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					Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement Reference Materials
The following reference material was used in the preparation of the Draft
SPEIS. RM_214 Administrative Record Number: NNSA 2007 Reference Citation:
Document Identification Number: Document Title (or description): NNSA,
Complex 2030 SPEIS Data Call, National Nuclear Security Administration,
Washington, DC, 2007. Author or Organization: Document Date: U.S.
Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration 2007
Complex 2030 SPEIS Data
Call
NNSA 2007

Assembly/Disassembly


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Complex 2030 SEIS Data Request CONSTRUCTION HE Machining/Formulation @
BEEF Non-PIDAS CONSUMPTION/USE/annual

Data Required Peak Electrical energy (MWe) Diesel Generators (Yes or No)

Concrete (yd3) Steel (t) 15.79 Liquid fuel and lube oil (gal) 71841.3
Water (gal) 5500.4 Land (acre) Laydown Area Size 5 Parking Lots 5 Total
Square Footage Added and Footprint of New 8340sqft Construction
Employment Total employment (worker years) 12 Peak employment (workers)
TBD Construction period (years) 2 Waste Generated Volume 0 Low level 0
Hazardous Nonhazardous (Sanitary and Other) 16.7yds3 solid 360gal liquid

Consumption/Use TBD yes 729
DATA REQUIRED

Complex 2030 SEIS Data Request OPERATIONS HE Machining/Formulation @ BEEF
Non-Pidas CONSUMPTION/USE/annual

Data Required Consumption/Use Annual Electrical energy (MWh) 267.84 Peak
Electrical demand Mwe) TBD Fuel Usage (gal or yd3) TBD Other Process Gas
(N, Ar, etc.) 0 Water (gal) 4500 Steam (tons) 0 Plant Footprint (acres)
100 Employment (workers) 60 Number of Rad Workers 0 Average annual dose 0
Maximum worker dose 0 Radionuclide emissions and effluents - nuclides and
0 curies NAAQS emissions (tons/yr) 1.40 Hazardous Air Pollutants and
Effluenets (tons/yr) 0.17 Chemical Use TBD Maximum inventory of fissile
material/throughput 0 Waste Category Volume Low level liquid (gal) 0
Solid (yd3) 0 Mixed Low level liquid (gal) 0 Solid (yd3) 0 TRU level
liquid (gal) 0 Solid (yd3) 0 5.13 Hazardous liquid (gal) Solid (yd3)
Nonhazardous (Sanitary) liquid (gal) 43200 Solid (yd3) TBD 12.44
Nonhazardous (other) liquid (gal) Solid (yd3)
FIMS Data for BEEF Non-PIDAS Area
Asset ID 04-300 04-35 04-36 04-480 04-998612

Current RPV No. Floors
$977,842 $543,893 Not in FIMS $381,638 $36,660 1 1 1 1 1

Gross sqft
1,387 1,000 1000 285 96

Facility Model Description
Complex 2030 SEIS Data Request CONSTRUCTION OST/GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT @
NTS Non-PIDAS DATA REQUIRED CONSUMPTION/USE

Data Required Peak Electrical energy (MWe) Diesel Generators (Yes or No)

Concrete (yd3) Steel (t) 0 Liquid fuel and lube oil (gal) 0 Water (gal) 0
Land (acre) Laydown Area Size 0 Parking Lots 0 Total Square Footage Added
and Footprint of New 0 Construction Employment Total employment (worker
years) Peak employment (workers) Construction period (years) Waste
Generated Low level Hazardous Nonhazardous (Sanitary and Other)

Consumption/Use 0 no 0

0 0 0 Volume 0 0 0
DATA REQUIRED

Complex 2030 SEIS Data Request OPERATIONS OST/GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT @ NTS
Non-PIDAS CONSUMPTION/USE

Data Required Annual Electrical energy (MWh) Peak Electrical demand Mwe)
Fuel Usage (gal or yd3) Other Process Gas (N, Ar, etc.) Water (gal) Steam
(tons)

Consumption/Use 36,015 6.10 TBD TBD 28,000,000 TBD

Plant Footprint (acres) 500 Employment (workers) 918.09 Number of Rad
Workers 0 Average annual dose 0 Maximum worker dose 0 Radionuclide
emissions and effluents - nuclides and 0 curies NAAQS emissions (tons/yr)
0 Hazardous Air Pollutants and Effluenets (tons/yr) 0 Chemical Use 0
Maximum inventory of fissile material/throughput 0 Waste Category Volume
Low level liquid (gal) 0 Solid (yd3) 0 Mixed Low level liquid (gal) 0
Solid (yd3) 0 TRU level liquid (gal) 0 Solid (yd3) 0 328.66 Hazardous
liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Nonhazardous (Sanitary) liquid (gal) 660960
Solid (yd3) TBD 819.85 Nonhazardous (other) liquid (gal) Solid (yd3)
FIMS Data for A/D   OST - General Supprt At NTS Non-PIDAS Area
Asset ID 06-CP-65   06-CP-70 06-CP-70A 06-CP-71 06-545748 06-CP-72 06-CP-50
06-CP-60 06-CP-45   06-GS-270 06-CP-1 06-CP-20 06-CP-3 06-999929 06-CP-9
06-CP-43 06-CP-41   06-CP-42 06-CP-410 06-CP-40

Current RPV
$3,760,527 $1,335,545 $71,763 $663,090 $19,078 $2,047,125 $2,663,907
$1,077,918 $5,078,621 $85,158 $20,574,687 $592,456 $339,240 $222,038
$14,922,897 $1,154,505 $2,544,250 $39,624 $395,300 $3,787,908

No. Floors
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Gross sqft
23,581 5,022 450 2,240 208 7,199 9,368 2,337 19,166 70 31,366 1,199 349
640 24,607 949 5,149 432 800 7,644

Facility Model Description
06-159 06-CP-162 06-CP-161 06-CP-160 06-CP-216 06-CP-213 06-CP-86 06-CP-
214 06-CP-95/95A 06-CP-100 06-900 06-906 06-908 06-914 06-913 06-902 06-
904 06-922 23-532 23-531 23-532 23-675 23-678 23-676 23-679 23-680 23-681
23-682 23-683 23-684 23-300 23-118 23-426 23-425 23-750 23-751

$1,585,728 $2,643,210 $1,022,795 $3,459,365 $243,993 $1,581,200 $191,367
$921,903 $3,927,155 $1,349,510 $8,823,197 $8,214,334 $14,593,981
$8,130,332 $2,132,149 $1,974,328 $9,717,956 $16,331,368 $4,233,436
$4,233,436 $4,233,436 $864,398 $864,398 $864,398 $864,398 $864,398
$864,398 $864,398 $864,398 $864,398 $20,603,387 $1,994,322 $905,777
$2,579,366 $16,887,219 $11,760,384

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

3,200 5,334 2,064 6,981 1,530 3,200 1,200 3,242 7,925 9,491 31,028 16,624
29,535 16,454 4,315 6,943 19,667 20,662 13,820 13,820 13,820 3,029 3,029
3,029 3,029 3,029 3,029 3,029 3,029 3,029 64,762 7,275 3,174 10,061
35,350 24,618
April 20, 2007 Nevada Test Site (NTS) Alternative Summary The NTS
alternative for Assembly/Disassembly (A/D) operations maximizes the use
of existing facilities at the Device Assembly Facility (DAF), the
underground complex of tunnels at U1a, the Big Explosive Experiment
Facility (BEEF), the Explosives Ordnance Disposal Unit, existing NTS site
infrastructure, and the support areas of Mercury, the Control Point and
Area 6 Construction (Figure 1). Other alternatives were considered that
included locating all of the A/D operations at either the DAF or U1a.
Either location has more than enough available land area to accommodate
the required increased infrastructure, however, the existing DAF, U1a,
and BEEF infrastructure are each uniquely suited to accommodate different
elements of the proposed mission. By utilizing each of these unique
existing assets, the need for additional construction is minimized and
the existing benefits of each site are maximized. This approach also
provides future flexibility to the Program to increase use of one element
over another depending on the future needs and circumstances of the
stockpile. The preferred NTS alternative would utilize the DAF for
Disassembly operations. DAF can fully support Disassembly operations
(approximately 400 units/year) and continue to support the Criticality
Experiment mission at the Facility. Disassembly operations in the DAF
would not require additional construction within the PIDAS or additions
to the existing PIDAS. In the non-PIDAS area of the DAF and outside the
buffer zones, an administrative facility and parking area would be
constructed to support the increased personnel processing requirement for
Disassembly. The remaining operations of Assembly, longer-term storage
for nuclear and non-nuclear components that are generated by DAF
disassembly activities, weapon surveillance, and storage for the
strategic reserve would be located 900 feet underground in the tunnel
complex at U1a. This alternative would maximize use of existing U1a High
Hazard Standard Industrial support areas, and include construction of new
tunnels and alcoves in accordance with nuclear explosive requirements for
Assembly and storage operations. At U1a, access to the tunnel network is
limited to two (2) vertical access/egress shafts. The discrete, small
surface footprint of the access/egress shafts and the advantages of depth
present a unique solution to the 2005 Design Basis Threat security
requirements. Operational security costs would be significantly reduced
as compared to costs for surface facilities, but may require construction
of a small PIDAS around the surface footprint of each shaft. To support
HE operations, three new buildings would be constructed at BEEF to
support HE formulation and machining. BEEF is also the NTS proposed
alternative for the consolidation of high explosive shot sites currently
located at several Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) sites. The co-location
of NWC shot site consolidation and HE formulation and machining provides
a fundamental synergy. Explosives disposal from disassembly activities
and from manufacturing activities would be conducted at the existing
Explosives Ordnance Disposal Unit (EODU) in Area 11 on Page 1 of 8
April 20, 2007 NTS. The EODU was first used in 1965 and continues to
operate as a permitted Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
treatment unit. The NTS provides the existing infrastructure services and
flexibility to accommodate the proposed missions, and any surge in A/D
operations. By siting the Assembly/Disassembly mission at the NTS, the
opportunity exists to fully utilize the NTS resources and maximize the
government's investment in the NTS. A. Disassembly at DAF within the
PIDAS Area

The Device Assembly Facility (DAF) was constructed for nuclear explosive
operations (NEO) in support of the underground weapons testing program
and has since transitioned into a multi-use Hazard Category 2, non-
reactor nuclear facility. DAF has an approved DSA to support this
mission, and has a current NES master study for generic nuclear explosive
operations. The estimated remaining useful life of DAF without major
refurbishment is about 50 years. Current DAF utilization supports: 1)
NNSA policy on the use of DAF for the disposition of damaged U.S. nuclear
weapons, 2) Sub critical Experiment assemblies, and downdraft table and
Glove box operations under the Stockpile Stewardship and Test Readiness
Programs, 3) Criticality Experiments, 4) material staging in support of
Los Alamos and Sandia Special Nuclear Material (SNM)) activities, 5)
Support to national security programs related to Emergency Response and
the Department of Homeland Security, and 6) Low volume NEO disassembly to
accelerate the dismantlement of retired and legacy warheads. As outlined
in the Program Capability and Facility Requirements for the Consolidated
Nuclear Production Center (CNPC) document, the DAF could provide support
to the entire projected Disassembly mission (approximately 400 units/yr)
in its current configuration; given adequate training, staffing, and
logistical support. To prevent congestion at the DAF, which may occur as
nuclear and non-nuclear components are generated during Disassembly, a
just-in time (JIT) transfer operation would be instituted between DAF and
U1a storage locations, or component source manufacturing sites. The
existing DAF structures and features that fully support nuclear weapon
Disassembly operations would include: 1. Nuclear Weapon Disassembly: The
DAF has 3 "gravel gertie" cells available that were designed to
accommodate HE/SNM disassembly with additional mitigative features in the
event of a high explosive violent reaction. Nuclear Weapon Staging: The
DAF has 3 buildings which can be used to stage Nuclear Weapons. Temporary
storage of nuclear components generated during Nuclear Weapon
Disassembly:

2.

3.

Page 2 of 8
April 20, 2007 The DAF also has 2 disassembly bays for explosives, SNM,
Nuclear Explosives, or nuclear components. 4. Temporary storage of non-
nuclear components generated during Nuclear Weapon Disassembly: The DAF
also has 2 disassembly bays for non-nuclear components. This would
require the removal of the down draft table from its current location in
one of the DAF buildings. Storage of tooling, stands and hanging gear.
This requirement can be met by combining with non-nuclear component
storage. The DAF also has several other areas to facilitate use and
storage for this equipment (e.g., large "button-hook" hallways adjacent
to disassembly cells for HEVR mitigation). Miscellaneous Support Within
DAF a. Radiography The DAF has a fully capable radiography facility with
a 9MeV LINAC and additional portable radiography capability. A possible
upgrade to Computed Tomography may be worth considering. b. Loading and
Unloading facilities The DAF has a loading dock with dock leveler, and
the ability to off-load oversized items and take them directly through
exterior doors. c. Administrative The DAF has some limited administrative
offices available to support this requirement, which includes restrooms
and showers. Changing areas for donning and doffing PPE are also
available in the DAF. B. Disassembly at DAF: Non-PIDAS Area Due to the
increased staffing required for Disassembly, a general administrative and
personnel processing facility would be required. This requirement could
be met, in part, by use of existing CEF Area 6 Control Point, and/or
Construction Camp facilities. This requirement could also be met by
construction of a new facility outside the DAF PIDAS and outside the
security and explosive buffer zones of the DAF, and service both the CEF
and Disassembly missions at DAF. U1a Nuclear Weapon Assembly, Component
Storage, Surveillance and Joint Test Assembly Operations The U1a complex
was originally constructed for testing of low yield nuclear devices. Most
recently, U1a has been used for Sub-Critical Experiments (SCEs). The U1a
Complex at NTS consists of a network of tunnels approximately 900 feet
below the ground surface that are mined in consolidated alluvium. Access
to the tunnel network is limited to two (2) vertical access/egress
shafts, and one small

5.

6.

C.

Page 3 of 8
April 20, 2007 diameter ventilation shaft. Personnel and equipment access
and egress the tunnel network via elevators in each of the access/egress
shafts. This alternative would utilize existing U1a surface and
underground High Hazard Standard Industrial support areas, and tunnel
support systems. The proposed U1a expansion for the Assembly mission
would be constructed to meet nuclear explosive operational standards.
This expansion is capable of meeting the requirements of approximately
125 units/yr for assembly, 75 units/yr surveillance and 15 units/yr Joint
Test Assembly (JTA) activities. The U1a expansion is also the proposed
location for long-term storage of nuclear and non-nuclear components and
tooling. It can also provide long-term storage and the United State's
strategic reserve of SNM. Based on over 30 years of underground nuclear
testing in tunnels, the capability exists to harden tunnels and alcoves
to withstand significant ground shock. Additional protection can be
provided, if required, to meet technical safety requirements. For a model
of the proposed U1a expansion, NTS has an existing approved Documented
Safety Analysis and Technical Safety Requirements for the G-Tunnel
complex and staging alcove, located in area 12 on the NTS. GTunnel was
upgraded and a DSA developed as part of the Program for Disposition of a
Radioactive Dispersal Device. For a portion of the non-nuclear support
and storage operations at U1a, nuclear safety is not the primary concern
and in these areas tunnel hardening can be relaxed to reduce costs. The
discrete, small surface footprint of the access/egress shafts at U1a, and
the advantages of depth present a unique solution to the 2005 Design
Basis Threat security requirements. Operational security costs would be
significantly reduced as compared to security costs for surface
facilities, but may require construction of a small PIDAS around the
surface footprint of each shaft. The primary Intrusion Detection System
would be the depth of the shaft. The access/egress and ventilation
shafts, and tunnel complex can be instrumented and monitored and provides
direct line-of-sight. If intruders were able to reach the underground
complex, they would also have to exit through one of the shafts, which
would provide sufficient response time for security personnel and other
assets. The proposed U1a expansion provides close proximity for all
operations, the flexibility to expand the above ground mission for non-
PIDAS protected activities (out of scope for this submission), and
continued support for the Sub-Critical Experiment Program. The
capabilities for each requirement at U1a include: 1. Nuclear Weapon
Assembly: At U1a, Assembly activities would be conducted in a combination
of specially hardened hemispherical cavities and/or standard alcove
cross-section. Environmental controls and other mitigative features would
be similar to DAF.

Page 4 of 8
April 20, 2007 2. Nuclear Component Inventory for Nuclear Weapon
Assembly: At U1a, the Nuclear Components Inventory would be staged in
especially hardened alcoves. Nuclear Weapon Staging: Specially hardened
alcoves would be constructed to stage Nuclear Weapons. Non-Invasive Pit
Rework: Specially hardened alcoves would be constructed for this
requirement. Surveillance Operations: Specially hardened alcoves would be
constructed for surveillance operations. JTA Facilities To support JTA
activities dedicated facilities will be required that are clearly
segregated from nuclear explosive areas to ensure there is no inadvertent
interchange of components. Specific alcoves would be constructed to meet
this requirement. Storage of Disassembled Nuclear Components as Strategic
Reserve. Specific alcoves would be constructed to meet this requirement.
Another advantage of the U1a alternative is the ability to expand the
facility without incurring additional costs such as an expanded PIDAS.
Nuclear Weapon Non-Nuclear Assembly and Disassembly and Special Purpose:
Additional alcoves would be constructed off of main drifts to co-locate
ancillary activities with the Assembly mission. These Special Purpose
requirements include: a) b) c) d) e) f) g) h) Radiography Loading and
Unloading facilities Vacuum chambers Pump-down/backfill manifolds Dynamic
Balancer/Moment of Inertia (MOI) Facility Paint Bay Metrology
Miscellaneous Support

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Each of the special purpose facility alcoves would range from about 1500
to 5000 square feet and include the interlock area. Control rooms for the
various operations would also be incorporated as additional footprint.
Combining operations such as vacuum chamber and pump-down/backfill, and
Dynamic Balancer/MOI will reduce the number of required alcoves.

Page 5 of 8
April 20, 2007 a. Radiography: At U1a, a special alcove would be mined
for radiography similar to the disposition alcove in G-Tunnel. A possible
upgrade to Computed Tomography may be worth considering.
Loading/Unloading Facility: A PIDAS may be required around each shaft,
which would contain the Loading/Unloading Facility. The U1h shaft has
been nuclear certified to support SCEs, and can handle oversized items.
If required, a new shaft could be customized for the A/D mission. Vacuum
Chamber Facility At U1a a specially mined alcove would be mined to
support this requirement or combined in one alcove with other compatible
activities Pump-down/backfill Manifold Facility At U1a a specially mined
alcove would be mined to support this requirement or combined in one
alcove with other compatible activities Dynamic Balancer/Moment of
Inertia Facility At U1a a specially mined alcove would be mined to
support this requirement or combined in one alcove with other compatible
activities Permissive Action Link (PAL) (may not be required) At U1a a
specially mined alcove would be mined to support this requirement or
combined in one alcove with other compatible activities Paint Bay At U1a
a specially mined alcove would be mined to support this requirement or
combined in one alcove with other compatible activities Metrology At U1a,
a specially mined alcove would be mined to support this requirement or
combined in one alcove with other compatible activities Underground
Administrative and Miscellaneous Support: It is common to construct
alcoves underground for administrative offices monitoring rooms, changing
areas for donning and doffing PPE, as required. The constant temperature
underground environment can be augmented to remove waste heat by
expanding the existing chilled water cooling system. Power can be
supplemented with uninterruptible power supplies underground and
generators at the surface.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

i.

Page 6 of 8
April 20, 2007 9. Non-Nuclear Component Inventory for Weapon Nuclear
Assembly, Tooling Warehouse, and General storage for excess hanging gear:
At U1a a specially mined alcove would be mined to support storage of
nonnuclear components and tooling that could be used for assembly
operations. The non-nuclear component storage would be combined with the
tooling alcove to accommodate the required storage of classified tooling,
excess SNL Handling Gear, common use tools, and multiple issues of
tooling to support the program being worked at any given time. This
requirement could be met by construction of less robust alcove
underground. To accommodate the storage requirements, an area of
approximately 20, 000 square feet with high strength industrial shelving
and forklift accessibility, with at least 4 20' X 40' enclosed cages or
cubicles for classified component and electrical tester calibration and
storage. This area could conceivably be used to support maintenance
activities for Quality level storage if properly segregated. Classified
Storage for Non-Nuclear Components Pending Disposition Most processing
and sanitizing of non-nuclear components pending disposition would be
conducted underground either in a new alcove or combined with nonnuclear
component storage activities. U1a Complex Non-PIDAS Area Non-PIDAS
requirements include secure and non-secure storage and processes that do
not require co-location with Assembly activities underground. Some of
these requirements can be met by use of existing NTS facilities and
construction of new facilities at the surface near the access/egress
shafts. The advantages of U1a is there are no requirements for a large
explosive standoff from the surface U1a shafts, which allows new
facilities to be constructed on the surface closer to the shaft
conveyance system. 1. General Administrative and Personnel Processing
Facilities This requirement could be met by use of existing Area 6
Control Point, and/or Construction Camp facilities. This requirement
could also be met by construction of a new facility and parking near the
U1h shaft to facilitate personnel processing.

10.

D.

E.

High Explosive Manufacturing (CHE & IHE) This requirement would be met by
construction of a new facility at BEEF. This facility would consist of
two buildings. The first building would be the explosives work area
constructed of heavily-reinforced, bermmed concrete structure arranged in
a linear configuration with the radiography area between the assembly,
inspection and machining spaces. Normal access to the workrooms shall be
from a central corridor through blast resistant doors. Rear access for
large assemblies shall be through larger blast resistant doors in the
rear of each room. The second building is the support area. The support
building shall consist of a machine shop, storage areas, office space,
rest rooms and laundry area arranged in a linear array

Page 7 of 8
April 20, 2007 across the central corridor. Magazines, parking and
delivery areas will be located around the exterior of the facility. F.
High Explosive Disposal Explosives disposal from disassembly activities
and from manufacturing activities would be conducted at the existing
Explosives Ordnance Disposal Unit on NTS. Explosives from disassembly
operations would first be sanitized at the Classified Storage for
Components Pending Disposition facility. This Unit has an exiting
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act permit and Air permit. Office of
Secure Transportation/General Plant Support: 1. Office of Secure
Transportation Support: This requirement will be met by the use of
existing NTS infrastructure, facilities and support functions. 2. General
Plant Support: This requirement will be met by existing NTS facilities or
as previously described

G.

Conclusion Due to its remoteness, geology, climate and legacy of research
and high hazard experimental success, the NTS is the logical choice for
consolidating nuclear weapon assembly/disassembly operations. NTS is
surrounded on three sides by thousands of square miles of military
reservation to mitigate private and commercial encroachment. The airspace
is controlled to preclude commercial over-flights and all transportation
is on federally owned roads. The geomorphology of the Basin and Range
Province, where the NTS is located, provides natural barriers to
intrusion and observation. Rainfall averages less than 6 inches per year
in the valleys with an average of over 300 days of sunshine per year.
There is an excess of underground water and power at the NTS to support
A/D operations, and the legacy of underground Nuclear Testing ensures the
NTS will be an industrial complex in perpetuity. The NTS provides the
flexibility to accommodate the A/D mission entirely at either the DAF or
U1a only; however, this would require more costly construction at the DAF
over the integrated DAF/U1a alternative proposed here. The NTS also
provides the existing infrastructure services and flexibility to
accommodate the proposed missions, and any surge in A/D operations. NTS
is the only NWC site to provide on-site disposal of Low level Radioactive
Waste. It is on schedule to meet the 2005 Design Basis Threat security
requirements. By siting the Assembly/Disassembly mission at the NTS, the
opportunity exists to fully utilize the NTS resources and maximize the
government's investment in the NTS.

Page 8 of 8
WEAPONS A/D CNPC OPTIONS 4/4/07

1/24/2008

Construction Summary Sheet Total Construction Inside PIDAS for A/D
Data Required Peak Electrical energy (Mwe) Diesel Generators (Yes/No)
Concrete (yd3) Steel (ton) Liquid fuel and lub oil (gal) Water (gal) Land
(acre) Laydown Area Size Parking lots Footprint of New Construction Total
Square Footage added Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak
employment (workers) Construction period (years) Waste Generated Low
Level Waste Hazardous Waste Non-Hazardous (Sanitary and Other)
Consumption / Use 145.00 Yes 202,549.14 10,381.79 9,718,204.15
1,122,000.00 95.72 27.55 17.36 1,042,402.98 1,042,400.98 3,114.81
2,022.00 57.60
3 Volume (yd )

Total Construction Outside PIDAS for A/D
Data Required Peak Electrical energy (Mwe) Diesel Generators (Yes/No) 3
Concrete (yd ) Steel (ton) Liquid fuel and lub oil (gal) Water (gal) Land
(acre) Laydown Area Size Parking lots Footprint of New Construction Total
Square Footage added Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak
employment (workers) Construction period (years) Waste Generated Low
Level Waste Hazardous Waste Non-Hazardous (Sanitary and Other)
Consumption / Use 132.00 Yes 121,990.98 7,653.35 11,637,508.27 891,000.00
126.80 28.70 16.94 1,350,993.78 1,350,989.78 3,729.97 1,851.00 54.00
Volume (yd3) 5,205.49 0.00 3,729.97

4,741.39 0.00 3,414.81

Construction Inside PIDAS for A/D
Data Required Peak Electrical energy (Mwe) 3 Concrete (yd ) Steel (ton)
Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown Area Size (acre) Parking lots (acre)
Footprint of New Construction (sq. ft.) Total Square Footage added (sq.
ft.) Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak employment (workers)
Construction period (years) Waste Generated Low Level Waste Hazardous
Waste Consumption / Use 130.00 195,779.65 9,895.11 1,056,000.00 94.11
25.25 16.53 1,024,815.98 1,024,814.98 0.00 2,805.31 1,734.00 51.10 Volume
(yd ) 4,402.92 0.00
3

Construction Outside PIDAS for A/D
Data Required Peak Electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (ton)
Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown Area Size (acre) Parking lots (acre)
Footprint of New Construction (sq. ft.) Total Square Footage added (sq.
ft.) Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak employment (workers)
Construction period (years) Waste Generated Low Level Waste Hazardous
Waste Consumption / Use 117.00 103,061.73 6,152.54 792,000.00 94.67 25.25
14.46 1,001,128.69 1,001,124.69 1,490.05 1,611.00 46.00 Volume (yd )
4,259.03 0.00
3

SPEIS - Weapons A-D CONSTRUCTION Data

1 of 6
WEAPONS A/D CNPC OPTIONS 4/4/07 Non-Hazardous (Sanitary and Other)
3,105.31 Non-Hazardous (Sanitary and Other) 1,490.05

1/24/2008

SPEIS - Weapons A-D CONSTRUCTION Data

2 of 6
WEAPONS A/D CNPC OPTIONS 4/4/07

1/24/2008

Construction Inside PIDAS for Support
Data Required Peak Electrical energy (Mwe) 3 Concrete (yd ) Steel (ton)
Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown Area Size (acre) Parking lots (acre)
Footprint of New Construction (sq. ft.) Total Square Footage added (sq.
ft.) Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak employment (workers)
Construction period (years) Waste Generated Low Level Waste Hazardous
Waste Non-Hazardous (Sanitary and Other) Consumption / Use 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 Volume (yd )

Construction Outside PIDAS for Support
Data Required Peak Electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (ton)
Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown Area Size (acre) Parking lots (acre)
Footprint of New Construction (sq. ft.) Total Square Footage added (sq.
ft.) Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak employment (workers)
Construction period (years) Waste Generated Low Level Waste Hazardous
Waste Non-Hazardous (Sanitary and Other) Consumption / Use 5.00 9,788.11
947.05 33,000.00 21.02 1.15 0.83 228,949.09 228,949.09 97.96 60.00 2.00
Volume (yd3) 489.41 0.00 97.96

0.00 0.00 0.00

Construction Inside PIDAS for Security
Data Required Peak Electrical energy (Mwe) 3 Concrete (yd ) Steel (ton)
Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown Area Size (acre) Parking lots (acre)
Footprint of New Construction (sq. ft.) Total Square Footage added (sq.
ft.) Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak employment (workers)
Construction period (years) Waste Generated Low Level Waste Hazardous
Waste Non-Hazardous (Sanitary and Other) Consumption / Use 15.00 6,769.49
486.68 66,000.00 1.61 2.30 0.83 17,587.00 17,586.00 0.00 309.50 288.00
6.50 Volume (yd ) 338.47 0.00 309.50
3

Construction Outside PIDAS for Security
Data Required Peak Electrical energy (Mwe) 3 Concrete (yd ) Steel (ton)
Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown Area Size (acre) Parking lots (acre)
Footprint of New Construction (sq. ft.) Total Square Footage added (sq.
ft.) Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak employment (workers)
Construction period (years) Waste Generated Low Level Waste Hazardous
Waste Non-Hazardous (Sanitary and Other) Consumption / Use 10.00 9,141.15
553.76 66,000.00 11.10 2.30 1.65 120,916.00 120,916.00 2,141.96 180.00
6.00 Volume (yd ) 457.06 0.00 2,141.96
3

SPEIS - Weapons A-D CONSTRUCTION Data

3 of 6
WEAPONS A/D CNPC OPTIONS 4/4/07

1/24/2008

Total Construction Outside PIDAS for Support
Data Required Peak Electrical energy (Mwe) Diesel Generators (Yes/No)
Concrete (yd3) Steel (ton) Liquid fuel and lub oil (gal) Water (gal) Land
(acre) Laydown Area Size Parking lots Footprint of New Construction Total
Square Footage added Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak
employment (workers) Construction period (years) Waste Generated Low
Level Waste Hazardous Waste Non-Hazardous (Sanitary and Other)
3 Volume (yd )

Consumption / Use 5.00 No 9,788.11 947.05 33,000.00 21.02 1.15 0.83
228,949.09 228,949.09 97.96 60.00 2.00

489.41 0.00 97.96

SPEIS - Weapons A-D CONSTRUCTION Data

4 of 6
WEAPONS ND 1/24/2008
CNPC OPTIONS
4/4/07
SPEIS - Weapons A-D CONSTRUCTION Data 5 of 6

WEAPONS ND 1/24/2008
CNPC OPTIONS
4/4/07
SPEIS - Weapons A-D CONSTRUCTION Data 6 of 6

WEAPONS A/D CNPC OPTIONS 4/4/07 Assumptions: Assume Assembly/Disassembly
MC facilities are: 25 Bays 10 Cells 2 LINAC Bays 1 Mass Properties Bay
Assumes all facilities are built independent (i.e. no economies of
resources) Workers and construction years are the total for each
independent facility. Concrete is 5,000 lb test strength concrete Steel
includes rebar and red iron only; no piping, hangers, steel members,
structural steel, siding etc. Assumes most optimum location (i.e. In
PIDAS or Not) is desired location (i.e. no industrial engineering
analysis for operational efficiencies) Estimate from Mueller Steel
Buildings: 3600 sq. ft. facility has: 24,000 lbs of steel weight or
0.003333 tons/sq.ft. Low Level wastes include concrete tailings Sanitary
wastes are estimated based on construction workers. Offices for support
personnel (engineers, tooling, metrology, maintenance, administrative
functions, etc. broken down by PIDAS area or not.)

Exclusions: Security infrastructure (ARGUS, PIDAS, RADAR, ETC)
Infrastructure and infrastructure support for: Individual Building Diesel
Generator sets Classified networks, computing, computing facilities
Electricity Telephone and other communications Fire Alarm/Fire Protection
Sewer Water Steam/Condensate Gas Air

SPEIS - Weapons A-D CONSTRUCTION Data

1 of 1
WEAPONS A/D CNPC OPTIONS OPERATIONS DATA

Annual Operations TOTAL
Data Required Annual Electrical energy (MWh) Peak Electrical energy (Mwe)
Fuel Usage (gal or yd3) Other Process Gas (N, Ar, etc.) Water Plant
footprint (acres) Employment (workers) Number of Radiation Workers
Average annual dose (mrems) Maximum worker dose (mrems) Radionuclide
emissions and effluents-nuclides and Curies Tritium (Ci) Total Uranium
(Ci) Total Other Actinides (Ci) NAAQS emissions (tons/year) Oxides of
Nitrogen (tons/year) Carbon Monoxide (tons/year) Volatile Organic
Compounds (tons/year) Particulate Matter (tons/year) Sulfur Dioxide
(tons/year) Hazardous Air Pollutants and Effluents (tons/yr) Chemical Use
Liquid (gallons) Solid (pounds) Maximum inventory of fissile
material/throughput Waste Generated Low Level Waste Liquid (gallons)
Solid (pounds) Mixed Low-Level Liquid (gallons) Solid (pounds) TRU Liquid
(gallons) Solid (pounds) Hazardous Waste Liquid (gallons) Solid (pounds)
Non-Hazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gallons) Solid (pounds) Non-Hazardous
(Other) Liquid (gallons) Solid (pounds) Consumption / Use 70,029 11.864
367 131 2,500 1,785 400 103 750 See Below 1.41E-02 7.50E-05 2.17E-15 See
Below 91.27 30.98 30.61 18.41 4.80 21.52 39,976.83 294,437.94

Volume (yd3) See Below 5,410.00 38.51 See Below 6.00 0.21 See Below 0.00
0.00 See Below 5,888.00 922.67 See Below 0.00 14,749.91 See Below
45,551.00 11,867.12

4/4/07 Summary Operations, SPEIS - Weapons A-D Operations Data

1 of 3
WEAPONS A/D CNPC OPTIONS OPERATIONS DATA

Annual Operations PIDAS
Data Required Annual Electrical energy (MWh) Peak Electrical energy (Mwe)
Fuel Usage (gal or yd3) Other Process Gas (N, Ar, etc.) Water Plant
footprint (acres) Employment (workers) Number of Radiation Workers
Average annual dose (mrems) Maximum worker dose (mrems) Radionuclide
emissions and effluents-nuclides and Curies Tritium (Ci) Total Uranium
(Ci) Total Other Actinides (Ci) NAAQS emissions (tons/year) Oxides of
Nitrogen (tons/year) Carbon Monoxide (tons/year) Volatile Organic
Compounds (tons/year) Particulate Matter (tons/year) Sulfur Dioxide
(tons/year) Hazardous Air Pollutants and Effluents (tons/yr) Chemical Use
Liquid (gallons) Solid (pounds) Maximum inventory of fissile
material/throughput Waste Generated Low Level Waste Liquid (gallons)
Solid (pounds) Mixed Low-Level Liquid (gallons) Solid (pounds) TRU Liquid
(gallons) Solid (pounds) Hazardous Waste Liquid (gallons) Solid (pounds)
Non-Hazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gallons) Solid (pounds) Non-Hazardous
(Other) Liquid (gallons) Solid (pounds) Consumption / Use Not Available
Not Available Not Available Not Available Not Available Not Available 380
103 750 See Below 1.40E-02 7.50E-05 See Below 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.00
0.00 See Below Not Available Not Available

Volume (yd3) 36.54 0.02 0 320.13 Not Available 10543.57 -

4/4/07 Summary Operations, SPEIS - Weapons A-D Operations Data

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WEAPONS A/D CNPC OPTIONS OPERATIONS DATA

Annual Operations NON-PIDAS
Data Required Annual Electrical energy (MWh) Peak Electrical energy (Mwe)
Fuel Usage (gal or yd3) Other Process Gas (N, Ar, etc.) Water Plant
footprint (acres) Employment (workers) Number of Radiation Workers
Average annual dose (mrems) Maximum worker dose (mrems) Radionuclide
emissions and effluents-nuclides and Curies Tritium (Ci) Total Uranium
(Ci) Total Other Actinides (Ci) NAAQS emissions (tons/year) Oxides of
Nitrogen (tons/year) Carbon Monoxide (tons/year) Volatile Organic
Compounds (tons/year) Particulate Matter (tons/year) Sulfur Dioxide
(tons/year) Hazardous Air Pollutants and Effluents (tons/yr) Chemical Use
Liquid (gallons) Solid (pounds) Maximum inventory of fissile
material/throughput Waste Generated Low Level Waste Liquid (gallons)
Solid (pounds) Mixed Low-Level Liquid (gallons) Solid (pounds) TRU Liquid
(gallons) Solid (pounds) Hazardous Waste Liquid (gallons) Solid (pounds)
Non-Hazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gallons) Solid (pounds) Non-Hazardous
(Other) Liquid (gallons) Solid (pounds) Consumption / Use Not Available
Not Available Not Available Not Available Not Available Not Available Not
Available 20 103 750 See Below 7.50E-05 8.38E-09 2.17E-15 See Below 91.27
30.98 29.71 18.41 4.80 21.52 See Below Not Available Not Available

Volume (yd3) 28.76 0.22 0 631.69 Not Available 1549.08 -

4/4/07 Summary Operations, SPEIS - Weapons A-D Operations Data

3 of 3
Assumed office personnel 1. Design, develop, and certify nuclear weapons.
Weapon

2030 assumed numbers (1/2 of current)

4/4/07 FTEs,SPEIS - Weapons A-D Operations Data Complex 2030 - Mapping of
Staffing to Capabilities by Program/Subprogram 15 15 2a. Manufacturing,
surveillance and disposition of plutonium components Weapon 10 3.
Manufacturing, surveillance and disposition of High Explosive components
HE 57.5 382.5 32.5 745.5 3025 1240 72.5 4. Manufacturing, surveillance
and disposition of nuclear weapons, assembly and disassembly. Weapon
557.5 65 6. Mission Support (direct) and indirect allocation to NW
program Support 1065 1785 Total Staffing 5. Store and transport nuclear
weapons, components, and materials; includes containers and H gear Weapon
7 1 of 1

WEAPONS A/D CNPC OPTIONS FTES
WEAPONS A/D CNPC OPTIONS AVERAGE ANNUAL DOSE

NUMBER OF RAD WORKERS CALCULATION 1,785 Future Plant Population 400
Future Rad Workers

Collective Dose Number Monitored Year For Year Monthly 2000 30259 327
2001 37644 358 2002 42333 350 2003 31551 308 2004 21474 324 2005 39587
336 2006 36383 317 Average Monthly Worker Dose

Average Annual Dose to Monthly Monitored 93 105 121 102 66 118 115 103

4/4/07 Rad Safety;SPEIS - Weapons A-D Operations Data

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WEAPONS A/D CNPC OPTIONS EMISSIONS PIDAS OPERATIONS EMISSION POTENTIAL
Unit Name Component Cleaning Painting Facilities Totals 0.00 0.00 NOx CO
VOC Total 9.00E-01 0.90 VOC - HAPS SO2 9.00E-01 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PM Total PM - HAPS HAPs Other HAPs Total ** 0.00 Emissions are VOC's that
have been excluded from Regulatory definition under 30TAC101.10.

*Used PTE numbers instead of Actual emissions.

Note: While there are Emergency Stationary standby engines in both the
PIDAS and non-Pidas areas, these function more in a Support role, and so
are counted in that Area's emissions. Note: There is one set of two
operational Painting facilities in the PIDAS area, with three separate
booths; there is one such facility in the Non-Pidas area. Note:
Miscellaneous Chemicals is group of activities, and covers the entire
site. It would be best to include these emissions in the Support Area,
though some of the emissions will occur in the PIDAS & Non-Pidas areas,
rather than provide information which by mis-interpretation may indicate
more emissions that are certified. Note: HAP total emissions for the
painting facilities are currently included in the PTE of Miscellaneous
Chemicals.

Unit Name

NOx

CO 0.00 12.04 18.94 30.98

VOC Total 0.00 22.90 6.81 29.72

VOC - HAPS SO2 0.00 6.18 5.31 11.49 0.00 0.01 4.79 4.80

PM Total 0.00 3.97 14.45 18.41

PM - HAPS 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00

HAPs Other HAPs Total 0.00 4.64 0.30 4.94 0.00 14.46 7.07 21.52

Totals - PIDAS OPERATIONS EMISSION POTENTIAL 0.00 Total - Non-PIDAS
OPERATIONS EMISSION POTENTIAL Totals - SUPPORT EMISSIONS POTENTIAL Totals
6.15 85.12 91.27

4/4/07 Emissions;SPEIS - Weapons A-D Operations Data

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WEAPONS A/D CNPC OPTIONS EMISSIONS Non-PIDAS OPERATIONS EMISSION
POTENTIAL
Unit Name Explosives Explosives Synthesis Explosives Formulation/Material
Evaluation Firing sites Hazardous Waste Permit HW Burning Ground HW
Storage HW Treatment/Processing Paper Incinerator Facility - Dual
Chamnber Incinerator Plastics Shop Dismantlement Support - Parts Cleaning
Stockpile Evaluation/Demilitarization - Epoxy Foam Production Explosives
processing/Demilitarization HWTF Liquid Processing Facility Painting
Facilities Pressing & Transferring HE & Mock Recrystallization of
Material Chemical Transfer Operations Totals 6.15 12.04 5.00E-02 4.41E-01
22.90 5.00E-02 4.41E-01 6.18 0.01 3.97 1.00 4.64 2.08E-03 7.50E-01 7.50E-
01 3.85E-03 2.50E-04 5.00E-02 4.41E-01 14.46 4.20E-02 1.21E-01 5.00E+00
8.00E+00 6.20E+00 2.40E+00 1.10E+00 1.45E-02 1.22E+00 5.00E-03 1.84E-03
8.00E-04 7.19E-06 7.19E-06 8.00E-04 7.19E-06 3.00E-01 2.40E+00 1.10E+00
1.58E-03 1.13E+00 1.30E-02 4.14E-02 3.20E+00 1.00E+00 2.80E+00 4.10E+00
2.40E+00 1.10E+00 1.58E-03 1.13E+00 3.80E-01 3.65E+00 NOx 7.30E-01 CO
2.70E-01 VOC Total 6.06E+00 3.90E+00 7.60E-01 2.10E-01 5.10E-01 1.42E+00
VOC - HAPS SO2 PM Total PM - HAPS HAPs Other HAPs Total 4.20E-01 2.04E+00
1.60E+00 1.59E+00

4/4/07 Emissions;SPEIS - Weapons A-D Operations Data

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WEAPONS A/D CNPC OPTIONS EMISSIONS SUPPORT EMISSIONS POTENTIAL
Unit Name Plant-Wide Steam Production Boilers, Natural Gas Boilers, #2
Fuel Oil Generators Boiler, backup diesel tank Boiler, Treatment
Chemicals Plant Wide Welding and Cutting Machine Shop - Machining Vehicle
Maintenance - Fueling Operations Vehicle Maintenance - Body Shop 16-18A
HWTF Liquid Processing Facility Chlorination Facilities Site-wide Cooling
Towers Load Leveling Engines Revision 3 Standby Emergency Engines Safety
Kleen Operations ER, Burning Ground RFI Characterization, Interim
Corrective Measures, and Composting Burning Grounds-GAC System
Miscellaneous Chem Tracking, Plant-wide Zone-11 Soil-Vapor Extraction
(SVE) System Totals 0.16 85.12 2.41 18.94 1.06E+00 6.81 5.31 7.06E+00
1.67E+01 1.52E+00 3.90E+00 6.89E-01 1.20E+00 1.12E-01 1.60E-01 4.65E-01
7.30E-01 9.84E+00 4.97E-01 7.20E-01 1.12E-01 1.60E-01 1.93E-05 9.98E-05
2.60E-01 1.95E+00 2.71E-02 2.08E-03 3.03E-01 3.03E-01 1.36E-02 1.48E-03
2.01E-06 5.63E-04 1.42E-02 5.91E-01 7.91E-03 3.54E-03 1.76E-04 3.54E-03
1.76E-04 NOx 4.51E+01 8.01E+00 8.10E+00 CO 7.65E+00 2.01E+00 1.45E+00 VOC
Total 1.07E+00 1.10E-01 2.30E-01 2.10E-01 2.00E-02 VOC - HAPS SO2 2.40E-
01 2.84E+00 5.00E-01 PM Total 1.85E+00 8.00E-01 1.10E-01 2.00E-02 PM -
HAPS HAPs Other HAPs Total

Emission are Fugitive VOC; not to be included in determination of Site's
PTE per Title V definitions Emission are Fugitive VOC; not to be included
in determination of Site's PTE per Title V definitions 4.07E-03 4.06E-03
5.00E+00 1.00E-02 4.79 3.00E-02 14.45 0.00 0.30 5.02E-03 5.00E+00
1.45E+00 7.07

4/4/07 Emissions;SPEIS - Weapons A-D Operations Data

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WEAPONS A/D CNPC OPTIONS RADIONUCLIDE EMISSIONS

4/4/07 Radionuclides;SPEIS - Weapons A-D Operations Data

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WEAPONS A/D CNPC OPTIONS CHEMICALS CHEMICALS Escalated 3% per year for 2
years Projected FY 2007 Data Factor 277536 37682 1.0609 1.0609 294437.94
pounds 39976.83 gallons

4/4/07 Chemicals;SPEIS - Weapons A-D Operations Data

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CNPC

Program, Capability and Facility Requirements For the Consolidated
Nuclear Production Center Background The complex of sites and facilities
to perform the nuclear portion of the US nuclear weapons production
mission has undergone considerable downsizing and consolidation since its
peak years of the 1960s. The complex today consists of the Y-12 Plant in
Tennessee for the production of nuclear secondaries and associated
components, the Savannah River Site in South Carolina for tritium
operations, the Pantex Plant in Texas for full weapon assembly and
disassembly, and facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New
Mexico for plutonium component production. This network of nuclear
facilities remains dispersed, is aged, and is not fully capable of
supporting projected future US national security requirements. One
alternative under consideration in NNSA long range program planning,
including the ongoing Supplement to the Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, is the
construction and operation of a new production center to perform the
nuclear component missions currently performed at Y-12, Pantex, and LANL.
The tritium operations would continue to be located at the SRS under all
alternatives. The purpose of this document is to describe the high level
program, capability, and facility requirements for this Consolidated
Nuclear Production Center (CNPC). Program Requirements The CNPC will be
sized and configured to support the US nuclear weapons stockpile
projected to exist after full implementation of the Moscow Treaty. Sizing
of the CNPC is driven by assumptions about requirements for new and
replacement weapon components and complete weapons. CNPC sizing
assumptions are based on planning discussions with the DoD (military
services, STRATCOM, and OSD) and military services, and the 2001 Nuclear
Posture Review. The CNPC capacity will be sized to support delivery of
125 weapon assemblies per year net to the stockpile of two weapon types
from the weapons assembly plant in five-day, single shift operations.
Multiple shift operation would yield up to 200 weapon assemblies per year
net to the stockpile of two weapon types. In addition to production and
assembly of complete weapons, the CNPC must be capable of receiving
weapons of each type from the stockpile for stockpile surveillance
purposes. Capability and capacity to dismantle the weapons, configure
them for laboratory and flight testing, perform component and system
tests, and, if necessary, reassemble the weapons for return to the
stockpile must exist. Based on expected weapon types in the Moscow Treaty
stockpile, sufficient capacity will be provided at the CNPC to support 75
weapon surveillance units per year. This capacity includes performing the
surveillance
disassembly and inspection, the required non-destructive and destructive
component and system testing, and rebuild of the weapons after testing to
return them to the stockpile. Nuclear component (pits and secondaries)
surveillance testing will also be supported at the CNPC. A capacity to
perform up to 15 destructive nuclear component surveillances per year
will be constructed. Weapon dismantlement sufficient to achieve the
Moscow Treaty-accountable stockpile level of 1700-2200 operationally
deployed strategic nuclear weapons is assumed to occur at the Pantex
Plant in existing facilities. Secondary dismantlement to eliminate the
current backlog of secondaries requiring dismantlement, as well as
secondaries taken from future dismantlement to achieve Moscow Treaty
levels, are assumed to occur at the Y-12 Plant. It is likely that further
stockpile reductions and associated weapon dismantlements will occur
during the operating life of the CNPC. The CNPC will be configured to
support weapon and component dismantlement missions for these future
stockpile reductions that might occur, in addition to dismantlement of
weapons replaced by production of new weapons. Sufficient capacity to
eliminate future weapon and component dismantlements within a reasonable
time period will be provided at the CNPC. A baseline dismantlement
capacity of 400 units per year in five-day, single shift operations is
assumed. The future US nuclear weapons stockpile is assumed to consist of
the same number of weapon types as exist today. The US national security
and political leadership are currently considering the authorization of a
new weapon type, the Reliable Replacement Warhead, to replace over the
next several decades the weapon types in the existing nuclear weapons
stockpile. Because a multi-decade series of decisions can not be forecast
with confidence at this time, the CNPC will be equipped to allow the
future production of both legacy type replacement weapons and the new RRW
weapons. As future decisions regarding the RRW are made, this mix of
production technology requirements will be revisited to assure that the
final CNPC that is constructed and operated is best tailored to meet
future production requirements. Plutonium and highly enriched uranium
(together referred to as special nuclear material, or SNM) will be stored
at the CNPC to support future NNSA needs. The NNSA nuclear weapons
program requires inventories of SNM to support in process operations of
the CNPC as well as inventories held as national security reserve. In
addition, the CNPC will be required to store Highly Enriched Uranium for
other DOE and NNSA missions such as Naval Reactors, Nuclear
Nonproliferation including down blending of excess materials, domestic
and foreign reactor supply, Defense Research Reactor supply, and Mutual
Defense. The projected changes in the HEU inventory over time have been
captured in classified documents to support CNPC planning. Because it is
likely that further stockpile reductions and associated weapon
dismantlements will occur during the operating life of the CNPC,
additional quantities of SNM will likely become excess to the nuclear
weapons program and require storage. It is assumed that the CNPC will not
be required to store the excess plutonium components (beyond a reasonable
work in process inventory) and that these plutonium components
will be declared excess to nuclear weapons program needs and
dispositioned at appropriate facilities. The CNPC will have adequate
capacity to store and process excess HEU components. Any required NEPA
decisions for these excess plutonium and HEU materials would be made at
the time the materials are declared excess, not in the Supplement to the
SSM PEIS. Required CNPC Capabilities The CNPC will include capabilities
for HEU processing and weapon component production as currently performed
at the Y-12 Plant, and plutonium processing and weapon component
production as currently performed on a limited capacity basis at LANL.
Process technology development in support of plutonium and HEU component
production would be performed at the CNPC. In addition, R&D in support of
LANL and LLNL programs requiring the use of Category I or II quantities
of SNM will be performed at the CNPC. Capabilities to safely and securely
store required quantities of SNM will be provided, as described above. In
addition, the CNPC will include facilities for the weapons assembly and
disassembly (A/D) mission currently performed at the Pantex Plant.
Nuclear explosive A/D facilities are quite different from plutonium and
HEU nuclear component production facilities. Although they share common
infrastructure requirements, like high security, the A/D facilities
introduce very different operating hazards and involve a very different
skill set for management, technical, and production workers. Therefore,
the generic CNPC definition will describe the weapon A/D function as a
severable piece to allow decision makers to consider an alternative that
locates the nuclear production facilities portion of the CNPC at a
different site than the weapons A/D mission. In all cases, the high
explosive processing and fabrication mission is assumed to be an integral
part of the weapons A/D mission. Both conventional high explosive (CHE)
and insensitive high explosive (IHE) processing and fabrication
capabilities are assumed to be included in the high explosive mission.
Though commercial or DoD sources for the synthesis and formulation of CHE
and IHE will be sought, current market capability forecasts indicate that
NNSA can not assume a commercial source for these materials, and that
limited facilities for CHE and IHE synthesis and formulation will be
required at the weapons A/D facility. In addition, facilities for process
technology development in support of all of the weapons A/D missions are
required. The production technology of the CNPC must support the
reprocessing of stockpile returned plutonium and uranium into feed
material that meets new production specifications. Fabrication,
inspection, and assembly equipment at the CNPC must support the
fabrication of new RRW weapons or replacement legacy weapons. In general,
the ability to produce legacy weapons will also provide RRW production
capability. RRW concepts use fewer hazardous materials (than found in
most legacy weapons) and require production tolerances within the range
of those required for legacy weapons production.
The assembly of plutonium and HEU nuclear weapons components also
requires the production of several unique non-nuclear components. For
plutonium components, it is assumed that the stainless steel and other
unique metallic parts would be fabricated at the NNSA non-nuclear
production site (currently the Kansas City Plant). Legacy weapon
plutonium components also require the production of beryllium components.
It is assumed that the limited beryllium component production capability
in the Complex will be sufficient to support any required legacy
plutonium component production. RRW plutonium components do not require
the production of beryllium components. For HEU secondaries, it is
assumed that the depleted uranium and lithium components would be
produced at the CNPC. Trade studies will be performed to determine
whether other secondary non-nuclear components should be produced at the
NNSA non-nuclear production site or at the CNPC. For purposes of current
planning, it is assumed that these other non-nuclear components
(currently produced at the Y-12 Plant) would be produced at the CNPC. The
CNPC will utilize best available production and inspection equipment used
by US industry. The CNPC will not require the design, development, and
fabrication of unique specialized production and inspection equipment
that are beyond the capabilities of equipment suppliers. Ongoing NNSA
technology development initiatives that adapt industry supplied equipment
to unique nuclear weapons production requirements will be assumed for
initial CNPC use only when satisfactory demonstration programs have been
completed. The CNPC design will not rely on undemonstrated equipment or
process technologies. Automation and remote handling will be utilized
when it can confidently reduce worker exposure to hazardous materials and
operations. However, processes will only be automated when experience and
analysis can demonstrate their feasibility for operability and
maintainability. The CNPC will include waste treatment facilities to
provide treatment of all radiological and hazardous process wastes
generated at the CNPC. Treatment will be sufficient to allow shipment to
off-site disposal facilities. Waste disposal will not be part of the CNPC
scope, though some potential sites have existing waste disposal
capabilities that could be used by the CNPC. The CNPC will be designed to
provide best reasonably achievable levels of safety for CNPC workers and
the offsite population residing near the CNPC. Applicable nuclear safety
and nuclear explosive safety standards and policies are defined in 10 CFR
820, 830, 835, 851 and 701, DOE and NNSA Orders, and NNSA policy
guidance. To the maximum degree practical, the CNPC will provide
engineered features to ensure operational safety, and not rely on
administrative controls. The CNPC will be designed to provide best
reasonably achievable levels of security to protect SNM and complete
nuclear weapons. Current classified 2005 Design Basis Threat requirements
from NNSA are to be used for the CNPC design. Trade studies will be
performed to seek to balance worker safety, security enhancements, and
costs for the CNPC. The siting of the CNPC facilities above or below
ground is a major example of
such a trade study. For initial planning purposes, it is assumed that
CNPC facilities will be constructed above ground. The CNPC will be
designed to have a useful operating life of at least 50 years without
major facility renovation beyond normal preventive and corrective
maintenance. The CNPC will be designed and operated to meet all existing
applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations. CNPC Facility
and Siting Requirements The CNPC will be considered for location at one
of the following NNSA sites: the Savannah River Site, near the Y-12 Plant
on federal property, the Pantex Plant, the Nevada Test Site, and Los
Alamos. It is currently assumed that adequate physical space can be made
available at each of the potential CNPC sites to support the full CNPC
mission. However, once the generic CNPC definition is further developed
it may be found that adequate space does not exist at one or more of the
assumed sites. Should a site not have adequate space for the full CNPC
mission, an alternative that locates only the plutonium and HEU missions
at the site will be evaluated, with the weapons A/D mission remaining at
Pantex or relocated to the Nevada Test Site. Beneficial use will be
sought from existing and planned assets and capabilities at each site
that are expected to have a reasonable remaining useful life at the time
of CNPC occupancy. For example, the new HEU Materials Facility (HEUMF)
being constructed at the Y-12 Plant is assumed to provide storage for
planned inventories of DOE and NNSA HEU until the CNPC is operational.
Should the CNPC be constructed at Y-12, the HEUMF would continue to
support DOE and NNSA needs, and the Y-12-specific CNPC design would not
require SNM storage facilities. In addition, it is assumed that three of
the five weapons A/D cells at the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the
Nevada Test Site would be available to support the CNPC weapons A/D
mission. Also, other DAF operating bays not currently assigned to long
term missions would be available for CNPC use. An analysis will be
performed at each potential CNPC site to identify existing or planned
production, support, and administrative facilities that could be
beneficially used by the CNPC if it were located at that site. The
uranium processing facility (UPF) currently planned at the Y-12 Plant is
assumed to be the major part of the facility definition for the HEU part
of the CNPC. In addition, facilities for storage of national security HEU
reserve, Naval Reactor HEU, and all other DOE and NNSA programmatic and
excess HEU and non-nuclear secondary component production will be
required at the CNPC. The Consolidated Plutonium Center (CPC) facility
concept would be the major part of the facility and process definition
for the plutonium facility portion of the CNPC. The CPC is built on the
prior NNSA work on the Modern Pit Facility (MPF). In addition, facilities
for national security reserve plutonium storage will be required at the
CNPC.
A modular arrangement of facilities (campus) is assumed for the CNPC
rather than separate operational wings of a single large facility under
one roof. The facilities making up the CNPC campus will be configured so
that they can be constructed sequentially. Different programmatic and
facility needs drive the sequence that the CNPC facilities will be built.
Because of the status of the design effort and programmatic need, the UPF
and associated facilities will be designed and constructed first. Because
of the programmatic need and current state of LANL plutonium facilities,
the CPF and associated facilities will be constructed second. The CNPC
A/D facilities would be the last segment of the CNPC to be constructed
and operated. The presently assumed schedule for these CNPC missions is:
Mission Highly Enriched Uranium (UPF) Plutonium Operations (CPF) Assembly
and Disassembly Start Facility Design 2009 2012 2015 Begin Operations
2018 2022 2025

The business case analysis of life cycle costs, along with a technical
assessment, will be conducted to validate, and if necessary modify, the
phased schedule for these missions that would be most economical and best
support national security requirements. It is assumed that facilities at
the Y-12 and Pantex Plants whose missions would be included in the CNPC
construction projects would be brought to a safe shutdown condition as
soon as programmatically possible if one of these sites is not selected
for the CNPC mission. This condition would allow the sites to remain in a
safe condition with minimal site surveillance awaiting D&D. It is also
assumed that the LANL and LLNL Category I or II nuclear facilities would
be reduced to Category III or IV nuclear facilities for R&D purposes
after the CNPC begins operations. Start-up and operation of the complex
suite of CNPC facilities will be an extremely complex operational
challenge. To facilitate start-up and operation of the CNPC, key staff at
the existing sites will be encouraged to relocate to the CNPC site to the
maximum degree feasible. It is assumed that financial incentives will be
offered for the relocation of key skills from the current site to the
CNPC. To enable key staff to participate in both the safe shutdown of
existing capabilities and the safe start-up and operation of CNPC
capabilities, "pre-building" of workload at the existing site will be
planned to generate a capability transition period for the CNPC. The CNPC
shall consist of a central core area that includes all operations
involving category I or II quantities of SNM, as well as all support
facilities that require SNM-level security protection. This core area
shall be surrounded by a Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment
System (PIDAS). A buffer area shall provide unobstructed view of the land
area surrounding the PIDAS. All administrative and non-SNM support
buildings shall be located outside the edge of the buffer area. In
addition, any nonnuclear production buildings located at the CNPC to
support nuclear component production shall be located outside of the
buffer area. The land requirements for operation of a CNPC and CNC are
shown below.
Land Requirements to Operate a CNPC*
Operation (acres) Total Area: 545* PIDAS Total: 235 o CPC: 40 o CUC: 15 o
A/D/Pu Storage: 180 Non-PIDAS Total: 310 o Non-SNM component production:
20 o Administrative Support: 70 o Explosives Area: 120 o Buffer Area: 100

*Total land area for CNPC at Y-12 would be reduced by approximately 27
acres due to existing uranium production facilities, including the HEUMF.

Land Requirements to Operate a CNC*
Operation (acres) Total: 55 o CPC: 40 o CUC: 15 Total Area: 195* PIDAS
Non-PIDAS Total: 140 o Non-SNM component production: 20 o Administrative
Support: 70 o Buffer Area: 50

*Total land area for CNC at Y-12 would be reduced by approximately 27
acres due to existing uranium production facilities, including the HEUMF.

The above areas assume an optimal square configuration for the central
PIDAS protected facilities. Site adaptation to local geography and
available land would likely increase these numbers.
Integrated Project Team Analysis Requirements & Assumptions IPT
Designation: Consolidated Nuclear Production Center (CNPC) (1)

1.Mission-related Requirements & Assumptions

Plutonium component fabrication, process technology development for
plutonium components, LANL and LLNL R&D for Category I or II quantities
of plutonium, storage of plutonium for in process inventory and strategic
reserve. (2) Highly enriched uranium (HEU) component fabrication, process
technology development for HEU components, LANL and LLNL R&D for Category
I or II quantities of HEU, storage of HEU for in process inventory and
strategic reserve, for Naval Reactors program, and excess HEU. (3)
Weapons Assembly and Disassembly and associated missions including high
explosive component fabrication. 2.Nature/size of the Stockpile (1) Based
on planning discussions with DOD and military Requirements & Assumptions
services as well as 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. (2) Moscow Treaty level
for stockpile. (3) Same number of weapon types that exist in current
stockpile. (4) Stockpile could be comprised of all legacy, all RRW, or a
mix of legacy and RRW weapons. 3.Capability/Competency(1) Plutonium and
HEU process capability, component related Requirements & production, and
process technology development. Uranium Assumptions processing facility
(UPF) currently planned at the Y-12 Plant is assumed to be the major part
of the facility definition for the HEU facility. Consolidated Plutonium
Center (CPC) facility concept would be the major part of the facility and
process definition for the plutonium facility. (2) R&D facilities for
plutonium and HEU for LANL and LLNL. (3) Weapons assembly and disassembly
capability, Weapons Evaluation and Test Facility capabilities, and
nuclear component surveillance capability. (4) High explosives (CHE and
IHE) synthesis, formulation, and fabrication capability. (5) Reprocess
and recovery capability for process residues and stockpile returned
plutonium and HEU. (6) Process technologies for both legacy and RRW
weapons. (7) Fabrication of depleted uranium and lithium components for
secondaries and cases. (8) Fabrication of other non-nuclear secondary and
case components (could be assigned later to NNSA non-nuclear production
plant). (9) Best available production and inspection equipment used by
industry that will not require major design, development, and fabrication
of unique specialized production and inspection equipment beyond the
capabilities of equipment suppliers. (10) Automation and remote handling
when it can confidently reduce worker exposure to hazardous materials and
operations. (11) Waste treatment facilities for all radiological and
hazardous
4.Capacity/Throughput-related Requirements & Assumptions

process wastes generated at the CNPC sufficient to allow shipment to off-
site disposal facilities. Waste disposal will not be part of the CNPC
scope. (12) Best reasonably achievable levels of safety for CNPC workers
and the offsite population. Expertise and experience in nuclear facility
operations. (13) Best reasonably achievable levels of security to protect
SNM and complete nuclear weapons. Expertise and experience in protection
of SNM and complete nuclear weapons. (14) Beneficial use will be sought
from existing and planned assets and capabilities at each site that are
expected to have a reasonable remaining useful life at the time of CNPC
occupancy. (1) Capacity to assemble 125 weapons per year net to the
stockpile. (2) Five-day single shift operations. (3) 75 weapon
surveillance units per year with capacity to rebuild and return to
stockpile if necessary. (4) Up to 15 pits and 15 secondaries surveillance
tested each year. (5) Capacity to dismantle 400 weapons and secondaries
per year. (6) Capacity allows up to 200 weapons per year in multiple
shift operations. (1) To have a useful operating life of at least 50
years without major facility renovation beyond preventive and corrective
maintenance. To enable key staff to participate in both the safe shutdown
of existing capabilities and the safe start-up and operation of CNPC
capabilities; "pre-building" of workload at the existing site will be
planned to generate a capability transition period for the CNPC. The
facilities making up the CNPC campus will be configured so that they can
be constructed sequentially. The HEU facility would be constructed first,
the plutonium facility constructed second, and the A/D facility would be
constructed last. A required start-up date for the CNPC will not be
arbitrary. Programmatic needs and budgetary realities will be used to
derive an assumed start-up date. At present, the assumed phased schedules
are: Start Facility Design 2009 2012 2015 Begin 2018 2022 2025

5.Schedule/Timeline-related Requirements & Assumptions

(2)

(3)

(4)

Mission Operations HEU (UPF) Pu Operations (CPF) A/D
6.Location/Configurationrelated Requirements Assumptions

&

(1)

Planning and cost estimates based on above ground construction of
facilities. Qualitative assessment for SPEIS of underground facilities.
Trade study will be performed in detail later. (2) Located at one of the
following NNSA sites: the Savannah River Site, near the Y-12 Plant on
federal property, the Pantex Plant, the Nevada Test Site, or Los Alamos.
(3) Should a site not have adequate space for the full CNPC mission, an
alternative that locates only the plutonium and HEU missions at the site
will be evaluated, with the weapons A/D mission remaining at Pantex or
relocated to the Nevada Test Site. (4) A modular arrangement of
facilities (campus) is assumed rather than separate operational wings of
a single large facility under one roof. (5) The CNPC shall consist of a
central core area that includes all operations involving category I or II
quantities of SNM, as well as all support facilities that require SNM-
level security protection. This core area shall be surrounded by a
Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System (PIDAS). (6) A buffer
area 300 feet wide shall provide unobstructed view of the land area
surrounding the PIDAS. All administrative and non-SNM support buildings
shall be located outside the edge of the buffer area. In addition, any
non-nuclear production buildings located at the CNPC to support nuclear
component production shall be located outside of the buffer area. (7) The
plutonium and HEU facilities together will require land area of 55 acres
within the PIDAS. The A/D facilities will require land area of 180 acres
within the PIDAS. (8) Administrative and non-SNM support buildings and
parking shall require an area of 70 acres outside of the buffer zone. (9)
Production facilities for non-SNM components shall require an area of 20
acres outside of the buffer zone. (10) High explosive fabrication and
processing areas shall require an area of 120 acres outside of the buffer
zone. (11) All facilities can be configured in a manner that is site
adapted to be optimal for the site geography and available land. (12) For
HEU/Pu/A/D missions: PIDAS area equals 235 acres, buffer area equals 100
acres, and outside area equals 210 acres for a total of 545 acres. For
HEU/Pu missions only: PIDAS equals 55 acres, buffer area equals 50 acres,
and outside area equals 45 acres for a total of 195 acres.
7.D&D -related Requirements & Assumptions

(1)

(2)

(3)
8.External Influences/IPT Connectivity Requirements & Assumptions

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4) (5) (5) (6)

Y-12 and Pantex Plant facilities whose missions would be included in the
CNPC would be brought to a safe shutdown condition as soon as
programmatically possible if these sites are not selected for the CNPC
mission. This condition would allow the sites to remain in a safe
condition with minimal site surveillance awaiting D&D. The LANL and LLNL
Category I or II nuclear facilities would be reduced to Category III or
IV nuclear facilities for R&D purposes after the CNPC begins operations.
The CNPC Business Case will include the costs of Pantex and Y-12 D&D.
Weapons dismantlement to Moscow Treaty levels is assumed to occur at
Pantex so that CNPC only required dismantling subsequent stockpile
replacements and reductions. Secondary dismantlement to Moscow Treaty
levels as well as existing dismantlement backlog is assumed to occur at
Y-12 so that CNPC only required dismantling subsequent stockpile
replacements and reductions. Capacity to store future stockpile
reductions (weapons and plutonium) not provided except for work in
process inventory. External site assumed to receive, store, and process
excess plutonium. Capacity to disassemble pits whose plutonium is
declared excess is not provided. Capacity to store all program and excess
HEU, as well as disassemble retired secondaries, is provided. Non-nuclear
components for pits (except beryllium) to be provided by the NNSA non-
nuclear production plant. Beryllium pit components to be provided by
LANL. Potential for non-nuclear secondary and case materials to be
provided by NNSA non-nuclear production plant.
other (2)
(1)
(1)
other (3)
(1)
other (4)
(1)

Fw: CNPC data - DAF Deliverable

Page 1 of 2

From: Wyka, Ted [Theodore.Wyka@nnsa.doe.gov] Sent: Friday, March 16, 2007
6:51 PM To: Rose, Jay -- Tetra Tech Subject: Fw: CNPC data - DAF
Deliverable

----- Original Message ----From: Monette, Deborah D.
<MONETTED@nv.doe.gov> To: Wyka, Ted Cc: Leppert, John (NEV); Golden, Bob
(NEV) Sent: Fri Mar 16 18:36:31 2007 Subject: RE: CNPC data - DAF
Deliverable Ted, Below is the DAF input required today for the CNPC IPT.
As you will see, even with CEF installed, DAF still has considerable
capacity both within the facility and within the existing PIDAS. Please
let me know if you have any questions. Debbie

-----Original Message----From: Golden, Bob Sent: Friday, March 16, 2007
12:25 PM To: Monette, Deborah D. Cc: Leppert, John L. Subject: CNPC data
Importance: High Debbie, The following is provided in response to the
CNPC Specific action A.4-DAF Availability. Identify the number and square
footage of the available operating bays and DAF support space. DAF
resides in a ~20 acre secure compound with Entry Guard Station.
Approximately 5 acres are available for development within the secure
compound. Available space in DAF: 3 Assembly Cells = 8,510 sqf. (Note: 1
Cell shared with low probability use DNW mission) 2 Radiography Bays =
6,351 sqf. (Note: 1 Radiography Bay shared with intermittent use
Subcritical Experiment mission) 1 Downdraft Table Bay = 1,681 sqf. 1
Assembly Bay = 1,681 sqf. (Note: 1 Shared with intermittent use
Subcritical Experiment mission) 2 Bunkers = 1,872 sqf. (Note: 1 Bunker
shared with SNL staged material) 2 limited use Vaults = 180 sqf.

Additional available space beginning FY2010: 1 High Bay = 1,790 sqf.

file://K:\PUBDOCs\Complex 2030 PEIS\Alternatives Data\NNSA 2007\CNPC\Fw
CNPC ... 1/24/2008
Fw: CNPC data - DAF Deliverable

Page 2 of 2

1 Bunker Support space:

=

936 sqf.

1 MC&A Meas. Bldg.

= 2,142 sqf.

1 Shipping/Receive Bay = 2,012 sqf. Admin Space 1 Glovebox Bay Corridors
= 3,700 sqf. = 1,681 sqf. = 20,000 sqf.

Part 2 of A.4 - DAF: Verify that operations of the criticality machines
for CEF will not place significant operational restrictions on space used
for the CNPC mission. Current data indicates that operation of the
criticality machines will not place significant operational restrictions
on other uses of the DAF. Bob Golden, NNSA/NSO DAF Federal Project
Director (702) 295-2353

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CNPC ... 1/24/2008
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CPC

An above ground facility is the basic pre-conceptual design configuration
for a Consolidated Plutonium Center. During conceptual design, a below
grade facility configuration would be considered during the conduct of
alternative studies. Although an above grade facility can be designed to
meet required security from the present design basis threat, a below
grade facility provides for a more passive security design with less
reliance on active security systems and can provide additional physical
security protection, especially with regards to an airplane crash
scenario. However, a below grade facility poses additional life-safety
considerations to protect personnel in an emergency and for them to be
able to egress the facility in a timely manner. These issues together
with physical security would be explored during a conceptual design
period. With regard to environmental considerations, a pre-conceptual
design representation of a below grade production building, bermed with a
concrete overcap, would require 25% to 50% more acreage than an above
grade facility due to the extension of the berm to the physical
structure. This soil overburden has the potential to reduce challenges to
the building confinement system from events such as external fires and
tornados. As much as 100% more concrete in volume is estimated to be
necessary for support structures and an overcap, together with a 100% to
200% increase in the volume of material excavated, backfilled, and
compacted. A 25% increase in asphalt paving is also estimated to take
place. There are additional costs and schedule increases estimated for a
below grade facility. Additional project costs are estimated to be
between $100 million to $500 million depending upon both the design and
the soil characterization. For example, a below grade facility with soft
soil and some involvement of groundwater might only add as much as 2 to 3
months to the project schedule, however, a 100% solid bedrock earthwork
could take an additional 2 1/2 years to 3 years for excavation. Both
examples provide bounding estimates with no site expected to be 100%
solid bedrock.
Dimensions (square footage) Table 3.4.1-1 . Dimensions for the CPC
Processing Facilities Footprint (ft2) Support Facilities Footprint (ft2)
Research and Development (ft2) Total Facilities Footprint (ft2) Total
Facilities Footprint (acres) Area inside PIDAS (acres) PIDAS plus buffer
zone (acres) Area Developed During Construction (acres) Post Construction
Developed Area (acres) 308,000 280,000 57,000 645,000 14.6 30 48 100 60

Construction The addition of R&D adds about 10% to the 125-ppy sized MPF.
As a result, we have increased the numbers in the construction table
(Table 3.4.1-2) by 10%. The highlighted numbers below are the
construction requirements for the CPC. Table 3.4.1-2. CPC Construction
Requirements
Requirement Electrical Energy (MWh) Peak Electricity (MWe) Concrete (m3)
Total Peak Yearly Aggregate (m3) Total Peak Yearly Steel (metric tons)
Total Peak Yearly Liquid Fuels (mega liters) Total Peak Yearly Gases (m3)
Total Peak Yearly Water (mega liters) Total Peak Yearly Total (Worker
Years) Peak (Workers) Construction Period (yrs) MPF 125 ppy (old number)
6,000 3.0 214,000 74,000 200,000 55,000 36,400 9,800 16.7 2.6 13,600
3,960 71.9 21.2 2,650 770 6 CPC 125 ppy (new number) 6,600 3.3 235,000
81,000 220,000 61,000 40,000 10,700 18.4 2.9 14,900 4,300 79.1 23.3 2900
850 6
Operations For operations, we took the MPF 125-ppy and the MPF 250-ppy
numbers and found an approximate mid-point to estimate the 200-ppy surge
number (shown in the highlighted column entitled "200 ppy (surge)").
Then, we took the 200-ppy surge number and added 10% for R&D (based on
LANL's assumption that R&D would increase requirements by the same
percentage as the amount of square footage added by R&D (10%). However,
for employment, LANL estimated 610 additional employess for R&D, of which
483 would be "hot workers". The numbers in the last column are the ones
we will use for the PEIS analysis of CPC. Table 3.4.1-3. CPC Operations
Annual Requirements
200 ppy (surge) Resources Electrical Consumptiona (MWh) Peak Electrical
(MWe) Diesel Fuelb (L) Nitrogenc (m3) Argonc (m3) Domestic Waterd (L)
Cooling Tower Make-up (L) Steame (kg) Total workers Radiation workers
a b

125 ppy 79,800 20.5 259,650 223,900 4,200 44,875,000 232,514,800
43,717,300 988 546

97,000 22.0 308,540 235,000 5,750 53,000,000 250,000,000 47,000,000 1173
675

200 ppy surge plus R&D 107,000 24.0 339,000 258,000 6,325 58,000,000
275,000,000 51,000,000 1780 1150

Electrical: Based on 24 hrs/day, 365 days/yr. Diesel Fuel: Based on
diesel generator testing 1 hr/week. c Nitrogen and Argon: Annual
consumption is based on 1 percent make-up. d Domestic Water: Calculations
for the annual consumption were based on 189 L/day/person, 240 days/year.
e Steam would require an energy source for generation. If coal were used,
it would require 3,710 metric tons/yr (125 ppy), 4,245 metric tons/yr
(250 ppy), 6,275 metric tons/yr (450 ppy). If natural gas were used, it
would require 4,358,100 m3/yr (125 ppy), 4,990,750 m3/yr (250 ppy),
7,732,150 m3/yr (450 ppy).

Table 3.4.1-4. CPC Waste Volumes
Annual Operating Waste Type (m3) TRU Solid (including Mixed TRU) TRU
Liquida Mixed TRU Solid (included in TRU solid above) Mixed TRU Liquida
LLW Solid LLW Liquida Mixed LLW Solid Mixed LLW Liquid Hazardous Solid
Hazardous Liquid Nonhazardous Solid Nonhazardous Liquid Construction
Waste Type (m3) Hazardous Liquid Nonhazardous Solid Nonhazardous Liquid
125 ppy 590 0 200 0 2,070 0 1.5 0.2 2.5 0.3 5,500 45,000 125 ppy 4.9
7,110 37,500 200 ppy (surge) 200 ppy surge plus R&D 665 730 0 0 240 260 0
0 2,700 3,000 0 0 1.8 2.0 0.3 0.3 2.8 3.0 0.4 0.4 5,700 6,200 53,500
59,000 200 ppy (surge) 200 ppy surge plus R&D 5.0 6.0 7,500 8,200 39,000
42,000
PREDECISIONAL DRAFT MISSION NEED STATEMENT

Consolidated Plutonium Center Mission Need Statement
Revision X

Approved by: Date:

Classification Reviewing Official

PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT
Contains Deliberative Process Information

1
PREDECISIONAL DRAFT MISSION NEED STATEMENT

Change Log

Revision No.
0

Date
Initial Issue

Summary of Revision

2
PREDECISIONAL DRAFT MISSION NEED STATEMENT

Background
Following the end of the Cold War, budgets in the early 1990's for
nuclear weapons programs declined precipitously, leading to a decline of
the nuclear weapons enterprise. Sites were closed, downsized, or
consolidated, and restoration of capabilities at new sites took longer
than planned. The lack of new requirements on which to justify the cost
of modernizing production capabilities (indeed, the cancellation of
several ongoing development programs) coupled with significant workforce
attrition led to loss of key production capabilities needed to sustain
the nuclear weapons stockpile into the future. The introduction of new
environmental and safety standards and regulations, along with the
requirement to clean-up facilities no longer needed, increased the costs
of doing business and limited productivity of the work that continued.
These factors, combined with the 1992 moratorium on underground nuclear
testing, forced the adoption of a new strategy. Defense Programs would
not continue the Cold War practice of replacing weapons in the stockpile
every 15-20 years; rather, it would emphasize science and technology in
seeking to extend the life of warheads in the existing stockpile beyond
their originally planned lifetime. This was the genesis of the program
called science-based stockpile stewardship whose major focus was
predicting the effect of changes in an aging stockpile, providing a
readiness posture for refurbishing weapons as needed, and developing
tools to assess and accept weapon component changes. Because Defense
Programs had, during the 1980's, just completed a cycle of warhead
modernization and production, there was no strong driver to sustain
production capabilities. The limited funding available was focused
primarily on the research and development (R&D) complex in order to
preserve the scientific and technical capabilities that would be required
to certify the future stockpile. As a result, the production complex
continued to be seriously under-funded and key capabilities further
degraded. Despite efforts over the past five year to restore key
capabilities, National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA's) current
nuclear weapons infrastructure has been unable to produce certain
critical components for warheads (e.g., plutonium parts, tritium) for
many years. And today's business practices--in particular, the way risk
is managed in authorizing potentially hazardous activities at labs and
plants--have become ineffective, significantly degrading productivity at
these facilities. In addition, increased anticipated threats to the
physical security of weapons-usable nuclear materials post September 11,
2001, have led to enormous increases over the past five years in the
costs to secure the complex. To assure NNSA's ability to maintain
essential military capabilities over the long term and to enable
significant reductions in reserve warheads, a truly responsive nuclear
weapons infrastructure as called for in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
is required. The NPR, and its follow-on assessments, have led to
conceptual breakthroughs in thinking about nuclear forces, breakthroughs
that have enabled concrete first steps in the transformation of those
forces and associated capabilities. Very importantly, the NPR

3
PREDECISIONAL DRAFT MISSION NEED STATEMENT

articulated the critical role of the defense R&D and manufacturing base,
of which a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure is a key element, in
the NPR's New Triad of strategic capabilities. NNSA has worked closely
with the Department of Defense in establishing the following guidelines
for stockpile and infrastructure transformation: o o o o o ensure long-
term safety, reliability and security of the nation's nuclear deterrent,
support current stockpile while transforming to a future stockpile and
infrastructure, execute the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program to
enable transformation to a responsive infrastructure, respond on
appropriate timescales to adverse geopolitical change, or to technical
problems with warheads or strategic delivery systems, and provide
opportunities for a smaller stockpile to meet the President's vision for
the lowest number of warheads consistent with the nation's security.

Success in realizing the vision for transformation will enable NNSA and
DoD to achieve over the long term a smaller stockpile, one that is safer
and more secure, one that offers a reduced likelihood that NNSA will
never again need to conduct an underground nuclear test, one that reduces
the nation's ownership costs for nuclear forces, and one that enables a
much more responsive nuclear infrastructure. Most importantly, this
effort will go far to ensure a credible deterrent for the 21st century,
thus reducing the likelihood the nation will ever have to employ its
nuclear capabilities in its defense. The Consolidated Plutonium Center
(CPC) is an essential part of addressing the current limitations in
infrastructure capability and transformation of the stockpile to ensure a
credible and cost efficient deterrent for the future.

Mission Need
As envisioned in the Defense Programs Complex 2030 Strategy (summarized
in the Deputy Secretary of Energy statements before the House Committee
on Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development (April 5,
2006), and the Interim Report on the Feasibility and Implementation of
the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program submitted to the
Congressional Defense Committees in March 2006), the proposed
Consolidated Plutonium Center (CPC) is necessary: to address deficiencies
in current infrastructure in pit manufacturing required to support the
stockpile; to transform the nuclear weapons stockpile in a timely manner
to maintain confidence in the nation's nuclear deterrence; and to provide
cost efficient operations for the long term. Deficiencies in Current
Infrastructure: Only recently has the NNSA regained a capability to
manufacture pits for the stockpile, however, this capability is limited
to a single pit type at 10 W88 pits per year at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory plutonium facility within technical area 55 (PF-4/TA-55). This
capability is being enhanced to 30 to 50 net RRW pits to the stockpile by
the end of FY 2012. However, this limited increase in capacity is not
capable of achieving the 4
PREDECISIONAL DRAFT MISSION NEED STATEMENT

required long term capacity for transforming the nuclear weapons
stockpile without significant additions and changes to the TA-55/PF-4
facility and supporting facilities. The required changes to TA-55/PF-4
and supporting facilities would impact continuation of the missions
within PF-4 (a facility which will approach 50 years in age by project
completion) while construction activity is ongoing. Based on a capacity
study of TA55/PF-4 conducted in FY 2004/2005, the upgrades and additions
to increase pit manufacturing capacity alone would approach the same
costs as a new facility. Furthermore, additions to achieve Complex 2030
objectives of cost efficiency through consolidation of activities and
reduced security risk, make modifications of the TA-55 facilities even
less attractive. Evaluations of the stockpile have shown that a capacity
of 125 pits per year is required even for stockpile levels below that
envisioned to support national security at optimistic geopolitical and
military conditions. NNSA can envision no future stockpile scenarios
whereby the interim pit manufacturing capacity being established at LANL
will meet projected long-term requirements for stockpile maintenance.
Classified analyses of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile confirm this
conclusion. The CPC would provide for the required pit manufacturing
capacity to support transformation of the stockpile and its maintenance
for the long term. Besides capacity, production agility (the ability to
change rapidly from the production of one pit type to another or to
simultaneously produce different pit types) is also a critical
requirement for supporting the stockpile. Production agility also
provides the ability to assimilate new technology and to manufacture new
pit designs. Production agility becomes increasingly important as
stockpile size decreases (a cost efficient objective of the Complex 2030
strategy) and contingency production becomes more dominant as a
requirement. The limited capability currently being established at LANL,
for example, has significant space constraints that limit the agility of
the production line. Changing from production of one pit type to another
requires process development, qualification of new processes,
demonstration of the ability to consistently produce product to
specifications, and support of the certification effort with parts. Since
much of this work at LANL must take place in the same glove-boxes as the
production work, the time to change from production of one design to
another is significant and would impact the amount of product available
to the stockpile. The CPC would provide for multiple manufacturing lines
to maintain a level product output. Agility is also a part of contingency
production ability. If contingency production is ever needed, the
response time will likely be driven by either a reliability problem that
requires prompt response, or another type of "emergency" that must be
addressed quickly. At significantly smaller stockpile levels than today,
it must be anticipated that an adverse change in the geopolitical threat
environment, or a technical problem with warheads in the operationally
deployed force, could require NNSA to manufacture and deploy additional
warheads on a relatively rapid timescale. This argues for a production
capacity and capability that exceeds that planned for TA-55 at LANL.
Contingent floor

5
PREDECISIONAL DRAFT MISSION NEED STATEMENT

space, parallel production lines, modular design, flexible expansion
capability, and development prototype space within a Consolidated
Plutonium Center would provide a significantly higher level of agility
than is currently possible within the LANL TA-55/PF4 facility.
Transformation of the Stockpile: As a result of decisions taken during
the Cold War, today's stockpile consists of highly optimized warheads
designed to tight specifications (e.g., maximized explosive yield with
minimum size and weight). This was the most cost effective way to meet
then existing military requirements but also led to warheads that were
designed relatively close to so-called "cliffs" in performance. It also
forced the use of certain hazardous materials that, given today's health
and safety standards, cause warheads to be more costly to maintain and
remanufacture. Maintaining the capability to produce/replicate these
designs requiring older production processes and hazardous materials
causes the supporting infrastructure to be larger and more costly than it
might otherwise be, and certainly less responsive. Today, to support an
operationally-deployed force in which most delivery systems will carry
many fewer warheads than the maximum capacity required in the "cold war",
technical risk needs to be managed differently, for example, "trading"
optimized size and weight for increased performance margins, system
longevity, and ease of manufacture and certification. Also, although the
laboratories can currently certify the performance of the warheads in the
stockpile, changes in those warheads from life extension programs or
modifications due to the aging of parts are leading the technical base
further from nuclear test certification. The directors of the national
laboratories have raised concerns about their ability to assure the
safety and reliability of the legacy stockpile indefinitely, absent
underground nuclear testing. Evolution away from tested designs,
resulting from the inevitable accumulations of small changes over the
extended lifetimes of highly-optimized systems is giving great concern.
As a result, there will ultimately be a point at which age and changes in
the warhead will lead to a lack of confidence with present legacy
warheads that can only be addressed through nuclear testing. The reliable
replacement warhead (RRW) is designed to address current issues with
maintaining the stockpile in a cost effective manner that meets military
requirements without nuclear testing by manufacturing to specifications
that take the performance away from so-called "cliffs" and doing so using
modern manufacturing processes without the use of many of the past
hazardous materials and in a more cost efficient manner. Transforming the
stockpile with RRWs as soon as possible, places the nation's nuclear
deterrent on a road of continued confidence in the nuclear stockpile's
deterrence. To transform the stockpile in a timely manner with RRW
warheads, pits need to be manufactured in far greater number (minimum of
125 pits per year) than what LANL PF-4 is capable. The Consolidated
Plutonium Center provides for the required manufacturing capacity in an
optimum cost effective manner to meet the transformation schedule and
continue long term support to the stockpile.

6
PREDECISIONAL DRAFT MISSION NEED STATEMENT

Cost Efficient Operations: The events of September 9, 2001, and
subsequent world events are driving reevaluations of how we maintain
security over special nuclear material. In the past three years, the
threat guidance and correspondingly safeguards and security requirements
have changed, increasing the costs to facilities that conduct safeguards
and safety Category I/II activities. A means to reduce vulnerability and
risk is to consolidate these materials and activities and is an important
element of NNSA's 2030 Strategy for transforming the nuclear weapons
complex and making it more secure and safe. Consolidation of special
nuclear materials for reduction in design basis threat risk and for cost
efficiency was a key recommendation from the Secretary of Energy Advisory
Board Task Force. The CPC will consolidate all plutonium Category I/II
activities into one location (with the exception of testing at the Nevada
Test Site (NTS), unless NTS is chosen for the CPC location). Laboratories
would perform all research and development, surveillance of stockpile
warheads, process development, production assistance, and certification
activities involving Category I/II levels of plutonium at the CPC. A CPC
with its increased agility and responsiveness also provides a number of
opportunities for cost savings in supporting RRW transformation: o
Opportunity to reduce the stockpile, since a responsive infrastructure
that can respond quickly to unforeseen requirements can eliminate the
need to maintain a large number of augmentation warheads, o Decrease the
likelihood that underground nuclear testing would need to be resumed, and
o Eliminate the need for costly life extension programs. Costs are saved
by not having to maintain the capability to manufacture older designs and
handle some hazardous materials to replicate legacy warheads. Most
warhead components were designed, built, and fielded with 1970s
technology that are increasingly difficult and costly to maintain and
require extra processes to manufacture to specification.

Analysis to Support Mission Need
Classified analysis on the stockpile with reduced augmentation unit
requirements and a design life of 30 years commensurate with the
elimination of the life extension programs was evaluated against required
manufacturing capacity. The required capacity was found to be a minimum
of 125 pits per year at the CPC to support the required warhead builds
with the support of 500 pits (average of 50 pits per year) built at LANL
during an interim time period of FY 2013 through FY 2022. A simplified
analysis of the capacity capability within TA-55/PF-4 was accomplished in
a study of the facility in FY 2004. This study revealed that to achieve a
capacity of 125 pits per year, upgrades to PF-4 and a new addition to the
facility would need to be accomplished. This analysis did not perform any
rigorous analysis of people flow and radiation exposure which would also
need to be accomplished to ensure the postulated

7
PREDECISIONAL DRAFT MISSION NEED STATEMENT

upgrades could achieve the desired capacity objective. Analyses on the
need to upgrade supporting facilities, such as CMRR and TA-50, were also
not accomplished, but would need to take place to support increased
production capacity. Similar classified analysis on the stockpile and
required manufacturing capacity was accomplished for the Modern Pit
Facility Project and by the Secretary's Energy Advisory Board independent
study of the nuclear weapons complex. Both showed that to replace or
transform the stockpile by 2030 to 2035, a pit manufacturing capacity of
a minimum of 125 pits per year is necessary, together with LANL
manufacturing 50 pits per year up to 2022.

Mission Need Date and Impact if Not Approved
The Consolidated Plutonium Center is required to be fully operating by
the end of FY 2022. This requires a CD-4 or acceptance of the facility by
September 2020 to allow for required operational readiness reviews and
ramping up production. This also allows sufficient time to move hazard
and security Category I/II material and missions from the Los Alamos
National Laboratory and transition their facilities to hazard and
security category III status. To support this mission need date, a CD-0
is being sought by June 2008 to initiate conceptual design. Delay in this
approval impacts the schedule for conceptual design and subsequent
design, construction, and operational date for the facility. If mission
need is not approved, a cornerstone of the NNSA Complex 2030 Strategy
will be missing, impacting the ability of NNSA to consolidate metal,
increase needed capacity, and provide support to the stockpile for the
long term in a cost efficient manner. NNSA will need to continue to rely
upon costly life extension programs for each warhead in the stockpile
with increasing risk to its ability to certify warhead performance as
further modifications are made and design of the warhead moves further
from its nuclear test base.

Scope of the Consolidated Plutonium Center
The Consolidated Plutonium Center (CPC) will consolidate within the
Nuclear Weapons Complex all Category I/II security and hazard class
defense programs mission activities requiring the use and handling of
plutonium material. It will provide the facilities and equipment to
perform pit manufacturing, pit surveillance, plutonium research and
development, manufacturing process development, manufacture of parts for
pit certification testing, and training of manufacturing and research and
development personnel. The CPC will also consolidate and store all
plutonium metal and other materials and parts required in support of
these activities, and have supporting analytical chemistry and
metallurgical capability. The CPC site location is to be determined
through completion of a programmatic environmental impact statement and
associated record of decision under the National Environmental Policy
Act. Five locations are being evaluated: Savannah River Site, Los 8
PREDECISIONAL DRAFT MISSION NEED STATEMENT

Alamos National Laboratory, Nevada Test Site, Pantex Site, and Oak Ridge
Y-12 Site. The physical configuration of facilities comprising the CPC
will be evaluated in an alternative study during conceptual design. Pit
Manufacturing: The CPC will have a pit manufacturing capacity of 125 RRW
pits single shift net to the stockpile. The pit manufacturing work
includes the fabrication of the plutonium components for pits and the
assembly of pits. A pit in this context is the assembly of all components
into the full pit that is shipped to Pantex. Typically, non-plutonium
parts will be government-furnished equipment and fabricated elsewhere.
Non-plutonium components will be shipped to the CPC to be assembled along
with the plutonium components into pits. A quality assurance acceptance
program will be required to receive and accept nonplutonium parts. In
addition, a bonded stores capability must be provided for interim storage
of government-furnished equipment and other parts/materials for WR
production. The CPC will require the capability to perform special
nuclear material shipping, receiving, and storage; pit disassembly and
feedstock sampling; metal preparation, recovery, and refining; product
forming, machining, welding, cleaning, and assembly; and product
inspection (including radiography), process qualification, production
surveillance, and analytical chemistry support. Supporting and ancillary
functions (waste handling, security operations, training, maintenance,
administration, process development, and testing) required to perform pit
manufacturing are also included in the CPC. These capabilities will be
applied to both WR production and production of parts/samples in support
of certification and new production surveillance activities. The CPC will
deploy manufacturing processes that will enable the production of
Reliable Replacement Warhead pits as components for replacement of
warheads in the enduring stockpile. The facility will be designed based
on an agile facility concept, whereby processes could be changed out as
new technologies are developed and limited additional capacity created as
contingency for unforeseen requirements. Feedstock for the fabrication of
the plutonium components will consist primarily of site-return pits
requiring disassembly and reprocessing, but will also include purified
metal from the CPC processing line. The capability to manufacture legacy
pits will be retained through the agility and flexibility aspects of
design with the manufacturing modules and floor space within the
facility. Pit Surveillance: Pit surveillance is the periodic disassembly
and inspection of pits removed from the active stockpile to help identify
any defects or degradation and assure that nuclear weapons in the
enduring stockpile are safe and reliable. Evaluations include leak
testing, weighing, dimensional inspection, dye penetrant inspection,
ultrasonic inspection, radiographic inspection, metallographic analysis,
chemical analysis, pressure tests, and mechanical properties testing.

9
PREDECISIONAL DRAFT MISSION NEED STATEMENT

Plutonium Research and Development: Plutonium research and development
seeks to understand the properties and performance characteristics of
plutonium, including fundamental thermodynamic, shock-induced
deformation, intermediate strain-rate elastic-plastic behavior, spall,
and surface ejecta. Understanding of the properties and performance
characteristics supports modeling of weapon performance and provides
assurance of stockpile reliability. Samples are prepared to support
tests, such as those using the JASPER gas-gun facility at the Nevada Test
Site. Parts are manufactured to support subcritical experiments to study
specific fundamental plutonium properties. Research and development also
supports studies on plutonium aging to measure and understand weapon
characteristics as the material ages. Sample fabrication requires the use
of lathes, drill presses, tomography, metallagraphic equipment,
polishing, precision machining and inspection, and rolling mill
equipment. Manufacturing Process Development: During the projected
lifetime of the facility (50 years), there will be changes in technology
and changes in design of warheads where new processes and equipment will
need to be developed and tested before they enter the production line.
Process development requires both cold and hot space. Examples currently
underway are foundry development where a new casting process is being
developed to increase capacity and efficiency; metal purification where a
new piece of equipment will accelerate activities, reduce radiation
exposure, and reduce waste; machining where multi-functional equipment
can replace the need for 3 or 4 separate pieces of equipment; new
dimensional analysis to reduce time and improve accuracy of measurement;
and module development to locate multiple pieces of equipment in a manner
that increases efficiency within a set of operations. This area also
provides capability for training new personnel, develop processes, and
evaluate new equipment without unnecessary exposure to radiation.
Manufacture of Certification Parts: Besides the manufacture of pits for
the stockpile, the manufacture of pits or parts of pits will be required
for support of physics and engineering certification testing. In most
instances, such pits or parts may be manufactured on the production line.
Their production, however, must be considered in design of the floor
space and equipment to ensure the production line is not interrupted in
achieving its required capacity and output to the stockpile.

Consolidated Plutonium Center and Strategic Planning
The Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign within Defense Programs
has the National Nuclear Security Administration mission to ensure the
readiness of the nuclear weapons complex to manufacture and certify
plutonium pits for the nation's nuclear stockpile. Because the pit is an
essential component of a nuclear weapon, a long-term pit manufacturing
capability is needed to maintain the nation's nuclear stockpile. The pit
campaign strategy, as stated in the approved Pit Manufacturing and
Certification 10
PREDECISIONAL DRAFT MISSION NEED STATEMENT

Implementation Plan, includes reestablishing the capability to
manufacture war reserve (WR), i.e., certified pits, the establishment of
a manufacturing capacity required to support the nuclear weapons
stockpile, and the ability to certify warheads with new manufactured
replacement pits for entry into the stockpile without the use of nuclear
testing. The Consolidated Plutonium Center is the major element in
accomplishing the long term planning declared in the Pit Manufacturing
and Certification Campaign mission. The Campaign strategy and mission
follows strategic planning and guidance documents from Congress,
Department of Energy through Defense Programs, and also joint Department
of Defense/Department of Energy planning documents: o Department of
Energy 2006 Strategic Plan; Strategic Theme 2 Nuclear Security; Goal 2.1
Nuclear Deterrent: Transform the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and
supporting infrastructure to be more responsive to the threats of the
21st Century. Section 3111 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006, Public Law 109-163 (2006), amended the Atomic Energy
Defense Act (Division of Public Law 107-314 (2002)) by inserting after
section 4204, a new section 4204a. This section establishes a requirement
for the Secretary of Energy to carry out a program, to be known as the
Reliable Replacement Warhead program, which will have the following
objectives: To increase the reliability, safety, and security of the
United States nuclear weapons stockpile. To further reduce the likelihood
of the resumption of underground nuclear weapons testing. To remain
consistent with basic design parameters by including, to the maximum
extent feasible and consistent with the objective specified in paragraph
(2), components that are well understood or are certifiable without the
need to resume underground nuclear weapons testing. To ensure that the
nuclear weapons infrastructure can respond to unforeseen problems, to
include the ability to produce replacement warheads that are safer to
manufacture, more cost-effective to produce, and less costly to maintain
than existing warheads. To achieve reductions in the future size of the
nuclear weapons stockpile based on increased reliability of the reliable
replacement warheads. To use the design, certification, and production
expertise resident in the nuclear complex to develop reliable replacement
components to fulfill current mission requirements of the existing
stockpile. To serve as a complement to, and potentially a more cost-
effective and reliable long-term replacement for, the current Stockpile
Life Extension Programs. Department of Energy & Department of Defense
joint report to Congressional Defense Committees March 2006; Interim
Report on the Feasibility and Implementation of the Reliable Replacement
Warhead Program, as required by section 3111 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Public Law 109-163; Goals of the
RRW Program:

o

o

11
PREDECISIONAL DRAFT MISSION NEED STATEMENT

o

o

o

o

o

Assure, over the long term, the Nation's ability to sustain the nuclear
stockpile with replacement warheads that provide the same military
capabilities as the warheads they replace. Provide warheads that can be
more easily manufactured, with readily available and more environmentally
benign materials, and whose safety and reliability can be maintained with
high confidence without underground nuclear testing. Enhance the security
of nuclear weapons and provide an enabler for the development of a
responsive and capable infrastructure. Statement of Clay Sell, Deputy
Secretary of Energy, Before the House Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, April 5, 2006: "RRW, we
believe, will provide enormous leverage for a more efficient and
responsive infrastructure and opportunities for a smaller stockpile."
"The 2030 infrastructure to support that stockpile will have the
following characteristics: o a strengthened, but consolidated R&D
infrastructure; o a modern production complex with a consolidated
plutonium center and increased production throughput; o consolidation of
Cat I/II materials to fewer facilities, and o streamlined business
practices, including a more effective approach to managing risks inherent
to our operations." National Nuclear Security Administration Strategic
Plan November 2004; Goal 1 Nuclear Weapons Stewardship: Ensure that our
nuclear weapons continue to serve their essential deterrence role by
maintaining and enhancing the safety, security, and reliability of the
U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Joint NNSA and Department of Defense
Briefing to STRATCOM, May 2006: "The Reliable Replacement Warhead program
will provide a vehicle for long-term sustainability of the nuclear
deterrent." RRW program will "enable transformation to a responsive
infrastructure." Defense Programs Strategic Vision for 2030, February
2005: "The future Responsive Infrastructure and the concept of RRWs will
make available weapons with improved safety, security, reliability and
performance margins." "DP will implement a Responsive Infrastructure
strategy as a series of projects and initiatives, each with the goal of
reducing RD&T and production costs and significantly reducing the
timeframe to design and field new capabilities." Defense Programs,
Complex 2030, A Preferred Infrastructure Planning Scenario for a Nuclear
Weapons Complex Able to Meet the Threats of the 21st Century: Go to a
consolidated plutonium center by 2022 with distributed modernization in
place for remaining capabilities Reduce the number of sites with Cat I/II
special nuclear materials Plan, construct, and start up a consolidated
plutonium center at an existing Cat I/II site for long-term NNSA
plutonium Cat I/II R&D, surveillance, manufacturing, and
storage/disposition operations
12
PREDECISIONAL DRAFT MISSION NEED STATEMENT

o

Complete the consolidated plutonium center with a capacity to support 125
RRW war reserve pits per year by 2022 Statement of Thomas P. D'Agostino,
Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs National Nuclear Security
Administration, Before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee
on Strategic Forces, April 5, 2006: "RRW, we believe, will provide
enormous leverage for a more efficient and responsive infrastructure and
opportunities for a smaller stockpile." "The envisioned 2030
infrastructure to support the stockpile would have the following
characteristics: o a strengthened, but consolidated R&D infrastructure; o
a modern production complex with a consolidated plutonium center and
increased production throughput; o consolidation of Cat I/II materials to
fewer sites and fewer locations within sites, and o streamlined business
practices, including a more effective approach to managing risks inherent
to our operations."

Project Path Forward
Subsequent to CD-0 Approval and Prior to Start of Conceptual Design, NNSA
will: o Form an Integrated Project Team (IPT) to oversee this project
from conception through completion. o Prepare a Project Execution Plan
required to manage the project during conceptual design. o Develop an
initial technology investment strategy that is consistent with the goal
of developing an environmentally compliant facility based on modern
manufacturing processes. o Award a contract for development of a
conceptual design and the Conceptual Design Report for the CPC. During
Conceptual Design, NNSA will: o Issue a Record of Decision on a selected
site for the CPC. o Evaluate facility alternatives. o Develop required
technology. o Prepare Functional and Operating Requirements (F&OR)
document. o Prepare a Conceptual Design Report that includes a cost
estimate for design through Title II and a construction cost range. o
Complete a site supplemental environmental impact statement to site the
facility at a specific geographic location. o Perform preliminary safety
and security analyses to ensure that features important to safety and
security are integrated into the design. o Develop an Acquisition
Strategy. o Prepare CD-1 documentation package to authorize decision to
initiate preliminary design. o Form a site office project team.

13
PREDECISIONAL DRAFT MISSION NEED STATEMENT

o

Issue a ROD that documents specific geographical location of the CPC at
the selected site.

During Preliminary Design (CD-1), NNSA will: o Update technology
development plans. o Update and implement project execution and
implementation plans. o Complete preliminary (Title I) design of the CPC.
o Establish project baseline cost estimate. o Update F&OR document and
prepare baseline facility design description and system design
descriptions. o Perform preliminary safety and security analyses to
ensure that features important to safety and security are integrated into
the detailed design. o Perform mission analysis to validate facility
need. o Initiate planning for operations and implement needed skill
development actions. o Prepare CD-2 documentation package to authorize
decision to initiate final design. During Final Design (CD-2), NNSA will:
o Complete technology development activities. o Update and implement
project execution and implementation plans. o Complete final (Title II)
design. o Update project baseline cost estimate. o Update facility
baseline in F&OR document, facility design description, and system design
descriptions. o Perform preliminary safety and security analyses to
ensure that features important to safety and security are integrated into
the detailed design. o Perform actions to prepare for facility operations
(staffing plan/staff buildup/staff training and development). o Prepare
CD-3 documentation package to authorize decision to construct. During
Construction (CD-3) and after acceptance (CD-4), NNSA will: o Construct
the CPC. o Prepare for operations. o Conduct operational readiness
assessments. o Conduct cold startup and acceptance testing. o Conduct hot
startup testing and subsequent activities leading to full-scale capacity
of production.

