                                            Page 55 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                         ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
    •    If people insist on using another counting method, consider asking them to act as an ob-
         server.
         Observing the counters count is a key role and helps achieve accuracy.
    •    Observers should be advised of the process that will be used in the count. They should
         be advised that they are not allowed to touch the ballots, but ballots can be turned in
         such a way so they can easily see them.
    •    Observers should be told that they have the right to ask counters to slow down, or speed
         up, or to question any count if they want. They should NOT be allowed to ask counters to
         back up to ballots they have already seen, counted, and recorded. Backing up will cause
         confusion in the recordkeeping. So the rhythm of the count should be kept so that ob-
         servers are comfortable enough to call out a question without having to back up.
    •    Oath of office and training take 20 minutes.

STEPS TO IMPLEMENT SORT AND STACK METHOD
Distributing ballots to teams

    1. Open the ballot box in view of the public.




             Figure 37: Opening locked ballot box in open meeting, Lyndeborough, November 2004
    2. Place an established quantity of ballots on the table to be used by each counting team.




                              Figure 38: Distributing ballots, Danville, November 2006
    3. Both members count the ballots in groups of 50. This is important in case it becomes
       necessary to redo a particular part of the process because the results do not equal the
       number of ballots, then counters only need to recount 50.



Hands-On Elections                                                                                 Page 56 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                              ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
    4. Counting by stack facilitates continuous self-auditing and ongoing reconciliation of the
       count. Counters always know the number of ballots they are working with, and can easily
       retrace their steps if they encounter a discrepancy.




           Figure 39: Ballots removed from ballot box and distributed, Lyndeborough, November 2004
Start counting ballots

    5. Team members should look at each ballot to ensure it is sorted into the correct pile. A 2-
       person team should swap sorted piles for the counting. This ensures a double check with
       a new set of eyes of the sorted piles during the counting.




                        Figure 40: Sorting ballots, State House, Concord, November 2004
    6. Once each table has the ballots assigned to it sorted into the six piles, start the counting
       process with the pile of ballots for the first candidate on the ballot. Some teams tape a
       piece of paper with the candidate’s name on the table to facilitate sorting.
    7. All other ballots should be set aside, but remain in public view on that table.




Hands-On Elections                                                                            Page 57 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                         ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
                                      Figure 41: Sort ballots into piles


COUNTING BALLOTS
    8. The team should count the ballots in the first candidate’s pile into groups of ten.
    9. Stack each group of ten ballots and the remainder at right angles to each other on the
        same pile. This allows an easy count by “tens” for the entire stack.
    10. Resolve any questions by calling the moderator to make determination of voter intent.




               Figure 42: Resolving question of voter intent, Lyndeborough, NH, November 2004
    11. Both counters count the piles of ten, plus remainders, agree on the number and enter it in
        the tally sheet.




                                     Figure 43: Tally sheet: Candidate A

Hands-On Elections                                                                           Page 58 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                        ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
    12. Counting in stacks of ten facilitates ongoing reconciliation of votes and ballots counted
        during the count. Any discrepancies discovered along the way are resolved at the level of
        ten ballots, rather than a larger number, which would take some time to backtrack for
        resolution.




                              Figure 44: Sorted ballots stacked in piles of tens
Next candidate, same contest

    13. Then begin counting the next candidate in the same contest, repeating the process de-
        scribed above (Steps 8 – 12).
    14. When all the piles have been counted and checked, that counting team is done with that
        set of ballots for that candidate in that contest.
    15. Counters agree on the number to enter on the tally sheet.




                                  Figure 45: Tally sheet: Candidate A, B, C
    16. If there is another candidate in that contest, counters count the pile for that candidate and
        agree on the number to enter on the tally sheet.

Same contest, counting the piles of undervotes, overvotes, and write-ins

    17. Counters repeat the process (Steps 8 – 12) for three additional counts, counting sepa-
        rately the piles for undervotes and overvotes and agree on the numbers to enter on the
        tally sheet.




Hands-On Elections                                                                           Page 59 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                        ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
              Figure 46: Tally sheet: Candidate A, B, C, Undervotes, Overvotes, and Write-in votes
    18. The team should add the votes for each candidate (including write-ins) and the number of
        undervotes (skipped/abstentions) and overvotes (defective) in that contest.
    19. Enter the total in the far right column of each row. It should equal 50.
    20. When the count for the stack of 50 ballots is complete, contain the stack with an elastic
        band to identify it as counted. It’s a good practice to use a specified color elastic or even
        sticky notes to keep the counted stacks easily identifiable.




                       Figure 47: Tally sheet: Single contest completed for first 50 ballots
Next contest

    21. Begin the sorting and counting process for the first candidate in the next contest (Steps 3
        - 16).
    22. When all piles for that contest have been counted, checked and entered on the tally
        sheet, the counting team is done with that set of ballots for that contest. (Steps 17 - 20).
    23. The team should add the votes for each candidate (including write-ins) and the number of
        undervotes (skipped/abstentions), overvotes (defective), and write-ins in that contest.
        That number should equal 50 (Steps 17 - 19).

Tallying

    24. Tally sheets should be turned in to the moderator - after the numbers equal 50 on the far
        right, and the aggregate of votes = 200 on the bottom right.
    25. Tally sheets should be signed by the counters before being turned in. Often counters sign
        the tally sheets before counting to ensure they don’t forget this important step.
    26. The Moderator should designate someone who routinely works with numbers to tally and
        check the team tally sheets. Find people in your community who work in professions such
        as accounting to help you out on Election Night.



Hands-On Elections                                                                                 Page 60 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                              ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
                      Figure 48: Tally sheet: Completed single contest count of 200 ballots
Moderator (local election manager) Review

    27. The moderator (manager) should check the final tallies before announcing the results.
    28. The count should be done of the total number of persons checked off as having voted on
        the checklist, and the aggregate tallies for each contest (office or question) should be
        verified against that count. See Election Night Reconciliation below.
    29. The total votes for all candidates (including write-ins) in a single contest, plus the under-
        votes (skipped/abstentions) in that contest, plus the overvotes (defective) in that contest,
        should equal the total number of ballots used.

Dealing with Discrepancies

    30. The moderator should be looking for any significant discrepancies between the totals. It
        may be difficult to get a perfect count from the checklist (pollbook).
    31. It is not essential that the total count for each office or question exactly match the total of
        those checked off on the checklist (pollbook).
    32. Provided the write-ins, undervotes (skipped/abstentions) and overvotes (defective) were
        tallied, the totals from one contest to the next for the same set of ballots should be the
        same (50 per batch).
    33. Tally sheets from each team should be carefully checked as each contest is counted.
        This helps you to keep reconciliation current during the night.
    34. Any mismatch of votes per contest with number of ballots per batch should be ad-
        dressed immediately.
    35. With ongoing reconciliation as described here, when the last tally sheet is handed in for
        the last race, reconciliation should be largely complete. Little tally work remains.
    36. If any discrepancies are found, the moderator should investigate and attempt to resolve
        the discrepancy before declaring the results.


Hands-On Elections                                                                               Page 61 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                            ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Advantages of using tally sheets to track undervotes and overvotes

    •    Tally sheets permit ongoing reconciliation (number checking) as the count progresses.
         This allows you to handle large numbers of ballots efficiently and with little confusion.
    •    Surprises at the end are less likely.




Hands-On Elections                                                                   Page 62 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Election Night Reconciliation*
                              * From the NH Department of State: Election Procedure
                              Manual
                              http://www.sos.nh.gov/FINAL%20EPM%208-30-2006.pdf
                              And from the NH Department of Justice: Counting and
                              Reconciliation on Election Night
                              Address to Democracy Fest Annual National Convention,
                              June 10, 2007
                              Sheraton Wayfarer, Bedford, NH, By Bud Fitch, Deputy
                              Attorney General, New Hampshire
                              http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/files/democrac
                              yfest_reconciliation_handcounting.pdf

The most effective way to ensure the legitimacy of any election is to demonstrate the validity of
election night results. Election night reconciliation—balancing the books, so to speak—is an im-
portant part of this process.

When a neighborhood convenience store locks up at night, the owner reviews inventory against
sales made, and sales made against the money in the register. The store owner wants to be sure
that what appears to have happened during the day is factually verified. If the numbers show that
ten dollars worth of sales have occurred but twenty dollars of inventory is missing, that store
owner knows there is a problem, and steps can be taken immediately to identify the source and
rectify the situation.

Similarly, on election night, election officials and the citizens they represent want to know that the
numbers all add up properly in the polling place. Election night reconciliation verifies the integrity
of all of the important activities that add up to the final election results: the number of ballots de-
livered to the polling place, the number of ballots cast, the number of voters checked in, the num-
ber of voters checked out, the number of votes cast in any given race, and the number of races or
issues being voted on.

ELECTION NIGHT BALLOT COUNT RECONCILIATION
Moderators are obligated to ensure that votes are counted accurately. (RSA 659:60.)




                   Figure 49: Reconciliation of number of ballots, Danville, NH November 2006
Moderators are strongly encouraged to adopt an election night reconciliation procedure that
checks the apparent results of the ballot counting against other known election statistics to en-
sure that the results are accurate.

It is inherent in the nature of an election night count, particularly at polling places that hand count
ballots, that even the most careful election officials can make mistakes. Most of the officials con-

Hands-On Elections                                                                               Page 63 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                            ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
ducting the counting will have been working for 12 or more hours before the counting process
starts. Often the counting is done under the pressure of the candidates, the public and the press
watching and anxiously waiting for the results. Therefore, taking the steps described below to
ensure that the count is accurate is necessary.

Each election, a small number of polling places report results which are conspicuously inaccu-
rate. The results report votes for the candidates in a given race that when added together total
more than the reported number of ballots used, or more than the total number of voters reported
as voting. In most cases, an inquiry by the Secretary of State or a recount discloses a counting
or tabulation error. Either mistakes are made when tallying up the counts done by individual
teams doing hand counts or errors are made in the manner in which ballots which were machine
counted but contain write-in votes are counted.

When election night results are invalid on their face, this diminishes the public’s trust in our elec-
tion system. It often results in a call for a recount. Finding and correcting easily identifiable er-
rors on election night is less work and less expensive than a recount.

A great deal of effort is taken to afford every qualified voter the opportunity to vote quickly and
easily. That effort is ineffective unless every vote is accurately counted. Voters deserve the ex-
tra effort that is required to conduct a reconciliation of election night results with other election
statistics.

BALLOT INVENTORY
The inventory of ballots is the starting point for the election night reconciliation of ballot counts.
The ballot inventory establishes a baseline of how many ballots were used at the election. The
moderator and clerk are required to keep track of the ballots made available for use at the elec-
tion and those actually used. The Return of Votes that must be filed with the Secretary of State
requires a report of the number of ballots used.

The Ballot inventory should start with determining the number of ballots received from the Secre-
tary of State (“SOS”). During the counting process, determine the number of ballots produced by
the Accessible Voting System (“AVS”) the telephone – fax voting system that must be available
for use by voters with disabilities.

The number of absentee ballots must be determined. This can be done during the hand count by
segregating the ballots or this can be kept track of during the processing of absentee ballots. At
elections where federal office only ballots are used, these will always be absentee ballots; the
number of these ballots should be kept track of separately. When reconciling the votes cast for
federal offices, these federal office only ballots should be included in the calculation of the total
number of ballots used at the election. When reconciling the votes cast for state and county of-
fices the number of federal office only absentee ballots must be subtracted from the total number
of ballots used.




Hands-On Elections                                                                      Page 64 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                   ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
BALLOTS USED
Determine the total number of ballots used at an election as follows:

Election Day Ballots received from SOS =             _____

+ Ballots from accessible voting system              _____
+ State Absentee Ballots Cast                        _____
+ Federal Office only
        Absentee Ballots Cast                        _____
+ Absentee Ballots/Photocopy ballots
used for election day ballots                        _____
- Spoiled Ballots                                    _____
- Election Day Ballots not used                      _____
= Total Ballots Cast at the Election                 _____




                   Figure 50: Counting stacks of ballots, Lyndeborough, NH, November 2004


COUNTING NUMBER OF VOTERS VOTING
The Return of Votes form requires that the number of voters checked off on the checklist as hav-
ing voted must be counted and reported.

HAND COUNT POLLING PLACES. In a hand count town the check-in checklist should be
counted and compared to the check-out checklist to establish the number of voters who voted.

MACHINE COUNT POLLING PLACES. In a machine count town the number of voters checked
off on the check-in checklist should be compared to the results tape from the ballot counting ma-
chine. The total ballots counted reported on the end of the election results tape must be added to
the number of ballots that had to be hand counted. Typically a small number of ballots are re-
jected as not readable by the Diebold optical scanning machine. These should be put in the side
pocket during polling hours and hand counted after the polls closed. These ballots, which are
entirely hand counted, are not included by the machine in its report stating the total number of
ballots counted. Other ballots which contain write-in votes or which were read by the Diebold
machine as entirely blank will be found in the write-in bin beneath the machine. These ballots are
included in the total ballots counted reported by the machine. Do not add them in twice, but en-
sure the write in votes have been recorded.