Organization Roles and Responsibilities
The Consolidated Plutonium Center (CPC) project is a Major Technical
Element (MTE) within the Pit Program Office (NA-118) and Pit
Manufacturing and Certification Campaign. The Pit Program Office selects
a senior project manager to direct CPC activities. The CPC federal
project manager will assemble and direct an Integrated Project Team (IPT)
to accomplish the tasks necessary to complete a conceptual design 14
PREDECISIONAL DRAFT MISSION NEED STATEMENT

report and acquire approval to enter into formal design (Critical
Decision 1 (CD-1)). The IPT will include representatives from
Headquarters, field office, laboratory, and plant organizations across
the NNSA weapons complex. During conceptual design and after site
selection, organization and management of the project will be reviewed
and modified as necessary to carry the project into formal design and
through construction of the facility subsequent to CD-1 approval.

15
PREDECISIONAL DRAFT MISSION NEED STATEMENT

Appendix A References
1. U.S. Department of Energy Strategic Plan, 2006. 2. The National
Nuclear Security Administration Strategic Plan, November 2004. 3. Defense
Programs Strategic Vision for 2030, February 2005. 4. Complex 2030, A
Preferred Infrastructure Planning Scenario for a Nuclear Weapons Complex
Able to Meet the Threats of the 21st Century, September 2006. 5. Joint
DoD & DOE Interim Report on the Feasibility and Implementation of the
Reliable Replacement Warhead Program, March 22, 2006. 6. Statement of
Clay Sell, Deputy Secretary of Energy, Before the House Committee on
Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, April 5,
2006. 7. Statement of Thomas P. D'Agostino, Deputy Administrator for
Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration, Before the
House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April 5,
2006. 8. Joint NNSA and DoD Briefing to STRATCOM, "Reliable Replacement
Warhead Program", May 2006 (OUO). 9. Section 3111 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Public Law 109-163 (2006). 10.
Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign Implementation Plan, FY
2007. 11. E. Ryder, "Analysis of the Ability of a Low Capacity Pit
Manufacturing Facility to Meet Long-Term Production Requirements of the
U.S. Stockpile (U)," Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM,
January 29, 2002 (SRD). 12. "Nuclear Posture Review (U)," Report to the
Congress in Response to Sections 1041 (as Amended) and 1041 of the Floyd
D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, PL
106-398, December 2001 (SFRD). 13. Secretary of Energy Advisory Board,
Report of the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force,
"Recommendations for the Nuclear Weapons Complex of the Future", October
4, 2005. 14. TA-55 Pit Manufacturing Responsive Infrastructure and
Capacity Study (U), Revision 2: April 15, 2005 (SRD).

16
Integrated Project Team Analysis Requirements & Assumptions IPT
Designation: Consolidated Plutonium Center
1.Mission-related (1) Requirements & Assumptions

2.Nature/size of the Stockpile Requirements & Assumptions

(1)

3.Capability/Competencyrelated Requirements & Assumptions

(1)

4.Capacity/Throughputrelated Requirements & Assumptions

(1)

5.Schedule/Timeline-related Requirements & Assumptions

(1)

6.Location/Configurationrelated Requirements & Assumptions

(1)

Provide long term pit manufacturing capability and perform all plutonium
activities to include research and development and surveillance involving
the use and handling of Category I/II levels of plutonium material. MPF
draft conceptual design documents with additions for the R&D facility
will serve as a base for CPC preconceptual design efforts. A CPC is
assumed to be an integral element of any CNPC. As a consolidation of
plutonium activities, the production facility would only handle Pu-239
material, except for the handling and disposition of SNM material from
stockpile pits being returned for feed material purposes. Stockpile
requirements based on transformation strategy and agreements between DOE
and DoD. CPC capacity and production out-put will be designed to meet RRW
requirements. Legacy pits will be supported as required through the use
of contingency floor space, additions of required specific pit equipment,
and development of specific procedures in handling required material. The
facility will not be designed specifically to support all legacy pit
types, such as was being done for the MPF facility, but will accommodate
any requirement for legacy pits as an adjustment to the equipment and
facility capability designed for RRW pits with the use of contingency
floor space and module flexibility. Meet current design basis threat and
facility safety requirements. Through the use of two or more lines of
production, assure a sustained rate of throughput (min 125 RRW pits net
to the stockpile) and have the agility to change production from one pit
type to production of another pit type in a short period of time, and
have the ability to simultaneously produce more than one type of pit, and
flexibility in the type of pit being produced. Provide a manufacturing
capacity of a minimum of 125 RRW pits net to the stockpile per year
single shift with a contingency of 200 pits through multiple shifts and
additional equipment. Be capable of supporting the surveillance program
at a rate of one pit per pit type in the stockpile per year. Assuming
overlap between legacy and RRW pits, an assumption is made that a maximum
of 15 pit types would need to be maintained. Fully operational facility
required by 2022 to support stockpile transformation objectives and
stockpile level requirements. Priority on delaying building a CPC vs.
other facilities (i.e. UPF) will need to be based on LANL interim
capacity and adjustments to transformation objectives with the DoD.
Without a CMRR nuclear facility, the maximum capacity to be achieved out
of LANL PF-4 is estimated to be 20 pits per year. Location to be
determined from five sites being evaluated under NEPA. Approximate total
acreage requirement for a CPC is 96 acres within a limited area, which
includes most direct support activities and buffer. All 5 sites are
assumed to be able to support a buried or partially buried/bermed
facility.
7.D&D -related Requirements & Assumptions

8.External Influences/IPT Connectivity Requirements & Assumptions

Other (1)

(1) LLNL Superblock and TA-55/PF-4 to revert to Category III activities
or closure once the CPC is fully operational. Any residual non-DP
missions (i.e. Pu-238) would need to fund the facility at a higher
safety/security category. (1) Research and Development portion of CPC may
accommodate environmental testing requirements involving the use and
handling of Category I/II levels of plutonium without the use of high
explosives. SNM storage at the CPC will be based on what's required to
support a 3 month production period. Approximately 3 MT of storage is
anticipated. (1)

Other (2)

(1)

Other (3)

(1)

Other (4)

(1)
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Options and Requirements for Plutonium Functions in the Future Complex 1.
Purpose:

This document serves as input for the Consolidated Plutonium Center (CPC)
and related facilities to be analyzed in the Supplemental Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement (SPEIS) for Complex 2030, which is a
supplement to the Stockpile Stewardship Management PEIS issued in the
1990s. 2. Outline:

This document is organized to describe the plutonium (Pu) operations in
the Weapons Complex today and how they might evolve in the future as a
function of time, based on programmatic decisions to be made in the
SPEIS. This discussion is teed up by an understanding of what conditions
are presumed to exist vis-?-vis plutonium operations over the study time
frames of interest. The operations are then correlated to the
Alternatives to be analyzed PEIS. Lastly, the requirements for the
Alternatives are articulated. 3. 1. 2. 3. Presumed Conditions for the
Future: The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement
Project (CMRR) Nuclear Facility becomes operational in ~2014. Materials
Disposition (MD) facilities at SRS begin operations in the later part of
the 2010s. Surplus pits are sited at Pantex, except: (a) for testing or
certification reasons, limited numbers may be at NTS, LLNL, and/or LANL;
and (b) for pits awaiting disposition, surplus pits may at SRS. TA-55
will be in a pit production mode at least through 2022. Pits produced
currently would be legacy weapons systems but, in the future, the
production focus may be shifted to Reliable Replacement Warheads (RRWs).
High-hazard testing of Pu or Pu components, will only be performed at NTS
during all time frames being considered. NTS will retain an enduring,
continuous Cat I security posture to support the Criticality Experiments
Facility and possibly other missions for the foreseeable future that
require Cat I security capability. Description of plutonium operations in
the Complex

4.

5. 6.

4.

Any description of plutonium operations in the Complex as they are today
and how they might be 2030 requires an understanding of not just the set
of final endstates for the operations but the path that one passes to get
to them, too. An overview of the operations are provided against the
following notional time frames: Current time frame (2006~2014, where 2014
corresponds to the expected beginning of operations of the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Building Replacement Project's Nuclear Facility
(hereafter:
CMRR)1 and to the de-inventory of LLNL of Cat I/II quantities of SNM);
Interim time frame (~2014-~2022, where the latter date corresponds to the
date for the beginning of operations of the proposed CPC); and Final time
frame (post-~2022). 4.1 Current Time Frame (2006-~2014)

The Pu missions and facilities at the various sites are: LLNL: Provides
Pu R&D and provides engineering, environmental and hydrotesting of Pu or
Pu-bearing components. The functions are primarily carried out at
Buildings 332, which maintains a continuous Cat I quantity of Pu,
Building 334, which hosts Cat I quantities of material of an episodic
basis, and Site 300, which is used for episodic testing for high-hazard
type tests. LANL: Like LLNL, provides Pu R&D and provides engineering,
environmental and hydrotesting of Pu or Pu-bearing components. The Pu
operations at LANL center around the Plutonium Facility, PF-4, at
Technical Area-55, except that hydrotesting is done at DAHRT and the
analytical chemistry and materials characterizations functions are
performed at CMR in Technical Area 3, about a mile away from PF-4.
However, CMR is being replaced by CMRR. CMRR will be collocated with PF-4
in TA-55. We assume that CMRR will be built as planned and begin nuclear
operations in ~2014. PF-4 focuses on its core DP missions, which are pit
production, certification, and surveillance. In this vein, PF-4 is being
directed to support pit production as an interim pit production facility.
Currently, pit production relates to legacy weapons systems, but, in the
near future, PF-4 will become more dedicated to producing RRWs at a rate
as much as 50 pits per year by 2012/2013. In addition to its Defense
Program (DP) missions, PF-4 currently supports and is expected to
continue to support non-DP missions for some time, namely Nuclear
Energy's (NE's) Pu-238 missions, NE's advanced fuels and ceramics work,
and Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation's (NN's) missions for pit
disassembly and conversion and plutonium oxide polishing. PF-4 is and
will continue to be a Cat I SNM facility. CMRR will be a Cat I facility
when it becomes available. NTS: Provides test facilities to house high
hazard experiments, including all testing involving high explosives in
conjunction with Pu, and engineering and hydro- testing. The Critical
Experiments Facility, previously at LANL, has been relocated to NTS. NTS
is expected to retain an enduring Cat I capability for the foreseeable
future since NTS must be retain the capability to resume nuclear testing,
if so directed by the President. Pantex: Assembles and disassembles
weapons and provides storage for surplus and strategic material assets.
Pantex also provides limited hydrotesting capability. Pu is
The CMRR Project consists of two principal buildings, the Nuclear
Facility and the Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building (RLUOB).
The latter is a radiological building whose fate is well understood and
is not the subject of this document, which focuses only on nuclear
operations. Accordingly, "CMRR" as used here means specifically the
Nuclear Facility portion of CMRR
1
containerized at Pantex such that "nuclear" operations are required only
in the unlikely event that the integrity of a pit is breeched. Surplus
pits are stored at Pantex, awaiting a disposition path, which is
envisioned to be via facilities to be sited at SRS. SRS: SRS does not
currently have a dedicated DP Pu mission. However, SRS provides storage
and management services for surplus Pu that are instrumental in achieving
the Complex 2030 vision since SRS becomes a place to send surplus Pu
material (to enable de-inventory of LLNL to Cat III levels, for example)
and, ultimately, to effect the disposition of the surplus Pu. Pu
disposition is achieved by irradiating Pu in commercial reactors, which
requires that the Pu be extracted from pits and other metal forms via the
upcoming Pit Disassembly Conversion Facility (PDCF) and then emplaced
into commercial fuel forms via the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility
(MOX FFF). PDCF and MOX FFF would be sited at SRS and would begin
operations shortly after the notional 2014 time frame used in this
document. Y-12: Not applicable during this time period. Y-12 does not now
have a Pu capability. 4.2 Envisioned Interim Time Frame (~2014-~2022)

The Pu missions and facilities at the various sites are expected to be as
follows, as depicted as changes from the current mission and facility
assignments in Section 4.1: LLNL: If there is a decision to consolidate,
LLNL will move programmatic materials to LANL and, possibly for some
limited specialty set of material, to NTS, will move surplus materials to
SRS2, and will move Pu mission work to LANL and NTS. If there is no
decision to consolidate, the programmatic materials and mission would
remain at LLNL as is currently the case. If there is a decision to
consolidate, LLNL's Building 332 would be rendered to a Cat III level,
and LLNL would no longer maintain a continuous Cat I security capability.
LLNL could continue to provide Cat I engineering testing in Building 334
and Site 300, but such testing would be, presumably, infrequent and to be
executed only on as-needed basis. LANL: Beyond what is described for the
current configuration at LANL, LANL will have begun operations with CMRR
as a Cat I facility to complement the existing Pu infrastructure at and
around TA-55 at the beginning of this time frame. Additional changes at
LANL's TA-55 during this timeframe will likely be required because TA-55
would be EITHER3

The decision to move surplus material to SRS for disposition has already
been made and nothing in this current NEPA is expected to cause one to
revisit this decision. It is possible that, if there were a decision to
consolidate but the timing of disposition facilities did not accommodate
the transfer of surplus LLNL materials to SRS, the LLNL surplus material
might have to shipped to an interim storage locale, pending SRS
availability. 3 This PEIS does not attempt to decide the fate of the non-
DP missions now or perhaps soon to be at TA55. There are, however,
related environmental impacts that relate to the missions TA-55 will
support in the 2012-2022 time frame.

2
a.

Dedicated and optimized for DP missions, especially pit production. In
this case, non-DP missions would be moved from TA-55 or terminated and
TA-55 could be reconfigured to more efficiently execute its dedicated DP
missions.

-ORb. Supportive of DP and non-DP missions. In this case, less pit
production would be realized but the NE, NN, and/or newly emergent
programs could be supported.

NTS: No change, except for the possible relocation of LLNL material and
or scope to NTS from a decision to consolidate. Pantex: No change in
mission or facilities. However, the shipment of surplus pits to SRS to
effect disposition would be expected to begin in earnest during this
timeframe. SRS: Operation of disposition facilities is expected to begin
during this time frame. Y-12: Not applicable during this time period. Y-
12 would not then have a Pu capability. 4.3 Envisioned Long-term
Configuration (post-~2022):

LLNL: Building 332 will have become obsolete and will be subject to
decommissioning. Episodic testing could be continued as required but
likely these testing missions will have migrated from LLNL to NTS or
elsewhere by 2022. LANL: The configuration at LANL depends on whether Los
Alamos is chosen as the site for a CPC; if so, whether the CPC is
realized by anchoring to existing facilities, with supplemental
capabilities annexed (the "Annex" case), or whether it is realized by
anchoring to new facilities; and on whether TA-55 will support non-DP
missions. The following table identifies the prospective endstates and
the fates of assets and programs.
Options to consider CPC with Greenfield option4

Status of PF-4

CPC with Annex Option

Los Alamos not selected as site for CPC5

Status on non-DP users Subject to Retained as a Cat III Non-DP users are
decommissioning, facility and/or not supported, unless one or more
materials science except as noted in non-DP users laboratory PF-4 entry.
assume custody for the facility for their needs Likely to be Retained as
part May or may not be upgraded and CPC suite of supported. If not
refurbished for new facilities. supported, TA-55 long-term CPC would
likely be mission. reconfigured to more efficiently execute DP mission.
If supported, some upgrades to PF-4 to support non-DP users would also
likely be required. Subject to Retained as a Cat III Non-DP users are
decommissioning, facility and/or not supported, unless non-DP users
materials science except as noted in assume custody for laboratory PF-4
entry. the facility for their needs

Status of CMRR

NTS: Could be site for CPC. If so, most Pu operations would migrate to
NTS. If NTS is not selected as host for the CPC, NTS remain primarily
unchanged from Section 4.2, except that certain additional testing might
be transferred to NTS from LLNL and LANL. Pantex: Could be site for CPC.
If so, most Pu operations would migrate to Pantex. If Pantex is not
selected as host for the CPC, Pantex remains primarily unchanged from
Section 4.2. SRS: Could be site for CPC. Presumably, CPC would be
integrated with existing SRS infrastructure to take advantage of current
infrastructure capability for handling Pu. If so, most Pu operations
would migrate to SRS. If SRS is not selected as host for CPC, SRS remains
primarily unchanged from Section 4.2, except that, at some point, the
disposition mission will have been completed and the PDCF and MOX FFF are
subject to reuse, modification, or disposition.
If this selection were made, the facilities at TA-55 would likely be
contractually divorced from the laboratory contract and the R&D functions
at TA-55 would be operated as user facilities. 5 See note 4.
4
Y-12: Could be site for CPC. If so, most Pu operations would migrate to
Y-12. If Y-12 is not selected as host for the CPC, Y-12 remains primarily
unchanged from Section 4.2. 5. 5.1 Relationships to the PEIS
Alternatives: No Action The "No Action" alternative does not mean that no
actions are taken in the future but that the actions already presented in
SSM PEIS in the 1990s are executed as planned. The "No Action"
Alternative for Pu operations for this Supplemental would be: LLNL: Not
consolidate materials or transfer scope from LLNL. LLNL would continue to
operate as supposed in the current PEIS until the facilities would reach
their ends of lifes and which point they would be subject to
decommissioning. LANL: LLNL material and scope are not moved to LANL.
LANL would continue its DP mission at the time, expected to be pit
production, and also possibly non-DP missions. NTS, Pantex, SRS, and Y-
12: No change from the existing SSM PEIS basis. 5.2 CPC Alternative LLNL:
Pu materials and scope would be transferred away from LLNL. This could be
done in one step or two. In one case, LLNL's mission and scope would be
consolidated in 2014 to LANL and then the overall Pu mission could be
consolidated from LANL to CPC in 2022, which, in the case that CPC were
then selected to be at Los Alamos, the second step might be trivial. In
the other case, LLNL could continue as currently identified in the
existing SSM PEIS and consolidate its mission and programmatic material
directly to the CPC in 2022. LLNL Pu facilities would be subject to
decommissioning. (TBD) LANL: -Interim period from 2014-2022: If LLNL
consolidates to LANL, LANL will absorb materials and mission during the
interim 2014-2022 period. If not, LANL remains largely unaffected during
the interim period. -Long term period: See table in Section 4.3.
NTS, Pantex, SRS, and Y-12: Any site could be selected as the CPC. In the
event that SRS were selected, the CPC presumably would be devised to
benefit from existing Pu infrastructure. 5.3 Reduced Operation
Alternative: LLNL: (1) Materials and scope would remain at LLNL and
operations would continue at LLNL as described in the SSM EIS until the
primary facility (assumed here to be Building 332) became obsolete, which
is thought to be in the early 2020s OR (2) Materials and scope would be
transferred to LANL and NTS in 2014 (leaving Building 332 as a Cat III
facility), Building 332 would be operated as a Cat III facility from
~2014-~2022, and then it would be subject to decommissioning. LANL:
Consolidation of LLNL materials or scope in 2014 might or might not
occur. Otherwise, operations at LANL would continue as described in the
SSM PEIS, as supplemented by the SWEIS for pit production and the EIS for
CMRR. The facilities would operate until they became obsolete. For PF-4,
the life time of the facility would likely extend to ~2030; for CMRR, for
two to three decades past this date.6 NTS: Consolidation of LLNL
materials or scope in 2014 might or might not occur and operations at NTS
would continue as described in the SSM EIS. Pantex, SRS, and Y-12: No
changes from the SSM EIS. 6. Requirements for PEIS Alternatives No Action
Alternative 1. Facilities: Only existing facilities will be used to meet
programmatic requirements. The principal processing facilities would be
PF-4, Building 332, and CMRR. Testing facilities will remain at NTS,
LLNL, and LANL. Storage: Materials will not be consolidated and will
continue to be stored where currently located, except for transfers for
ongoing testing and certification reasons or for the disposition of
surplus materials, which are already slated for disposition via SRS
facilities. LANL operates PF-4 in conjunction with CMRR to produce
approximately 50 pits per year, net to the stockpile, by 2012/2013.

2.

3.

CPC Alternative

6

CMRR is not designed to operate as a stand alone facility but rather be a
supporting facility for PF-4 and other facilities at or around TA-55. The
presumed extended life for CMRR would be realizable if PF-4 is no longer
available unless CMRR were substantially reconfigured.
6.2.1

CPC Greenfield Alternative 1. All DP Pu operations will be consolidated
at the CPC, except: (a) High hazard testing, which will remain at NTS;
(b) episodic engineering or environmental testing that may be required
from time-to-time, which may be located at NTS, LANL, or LLNL, as
applicable; and (c) operations with Cat III or less quantities of Pu. The
CPC will have a nominal throughput of 125 pits per year and a peak design
capacity of 250 pits per year. The CPC will not support any non-DP
missions, except as incidental to and not interfering with the DP
missions. The CPC will not support any non-weapons grade plutonium
operations. The CPC will provide storage for strategic and programmatic
materials up to 6 MT Pu-239 equivalent. The CPC will provide dedicated
R&D space as user facilities. The R&D portions of the CPC shall be
configured to enable the R&D and production missions to operate
independently. Environmental analyses: For the purposes of the
Supplemental PEIS, a. Legacy pit production shall be assumed since this
would be more environmentally limiting. b. The MPF data base shall be
used for environmental impacts, modified to reflect a smaller pit
throughput, an additional R&D mission, and, possibly, engineering and
environmental testing spaces. When its Pu mission is complete, PF-4 shall
be either subject to decommissioning or transferred to a non-DP custodian
for ownership. CMRR will be operated as a user facility for materials
science and/or Cat III or less quantities for Pu R&D, once the CPC is
operational. LLNL will be de-inventoried and ultimately decommissioned.
The deinventorying can be done in one step (directly to the CPC) or in
two steps (via an intermediate transfer to LANL and NTS, as applicable in
the 2014 time frame). (TBD) If Los Alamos is selected to host the CPC,
the operation of CPC will be administratively divorced from the LANL
operating contract and be contracted as a separate M&O production-site
contract.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7.

8. 9. 10.

11.

CPC LANL Annex Alternative: The requirements of 6.2.1 are inherited,
except as modified or amended by italics below. This alternative is the
one case that is an intermediate case between a full CPC and reliance
upon the existing infrastructure that currently exists at the sites: 1.
All DP Pu operations will be consolidated at the CPC, except: (a) High
hazard testing, which will remain at NTS; (b) episodic engineering or
environmental testing that may be required from time-to-time, which may
be located at NTS, LANL, or LLNL, as applicable; and (c) operations with
Cat III or less quantities of Pu.
2. The CPC will have a throughput that can be supported by the suite of
TA-55 facilities (PF-4, CMRR, and a prospective new annex to PF-4, where
the first two facilities might be reconfigured for the new mission). This
is thought to be in 80 pits per year range. 3. The CPC will not support
any non-DP missions, except as incidental to and not interfering with the
DP missions. TBD 4. The CPC will not support any non-weapons grade
plutonium operations. TBD 5. The CPC will provide storage for strategic
and programmatic materials up to 6 MT Pu-239 equivalent. 6. The CPC will
provide dedicated R&D space as user facilities, as practicable. The R&D
portions of the CPC shall be configured to enable the R&D and production
missions to operate independently, as practicable. 7. Environmental
analyses: For the purposes of the Supplemental PEIS, a. Legacy pit
production shall be assumed since this would be more environmentally
limiting. b. SWEIS data and the EIS for the CMRR shall be used as primary
data sources in conjunction with extracts from the MPF EIS effort. 8.
When its DP mission is complete, PF-4 shall be either subject to
decommissioning or transferred to a non-DP custodian for ownership. 9.
CMRR will be operated as a part of the CPC Annex Case. 10. LLNL will be
de-inventoried and ultimately decommissioned. The deinventorying can be
done in one step (directly to the CPC) or in two steps (via an
intermediate transfer to LANL and NTS, as applicable in the 2014 time
frame). (TBD) 11. The operation of CPC will be administratively divorced
from the LANL operating contract and be contracted as a separate M&O
production-site contract. Reduced Alternative Requirements The
requirements correspond to the same numbered requirements in 6.2.1 to
enable direct correlation between requirements: 1. All DP Pu operations
will be consolidated at LANL, except: (a) High hazard testing, which will
remain at NTS; (b) episodic engineering or environmental testing that may
be required from time-to-time, which may be located at NTS or LANL, or
LLNL, as applicable; and (c) operations with Cat III or less quantities
of Pu. 2. The LANL Complex will have a throughput that can be supported
by the suite of TA-55 facilities (PF-4 and CMRR with minimal
reconfiguration). This is thought to be on the order of 50 pits per year.
3. The LANL Complex will not support any non-DP missions, except as
incidental to and not interfering with the DP missions. (TBD) 4. The LANL
Complex will not support any non-weapons grade plutonium operations.
(TBD)
5. The LANL Complex will provide storage for strategic and programmatic
materials up to 6 MT Pu-239 equivalent. 6. Reserved. 7. Environmental
analyses: For the purposes of the Supplemental PEIS, a. Legacy pit
production shall be assumed since this would be more environmentally
limiting. b. SWEIS data and the EIS for the CMRR shall be used as primary
data sources. 8. When its DP mission is complete, PF-4 shall be either
subject to decommissioning or transferred to a non-DP custodian for
ownership. 9. Reserved. 10. LLNL will be de-inventoried and ultimately
decommissioned. The deinventorying can be done in one step (directly to
the CPC) or in two steps (via an intermediate transfer to LANL and NTS,
as applicable in the 2014 time frame). (TBD) 11. The operation of the
LANL Complex will be administratively divorced from the LANL operating
contract and be contracted as a separate M&O production-site contract.
Consolidated Plutonium Center Program Requirements Document

Revision X

Approved by: Date:

Classification Reviewing Official

PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT
Contains Deliberative Process Information Department of Energy approval
required prior to public release
PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

CHANGE LOG Revision No. 0 Date Summary of Revision Initial Issue
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Title Page

Change
Log......................................................................
........................................................... ii Table of
Contents.................................................................
...................................................... iii List of

Figures..................................................................
.................................... ..........iv List of Tables
.........................................................................
......................................................v List of Acronyms
.........................................................................
.............................................. vi 1 Introduction
.........................................................................
....................................................1 1.1 Background
.........................................................................
...........................................2 1.2 Purpose and Scope of
This Document
.........................................................................
..4 1.3 Consolidated Plutonium Center Mission Need Statement (Section x,
Reference x) .....5 2 CPC Project
Scope....................................................................
...............................................8 3 Functional Design
Requirements.............................................................
..............................10 3.1 Functional
Areas....................................................................
.......................................10 3.2 Safety and
Security.................................................................
......................................12 3.3 Technology Transfer
.........................................................................
...........................12 3.4
Capacity.................................................................
.......................................................13 3.5
Agility..................................................................
.........................................................13 3.6 Research
and Development
.........................................................................
.................14 3.7 Surveillance
.........................................................................
.........................................14 4 General Design Requirements
.........................................................................
......................14 4.1 Facilities, Regulatory Compliance, and
Safety ............................................................15 4.2
Process Development Requirements
.........................................................................
...17 5 Requirements Summary
.........................................................................
...............................17 6 References
.........................................................................
....................................................23
iii
PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

List of Figures Title Page Figure 1-1. CPC Requirements Hierarchy
....................................Error! Bookmark not defined.
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LIST OF TABLES Title Page Table 5-1. Requirements
Summary..................................................................
..........................17

v
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LIST OF ACRONYMS ALARA CPC DNFSB DoD DOE DPAG DP-IP DSW GFE ISM KCP LANL
MPF MWG NDA NEPA NNSA PPBES PRD PX R&D RF RTBF SBSS SNL SNM SRS SSG SSM
SSM PEIS SST WR as low as reasonably achievable Consolidated Plutonium
Center Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board Department of Defense
Department of Energy Defense Programs Analysis Group Defense Program
Integrated Plan Directed Stockpile Work government-furnished equipment
Integrated Safety Management Kansas City Plant Los Alamos National
Laboratory Modern Pit Facility Mission Working Group nondestructive assay
National Environmental Policy Act National Nuclear Security
Administration Program Planning and Budgeting Evaluation System Program
Requirements Document Pantex Plant research and development Rocky Flats
Plant Requirements in Technical Base and Facilities Science-Based
Stockpile Stewardship Sandia National Laboratory Special Nuclear
Materials Savannah River Site SafeGuards Transport Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Safe Secure Transport war-reserve
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Consolidated Plutonium Center Requirements Document

1

INTRODUCTION

As illustrated in Figure 1-1, this Program Requirements Document (PRD) is
an integral part of the hierarchy of documents required by Department of
Energy (DOE) Order 413.3, Project Management to address the programmatic
requirements for a Consolidated Plutonium Center (CPC). The PRD builds on
the high-level requirements listed in the CPC Mission Need Statement
(MNS) (Section 6, Reference 1). DOE Order 413.3 specifies these documents
as an integral part of the process for documenting and controlling the
design of capital projects. The complete document set traces the
evolution of the design from high-level mission need and programmatic
requirements to facility and system descriptions that the final design
specifications must ultimately meet. The PRD includes descriptions of the
scope of the CPC and associated requirements necessary to successfully
fulfill the mission need. The functional and operating requirements will
develop further definition during the conceptual design process.
PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

NNSA Program Planning & Budgeting Evaluation System (PPBES)
DOE Strategic Plan

CPC Requirements Documents

Other Sources

Pit Campaign Implementation Plan

DOE Order 413.3

NNSA Strategic Plan

Mission Need Statement Program Requirements Document

CPC Manufacturing Flow Sheets

Complex 2030 Strategy & Infrastructure Planning

Functional Areas & Objectives

CPC Functional & Operational Requirements CPC Facility Design Description
(FDD) Regulations, DOE Orders, Industrial Standards, and Best Management
Practices

Figure 1-1. CPC Requirements Hierarchy Design Descriptions
(SDDs)

CPC System

1.1

Background

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the DOE have a
hierarchy of documentation for planning and executing the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management (SSM) program. This hierarchy comprises the
NNSA Program Planning and Budgeting Evaluation System (PPBES). NNSA
strategic planning is shaped by reaction to world events, and by
Department of Defense (DoD) planning, stockpile support requirements, and
budgetary constraints. For support of the nuclear stockpile, the NNSA
planning strategy becomes integrated and is executed through the PPBES.
Currently, work in Defense Programs is broken into three elements:
Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), Readiness Campaigns, and Readiness in
Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF). Following the end of the Cold War,
budgets in the early 1990's for nuclear weapons programs declined
precipitously, leading to a decline of the nuclear weapons enterprise.
Sites were closed, downsized, or consolidated, and restoration of
capabilities at new sites took longer than planned. The lack of new
requirements on which to justify the cost of modernizing production
capabilities (indeed, the cancellation of several ongoing development
programs) coupled with significant workforce attrition led to loss of key
production capabilities needed to sustain the nuclear
PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

weapons stockpile into the future. The introduction of new environmental
and safety standards and regulations, along with the requirement to
clean-up facilities no longer needed, increased the costs of doing
business and limited productivity of the work that continued. These
factors, combined with the 1992 moratorium on underground nuclear
testing, forced the adoption of a new strategy. Defense Programs would
not continue the Cold War practice of replacing weapons in the stockpile
every 15-20 years; rather, it would emphasize science and technology in
seeking to extend the life of warheads in the existing stockpile beyond
their originally planned lifetime. This was the genesis of the program
called science-based stockpile stewardship whose major focus was
predicting the effect of changes in an aging stockpile, providing a
readiness posture for refurbishing weapons as needed, and developing
tools to assess and accept weapon component changes. Because Defense
Programs had, during the 1980's, just completed a cycle of warhead
modernization and production, there was no strong driver to sustain
production capabilities. The limited funding available was focused
primarily on the R&D complex in order to preserve the scientific and
technical capabilities that would be required to certify the future
stockpile. As a result, the production complex continued to be seriously
under-funded and key capabilities further degraded. Despite efforts over
the past five year to restore key capabilities, NNSA's current nuclear
weapons infrastructure has been unable to produce certain critical
components for warheads (e.g., plutonium parts, tritium) for many years.
And today's business practices--in particular, the way risk is managed in
authorizing potentially hazardous activities at labs and plants--have
become ineffective, significantly degrading productivity at these
facilities. In addition, increased anticipated threats to the physical
security of weapons-usable nuclear materials post September 11, 2001,
have led to enormous increases over the past five years in the costs to
secure the complex. To assure NNSA's ability to maintain essential
military capabilities over the long term and to enable significant
reductions in reserve warheads, a truly responsive nuclear weapons
infrastructure as called for in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is
required. The NPR, and its follow-on assessments, have led to conceptual
breakthroughs in thinking about nuclear forces, breakthroughs that have
enabled concrete first steps in the transformation of those forces and
associated capabilities. Very importantly, the NPR articulated the
critical role of the defense R&D and manufacturing base, of which a
responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure is a key element, in the NPR's
New Triad of strategic capabilities. NNSA has worked closely with the
Department of Defense in establishing the following guidelines for
stockpile and infrastructure transformation: o o o ensure long-term
safety, reliability and security of the nation's nuclear deterrent,
support current stockpile while transforming to a future stockpile and
infrastructure, execute the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program to
enable transformation to a responsive infrastructure,

3
PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

o o

respond on appropriate timescales to adverse geopolitical change, or to
technical problems with warheads or strategic delivery systems, and
provide opportunities for a smaller stockpile to meet the President's
vision for the lowest number of warheads consistent with the nation's
security.

Success in realizing the vision for transformation will enable NNSA and
DoD to achieve over the long term a smaller stockpile, one that is safer
and more secure, one that offers a reduced likelihood that NNSA will
never again need to conduct an underground nuclear test, one that reduces
the nation's ownership costs for nuclear forces, and one that enables a
much more responsive nuclear infrastructure. Most importantly, this
effort will go far to ensure a credible deterrent for the 21st century,
thus reducing the likelihood the nation will ever have to employ its
nuclear capabilities in its defense. The Consolidated Plutonium Center is
an essential part of addressing the current limitations in infrastructure
capability and transformation of the stockpile to ensure a credible and
cost efficient deterrent for the future. 1.2 Purpose and Scope of This
Document

The purpose of this document is to capture programmatic requirements per
DOE Order 413.3, which governs project management for the acquisition of
capital projects. Programmatic requirements by their nature are higher-
tier and general. They do not capture specific details such as facility
square footage, but rather represent a compendium of functional
requirements over the complete scope of facility capabilities that must
be considered. This compendium will then be the guide to the rest of the
design process (i.e., conceptual, preliminary, and final). Because these
requirements may change or are uncertain, the PRD must be a living
document. The PRD is a general document based on the Mission Need
Statement (MNS). The general nature of the document is dictated by
uncertainties in the required facility production capacity, pit
certification requirements, research and development needs, and the
inevitable changes that will occur in safety, security, and other
regulations between now (2008) and the second half of the next decade
(2015 -2020), when the CPC is scheduled to initiate facility operations.
As illustrated in Figure 1-1, this document addresses the programmatic
requirements for a CPC. The requirements in the PRD combine the high-
level MNS requirements with weapon design requirements, process design
requirements, WR production requirements, and DOE's operating policies.
These policies include Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H), safeguards
and security, waste management, life cycle asset management, and energy
conservation. The PRD provides high-level requirements through a listing
of functional areas that span the scope of the CPC. These high-level
requirements will guide the rest of the design process. The programmatic
requirements must be addressed by lower-tier facility and system design
descriptions, which These ultimately become design specifications during
preliminary and final design. requirements address the need to support
the stockpile but are not intended to state specific
PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

design options and do not imply or preclude any option for site selection
or for a new or refurbished facility. It is through this document that
the scope, or breadth, of the functional and operating requirements are
established. The PRD represents part of a baseline for the CPC and will
be maintained under change control. The document will be reviewed on an
annual basis. Any changes must be assessed for their impact on the design
process, scope, budget, and schedule. Changes to the PRD could include
changes to NNSA's Strategic Plan (Section 6, Reference 2). Further
changes could also come from alterations to the DOE's policies,
regulations, or executive orders, or to the Weapons Design Agency. This
document consists of the following major elements: o o o o o Introduction
Project Scope Functional Design Requirements General Design Requirements
Requirements Summary

In each section, general programmatic requirements and the nature of the
uncertainties associated with them will be discussed. 1.3 Consolidated
Plutonium Center Mission Need Statement (Section x, Reference x)

As envisioned in the Defense Programs Complex 2030 Strategy (summarized
in the Deputy Secretary of Energy statements before the House Committee
on Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development (April 5,
2006), and the Interim Report on the Feasibility and Implementation of
the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program submitted to the
Congressional Defense Committees in March 2006), the proposed
Consolidated Plutonium Center (CPC) is necessary: to address deficiencies
in current infrastructure in pit manufacturing required to support the
stockpile; to transform the nuclear weapons stockpile in a timely manner
to maintain confidence in the nation's nuclear deterrence; and to provide
cost efficient operations for the long term. Deficiencies in Current
Infrastructure: Only recently has the NNSA regained a capability to
manufacture pits for the stockpile, however, this capability is limited
to a single pit type at 10 W88 pits per year at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory plutonium facility within technical area 55 (PF-4/TA-55). This
capability is being enhanced to 30 to 50 net RRW pits to the stockpile by
the end of FY 2012. However, this limited increase in capacity is not
capable of achieving the required long term capacity for transforming the
nuclear weapons stockpile without significant additions and changes to
the TA55/PF-4 facility and supporting facilities. The required changes to
TA-55/PF-4 and supporting facilities would impact continuation of the
missions within PF-4 (a facility which will approach 50 years in age by
project completion) while construction activity is ongoing. Based on a

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capacity study of TA-55/PF-4 conducted in FY 2004/2005, the upgrades and
additions to increase pit manufacturing capacity alone would approach the
same costs as a new facility. Furthermore, additions to achieve Complex
2030 objectives of cost efficiency through consolidation of activities
and reduced security risk, make modifications of the TA-55 facilities
even less attractive. Evaluations of the stockpile have shown that a
capacity of 125 pits per year is required even for stockpile levels below
that envisioned to support national security at optimistic geopolitical
and military conditions. NNSA can envision no future stockpile scenarios
whereby the interim pit manufacturing capacity being established at LANL
will meet projected long-term requirements for stockpile maintenance.
Classified analyses of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile confirm this
conclusion. The Consolidated Plutonium Center would provide for the
required pit manufacturing capacity to support transformation of the
stockpile and its maintenance for the long term. Besides capacity,
production agility (the ability to change rapidly from the production of
one pit type to another or to simultaneously produce different pit types)
is also a critical requirement for supporting the stockpile. Production
agility also provides the ability to assimilate new technology and to
manufacture new pit designs. Production agility becomes increasingly
important as stockpile size decreases (a cost efficient objective of the
Complex 2030 strategy) and contingency production becomes more dominant
as a requirement. The limited capability currently being established at
LANL, for example, has significant space constraints that limit the
agility of the production line. Changing from production of one pit type
to another requires process development, qualification of new processes,
demonstration of the ability to consistently produce product to
specifications, and support of the certification effort with parts. Since
much of this work at LANL must take place in the same glove-boxes as the
production work, the time to change from production of one design to
another is significant and would impact the amount of product available
to the stockpile. The CPC would provide for multiple manufacturing lines
to maintain a level product output. Agility is also a part of contingency
production ability. If contingency production is ever needed, the
response time will likely be driven by either a reliability problem that
requires prompt response, or another type of "emergency" that must be
addressed quickly. At significantly smaller stockpile levels than today,
it must be anticipated that an adverse change in the geopolitical threat
environment, or a technical problem with warheads in the operationally
deployed force, could require us to manufacture and deploy additional
warheads on a relatively rapid timescale. This argues for a production
capacity and capability that exceeds that planned for TA-55 at LANL.
Contingent floor space, parallel production lines, modular design,
flexible expansion capability, and development prototype space within a
Consolidated Plutonium Center would provide a significantly higher level
of agility than is currently possible within the LANL TA-55/PF-4
facility.
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Transformation of the Stockpile: As a result of decisions taken during
the Cold War, today's stockpile consists of highly optimized warheads
designed to tight specifications (e.g., maximized explosive yield with
minimum size and weight). This was the most cost effective way to meet
then existing military requirements but also led to warheads that were
designed relatively close to so-called "cliffs" in performance. It also
forced the use of certain hazardous materials that, given today's health
and safety standards, cause warheads to be more costly to maintain and
remanufacture. Maintaining the capability to produce/replicate these
designs requiring older production processes and hazardous materials
causes the supporting infrastructure to be larger and more costly than it
might otherwise be, and certainly less responsive. Today, to support an
operationally-deployed force in which most delivery systems will carry
many fewer warheads than the maximum capacity required in the "cold war",
technical risk needs to be managed differently, for example, "trading"
optimized size and weight for increased performance margins, system
longevity, and ease of manufacture and certification. Also, although the
laboratories can currently certify the performance of the warheads in the
stockpile, changes in those warheads from life extension programs or
modifications due to the aging of parts are leading the technical base
further from nuclear test certification. The directors of the national
laboratories have raised concerns about their ability to assure the
safety and reliability of the legacy stockpile indefinitely, absent
underground nuclear testing. Evolution away from tested designs,
resulting from the inevitable accumulations of small changes over the
extended lifetimes of highly-optimized systems is giving great concern.
As a result, there will ultimately be a point at which age and changes in
the warhead will lead to a lack of confidence with present legacy
warheads that can only be addressed through nuclear testing. The reliable
replacement warhead (RRW) is designed to address current issues with
maintaining the stockpile in a cost effective manner that meets military
requirements without nuclear testing by manufacturing to specifications
that take the performance away from so-called "cliffs" and doing so using
modern manufacturing processes without the use of many of the past
hazardous materials and in a more cost efficient manner. Transforming the
stockpile with RRWs as soon as possible, places the nation's nuclear
deterrent on a road of continued confidence in the nuclear stockpile's
deterrence. To transform the stockpile in a timely manner with RRW
warheads, pits need to be manufactured in far greater number (minimum of
125 pits per year) than what LANL PF-4 is capable. The Consolidated
Plutonium Center provides for the required manufacturing capacity in an
optimum cost effective manner to meet the transformation schedule and
continue long term support to the stockpile. Cost Efficient Operations:
The events of September 9, 2001, and subsequent world events are driving
reevaluations of how we maintain security over special nuclear material.
In the past three years, the threat guidance and correspondingly
safeguards and security requirements have changed, increasing the costs
to facilities that conduct safeguards Category I/II activities. A means
to reduce vulnerability and risk is to consolidate these materials and
activities and is an important element of NNSA's 2030 Strategy for
transforming the nuclear weapons complex and making it more secure and
safe. Consolidation of special nuclear materials for reduction in design
basis threat risk and for cost efficiency was a key recommendation from
the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task Force.

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PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

The Consolidated Plutonium Center will consolidate all plutonium Category
I/II activities into one location (with the exception of testing at the
Nevada Test Site (NTS), unless NTS is chosen for the CPC location).
Laboratories would perform all research and development, surveillance of
stockpile warheads, process development, production assistance, and
certification activities involving Category I/II levels of plutonium at
the CPC. A CPC with its increased agility and responsiveness also
provides a number of opportunities for cost savings in supporting RRW
transformation: o o o Opportunity to reduce the stockpile, since a
responsive infrastructure that can respond quickly to unforeseen
requirements can eliminate the need to maintain a large number of
augmentation warheads, Decrease the likelihood that underground nuclear
testing would need to be resumed, and Eliminate the need for costly life
extension programs. Costs are saved by not having to maintain the
capability to manufacture older designs and handle some hazardous
materials to replicate legacy warheads. Most warhead components were
designed, built, and fielded with 1970s technology that are increasingly
difficult and costly to maintain and require extra processes to
manufacture to specification. CPC PROJECT SCOPE

2

The Consolidated Plutonium Center (CPC) will consolidate within the
Nuclear Weapons Complex all Category I/II security and hazard class
defense programs mission activities requiring the use and handling of
plutonium material. It will provide the facilities and equipment to
perform pit manufacturing, pit surveillance, plutonium research and
development, manufacturing process development, manufacture of parts for
pit certification testing, and training of manufacturing and research and
development personnel. The CPC will also consolidate and store all
plutonium metal and other materials and parts required in support of
these activities, and have supporting analytical chemistry and
metallurgical capability. The CPC site location is to be determined
through completion of a programmatic environmental impact statement and
associated record of decision under the National Environmental Policy
Act. Five locations are being evaluated: Savannah River Site, Los Alamos
National Laboratory, Nevada Test Site, Pantex Site, and Oak Ridge Y-12
Site. The physical configuration of facilities comprising the CPC will be
evaluated in an alternative study during conceptual design. Pit
Manufacturing: The CPC will have a pit manufacturing capacity of 125 RRW
pits single shift net to the stockpile. The pit manufacturing work
includes the fabrication of the plutonium components for pits and the
assembly of pits. A pit in this context is the assembly of all components
into the full pit that is shipped to Pantex. Typically, non-plutonium
parts will be government-furnished equipment and fabricated elsewhere.
Non-plutonium components will be shipped to the CPC to be assembled along
with the plutonium components into pits. A quality assurance acceptance
program will be required to receive and accept non-plutonium parts. In
addition, a bonded stores
PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

capability must be provided for interim storage of government-furnished
equipment and other parts/materials for WR production. The CPC will
require the capability to perform special nuclear material shipping,
receiving, and storage; pit disassembly and feedstock sampling; metal
preparation, recovery, and refining; product forming, machining, welding,
cleaning, and assembly; and product inspection (including radiography),
process qualification, production surveillance, and analytical chemistry
support. Supporting and ancillary functions (waste handling, security
operations, training, maintenance, administration, process development,
and testing) required to perform pit manufacturing are also included in
the CPC. These capabilities will be applied to both WR production and
production of parts/samples in support of certification and new
production surveillance activities. The CPC will deploy manufacturing
processes that will enable the production of Reliable Replacement Warhead
pits as components for replacement of warheads in the enduring stockpile.
The facility will be designed based on an agile facility concept, whereby
processes could be changed out as new technologies are developed and
limited additional capacity created as contingency for unforeseen
requirements. Feedstock for the fabrication of the plutonium components
will consist primarily of site-return pits requiring disassembly and
reprocessing, but will also include purified metal from the CPC
processing line. The capability to manufacture legacy pits will be
retained through the agility and flexibility aspects of design with the
manufacturing modules and floor space within the facility. Pit
Surveillance: Pit surveillance is the periodic disassembly and inspection
of pits removed from the active stockpile to help identify any defects or
degradation and assure that nuclear weapons in the enduring stockpile are
safe and reliable. Evaluations include leak testing, weighing,
dimensional inspection, dye penetrant inspection, ultrasonic inspection,
radiographic inspection, metallographic analysis, chemical analysis,
pressure tests, and mechanical properties testing. Plutonium Research and
Development: Plutonium research and development seeks to understand the
properties and performance characteristics of plutonium, including
fundamental thermodynamic, shock-induced deformation, intermediate
strain-rate elastic-plastic behavior, spall, and surface ejecta.
Understanding of the properties and performance characteristics supports
modeling of weapon performance and provides assurance of stockpile
reliability. Samples are prepared to support tests, such as those using
the JASPER gas-gun facility at the Nevada Test Site. Parts are
manufactured to support subcritical experiments to study specific
fundamental plutonium properties. Research and development also supports
studies on plutonium aging to measure and understand weapon
characteristics as the material ages. Sample fabrication requires the use
of lathes, drill presses, tomography, metallagraphic equipment,
polishing, precision machining and inspection, and rolling mill
equipment.

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Manufacturing Process Development: During the projected lifetime of the
facility (50 years), there will be changes in technology and changes in
design of warheads where new processes and equipment will need to be
developed and tested before they enter the production line. Process
development requires both cold and hot space. Examples currently underway
are foundry development where a new casting process is being developed to
increase capacity and efficiency; metal purification where a new piece of
equipment will accelerate activities, reduce radiation exposure, and
reduce waste; machining where multi-functional equipment can replace the
need for 3 or 4 separate pieces of equipment; new dimensional analysis to
reduce time and improve accuracy of measurement; and module development
to locate multiple pieces of equipment in a manner that increases
efficiency within a set of operations. This area also provides capability
for training new personnel, develop processes, and evaluate new equipment
without unnecessary exposure to radiation. Manufacture of Certification
Parts: Besides the manufacture of pits for the stockpile, the manufacture
of pits or parts of pits will be required for support of physics and
engineering certification testing. In most instances, such pits or parts
may be manufactured on the production line. Their production, however,
must be considered in design of the floor space and equipment to ensure
the production line is not interrupted in achieving its required capacity
and output to the stockpile. 3 3.1 FUNCTIONAL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
Functional Areas

General functional production and support areas required for pit
manufacturing are listed in this section. The CPC fabricates and
assembles pit components and products, and receives, ships, and stores
various materials, components, and products relating to its pit
production mission. o Requirement P3-1-The CPC will include special
shipping, receiving, packaging, and staging areas for handling shipments
of special nuclear materials (SNM) and products in accordance with
applicable NNSA requirements for such areas. Transfer of materials from
incoming Safe Secure Transports (SSTs) and SafeGuards Transports (SGTs)
will be handled in a secure manner and within an enclosed receiving dock.
Requirement P3-2-The CPC will include staging, storage, processing, and
handling areas to accommodate all incoming non-plutonium parts,
materials, and components. Requirement P3-3-The CPC will accommodate all
required storage needs for the various processing areas. These needs
include the storage of hazardous and nonhazardous materials and
components, storage at all necessary points in the pit production process
(e.g., receiving, feed material stores, in-line storage, and post-
production storage), and, where required, also include bonded storage.

o o
PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

o o

Requirement P3-4-All storage and staging areas will meet appropriate NNSA
requirements and standards, taking into consideration such things as
storage duration (long-term, intermediate, interim or short-term), and
material form (oxide, chloride, metal, or liquid). Requirement P3-5-
Support functions for the staging and storage of all hazardous materials
will be provided as required (e.g., packaging, nondestructive assays
[NDA], etc.).

Because a primary source of plutonium will be site-return pits and other
types of pits, appropriate disassembly and reprocessing areas must be
included in the CPC. o Requirement P3-6-The CPC will include a pit
disassembly area with the appropriate ancillary functions required to
handle all pit types in the enduring stockpile and in the National
Security inventory. Appropriate data will be collected, such as chemistry
data and visual inspections, in order to use the material as feedstock.
This data will be provided to activities supporting the surveillance
program for completeness of information. Requirement P3-7-The CPC will
include plutonium metal recovery, preparation, and processing areas
appropriate to supply the pit production areas with design specification
plutonium feed material. These metal recovery and processing areas must
accommodate various sources and compositions of input material.

o

The primary nuclear production areas at CPC include areas for foundry
operations, machining, and pit assembly. o o o Requirement P3-8-The CPC
will include areas for foundry and heat treatment operations as required
by anticipated reliable replacement warhead (RRW) pit designs.
Requirement P3-9-The CPC will include machining areas that can
accommodate anticipated reliable replacement warhead (RRW) pit designs
and material types required for RRW pit production. Requirement P3-10-The
CPC will include component and product assembly areas that will
accommodate different nuclear and nonnuclear parts for anticipated RRW
pit types that will be produced at the CPC. Assembly areas include
subassembly fabrication, main assembly, and post-assembly areas.

Many functional areas are required to support the primary nuclear feed
and production areas. o o o o Requirement P3-11-The CPC will include all
required inspection, qualification, and appropriate certification
activities to support pit production requirements. Requirement P3-12-The
CPC will include all required materials characterization areas to support
pit production requirements. Materials characterization includes
analytical chemistry, metallography, and other testing and
characterization functions. Requirement P3-13-The CPC will include all
necessary waste handling and management areas to accommodate anticipated
hazardous and nonhazardous waste types. These areas should not allow the
long-term accumulation of waste. Requirement P3-14-The CPC will include
necessary administrative areas (including training, quality assurance and
acceptance, etc.) and office space to support all activities. In general,
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PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

o

office space, cold laboratories, and training areas will be segregated
from nuclear facility areas. Limited office space will be included in the
nuclear areas. Requirement P3-15-The CPC will include process
development, materials testing, prototyping, and testing areas to support
pit production requirements. Safety and Security Requirement P3-16-
Equipment spacing and shielding will be designed to as low as reasonably
achievable (ALARA) considerations and will meet 10CFR835 requirements
(see Section 6, Reference 3). Requirement P3-17-Environment, safety, and
health will be integrated into the planning and execution of all project
activities in accordance with NNSA policies for integrated safety
management (ISM) and NNSA standards for nonreactor nuclear facilities.
Requirement P3-18-Safeguards and security will be integrated into the
planning and execution of all project activities in accordance with NNSA
policies for integrated safeguards and security management. Technology
Transfer

3.2 o o o

3.3

The CPC is intended to benefit from technology development efforts and
lessons learned in the process of recapturing pit production
technologies. Technology development beyond the current LANL baseline and
interim manufacturing period, specific to the fabrication process, will
be prototyped in preparation for manufacturing applications through the
use of demonstration facilities at other DOE sites. o Requirement P3-19-
The CPC will leverage the operating experience in production processes of
various DOE sites including Rocky Flats Plant (RF), Y-12 Plant, PX,
Kansas City Plant (KCP), LANL, LLNL, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL),
and Savannah River Site (SRS). Operating experience from other foreign
sites, such as the United Kingdom (UK), will be used as appropriate.
Requirement P3-20-The CPC design approach will institute a mechanism for
transferring knowledge, training personnel, and establishing the
necessary base for design, construction, and operations at the CPC.

o

Because the CPC must be capable of manufacturing all anticipated reliable
replacement warhead pits and accommodating future designs and
development, interaction with the design agency, current production
agency, current operating facilities, and R&D facilities will be vital. o
o o Requirement P3-21-The WR pits manufactured at CPC will meet the
requirements of pit specifications issued by the responsible design
agency and subsequently approved through the Project Change Control
Process. Requirement P3-22-The CPC will be designed so that production
processes can be changed out or modified as new technologies are
developed. Requirement P3-23-The CPC will incorporate technology,
product, and process changes and improvements as approved by the
appropriate design agency.
PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

3.4

Capacity

Capacity relates to the number of pits of a given type (and/or in total)
necessary to be produced over a period of time to meet projected National
Defense needs. Capacity includes the production requirements for normal
pit replacement, surveillance replacement, quality assurance or other
testing requirements, and contingency production requirements. o
Requirement P3-24-The CPC will accommodate production capacities as
required by NNSA but with a minimum production capacity of 125 RRW pits
net to the stockpile per year, accounting for stockpile replacement pits
and other pits necessary to fulfill program requirements. Requirement P3-
25-The CPC must accommodate the production of materials, samples, and
components required to support qualification, certification, and other
testing activities. Agility

o

3.5

Agility characterizes how a facility can adapt to and flexibly
accommodate different and changing needs or requirements. Agility applies
to various aspects of the CPC, including product diversity, production
capacity, operations, and technology. The CPC will deploy production
processes that will enable the manufacture of reliable replacement
warhead designed pits. The facility will be designed so that processes
can be changed out or modified as new technologies and products are
developed. The capability to manufacture legacy pits will be retained
through the agility aspects of design with the manufacturing modules and
floor space within the facility. o o o Requirement P3-26-The CPC will be
capable of manufacturing legacy pits through flexibility within the
design of the manufacturing modules leaving sufficient space to
accommodate any required variation in manufacturing tooling to
remanufacture a legacy pit. Requirement P3-27-The CPC will be able to
handle the introduction of new plutonium fabrication and process
technologies and will be capable of manufacturing pits of new designs
consisting of different alloys. Requirement P3-28-The CPC will be able to
cycle between low production levels (minimum level necessary to maintain
standby capability) and high production levels (maximum level consistent
with facility design baseline) with as little impact as possible to
production schedules and stockpile support. Requirement P3-29-The CPC
will be able to change over or accommodate a change in RRW pit type
production with minimal impact to production. Process qualification and
prototyping for a second RRW pit type may occur in tandem with ongoing
production of another pit type. Requirement P3-30-The CPC will be
designed for and capable of parallel pit production. The CPC will be
capable of producing up to two different pit designs at once.

o o
Plutonium source material will come primarily from site-return pits
requiring disassembly and reprocessing, but may also come in the form of
purified metal or oxides from another site, as needed.

13
PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

o o

Requirement P3-31-The CPC will be able to handle and process feedstock,
both metal and oxides from various sources, for the fabrication of
plutonium components. Requirement P3-32-The CPC single-shift capacity at
startup will be determined based on evolving National Security
requirements, but it will support no less than 125 RRW pits net to the
stockpile per year. Sprint or contingency production capabilities will be
accommodated through alternatives such as multiple-shift operations
(e.g., two eight-hour production shifts per day) and contingency floor
space for addressing agility requirements. Research and Development

3.6

Research and Development (R&D) will be provided at the CPC as a
consolidation of all R&D activities associated with the use and handling
of plutonium. Requirements for R&D will be coordinated with Los Alamos
National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. o o o o
Requirement P3-33-The CPC will be able to support R&D activities in the
areas of foundry, machining and inspection, assembly, component/surety
testing, environmental testing, nuclear material detection testing,
disassembly, and metal preparation. Requirement P3-34- The CPC will be
able to support R&D activities associated with the certification of pits.
Requirement P3-35- The CPC will be able to support R&D activities
associated with plutonium metal characteristics. Requirement P3-36-The
CPC will be able to provide analytical chemistry and metallurgical
characteristic support for research and development activities.

Surveillance 3.6 3.7 All surveillance activities of both legacy pits in
the stockpile and newly manufactured RRW pits will be supported at the
CPC. o Requirement P3-37-The CPC will be able to conduct all surveillance
activities required for both legacy pits and RRW pits with sufficient
space should the surveillance program require adjustments. GENERAL DESIGN
REQUIREMENTS

4

Detailed technical requirements for the CPC may be found in Section 3,
Functional Design Requirements. This section lists more general CPC
requirements in the areas of facility design, development, construction,
safety, startup, operations, regulatory compliance, safeguards and
security, quality assurance, and decontamination and decommissioning of
new and/or modified facilities developed for the CPC.
PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

4.1 4.1.1 o

Facilities, Regulatory Compliance, and Safety DESIGN LIFE

Requirement P4-1-The CPC will be designed for a service life of at least
50 years with major infrastructure upgrades anticipated at about 25
years. Components that are anticipated to require replacement during the
operating life of the facility will be explicitly identified, and the
facility design will allow the timely replacement of such components. The
service life of the facility and anticipated upgrades will be consistent
with the life cycle cost control and asset management goals established
for the facility. PROJECT BASELINES

4.1.2 o

Requirement P4-2-A project execution plan will be developed for the CPC
that will establish scope, cost, and schedule baselines for management of
the project. REGULATORY COMPLIANCE

4.1.3 o

Requirement P4-3-The CPC will be designed, built, and operated in
compliance with all applicable Federal, state, and local laws and
regulations, as well as NNSA requirements and implementation plans for
Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) recommendations.
PRELIMINARY WORK

4.1.4 o

Requirement P4-4-Prior to Title I design of the CPC, a preliminary
hazards analysis will be performed, and facility design features
pertaining to safety, security, and quality assurance will be
established. EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND PLANNING

4.1.5 o

Requirement P4-5-CPC facility features and information necessary to
support effective site emergency response actions shall be included in
the design and coordinated with the existing emergency planning of the
facility site. ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE

4.1.6 o

Requirement P4-6-The CPC will be designed, constructed, operated, and
decommissioned in full compliance with environmental regulations. The CPC
must also comply with the requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) prior to a decision on site selection and to initiation
of Title II or final design of the CPC.

15
PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

4.1.7 o

TRAINING

Requirement P4-7-Training plans for the CPC will support necessary skills
development for design, construction, and operation. Prior to
construction and operation, the training plans will include the type,
amount, and content of training required for personnel operating,
maintaining, visiting, and/or inspecting the facility. Space for required
training activities will be included in the facility design. MAINTENANCE

4.1.8 o

Requirement P4-8-The CPC will be designed for ease of system and unit
operations checkout, maintenance, inspection, and surveillance, and will
allow ready access to operations and support equipment. PUBLIC HEALTH AND
SAFETY

4.1.9 o

Requirement P4-9-The safety of the public and the workers and the
protection of the environment shall be a primary consideration in the
design, construction, and operation of the CPC. The CPC will implement a
comprehensive safety review process, including input from self-
assessments as well as external independent review groups.

4.1.10 CRITICALITY SAFETY o Requirement P4-10-All processing, staging,
and storage areas will be designed to be criticality safe under normal
operating and design basis accident conditions. The facility design must
meet DOE Order 420.1 and ANSI/ANS 8 series for criticality safety.

4.1.11 SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY o Requirement P4-11-The CPC facilities
will incorporate physical protection and material control and
accountability measures consistent with applicable regulations that are
necessary to prevent the theft or diversion of fissile materials.

4.1.12 QUALITY ASSURANCE o Requirement P4-12-The CPC project will
implement a quality assurance program. The program will meet applicable
NNSA requirements and will be consistent with established quality
management practices at the CPC site.

4.1.13 INFORMATION SYSTEMS INTEGRATION o Requirement P4-13-Integration of
production, quality assurance, facility operations, administration,
security, and safety information systems will be a goal of the CPC.
4.1.14 WASTE MINIMIZATION
PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

o

Requirement P4-14-Waste minimization will be a goal of the CPC. The
production of waste requiring off-site disposal will be reduced to ALARA
consistent with cost-benefit analyses.

4.1.15 LONG-TERM FACILITY DISPOSITION AND SITE STEWARDSHIP o Requirement
P4-15-The methods and cost of eventual facility decontamination and
decommissioning will be considered during design. The CPC will serve as a
model for long-term stewardship practices at nuclear facilities.

4.1.16 LIFE CYCLE COST CONTROL AND ASSET MANAGEMENT o Requirement P4-16-
Effective life cycle cost control and asset management will be a goal of
the CPC. Technology and operational practices that can reduce facility
life cycle costs will be applied consistent with safety and security
requirements.

4.1.17 ENERGY CONSERVATION o Requirement P4-17-CPC will meet or exceed
the energy efficiency standards established under the Energy Policy Act,
Public Law 102-486, Section 305. Sustainable building design principles
must be applied to the siting, design, and construction of the CPC.
Process Development Requirements

4.2

The pit manufacturing technology used in the CPC must vary somewhat from
the technology that was used at Rocky Flats. There are four main drivers
to change technology: 1) processing has changed as specified by the
design agencies; 2) some Rocky Flats manufacturing equipment is obsolete
and no longer supported; 3) state-of-the-art technology has improved
casting, machining, and welding processes; and 4) new environmental laws
may make some processes, such as the current density measurement
methodology, obsolete. o Requirement P4-18-A key goal of the CPC project
is to develop a safe, secure, environmentally-compliant facility based on
modern manufacturing practices. To ensure that this goal is met, a
comprehensive technology development effort must be implemented to
develop technologies that are not currently available. These include, but
are not limited to, a new production casting system, an advanced Contour
Measuring Machine or optical measuring system, a production machining
system, advanced data processing, transport, automation, and other
technologies as appropriate. REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY

5

Table 5-1 lists the requirements developed above in tabular form. Table
5-1. Requirements Summary

17
PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

ID# P3-1

Functional Area Shipping of SNM

P3-2

Non-Plutonium Parts

P3-3

Process Storage

P3-4

Storage Standards

P3-5

Storage Support

P3-6

Pit Disassembly

P3-7

Plutonium Recovery

P3-8

Foundry

P3-9

Machining

P3-10

Assembly Areas

P3-11

Inspection and Qualification

Requirement The CPC will include special shipping, receiving, packaging,
and staging areas for handling shipments of special nuclear materials
(SNM) and products in accordance with applicable NNSA requirements for
such areas. Transfer of materials from incoming Safe Secure Transports
(SSTs) and SafeGuards Transports (SGTs) will be handled in a secure
manner and within an enclosed receiving dock. The CPC will include
staging, storage, processing, and handling areas to accommodate all
incoming non-plutonium parts, materials, and components. The CPC will
accommodate all required storage needs for the various processing areas.
These needs include the storage of hazardous and nonhazardous materials
and components, storage at all necessary points in the pit production
process (e.g., receiving, feed material stores, in-line storage, and
postproduction storage), and, where required, also include bonded
storage. All storage and staging areas will meet appropriate NNSA
requirements and standards, taking into consideration such things as
storage duration (long-term, intermediate, interim or short-term), and
material form (oxide, chloride, metal, or liquid). Support functions for
the staging and storage of all hazardous materials will be provided as
required (e.g., packaging, nondestructive assays [NDA], etc.). The CPC
will include a pit disassembly area with the appropriate ancillary
functions required to handle all pit types in the enduring stockpile and
in the National Security inventory. Appropriate data will be collected,
such as chemistry data and visual inspections, in order to use the
material as feedstock. This data will be provided to activities
supporting the surveillance program for completeness of information. The
CPC will include plutonium metal recovery, preparation, and processing
areas appropriate to supply the pit production areas with design
specification plutonium feed material. These metal recovery and
processing areas must accommodate various sources and compositions of
input material. The CPC will include areas for foundry and heat treatment
operations as required by anticipated reliable replacement warhead (RRW)
pit designs. The CPC will include machining areas that can accommodate
anticipated reliable replacement warhead (RRW) pit designs and material
types required for RRW pit production. The CPC will include component and
product assembly areas that will accommodate different nuclear and
nonnuclear parts for anticipated RRW pit types that will be produced at
the CPC. Assembly areas include subassembly fabrication, main assembly,
and post-assembly areas. The CPC will include all required inspection,
qualification, and appropriate certification activities to support pit
production requirements.
PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

ID# P3-12

Functional Area Materials Characterization

P3-13

Waste Handling

P3-14

Administrative Areas

P3-15

Process Development

P3-16

Spacing and Shielding

P3-17

ES&H

P3-18

Safeguards and Security

P3-19

Operating Experience

P3-20

Technology Transfer

P3-21

Specifications

P3-22 P3-23

Equipment Change-Out Process Improvements

P3-24

Production Capacities

Requirement The CPC will include all required materials characterization
areas to support pit production requirements. Materials characterization
includes analytical chemistry, metallography, and other testing and
characterization functions. The CPC will include all necessary waste
handling and management areas to accommodate anticipated hazardous and
nonhazardous waste types. These areas should not allow the long-term
accumulation of waste. The CPC will include necessary administrative
areas (including training, quality assurance and acceptance, etc.) and
office space to support all activities. In general, office space, cold
laboratories, and training areas will be segregated from nuclear facility
areas. Limited office space will be included in the nuclear areas. The
CPC will include process development, materials testing, prototyping, and
testing areas to support pit production requirements. Equipment spacing
and shielding will be designed to as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)
considerations and will meet 10CFR835 requirements (see Section 6,
Reference 3). Environment, safety, and health will be integrated into the
planning and execution of all project activities in accordance with NNSA
policies for integrated safety management (ISM) and NNSA standards for
nonreactor nuclear facilities. Safeguards and security will be integrated
into the planning and execution of all project activities in accordance
with NNSA policies for integrated safeguards and security management. The
CPC will leverage the operating experience in production processes of
various DOE sites including Rocky Flats Plant (RF), Y-12 Plant, PX,
Kansas City Plant (KCP), LANL, LLNL, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL),
and Savannah River Site (SRS). Operating experience from other foreign
sites, such as the United Kingdom (UK), will be used as appropriate. The
CPC design approach will institute a mechanism for transferring
knowledge, training personnel, and establishing the necessary base for
design, construction, and operations at the CPC. The WR pits manufactured
at CPC will meet the requirements of pit specifications issued by the
responsible design agency and subsequently approved through the Project
Change Control Process. The CPC will be designed so that production
processes can be changed out or modified as new technologies are
developed. The CPC will incorporate technology, product, and process
changes and improvements as approved by the appropriate design agency.
The CPC will accommodate production capacities as required by NNSA but
with a minimum production capacity of 125 RRW pits net to the stockpile
per year, accounting for stockpile replacement pits and other pits
necessary to fulfill program requirements.

19
PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

ID# P3-25

Functional Area Certification

P3-26

Legacy Pits

P3-27

New Process Technologies

P3-28

Production Level

P3-29

Change-Over

P3-30

Parallel production

P3-31

Feedstock

P3-32

Operational Capacity

P3-33

Pit Manufacturing R&D

P3-34 P3-35 P3-36

Certification R&D Plutonium Metal R&D R&D Support Activities

P3-37

Surveillance

Requirement The CPC must accommodate the production of materials,
samples, and components required to support qualification, certification,
and other testing activities. The CPC will be capable of manufacturing
legacy pits through flexibility within the design of the manufacturing
modules leaving sufficient space to accommodate any required variation in
manufacturing tooling to remanufacture a legacy pit. The CPC will be able
to handle the introduction of new plutonium fabrication and process
technologies and will be capable of manufacturing pits of new designs
consisting of different alloys. The CPC will be able to cycle between low
production levels (minimum level necessary to maintain standby
capability) and high production levels (maximum level consistent with
facility design baseline) with as little impact as possible to production
schedules and stockpile support. The CPC will be able to change over or
accommodate a change in RRW pit type production with minimal impact to
production. Process qualification and prototyping for a second RRW pit
type may occur in tandem with ongoing production of another pit type. The
CPC will be designed for and capable of parallel pit production. The CPC
will be capable of producing up to two different pit designs at once. The
CPC will be able to handle and process feedstock, both metal and oxides
from various sources, for the fabrication of plutonium components. The
CPC single-shift capacity at startup will be determined based on evolving
National Security requirements, but it will support no less than 125 RRW
pits net to the stockpile per year. Sprint or contingency production
capabilities will be accommodated through alternatives such as multiple-
shift operations (e.g., two eight-hour production shifts per day) and
contingency floor space for addressing agility requirements. The CPC will
be able to support R&D activities in the areas of foundry, machining and
inspection, assembly, component/surety testing, environmental testing,
nuclear material detection testing, disassembly, and metal preparation.
The CPC will be able to support R&D activities associated with the
certification of pits. The CPC will be able to support R&D activities
associated with plutonium metal characteristics. The CPC will be able to
provide analytical chemistry and metallurgical characteristic support for
research and development activities. The CPC will be able to conduct all
surveillance activities required for both legacy pits and RRW pits with
sufficient space should the surveillance program require adjustments.
PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

ID# P4-1

Functional Area Design Life

P4-2

Cost and Schedule Baseline

P4-3

Regulatory Compliance

P4-4

Preliminary Work

P4-5

Emergency Response

P4-6

NEPA Compliance

P4-7

Training

P4-8

Maintenance

P4-9

Public Health and Safety

P4-10

Criticality Safety

Requirement The CPC will be designed to for a service life of at least 50
years with major infrastructure upgrades anticipated at about 25 years.
Components that are anticipated to require replacement during the
operating life of the facility will be explicitly identified, and the
facility design will allow the timely replacement of such components. The
service life of the facility and anticipated upgrades will be consistent
with the life cycle cost control and asset management goals established
for the facility. A project execution plan will be developed for the CPC
that will establish scope, cost, and schedule baselines within which the
project will be managed. The CPC will be designed, built, and operated in
compliance with all applicable Federal, state and local laws and
regulations, as well as NNSA requirements and implementation plans for
DNFSB recommendations. Prior to Title I design of the CPC, a preliminary
hazards analysis will be performed, and facility design features
pertaining to safety, security, and quality assurance will be
established. CPC facility features and information necessary to support
effective site emergency response actions shall be included in the design
and coordinated with the existing emergency planning of the facility
site. The CPC will be designed, constructed, operated, and decommissioned
in full compliance with environmental regulations. The CPC must also
comply with the requirements of NEPA prior to a decision on site
selection and to initiation of Title II design of the CPC. Training plans
for the CPC will support necessary skills development for design,
construction, and operation. Prior to construction and operation, the
training plans will include the type, amount, and content of training
required for personnel operating, maintaining, visiting, and/or
inspecting the facility. Space for required training activities will be
included in the facility design. The CPC will be designed for ease of
system and unit operations checkout, maintenance, inspection, and
surveillance, and will allow ready access to operations and support
equipment. The safety of the public and the workers and the protection of
the environment shall be a primary consideration in the design,
construction, and operation of the CPC. The CPC will implement a
comprehensive safety review process, including input from self-
assessments as well as external independent review groups. All
processing, staging, and storage areas will be designed to be criticality
safe under normal operating and design basis accident conditions. The
facility design must meet DOE Order 420.1 and ANSI/ANS 8 series for
criticality safety.

21
PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

ID# P4-11

Functional Area Safeguards and Security

P4-12

Quality Assurance

P4-13

Information Systems Integration

P4-14

Waste Minimization

P4-15

Facility Disposition and Stewardship

P4-16

Cost Control and Asset Management

P4-17

Energy Conservation

P4-18

Process Development

Requirement The CPC facilities will incorporate physical protection and
material control and accountability measures consistent with applicable
regulations that are necessary to prevent the theft or diversion of
fissile materials. The CPC project will implement a quality assurance
program. The program will meet applicable NNSA requirements and will be
consistent with established quality management practices at the CPC site.
Integration of production, quality assurance, facility operations,
administration, security, and safety information systems will be a goal
of the CPC. Waste minimization will be a goal of the CPC. The production
of waste requiring off-site disposal will be reduced to ALARA consistent
with cost-benefit analyses. The methods and cost of eventual facility
decontamination and decommissioning will be considered during design. The
CPC will serve as a model for long-term stewardship practices at nuclear
facilities. Effective life cycle cost control and asset management will
be a goal of the CPC. Technology and operational practices that can
reduce facility life cycle costs will be applied consistent with safety
and security requirements. CPC will meet or exceed the energy efficiency
standards established under the Energy Policy Act, Public Law 102-486,
Section 305. Sustainable building design principles must be applied to
the siting, design, and construction of the CPC. A key goal of the CPC
project is to develop a safe, secure, environmentally-compliant facility
based on modern manufacturing procedures. To ensure that this goal is
met, a comprehensive technology development effort must be implemented to
develop technologies that are not currently available in order to ensure
the CPC is designed consistent with the goal of developing a safe,
secure, environmentallycompliant facility based on modern manufacturing
practices. These include, but are not limited to, a new production
casting system, an advanced Contour Measuring Machine or optical
measuring system, a production machining system, advanced data
processing, transport, automation, and other technologies as appropriate.
PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

6 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

REFERENCES Consolidated Plutonium Center Mission Need Statement -
Revision 0, NA-118, National Nuclear Security Administration, March 2008.
National Nuclear Security Administration Strategic Plan, November 2004.
"Part 835 - Occupational Radiation Protection," Code of Federal
Regulations, Title 10, Volume 4, Parts 500 to end, U.S. Government
Printing Office. U.S. Department of Energy Strategic Plan, 2006. Defense
Programs Strategic Vision for 2030, February 2005. Complex 2030, A
Preferred Infrastructure Planning Scenario for a Nuclear Weapons Complex
Able to Meet the Threats of the 21st Century, September 2006. Joint DoD &
DOE Interim Report on the Feasibility and Implementation of the Reliable
Replacement Warhead Program, March 22, 2006. Statement of Clay Sell,
Deputy Secretary of Energy, Before the House Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, April 5, 2006. Statement of
Thomas P. D'Agostino, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National
Nuclear Security Administration, Before the House Armed Services
Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April 5, 2006. Joint NNSA and
DoD Briefing to STRATCOM, "Reliable Replacement Warhead Program", May
2006 (OUO). Section 3111 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006, Public Law 109-163 (2006). Pit Manufacturing and
Certification Campaign Implementation Plan, FY 2007. E. Ryder, "Analysis
of the Ability of a Low Capacity Pit Manufacturing Facility to Meet Long-
Term Production Requirements of the U.S. Stockpile (U)," Sandia National
Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, January 29, 2002 (SRD). "Nuclear Posture
Review (U)," Report to the Congress in Response to Sections 1041 (as
Amended) and 1041 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2001, PL 106-398, December 2001 (SFRD). Secretary of
Energy Advisory Board, Report of the Nuclear Weapons Complex
Infrastructure Task Force, "Recommendations for the Nuclear Weapons
Complex of the Future", October 4, 2005. TA-55 Pit Manufacturing
Responsive Infrastructure and Capacity Study (U), Revision 2: April 15,
2005 (SRD).

10. 11. 12. 13.

14.

15.

16.

23
White Paper: Programmatic Update of Synergies of PDCF with CNPC/CPC
Action Item A.5 of the "Preliminary Assumptions for a Consolidated
Nuclear Production Center (CNPC) Alternative for the Complex 2030
transformation initiative includes: "Review the possible synergetic space
and capabilities of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF)
planned for the Savannah River Site to the CNPC [Consolidated Nuclear
Processing Complex] or CPC [Consolidated Plutonium Complex] missions
should one of them be located at the SRS." Background Sandia's Nuclear
Weapons Program Integration and Studies Center coordinated an evaluation
in 2002 of the potential synergy between PDCF operations and availability
and the proposed Modern Pit Facility (MPF). Most of the technical issues
remain relevant for the evaluation of connections between PDCF and CPC or
CNPC, although the capabilities required for the two current cases extend
beyond the primary scope of the MPF as a standalone activity. The
discussion below identifies key features of the 2002 evaluation and
provides preliminary updates on how the analysis and conclusions apply to
today's requirements for transformation to the proposed CPC or CNPC. This
discussion focuses primarily on the programmatic interfaces; a complete
function by function analysis is not possible without a detailed scope of
the proposed Complex 2030 facilities. We assume for discussion purposes
that the PDCF-and-MPF study scope comparisons are largely valid for the
portion of the CPC and CNPC that includes the MPF functions. Discussion
Key features of the 2002 evaluation included: - Potential synergies
between the proposed NN Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) and
Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) were excluded at the request of NN.
Potential policy issues were related to the U.S.-Russian Plutonium
Management and Disposition Agreement (PuMDA) of 2000. Update: The PuMDA
will be heavily revised for future agreements, based on major changes in
the disposition plans of Russia; the cancellation of PIP by the U.S.; and
changes in implementation schedules by both parties to the original
agreement. The MFFF will be an NRC-licensed facility and is unlikely to
provide opportunities for shared facility operations. However, a Waste
Solidification Building (WSB) has been added to the NN scope to support
continued management of process effluents (including dissolved SNM) from
the NN projects, and may add additional connected capabilities. - The
study evaluated two approaches: "serial" and "concurrent" operations.
Serial operations assumed that the PDCF would perform its primary mission
of converting 25 MT of pits and clean metal, would be decommissioned (if
necessary to support evolving bilateral agreements), and be modified to
support MPF operations. Concurrent operations
assumed that the PDCF design would be modified to include additional
capability required for the MPF. Both approaches compared a PDCF
operating schedule of 20082018 (full operations in 2010) to the nominal
greenfield MPF schedule, with FY2015 startup and full operations
beginning in FY2018. Maximum throughput for either case had MPF
operations smaller than peak PDCF operations, in tons per year received,
processed, and delivered. At the time of MPF closeout in early FY2005,
the date for full operations had slipped to 2021. This data is comparable
to the ~2020 assumption identified for the CPC and phased approach for
the CNPC. Update: The current target date for PDCF startup is FY2018 and
further delays are possible. Current scope for PDCF would extend the
mission completion date to at least FY2028. If PDCF increase its scope
for disposition of additional pits that may become surplus as a
consequence of the stockpile reductions to Moscow Treaty levels, the
operating period could extend even longer. Therefore the Serial approach
does not appear to be viable for a CPC or CNPC that would begin
operations in approximately FY2020. However, the potential benefits of a
Concurrent approach would be greater with a longer overlap of operating
periods. - One uncertainty for any approach was the implementation of
evolving Design Basis Threat (DBT) security requirements. DBT
requirements have been identified and incorporated into PDCF design, and
existing SRS storage facilities are compliant with DBT2004 guidance and
will be compliant with DPT2005 guidance by 2008. Should future
requirements evolve, these requirements will be incorporated into both
the PDCF and CPC/CNPC facilities. DBT should not be a discriminator. An
evaluation of above-ground versus below-ground siting for business cases
and DBT implementation does not introduce difficulties with either
facility type or concurrent operation. - The Concurrent approach
evaluation showed considerable potential interoperability for storage,
handling, and process capability. However, significant design changes
would be required to support MPF activities that are not part of the PDCF
process. Nevertheless, the report stated that "integration of PDCF and
MPF will likely provide substantial economic benefit to the MPF project
as a result of floor space reduction in the MPF design. We estimate
savings on the order of $500 million as a result of floor space reduction
alone." Update: The PDCF design is nearly complete, but construction and
operation have been delayed considerably. The same factors that
identified savings from designing for Concurrent operation remain valid.
Savings are likely to be much greater than the amount identified in 2002,
based on later capital estimates for both PDCF and MPF. Even if design
changes were not pursued, the CNPC/CPC could share infrastructure with
the PDCF over a greater period of time than was assumed for the original
study.
-

When Sandia performed its evaluation in 2002, the only bulk-SNM
processing capability at SRS that were expected to remain in operations
through the time period leading up to MPF implementation were the NN
facilities. Tritium operations supported continued security and weapons-
related operations, but the only "bulk" processes for plutonium and
highly enriched uranium (HEU) were related to the NN missions. Update:
After PIP was cancelled by NN, EM began development of a replacement
capability: The Plutonium Disposition Project (PDP) is undergoing CD-1
design in 2007 and, if built, would operate from approximately FY2010-
FY2019 or through as late as FY2025. Also, in 2006 DOE authorized the
continued operation of H Canyon and HB Line facilities at SRS for
chemical processing of at least 25 MT of HEU and plutonium through at
least FY2019. Receipt and storage facilities at the SRS K Area are
configured to support the entire cycle of these missions, incorporating
latest DBT guidance. A Container Surveillance and Storage Capability
(CSSC) upgrade is underway in the KArea facilities. The WSB project, new
to the NN scope, was provided after NN program delays made it unlikely
that the SRS EM-management effluent-handling and wastemanagement
capabilities would remain available throughout the facilities life-
cycles. These process capabilities have identified high-throughput
processing missions for both plutonium and HEU. Some of those
capabilities could address portions of the CPC and CNPC scope that were
not judged to be available in the PDCF to support implementation of the
MPF.

Preliminary evaluations of these capabilities and additional discussion
of PDCF functions that match proposed CNPC/CPC functions that was not
included in the MPF evaluation. will be made to support CNPC Action Item
A.6 and the development of Complex 2030 business cases. Indeed, the
utilization of the additional SRS capabilities will be the primary
contributor to fulfillment of goal #8 of the Defense Programs "Getting
the Job Done!" vision for Complex 2030 Implementation: "Remove 10 MT of
special nuclear materials (SNM) from NNSA sites for processing and final
disposition." H-Area and K-Area capabilities, not projected to be
available in the 2002 study, have been identified for more than 8 MT of
HEU and plutonium transfers from NNSA sites to SRS between FY2007 and
FY2010, with additional materials under study for future modifications to
site and program baselines.
Los Alamos Upgrade Alternative for the Consolidated Plutonium Center
(CPC) Note to readers: The Record of Decision (ROD) on the 1999 Los
Alamos Sitewide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) is set at a
production level of 20 pits per year. The new LANL SWEIS, presently in
draft form, lists a production level of 20 PPY for the no action
alternative while the expanded operations alternative lists production
levels of 50 PPY on a single shift with 80 PPY production level on
multiple shift operations. It is not clear at this point whether the new
LANL SWEIS will have an associated ROD before the 2030 PEIS is issued in
draft form. Either way, the complex 2030 PEIS and the associated ROD is
expected to establish the boundary for pit production levels at Los
Alamos through 2030. Introduction and Background The scope of a
Consolidated Plutonium Center as described in NNSA planning information 1
includes the consolidation of all defense-related Hazard Category
(HazCat) 2 / Security Category (SecCat) I/II operations for plutonium
processing beginning in the year 2022. This same reference assigns Los
Alamos facilities the "interim mission" for plutonium between 2014 and
2022. All defense-related plutonium missions are, by definition, in
existence at Los Alamos facilities between 2014 and 2022 and for purposes
of estimating environment impacts for the CPC we need only include one
item of additional scope - a higher capacity for pit manufacturing than
presently established during the interim period. The potential single-
shift capacity of existing Los Alamos facilities to support the interim
mission has been established as 50 pits per year delivered to the
stockpile.2 The CPC is to be designed to support a pit-manufacturing
capacity of 125 pits per year to the stockpile.3 This difference forms
the planning basis for input to the SEIS, to raise the capacity to
produce pits in Los Alamos facilities from 50 to 125 pits per year on a
single shift basis without hindering the other defense-related
programmatic activities. For purposes of estimating the environmental
impacts of the CPC at Los Alamos, two approaches are evaluated. The first
is a "green-field" approach where an entirely new set of nuclear
facilities are constructed to achieve consolidation of plutonium
capabilities that do not rely on the use of any pre-existing facilities.
This level of environmental impacts is consistent between all of the
candidate sites. The second approach is an upgrade approach where pre-
existing facilities at Los Alamos are either upgraded or augmented with
new facilities to achieve CPC requirements. The former approach is

2030 Planning Scenario "TA-55 Pit Manufacturing Responsive Infrastructure
and Capacity Study (U)," Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-CP-05-0256,
April 15, 2005. Colloquially referred to as "Pit Capacity Study-1." 3
"Complex 2030: An Infrastructure Planning Scenario for a Nuclear Weapons
Complex Able to Meet the Threats of the 21st Century," Office of Defense
Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of
Energy, DOE/NA-0013, October 23,2006.
2

1

Page 1 of 5
addressed in other information submissions. The enclosed information is
meant to address the second alternative, i.e., upgrades and/or additions
to existing facilities. Existing and Currently Planned Facilities In this
description, we examine how Los Alamos could support a CPC designed
around existing and/or new facilities at the Los Alamos Technical Area
(TA) 55, which is the current site for the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility
(PF-4) and future site of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR)
Building Replacement (CMRR) Project. The programmatic operations at TA-55
are also supported by several facilities, including o The Radioactive
Liquid Waste Treatment Facility (RLWTF); o The solid waste
characterization and disposal site (TA-54); o The CMR Building (TA-03-
29); o The Sigma Building (TA-03-66); o The Main Shops (TA-03-39); o The
Radiochemistry Facility (TA-48, RC-1); and o The Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (LLNL) Superblock facilities. In addition, previously
planned facilities that will support plutonium operations at TA-55
include o The CMRR Facility; o A new radiography facility; and o A new
solid-waste staging facility. Estimated Modifications to Support the CPC
Mission Set The capacity of various facility configurations to
manufacture pits at Los Alamos has undergone a significant amount of
study over the past several years.4,5 In addition, a recent report
examined facility options to achieve the defense-related plutonium
missions at the required capacity for the interim period between 2014 and
2022.6 A subsequent independent review of this analysis was also
conducted7. These prior studies form the basis of determining what
additional facilities would be required at Los Alamos to raise the
required capacity from that of the interim mission to the CPC level of
manufacturing. The existing facilities can provide an adequate level of
support for portions of the overall manufacturing flowsheet and new or
refurbished facilities would therefore only need to accommodate those
portions of the flowsheet where the pre-existing capacity is inadequate.
4

"TA-55 Pit Manufacturing Responsive Infrastructure and Capacity Study
(U)," Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-CP-05-0256, April 15, 2005.
Colloquially referred to as "Pit Capacity Study-1." 5 "Alternatives for
Increasing Pit Production Capacity at the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility
(U)," Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-CP-06-0289, April 10, 2006.
Colloquially referred to as "Pit Capacity Study-2." 6 "Options for
Plutonium-Related Missions and Associated Facilities Between 2007 and
2022," Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-CP-06-0957 (UCNI), October 10,
2006. Colloquially referred to as the "CMRR Business Case." 7 "An
Independent Business Case Analysis for the Construction of the Chemistry
and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project - Nuclear Facility,"
TechSource, Inc., December 21, 2006.

Page 2 of 5
To achieve the required level of pit-manufacturing capacity for a CPC
with existing facilities, three alternatives are possible: 1. Refurbish
existing facilities with associated elimination of existing programs and
transition from supporting legacy pit systems to RRW-like pits; 2. Expand
the scope and possibly the size of the currently planned CMRR Facility;
3. Construct a new facility to augment pit-manufacturing capacity and
related infrastructure capacity.

These three options can be considered as either independent solutions or
in combination to achieve the required capacity across the suite of
facilities in or near TA-55. The optimum combination of remodeling space
in PF-4, adding space onto CMRR and constructing a new building is not
known at this time and requires additional study. However, for purposes
of assessing the impacts to the environment, we need only determine which
option would have the most significant impact to the environment (the
bounding case). Clearly, the bounding case for most environmental factors
would be the addition of a new facility to provide the additional pit
manufacturing, supply/recovery, and/or analytical chemistry support. An
option to remodel existing space in PF-4 cannot be ruled out however, so
additional information associated with this option is also included in
the tabular information. A new "Manufacturing Annex" would augment the
existing facilities to support the CPC mission set. Based on prior
planning information, we may assume that the new facility would be
approximately the same size as the buildings in the CMRR project. This
annex would be physically located near the existing PF-4 structure to
minimize the logistics of material and personnel movements between the
two facilities which would take place through hardened tunnels.
Therefore, with the exception of some updates of the offsite radiological
impacts (from increased material holding of the manufacturing annex
relative to the CMRR Nuclear Facility), the additional environmental
information for this manufacturing annex is simply extracted from that
determined in the course of the CMRR Project. An overhead conceptual view
of this facility configuration is shown in Figure 1. Note that the
Manufacturing Annex shown essentially consists of facilities similar to
the CMRR Nuclear Facility and the CMRR Radiological
Laboratory/Utility/Office Building (RLUOB). The Manufacturing Annex's
RLUOB is constructed to provide o Office space for the additional workers
required for increased pit-manufacturing, plutonium recovery/supply, and
analytical-chemistry operations; o Utility support for the Manufacturing
Annex Nuclear Facility, including gas supply; o Radiological space for
various support operations such as process development, health-physics
laboratories, equipment staging/testing, etc.; and o Additional space for
analytical chemistry instruments used for pit-manufacturingrelated
analyses in a similar vein to those installed in the CMRR RLUOB.

Page 3 of 5
Mfg. Annex RLUOB

Mfg. Annex

PF-4

CMRR NF CMRR RLUOB

Figure 1. TA-55 site plan showing the CMRR and Manufacturing Annex
facilities.

Using data from PF-4 safety analyses, we can grossly estimate the amount
of material that could be used for safety-basis-related calculations for
the Manufacturing Annex. The criticality limits for all of the gloveboxes
in the pit-manufacturing and recovery/recycle areas of PF-4 sums to about
1,100 kg Pu. For the operations that would likely be installed in a
Manufacturing Annex, the glovebox criticality limits sum to about 800 kg
Pu. The amount of material estimated to be on the floor of the CMRR
Nuclear Facility (for safety calculations) is approximately 600 kg Pu.
Thus, to first order, the amount of material on the floor in the
Manufacturing Annex, for safety calculations, would likely be 1.5x-2x
that for the CMRR Nuclear Facility. Because the Manufacturing Annex would
have stringent seismic and safety-related requirements like the CMRR
Nuclear Facility, this increase in material holdings may not
significantly impact the safety analysis for the Manufacturing Annex.
Besides the material holding for safety calculations, the environmental
data for the operation and construction of the Manufacturing Annex, as
envisioned in Figure 1, would be to first order the same as those for the
CMRR Project with selected additions to accommodate possible remodeling
of PF-4.

Page 4 of 5
Requested Tabular Environmental Information:
CONSTRUCTION Data Required Consumption/Use Peak Electrical energy (MWe)
0.3 Diesel Generators (Yes or No) Yes Concrete (yd3) 3,715 Steel (t) 401
Liquid fuel and lube oil (gal) 0 or negligible Water (gal) 2,111,800 Land
(acre) Laydown Area Size 2 acres Parking Lots 5 acres Total Square
Footage Added and Footprint of New Construction New 6.5 acres Employment
Total employment (worker years) 1,080 Peak employment (workers) 300
Construction period (years) 3.6 Waste Generated 200 Transuranic Waste
Contact Handled (cubic yards) 200 Low level 0 Hazardous 578 tons
Nonhazardous (Sanitary and Other)

Page 5 of 5
ETF

Output of the Feb 28/March Environmental Test Facilities Sub-team
Assumptions: o o o o o o At each Lab test one new RRW and one Legacy
weapon Legacy work includes: recertification, LLCE, SFI, ALT's, LEPs, etc
SNM gone from LLNL (cat I and II) by 2014 SNM gone from SNL by 2009
Assumes campaign mode still viable option Response time for: SFIs: 12
months Alts: 18 months Full weapon: 36 months Pressure to
optimize/downsize Operating costs on Business Studies include A1
Operations of Test A2 Equipment readiness A3 Cleanup & closeout of test
Programmatic Cost (PC) = A1 + A2 + A3 Total Facility Cost = RTBF + PC
Options: Option 1 - No Action - Status quo Option 2 .1 Site Standardized
testing (shock, vibration & thermal testing) and Enhanced Testing (High
G, Fire, Drop Tower, etc) Consolidate in place Consolidate in place
Consolidate in place Not applicable SNM/Radiation Testing SNM Mech
Testing

o o

SNL LANL LLNL NTS

Campaign Mode Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

Campaign Mode Not applicable Campaign Mode Not applicable

1
Option 2.2 Site Standardized testing (shock, vibration & thermal testing)
and Enhanced Testing (High G, Fire, Drop Tower, etc) Consolidate in place
Consolidate in place Consolidate in place Not applicable SNM/Radiation
Testing SNM Mech Testing

SNL LANL LLNL NTS

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable New capability (or at CPC)

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable New capability

Option 2.3 Site Standardized testing (shock, vibration & thermal testing)
and Enhanced Testing (High G, Fire, Drop Tower, etc) Consolidate in place
Consolidate in place Consolidate in place Not applicable SNM/Radiation
Testing SNM Mech Testing

SNL LANL LLNL NTS Other consideration: Site SNL

Campaign Mode Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable New capability

Fast Neutron Testing Build new at SNL - Low Enriched Uranium Externally
Driven Nuclear Assembly (LEUEDNA)

LANL LLNL NTS CPC

Build new LEUEDNA at NTS Build new LEUEDNA at CPC

2
Option 3.1 & 3.2 Shut down all large Enhanced Testing Facilities (High G,
Flame, Centrifuge, Sled Track and others to be named). Enhanced Testing
excludes Standardized Testing Facilities and move the large Enhanced
Testing Facilities to fewer or one locations (SNL and/or NTS) (Steady
state and or campaign basis) Site 3.1 SNL Test High Hazard and SNM
Everything moves to SNL with upgraded facilities and campaign SNM Not
applicable Keep Site 300 until new facilities are built Everything moves
to NTS and build new facilities Not applicable

LANL Other consideration: LLNL 3.2 NTS

CPC Option 3.3

Build a High Hazard capability facility or tunnel. Do this work on a
campaign basis. Site SNL Test High Hazard and SNM High hazard moves to
SNL with upgraded facilities and campaign SNM Not applicable Keep Site
300 until new facilities are built SNM testing moves to NTS Not
applicable

LANL Other consideration: LLNL NTS CPC

3
Call Tom Gutierrez at 505-845-6942 for corrections, refinements or if you
believe we are missing data for any alternative Respectfully
submitted....TG June 8, 2007 Update PROJECT - SPECIFIC ANALYSIS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL TEST FACILITIES Environmental Test Facilities (ETF) PEIS
Alternatives ETFs are currently distributed among the three National
Laboratories, SNL, LANL and LLNL based on their respective roles within
the Nuclear Weapons Complex in support of the nuclear weapon stockpile.
LANL and LLNL maintain capabilities to characterize each nuclear package
for which they are the responsible Design Agency. SNL maintains the
capabilities to characterize all of the components (for which they are
the Design Agency) however, not within the nuclear package yet maintain a
capability to characterize the complete weapon level characteristics. In
general terms, these capabilities relate broadly to defining, developing
and characterizing the performance of each component, sub-assembly,
assembly, sub-system, system and the entire weapon relative to the range
of parameters that could be experienced within stockpile to target
sequence. This PEIS analyzes a full spectrum of alternatives associated
with ETFs as shown on Table xx.xx below. Each of these alternatives is
described in this section. Table xx.xx.xx - ETF Alternatives
Downsize/Consolidate Alternatives No Action. Maintain status quo at each
site. All facilities must be maintained, 1 or upgraded to meet current
safety and security standards. 2 Consolidate (downsize) in Place (no
duplication of capability within a given site, but there may be
duplication from site to site) and consider four alternatives to test and
handle Special Nuclear Material. Consolidate (downsize) in place all
standardized component testing at each site. Consolidate Large Scale Test
Capabilities (full-up system level weapon testing) at SNL, or LLNL or
LANL and allow for campaign mode SNM radiation testing at LLNL (Building
334) and SNL (Aerial Cable Facility, Annular Core Research Reactor).
Consolidate (downsize) in place all standardized component testing at
each site. Consolidate Large Scale Test Capabilities (full-up system
level weapon testing) at SNL, LLNL and LANL. Build all Large Scale SNM
Environmental Test Capabilities (Aerial Cable Facility, Annular Core
Research Reactor, and Building 334) to the NTS or CNC, or CPC or CNPC
site. Move all Large Scale Test Capabilities to one (or two) site(s).
Move all Large Scale Test Capabilities to CNC or CPC or CNPC.

2a

2b

3 3a

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3b 3c

Move all Large Scale Test Capabilities to SNL with Security Campaigns of
CAT I/II Special Nuclear Material. Keep existing Large Scale Testing
Capabilities at SNL and build duplicate SNM Test Facilities (Aerial Cable
Facility, Annular Core Research Reactor, and Building 334) as required at
NTS or CNC or CPC or CNPC site. Build Next Generation Capabilities to
Support Complex 2030 and includes these alternatives: Build/Upgrade to a
Combined Environmental Test Facility Complex at SNL and campaign SNM at
SNL as required. Keep LANL Site 300 operational until new facilities are
built. Build/Upgrade to a Combined Environmental Test Facility Complex at
NTS or CNC or CPC or CNPC site. Keep LLNL Site 300 operational until new
facilities are built.