The total from the tape plus the number of completely hand-counted ballots is a statistic that
serves the same function in a machine count town that the check-out checklist serves in a hand

Hands-On Elections                                                                          Page 65 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                       ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
count town. This total of ballots should be compared to the number of voters checked off as hav-
ing voted on the check-in list to determine the total number of voters who voted.

TOTAL VOTES COUNTED
The next step in reconciliation is to determine the total votes counted for each contested office or
question. To effectively reconcile the election night results it is necessary to count not only votes
for candidates in a race but also the number of voters who skip the race, that is abstain (submit a
ballot with no candidate marked for that race). A ballot in which the voter overvoted, that is
marked two or more candidates for a race where the instruction is to vote for no more than one,
should for this purpose be treated as a skipped or abstention. The same applies in a multi-seat
office where the voter votes for more than the permissible number of candidates. Because the
voter may only vote for the permitted number and it is impossible to determine which candidates
the voter preferred most, the ballot is treated as if the voter did not vote for anyone for that office.

RACES OVERVOTED AND UNDERVOTED (BLANK, SKIPPED, AND ABSTENTIONS) In a
hand count polling place the counting teams should be instructed to record the number of ballots
where the voter skipped or abstained from voting in the race and the number where the voter
overvoted. These numbers must be reported along with the total number of votes for each candi-
date and write-in.

The ballot counting machine automatically records as a “blank” each ballot where the voter
skipped the race or abstained or where the voter overvoted. It is necessary to count the absten-
tions and overvotes only on the ballots that are entirely hand counted. If entirely blank ballots are
found in the write-in bin which were improperly marked and can be hand counted, it will be nec-
essary to subtract that ballot from the total blanks reported on the machine tape for every race
where a vote is counted for a candidate.

VOTES CAST FOR AN OFFICE
To determine the total votes cast for an office:

For each office (vote for no more than one):
  All votes for first candidate                    ____
+ All votes for second candidate                   ____
+ All voters for each additional candidate         ____
+ All write in votes                               ____
+ All blank/skipped/abstention/
overvote ballots                                   ____
= Total votes counted for the office               ____

Reconciliation. The election night results are reconciled if each of these statistics are equal for
each contested race or question.

Ballots used =                                     _____
Voters Voting =                                    _____
Total Votes Counted for the
Office/Question                                    _____

Small differences in the number of ballots used, number of voters voting and the total number of
votes counted for an office or question sometimes occur even when counts are accurate due to
human error in marking the checklist. Under no circumstances should the total votes counted for
an office or question exceed the total number of ballots used or the total number of voters voting.
Every effort should be made to resolve any discrepancies of this character. Errors in the other
direction, where there are fewer total votes counted than ballots used or voters voting are prob-
lematic, but do not create conspicuously invalid results.



Hands-On Elections                                                                       Page 66 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                    ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
If you are certain there is no counting error, declare the final results even if a small difference ex-
its. Occasional human error in checking the checklist as voters check in or in counting large
numbers of blank ballots when determining the number of ballots used are unavoidable. Make
the existence of that difference part of the record of the results. The difference usually will not be
an issue, unless the margin of victory is less than the difference. In that case, a candidate will
often request a recount.

PREDICTABLE UNDERVOTE
A second approach to reconciling election night results is to compare the total votes counted for
each candidate and write in the total number of voters voting/total number of ballots used and
access whether the undervote makes sense. At every election a certain number of voters will
abstain in certain races, i.e. they will not vote for any candidate. Alternately, they will purposefully
or by error vote for too many candidates, an overvote, thereby casting a ballot with the same ef-
fect as an abstention.

The rate of such undervoting is reasonably stable for the races at the top of the ballot. At elec-
tions where voters are voting for President of the United States, an undervote of ½ of one percent
(.005) is common. Therefore, when reconciling the apparent results at an election where Presi-
dent is being voted for, if your results suggest that more than 3% (.03) of the voters did not vote
for President, this is a warning sign. This result is possible, but should prompt the moderator to
recheck the results before announcing them.

At an election where the Governor is the top candidate on the ballot, the undervoting rate is less
constant, but generally should be less than 5% (.05). The same is true for candidates for United
States Senate. If the apparent election night results indicate that more than 5% of the voters did
not vote for Governor or United States Senator, the moderator should re-check the numbers be-
fore announcing the results.

The undervote rate for Representative to Congress can average around 4 – 5%. Therefore, re-
sults indicating that more than 7% of the voters did not vote in that race should prompt a review of
the numbers. The undervote rate for offices below these on the ballot is too unpredictable to be
helpful in reconciliation. However, it is sometimes the case that if an error is found regarding a
top-of-the-ballot race, for example that the results from a hand count team were omitted from the
tally, that error will have affected all the races and questions on the ballot. Checking the under-
vote for the top of the ballot races is another effective way to identify problems with the tallying.

In New Hampshire Election 2004:
    • 2.43% of the voters did not vote for Governor,
    • 3.89% did not vote for United States Senator,
    • 4.7% did not vote for Representative to Congress

An unusually high number of blanks or undervotes may be the result of atypical voting patterns,
however, it may also result from adding or transposition errors, from an unusual number of im-
properly marked ballots, or an error in calculating the total ballots cast/total voters voting number.

SECURE ENOUGH ASSISTANCE TO KEEP THE PROCESS MANAGEABLE
We strongly endorse the practice of some Moderators who have chosen to recruit a volunteer
Math teacher, Bookkeeper, CPA, Accountant, or someone who is both skilled in working with
numbers and who works with numbers daily to serve the Moderators as an assistant for the pur-
pose of verifying counts before the final results are determined.

WHY RECONCILE ON ELECTION NIGHT
    •    It is the law.
    •    Voters deserve accurate ballot counts


Hands-On Elections                                                                       Page 67 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                    ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
    •    Voter confidence in elections is eroded when recounts disclose election night errors.–
         Fewer voters participate
    •    Election Officials are accused of partisan malfeasance
    •    It is less work than a recount.




Hands-On Elections                                                                    Page 68 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                 ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Securing the Ballots*
From the NH Department of State: Election Procedure Manual
http://www.sos.nh.gov/FINAL%20EPM%208-30-2006.pdf




Ballot security and chain of custody is an important component of trusted elections. The following
instructions for securing the ballots at conclusion of the count on election night are taken from the
New Hampshire Department of State’s Election Procedure Manual. These instructions reflect
New Hampshire law regarding ballot security.

         After the ballots have been counted and a declaration and record of the result has been
         made, the moderator in the presence of the selectmen shall put the cast, canceled and
         unused ballots in suitable containers.

         Each container must be securely sealed and signed by the moderator and selectmen. Do
         not put marked checklists, tally sheets, or any other documents that may be needed later
         in with the ballots. The containers should be sealed with filament tape, as provided for
         each election by the Secretary of State and upon which is printed the following:

                  Enclosed are the ballots from the state election in the town of _____ (or in ward
                  ___ in the city of ______) held on _____, 20__ required by law to be preserved.

         Local officials should make certain that they have suitable containers available for pre-
         serving ballots after any local election. RSA 659:95; RSA 659:97.

         The town officers designated to deliver the ballots by the clerk should deliver the cast and
         counted ballots in their sealed container to the town or city clerk. The clerk shall sub-
         scribe upon the label the hour when he or she received the ballots and sign his or her
         name in the place provided. RSA 659:98.

         The clerk shall preserve these ballots for 60 days after a local election.

         The ballots used for federal races must be preserved for twenty-two months.

         If a recount is requested for a state election, the ballots will be collected by the Secretary
         of State. If a recount is conducted for a local election, the ballots must be retained for at
         least 60 days from the date of the recount unless some action regarding those ballots is
         pending, in which case they must be preserved 44 until the courts have made a final rul-
         ing and either the appeal period has ended or the appeal is final. RSA 659:98-100; RSA
         669:33.




Hands-On Elections                                                                       Page 69 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                    ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Financially Feasible and Accessible Recounts for
Checks and Balances in the Voting System
New Hampshire has integrated manual recounts into its election processes by passing some of
the most liberal recount laws in the nation. The financially feasible and accessible recounts serve
New Hampshire well, acting as a random post-election check and balance of election night
counts. Manual recounts are conducted centrally at the State House, overseen by the New
Hampshire Secretary of State, and staffed by citizen counters. Citizen and Party observers are
allowed to see every ballot, every vote cast, and every tally for every vote counted. Observers,
sitting across from the counters, are advised that it is they who “run the show” rather than the
counters, so they are expected to make their views known if they want the counters to go more
quickly or more slowly, if they want to challenge any vote as marked or counted, or if they have
any questions or concerns of any nature at all. Counters adhere to observer requests, no ques-
tions asked.




                    Figure 51: Counters and observers at NH State recount, November 2004
The New Hampshire Secretary of State manages large statewide recounts in an orderly and re-
spectful fashion.




                              Figure 52: Statewide recount, Concord, November 2004




Hands-On Elections                                                                             Page 70 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                          ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
At the March 10, 2006, public hearing of the Ballot Law Commission, Secretary of State Bill
Gardner made the following statement:

         One of the things that I said at the hearing when the Ballot Law Commission met to de-
         cide whether to approve these machines for the very first time, was that if these ma-
         chines were to be approved, that so long as I was Secretary of State we would have
         hand-counted recounts. We would not simply put the ballots back through the machines,
         as they’ve done in other places. That we would actually have hand-counted recounts.
         And that that would be something that was important to me as a test. And that if some-
         thing were to come up during those hand-counted recounts then everyone in the state
         would know about it.

Secretary Gardner’s position when coming into office some thirty years ago was subsequently
supported by the passage of New Hampshire law mandating paper ballots even when voting ma-
chines are used in the state:

         …no voting machine or device shall be used in any election in this state unless it reads
         the voter's choice on a paper ballot and is of a type so approved by the ballot law com-
         mission. - RSA 656:41




                 Figure 53: Hand-marked, hand-counted, paper ballots, Wilton, November 2004
And in April 2006 legislation signed into law by Governor Lynch transformed Secretary Gardner’s
30-year tradition of manual recounts into the law of the land for every election (local, state and
federal) and every ballot question that is recounted in the Granite State. House Bill 1147 and
1118, which passed with enthusiastic bipartisan support, states that for recounts:

         When counting the ballots, the secretary of state or his or her assistants shall visually in-
         spect each ballot. No mechanical, optical, or electronic device shall be used for the
         counting of ballots. -RSA 660:11

And

         When counting the ballots, the board of recount or their assistants shall visually inspect
         each ballot. No mechanical, optical, or electronic device shall be used for the counting of
         ballots. RSA 669:32

Recently enacted NH law also reinforced the Granite State’s paper ballot gold standard for all
elections:

         For purposes of facilitating the examination and recounting of votes cast, all elections
         shall be conducted using paper ballots in accordance with this title.-RSA 656:1-a

Hands-On Elections                                                                            Page 71 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                        ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
                     Figure 54: Centralized state recount, NH State House, November 2004




Hands-On Elections                                                                           Page 72 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                        ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Read and Mark Method for Hand Counting*
* From the NH Department of State: Election Procedure Manual
http://www.sos.nh.gov/FINAL%20EPM%208-30-2006.pdf




The steps for conducting a hand-count election using the Read and Mark method are outlined
here, as described in the New Hampshire Department of State Election Procedure Manual.

Step #1 – Close the Polls.

Step #2 – Verify that all absentee ballots have been processed.

Step #3 – Rearrange the polling place for counting. Counting tables must be at least 4 feet from
the rail. All counting, however, must occur where it is visible to members of the public located out-
side the rail.

Step #3a – (Optional whether done election night or later) Have the supervisors count the num-
ber of registered voters (including those who registered on election day) who are checked off as
having voted on the checklist.

Step #4 – Identify all those who will be counting.

Step #5 – Identify those who will be counting who are not election officials and who have not
taken an oath of office.

Step # 6 – Swear in these non-election officials as election officials (inspectors of election pro
tempore). RSA 658:7 gives the moderator authority to appoint such election officials as he or she
deems necessary. As election officials the volunteer ballot counters are swearing or affirming that
they will perform their duties lawfully and they become subject to criminal prosecution for official
misconduct pursuant to RSA 666:3.

Step # 7 – Read the instructions for counting to all the election officials who will be counting.

Step # 8 - Open the ballot box(es) in view of the public. Place similar quantities of ballots on the
table to be used by each counting team.

Step #- 9 - Have the counting teams count the ballots into piles of a known size (10, 25, 50 or
100 ballots).

Step #10 – Wrap each pile with a rubber band, clip it with a large binder clip, or stack them
crosswise.

Step # 11 - Prepare a tally sheet. (Tally sheets should be prepared ahead of time.) The sheet
should be organized in the same order as the ballot, with sections for each office and question
and the name of each candidate listed in the same order as they are listed on the ballot. There
should be a space following each name/question for one of the counters to put a hash mark for
each vote for that candidate/question. See sample election tally sheet at page 150.

Step #12 – Overview of the counting process:

         Each counting team will usually count all races and questions in one pile of 50 ballots at a
         time.