4 4a

4b

The Environmental Test Facilities Team has chosen the following list of
facilities to study during this PEIS: Site LANL Bldg Number 11-25 11-0001
Building Function Drop Tower Storage Building Sled Track PIXIE X-Ray
Building Control Building Control Building Control Room Shop/Assembly
Building Vibration Test Facility Control Bldg/Equipment Shelter HE
Magazine Building with 2500 LN2 Dewar Weapons Component Test Facility
Thermo-conditioning Rest House Simulation Tech Lab (HERMES III &
Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power) PBFA Heavy Lab Saturn & Sphinx
Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) Sandia Pulsed Reactor Facility (SPR)
Radiation Metrology Laboratory Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF) Low Dose
Rate Gamma Irradiation Facility Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF)

11-002 11-003 11-004 11-0024 11-0030 11-033 11-0036 11-0076 16-0207 16-
0301 SNL 970 982 6588 6590-6593 6594 6586 6631 6597

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6520, 6522, Outdoor Centrifuge 6523 B-D, 6525 6526/6529 25-ft Centrifuge
6584 Model Validation and System Certification Test Center 6610 Complex
Wave Test Facility 6715 Light Initiated High Explosive Test Facility
(LIHE) 6740, 6741 A- 10,000 - ft Sled Track C, 6742B, 6742D, 674347,
6751, 6751A 9838 Aerial Cable Facility and Control Building 6639, 6635
Radiography Building and Nondestructive Test Facility Mobile Guns Complex
Rollup 6539, 6539A, Thermal Test Complex, (TTC) 6539H, 9830 871, 888, 963
Electromagnetic/Environmental/Lightning, Strategic Defense Facility LLNL
836 834 334 Dynamic Testing Facility Thermal Testing Facility Hardened
Engineering Test Superblock)

Building

(within

ETF Alternative 1: No Action. Maintain status quo at each site. All
facilities must be maintained or upgraded to meet current safety and
security standards. Maintain status quo at each site. NNSA takes credit
for all consolidation and D&D facility efforts since 1996 and includes
SNL's TCR Phase 1 improvements in ETF and assumes commencement of TCR
Phase II in 2010 and any other proposed NWC ETF construction in this
alternative. All facilities must be upgraded to meet modern safety and
security standards. The other program effects, timeline and costs for
upgrading these facilities will be established prior to publishing the
Preliminary PEIS (we can have this timeline and costs completed by the
end of this July.) There is a need to upgrade and replace existing test
capabilities to support current and future mission requirements for the
broad range of full-scale testing capabilities that must be in place. The
Test Capabilities Revitalization (TCR) Phase II line item is necessary to
extend the life of critical aging facilities at Sandia National
Laboratories and to ensure that key capabilities are maintained to
support NW qualification and surveillance. Without revitalization of
SNL's current test facilities, individual test capabilities will notably
deteriorate during the next five years. The "No Action" alternative
assumes the current TCR Phase II line item will be approved and
construction will commence in 2010. (Dr. Beckner's Work Team is
identifying the timeline

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and costs for upgrading these facilities and will be completed prior to
publishing the Preliminary PEIS.) This alternative entails the continued
operation of the above list of facilities at each of the national
laboratories listed. To keep this entire group of facilities fully
operational will take an economic investment between now and 2030 to
insure they meet the Security and Safety requirements of today's
operating regime. This will require a funding profile as shown below. In
this alternative there is no new construction (except for NNSA's
previously programmed SNL - TCR Phase II which will be used to refurbish
the thermal, fluid, and aerodynamics ETF in TA1 and the mechanical ETF in
TA-III) therefore there are refurbishment effects in establishing
construction waste. These refurbishment effects are mainly creation of
Nonhazardous waste that is estimated below. All costs shown below are for
upgrades to existing facilities similar in nature to the SNL Facility
Upgrade Project entitled "Test Capabilities Upgrade Project, Phase I"
completed in FY2004. All Line Item costs shown below are estimates by the
sites to refurbish these facilities to meet current Security and Safety
Standards. Environmental Test Facilities - No Action Alternative SNL $TBD
million Starting in FY2010 and running per year LANL $TBD million through
FY2017 per year LLNL $TBD million per year Total NWC Site-wide $TBD
million For the four year yearly expenditure for per year in terms period
FY2012 upgrades in Safety & of upgrades through 2017 Security for these
base facilities

Background of Aerial Cable Test Facility to stay at SNL: The Aerial Cable
Facility, located in the Coyote Test Field at SNL, performs gravity drop
and accelerated pull-down tests in support of bomb qualification tests
and weapons development activities. This test capability provides
controlled simulations of the worst-case impact environments experienced
by weapons systems and shipping containers. Gravity drop tests are
performed from a cable suspended between two peaks, giving up to a 600-
foot (ft) vertical distance for acceleration. A rocket-assisted (320-ft
sled track) pull-down technique is used to provide higher impact
velocities when gravity tests are not adequate. The Deputy Administrator
for Defense Programs has given Program Direction in a November 2006
letter, for the Sandia Site Office and SNL to continue to maintain the
capability to utilize the ACF in Albuquerque, New Mexico, should the need
arise to conduct SNM ground testing. The ACF will remain operational
until a replacement facility can be constructed or the decision is made
to campaign SNM testing at SNL. NNSA may be in a situation where we will
always need to conduct SNM impact testing. The Design Agencies are in a
situation where the models need to be validated with actual test data for
the Agencies to have confidence that the models

4 of 19
accurately portray what actually happens during testing or use. Physical
issues of components have alerted our Agencies that we need to conduct
the right test to find a particular defect. NNSA may not need to conduct
these tests very often, but may need to have the ability to conduct these
tests. There is some level of support at LLNL and LANL to continue to
operate ACF at SNL as the only remaining high velocity, high impact Test
Facility that is authorized to test full-up (with Special Nuclear
Materials) weapons in the complex. The ACF may find support from the two
national physics laboratory leadership as the only remaining high
velocity testing facility that will allow the physics laboratory to
determine interrelationships of new materials under stresses available
through the existing ACF. Additionally, there are other options for
conducting impact tests of SNM components that would help in validating
models that are being considered where smaller scale impact tests could
be performed on components like smaller version of subsystems. However
until the physics modeling matures NNSA has committed to use the ACF at
some location within the complex. Background of ACRR staying Active and
Operational at SNL: The ACRR is an essential element in the neutron
vulnerability and hardness testing and certification of stockpile weapon
systems electronic components (e.g., transistors, integrated circuits),
subsystems (e.g., fire sets, neutron generators), and systems (e.g., AF&F
system). The ACRR is also an essential element in the hostile environment
testing of weapon system physics packages (both primary and secondary) at
the full-up system level, as well as material sample tests. In addition,
the ACRR performs neutron radiographic nondestructive examinations of
weapons systems components (e.g., neutron generators). DOE's Vision 2030
includes the need for a responsive infrastructure to design, develop, and
field new weapon systems if needed, and/or repackage current systems.
Under this alternative effluents, emissions and waste would be unchanged
from the "Final programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Stockpile
Stewardship and Management, September 1996." Additionally, there will be
no staffing change under the No Action Alternative. ETF Alternative 2:
Consolidate (downsize) in Place (no duplication of capability within a
given site, but there may be duplication from site to site) and consider
four alternatives to test and handle Special Nuclear Material ETF
Alternative 2a: Consolidate (downsize) in place all standardized
component testing at each site. Consolidate Large Scale Test Capabilities
(full-up system level weapon testing) at SNL, or LLNL or LANL and allow
for campaign mode SNM radiation testing at LLNL (Building 334) and SNL
(Aerial Cable Facility, Annular Core Research Reactor). Downsizing at
LLNL: There has been substantial downsizing at LLNL from the Weapons (W)
program over the last ten years with regard to Environmental Test
Facilities. However, the buildings that LLNL W Program has given up still
remain on the NNSA/Defense Programs inventory list although they are no
longer used for environmental testing purposes. If aspects of this
alternative are accepted, LLNL will make a significant contribution to
2030 PEIS reductions in square footage. Further NNSA proposed downsizing
at LLNL will include closing of Bldg 834 and an associated 12 buildings
near Bldg 834, and moving Bldg

5 of 19
834 capabilities (thermal conditioning and thermal exposure) into one new
additional facility near Bldg 836. This will allow the use of a common
control room and assist NNSA by reducing the LLNL ETF footprint. This
alternative allows Special Nuclear Material campaign mode testing at LLNL
(Building 334 - in the Superblock). This downsizing decision will have a
significant impact on availability of resources, including costs for
startup and shut down of testing campaigns. No staff members would lose
their positions in this downsizing since only three staff members operate
and maintain the combined facilities at B834, B836 and B334. B834 does
not have a dedicated staff. . Table cc.cc shows changes from eliminating
Bldg 834 and its associated 12 buildings. Table cc.cc - Changes at LLNL
Site 834 for Alternative 2a Data Reductions Plant footprint (acres)
13.7acres Employment (workers) 0 Waste Category Low Level Liquid (gal) 0
Solid (yd3) 0 Hazardous Liquid (gal) 200 3 Solid (yd ) 1913 Nonhazardous
Liquid (gal) 0 3 Solid (yd ) 998 Further downsizing of Environmental Test
Facilities at LLNL These facilities are being evaluated by NNSA for
usefulness, end of facility life decisions, and utility to the DP Weapons
Program. They are now placed on a D&D list by NNSA and will be programmed
in the Complex 2030 PEIS for D&D in the period 2012 through 2018. No
staff positions would be lost by this action because these buildings
either have been closed or are in the process of being closed. Some of
the below buildings may have been transferred to other DP mission work.
More analysis needs to occur on these facilities. This study will
complete the analysis of these 46 buildings and will include a final
recommendation in the Final PEIS. Table A. LLNL Excess Facilities - FY
2012 Candidates for D&D NNSA proposes to fund D&D of these facilities
prior to this date: Facility # of Original Function PEIS 2030 Buildings
Planned D&D date B823 Complex 2 Radiography complex 2012 2012 B830 1
Thermal/physical testing 2012 B831 (M52) 1 Magazine storage vault 2012
B832 Complex 5 Material properties testing 2012 Multi-purpose experiments
facility B833 1 2012 B857 1 Magazine storage vault 2012 6 of 19
NNSA proposes to fund D&D of these facilities prior to this date:
Facility # of Original Function Buildings Subtotal 11 buildings B834 K-
cell 1 B854 Complex 10 Combined sq footage: 10,820 Storage facility
Dynamic testing complex

PEIS 2030 Planned D&D date

B855 Complex 3 B856 1 B858 Complex 1

Assembly/disassembly facility Storage facility
Drop tower complex

2014 7 buildings are already gone, except for two bunkers and a control
room 2014 2014 Control Room gone, but tower still present

Subtotal

16 buildings B834 B-cell 1 B834 C-cell 1 B834 D-cell 1 B834 F-cell 1 B834
J-cell 1 B834 L-cell 1 B834 M-cell 1 B837 2 19 buildings B836 Complex 4

Combined square footage of 21,836 Housed brine system (therm. cond.)
Housed brine system (therm. cond.) Housed brine system (therm. cond.)
Special conditioning test cell
Thermal cycling test cell Hot soaking test cell Thermal soaking test cell
Storage facility

2016 2016 2016 2016 2018 2018 2018 2018

Combined square footage of 7,908
Dynamic test complex for assemblies w/ 2018 HE

46 total Total Square Footage of 40,564 buildings Drop dead data required
by Wednesday, June 13th by noon East Coast Time. Table dd.dd - D&D of the
above 46 Facilities at LLNL will reduce the emissions, effluents, and
waste at LLNL per the below table for Alternative 2a, 2b and Data
Reductions Plant footprint (acres) 100 acres Employment (workers) 8 Waste
Category Low Level Liquid (gal) 100 3 Solid (yd ) 10 Hazardous 7 of 19
Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Nonhazardous Liquid (gal)

0 50 100,000

Downsizing at LANL: This set of projects will include closing the Drop
Tower, Sled Track, PIXIE X-Ray Facility and its associated oil storage
buildings, and twelve Thermal conditioning (He and other types) Rest
Houses that have outlived their facility lifetimes. TA11, K Site has
outlived its facility life and either needs replacement or this facility
needs to placed on a D&D list. TA-16, Bldg 301, HE Qualification Building
has outlived its useful life. PIXIE X-ray does not have a mission. Drop
tower needs to be D&D'd to remove an old piece of infrastructure. LANL
can use SNL's drop tower if downward velocity data is needed in the
future. Table ee.ee - Reduction at LANL K- Site, Drop Tower, Sled Track,
PIXIE X-Ray facility and Twelve Thermoconditioning Rest Houses, TA-11, K
Site, TA-16, Bldg 301 for Alternative 2a Data Plant footprint (acres)
Employment (workers) Waste Category Low Level Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3)
Hazardous Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Nonhazardous Liquid (gal) Reductions
100 acres 8

100 10 0 50 100,000

Downsizing at SNL: Consolidation of the TA-V nuclear facilities (Gamma
Irradiation Facility (GIF), (ACRR), Radiation Monitoring Laboratory (RML)
and office space that houses the Radiation workers) at SNL is considered.
A single new facility is proposed under this alternative for housing the
(GIF, ACRR, Radiation Monitoring Laboratory) neutron threat facilities.
Some consolidation/downsizing of non-nuclear weapon component testing has
already occurred at SNL through the use of the SNL "Test Capabilities
Revitalization Phase I and Phase II." Phase I upgraded the Aerial Cable
Facility and the Thermal Test Complex and was completed in December 2005
at a total cost of $48M. Phase II is presently programmed for FY10-FY12
at a cost of approximately $78M. The Large Scale Test Capabilities at SNL
allow Special Nuclear Material testing at SNL by using the Aerial Cable
Facility (ACF) and Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR). This study will
develop the programmatic answer and estimate costs for campaigning work
at the SNL ACF and SNL ACRR should the programmatic decision be made to
remove all Category I/II nuclear material from SNL. 8 of 19
There is some redundancy at SNL in terms of Thermal Testing and this
alternative will determine if this redundancy will remain. The
possibility of removing this redundancy will assist NNSA in removing
surplus square footage from the ETF list of facilities. Table ff.ff -
Reduction at SNL for Removal of Old Thermal Testing Facility for
Alternative 2a Data Reductions Plant footprint (acres) 6 acres Employment
(workers) 2 Waste Category Low Level Liquid (gal) 50 3 Solid (yd ) 10
Hazardous Liquid (gal) 5,000 Solid (yd3) 25 Nonhazardous Liquid (gal)
20,000 Table gg.gg - Reduction at SNL for Consolidation of Nuclear
Facilities at TA-V into One Facility for Alternative 2a Data Reductions
Plant footprint (acres) 20 acres Employment (workers) 12 Waste Category
Low Level Liquid (gal) 50 3 Solid (yd ) 25 Hazardous Liquid (gal) 5,000 3
Solid (yd ) 25 Nonhazardous Liquid (gal) 100,000 Under this alternative,
effluents, emissions and waste would be reduced by the values shown
above. There is some chance that manpower will be reduced by the
consolidation effort of the nuclear facilities at SNL. This number is 7
men/women (TBD) reduced at this point in time, but will be resolved prior
to the release of the Preliminary PEIS in July 2007. (Raglin/Thornton
need this info by June 13th) ETF Alternative 2b: Consolidate (downsize)
in place all standardized component testing at each site. Consolidate
Large Scale Test Capabilities (full-up system level weapon testing) at
SNL, LLNL and LANL. Build all Large Scale SNM Environmental Test
Capabilities (Aerial Cable Facility, Annular Core Research Reactor, and
Building 334) to the NTS or CNC or CPC or CNPC site.

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2b1: This alternative includes alternative 2a consolidation/downsizing
programmatic effects, risks and costs at each site described above and
the below move (2b2) of two facilities to NTS or CNC or CPC or CNPC. 2b2:
This alternative will also include all the programmatic results for
building ACF and ACRR (and associated neutron threat facilities) at the
NTS or CNC or CPC or CNPC site. The program results for building Aerial
Cable Facility and the new LLNL Building 334 at NTS or CNC or CPC or CNPC
will be developed and described in this study. Alternative 2b Note: If in
other locations of this PEIS it is mandated that ACRR is ordered to close
due to reduction of SNL Security Forces, and no campaigns at SNL are
allowed then the decision to move (build new) ACF and ACRR must be made.
Under this alternative, effluents, emissions and waste would be
transferred to the receiving site from the donor site. If nuclear
facilities are moved from SNL (D&D of nuclear facilities at SNL and build
new at NTS or CNC or CPC or CNPC, (22-TBD) men/women will lose their jobs
at SNL and (22-TBD) men/women will be acquired at NTS or CNC or CPC or
CNPC. These numbers are TBD at this point in time, but will be resolved
prior to the release of the Preliminary PEIS by Wednesday close of
business 13 June, 2007). Background of Movement of the Aerial Cable Test
Facility to NTS or CNC or CNPC site or CPC from SNL: Because of the
planned decrease in the amount of Category I and II SNM at SNL/NM the
security posture will decrease significantly beginning in FY2009. This
reduction in security posture will make it cost-prohibitive for NA-10 to
support any ground testing of SNM test configurations at the ACF on a
routine basis. This alternative would require the construction of a new
ACF at NTS or CNPC or CPC or CNC and the D&D of the existing ACF at
SNL/NM. The construction of such a facility would require a two year
process: one for study and design and one more year for construction. The
study would involve site selection, economic evaluation of movement of
the five cables from SNL to CNPC or CNC or CPC or NTS, the actual design
of a new ACF, and the programmatic limitations that NNSA would outline
for the new ACF. The size estimate of this site is below 100 acres. Table
zz.zz - Impacts of Facility Closures for the Movement of the Aerial Cable
Test Facility from SNL to NTS or CNPC or CPC or CNC Annual Operations
CY2006 Data Facility Name: SNL Aerial Cable SNL Consumption/Use Annual
Electrical Energy (megawatt TBD by 13 June by SNL hours [HWh]) Peak
Electrical Demand (megawatt TBD by 13 June by SNL electric [MWe]) Fuel
Usage (gallons [gal] or cubic TBD by 13 June by SNL

10 of 19
yards [yd3]) Other Process Gas (nitrogen, [N], agron [Ar], est.) Water
(gal) Steam (tons) Plant Footprint (acres) Employment (workers &
contractors) Number of radiation workers Average Annual Dose Maximum
Worker Dose

TBD by 13 June by SNL

TBD by 13 June by SNL None 5,000 3 3 (shared by TA-III, IV and V) Zero
Zero (due to no exposures over the past five years) Radionuclide
Emissions TBD by 13 June by SNL NAAQS Emissions (tons/yr) TBD by 13 June
by SNL Hazardous Air Pollutants & Effluents TBD by 13 June by SNL
(nuclides $ curies [Ci]) Chemical Use 0 Maximum Inventory of Fissile
Classified response Material/Throughput

Waste Category

Volume

Destination (Treatment or Disposal) See Note #1 above.

Low Level Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3) Mixed Low Level Liquid (gal) Solid
(yds3) TRU Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3) HLW/Spent Fuel Liquid (gal) Solid
(yds3) Hazardous Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3) Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid
(gal) Solid (yds3) Nonhazardous (Other) Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3)

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown

11 of 19
Note 1: Movement to NTS or CNPC or CPC or CNC will result in nearly
identical Consumption/Use as shown in the column to the left. Use the
values on the left for comparison purposes. Table cc.cc - Impacts of
Facility Closures for the Movement of the Annular Core Research Reactor
(ACRR) from SNL to the NTS or CNC or CPC or CNPC. Annual Operations
CY2006 Data Facility Name: SNL Annular Core Research Reactor
Consumption/Use Annual Electrical Energy (megawatt 290,000 kilowatt hours
(kWh) hours [HWh]) Peak Electrical Demand (megawatt TBD by 15 June by SNL
electric [MWe]) Fuel Usage (gallons [gal] or cubic TBD by 15 June by SNL
yards [yd3]) Other Process Gas (nitrogen, [N], TBD by 15 June by SNL
agron [Ar], est.) Water (gal) 100,000 Steam (tons) None Plant Footprint
(acres) 10 Employment (workers & contractors) 12 Number of radiation
workers 12 Average Annual Dose 100 mrem/worker Maximum Worker Dose 100
mrem Radionuclide Emissions Argon-41 - 5 Ci/yr NAAQS Emissions (tons/yr)
NOX 0.9, CO 1.6, PM 0.1, SOX 0.03, VOC 0.1 Hazardous Air Pollutants &
Effluents 0 (nuclides $ curies [Ci]) Chemical Use 0 Maximum Inventory of
Fissile 300 kg U resident Material/Throughput Waste Category Volume
Destination (Treatment or Disposal)

Low Level Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3) Mixed Low Level Liquid (gal) Solid
(yds3)

0 10 yd3 0 0.2 yd3

Disposal

Disposal

12 of 19
TRU Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3) HLW/Spent Fuel Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3)
Hazardous Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3) Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal)
Solid (yds3) Nonhazardous (Other) Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3)

0 0.2 yd3 0 0 0 0.4 yd3 30,000 gal

Disposal

Disposal Disposal

0 0

Note 1: Movement to NTS or CNC or CPC or CNPC will result in nearly
identical Consumption/Use as shown in the column to the left. Use the
values on the left for comparison purposes. ETF Alternative 3: Move all
Large Scale Test Capabilities to one (or two) site(s). ETF Alternative
3a: Move all Large Scale Test Capabilities to CNPC or CPC or CNC. The
three Large Scale Test Capabilities are the SNL Aerial Cable Facility,
the SNL Annular Core Research Reactor and the LLNL Hardened Engineering
Test Building, Building 334. The alternatives to be studied include the
following: If CNPC or CPC or CNC is moved to NTS then study these sub-
alternatives: 3a1: Build new ACRR (and associated facilities - Radiation
Metrology Laboratory, a Low Dose Rate Gamma Irradiation Laboratory, a
small Hot Cell Facility, and a Reactor Operations Center) within the DAF
PIDAS (Personnel Intrusion, Detection and Assessment System) at NTS. This
will allow NNSA to take advantage of Security at DAF. Estimated
programmatic costs will be established in this study. 3a2: Build new ACRR
(and associated facilities - see Note 3a1 above) at U-1A (underground).
Because this reactor will be moved underground construction costs will be
more expensive. Estimated programmatic results and costs will be
established in this study. 3a3: Build Little Aerial Cable Facility at
NTS: This facility will be gravity drop only - no rocket assist. An area
near Area 12 has been selected which will give NTS height for this
facility. This facility will involve use of an existing crane,
installation of several lengths of arm extensions, certification of
crane, installation of a new trailer as a control room, installation of a
heater/chiller trailer and a new target area. Estimated program results
and costs for Little ACF will be established in this study.

13 of 19
3a4: Build replacement Aerial Cable Facility at NTS: This facility will
be built to replace the SNL facility at Area 12 of NTS for use to test
with Special Nuclear Material. NTS will take advantage of security at
Area 12 by running the weapon into the entrance of an older mine shaft.
Additionally, this will reduce fire danger post test flight. 3a5: Build
Building 334 capabilities at NTS (use one of the High Bays at DAF). This
leverages DAF Security. Estimated programmatic results and costs will be
made during this study. 3a6: Build Building 334 capabilities at NTS
(build new building within the PIDAS of DAF). This is an estimated 2,000
ft2 building that will take advantage of security at DAF. Estimated
programmatic results and costs will be made during this study. 3a7: Build
Building 334 capabilities at NTS (build an underground complex within U-
1A). This leverages security at U-1A. Costs for moving underground are
more expensive. Estimated programmatic results and will be made during
this study. Sub-alternatives 3a1 and 3a3 through 3a6 can be built at SRS,
LANL, PX to sit adjacent to either CNC or CPC or CNPC. No underground
shafts (alternative 3a2 and 3a7) will be built unless NTS is chosen.
Programmatic results and costs will be identified within this study.
Because these three facilities are used to test special nuclear material
these facilities either need to be build within a PIDAS or at a site that
can campaign Security for short duration (two to three week) tests. ETF
Alternative 3b. Move all Large Scale Test Capabilities to SNL with
Security Campaigns of CAT I/II SNM. The three Large Scale Test
Capabilities are the SNL Aerial Cable Facility, the SNL Annular Core
Research Reactor and the LLNL Hardened Engineering Test Building,
Building 334. This alternative includes the following: 3b1: Move LLNL
Building 334 Capabilities to SNL: Under this alternative the
responsibility for the capabilities of the LLNL Hardened Engineering Test
Building, Building 334 will be transferred to SNL. LLNL's Building 334
houses Radiation Monitoring (includes intrinsic radiation monitoring),
shock and vibration testing equipment plus a control room. Since SNL
already has these capabilities, no hardware will be transferred. SNL will
be tasked with the mission assignment for the testing full-up weapon
systems as listed above. The only remaining question open in this
alternative is "do the Authorization Basis documents held by SNL allow
for the range of experiments and testing available at the present LLNL
Bldg 334?" This is an easily resolved issue. Removal of Building 334 from
the ETF inventory reduces a duplicative NNSA facility but will greatly
increase the difficulty for the LLNL Weapons Designers to conduct weapon
certification. This is an obstacle that can be overcome by the use of
modern communication tools and frequent visits to SNL by LLNL design and
test engineers. Formation of a true synthesis of weapons design engineers
and scientists and weapons testing personnel will reduce the probability
of environmental discharges and operating costs for the overall DP
Program. If Bldg 334 is kept only for component level testing, its
nuclear category can be reduced to a Category Level III and Security can
be reduced around this particular facility at LLNL. Under this
alternative full-up weapons testing (with SNM without joining detonators
to He) will henceforth not occur at LLNL and that mission responsibility
will move the SNL.

14 of 19
3b2: Consolidate/Downsize the nuclear testing facilities at SNL: An
alternative to complete closure of SNL nuclear facilities is to
consolidate the unique neutron testing resources required by the NWC in
one location to support the mission requirements for the NNSA. This
project will eliminate ~ 64,000 square feet of office, laboratory, and
nuclear facilities that are over 40 years old and replace them with a
single, modern facility that will meet current facility design and
construction standards for nuclear facilities, optimize operations for
the next 50 years, and advance the capabilities for both diagnostics and
experiment. The center of this facility will be a new reactor building
for the Annual Core Research Reactor (ACRR). Also included will be the
Radiation Metrology Laboratory, a Low Dose Rate Gamma Irradiation
Laboratory, a small Hot Cell Facility, and a Reactor Operations Center.
Neutron survivability and reliability of the strategic stockpile is an
essential element of national security. There cannot be a failure in a
weapons system as the stockpile is both decreased in size and transformed
over the next 25 years to reflect a new generation of weapons, the
Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). Designing for reliability,
understanding the effects of hostile neutron environments on our systems
and new technologies, and being able to continue to certify that our
strategic weapons will survive through hostile environments represent the
keys behind the justification of this project. With the transition to a
stockpile stewardship program, Defense Programs has advocated a science-
based methodology for stockpile surveillance and verification. The
foundation of this methodology is grounded in an effective application of
theory, modeling, simulation, and experiment. Each of these disciplines
is necessary while none is sufficient alone. Given the incomplete
understanding of materials and response to neutron effects, it is
impossible to rely solely on analysis for prediction of hostile encounter
impact. The ACRR is an essential element to insure that within NWC our
Labs can meet immediate experimentation needs and continue to expand Lab
knowledge to support model development. Loss of the ACRR capability would
result in an inability to certify strategic weapons' reliability in
hostile neutron environments and would result in a single-point failure
mode for all the weapons in the strategic stockpile. The critical neutron
reliability facilities are now approaching 50 years in age. They were
designed and constructed prior to the current safety and security
regulations now implemented by the Department of Energy. Seismic design,
contained ventilation, and overall design for testing was not integrated
into the current Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) facility or the
current Hot Cell Facility. The consolidation of these facilities that are
spread over SNL into one central facility achieves a number of strategic
goals for NNSA. o Retention of critical capabilities required for
stockpile certification and Complex 2030. o Retention of ~$200M of unique
and no longer obtainable reactor fuel. o Elimination of space that has
been extended beyond its viable lifetime. o Significant reduction in
footprint. o Improved efficiencies in experimental operations.

15 of 19
o Improved efficiencies in building management and maintenance. This
consolidation will also support the integration of neutron research and
survivability analysis within the NNSA. With the continuing modernization
and reduction in size of component hardware in weapon systems, it is
essential to insure the scientists and the experiment facilities are
structured to facilitate rapid, reliable experiments and communication
between researchers and organizations. The synergies developed by this
consolidation will insure that this knowledge transfer happens. ETF
Alternative 3c: Keep existing Large Scale Testing Capabilities at SNL,
and build duplicate SNM Test Facilities (Aerial Cable Facility, Annular
Core Research Reactor, and Building 334) as required at NTS or CNC or CPC
or CNPC site. This alternative would take the Large Scale Testing
Capabilities at SNL to be built in Alternative 3c and place them at the
NTS or CNC or CPC or CNPC. Known differences from placing these
facilities at SNL are identified herein: SNL TCR Phase II facility and
equipment costs which are programmed, but have not occurred are necessary
to provide NNSA 10-12 years of additional testing capability prior to the
building of this combined environmental test facility to assure NNSA can
continue to test in the known environments of concern. Environmental data
to be determined. Facility and equipment environmental data for SNL-ACRR,
SNL-ACF and LLNL Building 334 will be adjusted for this other site.
Additional NTS or CNC or CPC or CNPC infrastructure programmatic results
will be addressed All D&D environmental results will be included herein
Personnel recruitment, training and relocation environmental results will
be included herein ETF Alternative 4: Build Next Generation Capabilities
to Support Complex 2030 ETF Alternative 4a: Build/Upgrade to a Combined
Environmental Test Facility Complex at SNL and campaign SNM at SNL as
required. SNL is studying a conceptual design for the authorization and
building a National Extreme Environments Test Complex (NEET). The next
generation of environmental testing will increasingly require the ability
to do extreme environments (i.e., any combination or sequence of normal,
abnormal, and/or hostile environmental testing that challenges the
safety, security, or reliability of the system). This capability will
ensure that the development of future weapon systems will meet the
increasingly stringent requirements of customers and that the margins of
safety, performance, and reliability are well understood and quantified.
SNL is currently conceptualizing a future Environmental Test Complex
where the entire NNSA system level (as opposed to component level)
environmental testing footprint is reduced to a six mile by five mile
area.

16 of 19
The core of this combined environmental testing complex is an underground
hypervelocity rail/coil sled track 8500 meters (~5 miles) in length
capable of accelerating a 200 kg load to Mach 15 (over 5000 meters/sec),
simulating a realistic reentry flight environment. The HyperSled track
would be the focal center for a consolidation of the electromagnetic,
thermal, radiation and mechanical environments communities. At the end of
the HyperSled track would be the Extreme Environments Facility (EEF)
designed to produce full-scale abnormal/hostile accident scenarios
(including lightning strikes). Properly designed with a 30-story high bay
and a removable target module, the EEF would eliminate the need for pull-
downs at the Aerial Cable Facility, enhancing security and safety. The
rationale for the construction of this facility and also the teaming of
the aerosciences, electromagnetic, thermal, radiation and mechanical
environments communities would be NNSA's need to engage in combined
environments testing with the intent to eliminate the Trinity exception
(nuclear safety can be assured in an abnormal environment in which the
nuclear safety design configuration is breached, the nuclear explosive
package remains operable, and energy capable of initiating a nuclear
detonation is present). Additionally, this facility would be used for
qualification in the stockpile to target sequence normal and hostile
environments (for the latter, to obtain resultant
mechanical/thermal/electrical system response) as well as to support the
annual Integrated Stockpile Evaluation process through coupled high-
fidelity experimentation and computation. The complex would be capable of
supplementing and even replacing costly Joint Test Assemblies and
qualification flight testing for both air delivered and RV systems
comprising the current and future (WR-based) stockpile. The surrounding
satellite facilities within the NEET Complex would consolidate the normal
environments test community (shock, vibration, loads, and EM) with
associated small laboratories, diagnostics development, and HE handling
in TA III. The recent Thermal Test Complex and the planned upgrades to
the Radiation facilities (NRSL) would be considered part of the NEET
Complex. The Lurance Canyon cable site would become a remote firing site
where SNL could still fire hundreds of pounds of explosives and take
advantage of the infrastructure put in place during TCR Phase 1 to handle
SNM in a campaign mode. The NEET Complex would provide capabilities that
have historically been maintained at multiple sites across the complex,
reducing operational costs, manpower requirements, and the footprint for
environmental test, consistent with the intent of 2030 Complex
transformation. The NEET Complex would allow the disposal and elimination
of all the rocket motors currently in inventory except for those needed
to simulate accident scenarios. In addition to reducing the ETF
footprint, the EM launch technology has direct future weapon research
applications for many DoD platforms and Integrated Technologies and
Systems (ITS) customers. The NEET Complex would advance the state-of-the-
art in energy storage and energy recovery (ultracapacitors and/or
flywheel banks), power distribution, material research, electrical
switching, fast response shielded diagnostics, EM launch capability, and
other related technologies. By the year 2030, population creep in the
City of Albuquerque, Mesa Del Sol, community to the southwest of and
outside of the safety perimeter of SNL Technical Area (TA) III will
require that all future testing occur with minimal environmental impact
(noise, smoke, waste, etc.) on the local community. The NEET Complex
will, by design, accommodate all foreseen environmental
17 of 19
ordinances while permitting SNL to maintain its environmental testing
responsibilities. Programmatically and politically, this notional concept
requires successful completion of Test Capabilities Revitalization
Facility Project, Phase 2 to provide the critical underpinnings for the
support complex to meet near-term WR-1 program requirements. Notional
Capabilities of the proposed National Extreme Environments Test (NEET)
Complex HyperSled Maximum Energy Requirements: 5.0 Gigajoules per shot
(50% efficiency) HyperSled Maximum Power Requirements: 10 Gigawatts per
shot HyperSled Maximum velocity: 5100 m/s (~ Mach 15) HyperSled Capacity:
2 shots per day EEF Explosive Limits: 500 lb TNT equivalent EEF Fire
Capacity: 20 Megawatt pool fires EEF Lightning Capacity: Double-pulse
high current X amperes The next generation of environmental testing
requires NNSA to consider a new test complex, one that challenges
existing and future weapon systems under combined or sequential
environments for the purpose of increasing margins and quantifiably
reducing uncertainties. NNSA is reviewing a notional concept (the NEET
Complex), that would replace/rebuild most of the existing environmental
test facilities and consolidate all environmental testing within a 30
square mile footprint to ensure that the research and development,
science and technology, and national security needs of the nation are
properly addressed.

SNL Responsible for starting and completing this table. Raglin and
Thornton: can you have this estimated data by next Wednesday, June 13th??
Drop dead deadline.....
Table xx.xx - Gross Results (Addition at SNL due to new facilities and
reduction at SNL due to removal of outdated Facilities) due to addition
of EEF and HEET and removal of outdated Facilities replaced by EEF and
HEET for Alternative 4a Data Plant footprint (acres) Employment (workers)
Waste Category Low Level Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Hazardous Liquid (gal)
Solid (yd3) Nonhazardous Liquid (gal) Reductions Xx acres Xxx

Xxxx Xxxx Xxxx Xxxx XXXX

18 of 19
ETF Alternative 4b: Build/Upgrade to a Combined Environmental Test
Facility Complex at NTS or CNC or CPC or CNPC site. Keep LLNL Site 300
operational until new facilities are built. This alternative would take
the Combined Environmental Test Facility Complex to be built in
Alternative 4a and place it at the NTS or CNC or CPC or CNPC. Known
differences from placing this facility at SNL are identified herein: SNL
TCR Phase II facility and equipment costs which are programmed, but have
not occurred are necessary to provide NNSA 10-12 years of additional
testing capability prior to the building of this combined environmental
test facility to assure NNSA can continue to test in the known
environments of concern. Environmental data to be determined. Facility
and equipment environmental data for HEET will be adjusted for this other
site. Facility and equipment environmental data for ACRR will be adjusted
for this other site. Additional NTS or CNC or CPC or CNPC infrastructure
programmatic results will be addressed All D&D environmental results will
be included herein Personnel recruitment, training and relocation
environmental results will be included herein

19 of 19
Rewrite of 3.7.4.4 on page 3-140 - 144 (please insert beginning on line 6
of 3-140 and end on line 4 page 3-144. Delete what is currently in place.
Part of the data request for input for the Complex 2030 Supplemental
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) is to examine an
alternative of relocating the JTA Flight Testing Program from the TTR to
the Nevada Test Site (NTS). 1 A rough order of magnitude (ROM) cost
estimate for relocating the Flight Test Program from the TTR to the NTS
is $7.6-million. This includes the physical transfer of current
instrumentation and test equipment and the very modest costs for
construction of several concrete pads for the re-installation of tracking
and photographic instruments on the proposed test bed. The ROM estimate
for annual Program operating costs at NTS is $10.3-million, which
includes $3.8-million for the NTS support portion only. Sandia will
realize a $6M per year security cost savings which will offset the $7.7 M
in relocation costs in roughly 11/4 years. There will be only moderate
NTS security costs compared to existing Tonopah security costs because
the NTS Stockpile Stewardship Program has an existing on-site security
force, so no other costs should be required other than campaign costs.
The very moderate relocation costs would easily be recouped within a
short period of time based upon the savings in security costs alone. Per
the NNSA HQ decision in October 2006, no flight tests with SNM will be
planned after completion of the current required set of tests. These
tests are scheduled for completion before the end of FY08 at the TTR. If
this decision is subsequently changed or an emergency variance in mission
is required and cable pull-down testing is required, however, then these
tests can be performed at the Nevada Test Site. The addition of
operations at the NTS provides numerous advantages. Among these, DOE
expands upon a strategic asset that is available to meet short notice
requirements for the DOE stockpile. NTS provides NNSA customers testing
priority over other non-DOE programs that compete when testing at U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD) test ranges. Transition from TTR to NTS is
planned to occur during the latter part of FY 2009 and the beginning of
FY 2010. This permits the transfer costs to be spread over two fiscal
years while providing adequate time for planning and engineering for the
NTS to receive the transferred equipment from TTR. Further considerations
of moving the TTR JTA flight tests to the NTS include: o o o Scheduling
of JTA flight tests will have top priority at the NTS as a key element of
the Stockpile Stewardship Program, Scheduling additional tests beyond the
number currently planned can readily be accomplished at a minimal cost
increase to the Program, Initial one-time investment in relocation costs
can be recovered (in less than two years) in savings in security costs as
security already exists as part of the NTS
o o o o o o

o

Stockpile Stewardship Program, thus should require minimal additional
campaign costs, The NTS security work force is in place and can handle
manpower surge requirements to support both flight test and recovery
operations as part of the NTS mission as has been demonstrated by their
previous experience, Preserving 30 to 60 skilled jobs in Nye County,
Nevada while maintaining the continuity of currently scheduled testing by
moving the JTA testing from TTR to NTS, and increasing the work week to
4-10 hour days from 3-13 hour days, Expanding and enhancing the workforce
capabilities for both the NTS and TTR missions in all areas including
technical, security, construction and mining, The USAF (Nellis AFB)
currently executes management controls for airspace only for both TTR and
NTS since they represent a contiguous restricted airspace, JTA staff can
immediately move into existing buildings (no new construction necessary),
Significantly enhancing Complex 2030 mission by combining Stockpile
Stewardship Test and Development work with the STS JTA flight tests
portion of the stockpile assurance program plus potential consolidation
of environmental testing needs of stockpile weapons (e.g., cable pull
down facilities), and Reducing costs for transportation of personnel and
equipment from Las Vegas or Pahrump to the NTS versus Tonopah (80 miles
vs. 240 miles).

The NTS has continuously provided support for the National Laboratories
and DTRA in conduct of specialized tests since its inception. Recent NTS
experience related to the JTA Flight Test Program includes: o o o o DTRA
air drops of earth penetrating weapons (both inert and active), 2
Depleted Uranium (DU) tank rounds fired into hard targets on the NTS,
Missiles fired from NTS to impact at TTR, and Routine interface with
Nellis AFB Range Operation personnel and Explosive Ordinance Disposal
(EOD) staff.

Since the cessation of active nuclear testing in 1992, the NTS has been
used by the Nuclear Weapons Laboratories as a field laboratory for
conduct of high-hazard and science based tests related to the Stockpile
Stewardship Program (SSP). The current SSP infrastructure meets or is
applicable to JTA program needs. The JTA drops contain classified
components and the NTS is already in a position with Q-cleared personnel
and facilities to support such operations. The Flight Test Program can
readily leverage its current capabilities o o o Expertise and process for
movement of classified articles is in place; Radiation control and
emergency response personnel are already in-place; and Procedures and
operational documentation support existing NTS operations.
There are many opportunities for the Flight Test Program to leverage the
infrastructure currently in place at the NTS with little cost impact to
the program. The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) also has an
advantage since the Flight Test Program would utilize existing NTS
infrastructure needed to support SSP Readiness while simultaneously
increasing the utilization of existing infrastructure. Thus, both
programs are enhanced. The facilities and personnel that might be
immediately leveraged include: o o o Existing microwave communications
infrastructure, Existing site fiber-optic infrastructure between
facilities and connection to the internet, Existing site power, roads,
water, communication, feeding, etc., supporting all

Figure 1 - View of NTS Area 14, Mid-Valley

o

operations, and Existing workforce with engineering, design, and
construction capabilities and associated equipment and facilities that
currently support all NTS activities.

The Mid-Valley location (Figure 1) was assumed to be the initial
(primary) location for establishing the necessary facilities for
conducting the JTA Flight Test Program. The Range Safety Footprint
Analysis 3 was reviewed for the proposed tests and it was concluded that
the Mid-Valley site met the necessary safety criteria to permit the
program to use this area of the NTS. Mid-Valley site preparation includes
test bed design, concrete pads, roads, and generator power. The NTS will
provide a microwave data/video link from the SNL-provided technical
systems in Mid-Valley to the NTS
3

High Altitude/High Speed and Low Altitude/High Speed drops were reviewed
for the proposed NTS target area. These included: Range Safety Footprint
Analysis for FTU-J10-1, Walt Wolfe, SNL, dated June 23, 2003; Range
Safety Footprint Analysis for B83 JTA-109, Walt Wolfe, SNL, dated July
31, 2004; Range Safety Footprint Analysis for B61 SRM-3, Walt Wolfe, SNL,
dated January 13, 2005; Range Safety Footprint Analysis for B61 JTA-433,
Walt Wolfe, SNL, dated August 23, 2004.
Control Point (CP) complex. Other sites are also available on the NTS
offering a variety of geologic conditions for testing advanced weapons
designs. Transition from TTR to NTS is planned to occur during the latter
part of FY 2009 and the beginning of FY 2010. This permits the transfer
costs to be spread over two fiscal years while providing adequate time
for planning and engineering for the NTS to receive the transferred
equipment from TTR.

TTR New Equipment Upgrade
Additionally, one of the assumptions is that upgrades to the equipment
would need to be made in the same timetable as proposed by TTR. SNL's new
equipment proposal estimate equals to a cost estimate of $14.5M. Error!
Reference source not found. demonstrates graphically that new equipment
costs will be recouped within three years. Table 1 - Initial ROM estimate
for moving the JTA Flight Test Program to the NTS
ITEM 1 2 3 4 RELOCATION ITEM DESCRIPTION Pre-Readiness Project
Management, Engineering, Testbed Design and Planning, Authorization Basis
Documentation, 15 Months Pre-Readiness Testbed Construction, Facility
Preparation, Communication Link Construction, 12 Months (excluding
concrete target) Transfer of SNL Technical Systems, Data Acquisition,
Data Reduction, and Miscellaneous Hardware to NTS, 6 Months Installation
and Startup of SNL Technical Systems in Testbed and Data Acquisition
Equipment in CP-20, 6 Months Total Relocation Costs (FY 2009) ROM COST
$3,700K $2,200K $600K $1,100K $7,700K

Table 2 - Initial ROM estimate for operating the JTA Flight Test Program
on the NTS (including SNL program costs)
ITEM 1 JTA FLIGHT TEST PROGRAM NTS OPERATING ITEM DESCRIPTION Annualized
Post-Readiness Operations Cost including Project Management, Test Safety
Reviews, Airspace/OCC Coordination, Facility Charges, Test Execution
Support, Radcon Support, RSL Photography Support, and JTA Recovery and
Transportation to CP-11 Bunker, based on 14 JTA tests per year occurring
on 7 drop days Annual Security Support: (Based upon WSI memorandum dated
15 December '06) ARL/SORD SUPPORT: Air Resources Laboratory/Special
Operations and Research Division (within NOAA) - Weather Service Support,
included as overhead costs. Daily soundings taken at Desert Rock.
Approximately $2K per sounding if Test Day soundings requested. Total NTS
Operating Costs on Annualized Basis (FY 2010) Current 2007 SNL annual
Program operating costs ($6-million/year), escalated at 2.8% per year.
Assumes starting at NTS January 1, 2010. Total Annual JTA Program Costs
at NTS Beginning 2010 ROM COST $3,700K

2 3

$100K $0

4

$3,800K $6,500K $10,300K
Official Use Only

COMPLEX 2030 SPEIS TTR Closure Alternative Review Information - Tonopah
Test Range (Campaign Alternative) 1. "Campaign" Alternative Description
The fourth alternative is to continue flight test operations at the
current Tonopah Test Range location operating in a campaign mode between
the Nevada Test Site and TTR. Campaign labor support would be provided
from Sandia and contractors based at the Nevada Test Site. Operational
costs in a campaign support mode would reduce labor costs associated with
the operation of TTR. Additionally, this alternative provides a
programmatic responsive action to support Complex 2030 goals when
incorporated with the following actions: o o o o Carry-out the high tech
mobile equipment upgrades, Provide a basis to incentivize the movement of
TTR range operations to NTS by 2019, Establish a capability to support
flight testing operations at two NNSA sites through 2019, Provide time to
work with DoD to address safe, efficient, and cost effective methods to
return TTR to DoD.

Advantages of the "campaign" mode are significant in the following ways:
o o o o o o Full time TTR staffing is immediately reduced by utilizing
technical personnel on other NTS projects between flight tests. A
potential $100M remediation of the TTR range is avoided if NNSA does not
relinquish the range operating permit until 2019. Once the high tech
mobile system becomes operational the conduct of flight tests can be
readily accommodated at NTS or other selected sites without the need for
highly specialized facilities at those sites. Some of the current TTR
staff would remain resident in Tonopah to provide maintenance and repairs
at TTR while the high tech mobile system is under construction and
testing. The current TTR target sites and flight paths that are better
than any of those at other sites continue to be available for testing
through 2019. Range availability at the TTR site avoids any delays likely
to be incurred at other sites.

To sustain the campaign mode of operations through the period of
performance of the current permit, there are some improvements and some
investments that must be made in the near term prior to full
implementation of the high tech mobile system. A lack of investment in
the high tech mobile system would necessitate an increasingly expensive
maintenance of existing equipment between now and 2019. The immediate
needs would include maintenance to buildings, and a new roof and siding
for one facility. The immediate cost needs would be $150K. The permit
requires SNL to maintain and upgrade a specific portion of the roads as
well as the power grid on the range. The requirements for the roads would
be $500K each year and the annual cost for the power grid would be $50K.
The annual cost of the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) contractor is
$550K. Of course these costs would be so, regardless of who might be the
M&O contractor as there is an existing interdependent arrangement with
the Air Force.
Page 1 of 1 Official Use Only
ETF at Sandia National Laboratories
A White Paper Supporting the Environmental Test Facilities' Response to
Complex 2030

Prepared by:

Anthony Thornton, Validation and Qualification Nydia Schmidt, Planning
and Project Development Howard Royer, Engineering Services Rod May, Exp.
Mechanics/NDT Diagnostics W. Gary Rivera, Explosive Projects/Diagnostics
Michele Caldwell, EM Qualification and Engr. David Clauss, Experimental
Struct. Dynamics Jeff Cherry, Mechanical Environments Basil Hassan,
Aerosciences Paul Raglin, Nuclear Facilities and Appl. Tech. Mark
Hedemann, Rad. Effects Sciences and Applic. Mike Valley, Diagnostic
Applications Sheldon Tieszen, Fire Science and Technology Doug Dederman,
Penetrator Technology Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, New
Mexico 87185 and Livermore, California 94550

Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a
Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy's
National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-
94AL85000.
  i
E1Fat &ndi1 NatbnalInb0mt201i?s
May 2007

DRAFT
CONTENTS Section Page 1 Executive Summary
.........................................................................
..................................... 1 2 Proposed Options for
Environmental Test Facilities
.......................................................... 3
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 2.12 Background Information
.........................................................................
................................. 3 Test Capabilities Revitalization
(TCR)
.........................................................................
.......... 3 Definitions
.........................................................................
......................................................... 7 Alternative
Options
.........................................................................
.......................................... 7 Programmatic Assumptions
.........................................................................
............................ 8 NTS Infrastructure
Assumptions..............................................................
............................... 8 Financial Assumptions
.........................................................................
..................................... 9 Facility Upgrade Assumptions
.........................................................................
........................ 9 D&D
Assumptions..............................................................
..................................................... 10 Missing Costs
.........................................................................
.................................................. 10 Other
Considerations
.........................................................................
..................................... 10 Campaigning Special Nuclear
Material
.........................................................................
....... 11 Existing
Facilities...............................................................
...................................................... 12 Electromagnetic
Environments
Complex..................................................................
............ 12 Large-Scale Mechanical Environments Complex
................................................................ 15
SNL/CA Environmental Test Complex
.........................................................................
........ 26 Thermal Test Complex
(TTC)....................................................................
............................ 29 Nuclear & Radiation Facilities Test
Complex
...................................................................... 30
Accelerator
Facilities...............................................................
................................................ 40 Engineering Sciences
Experimental Facility - Building 865
............................................... 44 Component
Environmental Test & Advanced Diagnostics Facility (Bldg.
860)................ 46 Mobile Guns Complex
.........................................................................
................................... 47 Future Concept - HyperSled/Extreme
Environments Test (HEET) Complex .................. 48

3

Facility Descriptions
.........................................................................
.................................. 11
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11

4 5

Summary and
Recommendations..........................................................
............................. 51
Appendix.................................................................
............................................................. 52

iii ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACF ACRR A&E AF&F AHCF ALARA ALCM ASC ASTM CNPC D&D DoD DOE DS&A DSW DTRA
EEF ELDRS EM EMES EMP EMR EMRTC ESC ESEF ES&H EPA ER ET ETF FIMS FLAME
FMOC ft ft2 ft/sec FTE gal GIF GSF HE HEET HEU HWT ITS hr KAFB kg l LANL
LAST LDRGIF Aerial Cable Facility Annular Core Research Reactor advanced
and exploratory Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility as
low as reasonably achievable Air Launched Cruise Missile Advanced
Simulation and Computing American Society for Testing and Materials
Consolidated Nuclear Production Center decommissioning and demolition
Department of Defense US Department of Energy Defense Systems &
Assessments Directed Stockpile Work Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Extreme Environments Facility Enhanced Low Dose Rate & Sensitivity
Electromagnetic Electromagnetic Environments Simulator Electromagnetic
Pulse Electromagnetic Radiation Energetic Materials Research and Test
Center Experimental Sciences Complex Engineering Sciences Experimental
Facility Environment, Safety, and Health US Environmental Protection
Agency Environmental Restoration Environmental Testing Environmental Test
Facilities Facilities Information Management System Fire Laboratory for
Accreditation of Modeling by Experiment Facilities Maintenance and
Operations Center foot square feet feet per second full-time equivalent
gallon Gamma Irradiation Facility gross square feet High Explosive
HyperSled Extreme Environmental Test Complex highly enriched uranium
Hypersonic Wind Tunnel Integrated Technologies and Systems hour Kirtland
Air Force Base kilogram liter Los Alamos National Laboratory Linear
Accelerator Sled Track Low-Dose Rate Gamma Irradiation Facility
iv ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
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LEU LEUEDNA LIHE LLNL lb m m3 MEMs NA NASA NDT NIST NMT NNSA NRC NTS NW
NWC OST PRS QASPR QMU RB R&D RF RGD RML RPV RRW RV SF SFI SMU SNL SNL/CA
SNL/NM SNM SPR SREMP STS TA TCR TEM TTC TTF TPY TWT TYSP USAF VTR WFO XTF
yd yd3 yr low enriched uranium Low Enriched Uranium Externally Driven
Nuclear Assembly Light Initiated High Explosive Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory pound meter cubic meter Micro-Electro-Mechanical
Systems not applicable National Aeronautics and Space Administration
nondestructive test National Institute of Standards and Technology New
Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology National Nuclear Security
Administration US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nevada Test Site Nuclear
Weapons Nuclear Weapons Complex Office of Secure Transportation plasma
radiating sources Qualification Alternatives to the SPR Quantified
Margins of Uncertainty Reentry Body Research and Development Radio
Frequency Radiation Generating Device Radiation Metrology Laboratory
Replacement Plant Value Reliable Replacement Warhead Reentry Vehicle
square feet Significant Finding Investigations Strategic Management Unit
Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories/California
Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Special Nuclear Material Sandia
Pulsed Reactor source region electromagnetic pulse Stockpile-to-Target
Sequence Technical Area Test Capabilities Revitalization Transverse
Electromagnetic Thermal Test Complex Thermal Test Facility tons per year
Trisonic Wind Tunnel Ten Year Site Plan US Air Force Vault Type Room Work
for Others Crossflow Test Fire Facility yard cubic yard year
v ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
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1 Executive Summary
The Environmental Test Facilities (ETF) within the Department of Energy
(DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) support a
primary DOE mission of maintaining and demonstrating the safety,
reliability, and performance of the nation's nuclear weapons systems.
NNSA performs this mission through its Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Program. At Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), this mission
includes thermal, mechanical, and radiation testing. These tests are
necessary to simulate the normal, abnormal, and hostile conditions that
the test articles would experience in real-world environments. As the
nuclear weapons systems engineering laboratory for the DOE complex, SNL
has the primary and critical responsibility to provide assurance that all
nuclear warhead use-control equipment, shipping containers,
transportation vehicles, and handling equipment meet the performance
requirements dictated by the Military Characteristics and can survive the
normal, abnormal, and hostile environments described within the STS
(Stockpile-to-Target-Sequence) requirements documents. The cradle-to-
grave responsibilities in sustaining the Nuclear Weapons (NW) stockpile
from concept development through design, manufacturing, surveillance, and
dismantlement require that SNL maintain and nurture the requisite ETF to
accurately assess and quantify the performance of the full-scale warhead,
as well as its components and subsystems. These tests include normal
environments of shock and vibration, abnormal environments from
mechanical shock and thermal insult, and hostile environments including
electromagnetic and radiation effects. To ensure the performance, safety,
and reliability of the NW stockpile, STS environment specifications are
created in the laboratory using SNL's ETF. These facilities have
historically been relied on by the other NW laboratories to support their
qualification and stockpile assessment work, including high-fidelity,
full-system tests involving Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) over the past
several decades. Notable support recently provided on the B61 and B83
surveillance programs and the W76 Life Extension Program reflects the
applicability of SNL's ETF for supporting the NNSA weapons program. With
SNL's full complement of test facilities and resident expertise for
supporting mechanical, thermal, radiation, and electrical testing, SNL
provides the Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) with full-service test and
evaluation support that is not available anywhere else in the DOE complex
or from other federal agency test facilities [including Department of
Defense (DoD) service laboratories]. SNL's ETF also provide unique,
critical capabilities for model development and validation for analyzing
weapon response. Many of the ETF are used to increase the ability to
predict the response of the warhead and provide confidence in the design
of all components and subsystems to external stimuli. The W76-1
qualification process has demonstrated that significant areas still exist
where the scientific understanding required to adequately model warhead
response is lacking. New engineering phenomena introduced by changes to
the weapons require basic research and scientific discovery to understand
the underlying engineering phenomena that control performance.
Environmental testing is an essential part of the scientific discovery,
diagnostic development, and data sets creation required to develop and
validate engineering computational models and assessment methodology for
weapon design, manufacturing,
1 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
DRAFT
qualification, and certification needed to maintain the Legacy stockpile,
refurbish weapons, and transform the stockpile as required. Much of the
test equipment is aging and is inadequate to provide realistic testing
environments for validating modeling and simulation requirements. Many of
the facilities have reached the end of their useful lives and do not meet
modern health, safety, design, environmental, and energy conservation
standards. There is a need to upgrade and replace existing test
capabilities to support current and future mission requirements for the
broad range of full-scale testing capabilities that must be in place. The
Test Capabilities Revitalization (TCR) Phase II line item is necessary to
extend the life of critical aging facilities and to ensure that key
capabilities are maintained to support NW qualification and surveillance.
Without revitalization of SNL's current test facilities, individual test
capabilities will notably deteriorate during the next five years. A key
component of SNL's ETF is the ability to test full weapon systems
containing SNM. Existing requirements suggest that SNL will not handle
SNM after FY 2008. However, future system development and surveillance
activities require that the NW Complex be able to support SNM testing in
a campaign mode. Recommendations are offered for a consolidated and
shared mobile security workforce that will permit infrequent campaign
mode SNM testing at the key facilities for minimum cost. Inherent to
NNSA's mission is a need to support non-DOE testing requests that are
compatible with NNSA's capabilities. As an example, the US Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has requested that DOE construct and operate
facilities that perform drop, thermal, and inspection characterization
tests on rail shipping casks designed to hold high-level radioactive
waste as part of NRC's certification process. This example is consistent
with DOE's thermal and mechanical testing capabilities; however, it is
independent of NNSA's need to upgrade and replace existing nuclear
weapons test capabilities at SNL. This white paper addresses NNSA's
request for an inventory of ETF and their current condition based on the
2030 Complex requirements. It examines the current environmental testing
facilities at SNL and their use, including the weapon tests they perform.
This paper also analyzes several options for the complex, including a "No
Action" alternative, various options to move key facilities to Nevada
Test Site (NTS) to consolidate SNM, and a newly proposed combined
environmental test complex that would relocate all environmental testing
currently spread out within the complex to a reduced 30 square mile
footprint at SNL. The options evaluate the cost of maintaining the
capabilities under several scenarios and the effort that it would require
to maintain each particular type of testing.

2 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
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2 Proposed Options for Environmental Test Facilities
2.1 Background Information

SNL was tasked by NNSA to consider several alternative options for the
Complex 2030 transformation. One of the difficulties of considering
alternative scenarios in which the facilities/capabilities are moved is
that in many cases, the required expertise to manage and run these
facilities is spread among more than one capability in order to reduce
costs. In addition, while these capabilities are primarily used to meet
weapon-qualification requirements, the facilities have other uses to
enhance basic science and fundamental physics understanding of key
phenomena in the STS environments.
2.2 Test Capabilities Revitalization (TCR)

The TCR construction line item is an approved $126M program driven by the
directed stockpile work (DSW) requirements and the need to provide
flexible environmental test capabilities that can support the evolving
NNSA future stockpile vision regardless of the decisions that are made
[i.e., not exclusively driven by enhanced surveillance, Reliable
Replacement Warhead (RRW), mitigation of reduced flight testing, and
related decisions that might be made]. The core competencies required
include the following: o o System, Subsystem, and Component
Qualification: Experimental capabilities operated with Quantified Margins
of Uncertainty (QMU) considerations in mind. Advanced Diagnostics:
Advanced diagnostics are critical to understanding fundamental physics
that govern component/subsystem/system manufacturing, performance, and
aging and/or response in the various STS environments. A broad set of the
appropriate diagnostics is a critical tool for the engineering laboratory
of the complex to have on hand to respond rapidly to changes in
requirements and designs. Phenomenology Discovery and Model Validation:
These facilities will perform sciencebased investigations to probe
fundamental physics critical to meet SNL's broad engineering mission in
support of NNSA. Activities will include understanding manufacturing
processes (welding, cement filling, etc.), characterizing STS
environments, predicting component/subsystem/system response to STS
environments, and aging.

o

This enhanced understanding, which guides science-based models in
Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) engineering codes, is needed to
validate the models, helps provide timely resolutions to Significant
Finding Investigations (SFIs), and is central to supporting weapon design
and qualification efforts. TCR is being executed in two phases. Phase 1
invested $48M to revitalize the Aerial Cable Complex and to construct a
Thermal Test Complex. The Thermal Test Complex consists of the following:
3 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
DRAFT
o Indoor abnormal thermal environments for testing of high-fidelity test
units (without SNM) with controlled crosswinds, explosives safety
(facility rated to 130 lb TNT), and emission controls Controlled radiant
and combined radiant-convective testing Test cell to investigate the
properties of fire environments in an enclosed, airflow, and temperature-
controlled structure Fire physics and diagnostic development science
laboratories

o o o

The Aerial Cable test capability revitalization provided through TCR
Phase 1 consisted of the following: o o o o o Data connectivity,
commercial power, communications infrastructure, and surveillance
capabilities Dual laser communication systems - sufficient bandwidth for
video, data, and telecom. Connects Bldgs. 9834, 9838, camera stations,
and 6584 Reliable power to replace generator use and data/signal
connectivity distributed around main site New roads and improved drainage
Six camera stations surrounding the main cable site. Each has power,
signal lines (fiber, copper), and reinforced concrete walls to support
data acquisition quantitative performance characterization Fixed and
portable high-performance day-night surveillance cameras provided for
camera stations, Bldg. 9834 (roof) and Bldg. 9838 (roof) New 4980-ft2
control building (Bldg. 9838) and secure storage area with infrastructure
in place to create temporary limited area as needed New rocket catch box.
Higher capacity cable to support higher speed (1100 feet/second) pull-
downs

o o o

TCR is revitalizing the NNSA normal and abnormal mechanical and thermal
environment test capabilities and enabling an integrated experimental
strategy to develop, validate, and apply models required to perform
weapon system qualifications and development activities. TCR, consistent
with the 2030 vision, is fundamental to the transformation of the complex
to be more responsive and cost effective. These investments will maintain
SNL's ability to consistently achieve NNSA defense program objectives as
the "engineering lab of the complex." TCR is integral to SNL's role in
increasing confidence in the warhead designs and demonstrating a
responsive infrastructure that will enable a reduction in total stockpile
size.
4 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
DRAFT
SNL has life-cycle responsibility for nonnuclear components, subsystems,
and systems deployed as part of the nation's nuclear deterrent. These
components, subsystems, and systems are required to endure and operate
under a set of diverse environmental conditions and are required to "fail
safe" in all environments, including extreme accident scenarios. The
Laboratory Director must certify that these components, subsystems, and
systems meet the requirements and that the environmental testing provides
an indispensable set of data that leads to the ability to make this
certification possible. In fulfilling its Stockpile Stewardship life-
cycle responsibilities, SNL o o o o o Resolves issues associated with
stockpile weapons Designs and develops planned stockpile alterations and
modifications to existing weapons Qualifies designs for stockpile
deployment Meets production requirements for neutron generators Maintains
an advanced and exploratory (A&E) development activity to meet the
Nuclear Weapon Posture Review requirement to maintain the capability to
design a new weapon system

ETF are used to perform nuclear weapon component, subsystem, and system-
level design, development, qualification, and surveillance, as well as
SFIs, model development, and validation experimentation and testing.
Successful completion of the TCR Phase II line item will field design,
development, qualification, and validation test capabilities for the
twenty-first century. The large-scale ETF principally focus on normal and
abnormal mechanical and thermal environment testing, although the shock
tubes located within the sled track complex can perform hostile
environment testing. The Aerosciences and Wind Tunnel test capabilities
are part of the science and engineering base used to resolve SFIs, to
support A&E programs, and to advance science-based stockpile stewardship.
SNL operates two small-scale wind tunnels, the Trisonic Wind Tunnel (TWT)
and the Hypersonic Wind Tunnel (HWT), which have been critical to the
NNSA mission and important contributors within the national aerodynamics
capability for over five decades. These facilities provide experimental
capabilities for the aerodynamic ground testing of subscale models of
stockpile flight articles such as gravity bombs and re-entry vehicles. As
NNSA increasingly relies upon modeling and simulation for maintaining and
developing stockpile systems, requirements for detailed experimental data
are being pushed to more demanding levels to support the development and
validation of large-scale multiphysics computational models. This, in
turn, requires the implementation of advanced laser-based instrumentation
to study the underlying flowfield physics in addition to traditional
aerodynamic measurements. The TWT and HWT are ideally suited for
experiments of this nature for reasons including their low-cost
operation, convenient size for optical diagnostics, and dedication to
NNSA's specific needs. SNL has the responsibility to produce the
aerodynamic design and analysis for all stockpile gravity bombs,
inclusive of their spin motors, as well as the aerodynamic and
aerothermodynamic environments to support system and component response
of re-entry systems. The Aeroscience
5 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
DRAFT
capabilities are integral to initiatives to implement predictive
surveillance evaluations to reduce flight-test requirements and will play
a pivotal role in the RRW #2 testing activities. The Experimental
Sciences Complex (ESC) is central to SNL's ability to provide the
engineering sciences needed to realize the NNSA 2030 vision of providing
"the Nation with an integrated nuclear security enterprise, consisting of
research, development, engineering, test, transportation, and production
facilities that operate a responsive, efficient, secure, and safe NNSA
capability and that is recognized as preeminent in personnel, technical
leadership, planning, and program management." Key to the ESC is its role
in supporting science-based Stockpile Stewardship to provide assurance of
the safety and reliability of the weapons in the stockpile. The ESC, as
envisioned, is well-aligned with the sentiment Tom D'Agostino expressed
in testimony to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces: "...stockpile stewardship is working; the stockpile
remains safe and reliable. This assessment is based not on nuclear tests,
but on cutting-edge scientific and engineering experiments and analyses,
including extensive laboratory and flight tests of warhead components and
subsystems." This integrated 40,000 ft2 experimental test facility will
house laboratory, research, and office space. ESC capabilities provide
the scientific underpinning to stockpile stewardship and certification.
This is needed to support Legacy Cold War warheads that will be retained
for the next few decades as the stockpile is transformed via RRW.
Further, it contributes to the science base required to upgrade the
available weapons with improved safety, security, reliability, and
performance margins. Additionally, selected ESC laboratories will perform
component and subsystem qualification testing. Integral to the ESC
mission is the development of advanced diagnostics, phenomenology
discovery and model validation efforts, and subsystem and component
qualification testing. Examples of advanced diagnostics developed in the
ESC laboratories include the following: o Noninvasive diagnostics for
fire temperature, species and soot concentration, and flowfield
quantification. These diagnostics are used at the Thermal Test Complex
constructed in TCR Phase 1. Noninvasive rheology (nondestructive)
diagnostics developed to study experiments to develop next-generation
potting/encapsulating materials and to optimize neutron generator
manufacturing processes. Diagnostics for capturing phenomena at the
micro-scale (and potentially at the nanoscale) supporting Micro-Electro-
mechanical Systems (MEMs) and microsystem design and performance
evaluation. These capabilities will support qualification of RRW surety
components.

o

o

Phase 2 will invest $78M to revitalize the sled track, mechanical shock,
vibration-acoustics, and centrifuge test complexes in Technical Area (TA)
III and the Aerosciences laboratories and wind tunnels in Bldg. 865, and
construct the new 40,000 ft2 ESC in TA I. As has been established through
a national study of test and evaluation capabilities, no other US
facilities can meet the unique DSW criteria to ensure a flexible and
agile enterprise that can reliably support the planned transformations of
the NW Complex. TCR Phase 2 is critical for the viability of SNL's
6 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
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ETF and is an essential component of its maintenance of capabilities
regardless of the options proposed. TCR Phase 2 is a necessary condition
for the survival of SNL's ETF.
2.3 Definitions

The ETF are divided into two categories--Base and Enhanced ETF. The Base
ETF are those facilities and laboratory scale "table-top" items used to
evaluate components and subassemblies in the environments defined by the
STS and the Military Characteristics requirements for each nuclear weapon
in the enduring stockpile. Every laboratory within the DOE complex has
some Base capability essential for day-to-day operations. The Enhanced
ETF are those facilities used to test full-scale weapon systems (with or
without SNM or high explosives onboard) or those unique major facilities
that are applied to development and certification of components,
subsystems and systems (e.g. nuclear and radiation facilities such as
ACRR or HERMES). Current NNSA direction is to focus on only the Enhanced
ETF. SNL decided to include the Base ETF in this paper because of the
large and significant role of Bldg. 860/865 in weapon components and
subsystems qualification.
2.4 Alternative Options

The alternative options under consideration include: Option 1 - No
action. Maintain status quo at each site. In this option, SNL will take
credit for all consolidation and decommissioning and demolition (D&D)
facility efforts since 1996 and include the completed TCR Phase 1
improvements. All facilities must be upgraded to meet modern safety and
security standards. Option 2 - Consolidate (downsize) in place (no
duplication of capability within a given site, but there may be
duplication from site to site) and consider three alternatives to handle
SNM: Option 2.1 - Consolidate in place all standardized component
environmental testing at each site. Consolidate Large Scale Test
capabilities (full-up system level weapon testing) at SNL, LLNL, and LANL
and ALLOW for campaign mode SNM radiation testing at LLNL (Building 334)
and SNL (Aerial Cable Facility, Annular Core Research Reactor). Option
2.2 - Consolidate in place all standardized component environmental
testing at each site. Consolidate Large Scale Test capabilities (full-up
system level weapon testing) at SNL, LLNL, and LANL. Build all Large
Scale SNM Environmental Test Capabilities (Aerial Cable Facility, Annular
Core Research Reactor, and Building 334 at LLNL) to the CNPC site. Option
2.3 - Consolidate in place all standardized component environmental
testing at each site. Consolidate Large Scale Test capabilities (full-up
system level weapon testing) at SNL, LLNL, and LANL. Build all Large
Scale SNM Environmental Test Capabilities (Aerial Cable Facility, Annular
Core Research Reactor, and Building 334 at LLNL) to NTS. Option 3 - Move
all Large Scale Test Capabilities to one (or two) site(s).
7 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
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Option 3.1 - Move all Large Scale Test Capabilities to CNPC/CPC/CNC.
Option 3.2 - Move all Large Scale Test Capabilities to SNL with campaigns
of CAT I/II SNM. Option 3.3 - Keep existing Large Scale Testing
Capabilities at SNL and build SNM Test Facilities (Aerial Cable Facility,
Annular Core Research Reactor, and Building 334 at LLNL) as required at
NTS or CNPC site. Option 4 - Build Next-Generation Capabilities to
support Complex 2030. To prepare for Complex 2030 and support
qualification, surveillance, and development of advanced weapon systems,
the future of environmental testing requires the ability to physically
simulate "extreme" environments under actual conditions. SNL defines
"extreme environments" as any combination or sequence of normal,
abnormal, and/or hostile impulse environments that challenges the safety,
security, and reliability of the system. SNL is considering a
consolidation of the ETF to a 30 square mile footprint. The core of this
combined environmental test complex is a five mile underground sled track
capable of achieving Mach 15 ending in a target area called the Extreme
Environment Facility. The HyperSled Extreme Environmental Test (HEET)
Complex will also include new facilities for Electromagnetic
Environments, Structural Mechanics, Aerosciences, Explosives, and
Geosciences. This next- generation complex will provide the ability to
test weapons in combined environments that are representative of
realistic conditions. The NextGeneration Capabilities to Support Complex
2030 include two alternatives: Option 4.1 - Build/Upgrade to a Combined
Environmental Test Complex (HEET) at SNL and campaign SNM at SNL as
required. Option 4.2 - Build/Upgrade to a Combined Environmental Test
Complex (HEET) at NTS or CNPC. Keep Site 300 until new facilities are
built.

2.5

Programmatic Assumptions

All four options assume that TCR Phase 2 will commence in FY 2010 in
order to maintain SNL test capabilities and to extend the useful life of
the Sled Track, Centrifuge, Mechanical Shock, and Bldg. 860/865
facilities. In addition, as part of the Complex 2030 Transformation, the
future of Nuclear and Radiation Test Facilities will include a footprint
consolidation and upgrade that is required regardless of Options 1-4. The
Pulse Power facilities ZR and Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility will remain at
SNL regardless of Options 1-4.
2.6 NTS Infrastructure Assumptions

The city of Jackass Flats was used as the location for most of the ETF
relocating to NTS. The roads and utilities currently serving Jackass
Flats are only sufficient for the current demands; therefore, additional
roads and utilities will have to be built. The following assumptions were
used for infrastructure development at NTS:
8 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
DRAFT
o o o o o Roads: 35 miles of two-lane paved roads from two different
intersections with US 95. Power: 10 miles of 115 kV transmission lines
from a main feeder paralleling US 95 to Las Vegas. Natural Gas: Assume 40
miles of 20-in. high-pressure gas transmission line Communications: 25
miles of new copper and fiber optic communication lines. New water well
and distribution system required on site.

It is assumed that these services are available in sufficient magnitude
in Mercury.
2.7 Financial Assumptions

The following assumptions were considered for the facilities portion of
the data entered in the ETF spreadsheets: o o FIMS data were used for all
entries except for calculated values or actual construction costs (when
data were available based on earlier studies (ACF and Sled Track), costs
were inflated to today's dollars. For calculated Facility Replacement
Values. The following unit costs were used: = $172.50/SF o Metal Storage
Shed o Pre-Engineered Metal Bldg. = $284.11/SF o Observation Tower = $
71.03/SF o Office Building = $487.05/SF o Office/Lab Building =
$537.79/SF o Nuclear facility in ABQ = $5000 /SF o Nuclear facility at
NTS = >$10,000 /SF

The dollars above include the SNL Site Factor of 2.27 and a geographical
factor for NM of 0.894 for consistency with FIMS data. Moderate
environmental clean up costs are included in D&D costs. Complete remedial
costs were not entered for the first draft of the spreadsheet because of
time constraints. The Average Annual Maintenance costs are the actual
material costs and laborhour charges recorded against Work Orders in the
SNL Maximo database.
2.8 Facility Upgrade Assumptions

Every facility is assumed to have a maximum 30 year life span. Hence, the
life expectancy of a facility acquired before 1977 is now 0 years. For a
facility with 0 years additional life use, 100% of the RPV for the
facility is required for upgrade cost. A facility with a remaining useful
life of 100% means that it was acquired this year. Using this approach
the following table was used to determine upgrade costs required to bring
a facility up to today's standards. Remaining useful life is 0% to 10% of
useful life = 100% RPV Remaining useful life is 11% to 30% of useful life
= 80% RPV Remaining useful life is 31% to 60% of useful life = 60% RPV
Remaining useful life is 61% to 90% of useful life = 30% RPV
9 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
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Remaining useful life is 91% to 100% of useful life = 10% RPV In those
instances for which TCR Phase 2 facility upgrade estimates are already
known, those values are included in the tables in the Appendix.
2.9 D&D Assumptions

D&D costs were determined under the following assumptions: 1. 2. 3. 4.
The work will be done in large blocks. There are incidental to moderate
radiation concerns. The work will be done under SNL current task order
contracts. Environmental Restoration (ER) will remediate ER sites and
address targets, soil contamination issues, septic systems, and leach
fields.

Based on previous SNL experience, the building removal should be in the
$75 to $100/GSF range. A lump sum of $25K was assumed to cover the D&D
cost for bunkers and magazines. If the building was listed in the FY 2008
TYSP, the estimate from that document was used. These figures are loaded
costs, assume direct expense funding, and include all standard costs
associated with D&D. A typical D&D project at SNL has, in addition to
abatement and demolition costs, significant costs for building
assessment, sampling and characterization, decontamination, and waste
disposal. SNL also has significant project management, NEPA, acceptance
and inspection, asbestos management, and Environment, Safety, and Health
(ES&H) verification costs. Normally the building slab and foundation are
removed as part of D&D as well as shutting off, disconnecting, rerouting,
and capping utilities back to a logical termination point as required.
2.10 Missing Costs

Estimates do not include complete utility or site infrastructure
removals. They do not include D&D planning and program management
activities conducted by the Facilities and ES&H organizations and are
funded through SNL's overhead. The figures also do not include moving
costs, equipment relocation or removal, or other costs associated with
vacating a building. Finally, the estimates do not include the cost of
personnel recruitment, relocation, and training for staff and families
moving to NTS. These data will be added at a later date. All cost
estimates are in FY 2007 dollars.
2.11 Other Considerations Fast Neutron Testing

To maintain a capability to create the hostile environments in the STS
system requirements and given the uncertainties associated with
Qualification Alternatives to the SPR (QASPR), consideration should be
given to building a Low Enriched Uranium Externally Driven Nuclear
10 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
DRAFT
Assembly (LEUEDNA) capability or re-starting the SPR-III reactor.
Currently, this pricing option is not included in the table.
2.12 Campaigning Special Nuclear Material

Recent decisions by NNSA and its contractors to minimize the number of
sites that work with CAT I/II quantities of SNM may have significant
impact on the alternative options being considered under Complex 2030.
NNSA's current position may leave several program requirements unmet in
the near term as there are several facilities conducting environmental
testing programs with SNM (at SNL and LLNL) that will not be allowed to
operate routinely with SNM beyond 2008 at SNL or beyond 2014 at LLNL
because of planned restrictions. The primary issue with sites handling
CAT I/II quantities of SNM is the expense of maintaining the requisite
security force necessary to monitor and protect the material. There is a
recognition that other NNSA sites [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL),
Y-12, and NTS] routinely conduct operations with CAT I/II quantities of
SNM, which introduces the possibility that some of the ETF could be moved
to either NTS, LANL, or the future Consolidated Nuclear Production Center
(CNPC) with incremental additional security costs at these facilities,
which already have a security force in place. SNL is considering methods
to conduct occasional "security campaigns" at its facilities. This would
take advantage of existing facilities and subject matter expertise to
obtain the necessary test data for qualification and surveillance
purposes. The methods being considered would require augmentation of the
security forces on the site for 4 to 6 weeks every 2 to 3 years and would
likely be the most cost-effective approach if approved by NNSA. Two
options under discussion are federalizing the security force for all NNSA
facilities, which would involve a mobile component available to support
SNM testing on an as-needed basis, or utilizing the OST security force
supplemented by local site security forces to maintain possession of the
CAT I/II quantities of material during the test period such that the test
facility (SNL or LLNL) would never take "ownership" of the test unit.
Each alternative, or some variation thereof, may resolve the current SNM
dilemma facing NNSA after 2008. SNL believes that the security
requirements necessary for campaigning SNM on a "limited basis" is a
solvable problem with the existing facilities. Alternatively, one can
consider an option in which SNL, LANL, LLNL, and Y-12 initiate a Research
and Development (R&D) program to develop a surrogate material for highly
enriched uranium (HEU) that has mechanical and thermal properties similar
to those of the actual HEU. Identification of a surrogate material would
eliminate the need for campaigning SNM, eliminate the need for
relocating/building duplicate facilities, and eliminate the requirement
for additional security during "high fidelity" testing. The cost and
schedule to undertake such an R&D endeavor have not yet been fully
developed or reviewed. For the purpose of this analysis, the cost of
campaigning SNM was assumed to take effect in 2010 through 2030 at an
average cost of $4M per year ($80M over 20 years).

3 Facility Descriptions
11 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
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3.1 Existing Facilities

SNL's ETF include the Electromagnetic Environments Complex, the Large
Scale Mechanical Environments Complex, the Thermal Test Complex, the
Photometrics/Data Acquisition Test Complex, the Non-Destructive Test
Laboratory, the Engineering Sciences Experimental Facility, the Component
Environmental Test and Advanced Diagnostics Facility, Nuclear & Radiation
Facilities, and a Mobile Gun Complex. Environmental Test Facilities are
located in TA I, TA III, TA IV, TA V, Coyote Test Field, at SNL/New
Mexico (SNL/NM). Additional ETF are located throughout various buildings
as part of the SNL/California (SNL/CA) Environmental Test Complex. These
facilities are briefly described below. Current activities at these
facilities involve occasional nondestructive testing of articles
containing a variety of radioactive materials including, but not limited
to, SNM. Destructive testing limits are determined by initial testing of
articles from which the material has been removed and/or replaced by
suitable substitute materials.
3.2 Electromagnetic Environments Complex

Mode-Stirred and Anechoic Chambers

The Mode-Stirred and Anechoic Chambers are used alone or in combination
for Radio Frequency (RF) measurements. The Mode-Stirred Chamber provides
a reverberant environment in which electromagnetic fields are
statistically uniform, providing 360 degree, homogeneous coverage of test
items in a single test run regardless of test item orientation. The
Anechoic Chamber simulates a free-field environment where test items are
illuminated in a directional manner dependent on the source antenna. Both
types of testing have their advantages and disadvantages, but the
combination supports the strengths of both. In addition, testing in these
chambers can be done at 220 megahertz (MHz) and above. The combination of
these chambers with the Electromagnetic Environments Simulator (EMES) in
TA I (250 MHz and below) allows for electromagnetic characterization over
a very broad frequency range. Electronics and electro-explosive devices
can be susceptible to upset or damage because of coupling of
Electromagnetic Radiation (EMR). The Mode-Stirred and Anechoic Chambers
are used for characterizing the coupling of electromagnetic energy into
test items and also analyzing vulnerability of components, subsystems,
and systems. Most weapon STSs have EMR environmental requirements in all
weapon stages. In addition, vulnerability in assembly and disassembly
operations may need to be considered. The Mode-Stirred Chamber has been
used almost full time over the last few years to support the W76-1 and
W80-3 electromagnetic qualification efforts. Some examples of recent use
are as follows: o o Measure shielding of the W76-1 aeroshell, War Reserve
and telemetry cables, and shipping container Qualify W76-1 Arming,
Fuzing, & Firing (AF&F) system in a re-entry body (RB) configuration in
STS environments
12 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
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o o o o o Prototype component behavior Determine shielding properties of
different flame-spray materials for developmental components Measure
shielding of payload bays and cable plants of the Air Launched Cruise
Missile (ALCM) and Advanced Cruise Missile Measure for baseline for C6
EMR characterization of canonical cables and cavities Qualify Code
Management System hardware

The Anechoic Chamber is used less frequently but has been used
extensively recently to characterize cavity coupling for weapons system
evaluation engineering campaign (C6). It has also been used in the last
few years to support sensitive EMI/EMC measurements for SNL's satellite
community. Current improvements include modernizing the control systems
of the amplifiers and of the operating/data acquisition system of the
Anechoic Chamber, improving accuracy and repeatability. The RF testing
branch of the Electromagnetic Environments Complex is in good condition.
The test and diagnostic equipment is very expensive but does not require
frequent replacement. The facility could be maintained as-is, replacing
equipment as needed, but does not need a major renovation. However,
should customer requirements change for higher power or higher frequency
testing, consideration should then be given to supporting new test
equipment.
Electromagnetic Environments Simulator (EMES)

EMES is a building-sized Transverse Electromagnetic (TEM) cell, which
supports electromagnetic plane wave illumination of test objects. Two
electromagnetic (EM) sources are used at the facility, low-frequency
Electromagnetic Radiation (EMR) and an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)
simulator. The TEM cell structure can theoretically support frequencies
as low as DC (or 0 Hz); however, the current amplifier at the facility
can be used from 100 kHz to 250 MHz. This gives good low-frequency
coverage to support higher-frequency measurements in the ModeStirred and
Anechoic Chambers in TA IV. The EMP simulator design is based on Mil-Std
2169B requirements and is unique in its fast-risetime pulse combined with
a large range of electric field amplitudes that can be generated. EMES
supports a portion of the frequency range of nuclear-weapon STS EMR
environments as well as high-altitude EMP environments. Every weapon has
these environmental requirements in most, if not all, weapon stages
called out in their respective STSs. EMES was used during 2006 in the EMR
mode to characterize electromagnetic leakage into the ALCM and Advanced
Cruise Missile as part of the W80-3 qualification effort. While the W80-3
program was cancelled, the cruise missile information is still useful for
the W80-1 stockpile system, and it has been planned to include this
information in the W80 STS. EMES was also used in 2003 and 2004 to
conduct EMP testing of commercial items for the congressionally chartered
EMP commission.
13 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
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Options for operating the facility in the foreseeable future include the
following: o Maintain the facility as-is with the exception of the custom
RF absorbers. Two hundred of the original 300 absorbers (30 years old)
remain and are decaying at an alarming rate. These must be replaced in
the near future to keep the facility operating as intended. Because total
cost of absorber replacement is high (approximately $400K for purchase,
shipping, and installation), the replacement can be staged over a series
of years. Redesign EMES to not need the custom RF absorbers. RF absorbers
will most probably have to be used, but newer materials may allow for
off-the-shelf, less-expensive parts. In the current building, a redesign
of the RF absorbers may drive a change to the TEM structure. Redesign
EMES with new absorbers in a new building as part of the HEET Complex to
accommodate changes to TEM structure.

o

o

SNL Lightning Simulator

The SNL Lightning Simulator can replicate severe direct-strike lightning
to meet stockpile needs for assuring nuclear safety in lightning
environments. The Lightning Simulator can also be used to generate nearby
lightning environments, which are a normal-environment concern for
reliability of electronic systems. It can generate lightning-like pulses
that meet the top 1% requirements for peak current, pulse width, and
risetime in nuclear weapon STS requirements documents. In the last two
years, the Lightning Simulator has been used to characterize a variety of
stockpile and new-development Lightning Arrestor Connectors and to
qualify the nuclear safety of the W76-1 in lightning environments. The
SNL Lightning Simulator is housed in Bldg. 888 on the east end of TA I at
Sandia/NM. In the past, an F4 airplane was instrumented and tested at
this facility. This part of TA I has been significantly developed,
virtually eliminating the opportunity to test large items outdoors.
Options for operating the facility in the foreseeable future include the
following: o Maintaining the facility as-is with no significant
investments. This has some risk because the Marx bank power supplies,
high-voltage trigger systems, and the continuing current power supply are
all 25+ years old and not easily replaceable. Replacing the Marx bank
power supplies, high-voltage trigger systems, and the continuing current
power supply to mitigate long-term downtime if the current systems fail.
Redesigning the current Simulator in a new building as part of the HEET
Complex to reduce ES&H hazards (most notably the two underground 16,000
gallon oil tanks), to
14 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007

o

o
DRAFT
enhance the reliability of the system, to reduce the footprint of the
facility, and to reduce maintenance and operational costs. The current
Simulator design is based on a 30-yearold pulsed power concept and
hardware.
3.3 Large-Scale Mechanical Environments Complex

Aerial Cable Test Facility

The Aerial Cable Test Facility, located in the Coyote Test Field,
performs gravity drop and accelerated pull-down tests in support of bomb
qualification tests and weapons development activities. This test
capability provides controlled simulations of the worst-case impact
environments experienced by weapons systems and shipping containers.
Gravity drop tests are performed from a cable suspended between two
peaks, giving up to a 600-foot (ft) vertical distance for acceleration. A
rocket-assisted (320-ft sled track) pull-down technique is used to
provide higher impact velocities when gravity tests are not adequate.
Operations require the use of a variety of chemicals (corrosives,
solvents, organics, and inorganics) in gaseous, liquid, and solid forms,
in relatively small quantities. No radioactive emissions are routinely
produced at this facility. Compressed gases used in the assembly areas
include acetylene and oxygen, argon, and helium. There are some chemical
emissions, including alcohols, ketones, and other solvents. Small amounts
of airborne emissions, including carbon monoxide and lead, are released
during explosives tests. Operations associated with preparation of test
payloads, fixtures, and rocket sleds involve machining that generates
residues, bonding of parts with epoxies, cleaning of parts, and wiping of
excess materials. In 2004, a major facility renovation was completed as
part of the TCR project. This renovation brought electrical power to the
facility, added communication and command and control capabilities,
provided a control/assembly/conference room/office complex, and generally
renovated or replaced old and aging equipment and cable systems. Much of
the facility and infrastructure was reused, so the cost for the
renovation was approximately $8.8M. For Option 1, Option 2, and Option
3.2, no changes are required or envisioned for the facility because it
has already been upgraded during the Phase 1 TCR project. Under Option
3.1 or 3.3, the facility would be mothballed and moved to the CNPC or
NTS. Under Option 4, the facility would be placed in cold storage and an
upgraded capability built as part of the HEET Complex at SNL, NTS, or the
CNPC.
Sled Track Complex

The 10,000-ft sled track, located in TA III, supports weapons system
qualification testing and weapons development efforts that must simulate
penetration, flight, high-acceleration, and highshock environments. The
simulated environment may be provided through impact, reverse ballistic,
or ejection testing. This testing includes shock/laydown tests for bombs,
sled ejection tests to verify parachute and laydown performance, impact
tests on transportation and container systems, impact fuze tests for
reentry vehicles, and a variety of other DOE and DoD system tests that
require high-speed impacts. Operations at the sled track also include the
following:
15 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
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o o o o o o Receiving, storing, and handling explosives; pyrotechnics;
propellants; and nuclear, radioactive, and chemical materials;
Fabricating and assembling rocket sleds including payloads and rockets;
Setting up explosive tests, electronic instrumentation, and data
recording and special equipment including lasers, tracking equipment, and
X-ray; Reducing hazards through area, systems, and personnel control;
Disposing of explosives; and Recovering radioactive and chemical
materials.

Small amounts of chemicals are maintained for use in assembling rocket
sleds and test payloads in Bldgs. 6741, 6743, and 6736. These include
various adhesives and epoxies used to fasten transducers and similar
items. Cleaners, lubricants, solvents, paints, and other such agents may
also be used in small quantities. Compressed gases are used in the
assembly areas, including acetylene and oxygen (for welding), argon, and
helium; and dry nitrogen and carbon dioxide are used for pneumatic
actuators. A major facility renovation is planned as part of the TCR
Phase 2 project. This renovation will renovate communication, command,
and control capabilities; provide a hardened section of sled track at the
south end to prevent damaging the track during some tests; renovate the
explosives and assembly buildings to bring them up to safety codes; and
generally renovate or replace old and aging equipment. Most of the
facility and infrastructure will be reused, so the cost for the
renovation will be approximately $7M. For Option 1, Option 2, and Option
3.2, no changes are required or envisioned for the facility assuming that
the facility is upgraded during TCR Phase 2. Under Option 3.1 or 3.3, the
facility would be mothballed and moved to the CNPC or NTS. Under Option
4, the facility would be placed in cold storage and an upgraded
capability built as part of the HEET Complex at SNL or at the NTS or CNPC
site. The existing sled track would be kept in mothball status and used
for high risk tests that could not be done at the new facility because of
the risk of damaging the facility.
Photometrics/Data Acquisition Test Complex

The photometrics team uses high speed digital and film cameras to
quantify the performance of test articles subjected to a range of test
environments. Typical measurements include velocity, acceleration, angle
of attack, and impact angle. The photo results are used to verify the
applied boundary and initial conditions in a test, to quantify the
response of the test unit to the applied stimulus, and to assist in the
development and validation of models for use in our computational
simulation tools. At the end of the day, the core of any major experiment
is the quality of the data obtained. The capability to obtain time
accurate and spatially resolved information is critical to the
qualification of weapon systems and for the development of mathematical
models. For the past three decades Sandia has been at the forefront of
automated optical laser tracking technology. Laser Tracker II and III
represent unique national assets that provide time-spaceposition-
information (TSPI) and photographic coverage currently unavailable by
other means.
16 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
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Historically, the trackers (and slaved video data acquisition) have been
used to collect data during rocket sled tests, missile firings, weapon
development tests and aerial cable pulldowns. The trackers have supported
every major Sandia weapon development program, along with significant
work for the DoD. The laser trackers routinely track missiles, rocket
sleds, smart munitions, parachute systems, aircraft, and other test
items. Test-item ranges up to 25,000 feet and velocities up to 20,000
feet/second can be accommodated with a single tracker system. For
trajectories that range beyond 25,000 feet, both trackers can be used in
tandem. Under good atmospheric conditions, tests ranges up to 50,000 feet
can be provided. Targets with speeds up to 6,000 ft/sec can be acquired
on the fly. Current laser tracker capabilities include: o o o o Azimuth
and elevation pointing accuracy of +/-13 microradians. Maximum slew rates
of 10 radians/second. Maximum accelerations of 150 radians/second/second.
Trajectory data rate of 1,000 Hz real-time data to disk.

Efforts are on-going to enhance the laser tracker capabilities to provide
accurate 6 degree-offreedom quantitative measurement capabilities with
active atmospheric mitigation features and to fully quantify flight
dynamics of high speed test articles.

17 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
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The mobile instrument unit (MIU) and the mobile instrumentation data
acquisition system (MIDAS) are used to record accelerations, pressures,
and temperatures with transducers that are hardwired to a test unit that
may be positioned in a remote location. Key characteristics of each
mobile unit follow:

Mobile Instrumentation Data Acquisition System (MIDAS) 1. Fully Self
Contained 2. Hazardous Materials Package Testing 3. Hardwire
Instrumentation Connections 4. NQA-1 Documentation 5. Acquire and Analyze
Structural and Thermal Data 6. Acquire 72 channels of piezoresistive
instrumentation data 7. Sample 100KSa/sec to 1MSa/sec 8. 2MSa/Ch battery
backed memory (Primary) 9. 12MSa/Ch battery backed memory (Secondary) 10.
Acquire 100 channels of Type K thermocouple data Mobile Instrumentation
Unit (MIU) 1. Fully Self Contained 2. Weapons and Explosive Testing
(Blast Protection) 3. Hardwire Instrumentation Connections 4. RF Link
Video and Data to Full Scale Operations Test Center 5. Acquire and
Analyze Structural and Thermal Data 6. Acquire 90 channels of
piezoresistive instrumentation data 7. Sample 100KSa/sec to 20MSa/sec
(Ch. 1-30) 8. 2.5MSa/Ch battery backed memory (Ch. 1-30) 9. Sample
100KSa/sec to 1.25MSa/sec (Ch. 31-90) 10. 16MSa/Ch battery backed memory
(Ch. 31-90) 11. Acquire 120 channels of Type K thermocouple data High-
Capacity Penetration On-Board Recorder (HiCapPen) Sandia National
Laboratories has developed the capability to capture key information
under extreme environmental conditions using a hardened on-board data
recorder with a high channel count and sample rate to acquire validation-
quality data in harsh environments. The key features of the HiCapPen
include: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Deep non-volatile memory (110 seconds) Frequency
response 35kHz/channel (156KSa/Sec) Remote and delay triggering
capability Designed for wide application of piezo-resistive transducers
Designed for rapid cycle-time characterization with Automated Test
Equipment (ATE)

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Photometrics Sandia National Laboratories has a host of cameras to choose
from to capture photometric information. These capabilities are essential
given the variety and types of experiments performed in TA-III. The
following list summarizes current photometric capabilities in TA-III:

Infrared cameras FLIR Phoenix DTS 640x512 pixel focal plane array, 1.5-5
micron spectral range, <25 milliKelvin NETD, 14 bit dynamic range, 100
frames/second at full resolution, variable windowing up to 22 kHz at
4x128 pixels, 60/180/500 mm triple field of view lens to support long
range imaging, variable integration time (<50 microseconds to full frame
time), fully radiometric. Thermacam researcher software for advanced
acquisition and analysis. Digital transfer system allows direct access to
unprocessed data at a rate up to 40 MHz. Includes nonuniformity
correction tables and IRIG-B. FLIR SC2000 320x240 pixel focal plane
array, 60 Hz, 0.10 degrees C sensitivity, 14 bit dynamic range, 7.5-13
micron spectral range, fully radiometric. Thermacam researcher software
for advanced acquisition and analysis. High-speed digital cameras 4 -
Phantom V7 monochrome 2 - Phantom V7 color Maximum frame rate vs. image
size: 4800 frames/sec at a resolution of 800 x 600. The resolution can be
windowed down so higher frame rates are possible. The maximum frame rate
of this camera is: 160,000 frames/sec at a resolution of 32 x 32 12-bit,
CMOS cameras. 1 - Phantom V9 monochrome Maximum frame rate vs. image
size: 1000 frames/sec at a resolution of 1632 x 1200. The V9 is a higher
resolution camera than the Phantom V7 at lower frame rates, at higher
frame rates the V7 has greater frame rate vs. image size. This is a 10-
bit, CMOS camera. 2- Phantom V10 color These are 14 bit cameras with
2400x1800 pixels. The frame rates and integration times are variable like
the V7 and V9. The frame rates for V7, V9, and V10 are relatively
equivalent for the same image window. All Phantom cameras can take an
IRIG input to sync images with other types of data using the same IRIG
input.
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2 - Kodak HG2000 Maximum frame rate vs. image size: 1000 frames/sec at a
resolution of 512 x 384 Split frame rate; 2000 frames/sec at a resolution
of 512 x 128, 8-bit, CCD camera. All digital cameras listed above can be
synched using external pulses to drive the cameras. 1 - Cordin 550
Rotating Mirror CCD Camera Maximum of 60 frames, each 1000 x 1000.
Minimum frame rate approximately 160,000 frames/second to a maximum of
4,000,000 frames/second. Recording time at 4,000,000 frames/sec 16us, 10-
bit, CCD camera. High-speed film cameras (16mm) 15 - Pin registered high-
speed motion picture cameras. Maximum frame rate: 400 frames/sec. Frame
size 0.3" x 0.4" 10 - Rotating prism high-speed motion picture film
cameras. Maximum frame rate: 10,000 frames/sec, at full frame size 0.3" x
0.4". 40,000 frames/sec at 1/4 frame size 0.075" x 0.4" 10 - High G
rotating prism high-speed motion picture cameras. Maximum frame rate:
1,000 frames/sec, full frame 0.3" x 0.4", on-board cameras 6 - High G
rotating prism high-speed motion picture cameras. Maximum frame rate: 300
frames/sec, full frame 0.3" x 0.4", on-board cameras Other film/camera
formats 4 - 35mm streak/synchro-ballistic cameras (Hytax). Maximum
recording rate: 100 feet/second film speed 4 - 5" Image motion (IM)
cameras. 5" wide film, maximum recording rate 90' feet/sec film speed 3 -
35mm rotating drum cameras (Dynafax). 224 frames, frame size
approximately 0.28" x 0.4", maximum frame rate 35,000 frames/sec 1 - 35mm
rotating drum camera (Cordin 377). 500 frames, frame size approximately
0.28" x 0.4" maximum frame rate 200,000 frames/sec 1 - Rotating mirror
synchronous access framing camera (Cordin 119), 130 frames, frame size
approximately 0.3" x 0.79", maximum frame rate 26,000,000 frames/sec
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1 - Rotating mirror synchronous access framing camera (Cordin 114), 25
frames, frame size approximately 0.75 x 1.0", maximum frame rate
5,000,000 frames/sec 1 - Rotating mirror continuous access simultaneous
framing/streak camera (Cordin 330), 80 frames, frame size approximately
0.7" x 1.0", maximum frame rate 2,000,000 frames/sec 1 - Rotating mirror
synchronous access streak camera (Cordin 134), 70mm film, maximum writing
rate 30mm/microsecond All film cameras listed above can operate at
various recording rates. 2 - Image converter streak and framing cameras
(Imacon 790), 4 x 5 film, maximum 10 frames, various fixed framing or
streak rates Framing rates from 25,000 to 20,000,000 frames /sec Streak
rates from 1mm/microsecond to 1000mm/microsecond Digital still cameras 1
- 12MP, 5 - 5MP, 1 - 3MP, 1 - 1MP Digital video cameras include high
definition video (HDV) capability. All cameras can be operated in a
classified environment with the exception of a few of the still digital
cameras. Concerns/Issues Sandia National Laboratories performs routine
maintenance on the MIU and laser trackers, but in general the health
level of the laser trackers is inadequate to sustain the capability. This
year (FY2007) the photometrics/laser tracker/mobile instrumentation unit
will receive approximately $870K in RTBF funds. This is far below the
amount needed to maintain warm-standby. This capability is operated in
run to failure mode. When a major system fails, senior management must be
approached for funds to implement repairs. However, Building 6587 is in
very good condition (except the roof which needs replacement) due to the
$4.2M renovation work performed in FY03 and FY04 through the FIRP
program. The MIU is in excellent shape, though it will continue to need
capital equipment investments to maintain and update the equipment. Many
elements of the laser trackers are no longer manufactured (no replacement
technology exists that could be inserted into the trackers without a
major redesign/overhaul) and the computer operating system is archaic
(pre-Windows). Though the photometrics team principally uses commercially
available equipment, they have pioneered quantitative photometrics
capabilities (e.g., Digital image correlation techniques) for
characterizing test article performance throughout a test. The laser
trackers are the only capability in the nation and they are regularly
used to support DoD testing when not being used to support NNSA sponsored
tests. The MIU (constructed to QC-1 standards) and MIDAS data acquisition
capabilities are the only mobile capabilities of their kind in the US.
The recently developed HiCapPen on board hardened data recorder system is
also unique.

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Centrifuge Complex

The centrifuges in TA III generate high-acceleration environments to
certify weapons components and systems, satellite systems, guidance
systems, and transportation containers. The 35-ft (indoor) and 29-ft
(outdoor) centrifuges simulate Reentry Vehicle (RV) launch and reentry
environments, aircraft maneuvering accelerations, crash and impact
decelerations, and other acceleration environments within the STS
envelope, and support environmental sensing device testing on bomb and
missile systems. The Centrifuge Complex contains a small chemical
inventory but no radioactive materials. Cleaners, lubricants, solvents,
paints, and agents are used in small quantities. Compressed gases used in
the assembly areas include acetylene and oxygen, argon, and helium.
Chemical emissions, including alcohols, ketones, and other solvents, are
associated with various aspects of surface preparation, cleaning, and
material processing, including quality control. Small amounts of airborne
emissions, including carbon monoxide and lead, are released during
explosives tests. Radioactive air emissions are not produced at this
facility. Noise from centrifuge operation, collision impacts, and
explosive testing does occur. Fragments resulting from centrifugelaunched
explosives are recovered shortly after test events.
Mechanical Shock Facility

The Mechanical Shock Facility in TA III provides controlled impact and
shock environments to support subsystem- and component-level development
and qualification testing and to model development and validation
activities. This facility houses two horizontal pneumatic actuators (18
in. and 12 in.) and their associated sled tracks (95 ft and 75 ft,
respectively) and two bungeeassisted vertical shock machines. Each
actuator can support sled and reverse ballistic speeds up to 250 ft/sec.
Complex Wave Facility (Bldg. 6610)

The Complex Wave Facility, located in Bldg. 6610 in TA III, supports
development, qualification, and acceptance testing of weapon systems for
normal shock and vibration environments. The facility can be operated
remotely, which enables testing of systems that include hazardous and
explosives materials. The electrodynamics shakers, control systems, and
data acquisition systems are located within a vault-type room (VTR),
which simplifies logistics associated with testing of classified
articles. Bldg. 6610 has the highest force rated shakers at SNL and is
used extensively for system-level tests of full-scale assemblies or items
requiring high vibration levels. For fast and efficient setup, two UD
T4000 electrodynamic shakers have been dedicated for vertical and
horizontal testing, respectively. The facility has state-of-the-art
control and data acquisition systems, allowing for up to 200 channels of
data sampled at 102 kHz. Controlled dynamic simulations are performed on
test articles ranging from small subsystem components to full-scale
assemblies. Tests include random vibration, shock on shakers, sinusoidal
vibration, mixed-mode vibration, tracked resonant dwells, and combined
temperature
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and vibration. Recent testing has included weapons, satellite subsystems,
rockets and payloads, reentry vehicles, and shipping configurations.
Option 1 assumes that TCR Phase 2 will fund an amplifier upgrade and
shaker rewinds, which will provide greater capability for margin testing.
In addition, there are some building and site improvements included in
TCR Phase 2. Option 2 would have no significant impact on operations in
Bldg. 6610 because, in most cases, articles being tested do not include
SNM. Option 3.1 would require closing the facility. Options 3.2 and 3.3
would be the same as Option 1. The functions in Bldg. 6610 would be
consolidated with other environmental test capabilities under Option 4.
This would provide an opportunity for higher fidelity, combined
environment experimental simulations in an integrated facility.
Vibration-Acoustics and Mass Properties Facilities (Bldg. 6560)

The large-scale vibration-acoustics facilities in TA III, which also
house Mass Properties operations, provide system-level vibration and
shock environment testing capabilities to certify weapons systems (bombs,
missile warheads, and reentry systems) to the normal STS environment
specifications and to support model development and validation
activities. These environmental requirements include transportation,
launch, flight, and reentry shock and vibration simulations on full-scale
weapons systems. The test capabilities include normal shock and
vibration, combined vibration and acoustics, and combined thermal and
vibration environments. The vibration and acoustics tests are run by an
engineer and a technologist, who are both resident at the facility. The
mass properties tests are run by the same engineer who supports mass
properties tests in TA I. Recent improvements have included converting
the building into a limited area and creating a VTR in the mass
properties high bay. TCR Phase 2 will provide much needed site and
building improvements, but no capability upgrades. Under Option 1,
considerable investment would be needed in Bldg. 6560 to replace the C220
shaker and amplifier as well as the hydraulic shaker. Both of these
shakers are near the end of their useful lives and require significant
maintenance and repairs to keep them operational. Option 2 would have no
significant impact on operations in Bldg. 6560 because, in most cases,
articles being tested do not include SNM. Option 3.1 would require
closing the facility. Options 3.2 and 3.3 would be the same as Option 1.
The functions in Bldg. 6560 would be consolidated with other
environmental test capabilities under Option 4. This would provide an
opportunity for higher fidelity, combined environment experimental
simulations in an integrated facility.
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Non-Destructive Test Laboratory, Bldg. 6639

This facility allows for the application of nondestructive test
technologies to items that are larger than the TA I facility can
accommodate and those test items that contain hazards (explosive, rad,
etc.) greater than permit levels for TA I. The radiation generating
devices (RGD) resident in the TA III facility have energy levels three to
four times greater than those fielded in TA I. The primary function of
the facility is to allow the radiographic inspection of full weapon
systems that contain High Explosive (HE) and/or rad materials. These
inspections are often necessary to determine the state of the weapon
prior to testing in the large-scale facilities in TA III. After testing,
it is required to inspect the system prior to shipping to assure that the
mechanisms have remained in a safe position. The high-energy capabilities
of the RGD at the facility allow for imaging through numerous layers of
materials or thick sections. In addition to its primary function, the
facility has also been used to evaluate other items such as solid rocket
motors and recovered waste drums to quantify the contents to determine if
the drums can be processed without further evaluation. The customer base
consists of the Nuclear Weapons, Defense Systems & Assessments, and
Integrated Enabling Services Strategic Management Units (SMUs). The
facility is also used by Work for Others (WFO) customers contracted
through the SMUs listed above or directly contracted through the
operational organization. There are no resident personnel at this
facility. Because of work loads, the facility is operated by personnel
who are resident in TA I and operate similar facilities for the
department. Because of the hazards inherent in operating RGDs at the
energy levels present, personnel operating this equipment are required to
have special training and knowledge of safe operating procedures as well
as documentation and record keeping associated with the ownership of
RGDs. The facility was refurbished in 2005 to replace the control
building that supported this capability and to refurbish the test cell.
This greatly improved the infrastructure and extended the life of the
facility. The refurbishment of the test cell will need to be revisited in
the future to eliminate issues that have been uncovered from water
infiltration through the earth overburden above the concrete cell roof.
The facility is operated in a campaign mode when the capabilities are
needed or as a staging area when preparing for field tests; consequently,
there are few opportunities for additional efficiencies or consolidation.
Consolidation between the TA I and TA III facilities could be
investigated, but an extensive building project would be required to
construct five shielded radiography bays to accommodate the current TA
III work. Much of the equipment is old, and reliability problems exist as
a result. A next-generation testing facility consolidating the two
nondestructive test (NDT) facilities would allow advanced radiographic
technologies during the tests. This would require shielding and methods
to protect the radiographic equipment in test areas that have not
incorporated these in the past. Real-time digital radiography would be
carried out during the test phase for the
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determination of system behavior while the environments, both single and
combined, are being applied. Higher fidelity data support validation and
qualification activities.
Light Initiated High Explosive Facility

The primary purpose of the SNL Light Initiated High Explosive (LIHE)
facility is to simulate cold x-ray-induced shock loading from an exo-
atmospheric nuclear blast, primarily investigating structural response of
complex test items such as RBs/RVs. This one-of-a-kind facility and
technique can induce load levels in varying distribution (such as cosine
distributions), including load discontinuities. The facility accomplishes
this testing by the remote-controlled spray application of a sensitive
primary explosive onto the surface of complex structural shapes. The
explosive is simultaneously detonated over the sprayed surface by
exposing it to an intense flash of light generated by a 40 kV to 208 kJ
capacitor bank. An emerging technology at the LIHE facility is to drive a
thin metallic flyer plate with the SASN explosive. Targets of various
geometries, such as flats, rings, cylinders, cones, and RVs can be
impacted with representative impulse distributions as well as varying
pressure pulse profiles. The LIHE facility is chartered by SNL in
concurrence with DOE/NNSA to (a) establish and maintain the LIHE impulse
testing capability at SNL, (b) maintain the LIHE facility to modern
operating standards, (c) support the development and qualification
testing of nuclear weapons for DOE/NNSA, and (d) provide test data for
use in validation of computer models developed for the Stockpile
Stewardship Program. Items previously tested at the facility include
RB/RVs of various geometries, rocket motor cases, and rings and plates.
Each re-entry weapon system in the nuclear stockpile has undergone
testing at LIHE in some capacity. The LIHE facility operated continually
from 1971 to 1992, when it was mothballed at the end of the Cold War. In
2001, a decision was made to reconstitute the cold x-ray impulse test
capability at SNL by restoring the facility to its prior capabilities.
Because of the onsite New Mexico Environmental Department permitted
Thermal Treatment Facility, where excess explosive and explosive
contaminated materials are treated, the restoration of the LIHE facility
was constrained to its original location at Bldg. 6715 in TA III. During
the time between mothball and restart, the physical condition of 6715
deteriorated to the point that a full renovation of the building was
required. Approximately $3M was spent on the renovation, with another $9M
spent on reinstallation of facility equipment, upgrade of unusable and
outdated equipment, training and mentoring of new personnel by retired
LIHE team members, and an extensive proof-ofcapability test series.
Option 1 - Under Option 1 of the proposed actions, the LIHE facility
would continue operation in its current mode. Normal upgrade of equipment
would be required because of wear and obsolescence. Work, and some
capital equipment expenditures, would be pursued to enhance the
capabilities of the facility by incorporating the LIHE-driven flyer plate
technique, which would better simulate the pressure pulse induced by a
cold x-ray blow-off event. Option 2 - Same as Option 1.