Hands-On Elections                                                                       Page 73 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                    ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
         A mark must be made on the tally sheet for each ballot for each office and question.
         Make a vertical line for the first four votes for any given candidate and then cross a hori-
         zontal line over the vertical lines for the fifth vote for that candidate, e.g., //// . If the voter
         wrote in a candidate, that name should be written in on the tally sheet.
         If the voter skipped a race or question, that is they did not vote for any candidate or did
         not mark either yes or no, put a hash mark in the “Skipped” line for that office on the tally
         sheet. If the voter overvoted, that is they voted for more candidates than they are permit-
         ted, put a hash mark in the “defective” line for that office on the tally sheet.
         The objective will be that when the team is done counting the 50 ballot pile they will be
         able to total the hash marks for each candidate and question.
         The team will then total the votes for all candidates for each office and all the “yes,” “no,”
         skipped, and defective for each question. The total votes for a single seat office must
         equal 50 votes for that office (including the votes for each candidate, write-in, “skipped”
         and “defective”).
         For offices where the voter may vote to fill two positions (for example where the race is
         for state Representative where voters get to choose two) the total votes counted should
         total up to 100. For offices where the voter may vote to fill three positions the total votes
         counted should total 150, and so on.
         If the total does not equal 50 the team should check their hash marks for that of-
         fice/question and correct any errors. The team is done counting a 50 ballot pile at the
         point when the office/question totals equal 50.
         As the teams count if there is any question regarding how a ballot should be counted, call
         the moderator to your table and seek his or her instructions on how the ballot should be
         counted.
         If a ballot is marked for any office or question in a way that does not leave the intention of
         the voter clear or if after getting basic instructions on how different marks are counted
         from the moderator there is disagreement over how to count a particular ballot for a par-
         ticular office a vote should be taken of the election officers present and counting votes.
         RSA 659:64.
         The moderator should call together the election officers, discuss the ballot in question
         and take a vote. The majority rules, and if there if no alternative receives a majority of the
         votes, the ballot shall be treated as defective for that office or question.
         If there are many questioned ballots that need to be voted on, the moderator may choose
         to hold these ballots aside and vote on several at one time. If this is done, however, it is
         the best practice that all questionable ballots be voted on before the team totals are tal-
         lied up. This ensures that the election officials do not know whether the vote on a particu-
         lar ballot will affect the outcome of the election. This process reinforces the neutrality and
         enhances the legitimacy of the counting process.

Step # 13 - -Starting with the first office on the ballot one counting team member (the reader)
should read off the name of the candidate (the word yes or no for questions) who received the te
on the ballot being counted. The second member of the ballot counting team (the marker) should
make a hash mark beside that name on the ballot. If the moderator can staff each team with three
counters, the third counting team member (the observer) should look at the ballot and ensure that
the correct name was read off and should watch the hash mark being made to ensure it is made
in the correct row.

Step # 14- The reader then reads off the name of the candidate in the second office who received
the vote on the ballot being counted, the marker should then make a hash mark on the tally sheet
in the appropriate row, which is checked by the observer. Continue this process until the entire
ballot has been marked on the tally sheet. Then proceed to the next ballot. If a voter has not
voted for any candidate for a particular office the reader should state “skipped” and the marker
should mark the “skipped” row for that office on the tally sheet.

If the voter voted for two or more candidates for an office where the ballot instructs to vote for one
the reader should read off “defective” and the marker should mark the “defective” row on the tally


Hands-On Elections                                                                           Page 74 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                        ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
sheet. If the instructions are that a voter should vote for two and the voter voted for three or more
follow these same instructions.

Step # 15 – When all 50 ballots have been marked on the tally sheet the hash marks should first
be totaled for each candidate including the “skipped” and “defective” rows and then for each of-
fice. The total votes for each office/question should equal 50. If they do not, go back through the
pile and correct any counting/marking errors.

Step # 16 - Bind the pile of ballots with the tally sheet on top with a rubber band or clip and notify
the moderator that he or she can pick up that pile.

Step # 17 – Start the process over with the next pile of 50 ballots.

Step # 18. – The moderator should designate some election officer who routinely works with
numbers, often the clerk, to tally the piles. Ideally a second election officer will assist and act as
observer for this tallying process. Usually these individuals do not work on a counting team. As
each team completes a pile of 50 ballots and has confirmed the accuracy of the count, the mod-
erator can carry the pile to the team who will be tallying the piles.

Step # 19. - When the last pile(s) have been counted and turned into the team that is tallying
piles the moderator should ensure that these officials have peace and quiet to finish the tallies.
The tallying must occur in public, however, when all the election officers and counters gather at
the tallying table and watch the final calculations it puts pressure on those making the final calcu-
lations and makes errors more likely. The tallying team should tally the results for all elections.
The use of a printing calculator allows the team or the moderator to check the printed tape as a
means of ensuring the accuracy of the tally. The final tallies should be written down and pre-
sented to the moderator.

Step # 20 – The moderator should stop before announcing the results and check the final tallies.
If a count was done of the total number of persons checked off as having voted on the checklist
the tallies for each office and question should be verified against that count. In towns or wards
with 1000s of ballots and 1000s of voters checked off on the checklist the moderator should be
looking for any significant discrepancies between the totals. It is difficult to get a perfect count
from the checklist, therefore, it is not essential that the total count for each office or question ex-
actly match the vote totals. Provided the write-in, skipped and defective votes were tallied, how-
ever, the totals from one office to the next should be the same. If any discrepancies are found the
moderator should investigate and attempt to resolve the discrepancy before declaring the results.




Hands-On Elections                                                                       Page 75 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                    ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Nationwide Costs to Replace DREs with Paper Ballot
Voting Systems
Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machines, commonly known as “touchscreens”, have proven
to be insecure, unreliable, inaccurate, and eminently hackable. Like the computerized optical
scanners in use in the nation today, they are owned and programmed by private corporations
claiming trade secrecy, keeping 80% of America’s vote counting secret and hidden from the pub-
lic eye and citizen oversight.

Unlike the optical scanners, however, the DREs offer no software independent check and bal-
ance on the computerized count, because DREs not only count the votes, they mark the ballots
too. Even if, as some e-voting industrialists and politicians propose, printers are tacked onto
these DREs, this has proven to be an unacceptable solution to providing a so-called “paper trail.”
The printouts are typically difficult to use for recounts, they are often defective, running as high as
a 10% error rate in the printed “paper trail.” And a computer print out is not the same as a real
paper ballot, marked by the voter so their intent can be easily discerned.

DREs pose as great a threat to our democracy as if some alien invader came to our shores and
announced they were now going to collect and count our votes for us.

The nation can and must rid itself of DREs. The costs of not doing so are too high. We lose our
democracy. And, given national spending priorities, the costs of replacing DREs with paper ballot
systems are manageable.

Following are estimate costs to replace Direct Electronic Recording (DRE) systems with paper
ballot systems – optical scanner and hand count, including transitional costs such as training,
configuration and integration.

REPLACING THE NATION’S DRES WITH OPTICAL SCANNERS
According to Election Data Services in 2006 there were 69,382 precincts (1,142 counties) using
DRE voting systems.

         Optical scan device $5,000/ea
         Programming $500/election

         Assuming 100% replacement for one device per precinct:
         69,382 precincts X $5,500 = $381,601,000.

         To allow for back up devices, add an additional device for every 4 precincts (shared
         backup):
         $381,601,000 x 1.25 = $477,001,250

         Adding Replacement of DREs for Disability Compliance
         Ballot Marking Device $6,000/ each

         69,382 precincts X $6,000 = $416,292,000.

         Integration, training and recruitment rough estimate is $4,000 per precinct:
         69,382 X $4,000 = $277,528,000

         TOTAL COST FOR DRE REPLACEMENT WITH PAPER BALLOT OPTICAL SCAN
         EQUIPMENT: $477,001,250 + $416,292,000. + $277,528,000 = $1,170,821,250




Hands-On Elections                                                                       Page 76 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                    ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
REPLACING THE NATION’S DRES WITH HCPB ELECTIONS
In New Hampshire, we have collected information on hand count costs through many years' ex-
perience of manual state wide recounts, and through limited surveys of NH hand count towns.
Generally, hand count towns estimate their election costs at around $700 / election, with some of
our NH hand count towns counting up to 3,600 ballots per polling place.

New Hampshire hand count towns count up to 3-4 times the national average of ballots proc-
essed in any given polling place (the national average is 1000 ballot / polling place) - but we have
not found the cost to vary much. This is largely due to the level of volunteerism among hand
counters, who come to count because it is considered an honor within their community, rather
than to get paid.

Using proper management and efficient processes, hand counting requires 5 teams of 4 people
(2 counter/tallyers and 2 observers) to count 1000 ballots in about 2-3 hours. This is accounting
for a typical general election ballot, consisting of 12-15 races.

The State of New Hampshire, which conducts 20-30 manual recounts every election, estimates
costs for hand counting at around 7 cents per race on the ballot. This is for a 4-person team, each
getting paid $10/hr.

For a general election ballot of 15 races; this comes to $1.05 / ballot.

NOTE: New Hampshire ballots are among the most complex in the nation, because of our large
legislature, consisting of 400 state reps. This means New Hampshire has many multi-member
districts. These races are more complex and time consuming to count than a typical one
seat/district race with only a handful of candidates running for that single seat. For instance, a
single district in New Hampshire might have as many as 26 candidates running for 13 seats. This
means that hand counters are counting the votes for each of those 26 names. Obviously, this
takes more time than counting a 2-3 person race running for one seat.

         For a typical average precinct by national standards (1000 ballots per precinct), a
         hand count election would cost 1,000 ballot X $1.05cents = $1050.

         For our 69,382 DRE precincts, Election Data Services gives us the number of 65,959,464
         registered voters. If every registered voter cast a ballot:
          65,959,464 / 1000 = 65,959 X $1050 = $69,256,950

         For hand counting voting systems to replace DREs, you would need to incorporate suffi-
         cient management staffing, training and recruitment funds.

         Management, training and recruitment rough estimate is $2,000 per precinct:

         69,382 X $2,000 = $138,764,000

         TOTAL COST FOR DRE REPLACEMENT WITH PAPER BALLOT HAND COUNT
         SYSTEM PLUS REPLACEMENT DISABILITY UNITS: $69,256,950 + $138,764,000 =
         $208,020,950




Hands-On Elections                                                                    Page 77 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                 ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Supporting Information for the Elimination of DREs
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY (NIST) STUDY
2006
I. Requiring Software Independence in VVSG [Voluntary Voting System Guidelines] 2007:
STS Recommendations for the TGDC
2.1 DRE Systems and Security
        DRE machines are essentially notebook computers programmed to display ballot images,
        record voter choices, and store the electronic CVRs [computer vote records] on remov-
        able memory cards. They are comparatively easy to use, particularly by those with im-
        paired vision; they can also produce an audio ballot for blind voters. They typically pro-
        duce a start-of-day zero report and an end of- day summary printout of the ballots cast on
        the machine, but they do not require or produce paper ballots, and it is this aspect that
        has helped to make them popular with election officials who have had to deal with logisti-
        cal and accuracy problems and historical fraud in handling and counting paper ballots.

         But many people, especially in the computer engineering and security community, assert
         that DREs are vulnerable to undetectable errors as well as malicious software attacks
         because there is no audit mechanism other than what the DRE can report on: how many
         records it has stored, ballot styles, etc. Potentially, a single programmer could “rig” a ma-
         jor election. The computer security community rejects the notion that DREs can be
         made secure, arguing that their design is inadequate to meet the requirements of
         voting and that they are vulnerable to large-scale errors and election fraud.

         One conclusion drawn by NIST is that the lack of an independent audit capability in
         DRE voting systems is one of the main reasons behind continued questions about
         voting system security and diminished public confidence in elections. NIST does
         not know how to write testable requirements to make DREs secure, and NIST’s
         recommendation to the STS is that the DRE in practical terms cannot be made se-
         cure. Consequently, NIST and the STS recommend that VVSG 2007 should require
         voting systems to be of the SI [software independent] “class,” whose readily avail-
         able (albeit not always optimal) examples include op scan and DRE-VVPAT.

         The widespread adoption of voting systems incorporating paper did not seem to cause
         any widespread problems in the November 2006 elections. But, the use of paper in elec-
         tions places more stress on (1) the capabilities of voting system technology, (2) of voters
         to verify their accuracy, and (3) of election workers to securely handle the ballots and ac-
         curately count them. Clearly, the needs of voters and election officials need to be ad-
         dressed with improved and new technology. The STS [Security and Transparency Sub-
         committee] believes that current paper-based approaches can be improved to be signifi-
         cantly more usable to voters and election officials, and that other kinds of all electronic IV
         (software IV) and E2E cryptographic systems may possibly achieve the goal of secure
         paperless elections. However, for VVSG 2007, the STS judges that designs for these
         new systems are still immature and that developing testable requirements for
         these approaches is not yet feasible. Industry has not yet responded in a signifi-
         cant way with new designs, and some method for jumpstarting industry to design
         and market these approaches may be beneficial.

         These systems may be dependent on software to an extent, however not nearly to the
         extent that today’s DREs rely on software correctness. How this software would be speci-
         fied and tested remains a matter of debate. Currently, the STS is divided on whether
         software IV [independent verification] systems are possible to secure at this point
         without further research.