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Option 3 - With a unique facility and operating team, the option to
recreate the LIHE facility at NTS or CNPC would require a duplicate
facility. This would essentially double the facility operating costs
associated with infrastructure. Under this scenario, it would be likely
most cost efficient if a single team were used to operate both
facilities. Option 3.2 is the same as Option 1. Option 4 - This option
presents the opportunity to take the LIHE facility to the next level of
quality and fidelity. A significant upgrade to the system would be to
introduce a second robot to the spray process. This significant change in
the spray process would remove most of the manual remote handling of
explosively coated items, decreasing the possibility of an accidental
detonation during spray operations. In addition, a major shift would
occur in how the test unit was sprayed, resulting in greater accuracy of
explosive deposition and deposition measurement. The LIHE facility is
currently the only facility capable of conducting a cold x-ray-induced
shock load simulation. Because of the extremely specialized nature of the
LIHE process, the team must demonstrate its proficiency to conduct a LIHE
test on a regular basis to maintain capability. With the decreased number
of strategic systems in the stockpile, the frequency of testing has been
decreased. To maintain a viable capability with a proficient team, the
process must be exercised on a regular basis, requiring funding and
support.
3.4 SNL/CA Environmental Test Complex

The California Environmental Test Complex provides a number of table-top
capabilities (shock, vibration, acceleration, climatic chambers, mass
properties, radiography) used for proof and qualification of weapon
systems, subsystems, and components. In addition to the ongoing weapon
design activities between LLNL and SNL, this complex also supports WFO
(DoD, Department of Homeland Security, Engineering Campaign Six, Model
Validation) projects. Key capabilities and table-top equipment at the CA
complex include the following: o o o o o o Vibration - Ling A340 and
Unholtz Dickie T2000 Shakers Shock - Lansmont Drop Table Climatic - Eight
assorted Chambers with volumes up to 7 ft x 12 ft x 8 ft Mass Properties
- Space Electronics CG/MOI, POI, and balancing machines Static
Acceleration - Rucker 16-in. Diameter Centrifuge Radiography - Three x-
ray machines ranging from 130 keV to 460 keV

The shock, vibration, and climatic chambers have been used by the W80
Program for margin testing. They are also used for weapon Joint Test
Assembly and Gas Transfer System activities. RRW will be a primary user
when it moves into a Phase 3 program.
High Pressure Test Facility

The mission for Bldg. 966, California's High Pressure Test Facility, is
to support high-pressure testing and development of weapons system
components (primarily gas transfer systems) and other R&D activities at
SNL/CA and LLNL. Test equipment includes pneumatic and hydraulic pressure
pumps up to 100 kpsi, environmental chambers, precision volume
measurement system, material test system, high-pressure hardware,
pressure gages, pressure transducers, leak
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detectors, data acquisition systems, burst chamber, pinch welder, and
mass spectrometer. The High Pressure Test Facility has the ability to
test with hydrogen and is capable of accommodating tests with explosives.
The High Pressure Test Facility is equipped with seven test cells that
are in good working order to support multiple tests.
Test Assembly Facilities

The SNL/CA Test Assembly Facilities are integral to the agile R&D weapons
development mission. Their primary purpose is to support the assembly and
testing of weapon systems. The facility also supports the assembly of
weapon subsystems, components, and WFO projects at the California site.
Bldg. 914 Test Unit Assembly Area has multiple bays to support weapon
assembly operations and WFO projects. The bays are set up with weapon
fixtures for the W80, W84, W87, and B83 programs and assorted support
hardware (tools, equipment, fasteners, etc.). Building 983's Flight Test
Unit Assembly Facility has two assembly rooms/cells set up to support
weapon assembly operations involving explosives, limited to less than 1
lb. These cells are equipped with weapon fixtures for the B83, W80, and
W87 programs.
Mechanics of Materials Test Laboratories

The Mechanics of Materials Test Laboratories primarily serve various DOE
programs and support DoD and other WFO programs. The laboratories possess
capabilities unique to SNL and serve both the NM and CA sites. The test
equipment in Bldgs. 972 and 941 have been purchased, maintained, and
expanded over the years, resulting in a unique SNL facility that serves a
wide range of weapons programs and research and development projects. The
laboratories focus on materials testing and structural testing. Equipment
includes 13 MTS servo-hydraulic test frames that operate from very low
loads (micro-Newton) up through 2 million pounds. Other test equipment
includes two electromechanically driven MTS frames, an Instron screw-
driven test frame, two Hopkinson Bar test systems, one gas gun, Creep
loading frames, and Endura Tech axial and torsion flexible loading
systems. The laboratories house substantial diagnostic equipment for
strain measurements, image correlation, and high-speed optical and
thermal imaging. This facility can support characterization and
validation testing of materials (foams, metals, polymers, ceramics,
composites, honeycomb, etc.), subsystems (Gas Transfer Systems, Neutron
Generator, AF&F, surety, handling, etc.) and systems over the entire STS
range of interest in any of the SNL weapons in the stockpile (W80, W84,
W87, B83, W76, etc.), or any future weapon development. Programmatic
testing spans the entire mechanics field (statics, dynamics, fracture,
fatigue, plasticity, aging, and environmental effects), supports
development of predictive solutions through tight coupling between
experiments and modeling, and has successfully solved complex problems.
The cumulative capabilities of this facility, housed within the two
laboratories in Bldgs. 972 and 941, are not duplicated within SNL or the
DOE complex. The SNL/CA Test Facilities will be required for future
design and development testing of RRW systems and components going
forward into FY 2008 to FY 2012. These testing capabilities will
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be maintained to enable an agile, cost-effective capability. Some of the
environmental test equipment is aging (20-30 years) and should be
upgraded or replaced to maintain the capability at SNL/CA. Maintaining
this test capability is crucial to support the design and development of
weapon systems at SNL/CA, and to support the engineering relationship
with LLNL.

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3.5 Thermal Test Complex (TTC)

The thermal environment test complex demonstrates through testing that
the nuclear weapon stockpile is safe from inadvertent nuclear detonation
in abnormal thermal environments. All weapons systems, as part of the
weapons design, qualification, and initial certification process, have to
demonstrate that they fail safely in fire environments. The thermal test
complex contains the test facilities, diagnostics, and highly trained
personnel to perform such qualification work. Numerous risk assessments
have demonstrated that fire, either alone or in combination with other
environments, is a dominant contributor to risk. During accidents, fire
occurs frequently when in the presence of fuels, such as are common in
transportation modes. Further, fire presents a severe thermal threat to
weapon systems. They are not intended to survive, but they must safely
fail. Computational advancements in the coming decades will improve
ability to cost effectively test weapons systems as part of design,
qualification, and certification but will not replace testing for at
least another century. The reason is that it must be shown that the
weapon system maintains a positive safety margin throughout a failure
transient so pervasive that the system is rendered irreversibly
inoperable. Failure is atomistic in nature and the length scale range is
beyond scientific prediction until computational machines become many
orders of magnitude larger. On the other hand, engineering prediction has
become an invaluable design-of-experiment tool and is considered an
indispensable part of the testing process. Cost effective testing is not
possible without computational modeling. Historically, it has not been
necessary to conduct abnormal thermal environment testing with SNM.
Acceptable measurement and computational methods exist for making the
extrapolation from test articles without SNM. There is no evidence to
suggest that the future will force a change in what has been accepted
historically in this regard. If anything, it can be expected that
advancements in computing will only solidify the testing basis without
SNM. Weapon system owners use the TTC during all phases of design and
initial qualification. It is also used to address significant findings
and for nonroutine testing to support the technical basis for annual
assessments. Testing includes safety critical components such as
capacitors, subsystems such as fire sets, and full-up systems. The
facility includes multiple environment capability. Examples include ovens
and humidity chambers for prepping hardware, test bays for evaluating
thermal properties of materials such as thermal diffusivity, and test
chambers for fire environments. Fire environments can be cost effectively
simulated electrically using radiant heat panels as is often done during
the design phase. Fires can be created with gaseous or liquid fuels up to
20 MW. The TTC consists of FLAME, XTF, radiant heat cells, laboratories,
and an outdoor test site in Lurance Canyon for larger, open fires. The
FLAME (Fire Laboratory for the Accreditation of Models and Experiments)
and the XTF (Cross-wind Test Fire facility) were designed with optical
access for advanced optical diagnostics to further the multidisciplinary
sciences underlying turbulent reacting flow as part of the goal to make
fire models more predictive. In
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addition to weapon system owners, other NW users include the
computational model developers. The test facilities within the TTC are
unique in the world in that they were specifically designed (by CFD fire
models) to provide controlled, reproducible boundary conditions necessary
to validate fire and thermal response models. Prior to 2006, fire testing
at SNL was conducted only at the Lurance Canyon burn site. During the
lull in weapons qualification testing in the 1990s, the Lurance Canyon
site underwent environmental restoration and the new facilities like
FLAME, XTF, radiant heat, and the other laboratories were built in TA III
as part of the Test Capabilities Revitalization project in the early
2000s. The new complex was fully commissioned at the end of 2005 and
began supporting weapons qualification testing in 2006. The Thermal
Radiant Heat Facility in TA III provides controlled temperature and heat
flux environments using quartz lamps [up to 5432 ?F (3000 ?C)] to develop
and validate thermal response models and to certify the performance of
transportation containers and weapons components, assemblies, and systems
for both normal and abnormal thermal environments The TTC is a state-of-
the-art facility in abnormal thermal environment testing. Functional and
operational requirements were evaluated for the period from 2000 to 2005
as part of its design. SNM is traditionally not part of abnormal thermal
environment testing; consequently, use of the TTC is not affected by any
Option 1, Option 2, Option 3.2, and 3.3 suboptions, since the TTC will
not be moved to another site. Option 3.1 would require the destruction
and rebuilding of the TTC at the CNPC. Looking to 2030, there is a need
to test weapon systems in real, sequential/combined environments.
Combined mechanical, thermal, and lightning environments and diagnostics
can be created in the notional HEET Complex at SNL or NTS. In either
case, combined environmental testing represents an additional capability
beyond what is currently available in the TTC. The TTC will remain a
viable part of the HEET Complex and will not be replaced.
3.6 Nuclear & Radiation Facilities Test Complex

During the development of nuclear weapons in the US, the need to ensure
that weapons would meet all reliability criteria during hostile radiation
environments was a major concern. This concern is driven by the STS
environments and Military Characteristics required for the weapon
systems. To ensure that the US weapon systems would function correctly in
these environments, radiation simulators were developed. For neutron and
some gamma environments, the critical facilities are the Sandia Pulsed
Reactor (SPR-III) and the SNL Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR). Both
reactors use HEU material to generate the unique radiation environments
required for testing and certification of US weapons systems and are
managed as Category II facilities.
Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR)

The ACRR is a critical element in the neutron vulnerability and hardness
testing and certification of stockpile weapon systems electronic
components (e.g., transistors, integrated circuits), subsystems (e.g.,
fire sets, neutron generators), and systems (e.g., AF&F system). The ACRR
is also a critical element in the hostile environment testing of weapon
system physics packages
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DRAFT
(both primary and secondary) at the full-up system level, as well as
material sample tests. In addition, the ACRR performs neutron
radiographic nondestructive examinations of weapons systems components
(e.g., neutron generators). DOE's Vision 2030 includes the need for a
responsive infrastructure to design, develop, and field new weapon
systems if needed, and/or repackage current systems. As noted above, the
ACRR would be critical to the neutron vulnerability and hardness testing
and certification in such cases. Also, the ACRR would be critical to the
neutron vulnerability and hardness testing and certification of primary
and secondary components and systems for the RRW program. The ACRR
directly subjects the part/device being tested to a neutron (and gamma)
irradiation environment that simulates the neutron spectrum anticipated
from an endo-atmospheric threat. The environment can be produced over
long periods of time (e.g., minutes to hours) in a steadystate operation
mode or very short periods of time (10 to 100 ms) in a pulse-operation
mode. The irradiation location is accessible for cables that transmit
power/signals to the device being tested, and/or receive operational and
diagnostic signals from the device being tested. Under appropriate work
controls, the device being tested can even include components which
contain explosives that can be detonated while being irradiated. These
testing capabilities allow for a customer to determine and/or assess the
function, failure, and recovery characteristics of the device being
tested within neutron-gamma irradiation test environments that simulate
STS threat levels. In addition, the ACRR also has a neutron radiography
capability to allow customers to perform nondestructive examination of
components to search for small defects or other conditions not otherwise
detectable. Customers for the ACRR include a variety of programs within
the SNL nuclear weapons Program: W76-1, W78, W88, Radiation Effects
Sciences Campaigns, and QASPR. Customers for the ACRR also include LANL
physics package developers. The ACRR facility is operated and maintained
by a staff of five reactor operators and two radiological control
technicians. The operators are trained and certified via a local reactor
operator training program. To assure compliance with applicable DOE
orders and DOE federal regulations, the operation staff is supported by
other staff (~20) with capabilities in safety basis documentation, system
engineering, and quality assurance. In addition, the facility relies upon
the corporate infrastructure to provide the various areas of ES&H support
and Facilities Management and Operations Center (FMOC) maintenance of
real property. The ACRR facility includes a relatively modern control
room panel with computer-aided control and diagnostic systems, and a
newly installed (2005 to 2006) heat rejection system for long duration
steady-state operations. Aging reactor power monitoring devices are being
replaced as time and funding allow. The ACRR facility structure is over
40 years old and has been operated for well beyond its expected lifetime.
The potential interim improvements to meet seismic and other safety
requirements could cost in excess of $20M and are not viewed as a cost-
effective expenditure. A new facility (i.e., the building structure) is
needed. The reactor and reactor fuel have many remaining years of useful
operational life (>95% of expected life). Concerns/Issues
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Complex 2030 Option Discussion. For the neutron/reactor facilities the
nine options evolve into a costing of three consolidated options: o
Option A. Options 1, 2.1, and 4.1 effectively set a course where the
facilities at SNL remain unchanged from the current path. o Option B.
Options 2.2, 2.3, and 3.3 effectively support the development of a new
Neutron Research and Survivability Laboratory (NRSL) at SNL and
establishment of an Annular Core Physics Reactor (ACPR) at the NTS or
CNPC which would be used only for the SNM testing of the physics packages
for weapons. SNL would manage this remote reactor and campaign personnel
to conduct these tests on the 10 year time interval projected. o Option
C. Options 3.1, 3.2, and 4.2 require the movement of the entire TA-V
capabilities to the NTS or CNPC Option A - This requires a new facility
to be constructed to house the ACRR which will meet current safety and
design criteria as well as improve the technical experiment capability of
the reactor. It is expected to cost on the order of $70M at SNL and is a
low risk option. Option B. - This is similar to option A above, except
for the establishment of a remote SNM testing capability at the NTS or
CNPC that is dedicated to the SNM mission and personnel are campaigned
from SNL as required every 5-10 years. Such an option would leverage the
SNL capabilities and could cost another $20M. This is also a low risk
option. Option C. - This option would move all TA-V facilities to the
CNPC or NTS. The facilities in TA-V are synergistic in the method they
provide support for the required work. If the full ACRR is moved, then
the RML must be moved with it to enable prompt diagnostic support.
Similarly, the GIF would be required in close proximity to support the
calibration and other diagnostic work that is directly needed by ACRR.
This means a critical mass of the nuclear facilities at SNL would be at
the new location and this would require the re-location of all the
supporting staff. If this is done at the NTS, as an example, then the
reconstruction of all these capabilities and the space for all the
supporting staff will be a significant cost expected to be in excess of
$200M. This will require the campaigning of all staff (or relocation) and
experimenters to NTS weekly and the annual costs could reach $1M or more
above current costs. This would include the support personnel necessary
to insure the reactor is run safely and compliantly. This is considered a
moderate to high risk option that has the potential to adversely impact
weapon reliability.
Sandia Pulsed Reactor Facility (SPRF)

The Sandia Pulsed Reactor (SPR), a fast-burst reactor used for neutron
radiation testing, is no longer in operation, will not be restarted prior
to 2012, and may not be restarted after that. The QASPR methodology has
been under development to use modeling and simulation coupled with
radiation testing at facilities other than the SPR. QASPR allows for the
extrapolation of testing
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results to determine equivalent results that would have been realized
under an SPR irradiation. The ACRR is the critical element of the use and
application of the QASPR methodology to neutron vulnerability and
hardness testing and certification. The SPR-III is a critical element in
the neutron vulnerability and hardness testing and certification of
stockpile weapon systems electronic components (e.g., transistors,
integrated circuits), subsystems (e.g., fire sets, neutron generators),
and systems (e.g., AF&F system). The fast neutron radiation environment
at STS threat levels can be produced only by the SPR-III. However, the
cost for security for the SPR-III (a Category I SNM device) has become
increasingly expensive because of newly promulgated DOE criteria for
design basis threat assumptions. Therefore, the SPR-III has been taken
out of operation, will be stored, and will not be restarted prior to
2012, if at all. SNL's QASPR program is developing a methodology to use
modeling and simulation coupled with radiation testing at facilities
other than the SPR (e.g., the ACRR and ion beam accelerators) to
extrapolate these testing results to determine equivalent results that
would have been realized under a SPR-III irradiation. If the QASPR
methodology is not fully funded or does not prove to be capable of
meeting neutron vulnerability and hardness testing and certification
requirements, then the SPR-III capability will have to be re-established.
The SPR directly subjects the part/device being tested to a neutron (and
gamma) irradiation environment that simulates the neutron spectrum
anticipated from an exo-atmospheric threat. The environment can be
produced over long periods of time (e.g., minutes to hours) in a
steadystate operation mode, or very short periods of time (~100 us) in a
pulse operation mode. The irradiation location is accessible for cables
that transmit power/signals to the device being tested and/or receive
operational and diagnostic signals from the device being tested. Under
appropriate work controls, the device being tested can include components
such as explosives that may be detonated while being irradiated. These
testing capabilities allow for a customer to determine and/or assess the
function, failure, and recovery characteristics of the device being
tested within neutron-gamma irradiation test environments that simulate
STS threat levels. Customers for the SPR have included a variety of
programs within the SNL Nuclear Weapons SMU: W76-1, Radiation Effects
Sciences Campaigns, and QASPR. After the SPR core is placed in storage,
the SPRF will manage a zero power reactor to develop data for another
program. This reactor is expected to be a key factor for the nuclear
criticality safety program managed by NNSA until the Critical Experiment
Facility is completed at the NTS in another three to five years. The SPR
facility is operated and maintained by a staff of four reactor operators
and a radiological control technician. The operators are trained and
certified via a local reactor operator training program. To ensure
compliance with applicable DOE orders and DOE federal regulations, the
operation staff is supported by other staff (~20) with capabilities in
safety basis documentation, system engineering, and quality assurance. In
addition, the facility relies upon the corporate infrastructure to
provide the various areas of ES&H support and FMOC maintenance of real
property.
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The SPR facility is over 40 years old and has been operated well beyond
its expected lifetime. A new facility is needed. The reactor itself has
many remaining years of useful operational life. The reactor's control
system instrumentation cabling was recently replaced (~2005) with all new
equipment. Concerns/Issues Complex 2030 Option Discussion. Option A. SPR-
III will continue on its path to storage. QASPR will require funding to
validate the modeling. The reactor will be in storage at the NTS or CNPC
and available to be reestablished, if required. Since SPR consists of
Category I material, it is not an option for campaigning, but would
require a full commitment to build a new, underground, high-security
facility at SNL - not an option at this time. The pursuit of this option
is considered moderate risk due to the failure to properly fund QASPR and
the potential loss of capability since there are only five qualified
operators for SPR. Option B and C - Consolidate SNM testing at the
CNPC/CPC location (assumed NTS for estimating purposes). The primary goal
at this time is a fully validated QASPR model that will allow release of
the SPR core material. However, if not successful either due to technical
issues or failure to be funded, the establishment of a SPRF at the NTS is
expected to cost twice the cost in Albuquerque due to the construction
demand and remoteness of the site. This would be >$100M. This also will
require the campaigning of all staff and experimenters to NTS weekly and
the annual costs could reach $1M or more above current costs. This would
include the support personnel necessary to insure the reactor is run
safely and compliantly. It also requires the campaigning of experiments
to the NTS annually. This is considered a moderate risk option. A second
option is the development of a Low Enriched Uranium Externally Driven
Assembly (LEU EDNA) to replace SPR and provide a very flexible facility
that can meet threat level fast neutron radiation environments. This type
of facility has not been built before, but the technology is well within
current capabilities. This type of "reactor" must have an external driver
and the potential options are under study. If this is supported, then the
LEU EDNA facility would be ~$150M (depending on location) and would be
classified as a Category II nuclear facility. This is also considered a
moderate risk option.
Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF)

The Gamma Irradiation Facility provides for testing, experimentation and
system/component performance when exposed to Co-60 gamma environments.
The GIF provides extensive flexibility in both high dose rate and total
dose testing to support a wide array of radiation effects and
experimental needs. Activities include electronic component hardness,
survivability, and certification tests for military and commercial
applications, weapon component degradation, radiation effects on material
properties, and experiments containing radioactive and strategic nuclear
materials testing. Typical experimental customers include radiation
damage computer modeling testing, support of QASPR modeling, and National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and SNL radiation hardness
testing for space communications, lasers, and satellite systems. The GIF
complements the ACRR facility in that it allows for gamma
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exposure discrimination to better understand both neutron and gamma
damage in radiation environments. The GIF is used to precondition neutron
dosimeter transistors used for experimental applications in neutron
environments, and organic materials R&D testing in nuclear environment
applications. The facility supports calibration of TLD measurement
systems used in support of reactor and pulsed-power machine dose
measurements. It has also been utilized for the radiation hardness
testing for robotic systems used in nuclear material retrieval devices
(i.e., "dirty bombs"). The facility is working with LLNL to determine
feasibility of relocating the instrumentation calibration capability from
NTS to SNL in support of underground testing, should it be required in
the future. The GIF provides three concrete, dry test cells and a 5.5 m
(~18 ft) deep pool for a variety of gamma irradiation experiments with
different test configurations, dose rates, and dose levels. To
accommodate these specific irradiation needs for experiments, custom
features have been incorporated into the GIF design as follows: o o o
Configurable radiation sources provide different geometries for the
source array (e.g., point, planar, circular). Shielded windows allow for
experiment observation during irradiation. Remote manipulators available
to facilitate experiment or source handling.

The in-cell facilities are dry, shielded rooms where irradiations are
performed with a highintensity gamma ray source. Typical irradiations
performed in the dry cells are at high dose rates (typically on the order
of 3 Mrad/hr at <1 m [~3.3 ft] from the source) and for short to
intermediate durations lasting up to a few days. The facility also
provides for future experimental and testing capabilities that would
require the radiation shielding provided by the facility experimental
test cells. For the in-pool testing, radioactive sources are held in a
submerged irradiation fixture near the bottom of the 5.5 m (~18 ft) deep
pool of demineralized water. Typical irradiations performed in the pool
are at moderate and low dose rates (<100 Krads/hr) and for long durations
lasting days, weeks, or months. Dry experiment canisters, which contain
test units, are immersed in the pool and positioned in preset locations
in the irradiation fixtures. The fixtures are voided of water to provide
an unshielded path between the source and the test unit. The pool can
store up to 1.5 MegaCuries of cobalt-60 (60Co). The sources are in the
form of pins and can be shared between the in-cell irradiation facilities
and the in-pool irradiation facilities. This Hazard Category 3 facility
is operated by a facility supervisor and a facility operator as dedicated
staff, as well as system engineers, safety basis analysts, facility
maintenance techcnicians, a radiological cotnrol technician, and
department management. Since the facility was first placed in service, it
has continuously improved its experimental arrays including the most
recent circular array, which allows for in-array exposure rates of
approximately 800 Rad/Sec.
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Concerns/Issues Complex 2030 Option Discussion. Option A & B. GIF is a
relatively new nuclear facility at SNL in excellent condition. This is a
low risk option. Option C - Consolidate SNM testing at the CNPC/CPC
location (assumed NTS for estimating purposes). The reconstruction of all
nuclear facilities at the NTS would mean that GIF would be moved. This
would compliment the movement of ACRR. However, the original cost of this
facility is expected to increase at least two fold due to the additional
design and review criteria imposed by DOE since it was built. The cost
would be complicated again due to the remote location at the NTS. It is
expected to be greater than $100M. This is considered a low risk option.

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Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF)

The AHCF is used for characterizing and repackaging nuclear materials,
radioactive materials, and mixed waste materials. The AHCF is designed to
allow SNL to safely characterize, treat, and repackage radioactive
material for reuse, recycling, or ultimate disposal. It is designed to be
operated as either a radiological or Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility,
depending on material at risk quantities campaigned within the facility.
The facility's main purpose is to support the deinventory of security
category 3 and 4 nuclear materials from SNL. The facility systems provide
for remote handling capabilities for existing and future items. SNL has
an inventory of Legacy nuclear materials that are excess to SNL/NM but
not necessarily excess to the DOE complex. Some of these materials have
been designated as "no defined use" (NDU). Current disposition plans
specify that some of the materials will ultimately be sent to DOE
disposal facilities. The AHCF also provides short-term storage for
radioactive materials and wastes. In addition to handling low-level
radioactive material, the AHCF has remote-handling capabilities to allow
for the characterization and repackaging of high-level radioactive
materials and waste. The AHCF is located in the high-bay area of Bldg.
6597 at SNL/NM. The AHCF consists of three parts: 1) a hot cell with two
storage silos in the floor (inside the cell) and access ports in the
roof; 2) a work area next to the hot cell with a permanent shield wall, a
fume hood, and six storage silos in the floor; and 3) space for material
storage. The building contains remotely operated bridge cranes, hot cell
manipulators, and video capability. Six inch floor silos are available
for short-term storage of materials during material campaign processing.
The silos are 15 feet deep; four are 9 inch diameter and two are 30 inch
diameter. A remote electric chain hoist is used in conjunction with the
bridge cranes to introduce material into the hot cell. The hot cell is a
10 ft x 10 ft square, it is lined with stainless steel for ease of
decontamination, and it contains a 1 ton jib crane. The AHCF is currently
not operational. DOE has not granted authorization for operation because
of limitations and concerns in the DSA for the facility. The facility is
being planned for use as a radiological facility to handle low quantities
of nuclear materials for disposal processing. Many of the Legacy material
packages will require repackaging at the AHCF because of their Hazard
Category quantities or because their form requires remote-handling
capabilities. These packages contain uranium oxide in various forms,
miscellaneous radioactive materials, depleted uranium, experiment
packages and scrap parts, metallographic samples, a small quantity of
thorium, and several AmBe sources. During operations, the facility is
staffed with one facility supervisor, two facility technicians, a
radiological control technician, and department management. As a Hazard
Category 3 nuclear facility, additional support staff include system
engineers, safety basis analysts, and facility maintenance techcnicians.
The AHCF is a temporary life facility and is intended to support material
removal. Its project length of operation is approximately eight years
from initial start-up. To provide an enduring capability to support ACRR,
a new Hot Cell facility with appropriate functional support is required.

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Radiation Metrology Laboratory (RML)

The RML provides measurement of dosimetry for high-dose applications of
exposure to neutron and gamma environments. This critical capability
provides the underpinning for the SNL radiation effects experimental
facilities for dose and dose rate measurements. Dosimeter measurements
for neutron environments specifically include the fast burst reactors
(SNL-SPR, WSMR-FBR), epi-thermal reactors (ACRR), gamma irradiation
environments (GIF, LDRGIF, HERMES), along with other NNSA test facilities
as requested (LANSCE). The RML includes a wide variety of radiation
measurement tools, dosimetry, and equipment, including alanine, sulfur,
TLD, alpha spectroscopy, and germanium detectors. The main RML facility
is located at SNL TA V, with a satellite laboratory in TA IV to support
the pulsed power facilities. All system calibrations are traceable to the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and measurement
procedures follow ASTM international consensus standards. Along with
radiation effects facility experiment support, the RML provides numerous
radiation interrogation techniques for a variety of experiments
including: specialty R&D projects in the field of radiation testing and
measurements, fuel enrichment confirmations, and flux profile mapping of
subcritical experiments. The laboratory also has supported environmental
analyses for underground storage, such as confirmation of actinide
migration through salt columns and other geologic strata. In past
operations, the facility has provided direct support to NTS for
underground testing as well as mobile testing support for other NNSA
laboratories and universities. The laboratory facility is supervised by a
Ph.D. technical staff member and two support technicians. The laboratory
supervisor utilizes the facility measurement capabilities in support of
development and maintenance of international consensus standards for
radiation processing and reactor measurement techniques. These standards
apply for experimental testing, nuclear power generation, sterilization,
and other industrial applications. Staff support includes chairmanships
of committees and international symposia along with collaboration with
universities, NIST, and international research facilities supporting
dosimetry measurements and analysis. Concerns/Issues The RML facility is
past its design life. Its capabilities are not well suited for the given
demands placed upon it by its primary customers. While several
instruments have been upgraded over the past few years, the
infrastructure with respect to electrical distribution and liquid
nitrogen to support instrumentation is rudimentary and limits the
facility from operating to current instrumentation standards and
requirements. Complex 2030 Option Discussion. Option A and B - RML will
be replaced with the construction of the new facility to house ACRR. This
is a low risk option. Option C - Consolidate SNM testing at the CNPC/CPC
location (assumed NTS for estimating purposes). The RML would be
reconstructed at the NTS as part of the new facility there required for
ACRR. However, the RML supports other major facilities at SNL and would
still be
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required there. Thus there would be a necessity to rebuild this
capability at SNL for an additional ~$5M. This is considered a moderate
risk option.
Low Dose Rate Gamma Irradiation Facility (LDRGIF)

The principal purpose of the LDRGIF is to provide the ability to perform
Enhanced Low Dose Rate Sensitivity (ELDRS) effect testing to a large
number of piece parts for extended periods of time (several years in many
cases). The program personnel supported in this application are weapons
systems component developers responsible for certifying the reliability
of their designs maintained in storage configurations over decades.
Additionally, satellite piece parts have been tested to predict device
degradation over the lifespan of the program mission. A separate exposure
room is equipped with a combination of temperature-controlled ovens and
radioactive sources that permit the simultaneous exposure to thermal and
gamma radiation environments. Finally, WFO customers, in support of DoD
missions, use the facility. Attractive features of the facility are
simplicity of operation, adequate shielding for personnel working in
public spaces, the use of special form sources, low inventories of source
materials, security controls for classified components, an existing
infrastructure of radiation protection, IH, training, maintenance,
administrative, and security support. The facility is operated by a
single operator [1 full-time equivalent (FTE)] with approximately 10% of
an FTE for supervision and management. This radiological facility is also
supported by an RCT at approximately 7.5% of an FTE. Concerns/Issues The
facility structure was not originally designed for this application and
is well past its designed life. This has led to challenges with respect
to as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) management concerns,
efficiency of operations, and facility costs. The programmatic testing
and operations capability could be optimized in a facility designed
around this specific testing use. Complex 2030 Option Discussion. Option
A and B - LDRGIF is planned for replacement as part of the new facility
to house ACRR. This is a low risk option. Option C - Consolidate SNM
testing at the CNPC/CPC location (assumed NTS for estimating purposes).
The LDRGIF would be reconstructed at the NTS as part of the new facility
there required for ACRR. This is considered a moderate risk option.

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3.7 Accelerator Facilities Saturn

Saturn is a pulsed power accelerator facility designed to produce intense
x-ray pulses, providing physical simulation for STS hot and cold x-ray
requirements. Saturn can be configured for either bremsstrahlung x-ray
sources or plasma radiating sources (PRS). In bremsstrahlung mode, Saturn
simulates hot x-ray environments, producing a broad spectrum of x rays
peaking near 50 keV energy, extending up to nearly 2 MeV. The x rays are
generated in a 17 ns FWHM pulse, providing high spectral and temporal
physical simulation (testing) fidelity for hot x-ray requirements for
heavily shielded full subsystems such as an AF&F subsystem. No other US
facility can provide adequate x-ray environments. Without Saturn, reentry
systems cannot be qualified to STS x-ray requirements. Physical
simulation (testing) at Saturn is required for system qualification to
hot x-ray requirements. In bremsstrahlung mode, Saturn also provides
critical physics discovery and model validation data for microelectronics
and circuit x-ray response. In PRS mode, Saturn provides atomic line or
combined atomic line/continuum x-ray sources up to 3 keV in energy. There
are no US facilities to provide adequate cold or warm x-ray testing
environments. Therefore, the PRS sources on Saturn are used to acquire
material property data for model development and model validation,
including support for system qualification computational simulations.
Saturn's bremsstrahlung source provided critical qualification data for
both W88 and W76-1 electronic subsystems and will be required to provide
similar qualification data for future reentry system efforts such as RRW-
1. Saturn's PRS sources have provided critical qualification data for
W76-0, W76-1, and W78 neutron generators as well as critical
qualification data for a variety of other W76-1 components/subsystems
with mechanical response issues. These PRS sources will provide similar
critical qualification data for future reentry system efforts such as
RRW-1. Saturn operations are conducted by a crew of 23 that maintains and
operates the Saturn, HERMES III, and SPHINX facilities, with certain
specialized skills shared amongst the set. Fourteen FTE positions from
this crew are associated with Saturn, with various mechanical and
electrical engineering and technician positions along with administrative
and ES&H personnel. In addition, the facility relies upon the corporate
infrastructure to provide the various areas of ES&H support and FMOC
maintenance of real property. Saturn was constructed and operational in
1987. A portion of the Saturn facility reused hardware from the PBFA-1
accelerator that had previously occupied the space. The older PBFA-1
hardware together with certain portions of the newer Saturn hardware
exhibited deterioration such that after 10 years, x-ray output for
various sources had dropped nearly in half. From 1999 to 2003, the weak-
link sections of Saturn were replaced with more robust hardware, and x-
ray output is somewhat greater than originally produced in 1987, with
greater reliability and reproducibility shot-to-shot. It is expected that
Saturn will be able to utilize existing capabilities to meet critical
NNSA qualification needs for the next 10 years.
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In addition, DoD's Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has recently
decided to discontinue support for its West Coast Facility (WCF)
simulators (Double Eagle and Pithon), which are smaller accelerators than
Saturn, funding R&D to restore the WCF testing modes at Saturn. The
reflex triode bremsstrahlung source at Pithon had provided unique
physical simulation capabilities for NNSA programs, partially filling in
a portion of the x-ray spectrum not covered by Saturn's standard
bremsstrahlung sources. SNL plans not only to work with DTRA on restoring
Pithon-level capability, but also to extend to higher x-ray fluxes to
enable a class of warm x-ray mechanical response model development and
validation experiments not accessible today. Success in this endeavor
will significantly relax design constraints on future reentry systems
with respect to x-ray vulnerabilities. Concerns/Issues Saturn will remain
a critical capability for reentry system qualification in Complex 2030.
There is no difference for Options 1-4. Electronic subsystems are highly
complex and will grow in complexity in time. Although subsystem
qualification will rely more heavily on computational simulation in the
future, the physical simulation capabilities of Saturn will be critical
for application-specific model development and validation work as well as
high-fidelity physical simulation.
HERMES III

HERMES III is a flash x-ray facility whose high-energy x rays (up to ~20
MeV) produced by the bremsstrahlung process provide high spectral and
temporal fidelity environments for physical simulation (testing) to STS
prompt gamma radiation requirements. No other US facility can provide
these testing capabilities at the subsystem level. Without HERMES III,
reentry systems cannot be qualified to STS prompt gamma requirements. The
capability is critical for qualifying electronic subsystems. In the large
test cell, these bremsstrahlung sources can also stimulate high-fidelity
source region electromagnetic pulse (SREMP) environments for nuclear
weapon as well as other military system testing. In addition, physical
simulation modes utilizing direct deposition of the accelerator's
electron beam in experiment objects have been developed and utilized for
structural response model development and validation. There are no high-
fidelity testing facilities for these responses, and validated models are
critical for adequate system qualification. HERMES III has supported W88
and W76-1 system qualification as well as neutron generator qualification
for the W76-0, W76-1, and W78. HERMES III operations are conducted by a
crew of 23 that maintains and operates the Saturn, HERMES III, and SPHINX
facilities, with certain specialized skills shared amongst the set. Eight
full-time equivalent positions from this crew are associated with HERMES
III, with various mechanical and electrical engineering and technician
positions along with administrative and ES&H personnel. In addition, the
facility relies upon the corporate infrastructure to provide the various
areas of ES&H support and FMOC maintenance of real property.

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HERMES III was operational in 1988. The mechanical design has proven
robust, and it should be capable of meeting the continuing NNSA needs for
the next 10 years. In 1988, only the full accelerator bremsstrahlung mode
was available. Since then, several new physical simulation modes meeting
customer needs have been developed. These include allowing temporary
extension of the front end of the accelerator to provide testing modes in
the outdoor exposure cell (enabling larger volume, lower fluence
exposures and SREMP testing), half-accelerator modes to enhance spectral
fidelity and reduce activation of test objects, and direct electron beam
exposure modes to significantly expand model validation capabilities.
Various other modes such as ion beam capability have been fielded at
HERMES III in support of other NNSA programs. Concerns/Issues HERMES III
will remain a critical capability for reentry system qualification in
Complex 2030. There is no difference for Options 1-4. Electronic
subsystems are highly complex and will grow in complexity in time.
Although subsystem qualification will rely more heavily on computational
simulation in the future, the physical simulation capabilities of HERMSE
III will be critical for application-specific model development and
validation work as well as high-fidelity physical simulation.
SPHINX

SPHINX is a flash x-ray facility with both bremsstrahlung and direct
electron beam deposition modes of operation. Accelerator power is
approximately a factor of 250 below that of Saturn. SPHINX provides fast
turnaround capability (cycle time 5 minutes) for dose-rate studies of
microelectronic devices as well as material response research in direct
electron beam mode. SPHINX has supported qualification of the W76-1
electronic subsystems as well as the W76-0, W76-1, and W78 neutron
generators. SPHINX provides a cost-effective capability for a large
volume of experiments that would otherwise be done at significantly more
expensive facilities (on a per test item-shot basis) such as Saturn.
SPHINX operations are conducted by a crew of 23 that maintains and
operates the Saturn, HERMES III, and SPHINX facilities, with certain
specialized skills shared amongst the set. One FTE position from this
crew is associated with SPHINX (primarily an electrical/mechanical
technician with some administrative and ES&H support). In addition, the
facility relies upon the corporate infrastructure to provide the various
areas of ES&H support and FMOC maintenance of real property. The
accelerator without front-end x-ray sources was acquired in the 1990s as
surplus equipment from the Defense Nuclear Agency. It had been originally
designed to drive microwave sources, and therefore has a very fast (2 ns)
electrical pulse rise time. This feature of SPHINX enables a range of
microelectronic device experiments not accessible at any other facility.
It is expected that SPHINX will function with only routine maintenance
for at least 10 years. Concerns/Issues
42 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
DRAFT
SPHINX will continue to provide cost-effective solutions for certain
radiation effects experiments in support of reentry system qualification
in Complex 2030. There is no difference for Options 1-4.
Z Machine

Z is an Inertia Confinement Facility (ICF) facility for which radiation
effects experimentation modes have been developed. The ICF program
develops and utilizes x-ray sources with temperatures below 1 keV.
Specialized sources applicable to the needs of radiation effects
experiments provide atomic lines ranging from 1.6 to 8 keV. Radiation
effects experiments has been allocated 14% of the shot days the last few
years. The radiation effects experiments have been critical for material
property studies for model development and validation for
thermomechanical shock phenomena as well as system generated
electromagnetic pulse phenomena. The facility is currently in
refurbishment to increase both reliability and x-ray output. Upon
reactivation, the first tests will be dedicated to reestablish experiment
modes with the most commonly used radiation effects sources as well as to
extend to higher photon energies (up to 13 keV).

43 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
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3.8 Engineering Sciences Experimental Facility - Building 865

Engineering Sciences Experimental Facility (ESEF) includes the HWT; the
TWT; the HighAltitude Chamber; and Thermal, Fluids, and Multiphase Flow
Laboratories. The facility houses a combination of production facilities
(primarily wind tunnels, vacuum chamber, multiphase flow facilities,
microsystems, and rheology laboratories) and those associated with
fundamental engineering research and scientific understanding to promote
the Stockpile Stewardship and other DOE programs. In addition, the
facility also supports a variety of test and experiments for WFO
customers (e.g., DoD, NASA, etc.). ESEF provides experimental
capabilities and advanced diagnostic methods for understanding the
fundamental physics of complex fluid flow, heat transfer, and aerodynamic
systems as applied to a variety of DOE programs. Of particular note, the
data and research findings created in this facility are used to certify
weapons systems and related components, as well as to validate and
improve related computational models. The two wind tunnels, which are the
only such facilities in the DOE complex, support Defense Programs
Stockpile Systems (gravity bombs, B61 and B83; re-entry systems, W76,
W78, W87, and W88; and RRW variants) by measuring aerodynamic and aero-
thermodynamic environments (forces and moments, pressure fields, heat
transfer, etc.) to support flight characteristics and component response.
They additionally provide dual-use capability for a wide variety of WFO
flight systems (DoD, NASA, MDA, etc). The Thermal, Fluids, and Multiphase
Flow laboratories have unique experimental apparatuses and diagnostic
equipment for investigating fundamental engineering science phenomena and
performing component-level testing. These laboratories primarily support
organizations within DOE such as the Industrial Technologies Program and
Strategic Petroleum Reserves Program, in addition to a variety of NW
programs. Option 1 - Past and current improvements to the facility have
included development and installation of advanced nonintrusive optical
diagnostics and instrumentation; additional wind tunnel tests sections to
extend capability; new multiphase flow research apparatus; new smallscale
thermal/fluid capabilities; and physical plant upgrades to support
ongoing operation (e.g., chilled water, compressors, cryogenic pumps,
vacuum pumps, etc.). Under TCR Phase 2B, small-scale thermal/fluid and
diagnostics laboratories are scheduled to move into the new Engineering
Sciences Complex (ESC), while large-scale facilities such as the wind
tunnels and multiphase flow laboratories will remain in a renovated Bldg.
865. Upgrades in Bldg. 865 will include replacement of an aging
compressed air receiver system, an improved flow straightener for TWT, an
electrical system upgrade for the HWT heating system, and HVAC
improvements. It is anticipated that ongoing demands of the Nuclear
Weapons program will require maintaining the capabilities of this
facility for the indefinite future. TCR Phase 2B, and continued support
by RTBF, is a critical element to achieving longevity. Continued
investment in these facilities beyond the scope of TCR Phase 2B and
current RTBF support is required to address aging infrastructure and
maintenance of capability.
44 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
DRAFT
Option 2 - The work conducted in the ESEF does not involve the use of
SNM. The wind tunnels, high-altitude chamber, and associated
infrastructure are unique to the DOE complex; therefore, they are not
candidates for consolidation. Construction of the ESC under TCR Phase 2B
will consolidate many of the thermal/fluid laboratories. Option 3 - Is
the same as Option 1. Option 4 - Next-generation aerodynamic and
aerothermodynamics facilities would require capabilities beyond those
provided by current facilities in Bldg. 865. New facilities could be
colocated with the proposed Combined Environmental Test Facility Complex
in TA III at SNL and would complement the proposed HEET Complex to
increase coverage of weapon flight envelopes. The new facilities would
include wind tunnels with capabilities ranging from subsonic through
hypersonic to support both production testing and engineering research.
The desired characteristics of these facilities would include the
following:
o o o o o o o o o

Larger test sections to accommodate bigger models and increased angle of
attack range Improved access for optical diagnostics and instrumentation
Improved modular design to accommodate multiple test sections Wide range
of Mach number, enthalpy, and Reynolds number Shock tunnel for simulation
of real gas effects during re-entry Quiet tunnel for simulation of
laminar boundary layer transition to turbulent flow Arc jet for thermal
protection system material characterization Longer run times for more
efficient operation Small-scale diagnostics development wind tunnel

45 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
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3.9 Component Environmental Test & Advanced Diagnostics Facility (Bldg.
860)

The Component Environmental Test and Advanced Diagnostics Facility,
located in Building 860 in TA I, supports development, qualification, and
acceptance testing; model validation experiments; and evaluation of
weapon components and other hardware. The advanced diagnostic
capabilities enable analysis and interpretation of hardware failures and
also support model validation efforts. The facility includes capabilities
for climatic/centrifuge, mass properties, modal/structural dynamics,
shock, structural mechanics, and vibration testing. Climatic/centrifuge
testing is accomplished using centrifuges and thermal chambers.
Structural mechanics testing is accomplished using MTS load machines and
actuators. Drop tables, resonant beams and fixtures, and Hopkinson bars
are used to simulate mechanical shock. Electrodynamic shakers are used to
simulate flight shock and vibration environments. Virtually any STS
environment for any stockpile system can be simulated at the component
level within this facility. All of the laboratories include a large
inventory of instrumentation and high-performance data acquisition
systems. Advanced diagnostics are accomplished through radiography,
ultrasonics, and computed tomography. Operations at the component
environmental test and advanced diagnostics facility also include the
following: o o o o Receiving, storing, and handling components with small
quantities of explosives (typically less than 5 g); and nuclear,
radioactive, and chemical materials; Assembling high-fidelity test units
and other assemblies (e.g., neutron generator assemblies); Setting up
electronic instrumentation and data recording; and Reducing hazards
through area, systems, and personnel control;

Small amounts of chemicals are maintained for use in mounting and
removing instrumentation from test articles and for processing
radiographic images. Cleaners, lubricants, solvents, paints, and other
such agents may also be used in small quantities. Liquid nitrogen is
used, primarily for thermal conditioning. Although most of work is done
in support of the NW SMU, this facility also supports development,
qualification and acceptance of hardware for the Integrated Technologies
and Systems Strategic Management Group , particularly DS&A programs
involving space assets. Recent improvements have included a new control
room for the vibration laboratory, a new highfrequency electrodynamic
shaker, and new data acquisition systems in the modal/structural dynamics
and shock labs. A new six degree of freedom vibration system will be
installed this summer.

46 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
DRAFT
TCR Phase 2 is critical to improving infrastructure for the modal test
and structural mechanics test areas. The remaining functional areas will
continue to be housed in Bldg. 860 under Option 1. Considerable
investment would be needed under Option 1 in Bldg. 860 to bring the
infrastructure in line with current standards and requirements. In
particular, the electrical system and heating and cooling systems are
inadequate. Option 2 would have no significant impact on operations in
Bldg. 860 because, in most cases, articles being tested do not include
SNM. The functions in Bldg. 860 would be consolidated with other
environmental test capabilities under Option 3. This would provide an
opportunity for higher fidelity, combined environment experimental
simulations in an integrated facility. The primary concern is the age of
the facility. Bldg. 860 was originally constructed in 1949, and the
electrical and heating and cooling systems are substandard. The roof was
replaced several years back, but leaks still occur fairly frequently.
Dirt and dust infiltration is common because of the poor sealing around
windows and doors.
3.10 Mobile Guns Complex

The Guns are managed as mobile test equipment by the Integrated Military
Systems Development Center of Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico
(SNL/NM). SNL/NM has contracted with the New Mexico Institute of Mining
and Technology (NMT)-Energetic Materials Research and Test Center (EMRTC)
to provide support services in operating the guns during specific test
series. The Mobile Guns Complex consists of three Davis guns and one gas
gun. The Davis guns are smooth bored guns in 8-, 12-, and 16-inch
diameters. These barrels are open at both ends and employ a moving mass
recoil system. This recoil system allows the guns to be trailer mounted
and mobile. The 8- and 12-inch barrels are interchangeable on the same
trailer, while the 16-inch gun has a dedicated trailer. Each Davis gun
trailer includes a hydraulic power unit, a winch for hoisting the load
into the barrel, and the hydraulic cylinders necessary to elevate the
barrel and operate the stabilizers. The gas gun is a 6-inch diameter gun.
It is also trailer mounted for mobility. In contains an onboard
compressor and two air storage tanks with a capacity of 27 cubic feet
each. These tanks are fed directly by the compressor and are capable of
storing compressed air up to 5000 psi. These storage tanks then feed the
firing chamber, which is 7.2 cubic feet. All guns are hinged to allow
firing angles from horizontal to vertical. The guns have limitations on
the size and weight of the projectiles they can deliver. The 16-inch guns
can achieve a launch velocity of approximately 1200 fps for a 2000 pound,
16-inch projectile, including sabot and pusher plate assemblies. The
maximum weight of a gas gun projectile/sabot assembly is approximately
120 pounds for similar impact velocities. These mobile guns are unique in
that they provide a capability for component (fuze), subsystem, or full-
scale penetration testing into in situ target materials (limestone,
granite, layered geologies, etc.) in addition to engineered targets. The
mobile guns provide a controlled environment for HiG impact conditions
(velocity, angle of obliquity, angle of attack, etc.) along with high-
fidelity photometric coverage or other off-board measurements. These
unique capabilities provide cost47 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories
May 2007
DRAFT
effective alternatives for risk mitigation, qualification, and failure
investigations to sled or flight testing. The mobile guns primarily
provide support to penetrating weapons programs for DoD and DOE. The guns
are also used in support of other federal agencies, including the
Japanese Lunar A space program. Recently, DoD has performed more full-
scale testing with the Davis Guns while DOE programs have utilized the
gas gun for component qualification and acceptance testing. SNL maintains
a capability for full-scale testing of its NW Penetrator, the B61-Mod11
test with the Davis Guns. Some examples of recent tests are as follows: o
o o o o 16-in. Davis Gun tests of BLU-109s (Divine Warhawk Series) SNL
SIPE Series Fuze test leveraged with Davis Gun test Gas Gun tests of
subscale BLU-109s (Divine Warhawk Series) Gas Gun tests of DOE Hi-G
Recorders (AdPen and HiCapPen) AFRL prototype munition

One or two SNL employees are required to perform gun experiments with
EMRTC personnel operating the guns utilizing SNL procedures and the other
staff are as follows: o o o One staff engineer (Bachelor or Master's
degree level) Two to six technicians to handle maintenance, operations,
test preparation, and data acquisition depending on test complexity One
of the SNL engineers act as a facility owner (ES&H, security, maintenance
of capability/operations)

The most significant recent upgrade to the mobile Gas Gun is the
installation of a new valve firing mechanism. The previous system used a
dual burst disk arrangement to release the gas from the firing chamber.
The new valve, called a spool valve, provides a more controlled release
of the gas and, more importantly, a repeatable delay time from trigger to
firing. In addition to the new spool valve, a new Programmable Logic
Controller and a new computer graphical user interface using National
Instruments hardware and LabVIEW software were recently installed. The
mobile Davis Guns have undergone a recent overhaul of the entire
hydraulic systems. The 16-in. gun uses a single large cylinder that
hoists the barrel and six smaller cylinders that control the outriggers.
The 12-in. gun also has a main hoist cylinder and two outrigger
cylinders, and the Gas Gun has a main hoist cylinder. All of these
cylinders, with the exception of the main hoist cylinders for the 16-in.
gun and the Gas Gun, have recently been completely rebuilt. In addition,
the 16-in. and 12-in. hydraulic systems have had the hydraulic fluid
flushed and replaced and new filters installed.
3.11 Future Concept - HyperSled/Extreme Environments Test (HEET) Complex
48 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
DRAFT
Consider a future where STS environmental testing can be performed at
SNL's test facilities with sufficient fidelity that only one flight test
is required at the end of a development program. The next generation of
environmental testing will increasingly require the ability to do extreme
environments (i.e., any combination or sequence of normal, abnormal,
and/or hostile environmental testing that challenges the safety,
security, or reliability of the system). This capability will ensure that
the development of future weapon systems will meet the increasingly
stringent requirements of customers and that the margins of safety,
performance, and reliability are well understood and quantified. SNL is
currently conceptualizing a future Environmental Test Complex where the
entire environmental testing footprint is reduced to a six mile by five
mile area. The core of this combined environmental testing complex is an
underground hypervelocity rail/coil sled track 8500 meters (~5 miles) in
length capable of accelerating a 200 kg load to Mach 15 (over 5000
meters/sec), simulating a realistic reentry flight environment. The
HyperSled track would be the focal center for a consolidation of the
electromagnetic and mechanical environments communities. At the end of
the HyperSled track would be the Extreme Environments Facility (EEF)
designed to produce full-scale abnormal/hostile accident scenarios
(crash, burn, and lightning strikes). Properly designed with a 30-story
high bay and a removable target module, the EEF would eliminate the need
for pull-downs at the Aerial Cable Facility, enhancing security and
safety.

The rationale for the construction of this facility and also the teaming
of the aerosciences, electromagnetic and mechanical environments
communities would be SNL's need to engage in combined environments
testing with the intent to eliminate the Trinity exception. Additionally,
this facility would be used for qualification in the STS normal and
hostile environments (for the latter, to obtain resultant
mechanical/thermal/electrical system response) as well as to support the
annual Integrated Stockpile Evaluation process through coupled high-
fidelity experimentation and computation. The complex would be capable of
supplementing and even replacing costly Joint Test Assemblies and
qualification flight testing for both air delivered and RV systems
comprising the current and future (RRW-based) stockpile. The surrounding
satellite facilities within the HEET Complex would consolidate the normal
environments test community (shock, vibration, loads, and EM) with
associated small laboratories, diagnostics development, and HE handling
in TA III. The recent Thermal Test Complex and the planned upgrades to
the Radiation facilities. would be considered part of the HEET Complex.
The Lurance Canyon cable site would become a remote firing site where SNL
could still fire hundreds of pounds of explosives and take advantage of
the infrastructure put in place during TCR Phase 1 to handle SNM in a
campaign mode. The HEET Complex would provide capabilities that have
historically been maintained at multiple sites across the complex,
reducing operational costs, manpower requirements, and the footprint for
environmental test, consistent with the intent of 2030 Complex
transformation.

49 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
DRAFT
The HEET Complex would allow the disposal and elimination of all the
rocket motors currently in inventory except for those needed to simulate
accident scenarios. In addition to reducing the ETF footprint, the EM
launch technology has direct future weapon research applications for many
DoD platforms and Integrated Technologies and Systems (ITS) customers.
The HEET Complex would advance the state-of-the-art in energy storage and
energy recovery (ultracapacitors and/or flywheel banks), material
research, electrical switching, fast response shielded diagnostics, EM
launch capability, and other related technologies. By the year 2030,
population creep in the Mesa Del Sol community to the southwest of TA III
will require that all future testing occur with minimal environmental
impact (noise, smoke, waste, etc.) on the local community. The HEET
Complex will, by design, accommodate all foreseen environmental
ordinances while permitting SNL to maintain its environmental testing
responsibilities. Programmatically and politically, this notional concept
requires successful completion of TCR Phase 2 to provide the critical
underpinnings for the support complex to meet near-term RRW program
requirements.

Notional Capabilities of the HyperSled/Extreme Environments Test (HEET)
Complex HyperSled Maximum Energy Requirements: 5.0 Gigajoules per shot
(50% efficiency) HyperSled Maximum Power Requirements: 10 Gigawatts per
shot HyperSled Maximum velocity: 5100 m/s (~Mach 15) HyperSled Capacity:
2 shots per day EEF Explosive Limits: 500 lb TNT equivalent EEF Fire
Capacity: 20 Megawatt pool fires EEF Lightning Capacity: Double-pulse
high current X amperes

50 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
DRAFT
4 Summary and Recommendations
The NNSA has requested its sites to provide a detailed facility portfolio
of all ETF. This request comes as a response to the consolidation efforts
NNSA has put forth in the Complex 2030 plan. One of the overarching goals
of the Complex 2030 plan is to transform the NNSA NWC into a responsive
infrastructure that supports specific stockpile requirements while
maintaining the essential US nuclear capabilities for an uncertain
future. This document has examined SNL's existing capabilities and
considers potential option alternatives for future development while
supporting the Complex 2030 goals. ETF at SNL supports the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Program by conducting thermal, mechanical, and
radiation testing. This testing assures the complex that all nuclear
warheads can survive normal, abnormal and hostile environments described
within the STS requirements. Existing ETF at SNL include Electromagnetic
Environments Complex; SNL/CA Environmental Test Complex; Thermal Test
Complex; Photometrics/Data Acquisition Complex; Nuclear & Radiation
Facilities Test Complex; Large Scale Mechanical Environmental Complex;
Non-Destructive Test Laboratory; Engineering Sciences Experimental
Facility; Component Environmental Test & Advanced Diagnostics Facility;
and Mobile Guns Complex. These facilities have varying degrees of
technical readiness, and their fit-for-mission use condition varies,
depending on the facility. Overall, the testing facilities are aging and
most are active beyond their designed useful life. The TCR Phase II
project is essential in extending the life of existing ETF to meet the
current needs of the existing stockpile. A key concern is the ability of
the NNSA to conduct occasional "security campaigns" within the complex
after 2008 for SNL and 2014 for LLNL. Efforts are under way to review
various options to establish a mobile security force that could serve the
entire Complex 2030 in the event that campaigning CAT I/II quantities of
SNM remains a future requirement. The next generation of environmental
testing requires SNL to consider a new test complex, one that challenges
existing and future weapon systems under combined or sequential
environments for the purpose of increasing margins and quantifiably
reducing uncertainties. SNL is reviewing a notional concept (the HEET
Complex), that would replace/rebuild most of the existing environmental
test facilities and consolidate all environmental testing within a 30
square mile footprint to ensure that the research and development,
science and technology, and national security needs of the nation are
properly addressed.

51 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
DRAFT
5 Appendix
[To include final table of various options.]

52 ETF at Sandia National Laboratories May 2007
Flight Testing

Complex 2030 Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
Generic Data Request Alternative 2.g. and 3.h. - Transfer Flight Testing
to Nevada Test Site

Summary
The Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA), manages the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The historical mission for
the NTS for over 50 years has been the development and testing of nuclear
weapons, weapons effects, and weapons safety and reliability in support
of the Nuclear Weapons Laboratories and the Department of Defense
(currently the Defense Threat Reduction Agency). The NTS is a unique
expanse of federally controlled land and facilities in a remote region of
southern Nevada that was set aside by the U.S. for the purpose of testing
nuclear weapons. The approximately 1,375 square miles that make up the
test site are surrounded by the Department of Defense Nevada Test and
Training Ranges and unpopulated land controlled by the Bureau of Land
Management. The geology, hydrology, meteorology, and radiological
environments are well characterized. The NTS Environmental Impact
Statement and the associated Record of Decision allow for the execution
of a variety of complex and unique projects and experiments while
ensuring the protection of the workers, the public and the environment.
The NNSA, through its Complex 2030 Vision, which is aimed at
consolidating and reducing the footprint of Special Nuclear Materials
(SNM) operations and high hazard experiments to a few or even one site,
requested the NNSA Nevada Site Office (NSO) to conduct a review of an
alternative of transferring the Joint Test Assembly (JTA) Flight Test
Program for the B61 and B83 gravity bombs from the Tonopah Test Range
(TTR) to the NTS. Because both the TTR and the NTS are in Nye County,
Nevada, this action would result in combining the flight test portions of
the Stockpile Assurance Program to the NTS mission. This would bring NNSA
closer to achieving its goals of the Complex 2030. A rough order of
magnitude (ROM) cost estimate for relocating the Flight Test Program from
the TTR to the NTS is $7.6-million. This includes the physical transfer
of current instrumentation and test equipment and the very modest costs
for construction of several concrete pads for the reinstallation of
tracking and photographic instruments on the proposed test bed. The ROM
estimate for annual Program operating costs at NTS is $10.3-million,
which includes $3.8million for the NTS support portion only. These costs
are detailed in the Alternative Discussion. There will be only moderate
NTS security costs compared to existing Tonopah security costs because
the NTS Stockpile Stewardship Program has an existing on-site security
force, so no other costs should be required other than campaign costs.
The very moderate relocation costs would easily be recouped within a
short period of time based upon the savings in security costs alone. This
document provides an overview of the projected schedule and a breakdown
of ROM estimates for both the transfer of the JTA Flight Test Program to
the NTS and for continued operation of the Program at NTS. Additionally,
we have included the proposed TTR new equipment costs.

Page 1 of 16
Complex 2030 SEIS Generic Data Request Alt. 2.g. and 3.h. - Transfer
Flight Testing to NTS March 12, 2007

Introduction
The current Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Joint Test Assembly (JTA)
Flight Testing Program is being conducted on the Tonopah Test Range
(TTR). Both the B61 and B83 gravity bombs are part of the nation's
nuclear weapons stockpile. Both bombs are unguided and carried by United
States Air Force (USAF) aircraft. Authority for the B61 and B83 joint
Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and
USAF Flight Test Program is contained in a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) between the NNSA and the USAF regarding Joint Test Assessment of
the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile dated February 16, 2001. The purpose of the
Flight Testing Program is to test the JTA in a normal "stockpile-to-
target" sequence (STS). Data generated by this program is essential to
certify the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. Part of the data request
for input for the Complex 2030 Supplemental Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement (SEIS) is to examine an alternative of relocating the
JTA Flight Testing Program from the TTR to the Nevada Test Site (NTS). 1
Per the NNSA HQ decision in October 2006, no B61 or B83 flight tests with
SNM will be planned after completion of the current required set of
tests. These tests are scheduled for completion before the end of FY08 at
the TTR. If this decision is subsequently changed or an emergency
variance in mission is required and cable pull-down testing is required,
however, then these tests can be performed at the Nevada Test Site.
Therefore, while SNM test units are not addressed in this document, there
is inherent flexibility in the planning for future operations to allow
for mission change/variation without subsequent prohibited consequences.
This, indeed, parallels with the concept of Complex 2030 - reducing the
footprint, strategically forecasting cost implications and potential
challenges. Since the NTS is an NNSA facility with top priority for
Stockpile related programs and has historically supported the testing
needs for numerous "high hazard" tests, this alternative is logical and
realistic. It supports the concept of the implementation of a responsive
nuclear weapons infrastructure by increasing the NNSA test flexibility
and responsiveness to rapidly changing environments. The addition of
operations at the NTS provides numerous advantages. Among these, DOE
expands upon a strategic asset that is available to meet short notice
requirements for the DOE stockpile. NTS provides NNSA customers testing
priority over other non-DOE programs that compete when testing at U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD) test ranges. Recent experience of testing at
DoD ranges indicates the original cost estimates are not well understood,
and may be the "best case" at each test range. Additionally, it is
thought that military drops done at DoD test ranges may not offer the
same fidelity in testing requirements that is necessary for a JTA drop,
given that the latter has significantly more scientific and engineering
data requirements.

The Generic Data Request for the Complex 2030 SEIS requests two types of
data: (1) site environmental baseline data; and (2) data for
alternatives. Site environmental baseline data will be used to write the
"affected environment" chapter. This data is generally readily available
from other NEPA documents, Annual Site Environmental Reports, and other
monitoring/permit reports. This will be gathered by the Complex 2030 NEPA
team. Data for each alternative will be used to develop the descriptions
of the SEIS alternatives and assess the environmental impacts. The
alternatives addressed in this paper are 2.g. and 3.h. for the Transfer
of Flight Testing to WSMR or NTS.

1

Page 2 of 16
Complex 2030 SEIS Generic Data Request Alt. 2.g. and 3.h. - Transfer
Flight Testing to NTS March 12, 2007

Additionally, the NTS Geology includes a myriad of soil alternatives
including: dry lake beds, hard rock tunnels, permeable, and mixed soils
which provide opportunities for many possible test conditions into the
future. It is not possible to perform a direct cost comparison between
DoD and DOE as potential relocation sites due to significant accounting
practice differences between the DoD and DOE sites. (1) DoD treats all
infrastructure costs as separate line item budgets and users are not
charged for any of these costs. Conversely, (2) DOE requires that all
project costs including infrastructure be distributed to all users. NTS
falls under the DOE cost model. The advantages of moving the TTR JTA
flight tests to the NTS include: o o o Scheduling of JTA flight tests
will have top priority at the NTS as a key element of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program, Scheduling additional tests beyond the number
currently planned can readily be accomplished at a minimal cost increase
to the Program, In response to Public Law 109-364, Section 3111, the NNSA
has reported to congress that "NTS will be considered as a potential site
for conduct of flight testing currently performed at the Tonopah Test
Range," Initial one-time investment in relocation costs can be recovered
(in less than two years) in savings in security costs as security already
exists as part of the NTS Stockpile Stewardship Program, thus should
require minimal additional campaign costs, The NTS security work force is
in place and can handle manpower surge requirements to support both
flight test and recovery operations as part of the NTS mission as has
been demonstrated by their previous experience, Preserving 30 to 60
skilled jobs in Nye County, Nevada while maintaining the continuity of
currently scheduled testing by moving the JTA testing from TTR to NTS,
and increasing the work week to 4-10 hour days from 3-13 hour days,
Expanding and enhancing the workforce capabilities for both the NTS and
TTR missions in all areas including technical, security, construction and
mining, The USAF (Nellis AFB) currently executes management controls for
airspace only for both TTR and NTS since they represent a contiguous
restricted airspace, JTA staff can immediately move into existing
buildings (no new construction necessary), Significantly enhancing
Complex 2030 mission by combining Stockpile Stewardship Test and
Development work with the STS JTA flight tests portion of the stockpile
assurance program plus potential consolidation of environmental testing
needs of stockpile weapons (e.g., cable pull down facilities), and
Reducing costs for transportation of personnel and equipment from Las
Vegas or Pahrump to the NTS versus Tonopah (80 miles vs. 240 miles).

o

o

o

o o o o

o
The NTS has continuously provided support for the National Laboratories
and DTRA in conduct of specialized tests since its inception. Recent NTS
experience related to the JTA Flight Test Program includes:
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o o o o

DTRA air drops of earth penetrating weapons (both inert and active), 2
Depleted Uranium (DU) tank rounds fired into hard targets on the NTS,
Missiles fired from NTS to impact at TTR, and Routine interface with
Nellis AFB Range Operation personnel and Explosive Ordinance Disposal
(EOD) staff.

Since the cessation of active nuclear testing in 1992, the NTS has been
used by the Nuclear Weapons Laboratories as a field laboratory for
conduct of high-hazard and science based tests related to the Stockpile
Stewardship Program (SSP). The current SSP infrastructure meets or is
applicable to JTA program needs. The JTA drops contain classified
components and the NTS is already in a position with Q-cleared personnel
and facilities to support such operations. The Flight Test Program can
readily leverage its current capabilities: o o o Expertise and process
for movement of classified articles is in place; Radiation control and
emergency response personnel are already in-place; and Procedures and
operational documentation support existing NTS operations.

There are many opportunities for the Flight Test Program to leverage the
infrastructure currently in place at the NTS with little cost impact to
the program. The SSP also has an advantage since the Flight Test Program
would utilize existing NTS infrastructure needed to support SSP Readiness
while simultaneously increasing the utilization of existing
infrastructure. Thus, both programs are enhanced. The facilities and
personnel that might be immediately leveraged include: o o o o Existing
microwave communications infrastructure, Existing site fiber-optic
infrastructure between facilities and connection to the internet,
Existing site power, roads, water, communication, feeding, etc.,
supporting all operations, and Existing workforce with engineering,
design, and construction capabilities and associated equipment and
facilities that currently support all NTS activities.

In addition to ready access to the existing NTS infrastructure, the NTS
workforce has experience and the "can-do" attitude to support complex
testing. This provides the Flight Test Program with an environment and
additional pool of talent that is already quality, safety, and security
conscious due to the nature of their work and years of experience on the
job. Additionally, many of the technical and management staff and the
security force at the NTS are already Q-cleared. Many also have Human
Reliability Program (HRP) certification. The NTS security work force is
in place and can support both flight tests and recovery operations as
part of the NTS mission as has been demonstrated by their previous
experience.

2

These included 25 flights (some were multiple delivery) which resulted in
over 40 weapons successfully dropped on NTS targets.
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Added Benefits for Complex 2030
Leveraging the consolidation envisioned under the Complex 2030 objective
for testing other components of current and future weapons in the
stockpile at the NTS would also enhance the opportunities for lowering
overall costs to the Nation. There are a number of other Environmental
Testing Facilities (ETFs) in the NNSA weapons complex whose purpose is to
determine if stockpile weapons meet the STS requirements. As the
stockpile has decreased, there is an excess in the number and capacity of
these testing facilities. Consolidating many of these facilities on the
NTS would enhance the opportunities for savings in labor and facilities
to support testing needs. Within the weapons complex, the ETFs are used
to perform physical testing and simulations of a variety of natural and
induced environments on nuclear weapons' components, subsystems and full-
up weapons. Additionally, ETFs are used for stockpile surveillance,
resolving significant findings of investigation, model development and
validation, and the development of diagnostics and measurement
technologies required to qualify weapons system to meet the military
characterization requirements. These facilities consist of sled tracks;
centrifuges; aerial cable facilities; burn sites; shock, vibration, and
electromagnetic test facilities; radiation testing sites; aeroscience and
wind tunnels; and many small laboratories for component testing.

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Alternative Description
The SNL flight test operations would be relocated as they now exist to
the NTS. Several possible locations for the JTA Flight Testing Program on
the NTS were considered; Mid-Valley, Frenchman Flats, and Yucca Lake.
Other locations are also feasible, but have not been examined as yet. No
location has yet been counted out, although a drop test site on Mid-
Valley, Area 14 (Figure 1) was chosen for developing a Rough Order of
Magnitude (ROM) estimate since it provides the greatest isolation from
other NTS activities. Given this, it also would require the most
infrastructure to support this operation.

Figure 1 - Mid-Valley, Area 14 was selected as the location for the
Flight Test Program Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) estimate

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The Mid-Valley location (Figure 2) was assumed to be the initial
(primary) location for establishing the necessary facilities for
conducting the JTA Flight Test Program. The Range Safety Footprint
Analysis 3 was reviewed for the proposed tests and it was concluded that
the Mid-Valley site met the necessary safety criteria to permit the
program to use this area of the NTS. Mid-Valley site preparation includes
test bed design, concrete pads, roads, and generator power. The NTS will
provide a microwave data/video link from the SNL-provided technical
systems in Mid-Valley to the NTS Control Point (CP) complex. Other sites
are also available on the NTS offering a variety of geologic conditions
for testing advanced weapons designs. Transition from TTR to NTS is
planned to occur during the latter part of FY 2009 and the beginning of
FY 2010. This permits the transfer costs to be spread over two fiscal
years while providing adequate time for planning and engineering for the
NTS to receive the transferred equipment from TTR. Construction of the
needed pads and target would occur after the Record of Decision for the
SEIS occurs. Figure 2 - View of NTS Area 14, Mid-Valley Flight Test
Program system upgrades would only begin after transition is complete or
at least not until 2010, recognizing that the funding for these upgrades
would come after transition and would be phased in over several FY. The
relevant milestones and activities are shown in Figure 3. It is planned
to offer the current staff of approximately 30 to 60 persons continuing
employment at NTS thus preserving these skilled jobs in Nye County,
Nevada while maintaining the continuity of currently scheduled testing.
The JTA Flight Test Program staff will be housed in CP-40, an existing
facility that includes an available high-bay area and office space. Minor
building preparation will be accomplished once the approval to proceed
has been issued. A photograph of CP-40 is provided in Figure 4 and the
current layout is shown in Figure 5. CP40 is an administrative type
building with restrooms and sufficient space to house the Flight Test
Program staff and data acquisition and communications equipment. It also
contains two high bay (garage type) rooms that would be useful for
equipment repair or storage. Another existing
High Altitude/High Speed and Low Altitude/High Speed drops were reviewed
for the proposed NTS target area. These included: Range Safety Footprint
Analysis for FTU-J10-1, Walt Wolfe, SNL, dated June 23, 2003; Range
Safety Footprint Analysis for B83 JTA-109, Walt Wolfe, SNL, dated July
31, 2004; Range Safety Footprint Analysis for B61 SRM-3, Walt Wolfe, SNL,
dated January 13, 2005; Range Safety Footprint Analysis for B61 JTA-433,
Walt Wolfe, SNL, dated August 23, 2004.
3

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facility, building CP-20 (Figure 6) could be used to house equipment and,
if additional space is needed, the SNL Flight Test Program data
acquisition systems and communications. The main NTS control point,
Figure 8 and Figure 7, would be used by SNL during actual flight testing.

Figure 3 - Schedule of events and activities for the transition of the
JTA Flight Test Program to the NTS in support of Complex 2030

Figure 4 - CP-40 includes administrative areas and a high bay that would
be useful for assembling test hardware

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Figure 5 - CP-40 plan view showing the basic existing layout of the
facility

Figure 6 - CP-20 is an ideal facility for housing the electronics for the
Flight Test Program

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Figure 8 - The main control room in CP1 will be used during the actual
flight tests

Figure 7 - Another view of the main control room in CP-1

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Existing communications capabilities between the CP facilities located in
the southeast portion of Area 6, include a fiber optic link between the
CP microwave towers and CP-1, 20, and 40. Microwave data communications
are available for connecting data and video requirements from the target
area to the CP complex. Setup of the microwave data/video links is a
routine test requirement on the NTS. These same communications
infrastructure elements can readily be applied to other locations on the
site should the JTA Flight Test Program desire to test in different
geological regimes.

Construction and Operations Data
The estimated cost for the initial move from TTR and the setup of the
facilities at NTS are shown in Table 1. Table 2 provides the initial ROM
estimate for the NTS support costs for annual operation of the program
including a ROM of the SNL Program, both labor and other direct costs,
based upon the 2007 Program escalated at 2.8% per year. Also provided are
the specific estimates for the SEIS Generic Data Request, Table 3 and
Table 4. Note that the operations estimates are not yet complete and the
SNL "No Action Alternative" should be used for a complete list of
hazardous chemicals and waste categories.

TTR New Equipment Upgrade
Additionally, one of the assumptions is that upgrades to the equipment
would need to be made in the same timetable as proposed by TTR. SNL's new
equipment proposal estimate equals to a cost estimate of $14.5M. Figure 9
demonstrates graphically that new equipment costs will be recouped within
three years.
Table 1 - Initial ROM estimate for moving the JTA Flight Test Program to
the NTS ITEM 1 RELOCATION ITEM DESCRIPTION Pre-Readiness Project
Management, Engineering, Testbed Design and Planning, Authorization Basis
Documentation, 15 Months Pre-Readiness Testbed Construction, Facility
Preparation, Communication Link Construction, 12 Months (excluding
concrete target) Transfer of SNL Technical Systems, Data Acquisition,
Data Reduction, and Miscellaneous Hardware to NTS, 6 Months* Installation
and Startup of SNL Technical Systems in Testbed and Data Acquisition
Equipment in CP-20, 6 Months Total Relocation Costs (FY 2009) ROM COST
$3,700K

2

$2,200K

3

$600K

4

$1,100K

$7,700K
o

This assumes that the Sandia staff and O&M contractor at TTR are fully
funded in FY09 & 1st 3 months of FY10 to support the disassembly of
equipment at TTR, transportation to NTS, and re-assembly of flight test
support equipment at NTS.

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o ITEM 1

Table 2 - Initial ROM estimate for operating the JTA Flight Test Program
on the NTS (including SNL program costs) JTA FLIGHT TEST PROGRAM NTS
OPERATING ITEM DESCRIPTION Annualized Post-Readiness Operations Cost
including Project Management, Test Safety Reviews, Airspace/OCC
Coordination, Facility Charges, Test Execution Support, Radcon Support,
RSL Photography Support, and JTA Recovery and Transportation to a Bunker,
based on 14 JTA tests per year occurring on 7 drop days Annual Security
(Based upon WSI memorandum dated 15 December '06) Support: ROM COST
$3,700K

2

$100K

3

ARL/SORD SUPPORT: Air Resources Laboratory/Special Operations and
Research Division (within NOAA) - Weather Service Support, included as
overhead costs. Daily soundings taken at Desert Rock. Approximately $2K
per sounding if Test Day soundings requested. Total NTS Operating Costs
on Annualized Basis (FY 2010)

$0

$3,800K $6,500K

4

Current 2007 SNL annual Program operating costs ($6-million/year),
escalated at 2.8% per year. Assumes starting at NTS January 1, 2010.
Total Annual JTA Program Costs at NTS Beginning 2010

$10,300K

25

Program Cost at TTR w/SNM 20 No SNM Savings w/SNM Program Cost at TTR w/o
SNM Millions of Dollars 15 Savings w/o SNM

10 Program Costs at NTS (includes relocation)

5

0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Fiscal Year

Figure 9 - Comparison of JTA Flight Test Program Costs at TTR and NTS

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Table 3 - Construction data for SEIS Generic Data Request CONSTRUCTION

Data Required Peak Electrical Energy (Mwe) Diesel Generators (Yes or No)
Concrete (yd3) Steel (t)

Consumption/Use 40,000 kwh Yes 800 cubic yards 1 Ton

Liquid fuel and lube oil (gal) Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown Area Size
Parking Lots Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak employment
(workers) Construction period (years) Waste Generated Low level Liquid
(gal) Solid (yd3) Mixed Low-level Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Hazardous
Liquid (gal)

32,000 2,880,000 3,047 / 727 2 each 200' X 300' N/A 0 0 30 15 months
Volume

0 0

0 0

0

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CONSTRUCTION

Solid (yd3) Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Nonhazardous
(Other) Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3)

0

0 6,000 gal

0 45 cubic yards

Table 4 - Annual Operations data estimates for SEIS Generic Data Request
ANNUAL OPERATIONS 4

Data Required Annual Electrical energy (MWh) Peak electrical demand (Mwe)
Fuel usage (gal or yd3) Other Process Gas (N, Ar, etc) Water (gal) Steam
(tons) Plant footprint (acres) Employment (workers) Number of Rad Workers
Average annual dose (per Sandia) Maximum worker dose (per Sandia)

Consumption/Use 480,000 40,000 kwh 32,150 480 1,680,000 0 3,047 29 1
<10Mrem Not answered

The operations estimates are not yet complete. Therefore, the SNL "No
Action Alternative" should be used as a reference for a complete list of
hazardous chemicals and waste categories.

4

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ANNUAL OPERATIONS 4

Radionuclide emissions and effluents - nuclides and Curies NAAQS
emissions (tons/yr) (per Sandia) Hazardous Air Pollutants and Effluents
(tons/yr) (per Sandia Chemical Use (per Sandia) Maximum inventory of
fissile material/throughout Waste Category Low level Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3) Mixed Low-level Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) TRU Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3) HLW/Spent Fuel Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Hazardous Liquid (gal)
Solid (yd3) Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3)

0 13.32 HCL - 3.7E-06 0 0 Volume

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

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ANNUAL OPERATIONS 4

Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) 0 700 gal

Transportation
All post-test transportation from the NTS to the Pantex Plant in
Amarillo, TX would be identical to the current TTR process. New
agreements replacing NTS as the originating site would replace the TTR
agreements. NTS has a long history including formal agreements with
Albuquerque for the shipment of SNM and classified components to and from
major DOE/NNSA sites and is therefore thoroughly familiar with the
processes and procedures for these shipments.

Accidents
The JTA Flight Test Program will develop a program specific emergency
plan. This plan will interface with the NTS Comprehensive Emergency
Management Plan ensuring the integration of potential program concerns.
This same process was used to address concerns associated with the DTRA
Hard and Buried Target test program.

Terrorist Threats
Following the NNSA Design Figure 10 - Storage sites for the JTA are
available on the NTS Basis Threat criteria for JTA drops, the NTS
security contractor and NTS operations would provide appropriate storage
sites and coverage for each test (Figure 10).

Page 16 of 16
Concept of Operations for joint US Air Force/NNSA Gravity Weapons Flight
Test Program
The B61 and the B83 gravity bombs are part of the nation's nuclear
weapons stockpile. Both bombs are unguided gravity bombs carried and
released by US Air Force aircraft. Authority for the B61 and the B83
Joint NNSA/Air Force Flight Test Program is contained in the Memorandum
of Understanding between the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) and the Department of the Air Force Regarding Joint Testing and
Assessment of the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, dated 16 February 2001. The
purpose of both Flight Test Program is to test the Joint Test Assembly
(JTA) in a normal "stockpile-to-target sequence" (STS). Data generated by
this program is essential to certify the nation's nuclear weapons
stockpile. Currently, certain versions of the B61 bomb can be dropped
from the B-2A and the B52H Bombers, while other B61 configurations may be
dropped from the F-15E, F-16C and the PA-200 fighter aircraft. The B83
bomb can only be dropped from a B-2A or a B52H aircraft. Sandia National
Laboratories (SNL) conducts an assessment program to assure the
reliability and safety of the nuclear weapons in the stockpile are
maintained at the levels required by the NNSA and the DoD. Nuclear
weapons are selected from the stockpile, returned to the Pantex plant
near Amarillo TX, denuclearized, instrumented, and then tested.
Coordination between SNL and the DoD is primarily handled by the Joint
Test Working Group (JTWG) for each weapon. This group is co-chaired by
DoD and NNSA, and is specifically concerned with stockpile testing and
evaluation. Membership is comprised of representatives from all concerned
agencies. Weapons are randomly selected from the stockpile each year for
testing and evaluation. The weapons are transported from DoD locations
and delivered to the Pantex plant where they are disassembled and
inspected, with any defects recorded. The nuclear portion of the weapon
is removed and relocated to separate areas for further analysis. The
nonnuclear portion of the weapon is reassembled with instrumentation into
a flight test configuration, called a Joint Test Assembly (JTA).
Therefore, no JTA configuration is capable of providing a nuclear yield.
Each year, anywhere between 2-6 bombs from each system will become JTAs.
Joint Test Assemblies containing components from the stockpile together
with data acquisition and transmission equipment provide as-realistic-as-
possible tests for use with military delivery systems, without the
nuclear package. Completed JTAs are then shipped to DoD operational bases
where they are mated to their aircraft delivery systems, and then flight
tested. Gravity bombs are flown by operational aircraft to various Test
Ranges and dropped.
Prior to each weapon flight test, there is significant coordination
between the SNL test engineer and the DoD test squadron. As much realism
as possible is planned into each test while ensuring the primary
objectives from both SNL and DoD are met. The bombs can be dropped from
high or low altitude, and from a slow speed to a high speed. Test range
radar and optical tracking systems record the aircraft performance until
the JTA is released. Once the JTA is dropped from the aircraft, these
systems track the JTA until it has landed on the ground. Before JTAs are
released, formal joint DoD/NNSA procedures, called Non-Nuclear
Verifications, are followed to assure the nuclear package is not present
in the JTA. Most JTA configurations are highly instrumented. Others have
minimal instrumentation to allow as many of the war reserve components to
be tested in a realistic environment. The information provided by the
range systems as well as the on-board recording systems provide
performance and reliability information for both the SNL engineers and
the DoD mission planners. The data generated by this program is essential
to certify the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile.
Integrated Project Team Analysis Requirements & Assumptions IPT
Designation:
1.Mission-related Requirements & Assumptions

Flight Test Alternatives (1) The requirements for the flight test mission
are identified in the Official Use Only (OUO) Program Introductory
Document dated October 3, 2005. The requirements are summarized here from
that document to keep the input non-OUO. The requirements are for 10 to
12 flight tests for stockpile systems per year and 2 to 7 development
flight tests per year.

2.Nature/size of the Stockpile Requirements & Assumptions

(1)

3.Capability/Competencyrelated Requirements Assumptions

&

(1)

4.Capacity/Throughputrelated Requirements Assumptions

&

(1)

5.Schedule/Timeline-related Requirements & Assumptions

(1)

6.Location/Configurationrelated Requirements Assumptions

&

(1)

7.D&D -related Requirements & Assumptions

(1)

The WSMR and NTS options are options that will require that D&D be
accomplished prior to turn over of the TTR to the Air Force. The other
three options keep the flight test mission at the TTR. The amount of D&D
will be the result of a negotiated process with the Air Force.
8.External Influences/IPT Connectivity Requirements & Assumptions

(1)

Other (1) Environmental Restoration

(1)

The WSMR and NTS options are options that will require that NNSA
determine what environment restoration is to be accomplished prior to
turning the TTR over to the Air Force. The other three options keep the
flight test mission at the TTR. The amount of environmental restoration
will be accomplished in accordance with the Sandia Land Use Permit and
other applicable requirements.

Other (2)

(1)

Other (3)

(1)

Other (4)

(1)
COMPLEX 2030 SPEIS TTR Closure Alternative Review Information - Tonopah
Test Range (No-Action Alternative) Per the NNSA HQ decision in October
2006, no B61 or B83 flight tests with SNM will be planned or conducted
after FY08. Therefore, SNM test requirements are not addressed in this
document. Since 1957, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has conducted
flight tests of gravity bomb systems and supported testing of many
military tactical systems at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). TTR was
established through a land permit from the Nellis Air Force Base (Nellis
AFB) and that permit was renegotiated and extended in FY 2001. During the
early years, SNL operated the range for DOE, and conducted hundreds of
tests annually. Beginning in the early 1990s, the number, and types of
tests at TTR declined coincident with various international events.1 The
current permit with the U.S. Air Force (USAF) extends the land-use permit
to 2019. At that time, either a new permit must be negotiated, or the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) funded operations at TTR
would end. If the NNSA closes the TTR operations prior to the end of the
permit, NNSA would still be required to remediate the land to a specified
level. There are ongoing discussions between the NNSA, USAF and the State
of Nevada aimed to define the levels to which the area would have to be
cleaned. This remediation is currently estimated to be between $100M and
$500M and will be refined during this PEIS process. A demolition and
disposal (D&D) activity would also be required to remove facilities and
structures no longer required by the military services. Finally, in order
to assess all options, an important variant need to be worked to ensure
that all possibilities have been addressed. This variant is to examine
the implications of terminating the permit agreement with the AF, and
becoming a tenant on AF property. What are the financial and programmatic
implications of such a change? Would it be possible to pay the AF for
security, medical, fire protection services that are required by the
Sandia operations at TTR and would the cost of these services be
significantly less than the cost of NNSA providing those services? Would
the operational areas and flight corridors be protected for the NNSA
mission, or would encroachment jeopardize NNSA's ability to conduct the
mission at TTR? Although there is no apparent environmental impact to
this variant, it should be considered as part of both OPTION 1 and OPTION
2 to capture possible cost reductions to current forecast operations.
CURRENT RANGE CAPABILITIES: a) Command and Control - The TTR Test
Director (TD), along with the military test representative provides
direction over the entire test. The TD is responsible for the safe
conduct of the test, while ensuring all required test objectives are met.
The TD is in constant communication with all range support groups to
ensure all systems are fully operational. The TD is also in constant
communication with the military personnel that have a communication link
with the pilot of the aircraft delivering the test article, ensuring that
delivery objectives will be achieved. 3 b) Optical/video - TTR provides
complete range-wide optical tracking capabilities. All of the optical
trackers have the Target Vector Translation System (TVTS) installed,
which receives target acquisition and focusing data from each operating
radar station to drive the tracking mounts.
Page 1 of 16
Cinetheodolites (Cine-T) are used to obtain precise time-space position
information of the test unit. The Cine-T's can be set up at any of the
existing 31 concrete pads, which ensures complete coverage of any test
area and approach corridor on the range. Mobile tracking telescopes can
be positioned at any accessible place on the test range. Tracking
telescopes and hand track stations are used to obtain high quality
photographic images on 35 mm and 70 mm film. They are also used to
determine event times, position information, generate public relations
photos, and provide standard and high-speed video imagery. The film is
taken to the Remote Sensing Laboratory in Las Vegas for processing.
Reduction of optical data is usually completed in one to two weeks.3 c)
Tracking Radars - The radars perform a primary tracking function, as well
as, complement other instrumentation on the range. During flight tests,
they continuously track in-bound aircraft and delivered targets. Most of
the radars have been designed or modified for precision and reliability,
and several are mobile and can be moved to accommodate all range targets
and aircraft. Radar data provides real-time data for the graphic displays
and provides time-space position information to the computer for posttest
analysis. The radars are equipped with closed circuit television (CCTV)
cameras. Video is recorded at each radar, transmitted to the Operations
Center, and displayed for test engineers and observers to view the
mission in progress. 3 d) Telemetry - The telemetry stations at TTR are
used for data collection to monitor performance of the test vehicle
during the course of the operation. Critical data is displayed in real
time during the test. After the test, the data is reproduced and
processed into quick-look records for preliminary engineering evaluation.
A mobile trailer is typically positioned near the target area to enhance
recovery of terminal data transmitted by the B83 during a contact fuzing
test. Magnetic tapes are sent to the customer for comprehensive data
reduction and archival. 3 e) Operations Control Center - The Operations
Control Center sits atop the Operations building and has a 360-degree
view of the range. The center houses alphanumeric and graphic LCD
displays, video monitors, air traffic radar displays, camera controls,
radio nets and telephone systems. During test operations, the test
director, range safety officer, test project engineer, camera controller
and range communicator staff the consoles in the center to control and
coordinate all test functions. All of the operator consoles contain LCDs
for alphanumeric, graphic or video displays along with telephone and
radio communication links and time display. A camera controller's console
contains the instrumentation for on/off control of all operational Cine-
T's and light metering equipment. The range communicator's console has
access to all TTR telecommunications and RF nets, and meteorological
instrumentation. This position also provides a real time coordination and
interface position for air traffic control/FAA agencies and emergency
security response. 3 f) Photometrics and Photography - The photometrics
group at TTR provides high speed motion picture and video coverage for
data acquisition and Public Relations documentation. The post-test data
reduction provides time-space position information, trajectory angles and
angles of attack and rotational velocities. Data is available in a
variety of media, including 35mm and 70mm formats, color reversal, color
negative and black and white. They provide both prints in color and black
and white, as well as video in tape formats or CD/DVD. High quality still
photography is available for both pre- and posttest activities.3
Page 2 of 16
g) Communications - The TTR has a fully integrated communications system
of ground-to-air and ground-to-ground radio links using both radio
frequency (RF) and land line equipment that ensures support of test
activities and emergencies. There are numerous "nets" that provide direct
communications between selected groups. Each major range function,
including radar, telemetry and cameras is assigned to one of the ground
nets, and all key interfunction stations are tied together by the test
operations net. The Sandia net is used for routine range communications.
Additional radio links include high frequency single sideband for long-
range communications and RF tie-ins with state police and medical
emergency networks. 3 h) Aircraft Flight Safety - TTR is located in a
very remote area of the Nellis Air Force Base Bombing and Gunnery Range.
The remote location, situated between two mountain ranges, and with
restricted airspace, ensures tests can be conducted with a high degree of
safety. The high desert location varies from 5,300 to 5,600 feet mean sea
level, providing a very large flat area for aircraft to traverse with a
high degree of safety. 3 i) Airspace - TTR provides full coordination for
all airspace requirements for each test. The TTR Test Director (TD)
attends monthly meetings with local AF airspace coordinators to ensure
all required on range and off range airspace is reserved and potential
conflicts with other Range users are avoided. In the event a change in
test planning requires a change in air or ground space utilization the TD
will coordinate such changes with the responsible Nellis AFB agency. 3 j)
Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Recovery - TTR has trained explosive
operators on hand for all tests. They have basic explosives training and
have specific training for each test article prior to the test. They have
heavy equipment, including cranes, backhoes, and forklifts available for
light construction, maintenance, material handling and test vehicle
recovery. They pioneered and developed a unique method for recovery of
penetrating test vehicles, so there is minimal ground disturbance. 3 k)
Meteorology - Three weather stations and rawindsonde balloon launches
generate the range metrological data. The weather station at the hard
target measures wind speed and direction, temperature, dew point and
barometric pressure. Instrumentation on a 300-foot tower measure wind
speed and direction, and temperature at three levels. Data from these two
stations are transmitted over land lines to the Operations Control Center
for recording and display. When upper atmosphere weather conditions are
require for specific tests, range personnel launch rawindsonde balloons.
Measurements of temperature, relative humidity, wind speeds and direction
can be obtained at altitudes up to 90,000 feet.3 l) TECCS (Test
Evaluation Command and Control System) - TECCS is a real-time data
acquisition program developed and distributed by Edwards AFB. TECCS
provides graphics of aircraft flight paths in relation to other airborne
vehicles and established ground points, supports mission control
activities with altitude threshold, run-in lines for bomb drop missions,
and push-over lines for high angle-of-attack missions. TTR Control Point
operators monitor real-time TECCS data to ensure aircraft lines of flight
and payload deliveries remain within predefined safe boundaries. TECCS
obtains target information from FAA data sources and on site TTR Radar
facilities. The graphics facility provides the operational and display
environment for the aircraft control operator and the radar director. A
map select system allows the operator to select from different map
displays. The
Page 3 of 16
operator may also select which radar tracks are to be used, alphanumeric
display (in feet, meters, or nautical miles), radar operational status,
and hard copy production. Plotting data can be frozen at any point, and a
playback capability permits multiple passes on recorded data files. The
tracking data is superimposed on background maps that contain range
boundaries, instrumentation locations, geographic features and mission-
unique features, such as predicted track and run-in lines. Another system
displays both FAA search radar data and range radar tracking data. This
supports range safety by continuously monitoring the area airspace and
provides a complete "air picture". 3 m) Security - Security at the range
is provided by Q-cleared personnel. Classified storage areas and
repositories are available for test items and documents. 3 n)
Radiological Technician - Provided by SNL from Albuquerque. For any tests
that require posttest radiography, the equipment and specialists are
provided by one of the physics laboratories. Permits and logistics are
coordinated by the TD and on-site range specialist. o) Emergency Services
- Fire and Medical services are provided by a highly qualified staff of
Paramedics, Emergency Technicians and Firefighters. The Medical Clinic
and Fire Department are co-located in the Range Headquarters area.
Emergency support equipment includes 2 ambulances, 2-1,000 gallon pumper
fire trucks, a Fire Rescue truck with a 250-gallon pumper on-board, and a
Haz Mat system comprised of 2 trailers, Response and Decontamination. A
medical aid station with 2 ambulances, staffed by highly qualified
Paramedics and Emergency Medical Technicians, is located near the range
headquarters. A modern full-service hospital is located in the town of
Tonopah about 35 miles from the range. 3 p) Shipping and Receiving- TTR
performs all requirements to ship hazardous and non-hazardous post-test
assets and material off range. Coordination is performed with the NNSA
Office of Safeguards Transportation for all Joint Test Assembly (JTA)
shipments. These shipments include explosives and radioactive components.
3 q) Working Space - Work areas with computer access is provided for all
customers in the Range Administration Building.3 r) Cost - The annual
operations cost for the entire range is approximately $9.68M. The annual
cost for Security (includes SNM test activity) at TTR is approximately
$9.8M. The Air Force reimburses NNSA $2.7M annually for their use of
those security services (the net cost to NNSA for security is $7.1M).4
The annual cost for maintaining fire protection and medical services is
approximately $1.0 M per year s) Targets - TTR has a wide variety of
targets located along a basic N-S line. The Antelope Lake in the southern
part of the range provides a variety of penetration targets to a depth
exceeding 150 feet. The Main Lake in the northern part of the range is
comprised of a 750-ft diameter concrete target (Hard Target) and an
extensive lake bed for all types of missions from low level penetration
missions to retarded (parachute) impacts. t) Computer Facility - The
range computer facility is the data gathering and distribution center for
all test activities. Real-time data processing and control functions are
handled by dual servers with
Page 4 of 16
automatic switch over capability, ensuring reliable back-up to meet
demanding test schedules. The data processing servers acquire, store, and
display radar tracking data. Range data is formatted and displayed in
real time for use by the Test Director, Safety Officer and Project
Engineer. In addition, camera, telescope and telemetry tracking stations
are interfaced to the system allowing them to acquire multiple real-time
targets. Data displays can be updated from 10 hertz to every 10 seconds,
with radar data recorded at 100 hertz. Several options (e.g. radar
choice, range in feet or meters) may be selected at any time. Telemetry
displays provide 36 different sets of data pages with up to 40 channels
per page. The computer facility can provide radar quick look data that
has been translated, rotated or smoothed on a variety of input parameters
within minutes of test completion.2 1. Alternative Description The first
alternative is to continue flight test operations at the current Tonopah
Test Range location. This "no-action" alternative has two options
presented with different degrees of no action. The first option is to
provide a minimal investment in the present equipment at TTR so that the
range is capable of continued support of flight test operations through
the current period of the Land Permit with the Air Force. The second
option requires additional investment in a mobile solution. Neither of
these options results in any significant changes to the current
operational activities at the range. The retention of operations at the
TTR would provide numerous advantages. Among these, DOE would retain a
strategic asset that would be available to meet short notice requirements
for the DOE stockpile. TTR provides NNSA customers testing priority over
other non-DOE programs that compete when testing at U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD) test ranges. Recent experience of testing at DoD ranges
indicates the original cost estimates are not well understood, and are
understated by each test range. Option 1. This option details the minimum
one-time investment required to maintain the TTR through the year 2030.
The Tonopah Test Range can be sustained to meet its present mission
requirements with reasonable investment in technology and infrastructure.
Current cost estimates for bringing the Range to a level of readiness
capable of achieving this goal are slightly over sixteen million dollars,
spread over several years. This estimate reflects the unloaded costs of
investment in necessary technology and infrastructure only. Annual
operating budgets and capital equipment life cycle replacement costs are
not included in this request. It is anticipated that most costs in those
categories will be handled through normal budget/process funding
channels. The cost estimates associated with this section assume that all
work will be accomplished by on-range employees or contractors already
funded. The investment required covers the following areas. The details
for each area are described. Radar -- $4.3M. This includes a
transformation of one radar from a maintenance intensive unit to a modern
fully functional unit, eliminating the prone to failure systems/parts
($3.3M); a future depotlevel maintenance effort for a second radar
($250K); and the acquisition of an Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF)
system ($750K). The acquisition of this IFF system allows the elimination
of 2 maintenance intensive radar systems and will save over $1M over the
next 25 years.

Page 5 of 16
Telemetry (TM) -- $1.75M. The TM section at TTR consists of a main
station and a mobile trailer system (B-67) that permits the collection of
TM data throughout the flight path during test operations. There is also
a repeater system that can be positioned in remote locations to capture
and relay data back to the main TM station. The cost includes a main
station upgrade including a depotlevel refurbishment on the TM dish
($100K), replacement of the system on the 8-foot dish with a refurbished
antenna, controller, camera and pedestal ($100K), acquisition of two
digital recorders to replace the analog magnetic recorders ($250K);
refurbishment of the 8-foot antenna dish on the B67 TM station ($100K),
replacement of the 2 analog recorders with digital recorders ($250K);
acquisition of six new dual receivers ($560K) to support both the main
and mobile stations; acquisition of a switching matrix to direct data to
range systems ($250K); miscellaneous support accessories for the new
recorders ($100K); acquisition of two discriminator chassis' replacing
the obsolete system ($40K). Communications -- $2.0M. A new LAN-based
system is currently being installed at the TTR. Communications is the
heart of that system. This will provide wireless coverage of the TTR at a
reasonable data rate and ensure effective communications during critical
test periods. This wireless system is critical to the implementation and
success of the new data master acquisition system, TRACS. The anticipated
costs include procurement and installation of a Voice/Video Over IP
(VOIP) communication net ($355K); emplacement of armored multi-strand
fiber cable over the west and east side of the target corridor ($1M),
procurement and installation of the towers, microwave links, switches,
antennas, network client units and base stations ($444K); replacement of
UHF radio transceivers to replace current system ($72K); and
miscellaneous support cabling and connectors, etc ($129K). Data Reduction
-- $500K. The anticipated cost is for a software engineer to support the
transition of the UNIX system to a PC-based software processor ($500K).
Optics -- $6.7M. The Optics group consists of three distinct functions.
The Time Space Positioning Information (TSPI) section collects precise
positional data using film cameras on Cinetheodolite mounts. The Event
Optics section use telescope tracking mounts used to record event data
for documentary purposes. The Photometrics section does both high speed
fixed camera arrays and still photography (there are no upgrades
anticipated in this area). The costs associated for this group include an
upgrade to TSPI Cinetheodolite tracking mounts ($1.82M); and an upgrade
to the Event Camera tracking telescope mounts ($4.88M). Facilities --
$1.0M. TTR will continue to use the existing facilities and maintain them
within the normal budget process. The immediate costs include a new HVAC
system for the control facility and a roof and siding repair on one
building. It also includes a repair to the electrical grid and road
surfaces. An annual commitment of $550K is required to maintain the
infrastructure systems per agreement in the AF-NNSA Land Permit. The
immediate needs would include major maintenance to buildings, and a new
roof and siding for one facility. The immediate cost needs would be $450K
for building repair. The permit requires SNL to maintain and upgrade a
specific portion of the roads as well as the power grid on the range. The
requirements for the roads would be $500K each year and the annual cost
for the power grid would be $50K. The annual cost of the Operation and
Maintenance (O&M) contractor is $550K.

Page 6 of 16
Graphics and Control Center -- $0. Any costs associated with these areas
will occur as part of the normal operation and through the normal budget
system. The total investment of $15.2M (excludes building upgrades and
infrastructure maintenance costs) spread over a few years to maintain and
upgrade the range will bring TTR to level of readiness necessary to
support flight test operations. This is a small investment in a national
asset. The risk associated with these changes is a reduced redundancy in
radar coverage, but with the acquisition of the IFF radar, this becomes a
very small operational risk. Operational funding. The current staffing
levels at TTR will remain the same. The estimate for this area is $10M
annually. With the cessation of SNM test activity, it should be possible
to turn over range security to the AF and reimburse the AF for NNSA's use
of that necessary service.

Option 2. This is referred to as the High-Tech Mobile (HTM) option. This
option allows a reduction in the operational costs at TTR because of
lower manpower test operational needs and because all test equipment
should remain in a highly reliable and operational state between tests
dates. With this investment, range campaign activities could be
considered. This estimate reflects the unloaded costs of investment in
necessary technology and infrastructure only. Annual operating budgets
and capital equipment life cycle replacement costs are not included in
this request. The cost estimates associated with this section assume that
all work will be accomplished by on-range employees or contractors
already funded. A vision of the HTM at TTR is shown in the picture below.
It includes the acquisition of modern, digital equipment that is
compatible with other national test range standards. The emphasis is on
Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) equipment with turn-key integration where
it is practical. This eliminates and/or reduces the cost significantly.
The amount of equipment purchased and integrated into the new concept
reduces the number of pieces to approximately 2/3 of today's equipment. A
second savings is realized in the amount of time and support equipment
required to maintain this state-of-the-art equipment.

Page 7 of 16
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The investment required covers the following areas. The details for each
area are described: Documentary / TSPI Optics - ($19.2M). This includes
five combined mounts [TSPI and documentary telescopes] (5) units with a
separate optics Control Trailer for remote control operations. Encryption
capability is included. Radar -- $4.3M. The proposal is identical to that
proposed in the minimum investment option. This includes a transformation
of one radar from a maintenance intensive unit to a modern fully
functional unit, eliminating the prone to failure systems/parts ($3.3M);
a future depot-level maintenance effort for a second radar ($250K); and
the acquisition of an Identification, Friend or For (IFF) system ($750K).
The acquisition of this IFF system allows the elimination of 2
maintenance intensive radar systems and will save over $1M over the next
25 years. Telemetry - $5.0M. New telemetry trailers, fully equipped, and
antennas will be purchased and all trailers will be DOT certified
($5.0M). This allows both assets to be fully mobile. Operations Control
Equipment -- $2.7M. Two operational control trailers, fully equipped,
would be acquired to replace the operations that currently take place in
the operational control tower at TTR. Test coordination, communications,
and safety would all be housed in these trailers. Operation displays
would provide continuous coverage of the test in progress.

Page 8 of 16
Data Reduction -- $500K. The anticipated cost is for a software engineer
to support the transition of the UNIX system to a PC-based software
processor ($500K). Communications -- $2.0M. A new LAN-based system is
currently being installed at the TTR. Communications is the heart of that
system. This will provide wireless coverage of the TTR at a reasonable
data rate and ensure effective communications during critical test
periods. This wireless system is critical to the implementation and
success of the new data master acquisition system, TRACS. The anticipated
costs include procurement and installation of a Voice/Video Over IP
(VOIP) communication net ($355K); emplacement of armored multi-strand
fiber cable over the West and Each side of the target corridor ($1M),
procurement and installation of the towers, microwave links, switches,
antennas, network client units and base stations ($444K); replacement of
UHF radio transceivers to replace current system ($72K); and
miscellaneous support cabling and connectors, etc ($129K). The total
investment of $36.0M cannot be spread over a long period of time due to
the fact that the equipment is required to support on-going tests. A
proposed development and integration schedule for this project will last
approximately 3 years assuming full funding support over that time.
Facilities -- $1.0M. TTR will continue to use the existing facilities and
maintain them within the normal budget process. The immediate costs
include a new HVAC system for the control facility and a roof and siding
repair on one building. It also includes a repair to the electrical grid
and road surfaces. An annual commitment of $550K is required to maintain
the infrastructure systems per agreement in the AF-NNSA Land Permit. The
immediate needs would include major maintenance to buildings, and a new
roof and siding for one facility. The immediate cost needs would be
$450K. The permit requires SNL to maintain and upgrade a specific portion
of the roads as well as the power grid on the range. The requirements for
the roads would be $500K each year and the annual cost for the power grid
would be $50K. The annual cost of the Operation and Maintenance (O&M)
contractor is $550K.

Page 9 of 16
ALTERNATIVE COST SUMMARY Upgrades Option 1 ($M) 6.7 4.3 1.75 .5 2.0 15.2
16.8 .450 .550 / yr Option 2 ($M) 18.2 4.3 5.0 3.2 2.0 32.7 36.0 .450
.550 / yr

Optics Radars Telemetry CP and other equipment IP Based Communication
Systems TOTAL one-time cost W 10% contingency Building Upgrade
Infrastructure (roads and power grid) -- annual cost __________

1. Audit of Alternatives to Testing at the Tonopah Test Range, DOE/IG
Report, February 1998. 2. Tonopah Test Range report, dated 05/99;
(capabilities report for new or potential customers), updated by Robert
Sherwood, TTR Computer Lead via e-mail, dated Nov 27, 2006. 3. Tonopah
Test Range report, dated 05/99; (capabilities report for new or potential
customers), updated by Robert Sherwood, TTR Team Leader via e-mail, dated
Nov 20, 2006. 4. Flight Test Continuity Briefing to Steve Goodrum, NA-12,
November 14, 2006; Hank Witek.

Page 10 of 16
2. Graphics The following is a map of the proposed TTR target areas.

TTR Target Areas

Main Lake

Concrete Target

Antelope Lake

Page 11 of 16
3. Siting Locations The TTR offers numerous target locations ranging from
the Main Lake in the north to Antelope Lake in the southern part of the
range. The rising mountains on both sides of the flight path offer ideal
locations for the location of radar antennae and optical tracking
equipment to track the aircraft and the test unit. The dry climate
provides ideal conditions for flight testing during most of the year. The
concrete target located in the area of the Main Lake provides an ideal
location for the recovery of units that are designed to use a parachute
during the descent. Core sampling was conducted in the 2003 to 2004
timeframe over a large expanse of the Main Lake and Antelope Lake areas,
to ensure that penetrating test units do not encounter unexpected
conditions. TTR can accommodate all the large safety footprints for high
altitude and/or high speed releases with no personnel or flight safety
issues. 4. Construction and Operations Data There would be no
construction required at the TTR for proposed SNL tests. The current
facilities would continue to remain adequate, if funding is provided to
maintain and repair them, when required. The numbers provided below are
based on 14 annual tests, including both regular Stockpile Surveillance
tests and any development tests required for each system. These tests
will be combined into fewer test windows when possible. These figures are
based on non-special nuclear material (SNM) testing. Data shown in the
table is per reference 5. Air quality data shown in the tables is per
reference 6.

Page 12 of 16
CONSTRUCTION DATA Data Required Peak electrical energy (megawatt electric
[MWe]) Diesel generators (Yes or No) Concrete ( cubic yards [yd]) Steel
(tons) Liquid fuel and lube oil (gallons [gal.]) Water (gal.) Land (acre
[ac]) Laydown area size Parking lots Employment Total employment (worker
years) Peak employment (workers) Construction period (years [yr]) Waste
Generated Low-Level Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd) Mixed Low-Level Liquid
(gal.) Solid (cubic yd) Hazardous Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd)
Nonhazardous (sanitary) Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd) Nonhazardous
(Other) Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd)

HTM Option Consumption/Use 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 Volume 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Page 13 of 16
ANNUAL OPERATIONS Data Required Consumption/Use Annual electrical energy
(megawatt-hours [MWh]) 595MWh Peak electrical demand (MWe) 812MWe Fuel
usage (gal or cubic yd) Other process gas (N, Ar, etc.) 480cu.ft. Diesel
generators 44 (about 20 per test) Water (gal.) *Yearly for entire range
including AF 6 million Steam (tons) 0 Plant footprint (ac) 280 sq miles
Employment (workers) 135 Number of rad workers 25 Average annual dose <10
Mrem Radionuclide emissions and effluents--nuclides and 0 curies NAAQS
emissions (tons/yr) SEE TABLE 13.32 Hazardous Air Pollutants and
Effluents (tons/yr) SEE 3.7E-06 TABLE Chemical use 0 Maximum inventory of
fissile material/throughput 0 Waste Category Volume -Low-Level Liquid
(gal.) 0 Solid (cubic yd) 0 -Mixed Low-Level Liquid (gal.) 0 Solid (cubic
yd) 0 -Transuranic (TRU) Liquid (gal.) 0 Solid (cubic yd) 0 -High-Level
Waste (HLW)/Spent Fuel Liquid (gal.) 0 Solid (cubic yd) 0 -Hazardous
Liquid (gal.) 35 Solid (cubic yd) <1 -Nonhazardous (sanitary) Liquid
(gal.) 0 Solid (cubic yd) 63 -Nonhazardous (Other) Liquid (gal.) 0 Solid
(cubic yd) 15

HTM Option

Page 14 of 16
NAAQS TABLE
NAAQS Summary NOx CO PM10 SO2 VOC Generator tpy 0.31 12.36 0.02 0.02 0.61
JTA tpy 3.7E-06 Total tpy 0.31 12.36 0.02 0.02 0.61

HTM Option (Total)

HAPS TABLE
HAPs Summary Hydrochloric Acid JTA B83 tpy 1.1E-06 JTA B61 tpy 2.7E-06
Total tpy 3.7E-06

HTM Option (Total)

__________
5. E-mail from Jerry Elliston, TTR Contractor Lead,   dated Nov 21, 2006.
Note: used as basis for calculations. Data provided   was for entire year,
not just JTA tests. Data shown in this table is for   B61 and B83 testing
only. 6. E-mail from Joanna Eckstein, dated Nov 16,   2006.

5. Transportation Data All B61-3/4/10 pre-test shipments from Pantex to
the designated military locations and post-test shipments from the test
location to the Pantex Plant in Amarillo TX are authorized in the
DOE/AL/200103/JTA, "Offsite Transportation Authorization, Revision 4;
Shipment Authorization of pre-test and post-test Shipment of B61-3/4/10
Joint Test Assemblies (JTA) 1/3/6/9/15." All B617 pre-test shipments from
Pantex to the designated military locations and post-test shipments from
the test location to the Pantex Plant in Amarillo TX are authorized in
the DOE/AL/99007/JTA, "Offsite Transportation Authorization, Revision 4;
Shipment Authorization of pre-test and post-test Shipment of B61-7 Joint
Test Assemblies (JTA) 1/3/5/6/8/15." All B83-1 pre-test shipments from
Pantex to the designated military locations and post-test shipments from
the test location to the Pantex Plant in Amarillo TX are authorized in
the DOE/AL/92011/JTA Revision 9; "Shipment Authorization for pre- and
post-test B83 JTA2 and Pre-test JTS2 Units". This revision expires August
1, 2007. The pre-test shipment is similar to a War Reserve (WR) shipment
in that it contains as much WR material as possible. The unit must be
inspected and certified by the Pantex Site Office (NNSA) prior to
delivery to the AF. The hazards for all configurations are appropriately
documented. If there are development units or modifications to existing
units, the OTA and the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for that system
will be updated or specific hazard and transportation documentation will
be provided to NNSA for approval. 6. Accidents In the development of the
Offsite Transportation Authorizations, the SER is prepared in accordance
with DOE Order 461.1A and Safety Guide (SG) 500 and documents the review
of the Joint Test Assemblies. The SER looks at the potential and the
consequences of accident scenarios for the test

Page 15 of 16
units while in transit in a DOE truck. Refer to the following Safety
Evaluation Reports for detailed information. (a) Safety Evaluation Report
for B61 Modifications 3, 4, 7, 10 and 11 High Fidelity Joint Test
Assembly (U), Revision 4, dated January 26, 2005. Classified SECRET/RD.
(b) Safety Evaluation Report for B61-7 Joint Test Assemblies (U),
Revision 5, dated September 20, 2005. Classified SECRET/RD. (c) Safety
Evaluation Report for b61-3/4/10 Joint Test Assemblies and B61-3 Flight
Test Units (U), Revision 4, Dated November 2, 2006 (DRAFT). Classified
SECRET/RD. Terrorist Threats. The NNSA Design Basis Threat provides the
threats that must be guarded against for all sites that where specific
materials and/or assets are temporarily or permanently stored. The
responses for Tonopah Test Ranges are in the Counterintelligence Threat
Assessment "The Terrorist Threat to Tonopah Test Range (TTR)" dated
August 2006. The document is classified SECRET/RD.

Page 16 of 16
1 What Company are you employed with ? SNL US Security Westinghouse Other
2 Where is your primary residnece? City Tonopah 89049 Henderson 89012
Albuquerque 87109 Santa Clara 84765 Las Vegas 89102 Reno 89512 Deeth
89823 Boulder City 89005 Meadview 86444 Carson City 89701 Fernley 89408
Pahrump 89041 Rio Rancho Fallon 89442 Caliente Enterprise 84771 County
Nye Clark Berrillo Washington Washoe Elko Mohave Carson City Lyon
Sandoval Churchill Lincoln

Other 25 59 25 1 110

Sandia

Weshinghouse

US Security

71 3 1 1 18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 109 74 23 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 110

1

6 3 1 1 9 1 1 1 1 1

22

42

2

8

1 1 1 2 2 3

7 13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

22 2

45 8 1

1 28 25

1 2 57

1
State Nevada New Mexico Arizona Utah

103 2 1 4 110

23 2 1 1

25

57

1

3 If not Tonopah, where do you reside while working? Mancamp 4 Are you
married? Yes No

37

24

3

10

81 29 110

23 3

16 9

42 17

5 Do you have a significant other? Yes 6 Is your spouse/significant other
employed? Yes No 7 If 6 is yes, are they employed by an NNSA afficiated
contractor? Yes No

14

2

5

7

89 15 104

19 5

21 5

48 6

1 30

1 14
16

8 List the ages of any dependents residing with you. Pre-school Grade
school Middle school High school College 9 Do you own or rent your
residence Own Rent

34 40 23 24 4 125 86 24 110 1

3 6 10 3

5 7 9 13 1

16 30 12 8 2

25

20 5

40 19

2
10 Is your residence stick built? manufactured housing? mobile housing?
apartment?

Own 65 23 6 94

Rent 6 5 1 2 14

21 3 1

15 8 3 1

29 17 3 7

11 How many vehicles do you ro your dependents operate? 12 List
organizational affiliations you have in your community of primary
residence. GLVAR Realtors Association Church Outdoor club Business owner
Scouts PTA Booster Club Tonopah Little League MSBL Baseball League Elks
VFW Beta Sigma Phi HS Basketball Coach 4 R Kids Nye County Search &
Rescue Central NV Officials Assn (NCOO) HS Wrestling Coach MS Wrestling
Coach Tonopah Volunteer Fire Department Trap Shoot Assn Nye County
Regional Ambulance Svs Average Annual Salary *With fringe

266

1 1 19 3 3 26 24 2 7 3 10 2 1 1 3 31 2 1 1 19 2 1

1 1 5 1 2 4 2 2 2 1 2 1 1

5 4 6 4 2 20 26 4 10 2

1 1 2

1 1 1

1 1 1 2

5 30

2 1

17 1 3 70000

*106547

58000

3
. COMPLEX 2030 SPEIS
Tonopah Test Range (TTR) Clospre - Alternative Review
Information -
(Operating in a Campaign Mode) .
41412007
swus vsnu=nz? I
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- Page1 of 18

COMPLEX 2030 SPEIS, Tonopah Test Range (TTR) Closure - Alternative Review
Information (Operating in a Campaign Mode) April 10, 2007

The Plan
An alternative to immediately relocating the entire Tonopah Test Range
(TTR) to another site would be to conduct the Joint Test Assembly (JTA)
tests at TTR on a campaign basis from the Nevada Test Site (NTS), while
doing Work for Others (WFO) as time and work permits. Sandia would
continue to be the mission owner while National Security Technologies
(NSTec) would then be the Maintenance and Operations (M&O) contractor.
This accomplishes multiple 2030 objectives, not the least of which is "to
maintain the national security mission, and in particular the science-
based Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), as the primary mission of the
national security laboratories while optimizing the WFO activities of
those laboratories to support other national security objectives in
fields such as intelligence and homeland security."1 The Sandia National
Laboratories (SNL) has indicated that a limited permanent staff at TTR
would be required to continuously maintain the facilities and equipment
at TTR once equipment investments have been made. For a drop test the
permanent staff at TTR would be augmented by technical staff members
integrated into NTS operations. Currently there is approximately $300K
annual WFO support performed by SNL at TTR. It is believed that NSTec can
grow WFO significantly at TTR as it provides a unique location for
expanded air-to-ground activities as well as larger scale Department of
Defense (DoD) ground operations. By the end of 2015 a decision could be
made to: 1. Close TTR in 2019 and use the interim period between 2015 and
2019 to transition equipment and further build-up infrastructure needs at
NTS, or 2. Renew the United States Air Force (USAF) - Department of
Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) permit at TTR and
continue work at that site, managed by the Nevada Test Site and mission
driven by SNL with the flexibility to alter what is necessary, given the
requirements at that time.

ROM Estimated Annual Operating Cost Comparison, FY07 $
TTR SNL M&O Contract TTR NSTec M&O SNL Full-Time TTR TTR Annual
Power/Road Maintenance TTR IES SNL Campaigners SNL Security Reimbursement
to AF WSI Campaign Security Total Annual Cost TTR No Action, No SNM 27
FTE, $2.6M 25 FTE, $7.2M $600K $1.1M TTR Campaign-In-Place 18 FTE, $4.4M
4 FTE, $1.2M $600K $.9M 21 FTE, 1/2 time, $3M $2.5M $300K 12.9M

$2.5M $14.0M

1
Report on the Plan for Transformation, January 31, 2007

Approach
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NSTec and SNL will prepare a detailed staffing requirements study to
address both maintenance of the existing TTR systems on a continuous
basis, as well as staffing for each specific drop test campaign. Given
the interdependence with the local Air Force Base, NNSA also wants to
ensure that they have considered the obligations NNSA has to be a "good
neighbor" in assuming 1/3 of the maintenance of roads, power lines, water
systems, and septic tanks and any other infrastructure overlaps. This
study will also work to identify positions that would continue to be
staffed by SNL, critical personnel from existing TTR contracts, and new
positions from NSTec resources. Per the NNSA Head Quarters decision in
October 2006, no B61 or B83 flight tests with Special Nuclear Material
(SNM) will be planned after completion of the current required set of
tests. These tests are scheduled for completion before the end of FY08 at
the TTR. If this decision is subsequently changed or if cable pull-down
testing is required, then either an emergency variance will be called for
at SNL or these tests could be performed at the Nevada Test Site.
Therefore, while SNM test units are not addressed in this document, there
is inherent flexibility in the planning for future operations to allow
for mission change/variation without subsequent prohibitive costs. In
this way, this proposal does indeed, "support current stockpile while
transforming to a future stockpile and infrastructure." 1

Decision at 2019 - Two Options
Option 1
The first proposed alternative is to continue flight test operations at
the current TTR location with SNL as the Mission Owner and NSTec serving
as the M&O Contractor. Replacements and upgrades of the legacy systems
are required. The preferred solution requires additional investment in
mobile equipment so that by 2019 the equipment and the site of operations
will be transitioned to NTS. This option does not result in any
significant changes to the current operational activities at the range at
this time and the investment can be spread over a three year period. The
main disadvantage to the campaign in place proposal is the conversion of
the existing M&O contract to the NSTec NTS M&O contract which would
require union affiliation for all craft and application of the NTS full
recovery cost model to the M&O costs. A primary assumption of this
proposal includes a minimally staffed, full-time M&O caretaker
maintenance crew to maintain the required facilities and reduced
equipment fleet, and a small full-time Sandia cadre to maintain the
technical systems. The staffing of the M&O could fluctuate based on
facility condition and equipment failures, and the Sandia staffing could
also fluctuate due the system integration required for new and upgraded
system purchases, installation, and commissioning. Security costs will
decrease with the completion of the SNM testing after FY08. The Air Force
base security costs will remain the same, but the security contract will
belong to the Air Force, with Sandia reimbursing the Air Force for a
negotiated amount. The campaign security support will be provided by the
NTS security contractor who will staff the requirements for JTA tests at
an estimated $300K per year.

1
Report to Armed Services Committee, D'Agostino, April 5, 2006 Page 3 of
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The retention of operations at the TTR would provide numerous advantages.
While the JTA mission would be allowed to continue, the TTR WFO would
grow stronger as a combined program with NSTec. Additionally, the impact
to the town of Tonopah will be minimal. Further, DOE would retain a
strategic asset that would be available to meet short notice requirements
for the DOE stockpile. It is important to note that TTR does provide NNSA
customers testing priority over other non-DOE programs that compete when
testing at U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) test ranges. It is also of
significance to note that, given the age of the technology used in the
JTA test articles, more test assets and different optical technical
abilities are required for test documentation than are normally used at
DoD ranges to meet customer requirements. Option 2 The second alternative
is to continue flight test operations at the current TTR location beyond
the 2019 scope, reapplying for a land-permit with SNL continuing as the
Mission Owner, while NSTec will continue to serve as the M&O Contractor.
This action will also require additional investment in a mobile equipment
solution (described below). This option does not result in any
significant changes to the current operational activities at the range
and can be spread over a three to five year period. This option enhances
NSTec's capabilities as sited in Option 1, assists in minimizing any
socioeconomic impacts to Tonopah and elongates the period necessary to
remediate the TTR landsite. The only difference between Option 1 and
Option 2 is simply that we extend the land permit beyond 2019. The
disadvantage to this is that it does not fit within the Complex 2030 Goal
of reducing the footprint or remediation of the land.

Advantages
There are multiple advantages to continuing SNL's mission while allowing
NSTec to be the M&O contractor at TTR side by side with the Air Force,
either until 2019 or beyond: o Minimizes the socioeconomic impact on the
town of Tonopah by maintaining the core cadre of craft (who appear to be
in the early to mid- forties and have families) who are familiar with TTR
facilities, operations, and maintenance. Allows opportunities for those
not fully employed with the TTR M&O and/or WFO Projects to be integrated
into the NSTec workforce, thereby allowing them to keep their homes in
the Tonopah area, while giving them expanded work-scope and additional
opportunities. While at NSTec during the workweek, they could stay at the
Mercury housing. The objective is to limit the socioeconomic impact to
Tonopah. Maintains the existing and long standing, unwritten "good
neighbor" relationship with Air Force Range Command, which allows for
shared resources and support that benefits SNL, the Air Force, and NSTec.
Eliminates the Air Force range cost increases to themselves by
maintaining the road, water and power costs per the Land Use Permit
requirements.
Page 4 of 18

o

o

o
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o

Maintains existing flight paths, which the Air Force is highly confident
in flying, thereby reducing the mission risk incurred in flying over more
challenging topography presented at other potential test sites. Increases
the NTS adaptability for future weapons complex testing. In the case that
RRW work is done at NTS and/or cable pull-down testing is required,
transport/land use will not be an issue. Additionally, flight testing may
be done, as required. not be limited to the present support capabilities
by the present TTR M&O.

o

o Increases the NTS WFO capabilities (it is anticipated this could grow
substantially) and
o Maintains the present relationship between NNSA and the TTR M&O for
occasional support required for TTR Industrial Sites and Soils projects
which are active NSTec projects. Takes advantage of a flight test area
that is near a unique testing range area. Provides a window of
opportunity for NNSA to ramp up in its planning of either moving or
integrating TTR capabilities into NTS, thereby developing the most
advantageous way to accomplish this while doing the least damage to the
town of Tonopah and having the least impact to its good neighbor, the Air
Force. The drop zones and targets at TTR cannot be readily duplicated at
other sites. In addition to the already discussed well known flight
paths, of equal importance is the fully characterized and well understood
geology of the impact areas. The very large restricted airspace and
extremely sparse population readily support low fast military aircraft
operations as well as higher altitude drops. The range accommodates long
run-ins at low altitude to insure all tracking is fully locked-on prior
to a drop. The existing critical tracking radar, optical, and telemetry
systems have been maintained in place for many years and continue to meet
quality requirements for the assurance testing program. However, most of
these equipments are no longer supported by the original vendors'
therefore current TTR highly skilled staff of SNL and contractor
personnel are essential to continuing operations until new equipment is
bought and transitioned in actual drop test situations. The testing
requirements for the purposes of collecting stockpile assurance
analytical data are substantially different from military test and
development needs for new munitions. These differences may not appear
obvious since both involve radar tracking, optical documentation, and
telemetry data. However, the precision and detail required by SNL are
essential when comparing the performance of nuclear system components
over many years.

o o

o

o
o

o

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o

At the end of this process a next generation, fully mobile test system
will have been developed and certified that can allow campaign style
operations to occur at several test ranges where unique target geologies
and terrains including sand, mixed soils, hard-rock, tufts, and granite
normally occur.

Comparison of JTA Flight Test Program Annual Operating Costs (2007
Dollars) No Action vs. NTS/SNL Campaign Mode (No Equipment Upgrades)
25

20

SNM Operations Cease

$ x 1-million

15

TTR No Action, No SNM

Campaign Mode, NTS (NSTec) and SNL 10 Record of Decision

~ $1.1-Million Savings per Year
5

TTR Land Withdrawal Decision

0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Fiscal Year 2014 2015 2016 2017
2018 2019 2020

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Discussion of TTR Technical Capabilities 2
Command and Control - The TTR Test Director (TD), along with the military
test representative provides direction over the entire test. The TD is
responsible for the safe conduct of the test, while ensuring all required
test objectives are met. The TD is in constant communication with all
range support groups to ensure all systems are fully operational. The TD
is also in constant communication with the military personnel that have a
communication link with the pilot of the aircraft delivering the test
article, ensuring that delivery objectives will be achieved.
Optical/Video - TTR provides complete range-wide optical tracking
capabilities. All of the optical trackers have the Target Vector
Translation System (TVTS) installed, which receives target acquisition
and focusing data from each operating radar station to drive the tracking
mounts. Cinetheodolites (Cine-T) are used to obtain precise time-space
position information of the test unit. The Cine-T's can be set up at any
of the existing 31 concrete pads, which ensures complete coverage of any
test area and approach corridor on the range. Mobile tracking telescopes
can be positioned at any accessible place on the test range. Tracking
telescopes and hand track stations are used to obtain high quality
photographic images on 35 mm and 70 mm film. They are also used to
determine event times, position information, generate public relations
photos, and provide standard and high-speed video imagery. The film is
taken to the Remote Sensing Laboratory in Las Vegas for processing.
Reduction of optical data is usually completed in one to two weeks.
Tracking Radars - The radars perform a primary tracking function, as well
as, complement other instrumentation on the range. During flight tests,
they continuously track in-bound aircraft and delivered test articles.
Most of the radars have been designed or modified for precision and
reliability, and several are mobile and can be moved to accommodate all
range targets and aircraft. Radar data provides real-time data for the
graphic displays and provides time-space position information to the
computer for posttest analysis. The radars are equipped with closed
circuit television (CCTV) cameras. Video is recorded at each radar;
transmitted to the Operations Center, and displayed for test engineers
and observers to view the mission in progress. Telemetry - The telemetry
stations at TTR are used for data collection to monitor performance of
the test vehicle during the course of the operation. Critical data is
displayed in real time during the test. After the test, the data is
reproduced and processed into quick-look records for preliminary
engineering evaluation. A mobile trailer is typically positioned near the
target area to enhance recovery of terminal data transmitted by the B83
during a contact fuzing test. Magnetic tapes are sent to the customer for
comprehensive data reduction and archival. Operations Control Center -
The Operations Control Center sits atop the Operations building and has a
360-degree view of the range. The center houses alphanumeric and graphic
LCD displays, video monitors, air traffic radar displays, camera
controls, radio nets and telephone systems. During test operations, the
test director, range safety officer, test project engineer, camera
controller and range communicator staff the consoles in the center to
control and
2
Capabilities Report for New or Potential Customers, Tonopah Test Range
report, dated 05/99; updated by Robert Sherwood, TTR Team Leader via e-
mail, Nov 20, 2006. Page 7 of 18
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coordinate all test functions. All of the operator consoles contain LCDs
for alphanumeric, graphic or video displays along with telephone and
radio communication links and time display. A camera controller's console
contains the instrumentation for on/off control of all operational Cine-
T's and light metering equipment. The range communicator's console has
access to all TTR telecommunications and RF nets, and meteorological
instrumentation. This position also provides a real time coordination and
interface position for air traffic control/FAA agencies and emergency
security response. Photometrics and Photography - The photometrics group
at TTR provides high speed motion picture and video coverage for data
acquisition and Public Relations documentation. The posttest data
reduction provides time-space position information, trajectory angles and
angles of attack and rotational velocities. Data is available in a
variety of media, including 35mm and 70mm formats, color reversal, color
negative and black and white. They provide both prints in color and black
and white, as well as video in tape formats or CD/DVD. High quality still
photography is available for both pre- and posttest activities.
Communications - The TTR has a fully integrated communications system of
ground-to-air and ground-to-ground radio links using both radio frequency
(RF) and land line equipment that ensures support of test activities and
emergencies. There are numerous "nets" that provide direct communications
between selected groups. Each major range function, including radar,
telemetry and cameras is assigned to one of the ground nets, and all key
inter-function stations are tied together by the test operations net. The
Sandia net is used for routine range communications. Additional radio
links include high frequency single sideband for long-range
communications and RF tie-ins with state police and medical emergency
networks. Aircraft Flight Safety - TTR is located in a very remote area
of the Nellis Air Force Base Bombing and Gunnery Range. The remote
location, situated between two mountain ranges, and with restricted
airspace, ensures tests can be conducted with a high degree of safety.
The high desert location varies from 5,300 to 5,600 feet mean sea level,
providing a very large flat area for aircraft to traverse with a high
degree of safety. Airspace - TTR provides full coordination for all
airspace requirements for each test. The TTR Test Director (TD) attends
monthly meetings with local AF airspace coordinators to ensure all
required on range and off range airspace is reserved and potential
conflicts with other Range users are avoided. In the event a change in
test planning requires a change in air or ground space utilization the TD
will coordinate such changes with the responsible Nellis AFB agency.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Recovery - TTR has trained explosive
operators on hand for all tests. They have basic explosives training and
have specific training for each test article prior to the test. They have
heavy equipment, including cranes, backhoes, and forklifts available for
light construction, maintenance, material handling and test vehicle
recovery. They pioneered and developed a unique method for recovery of
penetrating test vehicles, so there is minimal ground disturbance.
Meteorology - Three weather stations and rawindsonde balloon launches
generate the range metrological data. The weather station at the hard
target measures wind speed and direction, temperature, dew point and
barometric pressure. Instrumentation on a 300-foot tower measure wind
speed and direction, and temperature at three levels. Data from these two
stations are transmitted over land lines to the Operations Control Center
for recording and display. When
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upper atmosphere weather conditions are require for specific tests, range
personnel launch rawindsonde balloons. Measurements of temperature,
relative humidity, wind speeds and direction can be obtained at altitudes
up to 90,000 feet. TECCS (Test Evaluation Command and Control System) -
TECCS is a real-time data acquisition program developed and distributed
by Edwards AFB. TECCS provides graphics of aircraft flight paths in
relation to other airborne vehicles and established ground points,
supports mission control activities with altitude threshold, run-in lines
for bomb drop missions, and pushover lines for high angle-of-attack
missions. TTR Control Point operators monitor real-time TECCS data to
ensure aircraft lines of flight and payload deliveries remain within
predefined safe boundaries. TECCS obtains target information from FAA
data sources and on site TTR Radar facilities. The graphics facility
provides the operational and display environment for the aircraft control
operator and the radar director. A map select system allows the operator
to select from different map displays. The operator may also select which
radar tracks are to be used, alphanumeric display (in feet, meters, or
nautical miles), radar operational status, and hard copy production.
Plotting data can be frozen at any point, and a playback capability
permits multiple passes on recorded data files. The tracking data is
superimposed on background maps that contain range boundaries,
instrumentation locations, geographic features and mission-unique
features, such as predicted track and run-in lines. Another system
displays both FAA search radar data and range radar tracking data. This
supports range safety by continuously monitoring the area airspace and
provides a complete "air picture." Security - Security at the range is
provided by Q-cleared personnel. Classified storage areas and
repositories are available for test items and documents. Radiological
Technician (provided by SNL from Albuquerque) - For any tests that
require post-test radiography, the equipment and specialists are provided
by one of the physics laboratories. Permits and logistics are coordinated
by the TD and on-site range specialist. Emergency Services - Fire and
Medical services are provided by a highly qualified staff of Paramedics,
Emergency Technicians and Firefighters. The Medical Clinic and Fire
Department are co-located in the Range Headquarters area. Emergency
support equipment includes 2 ambulances, 2-1,000 gallon pumper fire
trucks, a Fire Rescue truck with a 250-gallon pumper on-board, and a Haz
Mat system comprised of 2 trailers, Response and Decontamination. A
medical aid station with 2 ambulances, staffed by highly qualified
Paramedics and Emergency Medical Technicians, is located near the range
headquarters. A modern full-service hospital is located in the town of
Tonopah about 35 miles from the range. Shipping and Receiving - TTR
performs all requirements to ship hazardous and non-hazardous post-test
assets and material off range. Coordination is performed with the NNSA
Office of Secure Transportation for all Joint Test Assembly (JTA)
shipments. These shipments include explosives and radioactive components.
Working Space - Work areas with computer access is provided for all
customers in the Range Administration Building. Targets - TTR has a wide
variety of targets located along a basic N-S line. The Antelope Lake in
the southern part of the range provides a variety of penetration targets
to a depth exceeding 150 feet. The Main Lake in the northern part of the
range is comprised of a 750-ft diameter

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concrete target (Hard Target) and an extensive lake bed for all types of
missions from low level penetration missions to retarded (parachute)
impacts. Computer Facility - The range computer facility is the data
gathering and distribution center for all test activities. Real-time data
processing and control functions are handled by dual servers with
automatic switch over capability, ensuring reliable back-up to meet
demanding test schedules. The data processing servers acquire, store, and
display radar tracking data. Range data is formatted and displayed in
real time for use by the Test Director, Safety Officer and Project
Engineer. In addition, camera, telescope and telemetry tracking stations
are interfaced to the system allowing them to acquire multiple real-time
targets. Data displays can be updated from 10 hertz to every 10 seconds,
with radar data recorded at 100 hertz. Several options (e.g. radar
choice, range in feet or meters) may be selected at any time. Telemetry
displays provide 36 different sets of data pages with up to 40 channels
per page. The computer facility can provide radar quick look data that
has been translated, rotated or smoothed on a variety of input parameters
within minutes of test completion. 3 The following is a map of the TTR
target areas.

Capabilities Report for New or Potential Customers, Tonopah Test Range
report, dated 05/99; updated by Robert Sherwood, TTR Computer Lead via e-
mail, Nov 27, 2006.

3

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Main Lake

Concrete Target

Antelope Lake

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Description of High-Tech Mobile (HTM) Option
This option allows a reduction in the operational costs at TTR because of
lower manpower test operational needs and because all test equipment
should remain in a highly reliable and operational state between tests
dates. This estimate reflects the unloaded costs of investment in
necessary technology and infrastructure only. Annual operating budgets
and capital equipment life cycle replacement costs are not included in
this request. The cost estimates associated with this section assume that
all work will be accomplished by on-range employees or contractors
already funded. A vision of the HTM at TTR is shown in the picture below.
It includes the acquisition of modern, digital equipment that is
compatible with other national test range standards. The emphasis is on
Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) equipment with turn-key integration where
it is practical. This eliminates and/or reduces the cost significantly.
The amount of equipment purchased and integrated into the new concept
reduces the number of pieces to approximately 2/3 of today's equipment. A
second savings is realized in the amount of time and support equipment
required to maintain this state-of-the-art equipment.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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The investment required covers the following areas. The details for each
area are described: Documentary / TSPI Optics - ($18.2M). This includes
five combined mounts [TSPI and documentary telescopes] (5) units with a
separate optics Control Trailer for remote control operations. Encryption
capability is included. Radar - $4.3M. The proposal is identical to that
proposed in the minimum investment option. This includes a transformation
of one radar from a maintenance intensive unit to a modern fully
functional unit, eliminating the prone to failure systems/parts ($3.3M);
a future depot-level maintenance effort for a second radar ($250K); and
the acquisition of an Identification, Friend or For (IFF) system ($750K).
The acquisition of this IFF system allows the elimination of two
maintenance intensive radar systems and will save over $1M over the next
25 years. Telemetry - $5.0M. New telemetry trailers, fully equipped, and
antennas will be purchased and all trailers will be DOT certified
($5.0M). This allows both assets to be fully mobile.

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Operations Control Equipment - $2.7M. Two operational control trailers,
fully equipped, would be acquired to replace the operations that
currently take place in the operational control tower at TTR. Test
coordination, communications, and safety would all be housed in these
trailers. Operation displays would provide continuous coverage of the
test in progress. Data Reduction - $500K. The anticipated cost is for a
software engineer to support the transition of the UNIX system to a PC-
based software processor ($500K). Communications - $2.0M. A new LAN-based
system is currently being installed at the TTR. Communications is the
heart of that system. This will provide wireless coverage of the TTR at a
reasonable data rate and ensure effective communications during critical
test periods. This wireless system is critical to the implementation and
success of the new data master acquisition system, TRACS. The anticipated
costs include procurement and installation of a Voice/Video Over IP
(VOIP) communication net ($355K); emplacement of armored multi-strand
fiber cable over the West and Each side of the target corridor ($1M),
procurement and installation of the towers, microwave links, switches,
antennas, network client units and base stations ($444K); replacement of
UHF radio transceivers to replace current system ($72K); and
miscellaneous support cabling and connectors, etc. ($129K). The total
investment of $32.7M cannot be spread over a long period of time due to
the fact that the equipment is required to support on-going tests. A
proposed development and integration schedule for this project will last
approximately three years assuming full funding support over that time.
Facilities - $1.0M. TTR will continue to use the existing facilities and
maintain them within the normal budget process. The immediate costs
include a new HVAC system for the control facility and a roof and siding
repair on one building. It also includes a repair to the electrical grid
and road surfaces. An annual commitment of $550K is required to maintain
the infrastructure systems per agreement in the AF-NNSA Land Permit. The
immediate needs would include major maintenance to buildings, and a new
roof and siding for one facility. The immediate cost needs would be
$450K. The permit requires SNL to maintain and upgrade a specific portion
of the roads as well as the power grid on the range. The requirements for
the roads would be $500K each year and the annual cost for the power grid
would be $100K.

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CONSTRUCTION DATA Data Required Peak electrical energy (megawatt electric
[MWe]) Diesel generators (Yes or No) Concrete ( cubic yards [yd]) Steel
(tons) Liquid fuel and lube oil (gallons [gal.]) Water (gal.) Land (acre
[ac]) Laydown area size Parking lots Employment Total employment (worker
years) Peak employment (workers) Construction period (years [yr]) Waste
Generated Low-Level Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd) Mixed Low-Level Liquid
(gal.) Solid (cubic yd) Hazardous Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd)
Nonhazardous (sanitary) Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd) Nonhazardous
(Other) Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd)

Consumption/Use 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 Volume 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

ANNUAL OPERATIONS
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Data Required Annual electrical energy (megawatt-hours [MWh]) Peak
electrical demand (MWe) Fuel usage (gal or cubic yd) Other process gas
(N, Ar, etc.) Diesel generators Water (gal.) *Yearly for entire range
including AF Steam (tons) Plant footprint (ac) Employment (workers)
Number of rad workers Average annual dose Radionuclide emissions and
effluents--nuclides and curies NAAQS emissions (tons/yr) SEE TABLE
Hazardous Air Pollutants and Effluents (tons/yr) SEE TABLE Chemical use
Maximum inventory of fissile material/throughput Maximum inventory of
fissile material/throughput Waste Category Low-Level Liquid (gal.) Solid
(cubic yd) Mixed Low-Level Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd) Transuranic
(TRU) Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd) High-Level Waste (HLW)/Spent Fuel
Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd) Hazardous Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd)
Nonhazardous (sanitary) Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd) Nonhazardous
(Other) Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd)

Consumption/Use 595MWh 812MWe 480cu.ft. 44 (about 20 per test) 6 million
0 280 sq miles 43 25 <10 Mrem 0 13.32 3.7E-06 0 0 0 Volume -0 0 -0 0 -0 0
-0 0 -35 <1 -0 63 -0 15

NAAQS TABLE
NAAQS Summary NOx Generator tpy 0.31 JTA tpy Page 16 of 18 Total tpy 0.31

HTM Option (Total)
COMPLEX 2030 SPEIS, Tonopah Test Range (TTR) Closure - Alternative Review
Information (Operating in a Campaign Mode) April 10, 2007 CO 12.36 3.7E-
06 12.36 PM10 0.02 0.02 SO2 0.02 0.02 VOC 0.61 0.61

HAPS TABLE
HAPs Summary Hydrochloric Acid JTA B83 tpy 1.1E-06 JTA B61 tpy 2.7E-06
Total tpy 3.7E-06

HTM Option (Total)

__________
5. E-mail from Jerry Elliston, TTR Contractor Lead,   dated Nov 21, 2006.
Note: used as basis for calculations. Data provided   was for entire year,
not just JTA tests. Data shown in this table is for   B61 and B83 testing
only. 6. E-mail from Joanna Eckstein, dated Nov 16,   2006.

Transportation Data All B61-3/4/10 pre-test shipments from Pantex to the
designated military locations and post-test shipments from the test
location to the Pantex Plant in Amarillo TX are authorized in the
DOE/AL/200103/JTA, "Offsite Transportation Authorization, Revision 4;
Shipment Authorization of pre-test and post-test Shipment of B61-3/4/10
Joint Test Assemblies (JTA) 1/3/6/9/15." All B61-7 pre-test shipments
from Pantex to the designated military locations and post-test shipments
from the test location to the Pantex Plant in Amarillo TX are authorized
in the DOE/AL/99007/JTA, "Offsite Transportation Authorization, Revision
4; Shipment Authorization of pre-test and post-test Shipment of B61-7
Joint Test Assemblies (JTA) 1/3/5/6/8/15." All B83-1 pre-test shipments
from Pantex to the designated military locations and post-test shipments
from the test location to the Pantex Plant in Amarillo TX are authorized
in the DOE/AL/92011/JTA Revision 9; "Shipment Authorization for pre- and
post-test B83 JTA2 and Pre-test JTS2 Units". This revision expires August
1, 2007. The pre-test shipment is similar to a War Reserve (WR) shipment
in that it contains as much WR material as possible. The unit must be
inspected and certified by the Pantex Site Office (NNSA) prior to
delivery to the AF. The hazards for all configurations are appropriately
documented. If there are development units or modifications to existing
units, the OTA and the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for that system
will be updated or specific hazard and transportation documentation will
be provided to NNSA for approval.

Accidents In the development of the Offsite Transportation
Authorizations, the SER is prepared in accordance with DOE Order 461.1A
and Safety Guide (SG) 500 and documents the review of the Joint Test
Assemblies. The SER looks at the potential and the consequences of
accident

Page 17 of 18
COMPLEX 2030 SPEIS, Tonopah Test Range (TTR) Closure - Alternative Review
Information (Operating in a Campaign Mode) April 10, 2007

scenarios for the test units while in transit in a DOE truck. Refer to
the following Safety Evaluation Reports for detailed information. (a)
Safety Evaluation Report for B61 Modifications 3, 4, 7, 10 and 11 High
Fidelity Joint Test Assembly (U), Revision 4, dated January 26, 2005.
Classified SECRET/RD. (b) Safety Evaluation Report for B61-7 Joint Test
Assemblies (U), Revision 5, dated September 20, 2005. Classified
SECRET/RD. (c) Safety Evaluation Report for b61-3/4/10 Joint Test
Assemblies and B61-3 Flight Test Units (U), Revision 4, Dated November 2,
2006 (DRAFT). Classified SECRET/RD. Terrorist Threats. The NNSA Design
Basis Threat provides the threats that must be guarded against for all
sites that where specific materials and/or assets are temporarily or
permanently stored. The responses for Tonopah Test Ranges are in the
Counterintelligence Threat Assessment "The Terrorist Threat to Tonopah
Test Range (TTR)" dated August 2006. The document is classified
SECRET/RD.

Page 18 of 18
COMPLEX 2030 SPEIS TTR Closure Alternative Review Information - White
Sands Missile Range Per the NNSA HQ decision in October 2006, no B61 or
B83 flight tests with SNM will be planned after completion of the current
required set of tests. These tests are scheduled for completion before
the Complex 2030 Record of Decision. Therefore, SNM test units are not
addressed in this document. 1. Alternative Description The second
alternative location would be the White Sands Missile Range (WSMR).
Located in south central New Mexico, White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) is
the largest installation in the DoD. WSMR is a Major Range and Test
Facility Base (MRTFB) under the Department of the Army Test and
Evaluation Command, Developmental Test Command providing test and
evaluation services to the Army, Air Force, Navy, other Government
agencies and industry. The Range spans 3420 square miles of land space
and 10,026 square miles of contiguous restricted airspace fully managed,
scheduled and controlled by the WSMR. Holloman Air Force Base is located
within and contiguous to the range east boundary with capabilities for
aircraft support and staging. Size, topography, low population, and great
community support renders WSMR virtually free of all elements of
encroachment. Extension areas comprised of sparsely populated ranch, BLM,
and state land (2,453 sq miles/1,569,925 acres) border the installation
to the north and west and are often used for safety and test areas
enabled by long standing use agreements. The Range's terrain ranges from
the high desert valley at 4,000' MSL to desert and wooded mountains at
approximately 9,000' MSL. WSMR contains all terrain types except
littoral. The climate is generally dry clear air with an average high of
61oF in winter to 92oF in summer and an average low of 36oF in winter to
69oF in the summer with very few non-test days due to inclement weather.
WSMR has a full suite of flight test instrumentation including radar,
telemetry and optical equipment, which allows complete coverage of a
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) gravity weapons flight
test. As an MRTFB, the range infrastructure and instrumentation
modernization and maintenance is funded under the DoD Test Resource
Management Center and Army Test and Evaluation Command including
additional investments made for Air Force, Navy and Joint test missions.
WSMR has extensive experience conducting flight tests, such as those for
the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), Small Diameter Bomb (SBD) Joint
Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) among others, with requirements
and flight test scenarios similar to the NNSA flight test program to
include penetrating weapons, weapons recovery and handling classified and
special materials. WSMR has the DoD's only Nuclear Reactor for research,
test and evaluation and is licensed and accustomed to special security
and handling of special materials. The Air Force 46th Test Group, a
detachment of the 46th Test Wing at Eglin AFB is the primary sponsor and
resident range liaison for Air Force flight tests at the range. WSMR has
proven capability to provide both real-time and post-test time, space,
and position information (TSPI) data on the aircraft and the test
article, from release to impact. The data are commonly acquired utilizing
optical tracking systems capable of providing accuracies up to +/- 6
Page 1 of 10
inches (in.) and/or a monopulse Doppler radar to provide range, azimuth,
and elevation to within +/- 0.1 mil. Other TSPI products include GPS pods
on aircraft, system telemetry and laser tracking. The range has extensive
experience and state of the art technology for providing highly accurate
and reliable TSPI measurements of in-flight systems. The WSMR has an
extensive network of radar, global positioning system (GPS), telemetry
(TM), and optics sites (fixed and mobile), which interface with the Real
Time Data Display System located in the Range Control Center and can be
provided to remote locations both on and off range via the test support
network and Defense Research Engineering Network. TM data can be provided
on digital media as well as analog or digital tape, strip chart, and
reduced forms, including any standard or custom formats required. The
WSMR has a full suite of communications control and coordination for the
entire test range. This includes Air to Ground communications as well as
ground control. Range frequency coordination and authorization is
included for all test programs. The WSMR provides the entire suite of
support functions required by a customer. Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD), post-test asset recovery and storage, static and/or remote
controlled targets, and shipping and receiving of equipment and test
articles are only a few of the capabilities. The NNSA tests would utilize
EOD, recovery and storage, and the shipping of equipment.1 RANGE
CAPABILITIES: a) Command and Control - The WSMR range control center is a
state of the art facility with real-time graphics and telemetry displays,
an air traffic control center meteorological data displays, as well as
communications centrally connected through the range network
infrastructure for data acquisition and distribution across the entire
test range. The WSMR Test Director (TD), along with the test
representative provides direction over the entire test. The TD is
responsible for the safe conduct of the test, while ensuring all required
test objectives are met. The TD has constant communications with all
range support groups to ensure all systems are fully operational. The TD
and the test representative are in constant communication with the
aircraft, ensuring the test unit is ready for the test as well.1 b)
Optical/video - WSMR has a complete range of optical tracking and video
capabilities for event detection, documentation and TSPI data including
position, altitude, aspect angle and roll rate. WSMR's optical tracking
capabilities include mobile and fixed tracking mounts capable of multiple
visible, near IR and far IR sensors. Tracking mounts are controlled via
external pointing data from telemetry, radar or system under test and are
all capable of closed loop video tracking. Each mount is capable of
hosting multiple apertures with various sensors and focal lengths for
long range detection and tracking. WSMR utilizes simulation planning
software for optimizing locations and configurations for data reliability
and repeatability. Capabilities include digital imagers in the visible
and IR at taxes up to 4800 frames per second and film cameras in excess
of 20,000 frames per second. Digital data are available in real time for
test control and quick look analysis via the WSMR RF and fiber network
and are all correlated to IRIG time standards. WSMR has numerous
recording, control and relay vans for configuration
Page 2 of 10
and coverage of trajectories covering the entire range. Film data are
converted to digital format for analysis and distribution. Data include
TSPI to +/- 6 inches accuracy.1 c) Tracking Radars - The radar suite at
WSMR consists mostly of C-band, gated CW, metric radars capable of
tracking in skin or beacon mode. There are ten (10) Single Object
Tracking radars of which eight are mobile. In addition, WSMR has two
mobile Multiple (40) Object Tracking radars. WSMR also has one mobile
Weibel radar Doppler radar. All the mobile radars can be deployed at any
of several hundred sites distributed throughout the range and can also
support off-range programs. WSMR has mission simulation and planning
software to optimize radar positioning for track quality of service and
accuracy based on mission scenarios. All metric radars are configured to
pass track data to each other and to the Range Control Center (RCC) for
cueing instrumentation, systems under test and track improvement through
data fusion. Radar data is processed (filtered and smoothed) at the RCC
and can be relayed to the test site, displayed on the monitors in the
mission control room, or sent to other radars for cueing. Tracking radars
provide TSPI data, test team motion and multi-gate data for miss
distance, event detection and debris tracking. WSMR operates a radar
transponder test and validation facility and the ability to integrate
transponders into test mission for closed loop tracking.1 d) Telemetry -
WSMR has an array of fixed telemetry sites to provide coverage of flight
tests across the range and a set of mobile telemetry stations for
receiving, recording and relaying telemetry information at custom
locations to meet test requirements. Telemetry data acquisition
capabilities include fixed and mobile local and long range secure, multi-
stream and high data rate (excess of 20mb/s) telemetry, FM, PCM, PAM,
1553, RS232, 422, IRIG 106, JTIDS/Link 16 and other standard analog and
digital data protocols and formats. All telemetry data is recorded for
required detailed data reduction. The data products of the telemetry data
center (TDC) consist of solid state digital recordings, analog and
digital linear tape, compact disks, jazz drive, zip disk and strip
charts. Additionally, the TDC provides reduction capabilities in concert
with systems analysts for automated scaling, threshold, change detection,
cross plots, relational measures, 2D/3D graphical and solid model
representation and play back post-test, real time and quick look data
reports. Each of these capabilities are centrally available at the range
control facility, each of the range test sites and via mobile
instrumentation and test control vans.1 e) Operations Control Center -
The Range Control Center (RCC) is a state-of-the-art digital data
facility central to test operations, data collection and distribution.
The center houses the operations control and data facility, telemetry
data center, air traffic control radar facility, network operations
center, flight safety engineering, real-time data display and reduction
facility, instrumentation controllers, meteorological data center and
test customer and analyst cells. During tests, the range controller
executes the test countdown and master schedule to coordinate all test
entities readiness and synchronization, test safety and test operations
parameters. In addition to the main range control facility, WSMR operates
a mobile test range control facility and test operations vans at remote
sites for on-site control and conduct.1 f) Photometrics and Photography -
WSMR has an extensive capability to provide photographic data
acquisition, editing and production for on-demand and planned documentary
photo of the test setup and any incidents of interest. Photographic
support includes still photography, closed circuit video surveillance and
non-track optical data video in the visible, image intensification
Page 3 of 10
and IR bands at frame rates up to 2000 digital and over 20,000 frames per
second film. Data measures include signature measurements, velocity,
attitude, roll rates, impact aspect angles and position among others.
Photographic capabilities also include chase aircraft with certified
flight photographers. WSMR has automated data reduction and analysis
capabilities for optical measurements and uncertainty analysis. Data
media include tape, digital video disks, compact disc, film and print
media.1 g) Communications - WSMR range communications operates the main
switch for all telecommunications and network operations including fiber,
Radio Frequency and hardwire networks. The range utilizes a trunking
radio system with repeater systems to provide test conduct and local
radio communication service. The integrated communications systems
provides ground-to-air and ground-to-ground radio links using both radio
frequency (RF) and land line equipment that ensures support of test
activities test control operations and emergencies. The range operates a
test support network and communications system to transport data, timing,
command and control and voice nets for range control, project operations
and instrumentations operations for each mission. Communications networks
are configured for each test event scenario and include the ability to
tie tactical communications to aircraft and other systems under test into
the net. The inter-range control center operates the test support network
and external connectivity for data distribution and distributed test
control.1 h) Aircraft flight safety - Team WSMR has a renowned capability
and experience in flight safety systems to include modeling and measuring
instantaneous impact predictions, design and certification of flight
termination systems (FTS) and safe test operations for aircraft and
weapons systems. WSMR conducts mission analysis and real-time control and
decision making for mission operations including meteorological data
considerations, flight profile and instrumentation information for flight
safety operations. Aircraft and test operations safety is highly afforded
by the control, management and vast restricted air and land space.1 i)
Airspace - WSMR controls and manages over 10,000 square miles of
restricted airspace with the full authority of the FAA. Thus, WSMR is not
required to call-up or schedule airspace operations or receive FAA
approval for operations within the restricted airspace. WSMR operates an
Air Traffic Control (ATC) radar facility in conjunction with the range
control facility for management and control of the airspace. The ATC
facility consists of state-of-the-art STARS radar scope and systems
operated by the FAA certified air traffic controllers from the Air Force
49th Fighter Wing for conducting operations on the range and approach and
departure from Holloman Air Force Base located on the range eastern
boundary. The range is also the user of record of additional call-up
airspace and military operations areas and is experienced in aircraft
operations control on and off range.1 j) Explosive Ordnance
Disposal/Recovery - WSMR has trained explosive ordnance disposal and
recovery operations personnel for recovery and disposal of explosive
ordnance that are utilized either on call or on standby for test
operations as required by the test plan and safety operations.
Capabilities include in-place disposal, recovery and disposal operations,
determination and validation of disposal methodologies and assessments,
Recovery operations include helicopter search and rescue, air lift
operations, heavy transport equipment, cranes, front end loader,
backhoes, forklifts both manned and robotic recovery and inspection
systems including backhoe
Page 4 of 10
operations. WSMR recovers all penetrating test units by excavation
techniques using front end loaders and backhoes.1 k) Metrology - WSMR has
a meteorology section that provides a wide range of technical
meteorological support including forecasts, warnings, and atmospheric
observations and measurements for test data and control. Forecasts are
tailored to project requirements and include cloud cover, upper level
wind speed and direction, lightening threat, luminance and transmittance
among others. Standard meteorological data is provided from fixed ground
stations throughout the range, emplaced stations at test sites and
rawindsonde balloons for altitude measurements up to 100K feet MSL.
Additional altitude measurement capabilities exist for very high altitude
measurements via met rocketsondes, Doppler weather radar data, wind
profilers, and scintillation measures. Meteorological data and forecast
information can be networked or transmitted in real time to the range
control center or be distributed to test sites throughout the range for
recording and display. Data are reference correlated to test data by IRIG
timing.1 l) Trajectory Plotting - The graphics facility provides the
operational and display environment for the aircraft control operator and
the radar director. The displays and the facility are located in the RCC.
The trajectory is projected in the RCC operations center for the TD and
other test personnel on the same plot as the planned trajectory, allowing
the test team to evaluate the aircraft and test unit flight safety.1 m)
Security - WSMR has an integral security workforce for operations
security, evacuation and roadblock services across the range. In
association with the operation of the nuclear test reactor, WSMR
personnel has personnel programs and special security training suitable
for NNSA test operation requirements. However, the number of personnel
available for a given test may require augmentation of the WSMR security
force dependant on the threat analysis and security plan. WSMR has a
variety of classified storage sites for temporary storage protection of
the test articles. The majority of the WSMR personnel have the
appropriate level of security clearances and are accustomed to secure
test operations and conduct.1 n) Radiological Technician - Provided by
SNL from Albuquerque. For any tests that require post-test radiography,
the equipment and specialists are provided by one of the physics
laboratories. Permits and logistics are coordinated by the TD and on-site
range specialist. WSMR also has a radiation protection office with
measurement survey capabilities and a metallurgy laboratory with portable
radiography capabilities available as required.1 o) Emergency Services -
A medical aid station with an ambulance, staffed by highly qualified
medical technicians, is located at the Stallion range center within 10
minutes of the planned NNSA test area. A modern full service hospital is
located in the town of Socorro, Alamogordo about 20 and 45 miles
respectively, from the proposed test location on the range. Additionally,
a full service fire station and EMS unit is located at the Stallion range
camp. This and additional resources can be deployed to the test site as
required by the test safety operating procedures and risk assessment.
WSMR Army Air Operations provide air evacuation services to local and
regional hospitals including Albuquerque as conditions dictate.1

Page 5 of 10
p) Shipping and Receiving- WSMR performs all requirements to ship
hazardous and nonhazardous post-test assets and material off range.
Coordination is performed with the NNSA Office of Safeguards
Transportation for all Joint Test Assembly (JTA) shipments. These
shipments include explosives and radioactive components. 1 q) Working
Space - Workspace for NNSA test operations can be provided by mobile
facilities, at the Stallion range camp or at the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency compound to the east of the proposed NNSA test area and including
work areas with computer access and for classified operations.1 r) Cost -
The annual operations cost for fifteen (15) flight tests at the WSMR is
approximately $1.95M as a function of the test scenarios and mission
type. The test scenarios are estimated to range in cost from $120K to
$150K including test planning and set-up. For the purposes of this
comparison cost estimate, $130K was used to calculate the annual cost
assuming 15 flight test missions. 1 s) Targets - WSMR has a wide variety
of targets located throughout the range. The planned NNSA targets are in
the northern section of the range. The final determination of the targets
will be determined by the geological study. Potentially, a concrete
target will be constructed in the general area of the penetration target
to facilitate all missions in the same location. The eastern and southern
sections of the range are not suitable for penetration missions. The
aircraft routing and planned targets can provide good sun and camera
angles for data and video collection. 1 t) Computer Facility - The range
computer facility is located inside the RCC. It provides support to all
facets of the test, from safety calculations and basic communications
support, to the coordinated real-time radar and video picture so the test
team can make instantaneous decisions about range safety and test
execution.1 ________
1. E-mail from Jerry Tyree, WSMR Business Office, to Lee Post, SNL 2951,
dated 11/27/06.

Page 6 of 10
2. Graphics The following is a map of the proposed White Sands Missile
Range target areas.

Proposed Target Areas

3. Siting Locations The northwest area of the WSMR would provide several
target area options for flight testing. Pending completion of soil core
sampling, it is anticipated that one or more locations in this area would
meet the requirements for the penetrator testing. A review of the
preliminary data indicates that this area of the WSMR could accommodate
the safety footprints of all current flight test scenarios.

Page 7 of 10
4. Construction and Operations Data The only construction that would be
required to support the JTA flight test operations at the WSMR would be
the installation of a circular concrete target. The target would be used
to aid in recovery efforts for all Retard Air and Retard Ground
configurations. It would also be used for free-fall test units. The
concrete target would be constructed of 4000 psi non-reinforced concrete,
500 feet (ft) in diameter with a depth of 12 in. The construction would
be managed by the test range, but paid for by the test agency. The cost
for this target in 2006 dollars is estimated to be approximately $8M.
Data Required Peak electrical energy (megawatt electric [MWe]) Diesel
generators (Yes or No) Concrete ( cubic yards [yd]) Steel (tons) Liquid
fuel and lube oil (gallons [gal.]) Water (gal.) Land (acre [ac]) Laydown
area size Parking lots Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak
employment (workers) Construction period (years [yr]) Waste Generated
Low-Level Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd) Mixed Low-Level Liquid (gal.)
Solid (cubic yd) Hazardous Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd) Nonhazardous
(sanitary) Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd) Nonhazardous (Other) Liquid
(gal.) Solid (cubic yd) ANNUAL OPERATIONS 2 Data Required Annual
electrical energy (megawatt-hours [MWh]) Peak electrical demand (MWe)
Fuel usage (gal or cubic yd) Other process gas (N, Ar, etc.) Diesel
generators Water (gal.) *Yearly for entire range including AF
Page 8 of 10

Consumption/Use 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Volume 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 Consumption/Use 595MWh 812MWe 480cu.ft. 44 (about 20 per test) 6
million
Steam (tons) Plant footprint (ac) Employment (workers) Number of rad
workers Average annual dose Radionuclide emissions and effluents--
nuclides and curies NAAQS emissions (tons/yr) SEE TABLE Hazardous Air
Pollutants and Effluents (tons/yr) SEE TABLE Chemical use Maximum
inventory of fissile material/throughput Waste Category Low-Level Liquid
(gal.) Solid (cubic yd) Mixed Low-Level Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd)
Transuranic (TRU) Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd) High-Level Waste
(HLW)/Spent Fuel Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd) Hazardous Liquid (gal.)
Solid (cubic yd) Nonhazardous (sanitary) Liquid (gal.) Solid (cubic yd)
Nonhazardous (Other) Liquid (gal.)

0 280 sq miles 135 25 <10 Mrem 0 13.32
3.7E-06

0 0 Volume -0 0 -0 0 -0 0 -0 0 -35 <1 -0 63 -0

NAAQS TABLE 3
NAAQS Summary NOx CO PM10 SO2 VOC Generator tpy 0.31 12.36 0.02 0.02 0.61
JTA tpy 3.7E-06 Total tpy 0.31 12.36 0.02 0.02 0.61

HAPS TABLE
HAPs Summary JTA B83 JTA B61 Total tpy tpy tpy Hydrochloric Acid 1.1E-06
2.7E-06 3.7E-06 2. E-mail from Jerry Elliston, TTR Contractor Lead, dated
Nov 21, 2006. Note: used as basis for calculations. Data provided was for
entire year, not just JTA tests. Data shown in this table is for B61 and
B83 testing only. 3. E-mail from Joanna Eckstein, dated Nov 16, 2006. 4.
E-mail from Joe Bonaguidi, SNL, dated December 11, 2006. Page 9 of 10
5. Transportation Data There is not a current Offsite Transportation
Authorization (OTA) from the WSMR for any B61 or B83 Joint Test
Assemblies (JTA). A route must be established by NNSA for all JTA
configurations planned for testing. This is not a significant issue, but
must be coordinated well in advance. All B61-3/4/10 pre-test shipments
from Pantex to the designated military locations and post-test shipments
from the test location to the Pantex Plant in Amarillo TX are authorized
in the DOE/AL/200103/JTA, "Offsite Transportation Authorization, Revision
4; Shipment Authorization of Pre-test and Posttest Shipment of B61-3/4/10
Joint Test Assemblies (JTA) 1/3/6/9/15." All B61-7 pre-test shipments
from Pantex to the designated military locations and post-test shipments
from the test location to the Pantex Plant in Amarillo TX are authorized
in the DOE/AL/99007/JTA, "Offsite Transportation Authorization, Revision
4; Shipment Authorization of Pre-test and Posttest Shipment of B61-7
Joint Test Assemblies (JTA) 1/3/5/6/8/15." All B83-1 pre-test shipments
from Pantex to the designated military locations and post-test shipments
from the test location to the Pantex Plant in Amarillo TX are authorized
in the DOE/AL/92011/JTA Revision 9; "Shipment Authorization for Pre- and
Posttest B83 JTA2 and Pretest JTS2 Units". This revision expires August
1, 2007. The pre-test shipment must be inspected and certified by the
Pantex Site Office (NNSA) prior to delivery to the AF. The hazards for
all configurations are appropriately documented. If there are development
units or modifications to existing units, the OTA and the Safety
Evaluation Report (SER) for that system will be updated or specific
hazard and transportation documentation will be provided to NNSA for
approval. 6. Accidents In the development of the Offsite Transportation
Authorizations, the SER is prepared in accordance with DOE Order 461.1A
and Safety Guide (SG) 500 and documents the review of the Joint Test
Assemblies. Transportation Risk Assessments are not required. The SER
looks at the potential and the consequences of accident scenarios for the
test units while in transit in a DOE truck. Refer to the following Safety
Evaluation Reports for detailed information. (a) Safety Evaluation Report
for B61 Modifications 3, 4, 7, 10 and 11 High Fidelity Joint Test
Assembly (U), Revision 4, dated January 26, 2005. Classified SECRET/RD.
(b) Safety Evaluation Report for B61-7 Joint Test Assemblies (U),
Revision 5, dated September 20, 2005. Classified SECRET/RD. (c) Safety
Evaluation Report for b61-3/4/10 Joint Test Assemblies and B61-3 Flight
Test Units (U), Revision 4, Dated November 2, 2006 (DRAFT). Classified
SECRET/RD. Terrorist Threats. The NNSA Design Basis Threat provides the
threats that must be guarded against for all sites where specific
materials and/or assets are temporarily or permanently stored. The
specific responses to any activities are contained in various documents.
Page 10 of 10
HE

HE R&D - Option 1 for Transformational Alternative
o Option 1 - Downsize in place o Already underway at many (all?) sites o
Transition some facilities to non-DP funding - Effectively downsizing for
DP - Consolidate specific activities at LANL, LLNL, SNL, PX o Identify
critical skills / competencies / locations - Identify sub-areas of
specialization and consolidate at specific locations - Potentially
eliminate HE R&D at SNL or Nuclear Design Lab or Plant o Identify
Complex-wide excess capacity and eliminate o Best estimate - bounding
conditions set by existing Option 0

10/18/06 1
LA-UR-07-0836 Summary of LANL's HE R&D "As Is" Table of Contents:
I. Introduction II. Mission, Activities, and supporting Infrastructure A.
B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. Energetic Materials Synthesis & Formulation R&D
Physics & Engineering Performance & Safety Models Thermal Response of
High Explosives Energetic Materials Characterization Characterization of
Explosively Driven Materials Detonator Technology Research and
Development HE Test Fire Capabilities at LANL Powder Explosives
Processing Core LANL High Explosives (HE) Infrastructure Capabilities

III. People IV. Facilities Summary

Cold War Triad
ICBMs

New Triad
Nuclear and non-nuclear strike capabilities

ICBMs

Transition

Bombers

SLBMs

C2, Intelligence & Planning

Bombers

SLBMs

Defenses

Responsive Infrastructure Far Term

Now

Near Term

Mid Term

2/12/2007

LA-UR-07-0836

1
LA-UR-07-0836
I. INTRODUCTION1 Since 1943, high explosives (HE), and more broadly,
energetic materials (EM) research has been at the core of Los Alamos
National Laboratory's (LANL) mission in establishing and enhancing the
Nation's nuclear weapons capabilities through technological innovations.
The success LANL has experienced in this field is a tribute to the
dedication and interaction of LANL's scientific and engineering community
in meeting mission deliverables through the development of new diagnostic
and test methods integrated with theory and model improvements. This
intellectual capability has led to significant nuclear weapon design
advances in more than 60 years, resulting in five out of seven nuclear
weapon primaries supporting the Nation's enduring stockpile deterrent
based on both LANL conventional HE and insensitive HE systems. Today, in
the absence of underground testing, LANL relies on a broad, cross-
disciplinary team approach across multiple directorates and divisions
(i.e., C, DE, HX, W, WT, LANSCE, MST, MPA, P, T, and X) to meet the
demands of responsible Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS), as
well as with other National Nuclear Security Administration /Department
of Energy (NNSA/DOE) organizations, external agencies (e.g., Department
of Defense [DoD], Defense Threat Reduction Agency [DTRA], and Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency [DARPA]), and multiple university
collaborations. The success of this approach is clearly evident by LANL's
leadership in U.S. and international topical conferences on energetic
materials and shock physics, the number of peer-reviewed publications,
and the increase in the number of LANL external collaborations in
energetic materials (EM) research science and technology. LANL's EM
research priorities are focused first and foremost on supporting the
Design Agency's (DA) mission tactical and strategic requirements for
performance and safety aspects of nuclear weapon primary components. Our
DA core energetic materials (EM) competency thrust areas can be summed up
briefly by the following: o o o "Ensure the Deterrent"- i.e., ensure and
extend HE performance of our enduring stockpile weapons over their design
lifetime. "Prevent the Event" - i.e., maintain and improve the HE safety
of our enduring and legacy stockpile over their design lifetime either
under accident conditions or attack "Enhance the Triad" through
Transformation, Integration, and Responsiveness to be "Ready for 2030" -
i.e., develop, optimize, and strategically position the NNSA's Design
Agency (DA) and Production Agency (PA) capabilities to possess the
technical edge ensuring our National Security posture for nuclear and
nonnuclear strike capabilities.

Each of these thrust areas can be further categorized between engineering
and physics certification and assessment requirements, and the 'hand-in-
hand' relationship between the engineering and physics assessments.
Engineering performance can be defined as the requirement for a specific
nuclear weapon component to perform within design specifications and
tolerances throughout its intended stockpile lifetime, and through the
Stockpile-to-Target-Sequence (STS) to the point of delivery. Science-
based stockpile stewardship simulations should be able to accurately
predict any deviations thereof. Potential HE deviations would impact the
nuclear weapon primary's physics performance, i.e., the hydrodynamic
implosion behavior and response of the primary. HE engineering safety
assessments require a science-based understanding of nonshock initiation
and reaction propagation mechanisms (i.e., impact, friction, shear and/or
cook-off by accident or by attack) that could potentially lead to
physical damage and/or a chemical reaction in the high explosive. Physics
safety evaluates whether or not the potential situation could lead to
special nuclear material (SNM) dispersal and/or inadvertent nuclear
detonation (IND). The majority of this summary was taken and used with
permission from the "LANL HE STRATEGY 30DAY STUDY REPORT (U)", MARCH
2005, LA-CP-06-1039
1

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New Triad enhancements for nuclear and nonnuclear strike capabilities
demand a responsive NNSA infrastructure to target SBSS advancements in
both EM performance and safety through multiple technological avenues.
Examples include new synthesis and formulations routes essential to
accelerate the development and incorporation of selected advanced EMs
into defined weapons applications, as well as extend our understanding of
these new class of materials for potential strategic applications. In
particular, to identify candidate materials to serve as replacements for
older EMs and/or inerts employed evaluation of performance, safety,
reliability, and/or artificial aging characteristics for enhanced
surveillance studies of existing of HE systems. Additional experimental
R&D integrated with theory and model development is required to advance
our understanding and predictive capabilities of the controlling
variables that dominate the performance or safety behavioral responses.
Furthermore, the future stockpile is expected to have surveillance
properties and periods that provide a more rapid, realistic assessment of
the "state of health" of the weapon (e.g. on board real time or embedded
sensor technologies), and with technological advances that yield less
frequent change-out of components (e.g. self-healing binder systems in
modern PBXs). Thus the future of High Explosive or Energetic Material R&D
will not be dominated by old familiar problems relating to performance
and performance predictability, but will be related to modernization and
consolidation, answering important questions regarding safety, surety,
and the development of technological advances that will make our systems
more reliable and secure.

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II. MISSION, ACTIVITIES, AND SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE A. ENERGETIC
MATERIALS SYNTHESIS & FORMULATION R&D RELEVANCE TO NNSA /LANL MISSION As
a stockpile steward, the LANL energetic material (EM) synthesis and
formulation research and development (R&D) capabilities are essential for
the development of new reduced sensitivity materials as well as for
enhanced studies of existing HE systems. Further, these capabilities
support the development and incorporation of selected advanced energetic
materials into newly defined weapons applications. LANL, as the Design
Agency, is responsible for identifying and selecting candidate materials
to serve as replacements for both energetic and inert materials that
serve in multiple primary functions. o Mission thrust areas include: o
developing candidate replacement IHE's o evaluating a viable replacement
for the binder Kel-F 800 to be used in a new IHE and HE mock "inert"
material o the identification of environmentally safe, costeffective
alternatives to barium nitrate containing mock HE materials o
understanding, detection and defeat of improvised energetic devices
(IEDs) for threat reduction and emergency response capabilities o New
molecules to be used for insensitive boosters R&D capabilities include: o
~500 g. bench-scale synthesis and formulation capabilities o analytical
and small-scale sensitivity characterization and testing o small-scale
pressing and machining o pilot scale synthesis and formulation of up to
100 lb batches o material safety, sensitivity, and compatibility testing
o material acceptance, certification, and qualification testing o
complete chemical characterization of new and stockpile energetic
materials o stockpile surveillance and recertification testing o
environmental sampling and analyses for energetic materials o DHS and
other security related energetic materials analysis and evaluation o
performance and safety test-fire o storage, handling, transport o
disposal of new classes of energetic materials

o

LANL INTELLECTUAL STRENGTHS & CAPABILITIES o Impressive record of
accomplishment o publications and patents over multiple decades o
innovations that have led to three R&D 100 awards o Recognized within the
DOE and DoD communities and the Nation's commercial energetic materials
enterprise o Internationally recognized as leaders in energetic materials
synthesis research CURRENT FACILITIES: TA-9-21 (and supporting
buildings).

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B. PHYSICS & ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE & SAFETY MODELS RELEVANCE TO NNSA
/LANL MISSION The primary objective of the Physics and Engineering
Performance and Safety (PEPS) effort is to develop predictive models for
the structural response, safety envelope, initiation properties and
performance characteristics of the High Explosive (HE) formulations used
in LANL designed nuclear weapons systems. This scope includes the two
types of main charge explosives: HMX-based PBX 9501 (also referred to as
Conventional High Explosive or CHE) and TATB-based PBX 9502 (also
referred to as Insensitive High Explosive or IHE). Also included are the
detonator explosives and surrounding materials, and some validation work
on similar explosive formulations that are used for both nuclear and
conventional munitions. Gas Guns o Mission Thrust: Capability o Develop
predictive models for the structural 1 to 8 km/s response, safety
envelope, initiation properties and performance characteristics of the
High Explosive (HE) formulations used in LANL designed nuclear weapons
systems o establishing bounds of operation during the Stockpile to Target
Sequence (STS) o identify and evaluate changes that could occur as a
result of aging o analyze the HE response to a variety of accident
scenarios (including during manufacture) o evaluate possible changes that
might result from formulation adjustments o develop accurate Equation of
State (EOS) o develop Detonation Shock Dynamics (DSD) o develop physics-
based reactive burn models (shock and non-shock initiation) o develop
improved models for mechanical and chemical response, especially for
unusual loading conditions (e.g. accidents) o develop engineering models
and predictive engineering performance o e.g. ViscoScram, etc. o R&D
Capabilities include: o One- and two-stage gas guns, in situ magnetic
gauging o VISAR, Photonic Doppler Velocimetry (PDV), pins, data
acquisition o Contained Firing (10 Kg chamber, vessels, boomboxes) o
Outdoor Firing (2000 lb maximum) o Small-scale characterization o Proton
Radiography LANL INTELLECTUAL STRENGTHS o The quality of this work is
well documented by the number of papers describing modeling results and
joint experiment modeling papers published by LANL workers in the
Detonation Symposium, APS Shock Conferences, as well as in the general
academic literature. o A large number of collaborations with DoD and
academic partners also results because of their interest in leveraging
against these capabilities. The output from several modeling efforts, for
example, molecular dynamics simulations and advanced continuum-level
constitutive modeling, are utilized within the LANL, SNL, LLNL and DoD
communities. CURRENT FACILITIES: TA-40-1, 8, 9, 12, 23; TA-39-6; LANSCE
AREA C (pRad)

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C. THERMAL RESPONSE OF HIGH EXPLOSIVES RELEVANCE TO NNSA /LANL MISSION
The chemical and physical mechanisms by which energy is released
subsequent to a thermal ignition in a high explosive are not fully
understood. Further, the mechanisms by which this energy release couples
to the material boundaries of a high explosive configuration are also not
well understood. There is no scientific basis for the assessment of error
in predictive calculations of thermal response in the absence of these
mechanisms. o Mission Thrusts: o Evaluating the potential for Pu
dispersal and inadvertent nuclear detonation o Produce validation data o
Provide detailed physical and chemical mechanisms that govern thermal
ignition of explosive materials (e.g. PBX 9501) o understand the response
of non traditional solid explosives to meet the challenge of conventional
threats such as small and large scale improvised explosive devices
(IED's). R&D Capabilities o Proton Radiography o X-Radiography o Outdoor
and Indoor Firing Sites o High Speed Photography o Velocimetry o Thermal
trajectories (thermocouples; infared imaging) o Bench top chemical
kinetics and calorimetry o Construction of models of thermal
decomposition o Intermediate scale thermal explosion experiments designed
to validate integral models of response

o

thermal (fire ...) IND initial impulse material heating ignition and
propagation final outcome ? burn-out dispersal

mechanical (bullet impact ...)

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LANL INTELLECTUAL STRENGTHS o Leading role in directing both the NNSA
complex and the world in the investigation of thermal response and
reaction violence phenomena o First demonstrated the global behavior of
HMX thermal decomposition, such that a single model of thermal response
can be used to model ignition subsequent to thermal heating, heating by
shear, friction or compressive flow, or impact in the run to detonation.
o First observed the role of cracking in the composite explosive in the
coupling of energy release with a metal boundary. o First to identify and
measure the propagation of energy release at near sound speed in a large
scale thermal explosion experiment. o These models are currently being
used by C, DE, W, WT, T and D division within LANL and externally by SNL
and China Lake. o Scientific impact that exceeds just the high explosive
community o Publications in Physical Review Letters, Journal of Chemical
Physics, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London o Experimental
advance in laser based explosive diagnostics (second harmonic generation)
was discovered and developed in this group. These techniques have been
patented and are now in open use throughout the complex and in the United
Kingdom. CURRENT FACILITIES: TA-9-34; TA-14; TA-39-6; TA-36-Lower
Slobbovia; TA-46-30

D. ENERGETIC MATERIALS CHARACTERIZATION RELEVANCE TO NNSA /LANL MISSION
The primary objectives of mechanical response are to characterize
selected energetic materials (EM) and simulants as a function of strain
rate, stress state, and temperature, which provide input to the
development of fundamental constitutive property models that are used for
engineering performance assessments, lifetime predictions, and weapon
assembly/disassembly processes at Pantex. o Mission thrust areas include:
o characterize selected energetic materials (EM) and simulants as a
function of strain rate, stress state, and temperature o characterization
of the aging effects in explosive binders o evaluating a viable
replacement for the IHE binder, Kel-F 800 o characterization of
environmentally, cost-effective alternatives for barium nitrate used as a
mock constituent of PBX 9501 o mechanical properties characterization and
in situ atomic force microscopy (AFM) of explosive binders o develop
predictive models for strength, damage nucleation and growth o model
validation o evaluate effects of aging, crystallinity, bond strength, and
fracture toughness o Polymer Equation-Of-State (EOS) and constitutive
model development R&D Capabilities include: o Ability to mechanically
test (tension/compression) energetic materials from 77 K to over 475 K in
temperature and strain rates of 0.0001 s-1 to 2000 s-1

o

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o o o o o o o Taylor impact apparatus (covers a very wide range of strain
Taylor Anvil Impact rates and deformation in one test) Small Angle
Neutron Scattering (SANS) at LANSCE tests Only large-scale U.S. HE
Crystal Growing Laboratory Atomic Force Microscopy Scanning Electron
Microscopy Optical Microscopies (polarization etc.) Shock Recovery In
situ neutron measurements of lattice strains and phase transformation
dynamics on SMARTS at LANSCE

LANL INTELLECTUAL STRENGTHS o National and internationally recognized as
leaders in the field o impressive credentials in the areas of dynamic
experimentation with several hundred publications o LANL experience has
lead to innovations in the characterization of HE, their binders and
other "soft" materials o Staff and the experimental capabilities continue
to play a strong role in the reimbursable work performed for the DoD.
CURRENT FACILITIES TA-9-21, 32, 33, 34; TA-40-12; TA-3-MSL; TA-46-30

E. CHARACTERIZATION OF EXPLOSIVELY DRIVEN MATERIALS RELEVANCE TO NNSA
/LANL MISSION The primary objective of explosively driven test is to
quantify the effects of HE-metal interactions on the post-shock
mechanical behavior of materials. This understanding is critical to
develop predictive capability of material response to explosive
environments in support of simulations of the environment of weapon
performance. This test capability is directly germane to primary
certification (Campaigns 1 & 2), the Hydro test program, and secondary
certification (Campaign 4.2). In particular, direct HE-driven shock
prestraining and HE-driven spallation tests are used to quantify the
unique pressure/time history of HEmetal loading. Understanding the
kinetic processes controlling phase transformations, shock hardening,
damage evolution, and fracture are the primary objectives of this
research and are all tied to the laboratory mission through program
requirements that include: C1, C2, C4, C8, and C12 Science Campaigns W76
LEP, W76 Rebuild, W88 Certification, and B61 Certification o Mission
Thrusts: o High Explosive Pulse Power (HEDP and ICE) o Equation of State
o Impact Response (Bullet Tests) o Alternate Accident Scenarios o Small
scale experiments are being conducted to look at energeticdriven shock
hardening, damage nucleation and growth, spall, and fracture o Larger
scale integrated experiments are thereafter conducted to quantify the
effects of shock prestraining, phase transformation, damage evolution,
and strain localization on material response and component performance.

Ancho Canyon Point 88 HE Pulsed Power Facility

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o R&D Capabilities: o Proton Radiography (pRad) o X-Radiography o Outdoor
and Indoor Firing Sites o High Speed Photography o Velocimetry

pRad image of colliding waves

LANL INTELLECTUAL STRENGTHS o Impressive record of accomplishment with
hundreds of publications across many connected disciplines. o Several
LANL fellows (less than 1% of the staff) working in this area leading to
new understanding of the processes of material deformation when subjected
to shock loading and high rates of strain o LANL's capabilities and
achievements are well-known within the DOE and DoD o Internationally
recognized as leaders in shock physics and dynamic materials research
(two researchers were named Fellows of the American Physical Society in
2006). CURRENT FACILITIES: TA-40-8; TA-36-Lower Slobbovia, MINIE; TA-39-
6, TA-39-88, LANSCE AREA C (pRad)

F. DETONATOR TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT RELEVANCE TO NNSA / LANL
MISSION The mission of detonator research and development is to maintain
current and deliver enhanced surety detonator designs specifically for
the nuclear stockpile. This mission is combined uniquely with main weapon
detonator production and stockpile stewardship for all LANL weapon
systems. LANL has developed staff, facilities, and equipment specifically
for the combined purpose of detonator technology. An added benefit of
this co-location is realized in integrated experiments, micro-scale
explosive physics, and development of applications based on close
association with synthesis chemists. This relationship has provided
explosive materials that have proven reliable and capable of withstanding
weapon environments for the life of existing systems. Current production
activities include the W76 LEP, reviving production capabilities for the
B61, W78, W88, and W87. As these products are developed, the R&D staff
and capabilities are leveraged as core members of product realization
teams. o o Mission Thrusts: Design Agency for Los Alamos Weapon
Detonators o EBW detonators o Slapper Detonators o Direct Optically
Initiated Detonators o MicroCDU Fundamental R&D and Capabilities o
Electrostatic Discharge Studies (ESD) o Prototype design for novel
experimental configurations o Transfer studies, e.g. detonator-booster
interaction o Fundamental mechanism(s) of initiation o Proton Radiography
(pRad) o X-Radiography (3D Tomography) o Outdoor and Indoor Firing Sites
o High Speed Photography o Velocimetry

o

LANL INTELLECTUAL STRENGTHS

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o o o LANL has a combined staff of Engineers, Physicists, and Chemists
that have mentored under detonator scientists and engineers. DoD, NASA,
and industrial partners have sought the capabilities of the staff
available at LANL. The original concept of exploding brigewire, exploding
foil, laser, multipoint slapper, and integrated detonators was developed
by the staff at LANL. The design to detonation systems has been thriving
for over 60 years at the same location with the same basic philosophy.
micro CDU

o

CURRENT FACILITIES TA-22-91,34; TA-40-5,15

DOI

G. HE TEST FIRE CAPABILITIES AT LANL Los Alamos has a complete range of
explosives testing capabilities, a major asset to the premier design
agency for primaries. DE-1, DE-6, W-6, and WCM-3 can test small
quantities (up to tens of grams) in enclosed firing vessels, while DE-9
can fire up to 10 kg at the enclosed TA-40-8. In addition, in DE-6 we
have outdoor facilities including, Q-Site, Minie, Lower Slobovia, Point
6, and Point 88. There are three firing sites with a 2000lb. load limit,
with one equipped for sophisticated explosive pulsed power experiments. o
Mission Capabilities (Some sites can and do combine a wide range of
diagnostics): o high speed photography o spectroscopy, o velocimetry
(VISARs, PDV) o Faraday rotation sensors o pin diagnostics o many-channel
digital data recording o high precision timing of HE events. Radiographic
Capabilities o Proton Radiography (pRad at LANSCE) Proton radiography
(800 MeV) has the ability to capture a sequence of images, creating a
movie of an explosive event (up to 33 frames, currently). Protons have
approximately 100 um spatial resolution for HE systems, with high
contrast over a wide range of areal densities. Protons are different from
x-rays in that there is no background or detector scatter, so
quantitative density measurements are possible. Prad shots are currently
limited to 10 pounds TNT equivalent in a containment vessel. o Low-energy
X-rays There is a wide range of low-energy x-ray capabilities at LANL,
including: 100, 180, 450, and 600 keV, 1 MeV, and 2.3 MeV. Spot sizes
range from 1 mm (for the 1 MeV machine) to 10 mm, with a 90 mrad dose at
1 m. The strength of low-energy x-rays is flexible timing with multiple
views, and a wide field of view for large objects. Low-energy x-rays have
better contrast than DARHT for small or lessdense objects, such as HE or
metal fragments, with an approximate 250 um spatial resolution and 100 ns
pulse width.

o

The facilities provide the data for HE characterization as needed for
evaluation of nuclear weapon explosives. Other facilities obtain crucial
information relating to detonator performance and weapon physics. Other
experiments, ranging from basic science (such as determination of
critical fields for high

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temperature superconductors) to homeland security (such as examining
improvised explosive device scenarios) are also conducted at these sites.
LANL INTELLECTUAL STRENGTHS As the premier design agency for nuclear
explosive primaries, the full range of explosive activities must be
available. We have: o The ability to design an explosives component,
fabricate a special detonator and related HE charges, and conduct a
physics experiment, or device demonstration, all in one site provides for
very efficient operations. o One site that is currently the only complete
high explosive pulsed power (HEPP) capability in the US. There are two or
more such facilities in Russia. o Los Alamos also has the facilities to
assemble very large classified experiments near the firing site, as
needed in some special applications. o Permits are in place for open air
firing and waste disposal. o Permits for the release of Tritium in HE
experiments are also in place, which facilitate controlled fusion
research along with weapons applications. o The remote location of Los
Alamos allows us to continue such activities without disturbing
surrounding population. CURRENT FACILITIES TA-40-5, 8, 15; TA-22-34; TA-
14; TA-36; TA-39; LANSCE AREA C

H. POWDER EXPLOSIVES PROCESSING AND MANUFACTURING RELEVANCE TO NNSA /LANL
MISSION LANL currently has an extensive manufacturing infrastructure that
provides support to all HE related R&D programmatic activities conducted
on and off-site. Components provided to the R&D activities support over
130 different programs, ranging from characterization of energetic
materials at the atomistic and molecular level through the testing of
large complex weapon assemblies required for validation and verification
of weapon designs. Many, if not all of these programs require finished HE
components for testing, analysis, or model validation. LANL currently
produces most of the HE components used in local R&D tests. The
manufacturing infrastructure provides a critical requirement that feeds
all R&D programs, as well as providing a venue for R&D into the
manufacturing process itself. The latter is an important component of the
overall stockpile stewardship mission of the Design Agency.

o

High Explosive Component Manufacturing o o o Machining (multiple mills
and lathes) A comprehensive HE pressing capability
(hydrostatic/isostatic, 3" 100 ton, 12" 1200 ton) Inspection (e.g. Brown
and Sharpe CMM, immersion density, hard gauging). The inspection is done
in environmentally controlled rooms capable of narrow temperature or
humidity range control. X-ray Inert fabrication

o o

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LANL INTELLECTUAL STRENGTHS o o o o Only current US manufacturer of
precision plane wave lenses Fabrication of pulse power components for
LANL and LLNL Rapid response to internal customer needs We have provided
manufactured components to LLNL, China Lake Naval Station, Eglin Air
Force Base, Sandia National Laboratory, and New Mexico Institute of
Mining and Technology.

CURRENT FACILITIES: TA-16-260 (and associated support facilities)

I. CORE LANL HIGH EXPLOSIVES (HE) INFRASTRUCTURE CAPABILITIES RELEVANCE
TO NNSA /LANL MISSION LANL currently has an extensive core infrastructure
that provides support to all HE related R&D programmatic activities
conducted both on and off-site. The R&D mission includes supporting over
130 different programs, ranging from characterization of energetic
materials at the atomistic and molecular level through the testing of the
large complex weapon assemblies required for validation and verification
of weapon designs. These activities are necessary for LANL to meet its
stewardship responsibilities for NNSA and the nation. In addition, LANL
is responsible for several production missions that utilize much of the
same core HE infrastructure. These production missions include actual
component production, as well as supporting surveillance activities. The
core infrastructure has evolved to include activities necessary to
provide not only the actual components and assemblies required for
testing, but the required safety, quality, and operational compliance
support for carrying out the R&D and production missions of the
Laboratory. o Core capabilities include: o An ES&H infrastructure
required for supporting HE operations at the Laboratory that is extensive
and addresses all aspects of HE safety as well as requirements from NNSA,
state, and other federal regulatory agencies.

SECTION III. PEOPLE An analysis of the total number of people that
participate in the HE R&D programs at Los Alamos is difficult to
accurately obtain. High Explosives Research and Development is supported
by Campaigns 1 (C1), Primary Assessment, C2, Dynamic Materials
Properties, the Enhanced Surveillance program (C8), as well as from
Directed Stockpile Work (DSW) that provide fundamental research
associated with SFIs and/or certification issues and RTBF. Furthermore,
all of these dollars are leveraged against many of the other programs at
the Laboratory. For example, if we look at the total FTEs that were
funded on DOE dollars from C2 and C8 that we identify as HE R&D
(including those that perform HE/Metal work), we find that a total of ~53
FTEs charged to these codes (95,550 hours; 1800 hours/FTE). However, if
one beaks it down into "individuals," one finds that the 53 FTEs were
spread among 348 employees in ~38 Different Groups from ~15 Divisions.
This is extremely significant: it shows that the HE R&D at Los Alamos is
leveraged extensively with other programs, and it would be difficult, if
not impossible, to transfer this networked relationship to one
consolidated facility. Our best estimate of individuals that work in HE
R&D as technical experts and/or supporting personnel is approximately 350
FTEs (including safety, purchasing, HR, program management, etc.).

IV. FACILITIES SUMMARY
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The LANL HE R&D facilities share some common spaces with the "hydro"
program. For this assessment, we have ignored these overlaps. Thus the
current HE R&D activities are housed in ~ 250,000 sq. ft. in
approximately 120 buildings (magazines, firing points, magazettes, and
rest houses etc., included).

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13
Annual Operations Data Required Annual Electrical energy (kWh) 23365374
Total Electrical demand (kWh) 41133 Fuel usage (gal or yds3) Other
process Gas (N, Ar, etc.) Water (gal) Steam (tons) Plant Footprint
(acres) NM NM NM NM 17 Consumption/ Use

TA-14 (Firing Sites)

TA-15 (Firing Sites)1

TA-36 (Firing Sites)

TA-39 (Firing Sites)

TA-09

TA-16 (Machine Shop, Burn Ground)3

TA-22 Emissions OB/OD (Firing from TA-16- waste Sites) 1484 boiler
treatment

83,424 133

8,568,752 18,359

200,388 624

715,628 3,285

561,600 3,456

10,056,782 3,178,800 8,580 6,696

Employment (workers) 954 Number of Rad Workers Average annual dose (rem)
2 0.097 Maximum worker dose (mem) institutional 1.84 Radionuclide
emissions and effluents-nuclides and Curies (Ci/yr) NAAQS emissions
(lbs/yr) TSP (lbs/yr) (PM) NOx (lbs/yr) CO (lbs/yr) VOC (lbs/yr) SOx
(lbs/yr)

619

335

0.15

0.15

3798 4045 3323 421 375

30.69 3.47 10.23 0.43 0.05

92.07 10.4 30.69 1.29 0.14

878.64 99.14 292.67 12.28 1.32
144.24 16.29 48.08 2.02 0.22

2.5 0.2 5.1 4.4 0.1

410.45 2003.65 2003.65 297.04 32.40

2239.00 1911.50 933.00 103.90 340.42

HE R&D IPT_LANL_ENV Ann Ops

DRAFT
Hazardous Air Pollutants and Effluents (lbs/yr) Chemical use Depleted
uranium (kg/yr) Lead (kg/yr) Beryllium (kg/yr) Aluminum (kg/yr) Copper
(kg/yr) Tantalum (kg/yr) Tungsten (kg/yr) Maximum inventory of fissile
material/throughput Waste Category Low Level Liquid (gal) Solid (m3/yr)
Mixed Low Level Liquid (gal) Solid (m3/yr) TRU Liquid (gal) Solid (m3/yr)
HLW/Spent Fuel Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3) Hazardous Chemical (kg/yr)
Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3) Non-hazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid
(yds3)

146

0.09

0.27

2.54

0.42

0.000243

102.07

40.81

3930 240 90 45450 45330 300 300

30 30

2700 150 30 450 300 300 300

1200 30 30 30

30 30 45000 45000

Volume 0 940 0 17 0 0.20 0 0 48300 0 0 35300 13000

940

0.2

0.9

16

0.2

NM NM

HE R&D IPT_LANL_ENV Ann Ops

DRAFT
Non-hazardous (Other) HEWTF Outfall 05A055

Liquid (mgal) Solid (yds3) Notes: NM= Not Measured at facility NA= Not
Applicable 1. Includes DARHT and other HX Firing sites 2. Institutional
average dose

0.13 0

0.13

OB/OD waste treatment TA-16 TA-36 BG Sum All OB/OD Emissio Waste HE (lbs)
Emissions ns treatment TSP (lbs/yr) 2239.00 (PM) NOx 1911.50 (lbs/yr) CO
933.00 (lbs/yr) VOC (lbs/yr) SOx (lbs/yr) HAP

NAAQS emissions (lbs/yr)

Emission factor

TSP (lbs/yr) (PM) NOx (lbs/yr) CO (lbs/yr)

0.093000 0.010500 0.031000

3000 3000 3000

279.00 31.50 93.00

1960 1880 840

VOC (lbs/yr) SOx (lbs/yr) HAP

0.001300 0.000140 0.000269

3000 3000 3000

3.90 0.42 0.81

100 340 40

103.90 340.42 40.81

HE R&D IPT_LANL_ENV Ann Ops

DRAFT
HE Ann Ops DRAFT

UCRL-MI-227820 Approved for public release Jon Maienschein February 5,
2007 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory HE R&D - December 2006 "As
Is" (current condition for DP) Energetic materials research and
development at LLNL is carried out primarily in two facilities - the High
Explosives Application Facility (HEAF), and the Chemistry, Materials and
Life Sciences Facility at Site 300. The location of these facilities in
the Livermore Valley is shown in the Appendix. More detail on each of
these facilities is given below. Additional activities (primarily
analytical) are carried out in other laboratory facilities involving
small (<1 gram) quantities of explosives; inasmuch as the explosives work
is a minor fraction of the overall activities in these laboratory
facilities, they will not be addressed further here. Note that the term
"energetic materials" includes high explosives, propellants, and
pyrotechnics. Throughout this document we will use the term HE R&D, as
this is the terminology used in the Complex 2030 PEIS process. The
facility descriptions below do not include hydro testing or environmental
testing, as those activities are being addressed by other groups in the
Complex 2030 PEIS planning process. 1. Facilities:

1.A. The High Explosives Application Facility (HEAF) is a full-spectrum
R&D facility housing well-integrated teams of experimental scientists and
engineers, theoretical and computational scientists, and support staff.
The integrated teams perform HE R&D in all aspects of high explosives:
explosive characterization, e.g. physical, chemical, mechanical, thermal,
aging, smallscale safety, compatibility, thermal stability and
decomposition rates, deflagration rates at high temperatures and
pressures performance and safety testing through detonation of up to 10
kg of explosives with precision diagnostics modeling and simulation of
explosive properties and reactions to normal or abnormal stimuli, across
spatial resolutions ranging from molecular through grain-scale to
fullscale hydrodynamics The HEAF includes laboratory areas approved for
handling explosives in quantities up to 10 kg, and office space for the
research and support staff. The net usable area of the facility is
approximately 65,000 square feet. An aerial view of the HEAF is shown in
Figure 1. The floor plan of the laboratory areas of the HEAF is shown in
Figure 2.

This work was performed under the auspices of the U. S. Department of
Energy by the University of California, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory under Contract No. W-7405Eng-48.

Page 1 of 6
Figure 1. The LLNL High Explosives Application Facility. The facility
section at the bottom of the image is the office area; the area behind
that houses the laboratory areas including firing tanks. Experimental
capabilities in HEAF include: o synthesis o formulation o safety testing
o mechanical properties (10-6 to 103 sec-1 strain rate) o permeability /
porosity measurement o thermal properties (e.g. specific heat, thermal
expansion, thermal conductivity) o thermal stability and ignition o
compatibility testing o particle size analysis o high pressure and
temperature deflagration o computed tomography radiography o precision
assembly and metrology o 100-mm gun for measurement of shock response o
fully-contained firing chambers - 1 g, 3 g, 100 g, 150 g, two 1-kg, 10
kg, gun tank o diagnostics for dynamic testing - streak and framing
cameras, laser velocimetry, blast measurement, in-situ embedded pressure
and particle velocity gauges, micropower impulse radar, high-speed video,
flash radiography o femtosecond laser machining of explosives o detonator
development, testing, and surveillance o laser labs for development of
new diagnostics o storage for 66 kilograms of explosives

Page 2 of 6
Figure 2. Floor plan of the laboratory area of the HEAF. Yellow areas
contain explosives characterization labs, the red areas contains firing
chambers and assembly rooms, the green area is diagnostic development
labs, and the blue area is mechanical and electronic support shops.

Page 3 of 6
1.B. The Chemistry, Materials and Life Sciences Facility at Site 300
provides the capability for larger scale synthesis and formulation, HE
R&D part fabrication (e.g. pressing radiography, machining and assembly),
and explosives waste packaging, storage and treatment. These capabilities
are provided by the Chemistry Area, the Process Area, the Explosive Waste
Storage Facility, and the Explosive Waste Treatment Facility. The net
usable space is approximately 35,000 square feet. Chemistry Area (scale-
up of formulation and synthesis of HE) - (Figure 3) o B825 - 1- and 2-
inch mechanical presses o B826 - small deaerator/loader; 1-pint, 1-gallon
mixers o B827 Complex - 50-pound deaerator/loader; heating ovens; 2-
gallon to 5-gallon mixers; melt cast kettles; synthesis pilot plant;
slurry kettles, grinders, reaction vessels o HE storage magazines - long
term and temporary storage

Figure 3. Chemistry Area at Site 300, providing scale up of formulation
and synthesis of HE. The central building houses a control room, with
three remote buildings in earth buried structures (one visible at lower
left, others shown by presence of conduits leading from control room to
each building. Process Area o B809 Complex - 25-inch isostatic press,
drying ovens o B817 Complex - 14- & 18-inch isostatic presses, drying
ovens o B823 Complex - 9-Mev, 2-Mev, 120-kev radiography of HE R&D parts
o B806 Complex, B807 - machining of HE R&D parts o B855 Complex - Large
HE part machining o B810 Complex - assembly of HE R&D parts o B805 -
general machine shop, explosives waste packaging, NC machine programming
o HE storage magazines - long term and temporary storage

Page 4 of 6
Explosives Waste Storage Facility o 5 HE storage magazines - State
permitted storage facility Explosives Waste Treatment Facility o B845
Complex - State permitted for Open Burn/Open Detonation of explosives
waste (Note - this list does not include other Site 300 facilities such
as Contained Firing, open firing sites, or environmental testing)

Figure 4. A portion of the Process Area at Site 300. Shown are B.806
(foreground), B807 directly behind B806 to the left, B805 behind B806 to
the right, and the EWSF at the top of the photo. 2. Staff: approximately
175 scientists, engineers, and technicians

Page 5 of 6
Appendix - Location of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory HE R&D
Sites in the Livermore Valley

Page 6 of 6
Table 1. Pantex HE R&D "To Be" Options
3/28/2007 Consolidating LANL/LLNL HE R&D @ Pantex Estimated HE Mission
Areas Floorspace Floorspace (ft2) R&D Synthesis 15,000 3,000 Annual
Incremental O&M $ $2M + Lab $ $2M + Lab $

Delta

Initial $ (est. in $M)

Critical PX Competencies Synthetic Chemists Chem Engineers Eng
Technicians Facility Managers Chem Engineers Eng Technicans Facility
Manager Pressing Engineers Fabrication Engineers Eng Technicians
Machinists Metrologists Programmers Component Engineers Process Engineers
Elec. Engineers Eng Technicians

Comments

FTEs

Lab FTEs Total FTEs

6,000 No changes 1,500 Minor mods

$

5

Pilot-scale production Lab-scale

4

8

12

Formulation

40,000

16,000

New facility

$

75

$2M + Lab $

Mods required for production mission as well Lab-scale

4

8
12

Fabrication

50,000 40,000

15,000 New facility 12,000 Minor mods

$ $

85 3

$2M + Lab $

Currently at CD-2 approval (production rqmt)

6

6

12

Components

5,000 30,000

1,500 No changes 15,000 Major mods

$5M + Lab $ $ 20

10 Detonator development & testing (w/mfg)

10

20

HE RD PX (TO BE) Input Rev 2 Sanitized w-RD (3)

S. G. Hallett
HE Mission Areas

Estimated Floorspace Floorspace (ft2) R&D 8,000 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,000
4,000 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,000

Delta

Initial $ (est. in $M)

Annual Incremental O&M $ $5M + Lab $

Critical PX Competencies Physicists Elec. Engineers Mech. Engineers
Materials Engineeers Eng Technicians

Comments

FTEs

Lab FTEs Total FTEs

D-Testing

No changes Minor mods No changes Inter mods Minor mods

$ $ $

5 15 3

2 contained chambers (1 kg & 2 kg) Safety Testing (outdoor pad-90 kg)
Outdoor pad (80 kg) Contained chamber (10 kg) Safety Overtest

6

10

16

Non D-Testing

5,000 5,000 2,000

2,500 New facility 2,500 Minor mods 1,000 No changes

$2M + Lab $ $ 2

Radiographers Physicists Acoustic Engineers QA Engineeers Quality
Technicians Chemists Physicists Technicians

Currently at CD-2 approval (production rqmt)

4

4
8

Chemical Testing

15,000 12,000

7,500 Inter mods 6,000 No changes

$

10

$3M + Lab $

Specific analytical equipment required

8

10

18

Explosive Safety

No changes

$1M + Lab $

Safety Engineers Physicists Equipment operators Facility Managers
Technicians Bldg Manager Administative Staff Admin space for Lab staff

4

4

8

Storage/Logistics Disposal 3,000 2,000 18,000 900 600 18,000

No changes Permitting Permitting $ $ $ 1 1 10

$3M $3M + Lab $

8 1 1

0 0 0

8 1 1

Lab Staff Support Fac

~$1M

262,500
114,750

$ $

235 150

~$31M + Lab $ totals ~$31M + Lab $ totals w/o HEPF

56

60

116

HE RD PX (TO BE) Input Rev 2 Sanitized w-RD (3)

S. G. Hallett
Table 2. Pantex HE R&D "To Be" Options
Consolidating LANL/LLNL/SNL HE R&D @ Pantex Estimated Floorspace R&D
Annual Incremental O&M $ $2M + Lab $ $ 5

HE Mission Areas

Floorspace (ft2) 15,000 3,000

Delta

Initial $ (est.)

Critical PX Competencies Synthetic Chemists Chem Engineers Eng
Technicians Facility Managers Chem Engineers Eng Technicans Facility
Manager Pressing Engineers Fabrication Engineers Eng Technicians
Machinists Metrologists Programmers

Comments

FTEs

Lab FTEs Total FTEs

Synthesis

6,000 No changes 1,500 Minor mods

Pilot-scale production Lab-scale

4

8

12

Formulation

30,000 10,000

12,000 Major mods 4,000 No changes

$

25

$2M + Lab $

Mods required for production mission as well Lab-scale

4

8

12
Fabrication

40,000 40,000

12,000 New facility 12,000 Minor mods

$ $

85 3

$2M + Lab $

Currently at CD-2 approval (production rqmt)

6

10

16

Components

72,000

57,600 New Facility

$

150

$10M + Lab $

Component Engineers Process Engineers Elec. Engineers Small Component
Dev. & Testing Eng Technicians

10

30

40

D-Testing

8,000 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,000

4,000 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,000

No changes No changes No changes Inter mods Minor mods

$7M + Lab $ $ $ $ 5 15 3

Physicists Elec. Engineers Mech. Engineers Materials Engineeers Quality
Engineers Heavy equip operators
2 contained chambers (1 kg & 2 kg) Safety Testing (outdoor pad-90 kg)
Outdoor pad (80 kg) Contained chamber (10 kg) Safety Overtest

6

16

22

Non D-Testing

10,000 5,000 2,000

5,000 2,500 No changes 1,000 Minor mods $ 2 10

$4M + Lab $

Radiographers Physicists Acoustic Engineers QA Engineeers Quality
Technicians Chemists Physicists Technicians

Currently at CD-2 approval (production rqmt)

4

8

12

Chemical Testing

15,000 12,000

7,500 Inter mods 6,000 No changes

$

$5M + Lab $

Specific analytical equipment required

8

16

24

HE RD PX (TO BE) Input Rev 2 Sanitized w-RD (3)

S. G. Hallett
HE Mission Areas

Floorspace (ft2)

Floorspace R&D

Delta

Initial $ (est.)