Hands-On Elections                                                                       Page 78 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                    ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
ELECTION SCIENCE INSTITUTE STUDY 2006
II. The Election Science Institute Study of DRE VVPAT for Cuyahoga County showed a ten per-
cent error rate for VVPAT printouts, rendering these votes unreadable and unusable for hand
counts in an audit or recount situation.

         Following the 2004 General Election in Ohio, Cuyahoga County adopted a new voting
         system using the Diebold touch-screen voting system. The new system complies with
         both the new federal election technology standards established under the Help America
         Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) and with recently enacted Ohio legislation that requires voting
         systems to produce a paper ballot that can be verified by the voter. Under Ohio law, this
         paper ballot (Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) serves as the official ballot in the
         event of recount or contested election. The May 2006 Primary, the first major election us-
         ing the new system, presented an opportunity to assess the new system’s benefits and
         weaknesses. The Cuyahoga County Board of Commissioners decided that an independ-
         ent scientific analysis of the Primary election would give elections officials objective feed-
         back on the accuracy, reliability and usability of the new voting system.

         In April 2006, the Cuyahoga County Commissioners engaged Election Science Institute
         (ESI) to study all aspects of the new system during the Primary Election. Voting devices
         are only a small part of an election system: any thorough assessment of a voting system
         must include an evaluation of the administrative procedures, pre-election programming
         and testing of the machines, voter and booth worker interaction, and counting and audit-
         ing procedures. Although the touch screen systems are vastly different from optical scan
         and punch card, it still holds true that an election will be only as successful and reliable
         as the human administration of all system components.

         Summary of Key Findings
         Key Finding: After three months of exhaustive research, empirical evidence supports the
         key definitive finding: The machines’ four sources of vote totals – VVPAT individual
         ballots, VVPAT summary, election archive, and memory cards – did not agree with
         one another. The current election system appears to provide some of its promised bene-
         fits at potentially great cost; namely, that the election system, in its entirety, exhibits
         shortcomings with extremely serious consequences, especially in the event of a close
         election. These shortcomings merit urgent attention. Relying on this system in its pre-
         sent state should be viewed as a calculated risk in which the outcome may be an
         acceptable election, but there is a heightened risk of unacceptable cost.

         Manual Count of Paper Ballots
         Key Finding: VVPAT’s were missing, missing information and the tally of the individual
         ballots did not always match the VVPAT summary printed at the end of Election Day. In
         order to validate the accuracy of Election Day vote tabulations by the Cuyahoga County
         BOE Diebold voting system, ESI conducted a manual count of the VVPAT paper ballots.
         Using a recount fixture that allowed for viewing the tapes without handling them, a team
         of election officials, booth workers and students tallied the votes for governor on each
         tape. The paper ballot tallies were initially compared to the results report printed on the
         VVPAT tapes. When the count did not match the count provided by the results report, the
         paper ballots were recounted.

         • 85% of the VVPAT Ballots and VVPAT Summaries reconciled after the primary
         manual count, where approximately 15% required a secondary count
         • 1.4% of the VVPAT cartridges exhibited missing ballots.
         • 16.9 % of VVPAT tapes showed a discrepancy of 1 - 5 votes between the tally of
         ballots and the results report; 2.1 % showed a discrepancy of over 25 votes.
         • During the manual recount, team members discovered 40 VVPAT tapes (9.66%)
         that were either destroyed, blank, illegible, missing, taped together or otherwise
         compromised.


Hands-On Elections                                                                       Page 79 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                    ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
         • Identifying information on the VVPAT tape such as precinct information and machine
         identification was inconsistent, as were the summary reports printed at the end of the
         day. 2.8% of the VVPATs were missing machine ID numbers; 5.4% did not identify the
         precinct, increasing the difficulty of a meaningful audit and raising questions about the in-
         tegrity of the vote count.
         • VVAPTs showed evidence of booth workers using trial and error to print reports and
         start up or close down the machines; workers apparently attempted to overcome printer
         problems by shutting down machines, removing and replacing cards, and restarting ma-
         chines.
         • 72% of the labels identifying canisters containing the VVPAT tapes were missing infor-
         mation. 46% of the canister labels were blank.
         • Booth workers frequently failed to sign the tapes. Such failures in chain of custody also
         increase the risk of a legal challenge.




Hands-On Elections                                                                      Page 80 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                   ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Resources
Black Box Report, SECURITY ALERT: July 4, 2005: Critical Security Issues with Diebold
Optical Scan Design. July 2005.
http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVreport.pdf

California Top to Bottom Review (information and reports)
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_vsr.htm

Collins, Michael , New Zogby Poll: It’s Nearly Unanimous, Scoop News, August 21, 2006
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0608/S00220.htm

Available from Democracy for New Hampshire:
       “We’re Counting the Votes” booklet
       http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/2606

         “We’re Counting the Votes” videos
         http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/2648

         Election Integrity Resources Page
         http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/2375

Election Assistance Commission’s 2004 Election Day Survey
http://eac.gov/election_survey_2004/statedata/StateLevelSummary.htm

Election Data Services 2006 Voting Equipment Report
http://www.edssurvey.com/images/File/ve2006_nrpt.pdf

ESI Study of DRE VVPAT for Cuyahoga County
http://www.votingindustry.com/TabulationVendors/1stTier/Diebold/esi_cuyahoga_final.pdf

Government Accountability Office (GAO). Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliabil-
ity of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed.
September 2005.
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05956.pdf

Humboldt County Voter Confidence Committee Spreadsheet Tool for Calculating Hand
Count Management Needs
http://www.guvwurld.org//Voting/Hand%20Counting%20Paper%20Ballots%20Calculator%20For
%20Manpower%20and%20Cost.xls

Letter Report on Electronic Voting, Committee on a Framework for Understanding Elec-
tronic Voting, National Research Council.
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/cstb/letter_evoting.html

Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World. Brennan Center for
Justice at NYU School of Law. June 2006.
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/SecurityFull7-3Reduced.pdf

New Hampshire State Constitution. Bill of Rights, Article 11.
http://www.state.nh.us/constitution/billofrights.html

NH Department of Justice: Counting and Reconciliation on Election Night
http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/files/democracyfest_reconciliation_handcounting.pdf


Hands-On Elections                                                                Page 81 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                             ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Available from the NH Department of State:
       Election Procedure Manual
       http://www.sos.nh.gov/FINAL%20EPM%208-30-2006.pdf

         NH Election Laws
         http://www.sos.nh.gov/statutes.htm

         Hand Count Methods and Costs
         http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/files/Hand_count_training_D-
         fest_July_5_2007.pdf