Incremental O&M $ $2M + Lab $

Critical PX Competencies Safety Engineers Physicists Equipment operators
Facility Managers Technicians Bldg Manager Administative Staff

Comments

FTEs

Lab FTEs Total FTEs

Explosive Safety

No changes

5

6

11

Storage/Logistics Disposal 3,000 2,000 18,000 18,000 900 600

No changes Permitting Permitting $ $ $ 1 1 10

$3M $3M + Lab $

8 1 2 Admin space for Lab staff

0 0 0

8 1 2

Lab Staff Support Fac

$1M

$ $ 294,500 155,350

315 230

~$41M + Lab $ ~$41M + Lab $ totals 58 102 160

HE RD PX (TO BE) Input Rev 2 Sanitized w-RD (3)
S. G. Hallett
Table 3. Pantex HE R&D "To Be" Options
3/28/2007 Construction Data for Consolidating LANL/LLNL HE R&D @ Pantex
Project Type New Construction Project name Pilot-Scale Formulation
Facility Data Required Peak electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel
(tons) Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total Footprint
(new or added) Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment
(workers) Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level
Hazardous Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other) Peak electrical
energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown
Size Parking Lots Total Footprint (new or added) Employment Total
employment (worker years) Peak Employment (workers) Construction period
(years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level Hazardous Hazardous Non-Hazardous
(sanitary & other) Peak electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel
(tons) Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total Footprint
(new or added) Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment
(workers) Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level
Hazardous Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other) Peak electrical
energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown
Size Parking Lots Total Footprint (new or added) Employment Project
Consumption 9.0 11,335.0 1,800.0 1,000,000.0 6.6 1.2 0.5 50,000.0 77.0
90.0 3.0 <0.1 na 77.4 9.0 11,005.0 1,935.0 1,000,000.0 13.0 2.0 0.2
50,000.0 77.0 90.0 3.0 <0.1 na 77.4 5.0 <100 180.0 100,000.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 25.0 30.0 3.0 <0.1 2.0 20.0 5.0 1,000.0 50.0 100,000.0 0.5 0.5 0.2
5,000.0

New Construction

HE Pressing Faclity (CD-2)

Facility Modification

Small Components

Facility Modification

Contained Chamber/Gas Guns
Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment (workers) Construction
period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level Hazardous Hazardous Non-
Hazardous (sanitary & other) Facility Modification Analytical Expansion
Peak electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water (gal) Land
(acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total Footprint (new or added)
Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment (workers)
Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level Hazardous
Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other) Peak electrical energy (Mwe)
Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown Size Parking
Lots Total Footprint (new or added) Employment Total employment (worker
years) Peak Employment (workers) Construction period (years) Waste
Generated (yd3) Low-Level Hazardous Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary &
other) Peak electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water
(gal) Land (acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total Footprint (new or
added) Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment
(workers) Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level
Hazardous Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other)

15.0 20.0 2.0 1.0 5.0 20.0 1.0 500.0 20.0 20,000.0

0.0 5,000.0 15 20 2 <0.1 0 20 2.0 650.0 75.0 200,000.0 1.0 0.2 0.1
18,000.0 25.0 35.0 2.0 <0.1 0.0 40.0 5.0 20.0 20.0 200,000.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 30.0 40.0 2.0 <0.1 5.0 50.0

New Construction

Administrative Support Bldg

General Modifications All other intermediate & minor mods
Table 4. Pantex HE R&D "To Be" Options
3/28/2007 Construction Data for Consolidating LANL/LLNL/SNL HE R&D @
Pantex Project Type New Construction Project name Small Component
Facility Data Required Peak electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel
(tons) Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total Footprint
(new or added) Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment
(workers) Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level
Hazardous Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other) Peak electrical
energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown
Size Parking Lots Total Footprint (new or added) Employment Total
employment (worker years) Peak Employment (workers) Construction period
(years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level Hazardous Hazardous Non-Hazardous
(sanitary & other) Peak electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel
(tons) Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total Footprint
(new or added) Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment
(workers) Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level
Hazardous Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other) Peak electrical
energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown
Size Parking Lots Total Footprint (new or added) Employment Total
employment (worker years) Peak Employment (workers) Construction period
(years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level Hazardous Hazardous Non-Hazardous
(sanitary & other) Project Consumption 7.0 7,550.0 275.0 750,000.0 4.0
1.0 0.6 72,000.0 58.0 68.0 3.0 <0.1 na 58.0 7.0 11,005.0 1,935.0
1,000,000.0 13.0 2.0 0.2 50,000.0 77.0 90.0 3.0 <0.1 na 77.4 5.0 1,000.0
50.0 100,000.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 25.0 30.0 2.0 <0.1 2.0 20.0 5.0 1,000.0
50.0 100,000.0 0.5 0.5 0.2 5,000.0 15.0 20.0 2.0 1.0 5.0 20.0

New Construction

HE Pressing Facility

Facility Modification

Pilot-Scale Formulation Facility

Facility Modification

Contained Chamber/Gas Guns
Facility Modification

Analytical Expansion

Peak electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water (gal) Land
(acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total Footprint (new or added)
Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment (workers)
Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level Hazardous
Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other) Peak electrical energy (Mwe)
Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown Size Parking
Lots Total Footprint (new or added) Employment Total employment (worker
years) Peak Employment (workers) Construction period (years) Waste
Generated (yd3) Low-Level Hazardous Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary &
other) Peak electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water
(gal) Land (acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total Footprint (new or
added) Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment
(workers) Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level
Hazardous Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other)

1.0 500.0 20.0 20,000.0

0.0 5,000.0 15 20 2 <0.1 0 20 2.0 650.0 75.0 200,000.0 1.0 0.2 0.1
18,000.0 25.0 35.0 2.0 <0.1 0.0 40.0 5.0 20.0 20.0 200,000.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 30.0 40.0 2.0 <0.1 5.0 50.0

New Construction

Administrative Support Bldg

General Modifications All other intermediate & minor mods
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Title:

Los Alamos National Laboratory Alternative Descriptions for the Complex
2030 High Explosives R&D Integrated Product Team (HE R&D IPT) Study

Author(s):

David J. Funk and John C. Dallman

Intended for:

Complex 2030 Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for HE R&D

Los Alamos National Laboratory, an affirmative action/equal opportunity
employer, is operated by the Los Alamos National Security, LLC for the
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Los Alamos National Laboratory Alternative Descriptions for the Complex
2030 High Explosives R&D Integrated Product Team (HE R&D IPT) Study David
J. Funk and John C. Dallman Dynamic and Energetic Materials Division Los
Alamos National Laboratory Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA 87545
Los Alamos National Laboratory Alternative Descriptions for the Complex
2030 High Explosives R&D Integrated Product Team (HE R&D IPT) Study David
J. Funk and John C. Dallman Dynamic and Energetic Materials Division Los
Alamos National Laboratory Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA 87545

Los Alamos National Laboratory Location1 LANL occupies about 40 square
miles (104 square kilometers) of land on the eastern flank of the Jemez
Mountains along the area known as the Pajarito Plateau. The terrain in
the LANL area consists of mesa tops and canyon bottoms that trend in a
west-to-east manner, with the canyons intersecting the Rio Grande River
to the east of LANL. Elevations at LANL range from about 7,800 feet
(2,380 meters) at the highest elevation on the western side of the site
to about 6,200 feet (1,890 meters) at the lowest point along the eastern
boundary at the Rio Grande River. LANL operations are conducted within
numerous facilities located over 47 designated Technical Areas (TAs)
within LANL's boundaries and at other leased properties situated near
LANL. The leased properties in the town of Los Alamos are assigned the
temporary designation of "TA-0." An additional TA, TA-57, is located
about 20 miles (32 kilometers) west of LANL at Fenton Hill on land
administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service. The 47
contiguous TAs (which are not numbered sequentially) have been
established so that together they comprise the entirety of the LANL site
(see Figure 1 and Figure 2).

1

Text and Data for this report has been taken from the LANL draft SWEIS
(2005) unless otherwise indicated.
 pr-7..- A-
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- A .
.-4ggi_:j?ggil   :51L-- VM{aki-
iv   i C-L. Q- wg ir 4 V1 Lf- ?wzx,_Qv `rsx gif    . .-
Lx-. ~xwLos Alamos National Laboratory Sita
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LosAIamos



Figure 2. Site map for LANL. LANL is divided into Technical Areas (TA).
HE R&D and supporting work is conducted at TAs 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 22, 35,
36, 39, 40, 46, and 53.
No Action Alternative Under no action, Los Alamos National Laboratory
will maintain its current capabilities and will continue the effort to
reduce square footage and modernize infrastructure as identified in its
DX Consolidation and Modernization Plan (200x) that received a Finding of
No Significant Impact or "FONSI" (reference). These capabilities include
a broad, cross-disciplinary team approach across multiple directorates
and divisions (i.e., C, DE, HX, W, WT, LANSCE, MST, MPA, P, T, and X) to
meet the demands of responsible Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship
(SBSS), as well as with other National Nuclear Security Administration
/Department of Energy (NNSA/DOE) organizations, external agencies (e.g.,
Department of Defense [DoD], Defense Threat Reduction Agency [DTRA], and
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency [DARPA]), and multiple
university collaborations. Shown in the chart below (Table 1), is the
summary of the notional strategy we have at Los Alamos to close many
facilities and replace them with fewer, modern facilities. The Shock and
Detonation Physics Building, or SDP, is a GPP building that is currently
awaiting DOE to approve the increase of GPP from $5 M to $10 M (this has
already been changed by Congress, but DOE has not issued a corresponding
order). The other major facility on the list is the High Explosive
Characterization facility or HEC. This facility, as currently envisioned,
would require congressional approval prior to construction (~ $30-40 M).
In total, the reduction previously identified would decrease out
footprint by roughly ~28%. Our DA core energetic materials (EM)
competency thrust areas can be summed up briefly by the following: o o o
"Ensure the Deterrent"- i.e., ensure and extend HE performance of our
enduring stockpile weapons over their design lifetime. "Prevent the
Event" - i.e., maintain and improve the HE safety of our enduring and
legacy stockpile over their design lifetime either under accident
conditions or attack "Enhance the Triad" through Transformation,
Integration, and Responsiveness to be "Ready for 2030" - i.e., develop,
optimize, and strategically position the NNSA's Design Agency (DA) and
Production Agency (PA) capabilities to possess the technical edge
ensuring our National Security posture for nuclear and nonnuclear strike
capabilities.

Each of these thrust areas can be further categorized between engineering
and physics certification and assessment requirements, and the 'hand-in-
hand' relationship between the engineering and physics assessments.
Engineering performance can be defined as the requirement for a specific
nuclear weapon component to perform within design specifications and
tolerances throughout its intended stockpile lifetime, and through the
Stockpile-to-TargetSequence (STS) to the point of delivery. Science-based
stockpile stewardship simulations should be able to accurately predict
any deviations thereof. Potential HE deviations would impact the nuclear
weapon primary's physics performance, i.e., the hydrodynamic implosion
behavior and response of the primary. HE engineering safety assessments
require a science-based understanding of nonshock initiation and reaction
propagation mechanisms (i.e., impact, friction, shear and/or cook-off by
accident or by attack) that could potentially lead to physical damage
and/or a chemical reaction in the high explosive. Physics safety
evaluates whether or not the potential situation could lead to special
nuclear material (SNM) dispersal and/or inadvertent nuclear detonation
(IND).
New Triad enhancements for nuclear and nonnuclear strike capabilities
demand a responsive NNSA infrastructure to target SBSS advancements in
both EM performance and safety through multiple technological avenues.
Examples include new synthesis and formulations routes essential to
accelerate the development and incorporation of selected advanced EMs
into defined weapons applications, as well as extend our understanding of
these new class of materials for potential strategic applications. In
particular, to identify candidate materials to serve as replacements for
older EMs and/or inerts employed evaluation of performance, safety,
reliability, and/or artificial aging characteristics for enhanced
surveillance studies of existing of HE systems. Additional experimental
R&D integrated with theory and model development is required to advance
our understanding and predictive capabilities of the controlling
variables that dominate the performance or safety behavioral responses.
Furthermore, the future stockpile is expected to have surveillance
properties and periods that provide a more rapid, realistic assessment of
the "state of health" of the weapon (e.g. on board real time or embedded
sensor technologies), and with technological advances that yield less
frequent change-out of components (e.g. self-healing binder systems in
modern PBXs). Thus the future of High Explosive or Energetic Material R&D
will not be dominated by old familiar problems relating to performance
and performance predictability, but will be related to modernization and
consolidation, answering important questions regarding safety, surety,
and the development of technological advances that will make our systems
more reliable and secure.
Table 1. Facilities and Sites as part of LANL "As Is" or no action
alternative.
HE R&D BUILDINGS - LANL STRUCTURES THAT WILL REMAIN AFTER HE R&D
CONSOLIDATION TA 6 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 16 16 16 15 36 36 36
36 36 36 36 BLDG 124 36 38 39 40 42 44 45 46 47 48 49 52 53 54 55 265 260
389 1508 446 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 BLDGNAME warehouse MAGAZINE PROCESS LAB
MAGAZINE ENVIRONMENTAL CHAMBERS PROCESS LAB MAGAZINE PROCESS LAB STORAGE
BLDG MAGAZINE MACHINING BLDG MAGAZINE MAGAZINE MAGAZINE MAGAZINE MAGAZINE
BOILER BLDG HE PROCESSING & RESTHOUSES Bun Grounds control room HE
wastewater treatment facility FIRING ACCESS CONTROL FACILITY PREPARATION
BLDG CONTROL BLDG MAGAZINE MAGAZINE PREPARATION BLDG CONTROL BUNKER
INSTRUMENT CHAMBER INTGROSS 7,025 156 1385 156 722 1682 156 1385 1557 156
2951 156 156 156 324 744 120 48413 192 845 2937 476 476 42 336 532 1101
42
36 36 36 36 37 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40

20 48 83 86 3 4 5 6 56 63 64 67 68 69 77 88 89 95 97 98 111 138 183 2 3 6
8 9 10 11 13

INSTRUMENT CHAMBER waste storage MAGAZINE X-RAY STRUCTURE RETAINED HE
MAGAZINES MAGAZINE TRIM BLDG READY MAGAZINE FIRING CHAMBER #1 GUN BLDG
EQUIPMENT SHELTER EQUIPMENT SHELTER CAPACITOR BANK ENCLO STORAGE BLDG
LIGHT GAS GUN FACILI MAGAZINE FIRING CHAMBER GAS GUN SUPPORT BUIL
CAPACITOR BANK BUNKE TRAILER BAY ADMINISTRATION/SHOPS PULSED POWER BLDG
NEUTRON FLUX STORAGE GUARD STA # 468 MAGAZINE PREPARATION BLDG
PREPARATION BLDG CONTAINMENT VESSEL GAS GUNS FACILITY MAGAZINE
PREPARATION & UTILIT MAGAZINE TOTAL

42 342 904 2827 8,627 289 684 100 362 238 231 231 269 241 1882 168 952
1624 799 1802 5105 1076 95 89 42 120 120 448 4129 42 743 78 109,080 new
admin bld
STRUCTURES THAT WILL BE REMOVED AS PART OF HE R&D CONSOLIDATION TA 9 9 9
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 16 BLDG 20
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 29 30 31 32 33 34 37 50 204 208 272 273 282 6 22 23
24 30 34 40 43 69 430 BLDGNAME OFFICE BLDG LAB & OFFICE BLDG MAGAZINE
MAGAZINE MAGAZINE MAGAZINE MAGAZINE MAGAZINE STOCK & EQUIP BLDG GAS
STORAGE SOLVENT STORAGE LAB/OFFICE BLDG LAB BLDG PROCESS LAB PROCESS LAB
RECEIVING & SHIPPING REFRIGERATOR SHELTER DAY MAGAZINE TRANSPORTABLE
TRANSPORTABLE STEAM BOILER PLANT 13 STORAGE BLDG MAGAZINE (Q EAST FIRING
AREA) CONTROL BLDG (Q EAST FIRING AREA) MAGAZINE(Q EAST FIRING AREA)
EXPLOSIVE PREP BLDG CONTROL BLDG INSTRUMENTATION BLDG ASSEMBLY & STORAGE
B SEMI-TRAILER HE PRESSING and Rest houses 435, 437 INTGROSS 154 24593 3
3 3 3 3 3 4472 200 280 2288 736 1557 1385 510 40 18 1620 1590 1131 595 36
440 8 144 276 55 899 258 25030 HEC HEC HEC HEC HEC HEC HEC HEC Replaced
by HEC HEC HEC HEC HEC HEC HEC HEC HEC HEC HEC HEC HEC HEC HEC HEC HEC
HEC HEC HEC HEC and heating upgrades
36 36 37 39 39 39 39 39 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 46 69
69 69 69

104 55 7 8 57 101 139 1 12 14 15 16 23 36 37 38 39 40 41 45 90 30 1 2 5
26

SHOP CONTROL BLDG DISPOSITIONED MAGAZINES FIRING SITE FIRING SITE FIRING
CHAMBER TRAILER SHED LABORATORY & OFFICE FIRING POINT PREPARATION BLDG
FIRING POINT UTILITY SHED MACHINE SHOP MAGAZINE MAGAZINE MAGAZINE
MAGAZINE INERT PREPARATION BLDG LABORATORY BLDG SOLVENT SHED
TRANSPORTABLE laser labs GUARD STA DOUBLEWIDE TRAILER TRAILER GUARD STA
#431 total

551 608 2,349 490 582 362 286 262 5354 1129 120 392 224 7774 42 42 78 78
336 336 84 1484 4183 166 1598 668 43 97954 SDP after move of guns&Ch8 to
TA-22 after move of guns&Ch8 to TA-22 after move of guns&Ch8 to TA-22
after move of guns&Ch8 to TA-22 after move of guns&Ch8 to TA-22 after
move of guns&Ch8 to TA-22 SDP HEC HEC ARG Building outside fence for
uncleared Building outside fence for uncleared ARG SDP HEC VESSEL
FACILITY VESSEL FACILITY VESSEL FACILITY

RECENT HE R&D FOOTPRINT REDUCTIONS TA 39 39 40 BLDG 2 62 4 BLDGNAME LAB
OFFICE BLDG STORAGE BLDG FIRING SITE INTGROSS 12515 1457 346 TRANSFERRED
TO TR TRANSFERRED TO TR
40 40 39 39 9 9 16 16

43 19 103 107 35 43 463 340

STORAGE BLDG GUARD STATION OFFICE TRAILER OFFICE TRAILER PROCESS LAB
PROCESS LAB Rest House HE PROCESSING

216 189 1382 1050 1677 1457 829 25440 46558 HEC did not take credit for
space reduction

NEW HE R&D SPACE/PROJECTS VESSEL FACILITY: 4 GPP Projects that provide 10
kg walk in containment vessels in light duty structures HEC: Line item
project to provide HE characterization - ~$35M SDP: GPP to provide modern
office and lab space for shock wave physics Building outside fence for
uncleared: GPP office/ light lab for uncleared workers REPLACEMENT
CONSOLIDATED TA22 shop: GPP machine shop building ARG: GPP project to
relocate security entrance total Current Status (Including Recent
Reductions) 253,592 sf CONSOLIDATED 180,880 sf PLANNED SPACE REDUCTION
72,712 sf 7,500 43000 12000 5000 4000 300 71,800
Alternative End-states Considered by the HE R&D IPT Downsize/Consolidate
Functions 2a Downsize in Place 2b Relocate HE Processing & Fabrication
from Site 300 - after hydro replacement facilities are in place,
authorized and fully functional (Hydro IPT option 2.2 or 2.3) and after
environmental test replacement facilities are in place, authorized and
fully functional (Env. Test IPT option 3). 2b' LLNL HEAF Annex for local
part fab Donor N/A LLNL Receiver N/A Pantex

LLNL

2c

2d 2e 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f 3g

Consolidate open-air 1-10 kg HE R&D experiments from LANL and Sandia to
HEAF and over 10 kg thru 100 kg HE R&D experiments at LANL (Phase out
firing sites for DP mission, possible WFO use). No new construction.
Consolidate unconfined firing to one or no sites. Consolidate Maincharge
HE R&D Experiments and Testing to one or both nuclear labs. Consolidate
to LANL Consolidate to LLNL Consolidate to Pantex Consolidate to SNL
Consolidate from LANL to LLNL or Pantex Consolidate from LLNL to LANL or
Pantex Consolidate from LANL and LLNL to Pantex

LANL, SNL ALL SNL SNL, LLNL, Pantex SNL, LANL, Pantex SNL, LANL, LLNL
LANL, LLNL, Pantex LANL LLNL LANL, LANL

Pantex. HEAF, Private industry LLNL

ALL LANL, LLNL LANL LLNL Pantex SNL LLNL, Pantex LANL, Pantex Pantex

Table 2. List of alternative end-states being considered for optimized
consolidation. Option 2a: Downsize in Place The LANL "as is" plan is the
DX Consolidation Plan presented to the HE R&D IPT in late February.
Downsizing in place will include a re-evaluation of this plan that will
involve both consolidation and transformation of our facilities, as well
as our operational paradigm. This downsizing will include a significant
reduction in footprint (from "as-is") and a complete transformation from
open air firing to contained firing. This downsizing can be accomplished
with only a small amount of new construction and the installation of one
or two additional contained firing vessels. As we evaluate this new
operational paradigm, we will be applying the latest in work flow
optimization software and work flow analysis. This will allow us to
develop best in class
efficiencies while using a minimal residual footprint directly applied to
required mission related work. This change will have a significant impact
on our environmental impact with expected order of magnitude reductions
in waste and physical environmental impact. These details are currently
being discussed and this "down-sizing" falls within our current SWEIS as
realized by our receipt of a FONSI for the DX Consolidation Plan. Option
2c: Consolidate Open Air 1-10kg Shots to HEAF and 10-100 kg Shots to LANL
Consolidation of open-air 1-10 kg shots at HEAF with simultaneous
consolidation of 10-100 kg shots to LANL would impact LANL's "As-Is" and
"Downsize in place" alternatives. We expect that we would have limited
closure of our firing points so that we could meet the need of these
demands, including shots from LLNL's 850 and 851, SNLs, 9920, 9930, 9939,
9940, Thunder Range, and surveillance and destructive testing from
Pantex. Thus, we expect no benefit to our environmental impact from
consolidation of 1-10 kg due to the increased impact of 10-100 kg.
Furthermore, additional consolidation will likely not be possible and
instead, expansion would likely occur, primarily in terms of personnel
needed to manufacture parts and those needed to conduct the additional
explosive operations. Option 2d: Consolidate unconfined firing to one or
no sites While operating with no open firing is actually part of LANL's
longer term internal planning, operating without an Open Burn/Open
Detonation (OB/OD) site appears, on the surface, to be impossible. We
currently operate an EM&R site that includes open detonation of
suspect/terrorist threat devices for the Laboratory and the County of Los
Alamos. This site is a destruct site that may always require some outdoor
capability (for example destruction of a "car bomb"). In addition, we use
our OB/OD permit to eliminate "Class L" explosives and to sanitize
classified remains of hydrodynamic experiments. OB/OD is a separately
permitted function that may not allow dual use of facilities. For
example, a contained firing vessel for programmatic testing may not also
be used as a waste treatment facility. Thus, replacement of all OB/OD
likely requires additional construction of a separately permitted
contained destruct capability (e.g. incineration, super critical water
oxidation, base hydrolysis or molten salt reactors). Furthermore, were we
to consolidate unconfined firing to LANL, the consolidation would impact
LANL's "As-Is" and "Downsize in place" alternatives. We expect that we
would have no closure of any of our active firing points so that we could
meet the need of the increased demand, including shots from LLNL's 850
and 851, SNLs, 9920, 9930, 9939, 9940, Thunder Range, and surveillance
and destructive testing from Pantex. Thus, this scenario would add
additional impacts that would need to be reviewed separately from option
3a, since in option 3a, the Pantex surveillance and destruct shots would
not have moved to LANL. Option 2e: Consolidate Maincharge HE R&D Exp. &
Testing to LANL and LLNL LANL has the current infrastructure to absorb
main charge HE R&D experiments and testing that SNL is currently
conducting at its site, with minimal or no impact. The tri-axial
mechanical testing could be located in an explosive testing bay, and all
thermal explosion studies could easily be conducted by LANL at its firing
sites. Option 3a: Consolidate HE R&D to LANL From LLNL To consolidate HE
R&D at LANL from LLNL would involve an increase of capacity for the types
of experiments and capabilities that currently exist at LANL to support
the Nuclear Explosive Package work and WFO work (See LANL transfer in
3b,e-g below), plus some additional
capabilities (e.g. injection molding). This results from the fact that
LLNL's mission requirements are similar in scope and applicability as
LANL's. Thus we would need to absorb approximately 210,000 square feet of
LLNL office and Laboratory space (though this is a worst case estimate).
From SNL To absorb SNLs HE R&D we will need the capability and capacity
to support the 70+ types of explosive components currently in the
stockpile, as well as the work required to develop advanced explosive
components for future use. We will have to be able to conduct the
following type of experiments and testing: o work with all explosive
materials: secondary & primary explosives, pyrotechnics and propellants o
conduct experiments and tests that are aimed to aid in the design and
development of nonnuclear components (stockpile and advanced components)
o conduct the experiments and testing required to develop the
constitutive models being developed to assess surety of the weapon
systems o develop the responsiveness and agility required to immediately
address the HE R&D related issues that arise during production of
explosive non-nuclear components To meet these needs, we would have to
construct an "ECF-like" facility at Los Alamos that would replicate the
capabilities that currently exist at SNL (50,000-105,000 square feet of
facility, depending on how we optimize our current non-nuclear
manufacturing capability). From Pantex The scope of HE R&D conducted at
Pantex could be easily absorbed by LANL in either its "As-Is" Down-sizing
in place alternatives with little or no impact. All: HE R&D Firing
Operations Finally, to absorb the full HE R&D mission we would need to
maintain our full suite of open-air firing sites and we would expect no
reduction in emissions, and we expect the need to increase the numbers of
personnel to fabricate and execute explosive operations.
TA-62 Location of Consolidation

TA-3

We expect that the construction would occur near TA-22, where the
original DX Consolidation was to have occurred. We have extensive real
estate and power access that would be available for the consolidation.

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Option 3b-e,g: Consolidate HE R&D from LANL To be a receiver site for
LANL's HE R&D, the prospective site must have the following capabilities:
o The ability to fabricate parts from standard and research explosives in
support of Defense program and Work For Others contracts. o The ability
to conduct experiments that validate simulations and predict deviations
that could potentially impact the nuclear weapon primary's physics
performance, i.e., the hydrodynamic implosion behavior and response of
the primary, including shock initiation studies using open-air firing
sites, contained firing, and precision gas guns. o The ability to conduct
experiments that probe nonshock initiation and reaction propagation
mechanisms (i.e., impact, friction, shear and/or cook-off by accident or
by attack) that could potentially lead to physical damage and/or a
chemical reaction in the high explosive. o The ability to examine new
synthesis and formulations routes essential to accelerate the development
and incorporation of selected advanced EMs into defined weapons
applications (including pilot scale synthesis and formulation). o The
ability to identify candidate materials to serve as replacements for
older EMs and/or inerts o The ability to evaluate performance, safety,
reliability, and/or artificial aging characteristics for enhanced
surveillance studies of existing and future weapon systems. o Conduct
experimental R&D that is integrated with theory and model development
required to advance our understanding and predictive capabilities of the
controlling variables that dominate the physics and engineering
performance or safety behavioral responses. o Develop rapid, realistic
assessment of the "state of health" of the weapon (e.g. on board real
time or embedded sensor technologies), and with technological advances
that yield less frequent change-out of components (e.g. self-healing
binder systems in modern PBXs). o Develop new materials and concepts
that, when combined with nuclear design concepts, lead to innovative
concepts in surety. o Complete analytical services o The ability to
combine, radiography, photography, velocimetry and other diagnostics to
understand the nature of explosive-metal interaction leading to enhanced
predictive capability for predicting strength, damage, spall etc. o The
ability to field a full suite of WFO dynamic experimentation requiring
heavy lab, explosive lab facilities, and test fire capability. o Ability
to field experiments in response to SFIs in a timely manner. o Safety and
Operational infrastructure needed to meet the above requirements. o
Complete DOT compliant energetic material shipping and receiving
capability We expect that the receiver site will have some duplication;
the worst case scenario would involve the construction of approximately
180,000 sq. of mixed office/laboratory space. In our future needs, we
expect to need two indoor firing facilities (not including boomboxes) and
two outdoor facilities with load limits of ~2000 lbs each. We have
estimated that the our HE R&D mission requires the support of 300-350
FTEs (including ES&H, HR, Facility Maintenance, etc.). Worst case would
dictate that an additional 350 FTEs would be required at the receiver
site to meet the full needs of the HE R&D mission. Finally, we have not
included the costs of D&D, but we would expect that the costs would be
comparable or greater than those for Site 300 (estimated @ $350 M), if we
were to return the
site "green field", given the quantity and types of materials that were
tested during the last 64 years. Option 3f: Consolidate HE R&D from LLNL
to LANL To consolidate HE R&D at LANL from LLNL would involve an increase
of capacity for the types of experiments and capabilities that currently
exist at LANL to support the Nuclear Explosive Package work and WFO work
(See LANL 's description in 3b,e-g) plus some additional capabilities
(e.g. injection molding). This results from the fact that LLNL's mission
requirements are similar in scope and applicability as LANL's. Thus we
would need to absorb approximately 210,000 square feet of LLNL office and
Laboratory space (this is a worst case estimate), and we expect to
consolidate at TA-22. LANL Emissions Listed in Table 3, is the LANL
determination of emissions, etc. that would need to be absorbed by the
receiver site:

Annual Operations Data Required Annual Electrical energy (kWh) Total
Electrical demand (kWh) 3 Fuel usage (gal or yds ) Other process Gas (N,
Ar, etc.) Water (gal) Steam (tons) Plant Footprint (acres) Employment
(workers) Number of Rad Workers 2 Average annual dose (rem) Maximum
worker dose (mem) institutional Radionuclide emissions and effluents-
nuclides and Curies (Ci/yr) NAAQS emissions (lbs/yr) TSP (lbs/yr) (PM)
NOx (lbs/yr) CO (lbs/yr) VOC (lbs/yr) SOx (lbs/yr) Hazardous Air
Pollutants and Effluents (lbs/yr) Chemical use Depleted uranium (kg/yr)
Lead (kg/yr) Beryllium (kg/yr) Aluminum (kg/yr) Copper (kg/yr) Tantalum
(kg/yr)

Consumption/Use 23365374 41133 NM NM NM NM 17 954 0.097 1.84 0.15 3798
4045 3323 421 375 146 3930 240 90 45450 45330 300
Tungsten (kg/yr) Maximum inventory of fissile material/throughput Waste
Category Low Level Liquid (gal) 3 Solid (m /yr) Mixed Low Level Liquid
(gal) 3 Solid (m /yr) TRU Liquid (gal) 3 Solid (m /yr) HLW/Spent Fuel
Liquid (gal) 3 Solid (yds ) Hazardous Chemical (kg/yr) Liquid (gal) Solid
(yds3) Non-hazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) 3 Solid (yds ) Non-hazardous
(Other) Liquid (mgal) 3 Solid (yds ) Notes: NM= Not Measured at facility
NA= Not Applicable 1. Includes DARHT and other HX Firing sites 2.
Institutional average dose Table 3. Environmental Summary of LANL HE R&D
Operations

300 Volume 0 940 0 17 0 0.20 0 0 48300 0 0 NM NM 0.13 0
HE R&D Alternative 2a - LLNL UCRL-MI- 229541 Approved for public release
Jon Maienschein Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory HE R&D EIS Data
for Complex 2030 PEIS Alternative 2a: Downsize in place (derived from
previously-described "As Is" condition) Energetic materials research and
development at LLNL is carried out primarily in two facilities - the High
Explosives Application Facility (HEAF), and the Chemistry, Materials and
Life Sciences Facility at Site 300. More detail on each of these
facilities is given below. Additional activities (primarily analytical)
are carried out in other laboratory facilities involving small (<1 gram)
quantities of explosives; inasmuch as the explosives work is a minor
fraction of the overall activities in these laboratory facilities, they
will not be addressed further here. Note that the term "energetic
materials" includes high explosives, propellants, and pyrotechnics.
Throughout this document we will use the term HE R&D, as this is the
terminology used in the Complex 2030 PEIS process. This alternative
differs from the "As Is" condition in closing B825/B826, B817, and some
machining bays in B806/B807. Details are given below. The facility
descriptions below do not include hydro testing or environmental testing,
as those activities are being addressed by other groups in the Complex
2030 PEIS planning process. 1. Facilities: 1.A. The High Explosives
Application Facility (HEAF) is a full-spectrum R&D facility housing well-
integrated teams of experimental scientists and engineers, theoretical
and computational scientists, and support staff. The integrated teams
perform HE R&D in all aspects of high explosives: explosive
characterization, e.g. physical, chemical, mechanical, thermal, aging,
smallscale safety, compatibility, thermal stability and decomposition
rates, deflagration rates at high temperatures and pressures performance
and safety testing through detonation of up to 10 kg of explosives with
precision diagnostics modeling and simulation of explosive properties and
reactions to normal or abnormal stimuli, across spatial resolutions
ranging from molecular through grain-scale to fullscale hydrodynamics The
HEAF includes laboratory areas approved for handling explosives in
quantities up to 10 kg, and office space for the research and support
staff. The net usable area of the facility is approximately 65,000 square
feet. An aerial view of the HEAF is shown in Figure 1. The floor plan of
the laboratory areas of the HEAF is shown in Figure 2.

Page 1 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 2a - LLNL

Figure 1. The LLNL High Explosives Application Facility. The facility
section at the bottom of the image is the office area; the area behind
that houses the laboratory areas including firing tanks. Experimental
capabilities in HEAF include: o synthesis o formulation o safety testing
o mechanical properties (10-6 to 103 sec-1 strain rate) o permeability /
porosity measurement o thermal properties (e.g. specific heat, thermal
expansion, thermal conductivity) o thermal stability and ignition o
compatibility testing o particle size analysis o high pressure and
temperature deflagration o computed tomography radiography o precision
assembly and metrology o 100-mm gun for measurement of shock response o
fully-contained firing chambers - 1 g, 3 g, 100 g, 150 g, two 1-kg, 10
kg, gun tank o diagnostics for dynamic testing - streak and framing
cameras, laser velocimetry, blast measurement, in-situ embedded pressure
and particle velocity gauges, micropower impulse radar, high-speed video,
flash radiography o femtosecond laser machining of explosives o detonator
development, testing, and surveillance o laser labs for development of
new diagnostics o storage for 66 kilograms of explosives

Page 2 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 2a - LLNL

Figure 2. Floor plan of the laboratory area of the HEAF. Yellow areas
contain explosives characterization labs, the red areas contains firing
chambers and assembly rooms, the green area is diagnostic development
labs, and the blue area is mechanical and electronic support shops.

Page 3 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 2a - LLNL 1.B. The Chemistry, Materials and Life
Sciences Facility at Site 300 provides the capability for larger scale
synthesis and formulation, HE R&D part fabrication (e.g. pressing
radiography, machining and assembly), and explosives waste packaging,
storage and treatment. These capabilities are provided by the Chemistry
Area, the Process Area, the Explosive Waste Storage Facility, and the
Explosive Waste Treatment Facility. The net usable space is approximately
35,000 square feet. Chemistry Area (scale-up of formulation and synthesis
of HE) - (Figure 3) o B825 - 1- and 2-inch mechanical presses - in this
alternative these presses will be relocated to the B827 Complex and B825
will be D&D'd. No new construction is required. o B826 - small
deaerator/loader; 1-pint, 1-gallon mixers - in this alternative these
units will be relocated to the B827 Complex and B826 will be D&D'd. No
new construction is required. o B827 Complex - 50-pound deaerator/loader;
heating ovens; 2-gallon to 5-gallon mixers; melt cast kettles; synthesis
pilot plant; slurry kettles, grinders, reaction vessels o HE storage
magazines - long term and temporary storage

Figure 3. Chemistry Area at Site 300, providing scale up of formulation
and synthesis of HE. The central building houses a control room, with
three remote buildings in earth buried structures (one visible at lower
left, others shown by presence of conduits leading from control room to
each building.

Process Area o B809 Complex - 25-inch isostatic press, drying ovens o
B817 Complex - 14- & 18-inch isostatic presses, drying ovens - in this
alternative, this complex will be D&D'd. Pressing will be conducted in
B809 Complex, so no new construction is needed.

Page 4 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 2a - LLNL o o o o o o B823 Complex - 9-Mev, 2-Mev,
120-kev radiography of HE R&D parts B806 Complex, B807 - machining of HE
R&D parts - consolidation into fewer bays will be done. There will be no
associated D&D, since the rest of the buildings will remain HE work area.
B855 Complex - Large HE part machining B810 Complex - assembly of HE R&D
parts B805 - general machine shop, explosives waste packaging, NC machine
programming HE storage magazines - long term and temporary storage

Explosives Waste Storage Facility o 5 HE storage magazines - State
permitted storage facility Explosives Waste Treatment Facility o B845
Complex - State permitted for Open Burn/Open Detonation of explosives
waste (Note - this list does not include other Site 300 facilities such
as Contained Firing, open firing sites, or environmental testing, which
are included in other portions of the EIS)

Figure 4. A portion of the Process Area at Site 300. Shown are B.806
(foreground), B807 directly behind B806 to the left, B805 behind B806 to
the right, and the EWSF at the top of the photo.

2. Construction No construction is required for this alternative.

3. D&D costs B825 and B826 will be D&D'd. The LLNL March 2007 cost
estimate for this is $ZZZ. Page 5 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 2a - LLNL 4. Staff: There is no staffing change for
this alternative (175 scientists, engineers, and technicians) 5.
Effluents, emissions, waste: There is no significant change in effluents,
emissions, or waste in this alternative from the "As Is" condition. As
some building close and the work is transferred to other buildings, as
specified above, the effluents, emissions and waste are transferred also.
The tables showing these data for the "As Is" condition are presented at
the end of this alternative. 6. HE shipments There would be no change in
the HE shipments to LLNL in this alternative.

Page 6 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 2a - LLNL "As Is" EIS data for LLNL HE R&D - page 1
LLNL HE R&D EIS Input - "As-Is" data for Tetra Tech
Data Required Annual Electrical energy (MWh) Peak electrical demand (MWe)
Fuel usage (gal or yd) Other Process Gas (N, Ar, etc) Water (gal) Steam
(tons) Plant footprint (acres) Employment (workers) Number of rad workers
Average annual dose Radionuclide emissions and effluents NAAQS emissions
(tons/yr) Hazardous Air Pollutants and Effluents (ton/yr) Chemical use
Maximum inventory of fissile material/throughput Waste Category Low level
Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) TRU Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) HLW/Spent Fuel
Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Hazardous Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Nonhazardous
(Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Nonhazardous (Other) Liquid (gal)
Solid (yd3) Notes 191 S300 not metered 10,739 Not Available Not Available
Program Not Available Not Available FITS 1.900 FITS 120 Program Specific
2001-2006 Average 0.086 Appendix A Appendix B Appendix B Program-Run
ChemTrack SWEIS Limits Table A.4-1 2001-2006 Cumulative 9000 64 600 62.7
B801 N/A 805 N/A 806 N/A 809 N/A 810 812 A,B,C,D,E N/A N/A 817 N/A 823
N/A 825 N/A 826 N/A 827 N/A B845 N/A B850 N/A
2/23/2007 Quinly/Kato via Maienschein

B851 N/A

855 N/A

1.138 30 0.012

0.160 2

0.200 6

0.080 1

0.120 10

0.140 0

0.070 0

0.070 8

0.040 0

0.040 1

0.340 6

0.020 0

0.120 1

0.300 7 0.009

0.040 0

7.8
66,675 2.5 936 0.25 Not Available

569,713 1.9 2412 0.1

8,698.40 0.317 1,033,350

1.194

0.253

0.087

9795 0.571

0.87

12,877 1.494

40.421

0.009

21,920 5.531 248,004 12.337

20.5

0 1.1 1150 0

65,988 0.142 2854

78.445

0.13

Annual Effluents and Emissions (Ci)
B191 - HEAF B801 1997-2006 (range - not average) Radionuclide Ci NA U-238
4.8E-02 - 7.2E-02 U-235 6.1E-04 - 9.3E-04 U-234 4.4E-03 - 6.8E-03 N-13
3.40E-03 Ar-41 2.00E-07 gross alpha 0.00E+00 gross beta 0.00E+00 U-238
0.0E+00 - 4.6E-07 U-235 0.0E+00 - 5.9E-09 U-234 0.0E+00 - 4.3E-08 U-238
1.70E-02 U-235 2.20E-04 U-234 1.60E-03 U-238 8.9E-03 - 6.2E-02 U-235
5.3E-05 - 8.0E-04 U-234 3.9E-04 - 5.8E-03 H-3 3.9E-01 - 1.9E+01 N-13
8.20E-02 O-15 7.60E-02 Ar-41 1.50E-04 NA

firing table

rm 125 CFF

B850

firing table

B851
firing table

rm 111

other Site 300 buildings

Page 7 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 2a - LLNL "As Is" EIS data for LLNL HE R&D - page 2
NNSA COMPLEX 2030 HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS DATA (1/17/07
NAAQS NAAQS NAAQS PM10 (tons/year) 0.047046127 0.0009 0.0353 0.0118
0.0118 0.1765 NAAQS SOx (tons/year) 0.00593891 0.0008 0.0001 0.0000
0.0000 0.0006 HAPs (tons/year) 0.005868435 0.0002 0.0096 0.0032 0.0032
0.0481 NAAQS NAAQS LEAD (tons/year POCs (tons/year) ) OZONE (tons/year)
0.035187513 0 0 0.0016 0 0 0.0002 0.0022 0 0.0001 0.0007 0 0.0001 0.0007
0 0.0011 0.0109 0

Building No. 191 801 812 845 850 851

NOx CO (tons/year) (tons/year) 0.579405001 0.628387909 0.0145 0.0128
0.0040 0.0003 0.0222 0.0001 0.0013 0.0001 0.0206 0.0048

Additional Buildings 805 0 806 0 809 0 810 0.0031 817 0 823 0 0 825 826 0
827 0.0027 855 0

0 0 0 0.0143 0 0 0 0 0.0125 0

0 0 0 0.0010 0 0 0 0 0.0009 0

0 0 0 0.0010 0 0 0 0 0.0008 0

0 0 0 0.0003 0 0 0 0 0.0002 0

0 0 0 0.0012 0 0 0 0 0.0014 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

* Note: Excludes emissions from generators, boilers, and other sources
not exclusively associated with the Building 131 High Bay. National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) include: CO, NOx, PM10, SOx, Lead,
and Ozone. CO = Carbon monoxide NOx = Nitrogen oxides PM10 = Particulate
Matter with an aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to a nominal 10
micrometer SOx = Sulfur oxides HAPs = Hazardous Air Pollutants as listed
in Section 112 of the Clean Air Act. POCs = Precursor Organic Compounds
as defined by Reg 2, Rule 1 of the Bay Area Air Quality Management
District (BAAQMD).

Notes 1. Annual Electrical energy (MWh) and Peak electrical demand (MWe)
Electrical data for LLNL Main Site buildings is based on metered data and
calculations from the previously used electric recharge program. Data
recorded is from FY 2006. LLNL Site 300 has no individual metering of
buildings, with metering only for the entire site. Where available,
results of energy use simulation computer programs are indicated. Peak
electrical demand is not available for individual buildings. 2. Fuel
usage (gal or yd) Only Natural Gas is used at LLNL Main Site buildings.
No fuel is used to condition Site 300 buildings. Individual buildings at
the LLNL Main Site and Site 300 are not metered for natural gas
consumption. Total LLNL Main Site natural gas use is metered. 3. Data
Available from Other (Non Energy Management Program) Activities at LLNL
Data concerning other than facility related energy and utility commodity
uses is not available to the Energy Management Program. "Others" must
provide this data. 4. Water (gal) Individual buildings at the LLNL Main
Site and Site 300 are not metered for water consumption. Total LLNL Main
Site water use is metered as is Site 300 water use. 5. Steam (tons) LLNL
does not import steam from another source. Data is not available from
steam generated by individual building systems where installed. 6. Plant
footprint (acres) and Employment (workers) Data is from the buiding's
data base maintained by the Plant Engineering Department. Plant footprint
(acres) are converted from Gross-Square Foot data. Employment (workers)
data are the total "Peak" DOE and LLNL workers from the data base. 7.
B131 High Bay Data entered is for the entirety of B131 - separate utility
consumption data for the High Bay is not available. 8. B845 Data provided
are totals for B845A, B845B and OS845C. 9. B851 Data provided are totals
for B851A, B851B and B851C. 10. B812 Data provided are totals for 812A,
812D, 812E, OS812B and OS812C

Page 8 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 2b - LLNL Alternative 2b: Relocate HE processing and
fabrication from Site 300 - after hydro replacement facilities (Hydro IPT
option 2.2 or 2.3) & environmental test replacement facilities (ET IPT
option 3) are in place, authorized, and fully functional. In this
alternative, the activities and configuration of the High Explosives
Application Facility as described in alternative 2a remain unchanged.
However, the HE R&D facilities at Site 300 are closed, and HE R&D parts
are fabricated at the Pantex plant and shipped to LLNL for testing in
HEAF. This alternative can only take effect after other activities at
Site 300 that require a HE processing and fabrication infrastructure,
specifically hydro testing at the Contained Firing Facility and system
environmental testing at the Environmental Test Facility, have been
transferred to new facilities in accordance with the plans developed by
the respective IPTs. In addition, this alternative can only take place
after the explosives stored at Site 300 have been relocated from Site
300. This alternative would gravely impact LLNL's ability to conduct HE
R&D. By its very nature, R&D requires iterative design - HE parts for one
experiment may be found to be unsuitable for the next experiment because
of the results of the experiment, so it is not practical to order R&D
parts far in advance. Fabrication of R&D parts requires flexible,
inexpensive, and responsive fabrication capabilities - these parts are
generally made to a informal sketch with a minimum of formality. In
contrast, the Pantex fabrication operation is structured for production
activities, with a high degree of formality and change control. This is
appropriate for a plant production activity, but is too cumbersome for
rapid-response fabrication of R&D parts. The Pantex institutional culture
is attuned to the production mission, not to fabrication of hundreds of
unique R&D parts - Pantex is rewarded for moving units through the plant,
as is appropriate for a production plant. This is inconsistent with HE
R&D part fabrication, and it is possible that modifying the Pantex
culture (if this were possible) would detract from Pantex's ability to
meet its production mission. Additional problems arise from the delays in
communications between scientists and fabrication personnel (face-to-face
communication would be greatly curtailed or else the travel burden would
be prohibitive), delays in attaining Pantex priority for R&D parts (in
some cases in which LLNL ordered R&D parts from Pantex because of unique
circumstances the delivery time was months or years), delays due to the
time to ship samples from Pantex to LLNL and to send them back and forth
as necessary for experimental iteration, and the high expense of Pantex
fabrication activities. As a result of all these issues, the HE R&D
productivity at LLNL would be greatly reduced. Furthermore, there are
some existing capabilities at Site 300 that are not currently available
at Pantex, for example melt-casting and injection-molding of HE R&D parts
and fabrication of very large HE parts for testing at other locations.
This capability could be built at Pantex, while another alternative is to
invest in another existing explosives fabrication facility (e.g. Iowa
Army Ammunition Plant, IAAP)) and build the capability there. Inasmuch as
the co-location of fabrication of multi-hundred pound explosive charges
and nuclear weapon assembly / disassembly appears to be inconsistent from
aspects of safety, security, and the institutional cultures required to
successfully carry them out, the latter option may be preferable.
However, a recent accident at IAAP shows the risks inherent in
outsourcing large-scale explosives fabrication jobs beyond the Complex.
It is possible that these capabilities would be lost to the complex,
significantly reducing the nation's ability to conduct critical
experiments.

Page 9 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 2b - LLNL In short, this alternative would certainly
gravely impact LLNL's ability to conduct HE R&D in HEAF, could detract
from the central Pantex weapon production mission, and has a significant
probability of resulting in lost capability to the nation in key HE R&D
fabrication technologies. 1. Facilities The facilities at Site 300 that
close under this alternative are: Chemistry Area (scale-up of formulation
and synthesis of HE) o B825 - 1- and 2-inch mechanical presses o B826 -
small deaerator/loader; 1-pint, 1-gallon mixers o B827 Complex - 50-pound
deaerator/loader; heating ovens; 2-gallon to 5-gallon mixers; melt cast
kettles; synthesis pilot plant; slurry kettles, grinders, reaction
vessels o HE storage magazines - long term and temporary storage Process
Area o B809 Complex - 25-inch isostatic press, drying ovens o B817
Complex - 14- & 18-inch isostatic presses, drying ovens o B823 Complex -
9-Mev, 2-Mev, 120-kev radiography of HE R&D parts o B806 Complex, B807 -
machining of HE R&D parts o B855 Complex - Large HE part machining o B810
Complex - assembly of HE R&D parts o B805 - general machine shop,
explosives waste packaging, NC machine programming o HE storage magazines
- long term and temporary storage Explosives Waste Storage Facility o 5
HE storage magazines - State permitted storage facility Explosives Waste
Treatment Facility o B845 Complex - State permitted for Open Burn/Open
Detonation of explosives waste

2. Construction No construction at LLNL is required for this alternative.
Construction could be required at Pantex if replacement melt-casting and
injection molding capabilities were implemented there. 3. D&D costs D&D
costs are incurred for the facilities listed in section 1 of this
alternative. The LLNL March 2007 cost estimate for this is: $QQQ. In
considering the entire Site 300, it must be recognized closure of the HE
Processing and Fabrication facilities takes place along with closure of
the rest of Site 300. In this case, the D&D and environmental restoration
costs for the entire Site must be considered. A recent very rough
estimate developed by the LLNL Site 300 Manager for this is $325M. 4.
Staff: Approximately 50 staff would lose their positions in alternative
2b relative to alternative 2a.

Page 10 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 2b - LLNL

5. Effluents, emissions, waste: Effluents, emissions, and waste stream
from the Site 300 buildings (all those listed in the "HE R&D As Is"
effluent table with a B8XX identification) would be eliminated upon
closure of those facilities. 6. HE shipments HEAF averages about 500 HE
R&D shots per year. The explosive parts for these shots would have to be
shipped from Pantex to LLNL. This would require an estimated 100 truck
trips per year, inasmuch as R&D parts often have to be made and tested
one-off before the design of the next part can be finalized. Further HE
shipments are required as part of Site 300 closure, as the large quantity
of explosives would have to be relocated elsewhere. This could require
hundreds of truck trips, but it is impossible to quantify this without
knowing where the explosive would be stored.

Page 11 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 2b' - LLNL Alternative 2b': Implement alternative 2b,
then construct an annex onto HEAF for local fabrication of HE R&D parts.
In this modification of alternative 2b, a pressing and machining cell
would be added to HEAF, to allow local fabrication of HE R&D parts. 1.
Facilities A 1500 sq foot net area cell will be added to HEAF to provide
pressing parts larger than can now be accommodated in HEAF and to provide
machining capability. It will be designed and built to the same level of
protection as HEAF, affording complete containment in the cell of the
consequences of an accident. A magazine suitable for storage of about 100
pounds of explosive will also be constructed nearby the new explosives
cell. 2. Construction Construction data are shown in the table below.
These were developed by taking a table that assessed needs for
constructing 400,000 sq ft additional explosive R&D space (alternative 3b
and 3e) and scaling it to the 1500 sq ft annex required here (using a 2/3
power scale factor). For the assumptions in this table, see alternatives
3b and 3e.
Construction Data required Electrical energy (MWh) Concrete (yd3) Steel
(t) Water (g) Land (acre) Laydown Area Size (size of parking lot) Parking
Lots Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak employment (workers)
Construction period (years) Waste Generated Hazardous Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3) Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Nonhazardous
(Other) Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Consumption / Use 13 MWe 600 cubic yards
50 tons 1500 gallons 0.2 acres 3000 sq ft

8 15 1 Volume 0 0 2000 gallons 0 0 150 cubic yards

Page 12 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 2b' - LLNL 3. D&D costs There are no D&D costs for
this alternative, beyond those of alternative 2b. 4. Staff: Approximately
25 staff would lose their positions in this alternative relative to
alternative 2a. 5. Effluents, emissions, waste: Effluents, emissions, and
waste stream from the Site 300 buildings (all those listed in the "HE R&D
As Is" effluent table with a B8XX identification) would be eliminated
upon closure of those facilities. The effluents, emissions, and waste
streams from HEAF would increase about 20% over the "As Is" case
documented in an earlier report, from the activity in the new explosive
area 6. HE shipments There should be no change in number of explosive
shipments from the current "As Is" conditions.

Page 13 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 2c - LLNL Alternative 2c. Consolidate open-air 1-10 kg
HE R&D experiments from LANL and Sandia to HEAF, and >10 kg through 100
kgHE R&D experiments at LANL. No new construction. In this alternative,
experiments up to 10 kg HE that are now conducted in open-air tests at
LANL and Sandia would be conducted in the HEAF at LLNL. Experiments > 10
kg that are now conducted in open-air tests at LLNL and Sandia would be
conducted at LANL (note that this does not include LLNL hydro shots,
which are dealt with separately by the Hydro IPT and in the EIS). The
shots would be accommodated by existing firing capabilities at LLNL (< 10
kg) and LANL (> 10 kg). At LLNL, office space is available near HEAF to
provide temporary housing for LANL or SNL staff while they are at LLNL.
To accommodate the higher firing load at HEAF, more LLNL staff would be
required to support the increased work in addition to the staff that LANL
and SNL would rotate in for their respective experiments. Furthermore, it
might be necessary to go to a two-shift operation to more fully utilize
the firing tanks. In many cases it takes several days to set up a shot in
a firing tank. In this case the double shift operation would not be fully
effective, because the experimental team setting up the shot cannot
productively and safely work two straight shifts to take advantage of
tank availability. Multi-shift experimental teams would have to be
developed. Overall, this alternative carries a significant element of
risk, as the ability of one facility to carry out the experimental
workload of three laboratories (each of which has an active firing
schedule at the present) is by no means assured. To the extent that
available shots are equally distributed among the three labs, each would
suffer equally from the limitations imposed by this option. It is assumed
in this alternative that alternatives 2b and 2b' are not adopted, and
that the HE R&D part fabrication capability at Site 300 remains in place.
The challenges in conducting HE R&D with parts fabricated at Pantex would
be greatly magnified if three laboratories were conducting experiments at
HEAF. The increased throughput of HE R&D part fabrication (many parts
would be made locally) and the increased number of explosives shipments
at LLNL could not be supported by the limited shipment and storage
capabilities in alternative 2b'. This alternative is not possible if
either alternative 2b or 2b' is implemented. Because LLNL hydro shots
that are > 10 kg are covered by the Hydro IPT, they are not included in
this alternative. Other large HE R&D shots are not conducted at LLNL. 1.
Facilities No new facilities are required for this alternative. The
facility description in alternative 2a pertain to this alternative. 2.
Construction There is no construction required for this alternative.

Page 14 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 2c - LLNL 3. D&D costs There are no D&D costs for this
alternative. LLNL firing sites that conduct tests > 10 kg are covered by
the Hydro IPT and are not in the scope of this IPT. 4. Staff:
Approximately 15 additional staff be required relative to alternative 2a.
5. Effluents, emissions, waste: Effluents, emissions, and waste would
increase by the amount of work transferred from LANL and SNL. Two methods
of estimating this are to simply multiply the HEAF emissions by 3, and to
add the portions of the LANL and SNL emissions resulting from shots that
move to HEAF. 6. HE shipments The number of HE shipments to LLNL will
greatly increase. Estimates for the increase from LANL and SNL should be
provided by these respective institutions.

Page 15 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 2d - LLNL Alternative 2d. Consolidate unconfined
firing to one or no sites. In this alternative, all unconfined firing
operations would be consolidated at one site or eliminated. In any case,
unconfined firing operations would be eliminated at LLNL. Currently, HE
R&D unconfined firing at LLNL is limited to destruction of excess
explosive parts and explosives waste, through open burn or open
detonation at the Explosives Waste Treatment Facility located at Site
300. Additional unconfined firing operations at Site 300 are conducted as
part of the Hydro test program, particularly in the areas of emergency
response. Inasmuch as this alternative 2d is part of the HE R&D
consolidation study, these other firing operations are out of the scope
of this alternative, and will not be considered further here. Therefore,
the impact of this alternative to LLNL is the elimination of open burn
and open detonation destruction of explosives. This has significant cost
and safety impacts to NNSA programs which need explosives R&D. Any
laboratory that conducts HE R&D has to have the ability to dispose of
excess and waste explosives, as well as explosives that have been tested
to the point that their safety properties are unknown and explosives that
are so new that their safety properties are not well understood. Many of
the excess and waste explosives can be shipped to another waste disposal
site. This increases the handling and transportation required for
disposal with a corresponding increase in cost and decrease in safety,
increases the environmental impact because of increased shipments, and
transfers the environmental impact of destruction from one location to
another; considering these factors, shipping explosives to another waste
disposal site is generally not the best practice. However, it could be
done if necessary. However, many explosives cannot be shipped off site.
Explosives that have been damaged in testing (common in testing hazards
response of explosives) have different safety properties than the
undamaged explosives. Explosives that are new or relatively new (common
in synthesis and formulation R&D) have not been qualified for shipping
over public roads, and the cost to do this qualification is very high and
often requires more material than is available. These materials are
called "Type L materials", and must be destroyed on site. In the absence
of open burn or open detonation, other alternatives are available. LLNL
has developed the process and equipment for molten salt destruction of
explosives and transitioned the technology and equipment to the US Army
in the Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky and for use in Asia. LANL and
SNL have developed supercritical water oxidation processes and equipment
for destruction of explosives. Each location carrying out HE R&D would
have to implement at least one of these technologies to carry out
destruction of explosives samples. A current estimate by the LNL
Explosive Demilitarization Program Leader is >$5 M for this. Moving from
open burn or open detonation to another explosive treatment process
increases the risk and reduces the overall safety of HE operations. Any
of the newer explosive treatment processes require some handling and some
mechanical preprocessing of the explosive to convert it into a form that
the process can handle. For explosives with uncertain safety properties,
this

Page 16 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 2d - LLNL represents a significant risk. By far the
safest way to dispose of explosives or assemblies containing explosives
is to minimize the handling of them, and this is achieved by either
burning or detonating them. This is often the method that law enforcement
personnel use to destroy unknown or suspect articles, for just this
safety reason. It is expected that, even if open burn or open detonation
is "eliminated" at a site, there may occasions when safety dictates that
an article be destroyed by deliberate detonation. 1. Facilities No new
facilities are required in this alternative. B845 will be D&D'd. 2.
Construction There is no construction required for this alternative. 3.
D&D costs D&D costs are incurred for B845. The LLNL March 2007 cost
estimate for this is: $GGG. 4. Staff: There is no impact on staffing from
this alternative. 5. Effluents, emissions, waste: The effluents,
emissions, and waste listed in the "As Is" information for B845 are
eliminated with this alternative. 6. HE shipments The number of HE
shipments from LLNL will greatly increase, as a large fraction of
explosive waste is shipped to other disposal sites. This could require an
additional 50 shipments per year.

Page 17 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 2e - LLNL Alternative 2e. Consolidate maincharge HE
R&D experiments and testing to one or both nuclear weapon labs In this
alternative, maincharge HE R&D experiments at SNL would be transferred to
LANL or LLNL. Pantex maincharge experiments are considered part of
production or plant support or surveillance, no HE R&D, and are therefore
not in the scope of this alternative. If the SNL experiments were
transferred to LLNL, they could be accommodated in existing laboratories
in HEAF. The maincharge HE R&D effort is small at SNL, so there is a
negligible impact on current HEAF activities. 1. Facilities No new
facilities are required in this alternative. 2. Construction There is no
construction required for this alternative. 3. D&D costs There are no D&D
costs for this alternative. 4. Staff: There is no impact on staffing from
this alternative. 5. Effluents, emissions, waste: Effluents, emissions,
and waste are unchanged from the "As Is" data. 6. HE shipments There is
no change in number of HE shipments for this alternative.

Page 18 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 3a, 3c, 3d, 3f, 3g - LLNL Alternatives 3a, 3c, 3d, 3f,
3g. Consolidate HE R&D to: 3a - LANL; 3c - Pantex; 3d - SNL; 3f - from
LLNL to LANL or Pantex; 3g - from LANL and LLNL to Pantex In these
alternatives, HE R&D is moved from LLNL to either LANL, SNL, or Pantex.
From the LLNL perspective all are essentially identical, and will be
discussed together. In the context of the Complex 2030 / PEIS process,
moving HE R&D from LLNL means moving the experimental portion and closing
the experimental facilities. In this case there are several paths along
which future work could evolve: 1. Maintain an experimental HE R&D
program with LLNL personnel at the receiver laboratory, conducting all
laboratory work at that site. 2. Maintain a theoretical / modeling HE R&D
program, relying on other laboratories to sustain an experimental
program. 3. Terminate HE R&D and rely on other laboratories for HE R&D.
The practicality of path 1 is very much in doubt. HE R&D is driven by
constant experimentation and characterization, with the scientists
closely involved in the daily laboratory work. This is completely
different than the often-cited examples of experiments at user facilities
such as beamlines where the work is conducted in (for example) a week-
long campaign followed by months of data analysis and preparation for the
next campaign in several months time, or as at telescopes where the work
can often be conducted remotely. To successfully maintain an experimental
HE R&D program at another laboratory with LLNL personnel, the personnel
would have to relocate to the new location. Experience shows that a tiny
fraction of scientific staff are willing to transfer under these
circumstances, and there is no reason to expect anything different here.
What would most likely happen instead is that LLNL would contract with
the receiver laboratory for that lab to conduct the tests. This would
result in the inevitable loss of HE R&D experimental expertise at LLNL,
along with the loss of personnel with expertise in HE science and
technology. This would logically transition to path 2 or path 3. Path 2
represents a logical extension of path 1 wherein experimental work is
conducted at the receiver laboratory by their personnel under contract
from LLNL. LLNL would maintain the theoretical and modeling staff to
conduct that portion of the HE R&D mission. As this situation persisted,
there would be a rapid decay in the practical knowledge of HE that is
needed for stockpile stewardship. The optimistic case is that theory and
modeling activities continue and support stockpile stewardship, with a
gradual diminution as a result of the lack of experimental activities.
The pessimistic case is that the lack of experimental underpinnings
results in lack of focus and increasing irrelevance of the theory and
modeling work. In general, most scientists engaged in theoretical or
modeling work understand the need for experimental data in their work,
and the lack of that would result in the top theory and modeling
personnel leaving the field to work in other areas where LLNL could still
conduct experiments. Depending on the degree of optimism applied to the
analysis, paths 1 and 2 almost inevitably lead to path 3 - termination of
HE R&D.

Page 19 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 3a, 3c, 3d, 3f, 3g - LLNL Path 3 represents transfer
of mission from LLNL. As a nuclear design agency, LLNL has responsibility
for all aspects of the nuclear explosives package. HE is a core element
of the NEP in all aspects of stockpile stewardship - performance, safety,
reliability, and emergency response. Without HE R&D it is impossible for
LLNL to fulfill its responsibilities in these areas. If the assumption is
made that LLNL is to maintain its current mission and therefore needs
some capability for HE R&D, a logical question is what minimum set of
facilities are needed to ensure that LLNL has a viable HE R&D effort.
This is a simple question for LLNL. HEAF is the most modern complete HE
R&D facility in the NNSA complex, and it would make no financial, safety,
programmatic, or any other kind of sense to close part of HEAF and keep
the rest open. Therefore, maintaining HEAF in its current form along with
capability at LLNL to fabricate HE R&D parts for use in HEAF is the
minimum set of LLNL facilities to ensure a long-term HE R&D program at
LLNL. This is accomplished in Alternatives 2a or 2b', described earlier.
1. Facilities No new facilities are required in this alternative. 2.
Construction There is no construction required for this alternative. 3.
D&D costs All facilities listed in Alternative 2a require D&D in this
alternative, and HEAF as well. The total D&D cost is estimated at $JJJ.
4. Staff: The entire HE R&D staff of ~ 175 scientists, engineers, and
technicians is at risk in this alternative. Perhaps 5-10% (9-18 staff)
would transfer to the receiving site, based on BRAC data. The future of
the rest is unknown.

5. Effluents, emissions, waste: Effluents, emissions, and waste from HE
R&D are zero in these alternatives. 6. HE shipments There are no HE
shipments in these alternatives.

Page 20 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 3b, 3e - LLNL Alternatives 3b, 3e. 3b - Consolidate
all HE R&D at LLNL; 3e. consolidate LANL HE R&D at LLNL In these
alternatives, HE R&D from LANL, SNL, and Pantex (3b) or just LANL (3e) is
consolidated at LLNL. Construction of a new facility at LLNL is necessary
to provide the R&D capacity from LANL and SNL. As a result, it is not
clear how cost savings would be realized by this approach. Consistent
with the discussion in alternatives 3a, 3c, 3d, 3f, 3g, these
alternatives would most likely result in transfer of mission from LANL
(and SNL in alternative 3b) to LLNL. For either of these alternatives, HE
R&D at Site 300 would have to remain in place - alternatives 2b or 2b'
could not also be adopted. 1. Facilities Working from the "As Is"
descriptions of LANL and SNL, a new experimental facility with about
400,000 square feet and 300 offices is projected - the sum of their
respective "As Is" configurations. In fact, this is probably somewhat
oversized, but it provides a worst-case situation for analysis. The new
facility would be located nearby HEAF, as shown below.

HEAF

Page 21 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 3b, 3e - LLNL 2. Construction

3. D&D costs There are no D&D costs for this alternative. * 4. Staff:

Page 22 of 23
HE R&D Alternative 3b, 3e - LLNL

The HE R&D staff would increase by approximately 300 personnel. 5.
Effluents, emissions, waste: The effluents, emissions, and waste will
increase to the sum of LLNL, LANL, and SNL (for alternative 3b)
effluents, emissions and waste as described in the "As Is" documentation.
6. HE shipments The number of HE shipments to LLNL would approximately
triple in this alternative.

Page 23 of 23
LLNL HE R&D EIS Input - "AsIs" data for Tetra Tech
Data Required Annual Electrical energy (MWh) Peak electrical demand (MWe)
Fuel usage (gal or yd) Other Process Gas (N, Ar, etc) Water (gal) Steam
(tons) Plant footprint (acres) Employment (workers) Number of rad workers
Average annual dose Radionuclide emissions and effluents NAAQS emissions
(tons/yr) Hazardous Air Pollutants and Effluents (ton/yr) Chemical use
Maximum inventory of fissile material/throughput Waste Category Low level
Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) TRU Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) HLW/Spent Fuel
Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Hazardous Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Nonhazardous
(Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Nonhazardous (Other) Liquid (gal)
Solid (yd3) Notes S300 not metered Not Available Not Available Program
Not Available Not Available FITS FITS Program Specific 2001-2006 Average
Appendix A Appendix B Appendix B Program-Run ChemTrack SWEIS Limits Table
A.4-1 191 10,739 B801 N/A 805 N/A 806 N/A 809 N/A 810 812 A,B,C,D,E N/A
N/A 817 N/A 823 N/A 825 N/A 826 N/A 827 N/A B845 N/A B850 N/A

2/23/2007 Quinly/Kato via Maienschein

B851 N/A

855 N/A

1.900 120 0.086

1.138 30 0.012

0.160 2

0.200 6

0.080 1

0.120 10

0.140 0

0.070 0

0.070 8

0.040 0

0.040 1

0.340 6

0.020 0

0.120 1

0.300 7 0.009

0.040 0
2001-2006 Cumulative 9000 64 600 62.7

7.8

66,675 2.5 936 0.25 Not Available

569,713 1.9

8,698.40 0.317

1.194

0.253

0.087

9795 0.571

12,844 0.87 1.494 40.421 0.009

21,920 5.531 248,004 12.337

20.5

0 1.1 1150 0

65,988 0.142 2854

78.445

2412 1,033,350 0.1

0.13
Annual Effluents and Emissions (Ci)
Radionuclide NA U-238 U-235 U-234 N-13 Ar-41 gross alpha gross beta U-238
U-235 U-234 U-238 U-235 U-234 U-238 U-235 U-234 H-3 N-13 O-15 Ar-41 NA
1997-2006 (range - not average) Ci 4.8E-02 - 7.2E-02 6.1E-04 - 9.3E-04
4.4E-03 - 6.8E-03 3.40E-03 2.00E-07 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.0E+00 - 4.6E-07
0.0E+00 - 5.9E-09 0.0E+00 - 4.3E-08 1.70E-02 2.20E-04 1.60E-03 8.9E-03 -
6.2E-02 5.3E-05 - 8.0E-04 3.9E-04 - 5.8E-03 3.9E-01 - 1.9E+01 8.20E-02
7.60E-02 1.50E-04

B191 - HEAF B801

firing table

rm 125 CFF

B850

firing table

B851

firing table

rm 111

other Site 300 buildings
NNSA COMPLEX 2030 HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS DATA (1/17/07)
NAAQS NAAQS NAAQS NAAQS SOx (tons/year) 0.00593891 0.0008 0.0001 0.0000
0.0000 0.0006 NAAQS LEAD HAPs POCs (tons/yea (tons/year) (tons/year) r)
0.005868435 0.035187513 0 0.0002 0.0016 0 0.0096 0.0002 0.0022 0.0032
0.0001 0.0007 0.0032 0.0001 0.0007 0.0481 0.0011 0.0109 NAAQS OZONE
(tons/year) 0 0 0 0 0 0

CO NOx PM10 (tons/year) (tons/year) Building No. (tons/year) 191
0.579405001 0.628387909 0.047046127 801 0.0145 0.0128 0.0009 812 0.0040
0.0003 0.0353 845 0.0222 0.0001 0.0118 850 0.0013 0.0001 0.0118 851
0.0206 0.0048 0.1765

Additional Buildings 805 0 806 0 809 0 810 0.0031 817 0 823 0 825 0 826 0
827 0.0027 855 0

0 0 0 0.0143 0 0 0 0 0.0125 0

0 0 0 0.0010 0 0 0 0 0.0009 0

0 0 0 0.0010 0 0 0 0 0.0008 0

0 0 0 0.0003 0 0 0 0 0.0002 0

0 0 0 0.0012 0 0 0 0 0.0014 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

* Note: Excludes emissions from generators, boilers, and other sources
not exclusively associated with the Building 131 High Bay. National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) include: CO, NOx, PM10, SOx, Lead,
and Ozone. CO = Carbon monoxide NOx = Nitrogen oxides PM10 = Particulate
Matter with an aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to a nominal 10
micrometer SOx = Sulfur oxides HAPs = Hazardous Air Pollutants as listed
in Section 112 of the Clean Air Act. POCs = Precursor Organic Compounds
as defined by Reg 2, Rule 1 of the Bay Area Air Quality Management
District (BAAQMD).
Notes 1. Annual Electrical energy (MWh) and Peak electrical demand (MWe)
Electrical data for LLNL Main Site buildings is based on metered data and
calculations from the previously used electric recharge program. Data
recorded is from FY 2006. LLNL Site 300 has no individual metering of
buildings, with metering only for the entire site. Where available,
results of energy use simulation computer programs are indicated. Peak
electrical demand is not available for individual buildings. 2. Fuel
usage (gal or yd) Only Natural Gas is used at LLNL Main Site buildings.
No fuel is used to condition Site 300 buildings. Individual buildings at
the LLNL Main Site and Site 300 are not metered for natural gas
consumption. Total LLNL Main Site natural gas use is metered. 3. Data
Available from Other (Non Energy Management Program) Activities at LLNL
Data concerning other than facility related energy and utility commodity
uses is not available to the Energy Management Program. "Others" must
provide this data. 4. Water (gal) Individual buildings at the LLNL Main
Site and Site 300 are not metered for water consumption. Total LLNL Main
Site water use is metered as is Site 300 water use. 5. Steam (tons) LLNL
does not import steam from another source. Data is not available from
steam generated by individual building systems where installed. 6. Plant
footprint (acres) and Employment (workers) Data is from the buiding's
data base maintained by the Plant Engineering Department. Plant footprint
(acres) are converted from Gross-Square Foot data. Employment (workers)
data are the total "Peak" DOE and LLNL workers from the data base. 7.
B131 High Bay Data entered is for the entirety of B131 - separate utility
consumption data for the High Bay is not available. 8. B845 Data provided
are totals for B845A, B845B and OS845C. 9. B851
Data provided are totals for B851A, B851B and B851C. 10. B812 Data
provided are totals for 812A, 812D, 812E, OS812B and OS812C
Nevada Test Site Explosives R&D: Current "As Is" Conditions - Description
This assignment is to identify and describe the Nevada Test Site (NTS)
facilities where High Explosive (HE) Research and Development (R&D) is
conducted. The NTS primary mission is as a service organization to bring
integrated solutions to our customer's problems. Customers include the
National Weapons Laboratories (NWL) -Los Alamos National Laboratory,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories,
Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). The NTS does not currently have an independent HE R&D program but
utilizes specific capabilities that include the Big Explosives
Experimental Facility (BEEF), Baker site, and the U1a Complex to support
LANL & LLNL Hydro testing programs. Tunnels U12P & U25X, and NPTEC have
been or are utilized by other organizations. Each site has the capability
and is suitable to conduct HE R&D experiments up to 100kg using hazardous
materials.

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Flat H D e ad o r s e

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19

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17 18

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BEEF

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Tunnels
30 16 14

U1a Complex
Yucca Lake

3

29

DAF Site
6 11 26

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Sp

Yucca Mountain Project

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Radioactive Waste Management Site
Frenchman Lake

Frenchman Flat

lls R

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JASPER Facility location

Spill Test Facility

X-Tunnel
Ja ck as sF
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Mercury

NTS Map showing various site locations The following is description of
NTS facilities that are available to conduct experiments using various
quantities of energetic material with hazardous materials.

.
22

To La

s Veg

as

CAI-193-188-093094

-1-
1. NTS Explosive Facilities 1. A Big Explosives Experimental Facility
(BEEF)
Mission: BEEF is a High Explosives (HE) and Pulsed Power test bed for
experiments sponsored by the NWL's. BEEF was initially calibrated for
5,000 lbs. HE experiments; BEEF has been calculated to withstand 70,000
lbs. of HE. Physical Description: BEEF is a nine acre site which is
remotely located in Area 4 of the NTS approximately 30 miles north of
Mercury, NV. This facility is an HE testing site, currently supporting
the LLNL Pulsed Power program. BEEF provides a 60 ft. x 60 ft. HE firing
table, which has been excavated five feet and then filled with pea gravel
to decouple the explosive shock wave from surrounding structures and
improve worker safety. Surrounding the firing table edge are three steel
enclosures referred to as Blast Enclosures, approximately 30 ft. long and
12 ft. in diameter, weighing in excess of 100,000 lbs that support
various diagnostics and electronics. There are two operational
underground bunkers; the 4-300 Control Bunker houses control systems and
diagnostics, and the 4-480 Camera Bunker dedicated to fast framing and
image converter cameras. 400 ft. west of the firing table is a 39 ft.
high dirt pyramid commonly called the "get lost dump" which captures
explosives ejecta and deflects the detonation wave. 500 ft. north of the
firing table is a 24 ft. diameter; corrugated steel pipe with a 10 ft.
dirt overburden housing the 60 ft. x 12 ft. Physics Trailer, No. 987 used
has a common office and assembly space for workers during HE operations.
The entire facility is surrounded by an 8 ft. chain link fence and all
access gates are locked and controlled. Power is supplied to the facility
from the 4-01 Substation, located 7,000 ft. to the north. Potable water
is transported in for the water chilling system. Telephone communications
are supplied by Verizon and radios are provided by NSTec. Cameras for the
firing table, the facility and the access road are part of the facility
and supported by NSTec Imaging.

-2-
Arial view of BEEF Facility Capabilities: o Diagnostics o Digitizers o
Fast framing cameras, high-speed digital video systems, & video systems o
Flash x-rays, laser, PDV, and Velocimetry
o

10,000 lbs. HE storage magazine

Facility Staffing: Two FTEs support facilities operations. Additional
programmatic and craft support is provided on a campaign basis.

1. B Baker Site
Mission: The current mission of the facility is to receive, store and
assemble energetic materials used for experiments at the Joint Actinide
Shock Physics Experimental Research Facility (JASPER), and BEEF. Baker
Site directly supports Campaigns 1, 2 and 12, and the Directed Stockpile
Work, Stockpile Services Research and Development, and is an RTBF
(Readiness Test Based Facilities) direct-funded mission essential
facility. The facilities and bunkers are located on the NTS approximately
65 miles north of Las Vegas, Nevada in Area 27 approximately 25 miles
northwest of Mercury. Access into Baker site is controlled by Wackenhut
Services, Incorporated (WSI) utilizing fences, a -3-
central alarm system, and requires prior authorization, onsite verbal
communications and camera verification. Explosives assembly operations
include inspecting and preparing explosive charges in various
configurations, assembly and disassembly of explosives charges with metal
parts and detonators for experimental studies, hand-packing or forming
uncased plastic explosives, and performing special explosives operations
within the limits of approved Operational Safety Plans. Parts may consist
of controlled materials such as depleted uranium, thorium, lithium
compound and beryllium.

Building 5310

Building 5321

Physical Description: The Baker Site is located in Area 27 of the NTS. It
is an explosives staging and storage area consisting of two explosives
assembly buildings, six support buildings, 12 explosives magazettes, and
five explosives bunkers. Explosive assembly areas consist of buildings
5310 (two assembly bays and one inspection/packaging bay) and building
5321 (one assembly bay). The assembly bays are permitted to handle cased
explosives or uncased explosives in any form, including test assemblies
or nuclear explosive-like assemblies (NELAs). The building 5310
inspection/packaging bay is a general purpose area. Because the
explosives may be noncontained, the three assembly bays are predicted to
have the highest potential for accidental explosive initiation. Building
5320 is a steel arch structure with 12-inch thick reinforced concrete
front and rear walls. Because of the lack of earth cover, the head wall
directs a larger portion of the accidental detonation energy southward;
away form other structures into an empty area. The closest structures
within 60 degrees to either side of the centerline of the structure's
front wall are Buildings 5323 and 5324, at approximately 330 ft SSW.
Building 5321 is a reinforced concrete, flat-roof structure with a
minimum of 2 ft. of soil overburden on the roof and against three walls.
The front/head wall (south wall) is 1 ft. thick, reinforced concrete door
frame with two 7 ft. wide doors and a personnel door. There are two
magazettes-sized vaults in each wing wall. Because of the lack of earth
cover, the front/head wall directs a larger portion of the accidental
detonation energy southward away from other structures into an empty
area. Magazines 5318 and 5319 are reinforced concrete, flat-roofed
magazines. They both have 12 inch reinforced concrete side, head, and
rear walls and roof with a minimum of -4-
2-ft. of earth cover on the top and against the 1 ft. thick side and rear
walls. Both magazines are considered "undefined magazines" for explosive
quantity-distance (Q-D) analysis. Other activities include inert
operations related to mock-explosive assembly and other non-explosive
general activities. Magazines 5323 and 5324 are steel arch magazines.
Each has a 5/8 inch thick steel arch for the side and roof. 5/8 inch
steel plates make up the front and rear walls. There is a minimum of 2
ft. of earth cover on the top and against the side and rear walls. Both
magazines are considered "undefined magazines" for explosive Q-D
analysis. The magazettes have walls, roof, and floors made of reinforced
concrete ranging from 68 in. thick. An earth barricade separates the
magazettes from other buildings. The magazettes are arranged side-by-side
with approximately 50 ft. separation between each. Building 5305, 5306,
5320, and 5321 each contain one Factory Mutual-approved flammable liquid
safety cabinet and building 5310 contains three of the cabinets.
Flammables stored in cabinets in explosives operating bays are limited to
one day's working supply. Maintained infrastructure (RTBF funding)
includes: o o o Water supply - Potable water is delivered on a weekly
basis. Delivery and maintenance of water system is paid by direct funds.
Power Communication - The facility is equipped with the DOE/Verizon
telephone system inside the compound. The telephones located at the
entrance to the compound are hot lines direct to the central alarm system
located inside the Device Assembly Facility. Government Services
Administration vehicles are equipped with mobile radios that operate on
the Joint Test Organization, Special Operations Center and/or Laboratory
networks. Life Safety Systems. Heating and Cooling. Core equipment

o o o

Facility Capabilities: Building 5310 contains three assembly bays and a
conference room. Each bay has the appropriate tooling for assembly of HE
experiments. Two bays have hydraulic powered overhead cranes and one has
an electric-driven, overhead crane. Building 5315 is utilized for
offices. Bunkers 5318 and 5319 are explosives bunkers. Bunker 5320 is
currently being utilized for radiological storage. Bunker 5321 is a large
assembly bay, with overhead crane and unique tooling for experimental
assembly. Facility Staffing: Two FTEs support facilities operations.
Additional programmatic and craft support is provided on a campaign
basis.

-5-
1. C U1a Complex
Mission: The U1a Complex scope of work includes the NSTec programmatic
and physical efforts required to operate and maintain the underground
complex as a fully functional, costeffective and safe location for NWL
experimental activities. These efforts include routine operation of the
equipment and systems associated with the complex; inspections, and
surveillance; maintenance of the complex, its associated systems,
components, structures and equipment; and the implementation of
modifications and enhancements to the complex. This also includes the
maintenance of a skilled and trained base staff and matrix support
personnel well versed in the surface and underground processes and
procedures required to safely implement formal work control at the
complex.

Physical Description: The U1a Complex consists of underground and
aboveground facilities. The underground facility is an experiment test
bed supported by three vertical shafts, namely U1a, U1g, and U1h Shafts,
and a number of horizontal drifts. The U1a Shaft is serviced by a 400 HP
hoist and man-cage for transporting personnel and equipment underground.
The U1h Shaft is also used to transport personnel, equipment and
materials in and out of the underground complex. In addition to the U1a
and U1h Shafts, the U1g Shaft with a 48inch diameter casing exists and
serves both as a means of emergency egress and as the exhaust for the
underground flow-through ventilation system. The annulus is stemmed to
the surface and contains cabling for instrumentation and utility pipes
for air and water. The connecting drift system includes the .01 main
drift, two refuge chambers, user alcoves, electrical equipment alcoves, a
mechanical equipment alcove, an Industrial -6-
Hygiene (IH) alcove, an underground shop, experiment drifts, a diagnostic
equipment alcove (Horseshoe), containment plugs, and containment
barriers. The U1a Complex is comprised of various surface support
structures. Surface support structures consist of the U1a Shaft access
building, hoist houses, administrative trailers, steel head frames,
trailer and transportainer office units, a 7,200 sq. ft.
storage/conference building, storage units, and provisions to support
equipment trailers for monitoring of experiments. A temporary shop
building also exists at the U1h Shaft location. Facility Capabilities:
The U1a Complex is a unique underground experimental complex used to
conduct National Laboratory's support activities involving sub-critical
experiments. The complex provides the ability to conduct HE R&D
experiments within a controlled confined space. Facility diagnostics
include digitizers, high speed cameras, flash x-rays, high-speed digital
video systems, laser, PDV (Photonic Doppler Velocimetry), and
Velocimetry. U1a is centrally located in Area 1 of the NTS, approximately
90 miles northwest of Las Vegas. Facility Support Base support and
readiness are continuous throughout the year. Base support includes
engineering support and site operations such as underground and
aboveground construction activities. Maintenance activities include both
site maintenance and equipment maintenance. Several upgrades to the
facility include a new chilled water system, a new U1h access control
building, and a design of a new communication system. Facility Staffing:
Forty-seven FTEs support facilities operations. provided on a campaign
basis.

Additional programmatic support is

1. D Area 11 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (EODU) and other Explosive
Storage facilities
Mission: The Area 11 EODU is designed specifically for the storage of
explosives and for the demolition of hazardous waste explosives. The
hazard categorization of these facilities is 10. Facilities 12-J, K, L,
and M located in Area 12 are utilized to store high explosive material.
The hazard categorization of these facilities is 10. The explosive
storage areas at Area 12 and the EODU in Area 11 are open on an as needed
basis, with entry allowed only by escort of the process owner. Physical
Description: The EODU area in Area 11 consists of three storage
structures for explosives and an EOD pad for detonation of explosives.
The EODU area is located approximately 2 miles off of Mercury Highway on
road 6-03. Entry onto the road is controlled by a locked chain gate. -7-
o o o

#1 storage structure limit capacity is 1,500 lbs. of type 1.1 explosives.
#2 storage structure limit capacity is 1,200 lbs. of type 1.4 explosives
#3 storage structure limit capacity is 1,000 lbs. of type 1.1 explosives.

Facilities 12-J, K, L, and M are located in Area 12, off of the dirt road
east of road 12-01. The facilities consist of 4 single story metal
buildings. The entry road into this area is blocked by a locked chain
gate. o o o o Buildings 12-L and M are both 1,090 sq. ft. buildings
designed for the storage of type 1.1explosives and limited to 70,000 lbs.
Building 12-M is not currently used for storage and is empty. Building
12-L is used by NSTec construction for storage of 1.1 explosives.
Building 12-J and K area both 460 sq. ft. structures used for the storage
of 1.4 type explosives (Blasting Caps).

These facilities do not have any systems, structures, or components (SSC)
including electrical power, water, communication or fire suppression
systems. They do have fire extinguishers mounted as each facility.
Facility Capabilities: The Area 11 EODU is designed specifically for the
storage of explosives and for the demolition of hazardous waste
explosives. No other use for this area and or facilities is planned.
These facilities are not designed to contain an explosion in the event of
an unplanned emergency. They are however located in areas with sufficient
distance surrounding the facilities, with a 3,000 ft. clearance around
the storage and demolition area. Construction Department personnel
assigned to Construction Engineering will conduct the processes and
operations at the Area 11 EODU site. These activities are limited to the
receipt, storage, and treatment, through detonation of explosives and
explosive materials as outlined in Part IV of the Nevada Division of
Environmental Protection Permit for the Hazardous Waste Management
Facility. Explosives and explosive materials sources are as follows: o o
o o Explosives and detonation materials are received and stored for
future use as detonating agents. Shaped-charges that are classified must
be detonated within 24 hours. Explosive materials that have been damaged
during transport, detective material, or have exceeded their shelf life.
This includes legacy items found on the NTS. Small arms ammunition
removed from a small arms practice range on the NTS. Until the Air
Quality Permit is approved or a revised permit is received, the EODU
cannot operate except by special authorization letters by the state of
Nevada.

The facilities at Area 12-J, 12-K, 12-L, and 12-M are designed
specifically for the storage of explosives. The explosive magazines
provide for bulk storage of high explosives, blasting agents, and
detonators and are generally used as a delivery point for large orders of
explosives and as a bulk storage area for commercial explosive products.
The support -8-
activity includes loading and unloading product and supporting delivery
to projects. Other activities include facility and road maintenance. The
facilities located in areas with sufficient distance surrounding the
facilities, with a 3,000 ft. clearance around the storage area. Facility
Staffing: None, support is provided on as needed basis.

-9-
1. E U12p Tunnel
Mission: Now inactive, Tunnel U12p has functioned as a test bed for DTRA
(Defense Threat Reduction Agency) activities and is available to support
other potential customers. NSTec craft personnel, engineers, supervisors,
safety personnel and other NSTec personnel can support activities in this
tunnel.

U12P Tunnel Portal Physical Description: Tunnel U12p is located in Area
12 in the northwest section of the NTS. o o o o o has 23,597 mined feet
has 16,731 open feet is currently inactive parts are radiologically
controlled due to past nuclear testing has a REOP-boundary radius of
2,000 feet

- 10 -
U12P Tunnel Complex The following buildings and structures support Tunnel
U12p: o 12-933 (Entry Building) o 12-908 (Walker Shack) o 12-922
(Electrical Shop) o 12-924 (DNA Conference Room) o 12-925 (Miner's Dry
Storage) o 12-926-P (Sandia Assembly Building) o Magazine P-1 (P-Tunnel
Explosives Magazine #1) o and Magazine P-2 (P-Tunnel Explosives Magazine
#2) Building 12-933 (Entry Building), a 1,745-square-foot building built
in 1991 located approximately 30 feet to the northeast of the Tunnel U12p
Main Drift. This building functions as the entranceway to Tunnel U12p.
All personnel must log in and out at this building. Building 12-908
(Walker Shack), a 1,281-square-foot building built in 1985 functions as a
storage area primarily for Construction workers and as a general-purpose
break room. Building 12-922 (Electrical Shop), a 1,970-square-foot
building built in 1986 functions as a storage area primarily for
Construction electrical personnel. Building 12-924 (DNA Conference Room),
a 1,260-square-foot building built in 1988 functions as a meeting room.

- 11 -
Building 12-925 (Miner's Dry Storage), a 1,260-square-foot building built
in 1988 functions as a storage area for construction personnel. Building
12-926-P (Sandia Assembly Building), a 1,320-square-foot building built
in 1987 functions as a storage area construction personnel. Magazine P-1
(P-Tunnel Explosives Magazine #1) is in an area off Road 12-01 leading to
Tunnel U12p. The magazine is a round-shaped structure and marked with the
lettering P-1. Magazine P-2 (P-Tunnel Explosives Magazine #2) is in an
area off Road 12-01 leading to Tunnel U12p. The magazine is a round-
shaped structure and marked with the lettering P-2. Maintained
infrastructure includes: o o Support facilities for Tunnel U12p do not
have potable water supplied to them. Water is delivered on an as needed
basis. The Area 12 electrical grid supplies power to the support
facilities for Tunnel U12p. These primary feeds are stepped down to 480-,
220-, 208- and 120-volt increments. Motors, compressors, welding
equipment and other high-voltage equipment typically operate at 480
volts. Industrial controls, lights, heating, ventilation, air-
conditioning and small equipment typically operate in the 220, 208- and
120-volt range. Support facilities for Tunnel U12p do not have sanitary
waste streams. Portable toilets are supplied as needed at the tunnel.
Building 12-933 (Entry Building) has operable telephones. Support
facilities for Tunnel U12p have heating and cooling systems.

o o o

Facility Capabilities: The P-Tunnel is one of the remaining tunnels
capable of conducting HE type experiments using hazardous materials.
Facility diagnostics would be provided from the Experiment Support group
that has expertise in the area of digitizers, high speed cameras, flash
xrays, high-speed digital video systems, laser, PDV, and Velocimetry.
Facility Staffing: None at this time.

1. F U25x Tunnels
Mission: The U25x Tunnel has been used to support the U.S. Army Defense
Ammunition Center Joint Demilitarization Technology (JDT)
characterization of effluent produced from open burning/open detonation
of conventional munitions and rocket motors. Other uses for the facility
have included energetic and non-energetic material testing by other
customers. - 12 -
These facilities are on Operational Standby pending new testing or other
activity.

U25X-Tunnel Portal Physical Description: The U25x Tunnel is located in
Area 25 of the NTS. The hazard categorization code of Tunnel U25x is 04,
and the 25-890 Portal Recording Building hazard categorization code is
10. The underground complex consists of a main entry drift (approximately
600 ft. long), a test chamber (approximately 35 ft. high x 50 ft. wide x
100 ft. long) at the end of the main entry drift, a cross-cut to a
mechanically bored vent raise, and the bored ventilation raise (15 ft.
diameter). The U25x Tunnel facility consists of the underground complex,
the portal yard area to support that complex, the lower storage areas,
and the surface area around the vent raise including the access road to
that raise. The vent raise is utilized as an emergency escape way, only.
The cross cut drift to the vent raise contains fixed radioactive
contamination (depleted uranium). Everyday use of this cross cut draft is
not permitted.

- 13 -
U25X-Tunnel Portal Yard Area The following buildings and structures
support Tunnel U25x: o o o o o o o o o o Building 25-890 Portal Record
Bldg. Access Control Shack Tunnel Management Trailer No. BIN 131046
Conference Trailer No. BIN 131049 Construction Electrician trailer Wood
storage shacks (3 each) Metal storage container Access control guard
shack Shower facility including portable/gray water trailer Construction
trailer

Maintained infrastructure includes: o o o There is no potable water
supplied to the facility. Non-potable water is supplied by water truck as
needed. The main power supply to the facility is 34.5 kilovolts (kV)
stepped down to 480/208/120 volts. There are no sanitary waste drains.
Portable toilets are provided as needed.

- 14 -
o

A telephone line is available in the access control shack located near
the U25x Tunnel portal.

The facility boundaries are not marked by fence lines although, in
general, the boundaries could be stated as: bounded on the west side by
the access road to the raise bore, on the north side by the raise bore,
on the east and south sides by the farthest extent of the lower storage
yards.

Facility Boundary U25x Tunnel Complex Facility Capabilities: The U25x
Tunnel facility has been designed to operate in a continuous state when
conducting detonation and/or burn tests. The Test Chamber is designed to
withstand detonations of up to 2,385 lbs. Net Explosive Weight (NEW). It
is recognized that over time the chamber and containment barrier may
dictate downgrading of the explosive load due to normal test related
stresses. The U25x Tunnel facility primarily was utilized in support of
the U.S. Army Defense Ammunitions Center (DAC), Joint Demilitarization
Technology (JDT), Open Burn/Open Detonation (OB/OD) test programs;
however, due to funding shortfalls, the facility is currently in an
operational standby status. The facility includes Building 25-890, which
is utilized as a recording station for each of the OB/OD tests. Facility
Staffing: None.

- 15 -
1. G NPTEC (Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex)
Mission: The NPTEC is designed to (1) discharge, at a controlled rate, a
measured volume of hazardous test material; (2) monitor and record
release data and local meteorological data; and (3) provide a means to
control and monitor these functions from a remote location. Tests can
focus on determining the physics of atmospheric dispersion of chemical
releases, validation of equipment and techniques for chemical release
detection, advanced HAZMAT training, and effectiveness of mitigation
technologies. The NPTEC has the capability to support the use of
explosives or solid propellants. A blast pad is constructed northeast of
the release stacks to support testing. The lakebed is also capable of
hosting radiological Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) experiments.
Physical Description: The NPTEC consists of a Administration building,
ES&H trailer, Customer Trailer, Conference Room, Electronics Lab,
Library, Skid, Water Storage Tank (Fire Suppression), Wind Tunnel, T00115
Electronic Termination, Safety Building, Electronic Termination,
Mechanical / Technical Office, Shop, NPTEC Tool Shop, Storage building,
Ice Box, Tank Farm, JP-8 trailer, Chemical Storage Cooler, Chemical
Storage Building, NPTEC Hazardous Material Storage Building, East Motels
(Storage Building), West Motels (Storage Building), Z building (Storage
Building), Field Office Trailer, Customer Lab Trailer, and Port Gaston
located in Areas 05, 14, 29, 06, 25 and 26 at the NTS. The hazard
categorization of this facility ranges from 5 to 10. The NPTEC is located
in Area 05 along the eastern edge of the NTS and within Frenchman Lake.
This NPTEC consists of Control and Test areas. Control consists of an
administration building, conference room, customer building, electronics
lab, ES&H trailer, library and a storage facility. Test consists of the
tank farm, the wind tunnel, electronic shops, maintenance shops, the
spill pads, and the elevated stacks. In addition, Trailer Park 1 and 3
located northwest of test area is used to support customer
experimentation.

- 16 -
Area 05 NPTEC Facility Boundary
Note: This is a graphical representation of the NPTEC facility boundary
that is not to scale

1

2

9

10
Area 11

GMX

7

8
306 GZ

Kay Blockho use

Nellis/N TS Property Line

Cambric Ditch

an m h nc ke e Fr La
Trailer Park 3 NPTEC Control NPTEC Test Trailer Park 1 WSI UG Garage REOP
WSI-000 9-09 CAU CAS#05 -99-03 REOP Shaw-0002-03 WSI F-800 REOP WSI-001
0-01 Small Boy Hamilto n

6

5

4

Area 05

3

- 17 -
Buildings and trailers at Control provide administrative and technical
support shelter and accommodation for test operations.

NPTEC Control
Latitude 36.801N Longitude 115.9509 W 05-026143 (10) Conference Room
Storage DOE PN 22333721 (10) Library Electronics Lab Administration FIRE
SUPPRESSION WATER STORAGE TANK (10) 652B (10) 05-8 (10) 05-131047 (10)
Customer Trailer 05-131045 (10) ES&H Trailer

E026035

05-8A Skid (10)

HAZCONTR0828504.vsd

Trailer Park 1

HazTest082504.vsd

AD RO 05 5-

NPTEC Test Area

Chemical Staging Pad #2 (5)

TO
Z-Building (10) Bottle Rack

Note: 1. Structures in bold are in the Facility Database (FIS/FIM) 2.
Hazard Categorization shown in ( ).

RO
Latitude 36.801N Longitude 115.9509W

AD
West Motel (5)

501
Bottle Rack 096873 Trailer

08/25/04

Meteorologic Towers (11 ea) out to 2.5 km 2297785 (10) Wind Tunnel AL6
(10) Electronic Termination JP-8 Trailer E102340 (5) 72' HSC 1 (10)
202533 (10) Safety Building

STACKS 50'

2 1 Chlorine Rail Cars (5)

Tank Farm (10) 106 104 101 131044 (10) 105 Mechanical Technical 090167
103 Office Trailer

T00113 (10) Tool Shop
T00112 (10) Storage Bottle Rack

Chemical Staging Chemical Pad #1 (5) storage T00012(5) Chemical Storage
Cooler T00013(5) East 105 Motel (5) Ice Box (10) Box Car machine shop

202177 Shop

(10)

(10)

1/2 Mile East of Access Road

TO ROAD 5-03

West Motels T00014 (5)

Note: 1. Structures in bold are in the Facility Database (FIS/FIM) 2.
Hazard Categorization shown in ( ).
08/25/04

- 18 -
Facility Capabilities: The NPTEC is equipped with closed circuit
television cameras, a public address system, evacuation alarm, and radio
networks for communication between Control and Test. Closed circuit
television is used to maintain visual contact between Test and Control to
enhance safety. Two spill pads are available for contained open-air
releases. Two elevated release stacks measuring 0.4 x 22 meters, (1.3 x
72 ft.) and 0.56 x 15.2 meters, (1.8 x 50 ft.). A series of 11
meteorological stations located at every 250 meters intervals out to 2.5
kilometers along a 225o alignment from the release stacks. This alignment
is the direction of prevailing winds during ideal test conditions.
Maintained infrastructure includes: o o Potable water is supplied to
Control administration building through a two-inch Polyvinyl Chloride
(PVC) line. There are two fire hydrants at the NPTEC. One is near the
Control area, and one is in the Test area. The control room in the
Administration building, 5-8, is equipped with sprinklers that are fed
from a pressurized vessel located approximately fifty feet west of the
building. The fire protection system provides a signal to the Area 23
Fire Department alarm board in Building 23-425. Sanitary waste drains
into a permitted leach field, Permit Number NY-1106, south of the NPTEC
Administration building 5-8. Power is supplied through 240 Volts
Alternating Current (VAC) and 120 VAC lines. Telephone and data lines are
available in the Control office areas. Heating and cooling is provided in
the Test and office areas

o o o o

Facility Staffing: Varies.

- 19 -
Pantex Plant HE* Research & Development Activities (As Is Condition)
Revised: February 6, 2007 Steve Hallett As a result of the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management PEIS coupled with the resulting Record of
Decision, Pantex Plant right-sized in-place consolidating its limited HE
R&D activities and HE production mission work into common facilities and
work areas. As a result, we do not segregate development and production
missions in terms of facilities, infrastructure or work force. The HE
production mission activities include: 1) HE synthesis - producing
stockpile explosives from precursor chemicals (e.g. - TATB, HNS, etc.).
2) HE formulation - physically combining explosives and (usually)
nonexplosive binders to produce energetic materials that exhibit desired
processing and performance properties. (e.g. PBX-9502, LX-07, XTX-8003,
mock, etc.) This activity also includes reprocessing explosives to meet
stockpile physical or performance requirements. (e.g. recrystallization,
micronization, etc.) 3) HE compaction - consolidating HE powder to form
higher density parts from pure or formulated explosives to meet stockpile
configuration requirements. (eg. main charges, booster pellets, etc.) 4)
Precision HE machining/assembly - accurately shaping compacted HE and
assembling into complex parts with precise features that meet the unique
needs of primary assemblies in the stockpile. 5) Component fabrication &
assembly - fabricating and assembling inert piece-parts and energetic
explosive products to meet "small" component configuration and
performance requirements for the stockpile. 6) Destructive testing -
mechanically evaluating (e.g. - tensile, compression, etc.) or test
firing explosive materials or components to support production
qualification, stockpile-related surveillance or process improvement
initiatives. These activities require complex diagnostics for data
acquisition and analysis. 7) Chemical/materials testing - chemically or
physically analyzing explosive or associated materials using a variety of
techniques including instrumental, wet chemistry, microscopy, etc. These
activities fundamentally support production qualification, stockpile-
related surveillance or process improvement initiatives. 8) HE production
operations safety basis & permitting - analyzing, modeling and/or
simulating explosive operations conducted at the plant to ensure
compliance with governing regulatory requirements. This competency is
also applied to defining operational risks and safety conditions for
operations. 9) HE operational logistics - handling, storing, moving,
etc., disposing of explosive materials and components required to support
production and development activities.
* For the purposes of this document HE refers to all explosives and
energetic materials related work performed at Pantex.
Production process improvement development initiatives have been
performed in virtually all of these mission areas over the years. This
development is primarily focused on enhancing safety, productivity,
quality, etc. Owing to the specificity of and accountability for the
production mission activities noted previously, this work is essential at
Pantex and is primarily funded through the Readiness Campaign and PDRD to
sustain production viability and resident technical competency.
Development activities at Pantex not related specifically to production
process improvement reside primarily within the Engineering Campaign
(Enhanced Surveillance) and periodic reimbursable work usually
technically directed by the National Laboratories. The FY06 complement of
Enhanced Surveillance funding related to HE materials or processes was
approximately $2M; the HE-related development work for the Labs was on
the order of $400K in FY06. The total HE mission-related funding
allocation for Pantex in FY06 was about $24M (including DSW production
and all sources of funding). As a result, the portion of work at Pantex
that fits the HE R&D scope as defined in the SPEIS is on the order of
<10% in terms of funding allocation. This work was, and traditionally is,
concentrated within the Non-destructive Testing and Chemical Testing
mission categories. A more detailed distribution of FY06 HE mission cost
by funding source can be found in Table 1. Table 1. Relative funding
distribution of HE mission work at Pantex (FY06) Enhanced Readiness
Direct Production PDRD Surveillance Campaign Production Support $1M $2M
$7.2M $11M $3M

OPM $0.4M

There are currently no Pantex facilities dedicated entirely to explosive
development work. As mentioned previously, development efforts are
conducted, in the production facilities, thus leveraging the
infrastructure investment to accomplish both objectives. An Explosives
Development and Training Facility was in initial planning stages in FY00
but efforts to prepare this project for Congressional funding
consideration were terminated in accordance with the right-sizing
initiative. The relative percentage of R&D work in the HE production
facilities is found in Table 2. This table also identified critical
process competencies present at Pantex to support the production mission.
These resources are also applied to the limited R&D conducted at the
plant.
Table 2. Relative quantity of R&D work performed by mission area and
facility (FY06)
HE Mission Areas Facilities R&D Footprint Mission Staff Used for R&D
Synthesis 15,182 9,371 8 5% 10% Critical Competencies Synthetic Chemists
Chem Engineers Eng Technicians Facility Managers Chem Engineers Eng
Technicians Facility Managers Pressing Engineers Fab Engineers Eng
Technicians Machinists Metrologists Programmers Facility Managers Comp
Engineers Process Engineers Eng Technicians Facility Managers Physicists
Elec. Engineers Mech. Engineers Materials Engineers Eng Technicians
Facility Managers

Formulation

28,255 9,371

8

5% 10%

Fabrication (includes compaction & shaping)

2,320 49,159 17,086 45,000

25

<5% <5% <5% 25%

Component Ass'y

7,585 7,634 17,086 28,481 9,446 6,991 792 2,111 7,210 1,358 1,801 35,146
3,500

10

<5% <5% <5% <5% 5% 5% 2% 5%

D-Testing (Test Fire & Mechanical testing)

20

Non D-Testing

4

5% 5%

Radiographers Physicists Acoustic Engineers QA Engineers Quality
Technicians Facility Managers Chemists Material Scientists Lab
Technicians

Chemical Testing

12,021 8,982
25

10% 5%
HE Mission Areas

Facilities R&D Footprint

Mission Staff

Used for

Critical Facility Managers

Explosive Safety

5,398

10

5%

Safety Engineers Physicists Equipment operators Warehouse staff Facility
Managers

Storage/Movement

38,000 3,217 8,525 12,077

10

2% 5% 5% 0%

10 Explosives Disposal 837 1,489 5% Technicians Facility Managers

For the explosives-related activities identified herein, the complement
of waste for explosive R&D is essentially insignificant as shown in Table
3. Table 3. Estimate of annual waste attributable to HE R&D at the Pantex
site. (Approximately 3% of the total HE mission-related waste) Waste
Class Weight (lbs.) 0 0 875 Volume (gal) 0 0 225 24,000 37,000 5 Volume
(m3) 0 0 0.9 90 140 <0.1

Low-Level (3) Mixed Low-Level (3) Hazardous Non-Hazardous Class I
(Industrial 234,000 solid) Class II 375,000 Universal 8

(3) There is currently very little or no low-level or mixed low-level
waste resulting specifically from the HE R&D activities at Pantex. This
are however, significant waste streams at the plant for both of these
resulting from the HE and weapon assembly/ disassembly missions. These
therefore would constitute new wastes at the site under a consolidation
action.
Supplemental PEIS Analysis for HE R&D "To Be" Options for Consolidating
at Pantex
Consolidating LANL and LLNL HE R&D Activities at Pantex High-explosives
research and development activity is currently distributed primarily
among three sites within the NWC based on their respective roles in
support of the nuclear weapon stockpile. LANL and LLNL both maintain
extensive R&D capabilities predominately in support of main charge sub-
system-related design and development responsibilities. In general terms
these capabilities relate broadly to defining, developing and
characterizing energetic materials, processes and tests involving
primarily secondary explosives. From an existing infrastructure
perspective, these roles closely match capabilities that must be
sustained at Pantex to support the nuclear weapons HE manufacturing
mission work. With minor exceptions, consolidating either of these
Physics Labs' responsibilities for HE R&D at Pantex will result in the
capability to consolidate both here since much of the technology and
infrastructure drivers are similar. From a preliminary planning point of
view, consolidating LANL and LLNL HE R&D responsibilities at Pantex will
result in the need for limited additional infrastructure. (The planning
matrix associated with this option can be found in Table 1.) The
information provided by the Labs in the "As Is" Condition descriptions
has been generally assimilated into the "Major Mission Area" categories.
In most of these categories, minimal initial cost (this is cost required
to construct new facilities, modify existing facilities or to otherwise
implement a non-existing capability at Pantex) is expected to re-
establish the R&D capability at Pantex. (Capacity required to support the
Labs R&D effort at Pantex remains a bit intangible and the facility space
and FTEs are best preliminary estimates.) The "Annual Incremental O&M"
cost column estimates additional Pantex dollars needed to provide
operational staff and maintenance for the increased workload linked to
R&D activities. (Maintenance cost in facilities occupied jointly by
production and R&D will be covered by production and R&D funs on an
incremental basis.) In all cases, the R&D operating staff will ensure
that operations conducted at Pantex comply with formality of ops, AB,
contractual authorities, etc., but the R&D technical staff will be
competent experts maintained and provided by the respective laboratories
directing the work. (Ideally, the methodology will be essentially akin to
NWC User Facilities models.) Therefore, the cost will contain a
corresponding laboratory staff cost as well as the Pantex incremental
cost. If either Lab is consolidated individually at Pantex, the
infrastructure requirements would not significantly change however, the
Lab manpower estimate would reduce by roughly 50%. The consolidation
options also include additional cost for administrative office space
($10M) for permanent and temporary Laboratory staff serving at Pantex.
These individuals will be performing their R&D duties, as required and
will be sustaining technical competence for their respective Labs in the
process.