         Improving Disability Access for Voters
         http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/files/Dem4NH_DisabilityVoting.pdf

New Hampshire Local Government Center Information on Town Meeting Warrant Articles
http://www.nhlgc.org/LGCWebSite/InfoForOfficials/townandcityarticles.asp?TCArticleID=48

Overview of Red Team Reports, Matt Bishop, University of California, Davis
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/red_overview.pdf

Putting the Party Back into Politics: Results of a Pilot Experiment Designed to Increase
Voter Turnout through Music, Food, and Entertainment. May 2005.
http://www.yale.edu/isps/publications/hooksett.pdf

Requiring Software Independence in VVSG 2007: STS Recommendations for the TGDC,
William Burr, John Kelsey, Rene Peralta, John Wack, National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology, November 2006
http://vote.nist.gov/DraftWhitePaperOnSIinVVSG2007-20061120.pdf

Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter. Voting Systems Technology As-
sessment Advisory Board for the State of California. February 2006.
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/security_analysis_of_the_diebold_accubasic_inter
preter.pdf.

Zogby Press Release August 23, 2006: “Americans Concerned About Election Transpar-
ency and Security”.
http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.dbm?ID=1163




Hands-On Elections                                                                Page 82 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                             ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Table of Figures
Figure 1: NH Secretary of State William Gardner ........................................................................................... 8
Figure 2: Election 2004, Bake Sales and Community in the Old Town Hall, Lyndeborough, NH .................... 9
Figure 3: Distributing ballots for recount, State House, Concord, November 2004 ......................................... 9
Figure 4: Paper ballots designed for use with computerized vote tabulation optical scanners ......................10
Figure 5: Sorting and stacking ballots for hand counting ...............................................................................12
Figure 6: States (in gray) with significant implementation of hand count elections ........................................12
Figure 7: California Secretary Bowen, announcing her decision to decertify e-voting equipment, August 3,
2007...............................................................................................................................................................13
Figure 8: Roughly 100 New Hampshire citizens showed up to protest the approval of Diebold voting
equipment ......................................................................................................................................................16
Figure 9: New Hampshire Ballot Law Commission March 2006 ....................................................................18
Figure 10: John Silvestro, President, LHS Associates, New England distributor of Diebold election
equipment ......................................................................................................................................................18
Figure 11: Lyndeborough Old Town Hall at night, polls closed, counting begins ...........................................23
Figure 12: Voting in Wilton, November 2004..................................................................................................23
Figure 13: Optical scan combined with parallel hand count on election night, Danville, November 2006 ......24
Figure 14: Concentric Circles of Community Voting Decisions ......................................................................25
Figure 15: Zogby Poll Results: Observable vote counting .............................................................................33
Figure 16: NH State recount: every ballot is seen by everyone .....................................................................34
Figure 17: Managing a lot of process, people, papers, numbers at NH State recount: 22,024 ballots counted
manually for a single contest..........................................................................................................................35
Figure 18: Lyndeborough Moderator Walter Holland welcomes newly registered voters with applause ........37
Figure 19: Listening to the voter’s intent by reading their marked ballot ........................................................37
Figure 20: Wilton Town Hall where voting takes place ...................................................................................38
Figure 21: The Lyndeborough Artillery, the longest continuous artillery in the nation, holds their regular
Election Day Bake Sale .................................................................................................................................39
Figure 22: Lyndeborough counters take oath of office ...................................................................................40
Figure 23: Lyndeborough, NH Moderator Walter Holland, November 2004 ...................................................40
Figure 24: Central recount vote totals tallied and projected for public observation at NH State House,
November 2004 .............................................................................................................................................42
Figure 25: State recount: 2-person counting team, seven observers, Concord, November 2004 ..................42
Figure 26: Wooden ballot box, Wilton, NH, November 2004 ..........................................................................43
Figure 27: Ballots sorted in stacks .................................................................................................................46
Figure 28: Four-person team, Wilton, NH, November 2004 ...........................................................................48
Figure 29: Sorting ballots, Danville, November 2006 .....................................................................................51
Figure 30: 2-person team of hand counters, Danville, NH November 2006 ...................................................52
Figure 31: 3-person team (Democrat, Republican, Independent) using the read and mark method, .............53
Figure 32: Four person team, using the read and mark method,Wilton, NH, November 2004 .......................53
Figure 33: Room layouts for counting ............................................................................................................54
Figure 34: Reconciling checklist and counting ballots, Wilton, NH, November 2004 .....................................54


Hands-On Elections                                                                                                                           Page 83 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                                                                   ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
Figure 35: Lyndeborough Moderator Walter Holland administers the oath of office, November 2004. ..........55
Figure 36: NH Deputy Secretary of State Dave Scanlon explains method to counters and observers, State
recount, Concord, November 2004 ................................................................................................................55
Figure 37: Opening locked ballot box in open meeting, Lyndeborough, November 2004 ..............................56
Figure 38: Distributing ballots, Danville, November 2006 ..............................................................................56
Figure 39: Ballots removed from ballot box and distributed, Lyndeborough, November 2004 .......................57
Figure 40: Sorting ballots, State House, Concord, November 2004...............................................................57
Figure 41: Sort ballots into piles .....................................................................................................................58
Figure 42: Resolving question of voter intent, Lyndeborough, NH, November 2004......................................58
Figure 43: Tally sheet: Candidate A ...............................................................................................................58
Figure 44: Sorted ballots stacked in piles of tens ...........................................................................................59
Figure 45: Tally sheet: Candidate A, B, C ......................................................................................................59
Figure 46: Tally sheet: Candidate A, B, C, Undervotes, Overvotes, and Write-in votes.................................60
Figure 47: Tally sheet: Single contest completed for first 50 ballots ..............................................................60
Figure 48: Tally sheet: Completed single contest count of 200 ballots ..........................................................61
Figure 49: Reconciliation of number of ballots, Danville, NH November 2006 ...............................................63
Figure 50: Counting stacks of ballots, Lyndeborough, NH, November 2004 ..................................................65
Figure 51: Counters and observers at NH State recount, November 2004 ....................................................70
Figure 52: Statewide recount, Concord, November 2004 ..............................................................................70
Figure 53: Hand-marked, hand-counted, paper ballots, Wilton, November 2004...........................................71
Figure 54: Centralized state recount, NH State House, November 2004 .......................................................72




Hands-On Elections                                                                                                                 Page 84 of 84
NH Fair Elections Committee                                                                                           ElectionDefenseAlliance.org

				
DOCUMENT INFO
Shared By:
Categories:
Tags:
Stats:
views:4
posted:11/4/2012
language:English
pages:84