3/19/07
Revision 2
Conservative costs estimated for this option are approximately $150M in
facilities modifications/new or enhanced capabilities and on the order of
$30M annual operating and maintenance costs plus the cost of resident and
visiting Lab staff. The total number of additional FTEs required is
estimated to be ~115-120, with just about half coming from the respective
Labs as technical experts. (See Table 1 for specifics.) In some cases the
initial cost may be reduced by transferring equipment from the
appropriate donor site to Pantex, thus precluding the need to purchase
new equipment. These potential transfers will be managed on a case-by-
case basis and will be detailed more specifically as planning progresses.
In addition, consolidation planning thus far has been driven by
capability needs and has not addressed capacity demands that may also
influence costs in the final analysis. Diversity of new materials and
processes introduced to Pantex through consolidation of HE R&D activities
will in some cases influence the plant's operating safety basis and
environmental permitting however, these issues are manageable through
established channels at a minimal project cost. A review of the plan by
qualified Laboratory staff will ensure that all essential capabilities
have been appropriately identified and considered. Major facility
modifications and new facilities are required to establish necessary R&D
capabilities in small components design & development (such as for
detonators and other small energetic devices) and for explosive
formulation. (The new facility required to support formulation is needed
to meet HE production mission demands for the transformed Complex.
Planning for is already underway.) In both cases, the fundamental
capabilities currently exist at Pantex but reside in 1950s vintage
buildings that have been planned for replacement in several previous
consolidation initiatives. Continuing operations in these two buildings
poses unique challenges in that both are located in Zone 12-South, near
the weapon assembly line. The capabilities are slated for relocation to a
renovated 1980s facility for small components and a new Pilot-Scale
Formulation Facility that not only solves the age concern but the risk
associated with proximity to the assembly line, as well. Bays in the
existing facility can be readily transformed into small component
development and assembly lines including the necessary clean, static-
free, humidity & temperature-controlled environments, etc. (~$20M).
Modifying this building as planned will service the R&D and production
requirements for small component development, fabrication and
qualification for the 2030 Complex. A very-preliminary cost estimate for
a new Formulation Facility is ~$75M. (At present, this cost estimate was
derived only through comparing the new facility configuration to a
recently opened processing and a planned manufacturing facility at
Pantex.) Intermediate facility modifications are required in areas
related to destructive testing and chemical testing capabilities. A
significant portion of the cost here is attributable to the expectation
that a limited complement of new or transferred diagnostic equipment will
be required to support the R&D work, including a diverse selection of
radiographic capabilities. In addition, Pantex currently has a 10-kg
contained firing chamber that has

3/19/07
Revision 2
not been used in the last 10 years but is functionally suitable to
perform intermediatesized test fire activities. The estimated cost to
reclaim the facility and recover the capability to meet HE R&D demands is
about $15M. (This includes any decontamination and system/equipment
upgrades that may be required including establishment of suitable gas gun
capability.) Large-scale contained test fire capability to support
hydrodynamic testing will not be established at Pantex since the Hydro-
Program is being planned separately. The remainder of the initial
estimated cost is minor and addresses such things as minimal equipment
upgrades, compliance-related permitting, safety basis revisions, etc.
Construction data for this scenario can be found in Table 3.

3/19/07
Revision 2
Consolidating LANL, LLNL and SNL HE R&D Activities at Pantex
Consolidating HE R&D activities from all three sites (LANL, LLNL and SNL)
poses a bit larger challenge at Pantex owing to the more exotic energetic
materials and special initiating devices designed/developed at Sandia.
Primary explosives, pyrotechnics and propellants require more operational
safety-related features when handling than most secondary explosives.
More extensive electronics competency is also required. In addition,
fundamentally different testing methodologies from those employed during
secondary explosives processing demand a specialized suite of
characterization capabilities. As would be expected, many of the actions
within this scenario are essentially the same as those defined for
LANL/LLNL consolidation at Pantex (the three-site consolidation planning
matrix is presented as Table 2). A major departure however, relates to
the special demands identified previously for the Sandia R&D
consolidation effort. Even though Pantex often supports SNL's development
activities in this regard, primary explosives, pyrotechnics and
propellants (and components utilizing these materials) have not
traditionally been a significant part of the Pantex production mission
responsibility. As a result, it is necessary to establish a full-scale
R&D capability at Pantex for these materials and components, including a
significant investment in essential infrastructure. Conservative costs
estimated for this option are approximately $230M-$240M in facilities
modifications/new or enhanced capabilities and on the order of $40M-$45M
in annual operating and maintenance costs plus the cost of resident and
visiting Lab staff. (The cost of these individuals will be determined
based on the ultimate staffing approach to be employed.) The estimated
number of individuals required to sustain this consolidation at Pantex is
~160 with just over half represented by Lab R&D experts. In some cases
the initial cost may be reduced by transferring equipment from the
appropriate donor site to Pantex, thus precluding the need to purchase
new equipment. These potential transfers will be managed on a case-by-
case basis and will be detailed more specifically as planning progresses.
In addition, consolidation planning thus far has been driven by
capability needs and has not addressed capacity demands that may also
influence costs in the final analysis. Diversity of new materials and
processes introduced to Pantex through consolidation of HE R&D activities
will influence the plant's operating safety basis and environmental
permitting, however these issues are manageable through established
channels at a minimal project cost. The most cost effective method of
achieving this capability will be delivered via construction of a Small
Energetic Component Facility. The addition of this facility is
incrementally unique to the Sandia consolidation plan, but if
constructed, would eliminate the need for major modifications identified
to support detonator and small component development activities for the
LANL and LLNL consolidation, as well. The estimated cost of the facility
is approximately $150M and would contain all capabilities and controls
necessary to design, develop, test and even produce small energetic

3/19/07
Revision 2
components required for nuclear weapon stockpile and non-NNSA customer
needs. The design would offer user-facility features and would serve as
an NWC-wide resource for meeting the demands of all four sites related to
these critical activities. As discussed for the LANL/ LLNL consolidation,
Pantex would assign a basic technical staff for operating and maintaining
the facility, but the Laboratories could provide specific science and
engineering staff to conduct mission-related research and development
within. (Ideally, the methodology will be essentially akin to NWC User
Facilities models.) Major facility modifications are required to
establish necessary R&D capabilities related to explosives formulation.
(The mods required to support formulation are actually essential in
meeting future specialty HE production mission demands for the
transformed Complex. Planning for such a facility is currently underway.)
The fundamental capability currently exists at Pantex but resides in a
1950s vintage building that has been planned for replacement in several
previous consolidation initiatives. Continuing operations in this
building poses unique challenges in that it is located in Zone 12-South,
near the weapon assembly line. The capability is slated for relocation to
an existing facility that not only solves the age concern and also other
manufacturing risks associated with its location, as well. Several bays
in the facility can be reconfigured for development and pilot-scale
formulation (~$25M). Modifying this facility as planned will service the
R&D requirement and the production requirements for the 2030 Complex.
Intermediate facility modifications are required in areas related to
destructive testing and chemical testing capabilities. (Under this
consolidation scenario however, two testing facilities will be
decommissioned at Pantex since capabilities associated with them will be
incorporated into the new Small Component Facility.) A significant
portion of the cost here is attributable to the expectation that a
limited complement of new or transferred diagnostic equipment will be
required to support the R&D work, including a diverse selection of
radiographic capabilities. In addition, Pantex currently has a 10-kg
contained firing chamber that has not been used in the last 10 years but
is functionally suitable to perform intermediate-sized test fire
activities. The estimated cost to reclaim the facility and recover the
capability to meet HE R&D demands is about $15M. (This includes any
decontamination and system/equipment upgrades that may be required and
establishing suitable gas gun capability.) Large-scale contained test
fire capability to support hydrodynamic testing will not be established
at Pantex since the Hydro-Program is being planned separately. The
remainder of the initial estimated cost is minor and addresses such
things as minimal equipment upgrades, compliance-related permitting,
safety basis revisions, etc. Construction data for this scenario can be
found in Table 4.

3/19/07
Revision 2
Editorial thought... The overall NNSA budget segment linked to HE R&D is
a small percentage of the total, however, it may be possible to realize
some efficiency through consolidation-in-place (not to be confused with
down-sizing in-place). Specific planning information has been provided
for the scenarios assigned however, in more general terms; it seems that
an alternate approach to solving this dilemma may be to: 1) Define
essential capabilities that must be maintained to support the nuclear
weapons stockpile of the future (Vision 2030) 2) Determine which
capabilities for HE R&D must be maintained within the NWC and which may
have potential for out-sourcing 3) Eliminate internal commonalities 4)
Analyze costs associated with the resulting shared infrastructure
approach 5) If appropriate, develop a corresponding business case
defending the fully integrated solution

3/19/07
Revision 2
Unclassified Unlimited Release

Sandia National Laboratories Facilities & Sites Identified for Evaluation
in the Complex 2030 High Explosives R&D Integrated Product Team (HE R&D
IPT) Study

Alternatives Considered for SNL-NM by the HE R&D IPT as Requested for
Bill Dubuque (NNSA)

POC: Leanna Minier (2555) and Cara Murray (2550)

NOTE: This is the UUR Version and should not be confused with the OUO
Version

April 6, 2007

Unclassified Unlimited Release
Unclassified Unlimited Release

Sandia National Laboratories Facilities & Sites Identified for Evaluation
in the Complex 2030 High Explosives R&D Integrated Product Team (HE R&D
IPT) Study Alternatives Considered for SNL-NM by the HE R&D IPT POC:
Leanna Minier (2555) and Cara Murray (2550) The information in this
document is a description of the "To Be" cases that have been discussed
in the HE R&D IPT study. The first two sections are the same as in the
"As Is" description. They were left because the maps are relevant to the
document. Additional information for the "To Be" case is likely to be
added since new information that is relevant is being obtained at the
time this document was written and handed over to Bill Dubuque (NNSA).
SNL-NM Location (same description as given in the "As Is" scenario) SNL-
NM is located at the Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) in central New Mexico
on the southeast side of Albuquerque. Figure 1 illustrates the SNL
location in respect to the state and the city of Albuquerque. The
facilities and sites that are being discussed by the HE R&D IPT are all
located within SNL-NM. The SNL-California site has two laboratories and
three offices within the Combustion Research Facility (CRF) where R&D on
explosives is also conducted. However, these labs and offices are a small
part of the CRF. For the purposes of this exercise, the SNL-CA two labs
and offices are not included because they will not provide a significant
impact on the PEIS.

Figure 1. Sandia National Laboratories-NM, KirtlandAir Force Base, and
surrounding area.
Unclassified Unlimited Release
Unclassified Unlimited Release

SNL-NM is located within the Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) boundaries.
SNL facilities are located on property that DOE owns as well as on
property owned by the United States Air Force (USAF). For this exercise,
there is a need to distinguish between the ownership of the properties
for the various SNL facilities that are being considered. Figure 2 is a
map that outlines the areas within the SNL-NM and KAFB that can be used
as a reference for this exercise. In general for the SNL complex, the DOE
owns much of the Technical Areas (TA) in TA I-IV and the USAF owns the
rest. The DOE utilizes some of the land owned by the USAF through an
agreement and the use of permits. The legal nature of an agreement is not
represented in this discussion but can be described as permits that are
negotiated on a site-by-site basis and have time periods attached with
them. DOE/SNL can request a renewal of permits if the land is still being
used when the permit is going to expire. NEPA documents exist for each
negotiated permit and for the activities that are to be conducted on the
USAF property. When SNL no longer needs the property, the DOE is
responsible for returning the property back to the USAF in the same
condition and state as the property was when it was permitted out to the
DOE. The DOE is responsible for the decontamination of the land and
removal of any structures that were added when the land was initially
permitted out to the DOE. This description of the permits is a brief
overview and is not intended to be a full representation of the nature of
the agreements or permits.

Figure 2.   Site map for SNL-NM. SNL-NM is divided into Technical Areas
(TA). The   different Technical Areas are shown on this map. The facilities
and sites   that are involved in this exercise are located in Technical
Areas II,   III and V, and within the Coyote Test Field

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SNL Facility/Site Involved in the Alternative Discussions The facilities
and firing sites being considered in this exercise are listed in Table 1.
The sites involved are listed in Table 1 (taken for the As Is document).
These documents were obtained from the SNL NEPA database and from the SNL
Environmental Department. Table 1. Facilities and Sites selected for
inclusion in the HE R&D IPT evaluation.
Facility Building or Site ID Components 905 6750 9960 9956 R&D Capable or
Support Facility or Firing Site R&D R&D Support R&D Conduct NW WFO work
NW/WFO NW/WFO NW/WFO WFO or

Explosive Facility (ECF)

Terminal Ballistic Facility (TBF) Explosive Preparation Area Shock
Thermodynamic Applied Research (STAR) Dynamic Explosives Site (DETS) 9939
Complex Test

9940 9939 9930

R&D Firing Site Firing Site

WFO/NW WFO/NW WFO/NW

Explosives Applications Lab (EAL) (ancillary to DETS) Explosives Test
Facility Thunder Range (permits for use by the DOE 9940- being evaluated
by USAF at this time)

9920 TR

Firing Site Firing Site

WFO/NW WFO

The STAR facility was added to this study at the request of the IPT
members of LANL and LLNL. However, it has been determined that no work or
data collection on explosives is being taken or evaluated. Furthermore,
there are no plans to study or collect data on explosives in the future.
Propellants are used to fire some of the guns. However, this usage does
not fall under the definition of HE R&D as described by the HE R&D IPT.
The work that is performed at the STAR was described to the IPT members.
For the "To Be" scenarios, there is nothing gained to add the STAR
facility. Therefore it shall be left out of the "To Be" scenarios. No
Action Alternative Under no action, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)
would continue its current configuration in performing all aspects of HE
R&D associated with our component and surety missions. LANL and LLNL
would continue to perform HE R&D associated with

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the physics package as they do today. Pantex will continue the
fabrication and surveillance of HE components for the design
laboratories. Alternatives Involving SNL-NM The following alternatives
that involve SNL-NM are listed in Tables 2a and 2b, which came from Bill
Dubuque (NNSA). The alternatives that involve SNL are the following: 21,
2c, 2e, 3a, 3b, 3c, and 3d. The alternative 3 options are consolidation
to one site. In option 3 alternatives, SNL is the receiver site in the
options except for option 3d, which SNL receives all the HE R&D work.
Alternatives 3 a-c are similar to SNL-NM and therefore will be combined
together. The Alternative 2 options are a downsizing effort. For the sake
of completeness, it is worth stating that option 1 is the "As Is"
condition. In the options, the assumption is that the mission does not
move from the original site. This is likely not going to be the case in
scenarios, such as in Option 3, where all work is moved from the site.
Table 2a. List of alternative being considered for optimized
consolidation.
Donor Downsize/Consolidate Functions 2a Downsize in place All Relocate HE
Processing & Fabrication from Site 300 - after hydro replacement
facilities (Hydro IPT option 2.2 or 2.3) & environmental test replacement
facilities (ET IPT option 3) are in place, authorized and fully
functional. 2b LLNL Receiver

All

2b'

2c

LLNL HEAF Annex for local part fab Consolidate open-air 1 - 10 KG HE R&D
Experiments from LANL and Sandia to HEAF, and over 10 kg thru 100 kg HE
R&D experiments at LANL (Phase out firing sites for DP missions, possivle
WFO use) No new constuction. Consolidate complex unconfined firing to one
or no sites - say why not feasible or necessary (No costing) TechSource
said we should include both
environmental and cost data for this option - It would provide them the
most information for making the case of why it was not feasible. I
mentioned in e-mail sent to the Team on 3/2/07. If a problem, we need to
discuss it soon.

LLNL

PX provide parts LLNL HEAF and private industry

LANL, SNL LLNL, SNL LABS Only? (Compromise might be to collect costs
only. Team needs to talk to John Immele further during PX visit.)

LLNL LANL LABS Only? (Compromise might be to collect costs only. Team
needs to talk to John Immele further during PX visit.) LLNL/LANL

2d 2e
Consolidate Maincharge HE R&D Experiments and Testing to one or both
Nuclear Labs SNL

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Table 2b. List of alternatives for consolidation to one Site.
Consolidate at Fewer Sites 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f 3g Consolidate to LANL
Consolidate to LLNL Consolidate to Pantex Consolidate to SNL Consolidate
from LANL to either LLNL or PX Consolidate from LLNL to either LANL or PX
Consolidate from LANL & LLNL to PX
Donor Receiver

LLNL, PX, SNL LANL, PX, SNL LANL, LLNL, SNL LANL, LLNL, PX LANL LLNL
LANL, LLNL

LANL LLNL PX SNL LLNL or PX LANL or PX PX

Option 2a: Downsize in Place SNL-NM conducted a substantial internal
downsizing that was completed in 1995. The history of the downsizing
effort is summarized in a document written by Steven Harris (SNL, Org
2552) and provided to Bill Dubuque (March, 2007). In brief, the majority
of the DP related explosives R&D work substantially downsized its
footprint in 1995 when the ECF (Bldg 905) was built. The footprint for
the DOE NW explosive work decreased from 210 to 22 acres in this
downsizing event, and the lab and office space decreased from a total of
110,000 sq. feet, which represented over a dozen buildings (offices, labs
and storage) to approximately 100,000 square feet that was now located
within one building - the ECF. Currently all the facilities that house
explosives-related R&D are functioning close to full capacity or are
unique to the function that they can perform (e.g. at SNL the spin-rocket
motors on the B61 and B83 can only be fired at the TBF for reliability
and surveillance testing, as well as for development related firings).
Further downsizing at this time is being considered. However, SNL is
experiencing an increase in WFO work that is requiring an expansion in
fire sites capacity. In all considerations, consolidation of the firing
sites has to be balanced with the increasing needs of firing sites for
WFO work loads. Option 2c: Consolidate Open Air 1-10kg Shots to HEAF and
LANL In the Option 2c scenario, there would be minimum impact to the ECF
where most of the R&D activities are conducted. The maximum shot size at
the ECF is 1kg of TNT equivalence. This option would not eliminate HE R&D
experiments and testing that are conducted at the ECF, nor will it
decrease the laboratory space currently required to do this work.

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The impact to DP work at the TBF (6750) is not likely to experience a
major impact in this scenario. There are some shots that occur at the TBF
that are over 10kg but these are not typically for NW applications are
infrequent. The TBF is used for firing the spinrocket motors, which are
less than 6 pounds of propellant. What are the firing site impact and
risk for Sites 9940, 9939, 9920 and Thunder Range? These sites are mostly
funded by WFO in the areas of national security (CIA, etc), JTOT and
NEST. The major sites of activity at this time are Sites 9940, 9930 and
9920. The firing sites at 9939 and Thunder Range are being developed to
respond to the increased demand in WFO programs. At this time, both of
these sites are on USAF property and permits for their use by DOE are
being pursued. A substantial amount of the work conducted at these firing
sties is under the 10kg weight. But some of it is over 10kg. The WFO at
the firing sites would be impacted in this scenario. A representative
example of the size and number of shots fired at firing site 9940 is
presented in Table 3. The impact of this scenario would affect SNL. Often
times the experiments are scale up and there is a dependency of the small
scale tests. Or the exercise utilizes and develops capabilities built on
small-scale HE. These capabilities are then applied to large-scale HE
situations. In each of these cases, it is important in the continuity of
the exercise to have the capability of both less than and greater than
10kg HE shots. Table 3. Site 9940 estimated shots per year and weight of
shot.
Estimated # of Test Shots per year 400 150 20 6
1

NEW1 per shot < or = 1 lb 1 to 5 lb 5 to 20 lb 20 to 50 lb

NEW is net explosive weight

Change in personnel: difficult to assess since the 9939 and Thunder Range
firing sites are still under the permitting process. The anticipated
trend is that the personnel will grow to be able to support the expanded
work in this area. D&D: not required at this time. It would be required
to shut the existing 9940 and 9920/30 sites. Option 2e: Consolidate
Maincharge HE R&D Exp. & Testing to LANL and LLNL In the Option 2e
scenario, the site where maincharge work is being conducted is focused at
the ECF. The work being conducted on maincharge at the ECF is in response
to addressing mission needs around the topic of surety. Sandia has a
significant role in its system integrator assignment for assuring the
safety and reliability of the nuclear weapon system, which requires that
Sandia be able to support the appropriate independent R&D capabilities
for evaluating system safety themes. This requires full system
evaluations, rather than limiting Sandia efforts to evaluation of Sandia
safety features, to the broad accident threats related to abnormal
thermal, mechanical, and electrical stimuli. Sandia

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must sustain a qualification testing capability and continue to develop
its computational tools and validate important energetic materials
response models. It is in this arena that Sandia conducts experiments on
maincharge explosives. The types of experiments typically conducted
include thermal cookoff and measurement of mechanical properties on
pristine and damaged maincharge explosive. If SNL had LLNL or LANL
conduct the experiments instead, this would not decrease the need for
this work at the SNL site. SNL also has components that utilize secondary
HE, which is the same family of explosives as the maincharge explosives.
Furthermore, SNL uses these same capabilities for the explosive materials
in the non-nuclear components. If work on the maincharge explosives
ceased at SNL, the work would continue on the other explosive materials
that are in the non-nuclear components. Impact would be the following in
this scenario: No D&D required No change in personnel occurs No net
downsize in footprint Option 3: Consolidate HE R&D to One DOE Site In the
Option 3, the underlying assumption for the consolidation is that mission
does not move from any site, only the work/experiments are to be
consolidated to one location. There are two scenarios to consider in
Option 3 for SNL. The first scenario is what it would take to be the
donor and transfer all the DP HE R&D related work to Pantex, LANL or
LLNL. The second scenario is SNL being the receiver site for all the
DPrelated HE R&D work. As the donor, SNL must retain the expertise on
site. As the receiver, SNL must ensure the capacity to conduct the work
is maintained, and that there is space for the extra experiments and
staff from the donor sites that come to oversee work. If all HE R&D
activities within the weapons complex were consolidated at SNL, SNL could
absorb the HE R&D activities currently performed at Pantex and activities
from LANL and LLNL conducted at outdoor firing sites without additional
construction. In order to transfer operations from the LLNL HEAF and Site
300 operations and storage, and the LANL activities located at various
facilities there, an additional total of 480,000 sq ft of office and
laboratory space would be required to be constructed. The construction
would likely be located in Technical areas 2 or 3. Figure 3 shows all the
Tech Areas.

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Figure 3. Tech Area II and Tech Area III maps where the likelihood of
building a lab to replace the LANL and LLNL capabilities when moved to
SNL-NM (Option 3d). For the experiment and testing work to be moved out
of SNL, the receiving Site will need the capability and capacity to do
the HE R&D that supports the 70+ types of explosive components currently
in the stockpile, as well as the work required to develop advanced
explosive components for future use. The donor will have to be able to
conduct the following type of experiments and testing: o work with all
explosive materials: secondary & primary explosives, pyrotechnics and
propellants o conduct experiments and tests that are aimed to aid in the
design and development of non-nuclear components (stockpile and advanced
components) o conduct the experiments and testing required to develop the
constitutive models being developed to assess surety of the weapon
systems o develop the responsiveness and agility required to immediately
address the HE R&D related issues that arise during production of
explosive non-nuclear components As SNL being the donor of the DP-related
HE R&D work, the major SNL facilities and sites that would be impacted
are the ECF (Bldg 905) and the TBF (site 6750). Currently, the WFO
workload at the ECF is ~25% and up to ~30% at the TBF. Relocation of the
HE R&D to another DOE Site would substantially impact the ECF (Bldg 905)
and TBF activities. This is not the case for the other facilities where
WFO is the main source of program funding at this time and is anticipated
to grow out to 2030. The closing of the ECF would have to be assessed.
However, it is likely to not be a best practice as the WFO

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load is increasing. Additionally, the ECF houses the battery testing and
neutron generator test labs. Closing of the ECF and demand that it be
demolished to decrease the footprint would require a new home to be
designated for these other two test labs. In addition, the synergistic
testing capabilities in place at the ECF would be lost to the other
explosives testing facilities, thus reducing the breadth of testing and
expertise in these areas to the WFO community. Sandia would not be able
to provide world class testing service to the Nation's need without the
capabilities of all of the existing labs, each providing a piece of the
whole. SNL could absorb the HE R&D activities currently performed at
Pantex and activities from LANL and LLNL conducted at outdoor firing
sites without additional construction if all the HE R&D activities within
the weapons complex were consolidated at SNL. In order to transfer
operations from the LLNL HEAF and Site 300 operations and storage, and
the LANL activities located at various facilities there, an additional
total of 480,000 sq ft of office and laboratory space would be required
to be constructed. The location of the construction would have to be
assessed as to be built on DOE property or to obtain a permit from the
USAF for additional property. Possible areas for construction include
Tech Area II (an extension to the ECF) and IV. A statement can't be made
at this time as to what locations would be considered for the new
construction. Refer to Figure 2 for a map of the Technical Areas. A close
up of Technical Area II is presented in Figure 4. The construction data
that is associated with the transfer the explosive R&D from LLNL and LANL
is presented in Table 4. No construction would be required to accommodate
the work that is currently conducted at Pantex. New firing sites would
not be required to be constructed. About half of the new construction
represents office space for traveling scientists and engineers, and the
remaining as laboratory space.

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Table 4. Construction data for the addition of LANL and LLNL capabilities
at SNL in Tech Areas II and III. Construction Data Required
Consumption/Use Peak Electrical energy (MWe) (Fully occupied 6 MW) 100 KW
(.1MW) *** 3 Concrete (yd ) 7500 CY *** Steel (t) 6000T *** Water (gal)
(500 gals/day Ave.) 264,000 Land (acre) Laydown Area Size 5 Acres *
Parking Lots(Based on 1/2 offices & 1/2 Lab Space) 8.5 Acres ***
Employment Total employment (worker years) 225 * Peak employment
(workers) 220 * Construction period (years) 2 years * Waste Generated
Volume Hazardous Liquid (gal) (no anticipated spills) 0 Solid (yd3) 0
Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) (Portable Toilet waste to be hauled
off site) 0 Solid (yd3) 0 Nonhazardous (Other) Liquid (gal) 0 3 Solid (yd
) 2650 CY **
* Based on data from the recently completed MESA/WIF (Weapons Integrated
Facility) Project. ** Based on recently completed Office Buildings on the
SNL Site. *** System Engineers input based on SF of building and code
requirements. *** Parking Lot Size based on 480KSF Building to be
occupied 1/2 offices and 1/2 Lab Space has no large presentation
rooms.

Impact would be the following in the scenario to bring everything to SNL-
NM: o No D&D required o Land would have to be permitted if on non Tech
Area (DOE owned) o Personnel: would require bringing in between 75-100
new personnel to support the new processes and capabilities at the new
lab o The footprint will increase at SNL (theoretically decrease at LLNL
and LANL) Waste management. The existing SNL waste management
infrastructure without modification can be applied to manage and treat
all anticipated waste streams from this alternative. All hazardous and
non-hazardous waste generated at SNL facilities would be managed in
accordance with all applicable Federal and New Mexico state regulations.
Much of this is done in tandem with the USAF at KAFB. An ancillary
benefit of the explosive R&D programs at SNL that are derived from our
location on KAFB is the support from the EOD capability on the AFB. A
significant portion of the explosive waste generated in the R&D programs
is disposed of through the EOD at a substantial cost savings to SNL.
Another benefit is the land agreement and
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acreage where storage sites for explosives and explosive-containing
devices are received and allowed storage. SNL-NM does not have an open
burn-open detonation (OB-OD) site to expel excess or waste explosive
samples. SNL-NM utilizes the EOD on the USAF base for this capability.
Transportation Data. Transportation would require explosive
transportation from the donor site (LANL, LLNL, Pantex) to SNL.

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Sandia National Laboratories Facilities & Sites Identified for Evaluation
in the Complex 2030 High Explosives R&D Integrated Product Team (HE R&D
IPT) Study

Alternatives Considered for SNL-NM by the HE R&D IPT as Requested for
Bill Dubuque (NNSA)

POC: Leanna Minier (2555) and Cara Murray (2550)

NOTE: This is the UUR Version and should not be confused with the OUO
Version

April 6, 2007

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Sandia National Laboratories Facilities & Sites Identified for Evaluation
in the Complex 2030 High Explosives R&D Integrated Product Team (HE R&D
IPT) Study Alternatives Considered for SNL-NM by the HE R&D IPT POC:
Leanna Minier (2555) and Cara Murray (2550) The information in this
document is a description of the "To Be" cases that have been discussed
in the HE R&D IPT study. The first two sections are the same as in the
"As Is" description. They were left because the maps are relevant to the
document. Additional information for the "To Be" case is likely to be
added since new information that is relevant is being obtained at the
time this document was written and handed over to Bill Dubuque (NNSA).
SNL-NM Location (same description as given in the "As Is" scenario) SNL-
NM is located at the Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) in central New Mexico
on the southeast side of Albuquerque. Figure 1 illustrates the SNL
location in respect to the state and the city of Albuquerque. The
facilities and sites that are being discussed by the HE R&D IPT are all
located within SNL-NM. The SNL-California site has two laboratories and
three offices within the Combustion Research Facility (CRF) where R&D on
explosives is also conducted. However, these labs and offices are a small
part of the CRF. For the purposes of this exercise, the SNL-CA two labs
and offices are not included because they will not provide a significant
impact on the PEIS.

Figure 1. Sandia National Laboratories-NM, KirtlandAir Force Base, and
surrounding area.
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SNL-NM is located within the Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) boundaries.
SNL facilities are located on property that DOE owns as well as on
property owned by the United States Air Force (USAF). For this exercise,
there is a need to distinguish between the ownership of the properties
for the various SNL facilities that are being considered. Figure 2 is a
map that outlines the areas within the SNL-NM and KAFB that can be used
as a reference for this exercise. In general for the SNL complex, the DOE
owns much of the Technical Areas (TA) in TA I-IV and the USAF owns the
rest. The DOE utilizes some of the land owned by the USAF through an
agreement and the use of permits. The legal nature of an agreement is not
represented in this discussion but can be described as permits that are
negotiated on a site-by-site basis and have time periods attached with
them. DOE/SNL can request a renewal of permits if the land is still being
used when the permit is going to expire. NEPA documents exist for each
negotiated permit and for the activities that are to be conducted on the
USAF property. When SNL no longer needs the property, the DOE is
responsible for returning the property back to the USAF in the same
condition and state as the property was when it was permitted out to the
DOE. The DOE is responsible for the decontamination of the land and
removal of any structures that were added when the land was initially
permitted out to the DOE. This description of the permits is a brief
overview and is not intended to be a full representation of the nature of
the agreements or permits.

Figure 2.   Site map for SNL-NM. SNL-NM is divided into Technical Areas
(TA). The   different Technical Areas are shown on this map. The facilities
and sites   that are involved in this exercise are located in Technical
Areas II,   III and V, and within the Coyote Test Field

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SNL Facility/Site Involved in the Alternative Discussions The facilities
and firing sites being considered in this exercise are listed in Table 1.
The sites involved are listed in Table 1 (taken for the As Is document).
These documents were obtained from the SNL NEPA database and from the SNL
Environmental Department. Table 1. Facilities and Sites selected for
inclusion in the HE R&D IPT evaluation.
Facility Building or Site ID Components 905 6750 9960 9956 R&D Capable or
Support Facility or Firing Site R&D R&D Support R&D Conduct NW WFO work
NW/WFO NW/WFO NW/WFO WFO or

Explosive Facility (ECF)

Terminal Ballistic Facility (TBF) Explosive Preparation Area Shock
Thermodynamic Applied Research (STAR) Dynamic Explosives Site (DETS) 9939
Complex Test

9940 9939 9930

R&D Firing Site Firing Site

WFO/NW WFO/NW WFO/NW

Explosives Applications Lab (EAL) (ancillary to DETS) Explosives Test
Facility Thunder Range (permits for use by the DOE 9940- being evaluated
by USAF at this time)

9920 TR

Firing Site Firing Site

WFO/NW WFO

The STAR facility was added to this study at the request of the IPT
members of LANL and LLNL. However, it has been determined that no work or
data collection on explosives is being taken or evaluated. Furthermore,
there are no plans to study or collect data on explosives in the future.
Propellants are used to fire some of the guns. However, this usage does
not fall under the definition of HE R&D as described by the HE R&D IPT.
The work that is performed at the STAR was described to the IPT members.
For the "To Be" scenarios, there is nothing gained to add the STAR
facility. Therefore it shall be left out of the "To Be" scenarios. No
Action Alternative Under no action, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)
would continue its current configuration in performing all aspects of HE
R&D associated with our component and surety missions. LANL and LLNL
would continue to perform HE R&D associated with

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the physics package as they do today. Pantex will continue the
fabrication and surveillance of HE components for the design
laboratories. Alternatives Involving SNL-NM The following alternatives
that involve SNL-NM are listed in Tables 2a and 2b, which came from Bill
Dubuque (NNSA). The alternatives that involve SNL are the following: 21,
2c, 2e, 3a, 3b, 3c, and 3d. The alternative 3 options are consolidation
to one site. In option 3 alternatives, SNL is the receiver site in the
options except for option 3d, which SNL receives all the HE R&D work.
Alternatives 3 a-c are similar to SNL-NM and therefore will be combined
together. The Alternative 2 options are a downsizing effort. For the sake
of completeness, it is worth stating that option 1 is the "As Is"
condition. In the options, the assumption is that the mission does not
move from the original site. This is likely not going to be the case in
scenarios, such as in Option 3, where all work is moved from the site.
Table 2a. List of alternative being considered for optimized
consolidation.
Donor Downsize/Consolidate Functions 2a Downsize in place All Relocate HE
Processing & Fabrication from Site 300 - after hydro replacement
facilities (Hydro IPT option 2.2 or 2.3) & environmental test replacement
facilities (ET IPT option 3) are in place, authorized and fully
functional. 2b LLNL Receiver

All

2b'

2c

LLNL HEAF Annex for local part fab Consolidate open-air 1 - 10 KG HE R&D
Experiments from LANL and Sandia to HEAF, and over 10 kg thru 100 kg HE
R&D experiments at LANL (Phase out firing sites for DP missions, possivle
WFO use) No new constuction. Consolidate complex unconfined firing to one
or no sites - say why not feasible or necessary (No costing) TechSource
said we should include both
environmental and cost data for this option - It would provide them the
most information for making the case of why it was not feasible. I
mentioned in e-mail sent to the Team on 3/2/07. If a problem, we need to
discuss it soon.

LLNL

PX provide parts LLNL HEAF and private industry

LANL, SNL LLNL, SNL LABS Only? (Compromise might be to collect costs
only. Team needs to talk to John Immele further during PX visit.)

LLNL LANL LABS Only? (Compromise might be to collect costs only. Team
needs to talk to John Immele further during PX visit.) LLNL/LANL

2d 2e
Consolidate Maincharge HE R&D Experiments and Testing to one or both
Nuclear Labs SNL

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Table 2b. List of alternatives for consolidation to one Site.
Consolidate at Fewer Sites 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f 3g Consolidate to LANL
Consolidate to LLNL Consolidate to Pantex Consolidate to SNL Consolidate
from LANL to either LLNL or PX Consolidate from LLNL to either LANL or PX
Consolidate from LANL & LLNL to PX
Donor Receiver

LLNL, PX, SNL LANL, PX, SNL LANL, LLNL, SNL LANL, LLNL, PX LANL LLNL
LANL, LLNL

LANL LLNL PX SNL LLNL or PX LANL or PX PX

Option 2a: Downsize in Place SNL-NM conducted a substantial internal
downsizing that was completed in 1995. The history of the downsizing
effort is summarized in a document written by Steven Harris (SNL, Org
2552) and provided to Bill Dubuque (March, 2007). In brief, the majority
of the DP related explosives R&D work substantially downsized its
footprint in 1995 when the ECF (Bldg 905) was built. The footprint for
the DOE NW explosive work decreased from 210 to 22 acres in this
downsizing event, and the lab and office space decreased from a total of
110,000 sq. feet, which represented over a dozen buildings (offices, labs
and storage) to approximately 100,000 square feet that was now located
within one building - the ECF. Currently all the facilities that house
explosives-related R&D are functioning close to full capacity or are
unique to the function that they can perform (e.g. at SNL the spin-rocket
motors on the B61 and B83 can only be fired at the TBF for reliability
and surveillance testing, as well as for development related firings).
Further downsizing at this time is being considered. However, SNL is
experiencing an increase in WFO work that is requiring an expansion in
fire sites capacity. In all considerations, consolidation of the firing
sites has to be balanced with the increasing needs of firing sites for
WFO work loads. Option 2c: Consolidate Open Air 1-10kg Shots to HEAF and
LANL In the Option 2c scenario, there would be minimum impact to the ECF
where most of the R&D activities are conducted. The maximum shot size at
the ECF is 1kg of TNT equivalence. This option would not eliminate HE R&D
experiments and testing that are conducted at the ECF, nor will it
decrease the laboratory space currently required to do this work.

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The impact to DP work at the TBF (6750) is not likely to experience a
major impact in this scenario. There are some shots that occur at the TBF
that are over 10kg but these are not typically for NW applications are
infrequent. The TBF is used for firing the spinrocket motors, which are
less than 6 pounds of propellant. What are the firing site impact and
risk for Sites 9940, 9939, 9920 and Thunder Range? These sites are mostly
funded by WFO in the areas of national security (CIA, etc), JTOT and
NEST. The major sites of activity at this time are Sites 9940, 9930 and
9920. The firing sites at 9939 and Thunder Range are being developed to
respond to the increased demand in WFO programs. At this time, both of
these sites are on USAF property and permits for their use by DOE are
being pursued. A substantial amount of the work conducted at these firing
sties is under the 10kg weight. But some of it is over 10kg. The WFO at
the firing sites would be impacted in this scenario. A representative
example of the size and number of shots fired at firing site 9940 is
presented in Table 3. The impact of this scenario would affect SNL. Often
times the experiments are scale up and there is a dependency of the small
scale tests. Or the exercise utilizes and develops capabilities built on
small-scale HE. These capabilities are then applied to large-scale HE
situations. In each of these cases, it is important in the continuity of
the exercise to have the capability of both less than and greater than
10kg HE shots. Table 3. Site 9940 estimated shots per year and weight of
shot.
Estimated # of Test Shots per year 400 150 20 6
1

NEW1 per shot < or = 1 lb 1 to 5 lb 5 to 20 lb 20 to 50 lb

NEW is net explosive weight

Change in personnel: difficult to assess since the 9939 and Thunder Range
firing sites are still under the permitting process. The anticipated
trend is that the personnel will grow to be able to support the expanded
work in this area. D&D: not required at this time. It would be required
to shut the existing 9940 and 9920/30 sites. Option 2e: Consolidate
Maincharge HE R&D Exp. & Testing to LANL and LLNL In the Option 2e
scenario, the site where maincharge work is being conducted is focused at
the ECF. The work being conducted on maincharge at the ECF is in response
to addressing mission needs around the topic of surety. Sandia has a
significant role in its system integrator assignment for assuring the
safety and reliability of the nuclear weapon system, which requires that
Sandia be able to support the appropriate independent R&D capabilities
for evaluating system safety themes. This requires full system
evaluations, rather than limiting Sandia efforts to evaluation of Sandia
safety features, to the broad accident threats related to abnormal
thermal, mechanical, and electrical stimuli. Sandia

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must sustain a qualification testing capability and continue to develop
its computational tools and validate important energetic materials
response models. It is in this arena that Sandia conducts experiments on
maincharge explosives. The types of experiments typically conducted
include thermal cookoff and measurement of mechanical properties on
pristine and damaged maincharge explosive. If SNL had LLNL or LANL
conduct the experiments instead, this would not decrease the need for
this work at the SNL site. SNL also has components that utilize secondary
HE, which is the same family of explosives as the maincharge explosives.
Furthermore, SNL uses these same capabilities for the explosive materials
in the non-nuclear components. If work on the maincharge explosives
ceased at SNL, the work would continue on the other explosive materials
that are in the non-nuclear components. Impact would be the following in
this scenario: No D&D required No change in personnel occurs No net
downsize in footprint Option 3: Consolidate HE R&D to One DOE Site In the
Option 3, the underlying assumption for the consolidation is that mission
does not move from any site, only the work/experiments are to be
consolidated to one location. There are two scenarios to consider in
Option 3 for SNL. The first scenario is what it would take to be the
donor and transfer all the DP HE R&D related work to Pantex, LANL or
LLNL. The second scenario is SNL being the receiver site for all the
DPrelated HE R&D work. As the donor, SNL must retain the expertise on
site. As the receiver, SNL must ensure the capacity to conduct the work
is maintained, and that there is space for the extra experiments and
staff from the donor sites that come to oversee work. If all HE R&D
activities within the weapons complex were consolidated at SNL, SNL could
absorb the HE R&D activities currently performed at Pantex and activities
from LANL and LLNL conducted at outdoor firing sites without additional
construction. In order to transfer operations from the LLNL HEAF and Site
300 operations and storage, and the LANL activities located at various
facilities there, an additional total of 480,000 sq ft of office and
laboratory space would be required to be constructed. The construction
would likely be located in Technical areas 2 or 3. Figure 3 shows all the
Tech Areas.

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Figure 3. Tech Area II and Tech Area III maps where the likelihood of
building a lab to replace the LANL and LLNL capabilities when moved to
SNL-NM (Option 3d). For the experiment and testing work to be moved out
of SNL, the receiving Site will need the capability and capacity to do
the HE R&D that supports the 70+ types of explosive components currently
in the stockpile, as well as the work required to develop advanced
explosive components for future use. The donor will have to be able to
conduct the following type of experiments and testing: o work with all
explosive materials: secondary & primary explosives, pyrotechnics and
propellants o conduct experiments and tests that are aimed to aid in the
design and development of non-nuclear components (stockpile and advanced
components) o conduct the experiments and testing required to develop the
constitutive models being developed to assess surety of the weapon
systems o develop the responsiveness and agility required to immediately
address the HE R&D related issues that arise during production of
explosive non-nuclear components As SNL being the donor of the DP-related
HE R&D work, the major SNL facilities and sites that would be impacted
are the ECF (Bldg 905) and the TBF (site 6750). Currently, the WFO
workload at the ECF is ~25% and up to ~30% at the TBF. Relocation of the
HE R&D to another DOE Site would substantially impact the ECF (Bldg 905)
and TBF activities. This is not the case for the other facilities where
WFO is the main source of program funding at this time and is anticipated
to grow out to 2030. The closing of the ECF would have to be assessed.
However, it is likely to not be a best practice as the WFO

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load is increasing. Additionally, the ECF houses the battery testing and
neutron generator test labs. Closing of the ECF and demand that it be
demolished to decrease the footprint would require a new home to be
designated for these other two test labs. In addition, the synergistic
testing capabilities in place at the ECF would be lost to the other
explosives testing facilities, thus reducing the breadth of testing and
expertise in these areas to the WFO community. Sandia would not be able
to provide world class testing service to the Nation's need without the
capabilities of all of the existing labs, each providing a piece of the
whole. SNL could absorb the HE R&D activities currently performed at
Pantex and activities from LANL and LLNL conducted at outdoor firing
sites without additional construction if all the HE R&D activities within
the weapons complex were consolidated at SNL. In order to transfer
operations from the LLNL HEAF and Site 300 operations and storage, and
the LANL activities located at various facilities there, an additional
total of 480,000 sq ft of office and laboratory space would be required
to be constructed. The location of the construction would have to be
assessed as to be built on DOE property or to obtain a permit from the
USAF for additional property. Possible areas for construction include
Tech Area II (an extension to the ECF) and IV. A statement can't be made
at this time as to what locations would be considered for the new
construction. Refer to Figure 2 for a map of the Technical Areas. A close
up of Technical Area II is presented in Figure 4. The construction data
that is associated with the transfer the explosive R&D from LLNL and LANL
is presented in Table 4. No construction would be required to accommodate
the work that is currently conducted at Pantex. New firing sites would
not be required to be constructed. About half of the new construction
represents office space for traveling scientists and engineers, and the
remaining as laboratory space.

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Table 4. Construction data for the addition of LANL and LLNL capabilities
at SNL in Tech Areas II and III. Construction Data Required
Consumption/Use Peak Electrical energy (MWe) (Fully occupied 6 MW) 100 KW
(.1MW) *** 3 Concrete (yd ) 7500 CY *** Steel (t) 6000T *** Water (gal)
(500 gals/day Ave.) 264,000 Land (acre) Laydown Area Size 5 Acres *
Parking Lots(Based on 1/2 offices & 1/2 Lab Space) 8.5 Acres ***
Employment Total employment (worker years) 225 * Peak employment
(workers) 220 * Construction period (years) 2 years * Waste Generated
Volume Hazardous Liquid (gal) (no anticipated spills) 0 Solid (yd3) 0
Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) (Portable Toilet waste to be hauled
off site) 0 Solid (yd3) 0 Nonhazardous (Other) Liquid (gal) 0 3 Solid (yd
) 2650 CY **
* Based on data from the recently completed MESA/WIF (Weapons Integrated
Facility) Project. ** Based on recently completed Office Buildings on the
SNL Site. *** System Engineers input based on SF of building and code
requirements. *** Parking Lot Size based on 480KSF Building to be
occupied 1/2 offices and 1/2 Lab Space has no large presentation
rooms.

Impact would be the following in the scenario to bring everything to SNL-
NM: o No D&D required o Land would have to be permitted if on non Tech
Area (DOE owned) o Personnel: would require bringing in between 75-100
new personnel to support the new processes and capabilities at the new
lab o The footprint will increase at SNL (theoretically decrease at LLNL
and LANL) Waste management. The existing SNL waste management
infrastructure without modification can be applied to manage and treat
all anticipated waste streams from this alternative. All hazardous and
non-hazardous waste generated at SNL facilities would be managed in
accordance with all applicable Federal and New Mexico state regulations.
Much of this is done in tandem with the USAF at KAFB. An ancillary
benefit of the explosive R&D programs at SNL that are derived from our
location on KAFB is the support from the EOD capability on the AFB. A
significant portion of the explosive waste generated in the R&D programs
is disposed of through the EOD at a substantial cost savings to SNL.
Another benefit is the land agreement and
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acreage where storage sites for explosives and explosive-containing
devices are received and allowed storage. SNL-NM does not have an open
burn-open detonation (OB-OD) site to expel excess or waste explosive
samples. SNL-NM utilizes the EOD on the USAF base for this capability.
Transportation Data. Transportation would require explosive
transportation from the donor site (LANL, LLNL, Pantex) to SNL.

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Sandia National Laboratories Facilities & Sites Identified for Evaluation
in the Complex 2030 High Explosives R&D Integrated Product Team (HE R&D
IPT) Study

Description and Current Status on Operations at Designated Sites as
Requested for Bill Dubuque (NNSA)

POC: Leanna Minier (2555) and Cara Murray (2550)

NOTE: This is the UUR Version and should not be confused with the OUO
Version

April 6, 2007

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Sandia National Laboratories Facilities & Sites Identified for Evaluation
in the Complex 2030 High Explosives R&D Integrated Product Team (HE R&D
IPT) Study Current Status on Operations at Designated Sites POC: Leanna
Minier (2555) and Cara Murray (2550) The information in this document is
intended to be brief overviews, as requested by the NNSA, of specified
facilities and sites that are used by SNL-NM for work that has relevancy
to R&D that is conducted on explosives. NNSA is requesting the
information in this document to be given to Tech Source, Inc., so that
Tech Source, Inc. can independently develop a Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement that is pertinent to the downsizing and consolidation of
explosives R&D for the future Nuclear Weapons Complex 2030. The
definition is broad as to what is included under R&D. See other documents
related to this exercise for the definition of what is categorized as HE
R&D. This information is for Bill Dubuque (NNSA) and Tech Source, Inc.,
who are conducting an independent Business Case Analysis for the HE R&D
consolidation evaluation. This document can be used in conjunction with
the "SNL As Is" document provided earlier. SNL-NM Location SNL-NM is
located at the Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) in central New Mexico on
the southeast side of Albuquerque. Figure 1 illustrates the SNL location
in respect to the state and the city of Albuquerque. The facilities and
sites that are being discussed by the HE R&D IPT are all located within
SNL-NM. The SNL-California site has two laboratories and three offices
within the Combustion Research Facility (CRF) where R&D on explosives is
also conducted. However, these labs and offices are a small part of the
CRF. For the purposes of this exercise, the SNL-CA two labs and offices
are not included because they will not provide a significant impact on
the PEIS.

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Figure 1. Sandia National Laboratories-NM, Kirtland Air Force Base, and
surrounding area. SNL-NM is located within the Kirtland Air Force Base
(KAFB) boundaries. SNL facilities are located on property that DOE owns
as well as on property owned by the United States Air Force (USAF). For
this exercise, there is a need to distinguish between the ownership of
the properties for the various SNL facilities that are being considered.
Figure 2 is a map that outlines the areas within the SNL-NM and KAFB that
can be used as a reference for this exercise. In general for the SNL
complex, the DOE owns much of the Technical Areas (TA) in TA I-IV and the
USAF owns the rest. The DOE utilizes some of the land owned by the USAF
through an agreement and the use of permits. The legal nature of an
agreement is not represented in this discussion but can be described as
permits that are negotiated on a site-by-site basis and have time periods
attached with them. DOE/SNL can request a renewal of permits if the land
is still being used when the permit is going to expire. NEPA documents
exist for each negotiated permit and for the activities that are to be
conducted on the USAF property. When SNL no longer needs the property,
the DOE is responsible for returning the property back to the USAF in the
same condition and state as the property was when it was permitted out to
the DOE. The DOE is responsible for the decontamination of the land and
removal of any structures that were added when the land was initially
permitted out to the DOE. This description of the permits is a brief
overview and is not intended to be a full representation of the nature of
the agreements or permits.

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Figure 2.   Site map for SNL-NM. SNL-NM is divided into Technical Areas
(TA). The   different Technical Areas are shown on this map. The facilities
and sites   that are involved in this exercise are located in Technical
Areas II,   III and V, and within the Coyote Test Field.

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SNL Facility/Site Descriptions The facilities and firing sites being
considered in this exercise are listed in Table 1. New sites added to the
SNL study that the IPT didn't receive previous information about are the
STAR, DETS, EAL, ETF and Thunder Range Sites. Information on the
facilities and sites was obtained from existing Site-Wide Environmental
Impact Statements (SWEIS), NEPA documents, and the program leads at the
firing sites. The documents were obtained from the SNL NEPA database and
from the SNL Environmental Department. Table 1. Facilities and Sites
selected for inclusion in the HE R&D IPT evaluation.
Facility Explosive Components Facility (ECF) Terminal Ballistic Facility
(TBF) Building or Site ID 905 R&D Capable or Support Facility or Firing
Site1 R&D Conduct mostly NW or WFO2 NW/WFO Information Source for
Description of Facility or Site SNL NM Facilities and Safety Information
Document Calendar Year 2003 Update Vol. 1 (SAND2005-0125). Final
Supplement Analysis for the Final Site-Wide Environmental Impact
Statement for Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (DOE/EIS-0281-SA-
04) NEPA ID: SN04-0003 NEPA ID: SNA05-0508 (Lalitt Chhabildas and
Reinhart) NEPA ID: SNA03-0297 (Greg Scharrer, SNL) NEPA ID: SNA06-0591
(Jerry Stofleth, SNL) NEPA ID: SNA03-0151 (Jerry Stofleth, SNL) NEPA ID:
SNA03-0330 (Jerry Stofleth, SNL) NEPA SNA-05-0436 (Greg Scharrer, SNL)

6750

R&D

NW/WFO

Explosive Preparation Area Shock Thermodynamic Applied Research (STAR)3
Dynamic Explosives Test Site (DETS) (Ancillary to EAL) 9939 Complex
Explosives Applications Lab (EAL) Explosives Test Facility Thunder Range
(permits for DOE use being evaluated by USAF at this time)
1 2

9960 9956

Testing support facility Gun facility

NW/WFO WFO

Bill

9940

Firing Site + facility

WFO

9939 9930

Firing Site Firing Site structures Firing Site structures Firing Site +

WFO WFO/NW
9920 TR

+

WFO/NW WFO

Facility is a building that houses staff full time. Structures are
buildings temporarily occupied when testing at the site is conducted.
Designation shows the source mostly geared at showing program funding.
Some sites are being established using WFO funds (e.g. 9939). 3 The STAR
facility does not conduct R-D-A on explosives. They do use propellant to
fire some of their guns. This site has only been included due to
agreement to the HE R&D IPT.

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1. Explosive Components Facility - ECF (Bldg 905) The ECF is on DOE-owned
land (Tech Area II), and is the facility where the majority of HE R&D is
contained. The ECF is a low-hazard, nonnuclear facility located in
building 905, which was completed in 1995. (Although there is a Safety
Assessment [SNL, 2003b] associated with the facility, it is not required
[Johnson, 2004]). It is located ~200 yards (yd) northeast of Tech Area II
border, 400 yd southeast of Tech Area I, ~1,000 yd northeast of the
Simulation Technology Laboratory in Tech Area IV, and slightly more than
2 miles (mi) east of the Albuquerque International Sunport main east/west
runway. The nearest off-base residential housing is located more than 1
mi northeast of the site. The ECF consolidates a number of activities
formerly conducted in TA-II related to energetic component research,
testing, and development. The ECF complex includes a main building of
~100,000 square feet (ft?), six explosive-service magazines, a storage
building, and service drives and parking areas needed to make the complex
self-contained. The magazines prevent fragments and blast overpressure
from accidental explosions from spreading beyond the facility's
boundaries. Utilities such as water, natural gas, power, communications,
and sanitary sewer extend from existing services on Kirtland Air Force
Base (KAFB). A security fence encloses the site, and access to the
complex is controlled at all times. The building is divided into two
wings, administrative and laboratory/testing, which are connected by a
corridor. The facility includes some 41,000 ft? of laboratories,
diagnostic centers, and performance test facilities for the research and
development of advanced explosives technology. A second-story maintenance
area extends over part of the administrative wing and most of the
laboratory/testing wing. The administrative wing contains a lobby,
conference rooms, offices, laboratories, a lunchroom, and some
maintenance areas. The lobby provides a reception area for visitors and
uncleared personnel. Two large conference rooms adjacent to the lobby are
equipped with video teleconferencing and presentation equipment. Access
is controlled to the rest of the building. Laboratories in the
administrative wing are light labs. No work with energetic materials is
done in these labs. The laboratory/testing wing is structurally decoupled
from the rest of the building to the extent that routine explosives tests
will not generally be heard or felt in the administrative wing. The
laboratory spaces in this wing are devoted to the routine testing of
explosives and explosive devices, neutron generators, and batteries. Nine
indoor firing pads and two walk-in chambers provide the capability for
detonating up to 1 kg (TNT equivalent) of explosives in each location. A
light-gas gun is used to conduct shock characterization, energetic-
material sensitivity, and armor-penetration studies. Explosives
laboratories are used for explosive and propellant preparation and
component disassembly, analysis, and aging and ignition studies. The
neutron generator laboratories are used for the development, engineering
design, and testing of neutron generators for weapon systems, research
manufacturing, and quality assurance evaluations. Tests may include life
cycle testing and environmental testing, and packaging for shipment is
done in

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the ECF. The Battery Safety Laboratory is used for evaluation and abuse
testing of batteries, mostly for weapon components. The nuclear weapon
mission of the ECF is to conduct research and development of a variety of
energetic components (cradle-to-grave responsibilities) and experiments
with explosives to aid in the assessment of total weapon surety. Programs
include about 70% NW and 30% WFO. The ECF is primarily a test facility
performing the following activities: o physical and chemical testing of
explosives, pyrotechnics, and propellants; o cradle-to-grave activities
for explosive components from design, surveillance, retirement; o
stockpile surveillance of explosives, pyrotechnics, and propellants; o
development of advanced explosive component; o research, development, and
testing of neutron-generating devices; o research, development, and
testing of batteries

production,

The ECF operations are allocated, but not limited to the following
programs and activities; o Direct Stockpile Activities involve research
and development (R&D), energetic materials, and other components. o
Special projects, conducted with the U.S. Department of Defense, include
projects for the purpose of reducing operational hazards associated with
energetic materials, advanced initiation and fuse development, and
material studies along with computer simulation. Other projects involve a
wide variety of experimental testing, R&D, analysis, technology transfer,
and technology development related to explosives, explosives materials,
explosive components, and other materials.

o

A broad range of energetic-material R&D and application activities are
conducted at the ECF. Advanced diagnostic equipment is used during
experiments ranging from micrograms to 1 kilogram tests, to sophisticated
spectroscopic studies on milligram-size samples that probe fundamental
processes of detonation. A variety of chemicals (corrosives, solvents,
organics, and inorganics) in gaseous, liquid, and solid forms in
relatively small quantities are used in many different processes. Air
emissions result from the use of corrosives, alcohols, ketones, and other
solvents. Sealed radioactive sources, X-rays, and lasers are used in the
facility. Low-level tritium emissions are associated with various aspects
of neutron generator development and testing and are not associated with
the explosives work that is conducted at the ECF. 2. Terminal Ballistics
Facility - TBF (Bldg 6750) The terminal Ballistics Facility (TBF) is a
low-risk, non-nuclear facility that includes a main building, two smaller
buildings (Buildings 6752 and 6753), and four explosives storage
magazines. The facility is located in Tech Area III, Building 6750. The
main building houses a small machine shop, office space, a control area,
and an indoor firing range. Building 6753 is

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used for large propellant charge assembly and temperature conditioning of
propellants. Building 6752 is an unoccupied storage shed for non-
hazardous materials. The storage magazines are used for long-term storage
of propellants and explosives. The four magazines can be used for the
storage of propellants and explosives. The TBF includes a 1,000 square-
foot indoor and a 100-acre outdoor firing range that accommodate live
testing and firing of guns ranging in size from 0.17 caliber to 8-inch.
The facility retains the world's fastest launch capability for masses of
300 to 2000 grams. The site also conducts static firings of solid fuel
rocket motors of up to 100,000 pounds thrust. The firing site can
accommodate explosive detonation tests up to 50-lb TNT equivalent. The
outdoor, large-caliber gun range has a 155 millimeter (mm) "Long Tom"
artillery piece permanently mounted in a revetment adjacent to the main
building. Also located outside of the facility is a large walk-in
explosive test chamber (Big Blue), providing the ability of detonating up
to 3 kilograms of high explosives. The TBF provides secure, remote,
indoor and outdoor test facilities for ballistics studies and solid-fuel
rocket motor tests. Indoor testing of firearms and projectiles is
conducted from a fixed stand to provide controlled firing of ammunition (
<= 20 mm). Various guns may be used for projectile or penetration tests,
with targets placed up to ~1,000 ft south of the main building. For
outdoor thrust tests, a rocket is oriented vertically on the static test
stand, with the nose resting on a load cell (to measure thrust force
during the propellant burn cycle). Spin rockets are tested using a
horizontal fixture with a load cell. Munitions testing performed outdoors
in explosives-rated chambers may use both explosives and chemicals.
Processes at the Terminal Ballistics complex are centered on the
evaluation of test materials, primarily the physical examination,
cleaning, and general quality assurance of munitions and components. In
addition, the Terminal Ballistics Complex provides unique test
environments and capabilities including the following: o An outdoor,
large-caliber gun range with a 155-mm "Long Tom" artillery gun
permanently mounted in a revetment; o A walk-in blast chamber for
conducting explosive effects experiments; o Static-fire rocket stands
used to measure the thrust force of small rockets; o Test environments
for ballistic studies and solid-fuel rocket motor tests; and o Secure,
remote indoor and outdoor test facilities; The TBF operations are
allocated, but not limited, to the following programs and activities: o
Direct Stockpile Activities; include development and survivability
testing of nuclear weapon subsystems and components by using firearms and
projectiles to determine material effects and responses. o Special
projects reduce operational hazards associated with explosives, explosive
initiators, hard target penetration, computer simulation. o Science and
Technology include material response evaluations. o Other projects
include experiments on shipping containers and storage facilities.

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The TBF maintains a small chemical inventory and no radioactive material
inventory. Various aspects of the preparation and evaluation of test
materials can result in emissions from a variety of solvents including
alcohols and acetone. Radioactive air emissions are not produced at this
facility. 3. Explosives Preparation Area - EPA (Bldg 9960) The EPA
building is 1844 square feet and provides support to explosive test
groups and other engineering organizations within SNL/NM. Personnel at
the complex machine raw explosives into a variety of shapes and perform a
wide range of assembly and disassembly work, including postmortem of
devices containing explosives. The explosives machining area of the 9960
complex has a lathe, hydraulic press, and two milling machines. These
machines have been modified for explosives machining, and they are
equipped with dual controls for local or remote operations. Remote
machining operations are monitored by closed-circuit TV, and the
operators are located in a blast-resistant room. During explosive
machining operations, a barrier, which is controlled remotely from
building 9960, is lowered across the facility entrance road to prevent
access to the complex. For conventional machining operations, the 9960
complex is also equipped with a lathe, milling machine and band saw.
Building 9960 is a converted storage igloo with static-control conductive
floors and workbenches. There are 4 stations with protective shields for
pressing up to 5 grams of sensitive powder or 25 grams of insensitive
powder. Larger quantities may be pressed by remoter control on a 25-ton
press. There is a video and audio link between the two buildings to
provide an extra margin of safety. A Faxtron 804 X-ray machine is located
in Building 9960. Only trained operators are authorized to operate the
machine. An approved list of operators is maintained as a permanent
attachment to OP471529. Operators of the machine and others in the
immediate area are required to wear a dosimeter while the machine is in
operation. The complex is equipped with a lightening early warning system
that activates visual and audio alarms when the potential gradient
reaches an unsafe level. If the alarm sounds, all activities using
explosives are suspended. In addition to explosive material, the project
activities involve the use of a small variety of chemicals including
acetone, alcohol, epoxides, adhesives, toluene, spray paint, lubricants,
and propane and argon gases in relatively small amounts. The laboratories
used in these activities meet the definition of the Occupational Safety
and Health (OSHA) Laboratory Standard (29 CFR 1910.1450). All
laboratories operate in accordance with the SNL ES&H Manual and the
Conduct of Operations Manual: Explosives Operations. Water from
explosives machining operations is filtered and discharged to a holding
tank. The contents of the tank are sampled, and the results analyzed to
determine whether explosive or regulated substances are present. After
the data is analyzed, permission is requested to discharge the water into
the sanitary sewer. All nonexplosives-containing liquid and regulated
solid waste is disposed of through the SNL/NM Hazardous and Solid Waste
Department, and no chemical waste is discharged onto the ground or into
the sanitary sewer. Most of the waste generate in these activities is
solvent rags or explosive

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chips. All explosive waste is stored and disposed by procedures outlined
in the SNL Explosives Safety Manual. SNL-NM proposes to continue these
activities in the current and foreseeable fiscal years, certainly through
FY2009. These activities would be performed in support of current and
proposed research and development initiatives, both for SNL/NM internal
customers and WFO. 4. Shock Thermodynamic Applied Research - STAR (Bldg
9956) The STAR facility is located within the USAF Coyote Test Field and
is a facility that can provide a full range of projectile/target
interactions. Impact velocities from 0.01 to 16km/s are available with a
broad range of diagnostic and analysis capabilities. The STAR Facility is
considered a comprehensive Equation-of-State (EOS) Physics R&D Facility
and is recognized for testing the impact and fragmentation properties of
a variety of materials. Experiments on explosives are not part of the
materials that are assessed. R&D activities performed have extensive
military applications. Although the majority of testing is carried out in
support of the Department of Defense (DoD)/DOE Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) and SNL internal customers, additional work is
performed for other agencies (e.g. NASA, DTRA, USAF, etc). The work load
has increased in intensity over the last ten years. STAR houses several
high-velocity launchers with projectile masses ranging from 0.1 grams to
greater than 1.0 kg. Guns are both propellant and gas (hydrogen/helium)
driven. All testing is done within enclosed and evacuated chambers that
are part of the guns themselves. o One large bore, two-stage light gas
gun (1.125-inch bore) o One medium bore two-stage light gas gun
(temporarily on loan to Washington State University) o One powder gun
(3.5 inch bore) o One gas gun (4.0 inch bore) o One oblique gun (4.0 inch
bore) This facility should not be included in the HE R&D IPT study. 5.
Dynamic Explosives Test Complex - DETS (Site 9940) Mission/activities:
Mission/activities: The DETS Complex is located on the Coyote Test Field.
Current work at the facility involves arming and firing of explosives and
the testing of explosive systems components in both terrestrial and
aquatic settings. These facilities are used to serve the needs of the
JTOT (Joint Tactical Operations Teams) nuclear emergency response program
and to meet the energetics technology needs of the DoD Special Forces and
the Intelligence Community. There are three lines of business: energetics
research, emergency response training, and threat assessments. The budget
is $10M; 90% of this is WFO. Energetics research is focused on defining
the behavior of energetics in environments of interest to the DoD and
Intelligence Community, and in developing new methods of using explosives
to gain access to denied spaces with minimal net explosive weight and
fragmentation.

Unclassified Unlimited Release
Unclassified Unlimited Release

Emergency response training provides realistic devices and venues for
teams to enhance their disablement skills and test new technology. Sandia
provides inexpensive, realistic devices, realistic venues, classroom
education, and new technology for the teams. Sandia evaluates potential
energetic threats to National Security and works with appropriate
agencies to develop prevention and mitigation approaches. A wide range of
energy sources are evaluated in this line of business. Most all the work
is WFO. There is one DP project. It is a novel approach to use control
for older weapon systems that draws upon our render safe expertise. That
project will be completed by the end of FY08, at which time all the work
is anticipated to be WFO. 9939 Complex (Site 9939), Explosives
Applications Laboratory Complex - EAL (Site 9930), and Explosives Test
Facility - ETF (Site 9920) These three remote sites are all located on
the Coyote Test Field. The sites are being utilized by the same group at
SNL-NM for the same programs. Therefore they will be described together.
Sites 9920 and 9930 are active. The 9939 Complex is in the process of
being taken out of standby mode and reactivated in order to take on some
of the additional WFO work load being experienced at the Sites 9940, 9930
and 9920. Mission(s) and capabilities: Site 9930 supports direct DP,
indirect DP and WFO missions. o Direct DP: Direct support for Test
Readiness is a primary mission. o Indirect work includes NEST/JTOT (NA-
40) activities, both for training and for technology integration. o Other
indirect work includes support for programs in the joint DOD/DOE
Munitions MOU and support for Navy-SP. o Capabilities include:
Development testing and assessment of warheads and munitions (arena
testing, fragmentation characterization, blast effects, etc.); IED
characterization and threat mitigation (CSC, EFP and flyer development
and evaluation); testbed for fireset development for underground Test
Readiness / Stockpile Stewardship, NEST/JTOT and DOD/WFO programs. Site
9920 directly supports DP programs in access delay (e.g. Transportation
Safeguards Division), perimeter control, and collateral effects.
Expansion into Homeland Security Dept. programs, both related and
unrelated to DP programs, is slated for the near future. The role of the
facility in NEST/JTOT training and Architectural Surety will be developed
in the near future as well. o DTRA is the primary support organization
for most of the work at 9920 currently. In the near future this will
expand to crossover HSD missions. o Capabilities include facilities for
access delay/denial R&D, aerosol sampling, particulate dispersal and
aqueous foam mitigation technologies. The Site is also capable of testing
large scale events (fuel air weapons, etc.). Site 9939 is a newly
approved for operations on KAFB. The primary mission for this Site will
be in the areas of ballistics R&D, Lethality research and the development
of special explosive 6.

Unclassified Unlimited Release
Unclassified Unlimited Release

compounds such as high-concentration peroxide, thermobarics, other
metalized fuel-air compounds, etc. Explosives testing would be limited to
22.5 kilograms of TNT equivalent.

There is little infrastructure to this Site, but it will fully functional
within the FY07 timeframe. o The expectation is that most of the
activities to center around DTRA, DARPA and HSD. o Capabilities will
include: shock tube experimentation, rocket motor thrust evaluation,
peroxide motor development activities, ballistic effects development (100
yard gun/projectile evaluation chamber). The people directly involved in
operating these facilities numbers about ten. The 5434 people involved in
supporting the capability and operation of these facilities is about 25.
The number of users in both DP and WFO programs around the SNL-NM and
SNL-CA Sites is about 200. The breakout of DP dollars versus WFO dollars
involved in these sites is about 50/50 - operating costs in total are
about $2.5M. Department operating costs are about $10M. A variety of
chemicals (corrosives, solvents, organics, and inorganics) in gaseous
(acetylene for welding), liquid, and solid forms, in relatively small
quantities, are used for surface preparations, cleaning material
processing, fabrication of test parts, per-explosives testing and quality
control. Associated emissions include corrosives, alcohols, ketones, and
other solvents. Additional emissions are associated with the conduct of
outdoor explosive tests. Nondestructive test, using X-rays and lasers,
are conducted within the facility. The ETF is located at the Coyote Test
Field and is comprised of two main buildings (9920/9926), testing
structures, explosive storage igloos, storage trailers and sheds. Work at
this facility involves testing with high explosives in support of
projects related to the NEST and other programs. 7. Thunder Range - TR

A section of Thunder Range (523 acres) is being requested to support the
expanded WFO work load that is being conducted at DETS (Site 9940). The
work that will comprise the expanded authority at the TR includes
explosive testing, threat assessment tests and training events similarly
to those being conducted at DETS but at a larger level. There are
currently no people with offices at the TR now, though there is
authorization for structures to be put in place. Located in the Coyote
Test Field, the Thunder Range Complex is generally bounded on the north
by Magazine Road, although a triangular area north of this road (North
Thunder Range) is also part of the permitted parcel. The complex is
bounded on the southeast by a fence along Isleta Road. The portion of the
complex closest to the Isleta Pueblo is approximately on-half mile north
of that boundary.

Unclassified Unlimited Release
Unclassified Unlimited Release

Locations of Facilities/Sites Figure 3a. The ECF (Bldg 905) is located
~200 yards northeast of Tech Area II, 400 yards southeast of Tech Area I,
~1000 yards northeast of the Simulation Technology Lab in Tech Area IV,
and slightly more than 2 miles east of the Albuquerque International
Sunport main east/west runway. This is the place where most all the
explosive R&D is conducted.

Figure 3b. The ECF (Bldg 905) building consists of Figure Office space
and laboratories.

3c. ECF floor plan.

Unclassified Unlimited Release
Unclassified Unlimited Release

Figure 4a. The sites located at the USAF Coyote Test Field include 9960,
9956, 9940, 9939, 9930 and 9920. Some of these sites are complexes that
include small structures for storage and test assembly.

9956 9940 9920 9930 9960 9939

Annual Operating Statistics The annual operating statistics for the
facilities are summarized in Table 2. Emissions data that was calculated
from each site's shot records is reported in Table 3. The waste
generation is summarized in Table 4. All sites are remote with the
exception of the ECF (905). Often times the data was not available
because it is not directly measured for individual sites that are in
remote locations. An example is the electrical accounting. Electric
metering is just now being installed for all new buildings in remote
sites (e.g. Coyote Canyon). Old buildings are scheduled for retrofitting
of electric meters. With exception of the ECF, the buildings of interest
in this study do not have meters and therefore electrical energy
consumption is not measured. The remote sites are sporadic in the work
conducted there and do not have a consistent use of electricity.
Typically at the remote sites, heat is obtained by electricity (portable
heaters or resistant heating) and typically hot water is obtained from
small 5-10 gallon water heaters.

Unclassified Unlimited Release
Unclassified Unlimited Release

Table 2. Annual operation statistics for sites of interest to the HE R&E
IPT.
Consumption from Annual Operations Annual Operations Statistics
Electrical Energy (kWh) (Note 1) Peak electrical demand (Note 2) Liquid
fuel - propane (gal/yr) (Note 3) Natural Gas (ft3) Process water
consumption (Mgal) (Note 3) Facility (acres) footprint ECF (905) 2655185
NM None 7,165,469 4.7 TBF (6750) NM NM None None No Data EPA (9960) NM NM
2605 (4 yr ave) None No Data STAR (9950) No data NM None None No Data
DETS (9940) NM NM 468 (4 yr ave) None No Data 12.3 (projected to 1500 by
2008) N/A 30 (40 at max) Complex 9939 NM NM 468 None No Data EAL (9930)
NM NM 875 None No Data ETF (9920) NM NM 1525 None No Data Thunder Range
(TR) NM NM 468 None No Data

22 24 x 10^6

100 N/A

5.8 N/A

23 N/A

30.6 N/A 1 (Note 6)

80 N/A

37.3 N/A

523 N/A 0 (expect 10 in 1 yr; 20 in 2 yrs 0

Boiler energy (ft3)

Employment (FTEs)

85

1

3

4

8

2

Rad workers (#)

7

0

3 (Note 4)
4 (operators of flash xray)

0

0

1

1

Radionuclide emissions and effluents - nuclides and Curies (uCi/yr)
NM = Not Measured

7.17 (Note 5)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

N/A = Not Applicable Note 1. Many of these facilities outside of the Tech
Areas do not have electric meters on them. Use of electricity is
intermittent. Note 2. Peak electrical demand data is not collected. Note
3. Process water consumption - SNL-NM obtains its water from the KAFB
water storage tanks on the NE side of the base. Note 4. Machinists have
to be trained RAD workers because they participate in disassembly of
neutron generators. Note 5. Emissions due to neutron generator work
conducted in building and is NOT due to explosive R&D activities. Note 6.
Site 9939 is in the process of being activated. Sites 9930 and 9920 are
growing work. Anticipate 25 people in these sites.

Unclassified Unlimited Release
Unclassified Unlimited Release

Table 3. Annual Air Emissions Estimate in Pounds per Year (based on 2006
shot record data)
Facility
Explosive Components Bldg 905 Terminal Ballistic Site(Bldg 6750) 0.5 0.8
0.0 4.3 0.0

CO

NOx

SO2

PM10

HAPs

3.8

6.4

0.1

35.3

0.0

Site 9940

15.5

26.0

0.2

144.2

0.0

Thunder Range Sites 9920, 9930, 9939 Star Facility (Bldg 9956 Site 9960*

100.0

168.0

1.4

930.0

0.0

9.0
15.1

0.1

83.7

0.0

10.3

15.5

0.0

221.5

2.3

* No explosive detonation or burning at the 9960 facility

Table 4. Waste Category Profile (Fiscal Year 2006 data) for the
Facilities/Sites of interest.
Waste Category FACILITY ECF TBF 9960 9956 9940 (9939 likely to be
similar) None None None None None 24.6 NM NM None 0.1 9930 9920 TR (Note
1)

Low Level liquid (kg) solid (ft3/yr) Mixed Low Level liquid (kg) solid
(ft3/yr) Hazardous1 liquid (kg) solid (kg/yr) 2 Non-Hazardous (sanitary)
liquid (kg) solid (ft3/yr) Non-Hazardous (chemical) liquid (kg) solid
(kg)
1 2

None None None None 304.4 16.1 NM NM 119.5 4756.2

None None None None None None NM NM None None

None None None None 41.5 None NM NM None 0.1

None None None None None None NM NM None None

None None None None None None NM NM None None

None None None None None 24.6 NM NM None 0.1

Most the hazardous material is explosive waste This data is not tracked
and is not measured (NM) Note 1: TR (Thunder Range) and 9939 have no data
relevant to HE R&D activities at this time but are at a minimum assessed
to be similar to 9940 since these Sites are expansions of the growing
9940 work.

Unclassified Unlimited Release
Sandia National Laboratories (New Mexico and California Sites) Explosives
R&D: Current "As Is" Conditions - Description
Approved for Unlimited Distribution SAND No. 2007-0823 P

February 16, 2007

Assembled by: Leanna Minier - POC (Org 2555) and Mark Garrett (Org 02554)
Sandia National Laboratories PO Box 5800 MS 1555 Albuquerque, NM 87185-
1555 LMINIER@sandia.gov

SNL Contributors include: Richard Behrens Jeff Cherry David Clauss
Charles Eberle Steve Harris Eugene Hertel Rodney May Cara Murray Anita
Renlund Andrew Rogulich Greg Scharrer

Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a
Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy's
National Nuclear Security Administration under Contract DE-AC04-
94AL85000.
Unclassified - Unlimited Release Sandia National Laboratories (New Mexico
and California Sites) Explosives R&D: Current "As Is" Conditions -
Description This assignment is to identify and describe the facilities
where explosive R&D is conducted. The same assignment is being conducted
at LLNL, LANL and Pantex. The information will be used for discussions to
maximize efficiencies and evaluate downsizing options amongst the NWC in
the areas where explosives R&D is conducted. As the Systems integrator,
SNL has mission responsibility for more than 95% of the U.S. NW
components and for assuring the safety and reliability of the complete,
integrated NW system. Support of this mission leads multiple facilities
within the SNL infrastructure that include R&D and testing with
explosives, explosive components and weapon systems. The following
guidelines were applied in the determination of what buildings are
presented in detail in this report, and which buildings are referenced. o
Details of the current state for the major facilities and labs that
conduct explosives R&D are provided. o Major facilities include Buildings
905 (NM), 6715 (NM), 6750 (NM) o Labs and office space within facilities
that conduct mostly non-explosives R&D and WFO include space in Buildings
906 (CA), 880 (NM) and 775 (NM). o The facilities that house and store
the explosives used in R&D are included in this report because they would
have to be considered if SNL explosive R&D was moved to another site. o
Many other facilities support explosive R&D in development and
applications by providing test capabilities qualified for testing
systems, subsystems and components that contain explosives. These
facilities are called out as testing facilities and are being inventoried
in a similar effort to this study that is referred to as Environmental
Testing Sites. o It is critical to identify these facilities in order to
obtain a good sense of what facilities are indirectly associated with
explosives R&D but don't specifically conduct explosive R&D. These
facilities provide critical testing for assessments and model validation
that is sometimes associated with explosives R&D and application efforts.
o We identify the testing facilities in this report but reference the
Environmental Testing report submission (authored by Anthony Thornton at
SNL) as the source for the facility details. o The facilities where
application-based R&D (includes some explosives R&D) is included as a
reference. Less than 5% of explosives R&D is conducted at these
facilities but the uniqueness of the facilities in applications must be
considered if explosives R&D were to be removed from SNL. An important
note to consider about the SNL-NM site is the ancillary benefits to the
explosive R&D programs that are derived from our location on Kirtland
AFB. One benefit is the support from the EOD capability on the AFB. A
significant portion of the explosive waste generated in the R&D programs
is disposed of through the EOD at a substantial cost saving to SNL.
Another benefit is the land agreement and acreage where storage sites for
explosives and explosivecontaining devices are received and stored.

2
Unclassified - Unlimited Release Summary Table of major facilities where
explosive R&D is conducted and supported.
Approximate Structure Replacement Value $50M $2M $1.5M Deferred Maintain.
YEAR ACQUIRED 1995 1963 1966 Site Acreage 22 1 100 Bldg Sq Ft 101582 3379
2748 Approxima te Equipment Value >$20M >$3M >$1M # of Staff 80+ 5 3 %
WFO 25% 25% 2030%

Type of Work NW R&D NW R&D NW R&D

SITE NM NM NM

Bldg # 905 6715 6750

PROPERTY NAME EXPLOSIVE COMPONENT FACILITY LIGHT INITIATED HIGH EXPLOSIVE
TEST FAC IMPACT TEST FACILITY (TBF)

Condition* Adequate Excellent Fair

The following sites are critical support for the explosives R&D conducted
at SNL. NW support NM 9960 EXPLOSIVE PREPARATION FAC <$1M NW support NM
6020 EXPLOSIVES REC & PACKING $1.6M NW support NM 6028 SST STORAGE FAC
(NW OF 6020) $0.5M NW support NM 6029 SST STORAGE FAC (NW OF 6020) - NOT
OWNED BY SANDIA

1965 1964 1985 1987

Excellent Fair Excellent n/a

1844 3306 3240

>$1M

2

~50%

The labs & offices identified below conduct fundamental explosive R&D.
The buildings that house these areas are used for multiple other NW and
WFO programs; explosive R&D is not the main activity. NW R&D CA 905
Excellent 1500 Two unique labs and corresponding office $12M ~80% space
at the Combustion Research Center 4 Excellent 800 880 and 2000 ~25% NW
R&D NM Supercomputers and Office space Excellent $150M 8 725 (office)
Condition* RPV is replacement value to rebuild the facility. Values are
based upon an SNL Critical Asset Survey conducted in 2004. Deferred
maintenance what would have to be invested in the facility to modernize
it to current building codes

3
Unclassified - Unlimited Release Explosive Component Facility (ECF); SNL-
NM Bldg 905
FACILITY DESCRIPTION: The ECF includes over 100,000 sq. ft. of
laboratories, diagnostic centers and performance facilities for the
research and development of advanced explosive technology and sits on 22
acres on Tech Area II. Unique facility features include: o Explosives
labs qualified for all types of explosives (primary and secondary high
explosives, propellants, thermobarics, propellants) o Light/optic labs o
Battery lab o Neutron generator lab areas o Gas gun o Maintenance areas o
High explosives chambers and firing pads o Explosive component
disassembly area o Explosives receiving area o Explosives storage

MISSION & ACTIVITIES: Multiple missions are supported within the ECF
facility to result in a wide array of activities. o Stockpile "cradle-to-
grave" responsibility for all the 70+ non-nuclear explosive components.
Includes development and production activities. Explosive R&D activities
required to support this mission include: o ability to handle, store,
test and model all types of explosive materials (primary and secondary
high explosives, pyrotechnics and propellants) that are used in explosive
components o performance (testing and modeling) o materials compatibility
studies o science-based surveillance o explosive detection (health
monitors) o development of advanced explosive diagnostics o Surety
assessments: system integrator assignment for assuring the safety and
reliability of the complete, integrated nuclear weapon system. Mission
space requires developing an understanding of the response of explosives
within a weapon system when subjected to abnormal environments. Explosive
R&D activities required to support this mission include: o experiments to
measure material response relevant to assessments being made o
qualification testing development o computational tool development o
validation method development PEOPLE: o 80+ people o 50% of the people
hold an advanced degree (MS or Ph.D.) in the fields of chemistry and
engineering BUDGET: The annual operating budget for the ECF runs up to
$35M. Budget need varies depending on people and infrastructure needs.
Maintenance of infrastructure and instruments: around $3M WFO: NW-WFO
(DoD and other govt. WFO agreements) and non-NW WFO typically account for
25% of the budget.

4
Unclassified - Unlimited Release

905

Explosive Component Facility (Bldg 905) in Tech Area II SNL-NM

5
Unclassified - Unlimited Release Light-High Explosives Facility (LiHE);
SNL-NM Bldg 6715
FACILITY DESCRIPTION: The LIHE facility is a ~3,400 square-foot facility,
located in the NE corner of Technical Area 3. The facility has recently
undergone a 3 year and ~$11M refurbishment that included an investment to
re-staff, train, and qualify this capability. The facility has
specialized capabilities to formulate, apply, light-initiate, and
properly dispose of up to 800 g of the primary explosive, silver
acetylide - silver nitrate (SASN). Robotic and remote manipulation of
explosive materials and test assemblies is required due to the
sensitivity of the SASN explosive. Structural and diagnostic
instrumentation capabilities include up to 160 channels of high speed
data acquisition, flash x-ray, high speed photography, and VISAR systems.
The facility is also permitted to dispose of explosive wastes on-site.

LIHE Facility (6715)

MISSION & ACTIVITIES: Mission is to simulate the hostile cold x-ray-
induced shock loading from an exo-atmospheric nuclear blast shock
environment to SLBM and ICBM systems. This one-of-a-kind facility and
technique is capable of inducing load levels in varying distribution
(such as cosine distributions), including load discontinuities. The
facility is used to qualify weapon systems to hostile mechanical shock
environments, as well as work in close coordination with structural
dynamics modeling activities. PEOPLE: o 5 full-time people o 1-2 people
with advanced engineering degrees BUDGET: The annual labor budget for the
LiHE runs about $2M. Annual upkeep of instrumentation runs about $100k
WFO: Minimal

6
Unclassified - Unlimited Release Terminal Ballistics Facility (TBF); SNL-
NM Bldg 6750
FACILITY DESCRIPTION: Facility includes a 1,000 square-foot indoor and a
100acre outdoor firing range that accommodate live testing and firing of
guns ranging in size from 0.17 caliber to 8-inch. The facility retains
the world's fastest launch capability for masses of 300 to 2000 grams.
The site also conducts static firings of solid fuel rocket motors of up
to 100,000 pounds thrust. The firing site can accommodate explosive
detonation tests up to 50-lb TNT equivalent.

MISSION & ACTIVITIES: This is a test site. Its mission is to conduct
propellant and ballistics testing. The testing is conducted in support of
multiple programs, including NW-based explosive R&D. Examples of NW-based
explosive R&D includes instrumented explosive experiments (materials
response, modeling validation) and spin-rocket motor surveillance.
PEOPLE: o 1 full-time person at all times and one engineer available at
all test times. o 2-12 people to depending upon the test being supported.
BUDGET: The annual operating budget for the TBF runs between $3-5M,
depending upon testing conducted. WFO: NW-WFO and non-NW WFO typically
account for 20-30% of the annual budget. Requires annual upkeep of
Environmental permits

7
Unclassified - Unlimited Release Laboratories within the Combustion
Research Facility Utilized for Explosive R&D
THERMAL ANALYSIS LABORATORY FACILITY DESCRIPTION: The Combustion Research
Facility (CRF) is an internationally recognized DOE Office of Science
user facility. Housed within the facility are two labs (Bldg 906) with
unique instruments routinely applied to conduct NW-based explosive R&D: a
thermal analysis lab and a chemical imaging lab. LABORATORY DESCRIPTIONS:
Both labs utilize advanced, customized mass spectroscopic instruments.
The thermal decomposition lab is 1500 square feet and is home to the
STMBMS, a unique instrument for determining (1) EM vapor pressures, (2)
gas signatures evolving from explosives, (3) processes that control aging
of materials, (3) reaction kinetics to develop methods to predict the
safety and aging of existing explosives, (4) determine reaction schemes
to design new energetic materials for munitions applications (rockets,
guns, warheads). The Chemical Imaging lab is 800 square feet and is home
to the Chemical imaging precision mass analyzer (ChIPMA) instrument. This
unique instrument is utilized for examining reactions process at
microscopic spatial scales. It is used to investigate reactions related
to aging and safety of explosives.

CHEMICAL IMAGING LABORATORY

MISSION & ACTIVITIES: The mission of this laboratory is to conduct the
R&D relevant to characterizing the chemical and physical state of
materials, and identifying the reactive processes Mission activities
include (1) Safety and aging of RDX and HMX based explosives, (2) Aging
issues associated with PETN and CP/HMX based detonators, (3) Development
of new materials, (4) Analysis of aging issues associated with non-
explosive materials (i.e., rubbers, polymers, adhesives), (5) Range of
projects for DoD associated with chemical propulsion (see below). PEOPLE:
o 2 full-time PhD scientists o 2 full-time technologists BUDGET: The
annual labor budget runs at about $1M. Operating budget is ~$0.25M WFO:
NW-WFO and non-NW WFO have typically accounted for 80% of the annual
budget (varies annually). ROM REPLACEMENT COST: Instrumentation for both
labs: $11.5M

8
Unclassified - Unlimited Release

anaa      --
 a   ;siUral -

     .



i
Sandia National Laboratories I CA
1 9

Unclassified - Unlimited Release Engineering & Sciences Computational
Support (space in Bldg 880)
Red Storm: <100 TereOps Red Storm (41.5 TeraOps)

Building 880 houses multiple organizations and two super computers
(Thunderbird and NWCC) at SNL. A third facility, Bldg 725, houses the Red
Storm supercomputer. Several staff members who utilize the computers for
NW-based explosive R&D have office space in Bldg 880. There are
approximately 10 offices, 2000 square feet.

ms - s
(1-10 -3)

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:
Time Scales

us
(10 -6)

ns
(10 -9)

Macroscale (structural level) Mesoscale (grain level) Microscale
(subgranular) Atomistic/Molecular
o

ps

NWCC (16.7 TeraOps)

(10 -12)

fs
(10 -15)

A

nm
107 atoms

um
1010 atoms

> mm
> 1015 atoms

Length Scales

MISSION & ACTIVITIES: Mission is the modeling and simulation for safety,
surety, reliability and performance of explosives, explosive components
and full weapons systems. Engineering models are used throughout the NWC
to address response of systems and components. Specific expertise in
explosives R&D is used to assess system response to normal (storage,
transportation) environments and abnormal environments (fire, mechanical
insult). Physics-based models are derived from experimental
investigations conducted throughout the NWC. PEOPLE: o 8 staff with
advanced degrees working on NW-related projects that qualify as
explosives R&D (SFI's, material constitutive models, etc). BUDGET: o
Labor budget: ~$3.5M WFO: ~25% WFO

10
Unclassified - Unlimited Release
Buildings 880 and 725 in Tech Area I (SNL-NM)
aan
725


Unclassified - Unlimited Release Storage Facilities for Explosives (6000)
(supports NW Explosive R&D)

FACILITY DESCRIPTION: Storage of the explosives must be considered in any
moves. Currently there are two facility infrastructures used for
explosive storage: the "6000 Igloos" and Manzano. Both storage
infrastructures and the facilities are owned by Kirtland AFB. The 6000
Igloo storage area has a total of 21,000 square feet and includes 21
facilities (10 of 21 are for classified storage). The Manzano storage
area includes 43 facilities, - 19 are used for general storage - 13 are
used for explosive storage - 12 are used for classified -- 4 of 12 are
for accountable storage -- 3 of these 4 are also used as SNM storage -- 1
of the 12 is used for explosive storage The total storage area at Manzano
is 97260 square feet. MISSION & ACTIVITIES: Mission of this are is to
provide storage for explosives at SNL. PEOPLE: o 18 NNSA staff care for
the storage of the explosives in all forms and in subsystems and systems.
BUDGET: ~$2M

12
Unclassified - Unlimited Release Explosive Preparation Area (9960)
(supports NW Explosive R&D)

FACILITY DESCRIPTION: Remote control capabilities for cutting explosives
and explosive components. Building is 1844 square feet and located in
Tech Area IV.

Bldg 9960

MISSION & ACTIVITIES: Mission of this are is to prepare explosive samples
using remote handling capabilities. An example of an explosive operation
includes the machining of explosive components to expose the inside of
the component and explosive for surveillance studies. PEOPLE: o 3 staff
BUDGET: ~$400K WFO ~20%

13
Unclassified - Unlimited Release Environmental Test Facilities Supporting
NW-Based Explosive R&D The following facilities are test facilities that
support explosive R&D. NOTE: these facilities are being called out and
described in the Environmental Testing Report where further details of
the logistics for each facility can be found. They are being referenced
in this report since some (~10-25%) explosive R&D is conducted (i.e.
surveillance, model validation, etc).
Facility Mission/Activities People NW/WFO

860-NDE

Non-destructive inspection (radiography, ultrasonics, optical, dye
penetrant, etc) of components and subsystems. May contain up to 5 grams
explosives in a single test item. Used for qualification, certification,
model validation data, and SFIs/failure analyses.

6

70/30

860-Shock

Component testing (up to 5 grams of explosives per unit)Drop tables,
resonant fixtures, Hopkinson bars, tunable beams to simulate high
amplitude, high frequency shocks-supports acceptance, development,
qualification and model validation

5

75/25

860-Structures Lab

Component testing with up to 20 grams explosives in single test setup.
Multiple actuators and reactions system to support static loads up to
600,000 lbf . Pressure cage for testing internal testing of components
and several vessels for external pressurization up to 20,000 PSI
Component testing with temperature, altitude, and steady state
accelerations as environments. May contain up to 5 grams of explosives
per unit.

5

90/10

860Centrifuge/Climatic

3

90/10

14
Unclassified - Unlimited Release

Facility

Mission/Activities Multi-scale testing to determine dynamic
characteristics of structures (up to 15 g of explosives)-modal test
methods including impact and vibrationsupports model validation and
development, instrumentation for system and component shock/vibe and
blast tests, shock and vibration troubleshooting

People

NW/WFO

860-Modal Measurement of mass properties (mass, center of gravity, moment
of inertia) of small objects (up to 100 pounds), explosives up to 50
grams-Space Electronics mass properties machine-supports acceptance and
model validation 860-Mass Properties

8-10

70/30

1-2

70/30

860-Vibration

Component testing (up to 5 grams of explosives per unit)Electrodynamic
shakers w/ temperature conditioning to simulate shock and vibration
environments and HALT/HASSsupports acceptance, development. qualification
and model validation

7-8

70/30

6610

Large scale testing, can be remotely operated, test articles with up to
100 lbs HEElectrodynamic shaker testing to simulate shock and vibration
environments-used for qualification, certification, component
environments, and model validation data

2-4

80/20

15
Unclassified - Unlimited Release FACILITIES WHERE APPLICATION-BASED
EXPLOSIVES R&D IS CONDUCTED

Facilities: 9930, 9939, 9920 - Explosives Applications
Mission/activities: The Explosives Applications Department engages in the
research, design, development, manufacture and testing of explosive
components, explosive systems, and arming and firing (A&F) system
hardware. The department operates laboratories in Tech Area IV and the
Explosives Applications Laboratory (Site 9930) in Coyote Canyon. We also
conduct operations at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and other locations. DP
support includes design and fielding of A&F systems for the nuclear
Underground Test Program (UGT) as an element of the DoE Enhanced Test
Readiness Program. At the NTS, the department was also responsible for
developing and fielding the very large explosively driven closures for
underground nuclear weapon effects testing. Today, the department is
engaged in a broad spectrum of explosives applications - including the
design and development of explosive shaped charges, the development of
specialized detonator firing systems, and the modeling of blast phenomena
and their effects. Department Staff support the DoE/NNSA Emergency
Response Program and work with the local, national, and international law
enforcement communities to combat terrorism with the development of tools
bomb technicians use to defeat improvised explosive devices. People: 36
WFO: 48 % of budget

16
Unclassified - Unlimited Release FACILITIES WHERE APPLICATION-BASED
EXPLOSIVES R&D IS CONDUCTED

Facilities: Building 963 - Org. 5400's Test & Assembly Lab (TAL) Mission:
DP related mission includes support of NW Advanced Systems & Technology
program with high-speed reentry, rocket, precision navigation, earth
penetrating weapons, conventional munitions technology and guided flight
systems. Mission is achieved through concurrent cost reimbursable WFO
programs. Activities: Perform the assembly and testing of target Reentry
Vehicles and Countermeasures in support of Missile Defense Agency's
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) programs. Perform missile systems tests
in support of various WFO programs. Perform R&D of conventional warheads
and subsystems in support of various WFO programs.

Other Sandia explosive certified facilities critical to the performance
of our mission: Sled Track 860 Shock & Vibration, Static Pull Testing 865
High Altitude Chamber 6526 Centrifuge 6539 Thermal Test Complex 6560 Mass
Properties, Vibration, Acoustic Facility 6570 Mechanical Shock Facility
6610 Shock & Vibration Testing 6736 Sprint Missile Building 6743 Rocket
Motor Assembly Building 9832 ACF Rocket Motor Assembly Building 9960
Explosives Machine Shop 6000 Igloo and Manzano Explosive Storage 9930
Explosives Applications Aerial Cable Facility Kauai Test Facility People:
~ 150 WFO: ~95% of budget

17
Option 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f 3g 3h

LANL 300 -150 -150 -150 -150 175 -150 -150

LLNL -175 300 -175 -175 300 -175 -175 -175

Pantex -10 -10 160 -10 96 96 116 -10

SNL -45 -45 -45 325 No change No change No change -45

NTS TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD
Table AA. Pantex HE R&D "To Be" Options 3/28/2007 Construction Data for
Consolidating LANL/LLNL/SNL HE R&D @ Pantex Project Type New Construction
Project name Small Component Facility Data Required Peak electrical
energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown
Size Parking Lots Total Footprint (new or added) Employment Total
employment (worker years) Peak Employment (workers) Construction period
(years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level Hazardous Hazardous Non-Hazardous
(sanitary & other) Peak electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel
(tons) Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total Footprint
(new or added) Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment
(workers) Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level
Hazardous Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other) Project Consumption
7.0 7,550.0 275.0 750,000.0 4.0 1.0 0.6 72,000.0 175.0 68.0 3.0 <0.1 na
58.0 7.0 11,005.0 1,935.0 1,000,000.0 13.0 2.0 0.2 50,000.0 230.0 90.0
3.0 <0.1 na 77.4

New Construction

HE Pressing Facility

Facility Modification

Pilot-Scale Formulation Facility

Peak electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water (gal) Land
(acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total Footprint (new or added)

5.0 1,000.0 50.0 100,000.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0
Project Type

Project name

Data Required Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment
(workers) Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level
Hazardous Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other)

Project Consumption 75.0 30.0 3.0 <0.1 2.0 20.0

Facility Modification

Contained Chamber/Gas Guns

Peak electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water (gal) Land
(acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total Footprint (new or added)
Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment (workers)
Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level Hazardous
Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other)

5.0 1,000.0 50.0 100,000.0 0.5 0.5 0.2 5,000.0 30.0 20.0 2.0 1.0 5.0 20.0

Facility Modification

Analytical Expansion

Peak electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water (gal) Land
(acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total Footprint (new or added)
Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment (workers)
Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level Hazardous
Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other) Peak electrical energy (Mwe)
Concrete (yd3)

1.0 500.0 20.0 20,000.0

0.0 5,000.0 30 20 2 <0.1 0 20 2.0 650.0

New Construction

Administrative Support Bldg
Project Type

Project name

Data Required Steel (tons) Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown Size Parking
Lots Total Footprint (new or added) Employment Total employment (worker
years) Peak Employment (workers) Construction period (years) Waste
Generated (yd3) Low-Level Hazardous Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary &
other)

Project Consumption 75.0 200,000.0 1.0 0.2 0.1 18,000.0 50.0 35.0 2.0
<0.1 0.0 40.0

General Modifications

All other intermediate & minor mods

Peak electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water (gal) Land
(acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total Footprint (new or added)
Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment (workers)
Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level Hazardous
Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other)

5.0 20.0 20.0 200,000.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60.0 40.0 2.0 <0.1 5.0 50.0
Table DD. Pantex HE R&D "To Be" Options 3/28/2007 Construction Data for
Consolidating LANL/LLNL HE R&D @ Pantex Project Type Project name Data
Required Pilot-Scale Formulation New Construction Facility Peak
electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water (gal) Land
(acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total Footprint (new or added)
Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment (workers)
Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level Hazardous
Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other) New Construction HE Pressing
Faclity (CD-2) Peak electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons)
Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total Footprint (new or
added) Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment
(workers) Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level
Hazardous Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other)

Project Consumption 9.0 11,335.0 1,800.0 1,000,000.0 6.6 1.2 0.5 50,000.0
230.0 90.0 3.0 <0.1 na 77.4 9.0 11,005.0 1,935.0 1,000,000.0 13.0 2.0 0.2
50,000.0 230.0 90.0 3.0 <0.1 na 77.4

Facility Modification

Small Components

Peak electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water (gal) Land
(acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total Footprint (new or added)
Employment

5.0 <100 180.0 100,000.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Project Type

Project name

Data Required Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment (workers)
Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level Hazardous
Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other)

Project Consumption 75.0 30.0 3.0 <0.1 2.0 20.0

Facility Modification

Contained Chamber/Gas Guns

Peak electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water (gal) Land
(acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total Footprint (new or added)
Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment (workers)
Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level Hazardous
Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other)

5.0 1,000.0 50.0 100,000.0 0.5 0.5 0.2 5,000.0 30.0 20.0 2.0 1.0 5.0 20.0

Facility Modification

Analytical Expansion

Peak electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water (gal) Land
(acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total Footprint (new or added)
Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment (workers)
Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level Hazardous
Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other)

1.0 500.0 20.0 20,000.0

0.0 5,000.0 30.0 20.0 2.0 <0.1 0.0 20.0

New Construction

Administrative Support Bldg

Peak electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons)

2.0 650.0 75.0
Project Type

Project name

Data Required Water (gal) Land (acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total
Footprint (new or added) Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak
Employment (workers) Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3)
Low-Level Hazardous Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other)

Project Consumption 200,000.0 1.0 0.2 0.1 18,000.0 50.0 35.0 2.0 <0.1 0.0
40.0

General Modifications

All other intermediate & minor mods

Peak electrical energy (Mwe) Concrete (yd3) Steel (tons) Water (gal) Land
(acre) Laydown Size Parking Lots Total Footprint (new or added)
Employment Total employment (worker years) Peak Employment (workers)
Construction period (years) Waste Generated (yd3) Low-Level Hazardous
Hazardous Non-Hazardous (sanitary & other)

5.0 20.0 20.0 200,000.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60.0 40.0 2.0 <0.1 5.0 50.0
Hydrotcsting

Capabilities The High Explosives Testing Key Facilities at LANL are
located in five TAs (TA-14, TA-15, TA-36, TA-39, and TA-40) and comprise
more than one-half (22 of 40 square miles [14,080 of 25,600 acres (5,698
of 10,360 hectares)]) of the land area occupied by LANL and has 16
associated firing sites. The firing sites are in remote locations and
canyons and specialize in experimental studies of the dynamic properties
of materials under high-pressure and -temperature conditions. The
facilities that make up the explosives testing operations are used
primarily for research, development, test operations, and detonator
development and testing related to the DOE Stockpile Stewardship Program.
Major High Explosives Testing (Hydrotesting) buildings are located at TA-
15 and include the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (TA-
15-312) and the TA-15-306 firing site. Building types consist of
preparation and assembly facilities, bunkers, analytical laboratories,
high explosives storage magazines, and offices. TA-15, located in the
central portion of LANL, is used for high explosives research,
development, and testing, mainly through hydrodynamic testing and dynamic
experimentation. TA-15 is the location of two active firing sites, the
Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT), which has an
intense highresolution, dual-machine radiographic capability, and
Building 306 (R306), a multipurpose facility where primary diagnostics
are performed. Currently, there exists no permanent radiographic
capability at R306. The Pulsed High Energy Radiation Machine Emitting X-
Rays (PHERMEX) Facility, a multiple-cavity electron accelerator capable
of producing a very large flux of x-rays, was disabled in 2004;
decontamination and decommissioning of this facility has not been funded.
The DARHT facility, the major hydrodynamic test-firing site, is located
approximately 2.6 miles from the main administrative area of the Los
Alamos National Laboratory.

1
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Figure xx Location of the Laboratory
2

DARHT is used to investigate weapons functioning and systems behavior in
nonnuclear testing. The major capabilities and categories of this high
explosives testing activities include: - Hydrodynamic tests are dynamic
integrated systems tests of mockup nuclear packages during which high
explosives are detonated and resulting motions and reactions of materials
and components are observed and measured. Explosively generated pressures
and temperatures cause some materials to behave hydraulically (like a
fluid). Surrogate materials such as depleted uranium replace actual
weapons materials in the mockup nuclear weapons package to ensure there
is no potential for a nuclear explosion. Dynamic experiments to provide
information regarding the basic physics of materials or to characterize
the physical changes or motion of materials under the influence of high
explosives detonations. In the past, DOE has conducted dynamic
experiments using plutonium metal. DOE could perform such studies again
in the future at DARHT and other facilities. As a matter of policy,
dynamic experiments involving plutonium would be conducted inside
containment vessels.

-

3
Figure xx. Location of TA-15 within the Laboratory.

The Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility has completed
construction with the exception of completing the installation of an
access door into Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility Axis
II; this access door will facilitate the accelerator cell and equipment
maintenance within the axis. The first axis became operational in 2001
and the second axis was tested in late

4
2004. In 2005, failing accelerator cells of the Dual-Axis Radiographic
Hydrodynamic Test Facility Axis II were refurbished to bring them up to
design specifications. The second axis is on schedule to be operational
in May 2008. With the completion of the DARHT second axis, DARHT will be
used to study the threedimensional implosion of mock nuclear weapons
primaries. DARHT will allow imaging through dense materials, generate
three-dimensional information from two lines of sight, and provide images
of high resolution. The first axis of DARHT has already produced images
with significantly higher spatial resolution and penetration than is now
possible at any other facility. With completion and operation of the
second axis, three dimensional data and time-sequenced images taken
within millionths of a second or at arbitrary times will be obtainable.
The DARHT Facility houses two linear-induction electron-beam accelerator
machines (LIA) with an included angle of 90 degrees, which produce
intense electron beams, which in turn are converted to bremsstrahlung x-
ray pulses of short duration. The accelerator in the first axis
accelerates electrons to ~19 MeV and a current of 2000 amps. The x-ray-
generating machine in the first axis has a 4-MeV electron source that
injects an electron beam into a series of accelerating cells resulting in
a nominal 60-70 nsec. pulse of high intensity x-rays resulting in a dose
of approximately 600 rad at one meter from the x-ray target. The second
axis machine also has a nominal 2.5 to 3.5-MeV electron source that
injects an electron beam into a second series of accelerating cells. The
second axis accelerator accelerates electrons to ~17-18 MeV with a
current of 2000 amps resulting in four nominal 20-100 nsec pulses spaced
over a time period of 1.6 microseconds. The entire facility was known as
the Hydrotest Firing Site (HFS) in pre1995 construction and design
documentation. The Hydrotest Firing Site consists of 2 major components.
The first is the HFS Building known as the DARHT Accelerator Building
(R312) consisting of the East and West Accelerator halls that house Axis
1 and Axis 2 of the DARHT Accelerator respectively. The second part of
the facility is the HFS Firing Site known as the DARHT R312 Firing Site.
The DARHT R312 Firing Site is outside the DARHT Accelerator building in
an area roughly between the East and West Halls of the DARHT Accelerator
Building and the earthen berm to the north of the building. The
intersection of the two DARHT axes marks the center of the DARHT R312
Firing Site, where most explosives tests will be performed. The
Accelerator Building at the DARHT Hydrotest Firing Site (HFS) contains
39,650 sq. ft. A 15-person permanent occupancy is anticipated for the
building. The HFS Accelerator Building in addition to the two
accelerators, houses high-speed electronic and optical instrumentation,
and equipment for the accelerator building and for operational support.
It is constructed of reinforced concrete, some of which is earth
sheltered, which is designed to shield operating personnel from the
radiation produced by the electron beams and to resist blast forces from
the detonation of explosives. A reinforced-concrete floor provides
radiation shielding for the equipment beneath it. Between the accelerator
halls are the detection chamber, control room, supporting facilities,
assembly room, equipment room, and other rooms. These spaces accommodate

5
experimental equipment and address functional interrelationships
established by user groups. A baffle hallway and stairway between each
power supply hall and the adjacent accelerator hall provides radiation
shielding at the point of access to the accelerator halls. A large
chamber for optical facilities is housed in a small wing at the end of
the first accelerator hall, next to the firing point, to allow multiple
line-of-site coverage of the experiment. The DARHT Facility has been
designated a non-nuclear radiological facility based on the radiological
source inventory limits listed in DOE STD 1027-CN1-97. The DARHT Facility
has been designated a moderate hazard facility by the Los Alamos Site
Operations Office of the DOE/NNSA. The DARHT accelerators themselves have
no potential for impact to the public or environment outside shielding
and accelerator facility containment. The DARHT Facility does not qualify
as a nuclear facility because the isotopic inventories of the beamstop
and activated accelerator components are all well below the Category 3
thresholds given in DOE-STD-1027-92. TA-15 also includes office space for
approximately 100 staff in buildings 494, 484 and 183. Office space also
exists at DARHT and R306. Also in TA-15, is the Vessel Prep Building that
serves to clean out 6 ft and 8 ft vessels used in hydrodynamic testing,
the XRay Calibration Facility a carpenter shop, and a warehouse.
Construction, Upgrades, and DD&D. Another project for DARHT would be
assembly, installation, and operation of a containment structure for
assembling components into test assemblies for dynamic experimentation.
Currently, test components are assembled in TA-16. Completed test
assemblies are then transported to TA-8 for radiographic examination,
after which they are transported to the firing site in TA-15. The
proposed structure, to be located at TA-15, is designed to contain any
explosions that could occur during test component assembly. The Final
Environmental Impact Statement, Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test
(DARHT) Facility (DARHT EIS) (DOE 1995a) evaluates containment options
for dynamic experiments at the DARHT facility, including containment
vessels and a building addition. Assembly and radiography operations
would be collocated in this containment structure at the DARHT firing
site, which would reduce test assembly transportation. This would reduce
security risks and the risk of vibration-induced explosions during
transport. Risks to the environment and collocated workers would also be
substantially reduced compared to those associated with facilities
currently used for these activities. The containment structure would be
brought to the LANL site in sections for assembly adjacent to the DARHT
firing site in TA-15. Environment The principal activities within TA-15
have operated below the levels projected in the 1999 LANL SWEIS. Sampling
is performed to better understand the levels of contamination at the
firing sites, the success of decontamination efforts, and the success of
mitigation techniques that are applied to specific experiments. LANL
monitoring programs are regularly reviewed and adjusted to take into
account the latest trends in results. Past emission levels analyzed
through the existing LANL monitoring programs

6
and those projected in this SWEIS would not be expected to cause
unacceptable impacts on human health or the environment. The use of
aqueous foam was implemented at DualAxis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test
Facility to reduce the amount of particulates released. From 2005 through
2006, foam was used to reduce particulate emissions during dynamic
experiments. Aqueous foam was used on explosive tests that included
beryllium. Use of the foam continues for certain tests, but plans are to
move these tests into vessel containments in 2007. The use of foam is
estimated to reduce fine particulates by 50 to 95 percent depending on
the individual shot. The foam breaks down and is rinsed to a sump from
which it is pumped and sent to the Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment
Facility for treatment. This additional, non-hazardous waste was included
in the waste analysis in this SWEIS. During 2005, foam was used to reduce
particulate emissions during dynamic experiments. Aqueous foam was used
on explosive tests that included beryllium. Use of the foam continues for
certain tests, but plans are to move these tests into vessel containments
in 2007. No stacks require monitoring for radiological air emissions at
this Key Facility; all non-point sources are measured using ambient
monitoring. There are no experiments or activities at LANL that would
involve the burning of depleted uranium. High explosives and explosives-
contaminated materials (not including depleted uranium) are burned or
detonated in accordance with a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) permit as a hazardous waste treatment to render the materials safe
for disposal. The State of New Mexico open burning permits that would
allow a variety of experiments and testing have been withdrawn at the
LANL contractor's request. Experiments at the Dual Axis Radiographic
Hydrodynamic Test Facility are subject to specific monitoring
requirements. Facilities required to support Hydrodynamic Testing High
Explosives Processing Facilities are located in six TAs: TA-8, TA-9, TA-
11, TA16, TA-22, and TA-37. This Key Facility includes production and
assembly buildings, analytical laboratories, explosives storage
magazines, and a building to treat wastewater contaminated with
explosives. High Explosives Synthesis and Production. Activities under
this capability include explosive manufacturing capacity such as
synthesizing new explosives and manufacturing pilot-plant quantities of
raw and plastic-bonded explosives. These operations allow the LANL
contractor to develop and maintain expertise in explosive materials and
processes that is essential for long-term maintenance of stockpile
weapons and materials. High Explosives and Plastics Development and
Characterization. Activities included in this capability provide
characterization data for explosives applications in nuclear weapons
technology. Information on the initiation and detonation properties of
high explosives coupled with non-high explosives component information
for modeling is essential to weapons design and safety analysis. A wide
range of plastic and composite materials is used in nuclear weapons such
as adhesives, potting materials, flexible cushions and pads,
thermoplastics, and elastomers. A thorough understanding of the

7
chemical and physical properties of these materials is necessary to
effectively model weapons behavior. High Explosives and Plastics
Fabrication. High explosives powders are typically compacted into solid
pieces and machined to final specified shapes. Some small pieces are
pressed into final shapes, and some powders, based upon their properties,
are melted into stock pieces. Fabrication of plastic materials and
components is a core capability associated with high explosives
processing, and a wide variety of plastic and composite materials may be
fabricated. Test Device Assembly. This capability provides the capacity
to assemble test devices ranging from full-scale nuclear-explosive-like
assemblies (where fissile material has been replaced by inert material)
to materials characterization tests. In addition to assembly operations,
this Key Facility conducts explosives testing support and radiography
examinations of the final assemblies. Research, Development, and
Fabrication of High-Power Detonators. This capability includes activities
such as detonator design; printed circuit manufacture; metal deposition
and joining; plastic materials technology development; explosives
loading, initiation, and diagnostics; laser production; and explosives
systems design, development, and manufacture safety. Detonators, cables,
and firing systems for tests are built as part of this capability.

8
LLNL's Site 300 has been used since 1955 to perform experiments that
measure variables important to nuclear weapon safety, conventional
ordnance designs, and possible accidents (such as fires) involving
explosives. The facilities used for Site 300 firing activities consist of
four firing point complexes and associated support facilities. The
locations of the four firing complexes are indicated in Figure 1.

QuickTime(TM) and a TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor are needed to see
this picture.

Figure 1. Locations of B801, B812, B850, and B851 at Site 300 Building
801 Complex The Building 801 Complex comprises Buildings 801A, 801B, and
801D and is approximately 51,000 gross square feet. The Building 801
Complex is part of the explosives test facilities and is in the northeast
quadrant of the site, called the east firing area.

1
Figure 2. The Contained Firing Facility at the Building 801 Complex An
indoor firing chamber was added as part of the Contained Firing Facility
modifications made between 1998 and 2001 (Figure 2.). Performing
hydrotests in the firing chamber dramatically reduces particle emissions
and minimizes the generation of hazardous waste, noise, and blast
pressure. The modifications also included a new support facility,
mechanical/electrical equipment area, and a diagnostics equipment
facility in Building 801A. Additional office facilities were added to
Building 801D. The Contained Firing Facility is an important adjunct to
NNSA's science-based stockpile stewardship program. Without the
validation provided by underground nuclear tests, Livermore and Los
Alamos scientists must still assure the safety and reliability of our
nation's nuclear stockpile as weapons age beyond their originally planned
life. Computer modeling supplies a wealth of information about how the
explosives and assemblies in nuclear weapons will behave, but improved
hydrodynamic testing of certain components is necessary to validate the
computations. The CFF drastically reduces emissions to the environment
and minimize the generation of hazardous waste, noise, and blast
pressures. Although emissions from open-air testing at Site 300 are well
within current environmental standards, the CFF is an "insurance policy"
that will allow continued high explosives testing should environmental
requirements change. CFF is a permanent, state-of-the-art firing chamber
constructed on the site of Building 801's previous open-air firing table.
About 2,500 square meters were added to Building

2
801, also the site of LLNL's recently upgraded 18-megaelectron-volt flash
x-ray (FXR) machine. Building 801 contains a variety of other advanced,
high-speed optical and electronic diagnostic equipment that together
constitute a unique capability to diagnose the behavior of high-
explosives-driven assemblies. The CFF additions consisted of four
components: a firing chamber, a support area, a diagnostic equipment
area, and an office/conference module. The heart of the CFF is the firing
chamber. Slightly larger than half a small gymnasium (16 by 18 meters and
10 meters high), the firing chamber contains the blast overpressure and
debris from detonations of up to 60 kilograms (kg) of cased explosive
charges. The inside surfaces of the chamber are protected from shrapnel
traveling as fast as 1.5 kilometers per second with 38-millimeter-thick
mild steel plates. To permit repetitive firings, all main structural
elements of the firing chamber are required to remain elastic when
subjected to blast. Detonations will be conducted above a 150-millimeter-
thick steel firing surface (the shot anvil) embedded in the floor. All
main structural elements of the firing chamber must be able to withstand
repetitive firing as well as meet design safety standards. These criteria
require the structure to withstand a 94-kg TNT blast, which is the
equivalent to 60 kg of high explosives. During the testing phase of the
project, "overtests" were run using 75 kg of high explosives to assure
that the building can withstand planned 60-kg detonations. A key aspect
of the new facility is that the rectangular concrete firing chamber was
made with low-cost, conventional reinforcement, as opposed to the labor-
intensive, laced reinforcement commonly found in many blast-resistant
structures. From a materials standpoint, a spherical chamber shape would
have been more blast efficient, but a slightly heavier, rectangular shape
was cheaper to construct, provides easier and more desirable setup and
working surfaces, and encompasses existing diagnostic systems. The
thickness of the reinforced concrete walls, ceiling, and floor of the
chamber are 1.2, 1.4, and 1.8 m, respectively. The support area, which
measures about 1,500 meters2, is for preparing the nonexplosive
components of an experiment and also for equipment and materials storage,
personnel locker rooms, rest rooms, and decontamination showers. It also
houses filters, scrubbers, and a temporary waste-accumulation area for
the waste products from testing. The diagnostic equipment area (about 600
meters2) accommodates a multibeam FabryPerot velocimeter to measure
velocity-time histories from as many as 20 points on an explosively
driven metal surface. The velocimeter optical equipment takes
measurements through 12 horizontal optical lines of sight into the firing
chamber. There are already 11 vertical optical lines of sight from the
existing camera room, which is now under the new contained firing
chamber. The Building 801 Complex is designed to obtain explosives test
data through the use of the flash x-ray accelerator, designed to
accelerate charged particles and generate x-rays; a high-speed camera;
and a laser-doppler interferometry operation. This equipment

3
measures the velocity of explosively driven surfaces. Other electronic
and mechanical systems capable of diagnosing various aspects of the high
explosives tests are housed in Building 801 Complex facilities. Building
812 Complex The Building 812 Complex is an active open-air explosives
firing facility. The complex includes five buildings (Buildings 812A,
812B, and 812C, 812D [currently inactive], and 812E), two magazines, and
an open-air firing table. Building 812E is currently used to repair and
test portable x-ray equipment. The current complex total operational
building area is 5,532 gross square feet. Building 850 Complex The
Hydrodynamics Test Facility, Building 850 Complex, is an explosives test
facility. This 5,840-gross-square-foot complex consists of Bunker 850 and
a magazette in the northwest quadrant of the site (called the west firing
area) and comprises an active firing, explosives test, and high-speed
camera repair and test facility. The multidiagnostic facility includes a
permanently mounted, smooth-bore, 155-millimeter gun for conducting
impact experiments, high-speed rotating-mirror cameras, gigalumen light
sources, portable flash x-ray sources, and various other diagnostic
equipment. This facility has an outdoor detonation firing table with
gravel covered pads for stands of concrete, wood, or steel. During an
experiment, the explosive is placed on the test stand and fired. The
firing debris may consist of wood, plastic, wiring, and gravel. This
debris is potentially contaminated with high explosives, beryllium, and
depleted uranium. Building 851 Complex The Hydrodynamics Test Facility,
Building 851, is part of the explosive test facility operations. This
13,681-gross-square-foot complex is in the northwest quadrant of the site
and houses a LINAC, a laser room, several laboratories, a portable x-ray
room, several shop areas, and offices. Building 851 includes an open-air
firing table of gravel-covered pads with stands of concrete, wood, or
steel. During an experiment, an explosive device is placed on the test
stand and fired. The firing debris may consist of wood, plastic, wiring,
and gravel. The debris is potentially contaminated with unexpended
explosives, beryllium, and depleted uranium. Building 851 is equipped for
the radiography of explosives devices during intentional detonation
testing, including high-speed rotating-mirror cameras; optical
interferometry for precise, free-surface velocity measurements;
electronic pin timing diagnostics; and various other photoprocessing
operations that involve both manual and automatic film and paper
developing. Associated Support facilities necessary for hydrotesting The
following list includes facilities that are necessary support facilties
for hydrotesting or facilities that are necessary to the operation of
Site 300 as a hydrotesting facility. Some

4
of these facilities will be covered by other IPT's (e.g., HE R&D and
Environmental Testing). - - Site 300 H.E. casting and machining
facilities (covered under HE R&D) Site 300 Shaker and Environmental test
facilities (covered under Environmental Testing) Site 300 supporting
magazines, shops, offices, observation posts, guard stations, and
materials management

-

Other facilities necessary for hydrotesting that might not be captured by
the HE R&D or Environmental Testing IPT's include: Building 806 Complex
The Building 806 Complex is located in the process area in the southeast
quadrant of Site 300 and consists of Buildings 806A and 806B. This 8,314-
gross-square foot complex is used for machining and inspecting explosive
parts. Explosives are also temporarily stored at the complex. Building
810 Complex The 5,079-gross-square-foot Building 810 Complex is located
in the process area, in the southeast quadrant of Site 300, and consists
of Buildings 810A, 810B, and 810C. Building 810A and 810B are used to
assemble explosives parts into test components. Building 810A is also
used for the temporary storage of explosives parts. Building 810C is used
for storing nonexplosive parts for test components. The test components
may also include beryllium, lithium, tritium, thorium, or depleted
uranium. Building 823 Complex The 2,748-square-foot LINAC Radiography
Complex, Building 823, is in the southeast quadrant of Site 300 and
consists of two buildings. Building 823A contains office space, a
darkroom with a radiographic film processor, and control panels for three
real-time imaging systems housed in Building 823B. These units include a
transportable 9-millionelectron-volt, a 2-million-electron- volt, and
120-thousand-electron-volt x-ray machines. Building 823B contains staging
and real- time imaging systems, and a doubly encapsulated cobalt-63
isotope source in a lead-shielded radiographic projector. The isotope
source is no longer operational and is being stored in Building 823 in a
transportainer until it is sent back to the manufacturer for disposal.
This complex provides the means for radiographic inspection of pressed
explosives parts and weapon test components. After x-ray film has been
exposed in Building 823B, it is processed through the automatic film
processor in Building 823A. The authorized materials in this facility
include explosives, natural and depleted uranium, and beryllium in
metallic form. Fissile materials currently are not allowed at Site 300
but may be allowed only after thorough review and approval by Site 300
management and after proper operational safety procedures are applied.

5
Building 823B has an earth berm on two sides that provides radiation
shielding for the office/control building located east of the berm. The
Varian 9-million-electron-volt LINAC is used in Building 823B to beam
into the open space directly to the west. Building 845, Explosive Waste
Treatment Facility The EWTF is a 666-square-foot facility located in the
north-central section of Site 300. The EWTF replaces Building 829, which
has been closed. The EWTF consists of an earthcovered control room,
Building 845A; an inert storage area, Building 845B; a thermal treatment
unit (burn cage), an open burn unit (burn pad), and an open detonation
unit (detonation pad). The EWTF is permitted under a hazardous waste
permit issued by the California Department of Toxic Substance Control for
the treatment of explosives waste. Treatment of other hazardous,
radioactive, or mixed waste materials is prohibited.

6
To: Ted Wyka, Jay Rose From: Diane Bird (NNSA), Don Roberts (LLNL), Tom
Blejwas (SNL), Ping Lee & Dave Henderson (NSTech), James Peery & Rollin
Whitman (LANL), and Jeff Yarbrough (PX) Subject: Summary of Hydrotesting
IPT PEIS data input Date: 30 March 2007

This memo lists the materials that the Hydrotesting IPT is submitting for
the PEIS data call. In addition to this cover letter (Hydro IPT PEIS data
call summary.doc), we include the following files: - - - A description of
the Hydrotesting PEIS alternatives: Hydro_PEIS_options.final.doc A list
of the Hydrotesting IPT's Analysis Requirements and Assumptions:
HydroIPTRqmts-AssumpTemplateRev2[1].doc A table indicating how to map the
waste stream information in the accompanying spreadsheets to the various
Hydrotesting PEIS alternatives: PEIS data call summary table.doc A
description of the existing LANL hydrotesting facilites: 2030 LANL
input.doc An Excel spreadsheet containing the LANL PEIS data call input:
LANL HYDRO PEIS.xls A description of the existing LLNL hydrotesting
facilities: 2030 LLNL Input.doc An Excel spreadsheet containing the LLNL
PEIS data call input: LLNL Hydrotest PEIS data call summary
table.070330.xls

- - - -

If you have any questions, please call me. Thank you. Diane Bird
Hydrotesting IPT lead NNSA Livermore Site Office
OFFICIAL USE ONLY To: Ted Wyka, Jay Rose From: Diane Bird, Don Roberts
(LLNL), Tom Blejwas (SNL), Ping Lee (NSTech), James Peery (LANL), and
Jeff Yarbrough (PX) Subject: PEIS Alternatives for Large Scale
Hydrotesting Date: 29 January 2007 The purpose of this memo is to provide
additional detail on the Proposed Alternatives for large-scale
hydrotesting that are being put forward for the revised PEIS.

Introduction
The goal of NNSA's National Hydrotesting Program (NHP) is to meet the
hydrotest requirements for certifying the safety and reliability of the
nuclear weapons stockpile. As part of the Nuclear Weapon Complex
Integration Council (NWC-IC) process and the NNSA Complex 2030 vision,
the laboratories and plants, in cooperation with NNSA, are finding ways
to meet this mission while reducing the facility footprint, increasing
efficiency, and reducing costs. More than one end state is possible. The
hydrotesting IPT has identified the following alternatives: o o
Alternative 1: No Action - - - o Continue operations at existing sites
Option 1: Consolidate large-scale hydrotesting to 3 sites (LANL, LLNL,
NTS) Option 2: Consolidate large-scale hydrotesting to a single site
(either NTS or LANL) Consolidate large-scale hydrotesting to 2 sites (NTS
and LANL) Alternative 2: Transformation Alternative

Alternative 3: Reduced Scope Alternative -

Definitions:
Before discussing the Proposed Alternatives, we need to provide some
definitions of the types of experiments that fall within the purview of
large-scale hydrotesting, the numbers of such experiments that are
required to meet the programmatic mission, and the type of activities
that fall outside the scope of large-scale hydrotesting. o Large-scale
hydrotesting: consists of complex HE-driven experiments that validate
simulation. These experiments include the following categories: -
Integrated Weapons Experiments (IWEs) that validate and calibrate large,
complex simulations relying on a wide variety of physics models. These
experiments include: corepunches (CP), pinshots with wide-angle
radiography (JOPIN), and velocimetry experiments.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY Page 1 of 7
OFFICIAL USE ONLY - - - o Focused Experiments (FEs): intermediate scale
experiments that validate specific aspects of simulation (e.g., physics
models). Large charges: either IWEs or FEs requiring >200 lbs (but
<15,000 lbs) of High Explosive. Subcrits: IWEs, FEs, and small-scale
experiments using SNM (currently fired at U1a).

Several activities crucial to the NNSA mission involve the use of high
explosives, detonators, or propellants, but fall outside the scope of
large-scale hydrotesting. Such activities include: - - - - Component
tests: tests of the explosive components outside the nuclear package.
High Explosive (HE) Production, Development, and Surveillance activities.
High Explosive (HE) Research & Development activities, including small
experiments driven by HE containing less than ~10 kg HE. Activities for
the emergency response community for which the principal purposes are
training and the development of new render-safe technologies rather than
the validation of hydrodynamic behavior. NW Environmental testing --
Normal, Abnormal, and Hostile (many different types of testing using
explosives). Transportation Safeguards testing for DOE. Access
delay/denial testing for DOE. Vulnerability assessments for NW. Use-
Control systems development and testing.

- - - - -

Requirements and Assumptions:
In devising strategies for future large-scale hydrotesting, we have made
the following basic assumptions: o o Contained firing will be a
requirement for future - - - Minimal (but non-zero) open air firing of
hazardous materials will endure. We will continue to evaluate the
specific risks of each option Options that involve unacceptable
programmatic risk will be identified Consolidation options involve
increased programmatic risk (scope, schedule, cost)

With these basic assumptions, we have identified the following
hydrotesting requirements, including the types of diagnostics that are
required for each class of experiment.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY Page 2 of 7
OFFICIAL USE ONLY o We assume that for the near-term, the US hydrotest
program will be based on a subcrit and simulant-based program. - - As
with nuclear testing, do not preclude the need for future DYNEX-like
experiments. LANL and LLNL are developing a plan to determine what
experiments are necessary to support a decision on the long-term need for
DYNEX or DYNEX-like experiments (also known as "DPE" capability).
Depending on the outcome of this decision, the range of options for
longterm hydrotesting could be reduced. Options that depend on the
outcome of this decision will be identified in the detailed discussion of
alternatives that follows.

-

o

IWEs: The diagnostic requirements and numbers of IWEs envisioned to meet
programmatic needs, as spelled out in the National Hydrotesting Plan are
as follows: - - - CP: High Energy Radioagraphy (>=16 MeV), pins, foils,
velocimetry, high speed optics, fiber optics. JOPIN: Radiography (>= 10
MeV), large field of view, pins, foils, velocimetry, high speed optics,
fiber optics Approximately 10 IWEs/yr are required to meet programmatic
needs. This includes those experiments needed in support of RRW, plus
tests in support of SLEPs, SFIs, and surety and physics improvement
tests.

o

FEs: The diagnostic requirements and numbers of FEs envisioned to meet
programmatic needs are as follows. In the future, this class of
experiment will be included in the National Hydrotesting Plan. - -
Radiography (>= 10 MeV), large field of view, pins, foils, velocimetry,
high speed optics, fiber optics. Approximately 50 FEs/yr are required to
meet programmatic needs. This includes subcrit preparation, PRAD shots,
and surety and physics improvements tests.

o

Large Charges: The diagnostic requirements for experiments involving
large amounts of HE can vary widely. The number of such experiments
needed to meet programmatic needs, as envisioned in the National
Hydrotesting Plan are as follows: - Up to 5 - 10 shots/yr. This number
would include pulse power shots to study equation of state (EOS), in
addition to certain surety tests and workfor-others (WFO) experiments.

o

Sanitization: We assume that sites with large-scale hydrotesting missions
will require the capability for sanitization of HE at firing sites - A
burn permit to dispose of unexploded HE is necessary

OFFICIAL USE ONLY Page 3 of 7
OFFICIAL USE ONLY - Lacking such capability, or lacking sufficient
capacity, the ability to transport unexploded HE residue for disposal
elsewhere is required. Some sites are already using this approach for a
portion of their HE sanitization.

Proposed Alternatives
Alternative 1: No Action
This alternative required no changes to the existing PEIS or the
individual site-specific EISs.

Alternative 2: Transformation Alternative
There are two possible options proposed for the Transformation
Alternative: Alternative 2.1: Consolidation of large-scale hydrotesting
to LANL, LLNL, and NTS. This option integrates large-scale hydrotesting
at National User Facilities at LANL and LLNL. Hydrotests that could not
be conducted at these National User Facilities (e.g., experiments with
large quantities of HE) would be conducted at BEEF (NTS) or Ancho Canyon
(LANL). Alternative 2.1 assumes that the long-term hydrotesting needs of
the weapons program can be met with a combination of surrogate
hydrotests, subcritical experiments, and fundamental material science
experiments (e.g. gas gun shots, etc.). Alternative 2.2: Consolidate
large-scale hydrotesting to a single site (NTS or LANL). This option
integrates all large-scale hydrotesting at a single location: either a
new consolidated hydrotesting facility at NTS or an expansion of the
contained hydrotesting capabilities at LANL. The choice between NTS and
LANL depends primarily on the program's decision regarding the need for
DYNEX or DYNEX-like experiments as part of a long-term hydrotesting plan.
Further details on each alternative follow: Alternative 2.1 designates
DARHT (LANL) and CFF/FXR as National User Facilities. These facilities
would be used for large-scale hydrotesting in support of the National
Hydrotesting Plan. Because of its unique high energy radiography and
multi-pulse capabilities, DARHT is designated the National User Facility
for corepunch (CP) experiments. The major components for a large-scale
hydrotesting capability at Los Alamos include DARHT 1 & 2, coupled with
6' and 8' vessels and cleanout capabilities at the Vessel Preparation
Building. This capability addresses all contained shots for surrogates
from a hazardous materials standpoint and most shots for surrogates from
the standpoint of HE load. These facilities provide the capability
required for multi-pulsing corepunch (CP) experiments and backup
capability for pinshot (JOPIN) experiments, albeit with a reduced set of
diagnostics (e.g., no high speed cameras or velocimetry). DARHT also
provides full-scale, scaled shots, and some large scale shot capability
for other types of experiments and WFO activities.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY Page 4 of 7
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Because of it's large, modern contained firing chamber
with a full suite of diagnostics, CFF/FXR is designated the National User
Facility for pinshot (JOPIN) and velocimetry experiments. The major
components for a large-scale hydrotesting capability at Livermore include
CFF, coupled with FXR. This capability addresses all contained shots for
surrogates from the standpoints of both hazardous materials and HE load.
This facility provides the capability required for all pinshot (JOPIN)
and velocimetry experiments (including the full suite of required
diagnostics) and backup capability for single-view, single- or double-
pulse corepunch (CP) experiments for most shots, albeit with a reduced
views and penetrating capability. CFF/FXR also provides full-scale,
scaled shots, and some large scale shot capability for other types of
experiments and WFO activities. Because it makes use of existing, modern
facilities for contained firing or large-scale hydrotests, Alternative
2.1 involves no major new construction or upgrades at existing large-
scale hydrotesting facilities. As part of the planned consolidation to
National User facilities, other firing sites at LANL and LLNL would be
closed or operated for "work for others" (WFO) activities on a full cost
recovery basis. In general, these WFO sites would not receive RTBF
funding but, rather, the costs of operating these sites would be charged
to each customer who uses a site. Both LANL and LLNL are in the process
of identifying firing sites that will be closed as part of this plan, but
the anticipated closures will include two or more firing sites at each
Laboratory. Although outside the scope of large-scale hydrotesting, six
firing sites at Pantex, used for HE production, development, and
surveillance, will be decommissioned and decontaminated and three firing
sites will require upgrades. The upgrades will include two open-air
firing sites with bunkers and one facility containing indoor firing
chambers. Sandia would continue to operate firing sites for non-
hydrotesting work, but those sites would be operated on a full-cost-
recovery basis. In general, these sites would not receive RTBF funding
but, rather, the costs of operating these sites would be charged to each
customer who uses a site. At Sandia, we anticipate only one potential
exception to that - the Explosives Component Facility and its ancillary
locations. The primary customer for this facility is NA-10. This facility
supports the design, development, and life cycle management of all
explosive components outside the nuclear package. At present it is
operated without RTBF funding by taxing all work, whether NA-10 or other.
However, by 2030, the facility will be over 35 years old and it may
require refurbishment, modifications, or even replacement, which would
require RTBF funding. The number of firing sites for non-hydrotesting
work at Sandia will be reduced in number to the most efficient to meet
the needs of the broad range of customers. A meeting of the four
organizations that operate the Sandia firing sites to initiate discussion
of consolidation in place is scheduled for the week of January 29, 2007.
Alternative 2.2 consolidates all large-scale hydrotesting to a single
site at either NTS or LANL. The choice between NTS and LANL depends
primarily on the program's decision regarding the need for DYNEX or
DYNEX-like experiments as part of a longterm hydrotesting plan. In either
case, a single location (comprised of one or more firing OFFICIAL USE
ONLY Page 5 of 7
OFFICIAL USE ONLY sites) would be used for all large-scale hydrotesting
in support of the National Hydrotesting Plan. This alternative can be
divided into two cases: consolidation to NTS and consolidation to LANL.
Each will be discussed below. NTS case: The major components for a large-
scale hydrotesting capability at NTS would include high-energy
radiography (>=16 MeV) for corepunch experiments and mediumenergy
radiography (>= 10 MeV) for JOPIN experiments coupled with a Contained
Firing Facility (2 chamber CFF), 6' and 8' vessels (secondary containment
for DPE), and using existing vessel cleanout capabilities at NTS.
Examples of the type of radiography machines that could meet these
capabilities include DARHT 1 & 2, either a LTD or USRA Induction Voltage
Adder X-ray Machine, and a CYGNUS x-ray machine. The timescale before a
decision is required to commit to the construction of such a facility
allows us to evaluate other radiographic technologies as well (for
example a Prad 20/50 GeV machine or a compact radiographic source). The
capability envisioned under Alternative 2.2 will address all contained
shots for surrogates requiring multi-pulsing, some 3D capability,
pinshots with wide-angle radiography (JOPINS), full scale, scaled shots,
and some large scale shot capability. This facility will be DPE capable.
A two-chamber CFF, for example enables the setup and fielding CP and
JOPIN shots for optimum use of other velocimetry, high-speed cameras, and
pin diagnostics. It also provides the capacity necessary to address
focused experiments, and provides risk mitigation in the event of a
single point of failure in one of the firing chambers (for example, in
association with DPE activity). This capability could augment or replace
the need for BEEF/Ancho Canyon for Work for Others. Alternatively,
placing the NTS radiographic capability underground at U1a addresses
containment issues and presents potential cost savings by eliminating
some waste stream issues and reducing security costs. A single
containment vessel would be utilized and would be permanently entombed at
U1a. Surface siting verses underground siting should be considered as a
business case to determine the optimal configuration. LANL case: The
major components for a large-scale hydrotesting capability at Los Alamos
include high-energy radiography (DARHT 1 & 2) coupled with 6' and 8'
vessels and cleanout capabilities at the Vessel Preparation Building.
This capability addresses all contained shots for surrogates from a
hazardous materials standpoint and most shots for surrogates from the
standpoint of HE load. These facilities provide the capability required
for multi-pulsing corepunch (CP) experiments and backup capability for
pinshot (JOPIN) experiments, albeit with a reduced set of diagnostics
(e.g., no high speed cameras or velocimetry). The loss of capacity and
diagnostic capability resulting from a CFF/FXR shutdown would necessitate
a replacement CFF capability with medium energy radiography (via, for
example, an Induction Voltage Adder x-ray radiographic machine such as,
LTD or URSA and a Contained Firing Facility (CFF) to provide an
additional Los Alamos site for capacity for pinshots with wide-angle
radiography (JOPINS), velocimetry, high speed cameras, scaled, and large
scale shots. This capability would augment or replace the need for
BEEF/Ancho Canyon for Work for Others.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY Page 6 of 7
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Transition: During the transition to single-site
operation for large-scale hydrotesting (either at NTS or at LANL), there
would be a need to continue operations at the existing National User
Facilities described in Alternative 2.1. In the case of consolidation at
NTS, both DARHT and CFF/FXR would continue operation while the facilities
described in Alternative 2.2 (NTS case) above were constructed, tested,
and certified for operation. In the case of consolidation at LANL,
CFF/FXR would continue operation while the facilities described in
Alternative 2.2 (LANL case) above were constructed, tested, and certified
for operation. Planned activities at Pantex and Sandia are unchanged from
Alternative 2.1.

Alternative 3: Reduced Scope Alternative
Alternative 3 envisions extending the life of one of the National User
Facilities described in Alternative 2.1 (DARHT) and replacing the
capability lost through closure of the other National User Facility
(CFF/FXR) with a corresponding capability at NTS. The Contained Firing
Facility (CFF/FXR) would continue operations until the end of life of the
facility (>= 2040). LANL plus NTS case: The major components for a large-
scale hydrotesting capability at Los Alamos include DARHT 1 & 2, coupled
with 6' vessels and cleanout capabilities at the Vessel Preparation
Building. This capability addresses all contained shots for surrogates
from a hazardous materials standpoint and most shots for surrogates from
the standpoint of HE load. These facilities provide the capability
required for multi-pulsing corepunch (CP). The major components for a
large-scale hydrotesting capability at NTS would include medium-energy
radiography (>= 10 MeV) for JOPIN experiments coupled with either a
Contained Firing Facility (a single-chamber CFF), 6' and 8' vessels
(secondary containment for DPE), or located underground at U1a with a
single containment vessel. Vessel cleanout capabilities at NTS would be
utilized in the first case. In the second case the vessels would be
entombed at U1a. Examples of the type of radiography machines that could
meet these capabilities include either a LTD or USRA Induction Voltage
Adder X-ray Machine, and a CYGNUS x-ray machine, or a compact radiography
source. The new NTS facility will address all contained shots for
surrogates requiring wide-angle radiographs (JOPINS), full scale, scaled
shots, and some large scale shot capability, but no multi-pulsing or 3D
capability. Additionally, this facility will be DPE capable. This
capability would augment or replace the need for BEEF/Ancho Canyon for
Work for Others. Transition: During the transition to two-site operation
for large-scale hydrotesting, there would be a need to continue
operations at the existing National User Facilities described in
Alternative 2.1. In this case, CFF/FXR would continue operation until its
end of life (>= 2040). This implies that the facilities at NTS described
above would need to begin construction in time to allow for construction,
testing, and certification for operation to be completed before that
time. Planned activities at Pantex and Sandia are unchanged from
Alternative 2.1. OFFICIAL USE ONLY Page 7 of 7
Construction Data Required Peak Electrical energy (kWh) Diesel Generators
(Yes or No) Concrete (yds3) Steel (t) Liquid Fuel and lube oil (gal)
Water (gal) Land (acre) Lay down Area Size, Parking lots Employment Total
employment (worker years) Peak employment (workers) Construction period
(years) Waste Generated Low Level Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3) Mixed Low
Level Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3) Hazardous Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3) Non-
hazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3) Non-hazardous (Other)
Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3)
Notes: NM= Not Measured at facility 1. From DARHT EIS Enhanced
Containment Option: Phased Containment Alternative 2. From DARHT EIS
Enhanced Containment Option: Building Containment Alternative

Consumption/Use

DARHT Construction 365000 Yes 16000 1600 25000 NM 3.5 175

1

DARHT Containment Building Option2 85000 6000 600 12000 NM 3.5 41

Volume NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Decontamination and Decommissioning

PEIS Alt 2.1

PEIS Alt 2.2

PEIS Alt 2.3

PEIS Alt 3 LANL to D&D: Meenie, PHERMEX and all TA-15 and 36 HYDRO Firing
Sites 1,2 and support facilities NM No NA NA NM NM

Data Required Peak Electrical energy (kWh) Diesel Generators (Yes or No)
Concrete (yds3) Steel (t) Liquid Fuel and lube oil (gal) Water (gal) Land
(acre) Lay down Area Size, Parking lots Employment Total employment
(worker years) Peak employment (workers) Construction period (years)
Waste Generated Volume Low Level Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3) Mixed Low
Level Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3) Hazardous Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3) Non-
hazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3) Non-hazardous (Other)
Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3)

LANL to D&D: Meenie, PHERMEX and 2 TA-36 Consumption/Use Firing Sites NM
No NA NA NM NM

LANL to D&D: Meenie, PHERMEX and 2 TA-36 Firing Sites 1, 2 NM No NA NA NM
NM

LANL to D&D: Meenie, PHERMEX, 2 TA-36 Firing Sites 1,2 and DARHT NM No NA
NA NM NM

NM

NM

NM

NM

27

27

66

146

7

7

16

35

NA 28112 NA NA NA 492
NA 28112 NA NA NA 492

NA 70141 NA NA 30000 492

NA 93277 NA NA 40000 975

NA NA

NA NA

NA NA

NA NA

NA 8487

NA 8487

NA 15492

NA 58909

Notes: NM= Not Measured at facility 1. D&D waste volumes as provided are
based upon a square footage extrapolation from the D&D of buildings of
similar construction. A 2. Some waste generated during D&D of firing site
facilities could be categorized as hazardous wastes, proper
decontamination and Model Code E Buildings with Radiological
Contamination: These buildings have structural components and/or systems
contaminated Model Code F Buildings with Mixed Waste: These buildings
have structural components and/or systems contaminated with both Model
Code G Buildings with Hazardous Wastes: These buildings have structural
components and or systems contaminated with
D&D Waste volume estimate Industrial Waste Disposal Non Haz Rubbish
(yds3) based upon 0.1yds3/sq.ft
1, 2

Hazardous Industrial waste Waste

Industrial Waste

LLW

LLW Demo Slab&Foot ings (tons) based upon 0.08yds3/s Man q.ft 1, 2 Hours
840 762 30059

Facility 15-27 15-44 15-183 15-184 PHERMEX Facility 15-185 PHERMEX
Facility 15-186 PHERMEX Facility 15-189 PHERMEX Facility 15-198 PHERMEX
Facility 15-199 PHERMEX Facility

AFDCS Model Code N N F

Construction Concrete Concrete Concrete

Square Footage 560 508 20,039

Demo Demo Demo Asbestos Structure Slab&Foot Structure Waste (tons) ings
(tons) (tons) (yds3) based based based upon upon based upon upon 3 3 3
0.01yds /sq. 0.52yds /s 0.08yds /s 0.52yds3/s ft 1 q.ft 1, 2 q.ft 1, 2
q.ft 1, 2 73 7 379 58 66 7 343 53 2605 261 13546

D&D Period (wks) 5 5 180

2084

F

Concrete

10,841

1409

141

7329

1127

16262

98

F

Concrete
12,698

1651

165

8584

1321

19047

114

F

Concrete

2,338

304

30

1580

243

3507

21

F

Concrete

452

59

6

306

47

678

4

N

Concrete
905

118

12

612

94

1358

8

N

Concrete

2,027

264

26

1370

211

3041

18
15-200 PHERMEX Facility 15-201 PHERMEX Facility 15-310 PHERMEX Facility
15-241 15-242 15-243 15-263 15-280 (R306)

N

Concrete

702

91

9

475

73

1053

6

N

Concrete

870

113

11

588

90

1305

8

F G G G G F

Concrete Concrete Concrete Concrete Concrete Concrete

3,194 142 455 516 1,287 2,155

415 18 59 67 167 280

42 2 6 7 17 28

2159 96 308 349 870 1457

332 15 47 54 134 224

4791 213 683 774 1931 3233
29 1 4 5 12 19

15-285 15-306 15-319 (R306) 15-313 RSL 15-312 DARHT 15-494 ATOC 15-484
HTOC 15-446 Access Control 15-534 VPB

N F F N F N

Metal frame and stucco 3,920 Concrete 2,830 Concrete Concrete Concrete
108 24,668 53,884

510 368 14 3207 7005 1877

51 37 1 0 0 0

168

408 1913 73 294 11

5880 4245 162 37002

35 25 1 222 485 130

16676

2565 36426 5604

80826 21660

Metal Building 14440 Metal frame and stucco 7,386 Metal frame and stucco
3,103 Metal Building 7964

621

1502

N

960

0

317

768

11079

66

N N

403 1035
0 0

133 342

323 828

4655 11946

28 72
15-563 Carpenter shop 15-564 Cal Lab 15-565 Warehouse 15-562 CIGNAS 36-
003 Eenie 36-004 36-005 36-006 Meenie 36-78 36-82 36-09 36-10 36-55 IJ
36-107 36-83 Total

N N

Metal Building 3655 Metal Building 3200

475 416

0 0

157 138

380 333

5483 4800

33 29

N N F G F F G G G G F G G

Metal Building 7064 Concrete Concrete Concrete Concrete Concrete Metal
Building Trailer Concrete Concrete Concrete Concrete Concrete 1,970 1,239
624 624 658 1,527 665 67 416 732 1055 1040 202528

918 256 161 81 81 86 199 86 9 54 95 137 135 26329

0 26 16 8 8 9 0 0 1 5 10 14 14 975

304 1332

735 205 838 422 422 445 1032 450 45 281 495 713 703 80840 129 65 65 68
159 69 7 43 76 110 108 12437

10596 2955 1859 936 936 987 2291 998 101 624 1098 1583 1560 303792

64 18 11 6 6 6 14 6 1 4 7 9 9 1823

23954

8626
D&D Total Sq. Buildings   Footage 14-30, 14FIRP 34, 14Estimated 40, 14D&D
Projects 38, 14-43 1716   Disposal Non Haz Rubbish (yds3) 176.00 Asbestos
Waste (yds3) 20.00 Demo   Structure (tons) 142.00 Demo Slab&Footing s
(tons) 141.50 Man hours   D&D Period (wks) 873.00

D&D Buildings TA-15040, 15305

Total Sq. Footage

D&D Buildings

Total Sq. Footage

D&D Buildings

Total Sq. Footage

D&D Buildings

Total Sq. Footage

17039

TA-09-35

1911.00 TA-09-43

1768.00 TA-40-004

572.00

0.10

2000.00

0.12

0.01

238.00

0.01

80.00

0.04

20.00

0.01

0.00

0.00
0.08

1600.00

0.09

300.00

0.16

260.00

0.15

300.00

0.52

0.08 0.51

950.00 6406.00

0.06 0.38 1910.00 1.00 1739.00 0.98 1530.00 2.67

10

0.0058

26.00

0.0015
Annual Operations Data Required Annual Electrical energy (kWh) Fuel usage
(ft3) Other process Gas (N, Ar, etc.) Water (gal) Steam (tons) Plant
Footprint (acres) Employment (workers) Number of Rad Workers Average
annual dose (rem)2 Maximum worker dose (mem) institutional Radionuclide
emissions and effluentsnuclides and Curies (Ci/yr) NAAQS emissions
(lbs/yr) TSP (lbs/yr) (PM) NOx (lbs/yr) CO (lbs/yr) VOC (lbs/yr) SOx
(lbs/yr) Hazardous Air Pollutants and Effluents (lbs/yr) Chemical use
Depleted uranium (lbs/yr) Lead (lbs/yr) Beryllium (lbs/yr) Copper
(lbs/yr) Other metals (lbs/yr) High explosives (lbs/yr) Tritium (Ci/yr)
Hlithium Hydride (lbs/yr)

DARHT Phase Containment Option: Vessels1 Consumption/Use 2520000 12600 NM
100000 NM 17 29 25 0.097 1.84

Comments

2520000.00 12600.00 Natuaral gas 100000.00

29.00 note: included in 25.00 Employment (workers)

19 79

PM10=8.8kg/yr NO2=36kg/yr

NA

720 14 9 100 210 3300 3 100

720.00 Material releases 14 Material releases 9.00 Material releases
100.00 Material releases 210.00 Material releases 3300.00 Material
releases 3.00 Material releases 100.00 Material releases

LANL HYDRO PEIS

DRAFT
Annual Operations Maximum inventory of fissile material/throughput Waste
Category Low Level (ft3) 30 year Average annual(ft3) Average annual(ft3)
Mixed Low Level (gal) Liquid (gal) Solid (m3/yr) TRU Liquid (gal) Solid
(tons) HLW/Spent Fuel Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3) Hazardous Liquid (lbs)
Solid (lbs) Non-hazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid (ft3) Non-
hazardous (Other) Liquid (mgal) Solid (yds3) Notes: NM= Not Measured at
facility NA= Not Applicable 1. Based upon DARHT EIS Enhanced Containment
Alternative: Phased Containment

DARHT Phase Containment Option: Vessels1

Comments

Volume 5700 12500 55 NA NA NA 2.00 NA NA 2500 310 NM 9400 NA NA 2500.00
310.00 5700.00 5700ft3=211yds3=161m3 Max annual: 12500.00
12500ft3=463yds3=354m3 55.00

2.00

9400.00

LANL HYDRO PEIS

DRAFT
Annual Operations 2. Institutional average dose

DARHT Phase Containment Option: Vessels1

Comments

OB/OD waste treatment Sum All Waste treatment 279.00 31.50 93.00 3.90
0.42 0.81

NAAQS emissions (lbs/yr) TSP (lbs/yr) (PM) NOx (lbs/yr) CO (lbs/yr) VOC
(lbs/yr) SOx (lbs/yr) HAP

Emission factor 0.093000 0.010500 0.031000 0.001300 0.000140 0.000269

HE (lbs) 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000

TA-36 OB/OD Emissions 279.00 31.50 93.00 3.90 0.42 0.81

LANL HYDRO PEIS

DRAFT
Annual Operations Data Required Annual Electrical energy (kWh) Total
Electrical demand (kWh) Fuel usage (gal or yds3) Other process Gas (N,
Ar, etc.) Water (gal) Steam (tons) Plant Footprint (acres) Employment
(workers) Number of Rad Workers Average annual dose (rem)3 Maximum worker
dose (mem) institutional Radionuclide emissions and effluents-nuclides
and Curies (Ci/yr) NAAQS emissions (lbs/yr) TSP (lbs/yr) (PM) NOx
(lbs/yr) CO (lbs/yr) VOC (lbs/yr) SOx (lbs/yr) Hazardous Air Pollutants
and Effluents (lbs/yr) Chemical use Depleted uranium (kg/yr)6 Lead
(kg/yr) Beryllium (kg/yr) Aluminum (kg/yr) Copper (kg/yr) Tantalum
(kg/yr) Tungsten (kg/yr) Maximum inventory of fissile material/throughput
Waste Category5 Low Level

TA-15 (Firing TA-36 (Firing Sites)1 Sites)2 OB/OD waste treatment
Consumption/Use 8769140 18983 NM NM NM NM 17 619 0.097 1.84 0.15 1250 141
416 17 2 4 3130 180 60 450 330 300 300 Volume 92.07 10.4 30.69 1.29 0.14
0.27 2087 150 30 450 300 300 300 8,568,752 18,359 200,388 624

619

0.15 878.64 99.14 292.67 12.28 1.32 2.54 1200 30 30 30 TA-36 OB/OD
Emissions 279.00 31.50 93.00 3.90 0.42 0.81

LANL HYDRO PEIS
Annual Operations Liquid (gal) Solid (m3/yr) Mixed Low Level Liquid (gal)
Solid (m3/yr) TRU Liquid (gal) Solid (m3/yr) HLW/Spent Fuel Liquid (gal)
Solid (yds3) Hazardous Chemical (kg/yr) Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3) Non-
hazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid (yds3) Non-hazardous (Other)
Liquid (mgal) Solid (yds3) 0 940 0 0.9 0 0.20 0 0 35300 0 0 NM NM NM NM

TA-15 (Firing TA-36 (Firing Sites)1 Sites)2 OB/OD waste treatment 940

0.9

0.2

35300

OB/OD waste treatment TA-36 OB/OD Emissions 279.00 31.50 93.00 3.90 0.42

NAAQS emissions (lbs/yr) TSP (lbs/yr) (PM) NOx (lbs/yr) CO (lbs/yr) VOC
(lbs/yr) SOx (lbs/yr)

Emission factor 0.093000 0.010500 0.031000 0.001300 0.000140

HE (lbs)4 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000

LANL HYDRO PEIS
Annual Operations HAP 0.000269

TA-15 (Firing TA-36 (Firing Sites)1 Sites)2 OB/OD waste treatment 3000
0.81

Notes: NM= Not Measured at facility NA= Not Applicable 1. Includes DARHT
and other HX Firing sites located within TA-15: R306. This is the
composite operating limit for TA15 Firing Sites per the 1999 SWEIS
expanded operation Alternative: 100 hydrodynamic test per year. 2.
Includes all firing sites located within TA-16: Eenie, Meenie, Minnie,
and Lower Slobbovia 3. Institutional average dose 4. Based upon the
annual average amount of HE treated/disposed at the DE OB/OD waste
treatment sites, includes off spec HE form TA-16 machining operations. 5.
Waste estimates based upon SWEIS Expanded Operastions Alternative for
High Explosive testing TA-14, TA-15, TA36 and TA-40. 100 Major
hydrodynamic tests per year. The Expanded Operations Alternative, in
addition to increasing the number of hydrodynamic tests to about 100 per
year, also increased the annual amount of depleted uranium (DU) emissions
to about 6,900 lbs per year (3,130 kg/yr) at LANL's high explosives
testing facilities. 6. The Expanded Operations Alternative, in addition
to increasing the number of hydrodynamic tests to about 100 per year,
also increased the annual amount of depleted uranium (DU) emissions to
about 6,900 lbs per year (3,130 kg/yr) at LANL's high explosives testing
facilities.

LANL HYDRO PEIS
LANL Hvnno pans
LANL Hvnno pans

LANL HYDRO PEIS

Building 801 Complex Data Required ANNUAL OPERATIONS Annual Electrical
energy (MWh)1 Peak electrical demand (MWe) Fuel usage (gal or yd3)
5 3 4 2

No Action

Alternative 2.1

ALTERNATIVES Alternative 2.2

Alternative 2.3

Alternative 3

Notes

<16.3 M kWh/y (SW/SPEIS) Not available 0 Yes <67,900 gal/day (SW/SPEIS)
Not applicable

<16.3 M kWh/y (SW/SPEIS) Not available 0 Yes <67,900 gal/day (SW/SPEIS)
Not applicable 1.138 30 0.012

0 0

0 0

0 1 - Electrical use is not metered at S300. Use not to exceed SW/SPEIS
projection 0 2 - See number 1. 3 - Fuel oil is no longer used at LLNL.

Other Process Gas (N, Ar, etc) Water (gal)

No 0 Not applicable D&D 0 0

No 0 Not applicable D&D 0 0

No 4 - See SW/SPEIS Page A-180 for chemical use. 0 5 - Water use is not
metered at S300. Use not to exceed SW/SPEIS projection of 6 Not
applicable D&D 6 - LLNL FITS Data 0 7 - LLNL FITS Data 0 8 - LLNL Hazards
Control - 2001-2006 actual data averages (m/rem/y)

Steam (tons) Plant footprint (acres)
6 7
1.138 30 0.012
9

Employment (workers)

Number of Rad workers Average annual dose (2001-2006 (Appendix J,
SSMPEIS) rem/yr
8

Maximum worker dose Radionuclide emissions and effluents
11 10

0.25 Involved Worker 0.25 Involved Worker .0052 Non-Involved .0052 Non-
Involved 2.1 Cumulative to 260 2.1 Cumulative to 260 employees employees
ALARA ALARA Appendix A Appendix B Appendix A Appendix B

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 9 - See Appendix J of the Stockpile Stewardship PEIS. 0 0 10 - Appendix
A contains actual emissions. Not to exceed SW/SPEIS projections. 0 11 -
Appendix B contains actual emissions. Not to exceed SW/SPEIS projections.
0 12 - Appendix B contains actual emissions. Not to exceed SW/SPEIS
projections. 0 13 - See SW/SPEIS Page 1-180 for example list of
chemicals. 0 13a - 2006 Emission values 0 13a - 2006 Emission values 0
13a - 2006 Emission values 14 - Not to exceed SW/SPEIS. 15 - Actual
cumulative wastes totals for 2001-2006. Not to exceed SW/SPEIS proj

NAAQS emissions (tons/yr) Hazardous Air Pollutants and Effluents 12
(ton/yr) Chemical use13 Explosive (lb/yr)13a Depleted uranium (lb/yr)13a
Beryllium (lb/yr)13a Maximum inventory of fissile 14 material/throughput
Waste Category (2001-2006 15 Cumulative) Low level Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3) Mixed Low-level Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) TRU Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3) HLW/Spent Fuel Liquid (gal) Solid (yd ) Hazardous Liquid (gal)
Solid (yd ) Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Low level
(Description CFF 2001 ) 16 2001 ) Hazardous (Description CFF 2001 )
16 16 3 3

Appendix B Appendix B SW/SPEIS Page A- SW/SPEIS Page A180 180 233.87
206.85 4.19 233.87 206.85 4.19

9000 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 569,713 1.9 0 2412 0.1 53,000 kg/yr 7,200 kg/yr
6,150 kg/yr 53,000 kg/yr 7,200 kg/yr 6,150 kg/yr

9000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 569,713 1.9 0 2412 0.1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 - Description of Contained Firing
Facility submitted to Tetra Tech (2001) for LL 0 0
Table 2A - D&D WASTE data estimates for PEIS Generic Data Request D&D
WASTE for B-801

Waste Catego Low level

Volume
Decommission Demolition

Liquid (gal) 40,000 Solid (yd3) 100 Mixed Low-level Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3) TRU Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) HLW/Spent Fuel Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3) Hazardous Liquid (gal) 15,000 Solid (yd3) Nonhazardous (Sanitary)
Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) 918 Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3)

100

9,181
Building 810 Complex Data Required ANNUAL OPERATIONS Annual Electrical
energy (MWh)1 Peak electrical demand (MWe) Fuel usage (gal or yd3)3 Other
Process Gas (N, Ar, etc)4 Water (gal)5 Steam (tons) Plant footprint
(acres)6 Employment (workers)7 Number of Rad workers Average annual dose
Maximum worker dose Radionuclide emissions and effluents NAAQS emissions
(tons/yr)8
2

No Action

Alternative 2.1

ALTERNATIVES Alternative 2.2

Aternative 2.3

Alternative 3

Notes

<16.3 M kWh/y (SW/SPEIS) Not available 0 Yes <67,900 gal/day (SW/SPEIS)
Not applicable 0.12 10 0 0 0 0 Appendix B

<16.3 M kWh/y (SW/SPEIS) Not available 0 Yes <67,900 gal/day (SW/SPEIS)
Not applicable 0.12 10 0 0 0 0 Appendix B

<16.3 M kWh/y (SW/SPEIS) Not available 0 Yes <67,900 gal/day (SW/SPEIS)
Not applicable 0.12 10 0 0 0 0 Appendix B

<16.3 M kWh/y (SW/SPEIS) Not available 0 Yes <67,900 gal/day (SW/SPEIS)
Not applicable 0.12 10 0 0 0 0 Appendix B

<16.3 M kWh/y 1 - Electrical use is not metered at S300. Use not to
exceed (SW/SPEIS) M kWh/y. Not available 2 - See number 1. 0 3 - Fuel oil
is no longer used at LLNL. Yes 4 - See SW/SPEIS Page A-172 for chemical
use. <67,900 gal/day 5 - Water use is not metered at S300. Use not to
exceed SW (SW/SPEIS) gal/day. Not applicable 0.12 6 - LLNL FITS Data 10 7
- LLNL FITS Data 0 0 0 0 Appendix B 8 - Appendix B contains actual
emissions. Not to exceed SW

Hazardous Air Pollutants and Effluents (ton/yr)9 Chemical use10 Maximum
inventory of fissile material/throughput Waste Category (2001-2006
Cumulative)11 Low level Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Mixed Low-level Liquid
(gal) Solid (yd3) TRU Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) HLW/Spent Fuel Liquid
(gal) Solid (yd3) Hazardous Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Nonhazardous
(Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3)

Appendix B Appendix B Appendix B Appendix B Appendix B 9 - Appendix B
contains actual emissions. Not to exceed SW SW/SPEIS Page A- SW/SPEIS
Page A- SW/SPEIS Page A- SW/SPEIS Page A- SW/SPEIS Page A172 172 172 172
172 10 - See SW/SPEIS Page 1-172 for example list of chemical 0 0 0 0 0
11 - Actual cumulative wastes totals for 2001-2006. Not to e (Appendix
C). 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.087 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.087 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.087 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.087 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.087 0 0
Table 2A - D&D Waste data estimates for PEIS Generic Data Request D&D
WASTE for B-810

Waste Catego

Volume
Decommission Demolition

Low level Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Mixed Low-level Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3) TRU Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) HLW/Spent Fuel Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3) Hazardous Liquid (gal) 50 Solid (yd3) 100 Nonhazardous (Sanitary)
Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) 94 Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3)

940
B812 A,B,C,D,E Data Required

ALTERNATIVES Alternative Alternative Alternative 3 Alternative 2.2 No
Action 2.3 2.1 Notes

ANNUAL OPERATIONS Annual Electrical energy (MWh)1 <16.3 M kWh/y
(SW/SPEIS) Not available Fuel usage (gal or yd3)3 Other Process Gas (N,
Ar, etc)4 Water (gal)5 0 Yes <67,900 gal/day (SW/SPEIS) Not applicable
Plant footprint (acres)6 Employment (workers)7 Number of Rad workers
Average annual dose Maximum worker dose Radionuclide emissions and
effluents NAAQS emissions (tons/yr)8 Appendix B Hazardous Air Pollutants
and Effluents 9 (ton/yr) Chemical use10 Explosive (lb/yr)10a Depleted
uranium (lb/yr)10a Beryllium (lb/yr)10a Low level Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3) Mixed Low-level Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) TRU Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3) HLW/Spent Fuel Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Hazardous Liquid (gal)
Solid (yd3) Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) 0 0 0 0 8 - Appendix B
contains actual emissions. Not to exceed SW/SPEIS projections. 0.14 0 0 0
0 0

0 0 0 No

0 0 0 No

0 0 0 No

1 - Electrical use is not metered at S300. Use not to exceed SW/SPEIS
projection of 16.3 0 M kWh/y. 0 2 - See number 1. 0 3 - Fuel oil is no
longer used at LLNL. No 4 - See SW/SPEIS Page A-180 for chemical use. 5 -
Water use is not metered at S300. Use not to exceed SW/SPEIS projection
of 67,900 0 gal/day. 0 D&D 6 - LLNL FITS Data 0 7 - LLNL FITS Data 0 0 0
0

Peak electrical demand (MWe)2

0 0 D&D 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 D&D 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 D&D 0 0 0 0 0

Steam (tons)

Appendix B SW/SPEIS Page A-180 167.76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9,795 0.571 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 9 - Appendix B contains actual   emissions. Not to exceed SW/SPEIS
projections. 0 10 - See SW/SPEIS   Page 1-180 for example list of
chemicals. 0 10a - 2006 Emission   values 0 10a - 2006 Emission values 0
10a - 2006 Emission values 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2A - D&D Waste data estimates for PEIS Generic Data Request D&D
WASTE for B-812

Waste Catego

Volume
Decommission Demolition

Low level Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Mixed Low-level Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3) TRU Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) HLW/Spent Fuel Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3) Hazardous Liquid (gal) 110 Solid (yd3) 1 Nonhazardous (Sanitary)
Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) 90 Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3)

350

50

1,310 877
Building 823 Complex Data Required

ALTERNATIVES No Action Alternative 2.1 Alternative 2.2 Alternative
Alternative 3 2.3 Notes

ANNUAL OPERATIONS Annual Electrical energy (MWh)1 <16.3 M <16.3 M kWh/y
kWh/y (SW/SPEIS) (SW/SPEIS) Not Not available available 0
4

Peak electrical demand (MWe) Fuel usage (gal or yd3) Water (gal)
5 3

2

<16.3 M <16.3 M <16.3 M kWh/y kWh/y kWh/y 1 - Electrical use is not
metered at S300. Use not to exceed SW/SPEIS projection of 16.3 M
(SW/SPEIS) (SW/SPEIS) (SW/SPEIS) kWh/y. Not Not Not available available
available 2 - See number 1. 0 Yes 0 Yes 0 3 - Fuel oil is no longer used
at LLNL. Yes 4 - See SW/SPEIS Page A-172 for chemical use.

0 Yes

Other Process Gas (N, Ar, etc)

Yes

Steam (tons) Plant footprint (acres)6 Employment (workers) Number of Rad
workers Average annual dose Maximum worker dose Radionuclide emissions
and effluents NAAQS emissions (tons/yr) Hazardous Air Pollutants and
Effluents (ton/yr) Chemical use6 Maximum inventory of fissile
material/throughput Waste Category (2001-2006 7 Cumulative) Low level
Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Mixed Low-level Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) TRU
Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) HLW/Spent Fuel Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3)
Hazardous Liquid (gal) Solid (yd ) Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal)
Solid (yd )
3 3 7

<67,900 <67,900 <67,900 <67,900 <67,900 gal/day gal/day gal/day gal/day
gal/day 5 - Water use is not metered at S300. Use not to exceed SW/SPEIS
projection of 67,900 (SW/SPEIS) (SW/SPEIS) (SW/SPEIS) (SW/SPEIS)
(SW/SPEIS) gal/day. Not Not Not Not applicable applicable Not applicable
applicable applicable 0.07 8 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 8 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 8 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.07 8 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 6 - LLNL FITS Data 8 7 - LLNL FITS Data 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 SW/SPEIS SW/SPEIS SW/SPEIS Page A-172 Page A-172 Page A-172 0 0

0 0 SW/SPEIS SW/SPEIS Page A-172 Page A-172 6 - See SW/SPEIS Page 1-172
for example list of chemicals. 0 0 7 - Actual cumulative wastes totals
for 2001-2006. Not to exceed SW/SPEIS projections (Appendix C).

0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12,877 1,494 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12,877 1,494 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12,877 1,494 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12,877 1,494 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12,877 1,494 0 0
Table 2A - D&D Waste data estimates for PEIS Generic Data Request D&D
WASTE for B-823

Waste Catego

Volume
Decommission Demolition

Low level Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Mixed Low-level Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3) TRU Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) HLW/Spent Fuel Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3) Hazardous Liquid (gal) 55 Solid (yd3) 6 Nonhazardous (Sanitary)
Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) 60 Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3)

20

279
Building 850 Complex Data Required

No Action

ALTERNATIVES Alternative Alternative 2.1 2.2

Alternative Alternative 3 2.3 Notes

ANNUAL OPERATIONS Annual Electrical energy (MWh)1 <16.3 M kWh/y
(SW/SPEIS) 0 0 Not available Not available Not available 0 Yes 0 No 0 No
1 - Electrical use is not metered at S300. Use not to exceed SW/SPEIS
projection of 16.3 0 M kWh/y. Not available 2 - See number 1. 0 3 - Fuel
oil is no longer used at LLNL. No 4 - See SW/SPEIS Page A-180 for
chemical use.

Peak electrical demand (MWe)2 Fuel usage (gal or yd3)3 Other Process Gas
(N, Ar, etc)4 Water (gal)5

0 Not available 0 No

Steam (tons) Plant footprint (acres)6 Employment (workers)7 Number of Rad
workers Average annual dose Maximum worker dose Radionuclide emissions
and effluents NAAQS emissions (tons/yr)8

<67,900 gal/day 5 - Water use is not metered at S300. Use not to exceed
SW/SPEIS projection of 67,900 (SW/SPEIS) 0 0 0 0 gal/day. Not Not Not Not
Not applicable applicable applicable applicable applicable 0.12 1 0 ALARA
Appendix A Appendix B D&D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 D&D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 D&D
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 D&D 6 - LLNL FITS Data 0 7 - LLNL FITS Data 0 0 0 8 -
Appendix A contains actual emissions. Not to exceed SW/SPEIS projections.
0 9 - Appendix B contains actual emissions. Not to exceed SW/SPEIS
projections. 0 10 - Appendix B contains actual emissions. Not to exceed
SW/SPEIS projections. 0 11 - See SW/SPEIS Page 1-180 for example list of
chemicals. 0 11a - 2006 Emission values 0 11a - 2006 Emission values 0
11a - 2006 Emission values

Hazardous Air Pollutants and Effluents (ton/yr)9 Chemical use10 Explosive
(lb/yr)11a Depleted uranium (lb/yr)11a Beryllium (lb/yr)11a Low level
Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Mixed Low-level Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) TRU
Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) HLW/Spent Fuel Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3)
Hazardous Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal)
Solid (yd3)

Appendix B SW/SPEIS Page A-180 56.18 0 0

7.8

0

0

0

0
0 1.1 1150 0

0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0
Table 2A - D&D Waste data estimates for PEIS Generic Data Request D&D
Waste for B-850

Volume Waste Catego Decommission Low level Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Mixed
Low-level Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) TRU Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) HLW/Spent
Fuel Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Hazardous Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) 40
Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) 250 Nonhazardous
(Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3)
Demolition

358
Building 851 Complex Data Required

No Action

ALTERNATIVES Alternative Alternative Alternative 2.2 Alternative 3 2.1
2.3 Notes

ANNUAL OPERATIONS Annual Electrical energy (MWh)1 <16.3 M <16.3 M <16.3 M
<16.3 M kWh/y kWh/y <16.3 M kWh/y kWh/y kWh/y 1 - Electrical use is not
metered at S300. Use not to exceed SW/SPEIS projection of 16.3 (SW/SPEIS)
(SW/SPEIS) (SW/SPEIS) (SW/SPEIS) (SW/SPEIS) M kWh/y. Peak electrical
demand (MWe)2 Not available Not available Fuel usage (gal or yd3)3 Other
Process Gas (N, Ar, etc)4 Water (gal)5 <67,900 <67,900 <67,900 <67,900
<67,900 gal/day gal/day gal/day gal/day gal/day 5 - Water use is not
metered at S300. Use not to exceed SW/SPEIS projection of 67,900
(SW/SPEIS) (SW/SPEIS) (SW/SPEIS) (SW/SPEIS) (SW/SPEIS) gal/day. Not Not
Not Not applicable applicable Not applicable applicable applicable 0.3 7
0.3 7 0.3 7 0.3 7 0.3 6 - LLNL FITS Data 7 7 - LLNL FITS Data 0 Yes 0 Yes
Not available Not available Not available 2 - See number 1. 0 Yes 0 Yes 0
3 - Fuel oil is no longer used at LLNL. Yes 4 - See SW/SPEIS Page A-181
for chemical use.

Steam (tons) Plant footprint (acres)6 Employment (workers)7 Number of Rad
workers Average annual dose (2001-2006 Averages)8 Maximum worker dose
Radionuclide emissions and effluents NAAQS emissions (tons/yr)10
9

0.009 ALARA

0.009 ALARA

0.009 ALARA

0.009 ALARA

0.009 8 - LLNL Hazards Control - 2001-2006 actual data averages (m/rem/y)
ALARA

Appendix A Appendix A Appendix A Appendix B Appendix B Appendix B
Hazardous Air Pollutants and Effluents (ton/yr)11 Chemical use12
Explosive (lb/yr)12a Depleted uranium (lb/yr)12a Beryllium (lb/yr)12a Low
level Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Mixed Low-level Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3)
TRU Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) HLW/Spent Fuel Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3)
Hazardous Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal)
Solid (yd3)

Appendix A Appendix A 9 - Appendix A contains actual emissions. Not to
exceed SW/SPEIS projections. Appendix B Appendix B 10 - Appendix B
contains actual emissions. Not to exceed SW/SPEIS projections.

Appendix B Appendix B Appendix B Appendix B Appendix B 11 - Appendix B
contains actual emissions. Not to exceed SW/SPEIS projections. SW/SPEIS
SW/SPEIS SW/SPEIS SW/SPEIS SW/SPEIS Page A-181 Page A-181 Page A-181 Page
A-181 Page A-181 12 - See SW/SPEIS Page 1-181 for example list of
chemicals. 237.33 237.33 237.33 237.33 237.33   12a - 2006 Emission values
139.11 139.11 139.11 139.11 139.11 12a - 2006   Emission values 0 0 0 0 0
12a - 2006 Emission values 600 62.7 0 0 0 0 0   0 65,988 0.142 2854 0 600
62.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 65,988 0.142 2854 0 600 62.7   0 0 0 0 0 0 65,988 0.142
2854 0 600 62.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 65,988 0.142 2854   0 600 62.7 0 0 0 0 0 0
65,988 0.142 2854 0
Table 2A - D&D Waste data estimates for PEIS Generic Data Request D&D
Waste for B-851 (Historical Site)

Volume Waste Catego Decommission Low level Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Mixed
Low-level Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) TRU Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) HLW/Spent
Fuel Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Hazardous Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3)
Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) 240 Nonhazardous
(Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3)
Demolition

1,000

55 250 55 2,405
Table 2A - D&D WASTE data estimates for PEIS Generic Data Request D&D
WASTE for HYDROTEST FACILITIES

Waste Catego Low level

Total Volume
Decommission Demolition

Liquid (gal) 40,000 Solid (yd3) 100 Mixed Low-level Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3) TRU Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) HLW/Spent Fuel Liquid (gal) Solid
(yd3) Hazardous Liquid (gal) 15,215 Solid (yd3) 47 Nonhazardous
(Sanitary) Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) 1,652 Nonhazardous (Sanitary) Liquid
(gal) Solid (yd3)

1,350

50

55 470 1,365 14,040
Data Required Electrical energy (MWh) Concrete (yd3) Steel (t) Water (g)

Construction of a CFF-like containment at LANL or NTS

Consumptio n/Use Project Assumptions: 150 MWatts Firing Chamber, Support
Building and Diagnostic Chase similar to B801 CFF at Site 3 5,000 cubic
yards 2,500 tons Estimating Assumptions: 200,000 gallons Elect: 200A @
50% - 100 x 208V x 1.73 = 36,000x (24 Mo x 174 Hr) / 1,000,000 Concrete:
Based on CFF + additional margin fro uncertainty Steel: Incl reinforcing
steel, Blast Doors, Penetrations and steel lining 3

Land (acre) Laydown Area Size (part of parking lot) Parking Lots
Employment

2

Water: Allowance Park Lot: Based on CFF Tot Employ: 2 YR x 30 EA/YR Peak
Employ: 50 EA

Total employment (worker years)

60

Constr Period: 2 YR
Peak employment (workers) Construction period (years) Waste Generated
Hazardous Liquid (gal) Solid (yd3) Nonhazardo us (Sanitary) Liquid (gal)
Solid (yd3) Nonhazardo us (Other) Liquid (gal) Solid (yd )
3

50 San Liquid: 440 Work Days x 50 GAL/DAY 2 (24 Months) Solid: 1 EA x 40
CY Dumpsters x 24 MO + 30,000 SF x 0.33 FT / 27 CF/CY (Grub & Clear soil
removal) Volume

0 0

22,000 gallons 0

0 1,300 cubic yards

Project Assumptions: Firing Chamber, Support Building and Diagnostic
Chase similar to B801 CFF at Site 300
Estimating Assumptions: Elect: 200A @ 50% - 100 x 208V x 1.73 = 36,000x
(24 Mo x 174 Hr) / 1,000,000 Concrete: Based on CFF + additional margin
fro uncertainty Steel: Incl reinforcing steel, Blast Doors, Penetrations
and steel lining Water: Allowance Park Lot: Based on CFF Tot Employ: 2 YR
x 30 EA/YR Peak Employ: 50 EA Constr Period: 2 YR San Liquid: 440 Work
Days x 50 GAL/DAY Solid: 1 EA x 40 CY Dumpsters x 24 MO + 30,000 SF x
0.33 FT / 27 CF/CY (Grub & Clear soil removal)
APPENDIX A

Annual Effluents and Emissions (Ci)
1997-2006 (range not average) Radionuclide NA NA H-3 Transuranics NA
firing table U-238 U-235 U-234 N-13 Ar-41 gross alpha gross beta U-238 U-
235 U-234 NA Ci

B191 - HEAF B131 - High Bay B331 B332 B334 B801

12-276 0.00E+00

4.8E-02 - 7.2E-02 6.1E-04 - 9.3E-04 4.4E-03 - 6.8E-03 3.40E-03 2.00E-07
0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.0E+00 - 4.6E-07 0.0E+00 - 5.9E-09 0.0E+00 - 4.3E-08

rm 125 CFF

B834 A, E, H
APPENDIX A

U-234 H-3 N-13 O-15 Ar-41 NA

3.9E-04 - 5.8E-03 3.9E-01 - 1.9E+01 8.20E-02 7.60E-02 1.50E-04

rm 111

B812

LLNL SW/SPEIS AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS (RADIOLOGICAL) PROJECTIONS
Radioactive Air Emission - Livermore Site
Actual Value Actual 2005(CY) Value SW/SPEIS 2003(C Actual Value Y)
2004(CY) Livermore Site Projection SW-MEI 0.13 0.044 0.0079 mrem 0.0065
mrem mrem/y mrem Population Dose 1.8 person- 1.6 1.0 person-rem 1.2
person-rem rem/y personrem

Source: 2005 Annual Yearbook

Radioactive Air Emissions - Site 300
Actual Value SW/SPEIS 2003 Actual Value 2004 (CY) Projection (CY) Actual
Value 2005 (CY)

Site 300
APPENDIX B

NNSA COMPLEX 2030 HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS DATA (1/17/07)
NAAQS NAAQS NAAQS NAAQS CO NOx PM10 SOx HAPs POCs Building No.
(tons/year) (tons/year) (tons/year) (tons/year) (tons/year) (tons/year)
131 High Bay 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0.022084* 191 0.579405001 0.628387909
0.047046127 0.00593891 0.005868435 0.035187513 331 0.371655183
0.483385556 0.03642318 0.006053546 0.001308702 0.027927719 332
0.518507646 0.908227852 0.052640492 0.119914331 0.200142069 0.245052444 0
0 0 0 0 0 334 801 0.0145 0.0128 0.0009 0.0008 0.0002 0.0016 834 0.0026
0.0120 0.0009 0.0008 0.0002 0.0010 0.0039 0.0182 0.0013 0.0012 0.0003
0.0015 836 845 0.0222 0.0001 0.0118 0.0000 0.0032 0.0001 850 0.0013
0.0001 0.0118 0.0000 0.0032 0.0001 851 0.0206 0.0048 0.1765 0.0006 0.0481
0.0011 812 0.0040 0.0003 0.0353 0.0001 0.0096 0.0002 Additional Buildings
0 805 806 0 809 0 810 0.0031 817 0 823 0 825 0 826 0 827 0.0027 855 0
NAAQS LEAD (tons/year) 0* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0007 0.0007 0.0109 0.0022 NAAQS
OZONE (tons/year) 0* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0.0143 0 0 0 0 0.0125 0

0 0 0 0.0010 0 0 0 0 0.0009 0

0 0 0 0.0010 0 0 0 0 0.0008 0

0 0 0 0.0003 0 0 0 0 0.0002 0

0 0 0 0.0012 0 0 0 0 0.0014 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

* Note: Excludes emissions from generators, boilers, and other sources
not exclusively associated with the Building 131 High Bay. National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) include: CO, NOx, PM10, SOx, Lead,
and Ozone. CO = Carbon monoxide NOx = Nitrogen oxides PM10 = Particulate
Matter with an aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to a nominal 10
micrometer SOx = Sulfur oxides HAPs = Hazardous Air Pollutants as listed
in Section 112 of the Clean Air Act. POCs = Precursor Organic Compounds
as defined by Reg 2, Rule 1 of the Bay Area Air Quality Management
District (BAAQMD).
APPENDIX B

LLNL SW/SPEIS AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS (NON-RADIOLOGICAL) PROJECTIONS MARC
Nonradioactive Air Emissions - Livermore Site Nonradioactive Air
Emissions Site 300
2005 Actual3 (kg/day) SW/SPEIS 2003 Actual1 2004 Actual2 Projection
(kg/day) (kg/day) 2005 Actual3 (worst case (kg/day) year) (kg/day) (CY)
(CY) (CY) Pollutants Carbon Monoxide Nitrogen oxides Particulate Matter
Sulfur oxides 49.7 (20 tons/year) 54.7 (22 tons/year) 29.8 (12 tons/year)
3.0 (2.1 tons/year) 9.8 (3.8 tons/year) 147 (59.9 tons/year) 16 63 5.8
1.7 51.8 71.3 5.3 1.7 49.9 68.6 5.6 1.7 SW/SPEIS Projection (worst case
year) (kg/day) Pollutants Carbon 3.7 (1.5 ton/year) monoxide Nitrogen
12.4 (5.0 oxides tons/year) Particulate 11.2 (4.5 matter tons/year)
Sulfur oxides 0.4 (0.52 tons/year) 1.9 (0.77 Precursor tons/year) organic
compounds Totals 29.6 (12.3 tons/year) 2003 Actual1 (kg/day) 2004 Actual2
(kg/day) (CY) (CY) 0.22 0.97 0.31 0.98 0.57 (CY) 0.19 0.89 0.35 0.47 0.39

0.19 0.52 0.28 0.03 0.41

Precursor organic compounds Total

14

15.7

24.9

3.05

2.29

1.35

87.9

145.8

150.7

Source: 2005 Annual Yearbook

Source: 2005 Annual Yearbook
Appendix C

Waste Generation (All LLNL) SW/SPEIS Projection 2003 Actual (FY) Routine
Nonroutine Routine Nonroutine 510 1,700 179 171 330 710 85 60 88 81 18 8
50 60 2 0 2.8 0 0 0 5,100 4,520 330,000 209,000 2005 Actual (FY) 2004
Actual (FY) Routine Nonroutine Routine Nonroutine 141 273 127 414 151 38
54 424 19 27 16 23 1 0 0 4 1 0 1 4 2,850 2,905 297,000 237,600

Waste Type Units Hazardous mt LLW m3/y MLLW m3/y TRU m3/y Mixed TRU m3/y
Sanitary Solid mt Wastewater gal/d Source: 2005 Annual Yearbook
RRW Info

Reliable Replacement Warhead Q&A from Nature Magazine June 19, 2006
Factual Questions Q1. Is the RRW to replace all warheads in the arsenal?
Q2. There are press reports that only the W76 is being considered at the
moment. Can you confirm or deny that? A1 & A2. As part of a larger
transformation strategy, all existing legacy warheads will be studied for
the feasibility of their replacement over the next 25-30 years in lieu of
life extension. The ongoing RRW Feasibility Study is specifically
examining the potential to replace a portion of W76 warheads on Submarine
Launched Ballistic Missiles, and considering compatibility of these
warheads with Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. The Nuclear Weapons
Council, using the results from the ongoing RRW Study, will establish the
approach that will be adopted for integrating a warhead replacement
concept into the long-term stockpile strategy.

Q3. Has the DoD provided NNSA with a specific set of revised margins yet?
If so, can you say anything about it? If not, what is the design basis
for the current RRW competition? A3. The DoD provides NNSA with military
characteristics for warheads, such as the required nuclear yield and the
physical environments in which the warhead must survive. The DoD has
provided draft military characteristics for the RRW Study. While they
contain similar yield, reliability and environments of the current W76,
they expand safety, security, and manufacturability expectations. The
basis for the current RRW design concepts is improved performance
margins, high confidence in long term certification, certification
without additional nuclear testing, manufacturability, and improved
safety and security.

Q4. Costing seems to be emphasized in the design competition. Can you say
anything about how that's being carried out? A4. Preliminary lifecycle
cost estimates will be developed by the laboratories and production
plants for the design concepts. If RRW is technically feasible, then we
expect that the NWC will recommend proceeding with engineering
development of the system. If Congress authorizes and appropriates funds
for such a development program, NNSA will complete detailed design and
preliminary cost estimates of an RRW concept to confirm that it is cost-
effective, will provide surety enhancements, and will support both
stockpile and infrastructure transformation. A major goal of the
development program is
to ensure that the safety and reliability of the RRW system can be
certified without nuclear testing.

Q5. In reviewing testimony, reports, and news articles, I've found about
a halfdozen changes that people are floating as possibly part of the RRW
program (replacing the Beryllium casing on the primary, for example). I
presume NNSA isn't going to say whether any of these are part of the
program, but if you would be willing to confirm or deny any of them, let
me know and I'll send you a list. A5. As part of the RRW Feasibility
Study, the design laboratories are investigating the possibility of
replacing some "hazardous" materials with ones that are more
environmentally benign. An objective of the Reliable Replacement Warhead
(RRW) program is to develop design concepts that could be more easily
manufactured, with readily available and more environmentally benign
materials, and whose safety and reliability could be maintained with high
confidence without underground nuclear testing. Because of the relaxation
of Cold War requirements (e.g., ratio of explosive yield to size and
weight), RRW design concepts can optimize tolerances, dimensions,
features, and materials based on trade-offs for ease of manufacture,
higher performance margins, and enhanced safety and use-control.

(No Q6.)

Q7. Where will things go once the Nuclear Weapons Council receives the
proposed designs this fall? What's expected to happen next? When might a
RRW actually enter the stockpile? A7. In March 2005, the Nuclear Weapons
Council (NWC) approved a joint Department of Defense (DoD) and National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) study to examine the feasibility
of RRW, with first deployment on submarine launched ballistic missiles
and a goal of achieving first production in approximately 2012. The
objective of the RRW study is to identify designs that will sustain long-
term confidence in a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile without nuclear
testing and enable transformation to a more responsive nuclear weapons
infrastructure. If RRW is technically feasible, then we expect that the
NWC will recommend proceeding with engineering development of the system.
If Congress authorizes and appropriates funds for such a development
program, NNSA will complete detailed design and preliminary cost
estimates of an RRW concept to confirm that it is cost-effective, will
provide surety enhancements, and will support both stockpile and
infrastructure transformation. A major goal of the development program is
to ensure that the safety and reliability of the RRW system can be
certified without nuclear testing.
Q8. Is the UK playing any role in RRW? A8. Not at this time.

Policy/journalistic type questions: Q1. The main question I have is about
testing. Former weapons designers I've spoken with are very skeptical
about making any changes at all to the primary or secondary in the
absence of testing. What will be the basis for the NNSA's confidence in
an untested RRW? A1. The intent of the RRW program is to identify nuclear
and non-nuclear replacement components that could be fielded without
nuclear testing. Developing feasible RRW options will, of course, be
rooted in the past nuclear test data base, which provides a solid
foundation for understanding the complex issues of nuclear performance,
and will exploit the experience of the remaining designers and engineers
who have successfully fielded our current stockpile. The past nuclear
test data will be combined with today's modern supercomputer simulation
capabilities and physics and engineering assessment tools, which were not
available to the previous generation of designers, to enable warhead
certification without testing. Replacement components will be designed to
be less sensitive to incremental aging effects and will provide more
favorable reliability margins than those currently in the stockpile. As a
result, fielding RRW systems will likely reduce the possibility that the
U.S. will need to conduct a nuclear test to diagnose or remedy a
stockpile reliability problem.

Q2. Has the NNSA thought about how it will convince policy-makers that
testing isn't necessary? A2. A requirement for Reliable Replacement
Warhead (RRW) design concepts proposed in the ongoing study is
certification without the need for nuclear testing. To provide confidence
that this will be true, the certification plans for the RRW designs must
establish a pedigree based on past nuclear tests. The Stockpile
Stewardship Program has over the past ten years provided improved
analytic tools and a better understanding of weapon physics and
engineering in order to allow designers to do this with improved
confidence. Plans for the RRW program and this fundamental requirement of
certification without additional nuclear testing have been communicated
with all levels of policy makers at the Department of Energy and the
Department of Defense.

Q3. Some critics of the program believe that this is simply a recycling
of the advanced concepts and nuclear earth penetrator programs of a few
years back. How do you respond? What makes RRW different?
A3. The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program has no relationship to
the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. The focus of the RRW program is to
extend the life of those military capabilities provided by existing
warheads, not develop warheads for new or different military missions.
The program is exploring the feasibility of design concepts to sustain
existing military capabilities for the indefinite future with replacement
warheads that are safe and reliable, not to provide new military
capabilities. Warheads that may result from RRW will meet the military
capabilities of the warheads they replace and will be delivered by
existing delivery systems. What makes RRW different is that it will be
certified using the Stockpile Stewardship Program tools and it will
incorporate enhanced safety and use control features.

Q4. A basic cost assumption that some skeptics have questioned is that
the price of maintaining the existing stockpile is rising. Several people
said that they believe stockpile recertification is actually growing
cheaper each year due to better models, Pu aging programs, etc. Can you
point me to the rising budget numbers for SSP? Can you say anything about
where the rise in cost is coming from (i.e. is it primarily Stockpile
Stewardship, LEP, etc.)? A4. The issue is not the cost of maintaining the
legacy stockpile. Rather, the path we are currently on--successive
refurbishments of the Cold War legacy stockpile--presents increased risk
in our being able to assure high confidence in the continued safety and
reliability of that stockpile over the very long term (decades) without
nuclear testing. The evolution away from tested designs, resulting from
the inevitable accumulations of small changes over the extended lifetimes
of these highly optimized systems, is what gives rise to this concern.
Nor will the current path permit transition to a truly "responsive" and
cost effective nuclear weapons infrastructure as called for in the
Nuclear Posture Review. These concerns reflect the judgment of the
directors at the three national weapons laboratories--Los Alamos,
Livermore and Sandia--and that of the Commander of U.S. Strategic
Command, as advised by his group of experts. If feasible, RRW will
provide replacement warheads for existing stockpile weapons that will be
more easily manufactured with more readily available and more
environmentally benign materials, and whose long term safety and
reliability could be assured with high confidence, without nuclear
testing. These weapon design changes are projected to result in increased
efficiencies in the infrastructure required to support the stockpile, and
possibly reduced infrastructure costs over the long term. Funding for
stockpile stewardship has increased since the beginning of the
Administration to redress past underfunding of the nuclear weapons
manufacturing complex, to restore lost production capabilities and
modernize others, and to meet increased security requirements.
Q5. Also in terms of cost, several people have pointed out that a new RRW
with a different size, shape and center of mass, could require extensive
recertification of existing delivery systems (such as Trident II). Has
anyone been talking to the services about this issue? Will the expense of
retesting SLBMS and possibly ICBMs with RRW payloads be incorporated into
costings in this round of the design competition? A5. The Services have
been fully engaged in the RRW feasibility study--indeed the Navy and Air
Force co-chair the study. Moreover, the need for, and cost, of missile
flight test programs is being carefully considered in the overall effort.
The RRW reentry system concepts requirements include the need to preserve
the aerodynamic and mass properties of the warhead reentry systems they
replace and thus will be completely compatible with existing ballistic
missile delivery systems. Likewise, any proposed NNSA Arming, Fuzing, and
Firing (AF&F) system will be compatible with the existing Department of
Defense (DoD) AF&F system.

Q6. There's some debate about the proliferation implications of RRW. I've
heard some claim it will be perceived by many countries as a US push to
design "new" warheads. I've heard others say they think it might help (by
reducing the number of total warheads, etc). Does the NNSA have an
official position on whether this will hurt or help non-proliferation
efforts? A6. The impetus for our work on RRW is to extend the life of
those military capabilities provided by existing warheads, not develop
warheads for new or different military missions. The RRW is seen as the
"enabler" for both long-term stockpile and infrastructure transformation
to support national defense capabilities. The ability to produce modern
replacement warheads on timescales responsive to technical problems in
the stockpile or to emerging threats will also provide opportunities for
further reductions in non-deployed warheads and ensure progress towards
the President's vision of the smallest stockpile consistent with national
security. Success in realizing our vision for RRW will enable us to
achieve over the long term a smaller stockpile, one that is safer and
more secure, one that offers a reduced likelihood that we will ever again
need to conduct an underground nuclear test, one that reduces the
nation's ownership costs for nuclear forces, and one that enables a much
more responsive nuclear infrastructure. Most importantly, this effort
seeks to ensure a credible deterrent for the 21st century, thus reducing
the likelihood we would ever have to employ our nuclear capabilities in
defense of the nation.

Q7. Is the NNSA considering other changes to the nuclear weapons complex
as part of RRW? The SEAB report from last year suggested RRW should be
part of a
program to drastically shrink and reshape the existing complex. Do you
guys have a position on that? A7. The NNSA is incorporating many of the
recommendations from the SEAB report in developing its approach to
transforming to the future nuclear weapons infrastructure--the so-called
"Complex 2030". The plan to achieve the Complex 2030 preferred scenario
relies on four strategies: (1) transform the stockpile; (2) transform the
physical infrastructure of the nuclear weapons complex; (3) transform the
way we do the business of the nuclear weapons complex; and (4) drive the
science and technology base for longterm national security. The second
strategy will result in consolidation and modernization of the complex.
This includes reducing the number of sites, and locations within sites,
that contain quantities of special nuclear materials requiring high
levels of security. Similarly, expensive experimental facilities will be
consolidated as appropriate for mission needs. RRW is clearly part of
first strategy to transform the stockpile and enables parts of the second
and third strategies. Indeed, we agree with SEAB on the importance of RRW
for enabling a responsive nuclear weapons complex infrastructure.
Official Use Only

RRW Fact Sheet and Qs&As
(Draft: 6 April 2006)

Table of Contents

RRW Fact Sheet/Talking Points Purpose of the RRW Program RRW and
Stockpile Confidence Is RRW a new warhead? RRW and new military
capabilities RRW and Stockpile Stewardship RRW and Life Extension
Programs (LEPs) RRW and Responsive Infrastructure RRW and Nuclear Testing
RRW and Dismantlement RRW Funding/Costs Treaty Issues

2 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 13 14

Official Use Only
Official Use Only Reliability Replacement Warhead (RRW) o Stockpile
Stewardship is working; the stockpile remains safe and reliable--this
assessment is based not on nuclear tests, but on cutting-edge scientific
and engineering experiments and analysis, including extensive laboratory
and flight tests of warhead components and subsystems. As we continue to
draw down the stockpile, however, we must consider the long-term
implications of successive refurbishments of the legacy warheads from the
Cold War. Each refurbishment takes us further from the tested
configurations of these highly optimized systems, raising concerns about
our ability to ensure stockpile safety and reliability over the very long
term. This is the impetus for our work on RRW--indeed, it is to extend
the life of those military capabilities provided by existing warheads,
not develop warheads for new or different military missions.

2

o

o

o

The RRW program is examining the feasibility of providing replacement
components for legacy warheads. By relaxing Cold War design constraints
that maximized yield to weight ratios, it will allow us to design
replacement components that are easier to manufacture, are safer and more
secure, eliminate environmentally dangerous materials, and increase
design margins, thus ensuring long-term confidence in reliability and a
correspondingly reduced chance we would ever need to carry out another
nuclear test. RRW thus offers promise to enable transformation to a more
efficient and responsive nuclear weapons R&D and production
infrastructure. Once we demonstrate that we can produce replacement
warheads on a timescale in which geopolitical threats could emerge, or
respond in a timely way to technical problems in the stockpile, then we
can go much further in reducing non-deployed warheads and meet the
President's vision of the smallest stockpile consistent with our nation's
security. Last year, an RRW design competition was initiated in which two
independent design teams from our nuclear weapons labs are exploring RRW
options. A competition of this sort has not taken place in over 20 years,
and the process is providing a unique opportunity to train the next
generation of nuclear weapons designers and engineers. The program is on
schedule--preliminary designs will be provided this Spring. After that,
intensive peer review will lead to selection of a preferred option. A
decision to proceed into engineering development would follow and would
require the concurrence of Congress.

o

o

o

Official Use Only
Official Use Only Background o Even as the numbers of U.S. nuclear
weapons are reduced, aging nuclear weapons will need to be refurbished.
Under current plans, the NNSA will complete Life Extension Programs
(refurbishments) on existing warheads. o

3

During the Cold War, a new nuclear weapons system was introduced every 5-
8 years, while two or three weapons were in full-scale development at any
given time. This led to "turning over" of the stockpile approximately
every 20 years. At the time, modernization efforts generally focused on
fielding new warheads with new military capabilities. No new nuclear
weapon has been fielded in nearly 20 years. The administration has not
proposed developing or fielding any new nuclear weapons. The RRW program
is not related to the feasibility study for the Robust Nuclear Earth
Penetrator--completion of the RNEP study was not funded by Congress in FY
06. The RRW study is funded at approximately $25 million for FY 06.

o o o Apr06

Official Use Only
Official Use Only Purpose of the RRW Program Q: What is the purpose of
the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) study initiated in FY 05?

4

A: The RRW program has the same purpose as the life-extension programs
(LEP) that are ongoing today--to ensure the long-term sustainability of
the military capabilities provided by warheads in the existing stockpile.
There is, however, concern that our current path-- successive
refurbishments of existing warheads developed during the Cold War and to
stringent Cold War specifications--may pose an unacceptable risk to
maintaining high confidence in system performance over the long-term.
Specifically, the directors of our national laboratories have raised
concerns about their ability to assure the safety and reliability of the
legacy stockpile over the very long term absent nuclear testing. The
Commander of Strategic Command shares these concerns. The evolution away
from tested designs, resulting from the inevitable accumulations of small
changes over the extended lifetimes of these highly optimized systems, is
what gives rise to these concerns. While we are confident that the
stockpile stewardship program is working and that today's stockpile is
safe and reliable, it is only prudent to explore alternate means to
manage risk in seeking to ensure stockpile safety and reliability over
the long term. Q: How will RRW be different from these "highly-optimized"
Cold War systems? A: During the Cold War, warheads were designed to
maximize explosive yield with minimum size and weight so that many
warheads could be carried on a single delivery vehicle. These and related
requirements tightly constrained designs and led to relatively narrow
performance margins. Moreover, warhead components designed, built, and
fielded using 1970's technology and materials, some of which are no
longer available, are increasingly difficult and costly to remanufacture.
Today, with substantial nuclear force reductions and warhead downloading
underway, warhead designs need not be so tightly constrained. The RRW
effort is exploring concepts that relax some design constraints in order
to promote more favorable performance margins, extend system longevity,
enhance weapon safety and control capabilities, and promote ease of
manufacture and certification. We will also explore warhead components
that are both safer and less difficult to produce and maintain, including
use of insensitive high explosives and less hazardous alternatives for
beryllium components and identification of materials and components that
are less sensitive to aging. The goal of the RRW program is to
demonstrate that we can design, develop, produce and certify, with high
confidence, replacement warheads with these improvements without nuclear
testing. Q: What is the current status of the RRW program? A: Last year,
the DoD and DOE jointly initiated an RRW design competition in which two
independent design teams from the nuclear weapons laboratories--LLNL and
LANL both in partnership with Sandia--are exploring RRW options that
could be deployed on existing delivery systems. A competition of this
sort has not taken place in over 20 years and is providing a unique
opportunity to train the next generation of nuclear weapons designers and
engineers. Both teams are confident that their designs will meet
established requirements and be certifiable and producible without
nuclear testing. The program is on schedule--the

Official Use Only
Official Use Only preliminary designs will undergo an intensive, in-depth
peer review process leading to selection of a preferred option that will
be considered for engineering development. The design competition and
evaluation is scheduled to conclude at the end of this year. Q: Why are
you doing this now? Why the sense of urgency?

5

A: In a few more years, there will be no one left that has participated
in a nuclear test or that has fielded a warhead through initial design,
development, production and certification. It is essential that we employ
these individuals now to train those who will support the stockpile into
the future. Q: What do you hope to gain from RRW and stockpile
transformation? A: Success in realizing our vision for RRW will enable us
to achieve over the long term a smaller stockpile, one that is safer and
more secure, one that offers a reduced likelihood that we will ever again
need to conduct an underground nuclear test, one that reduces the
nation's ownership costs for nuclear forces, and one that enables a much
more responsive nuclear infrastructure. Most importantly, this effort
seeks to ensure a credible deterrent for the 21st century, thus reducing
the likelihood we would ever have to employ our nuclear capabilities in
defense of the nation.

Official Use Only
Official Use Only RRW and Stockpile Confidence

6

Q: Stockpile confidence is often mentioned as a main purpose of RRW. Does
this mean we are not currently confident in our nuclear stockpile? A:
Today's stockpile remains safe, secure and reliable without the need for
nuclear testing. The Directors of our national laboratories--Los Alamos,
Livermore and Sandia--have confirmed this annually for the past ten
years. Q: Why then are we proceeding to develop an RRW? A: The path we
are currently on--successive refurbishments of the Cold War legacy
stockpile-- presents increased risk in our being able to assure high
confidence in the continued safety and reliability of that stockpile over
the very long term (many decades) without nuclear testing. The evolution
away from tested designs, resulting from the inevitable accumulations of
small changes over the extended lifetimes of these highly optimized
systems, is what gives rise to this concern. Nor will the current path
permit transition to a truly "responsive" and cost effective nuclear
weapons infrastructure as called for in the Nuclear Posture Review. These
concerns reflect the judgment of the directors at the three national
weapons laboratories--Los Alamos, Livermore and Sandia--and that of the
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, as advised by his group of experts.

Official Use Only
Official Use Only Is RRW a new warhead? Q: Is RRW a new design warhead?

7

A: The purpose of the RRW program is to extend the life of those military
capabilities provided by existing warheads not to develop new warhead
types for new or different military missions. We expect warheads that
might ultimately result from this program will match the military
capabilities of the warheads they replace and be deployed on existing
delivery systems. In contrast, during the Cold War when we were "turning
over" the stockpile every 20 years or so, modernization efforts generally
focused on fielding new warheads with new military capabilities. Q: Why
isn't RRW reported under the Section 3143 "line item" requirement of
Public Law 107-314 as a "new" or "modified" nuclear warhead? A: RRW is
being reported under its own budget line item and thus is fully
consistent with the letter and the intent of Section 3143, which is to
provide Congress with increased transparency into nuclear warhead
research and development (R&D) programs. Q: Under the definition of "new"
articulated in Section 3143, is RRW a new warhead? A: The Section 3143
language states that the "line item" reporting requirement: "...shall not
apply to funds for purposes of conducting, or providing for the conduct
of, research and development, or manufacturing and engineering,
determined by the Secretary to be necessary--(1) for the nuclear weapons
life extension program; (2) to modify an existing nuclear weapon solely
to address safety or reliability concerns; or (3) to address
proliferation concerns." We have determined that the activities currently
underway in the RRW program meet exception (2) above and thus the Section
3143 definitions of "new" and "modified" are not applicable. The RRW
program is reported under a separate line item addressing replacement
warheads. If pressed: Q: Section 3143 identifies a "new" warhead as one
that contains either a pit or a canned subassembly (CSA) that was not in
the stockpile on the date of the enactment of this Act. Will RRW have
such a pit or CSA? A: Until we complete the RRW cost and feasibility
study, we will not know the full design characteristics of the warhead.
That said, an optimum warhead design to address long-term reliability
concerns would almost certainly employ a new pit design--for example, one
that used additional plutonium to improve design margins. We would follow
this path in order to sustain the safety and reliability of the warhead
to meet existing military requirements. Indeed, the resulting warhead
would not provide new military capabilities beyond those of the warhead
in the stockpile that it is intended to replace.

Official Use Only
Official Use Only RRW and new military capabilities Q. Will RRW provide
new military capabilities?

8

A. The RRW program is exploring feasibility of options to sustain
existing military capabilities for the indefinite future with replacement
warheads that are safe and reliable, not that provide new military
capabilities. RRW will provide options to reduce the cost and risk of
maintaining existing warheads by broadening performance margins,
enhancing surety, and addressing contemporary production issues (e.g.,
manufacturability, avoid use of hazardous materials, etc.) in replacement
designs. Q: Could the RRW approach be applied to fielding new warheads
with new or different military capabilities? A: That is neither the
purpose nor the intent of the RRW program. The focus of the RRW program
is to extend the life of those military capabilities provided by existing
warheads, not develop warheads for new or different military missions.
If, in the future, the DoD identifies requirements for new or different
military capabilities, it is conceivable that certain of the concepts
identified in the RRW program could be applied in the development of
warheads to meet those new requirements. That is not, however, the
purpose of the RRW program. In any event, no new or modified warhead
could be developed or fielded without the specific authorization of
Congress. Q: Has DoD identified requirements for such new or different
military capabilities? A: The DoD has identified no requirements for such
weapons, but our experience suggests that we are not always able to
predict future requirements. The RRW program is not intended to lead to
the development of warheads with new or different military capabilities.
However, as we learn more about nuclear weapons and their potential
capabilities through RRW and the entire Stockpile Stewardship Program, we
may, in the future, apply this knowledge if the DoD ever decides it
requires a fundamentally new nuclear warhead. The DOE must preserve the
ability to produce weapons with new or modified military capabilities if
this is required in the future.

Official Use Only
Official Use Only RRW and Stockpile Stewardship Q: Does the new focus on
RRW mean that the stockpile stewardship program has failed?

9

A: No. Today, stockpile stewardship is working--we are confident the
stockpile is safe and reliable, and there is no requirement at this time
for nuclear tests. Our decision to embark on the path to an RRW does not
result from a failure of stockpile stewardship, but is a reflection of
its success. As a result of the SSP, there is strong promise that we can
achieve the RRW goal. Actions we take now and in the next few years to
start down this new path will be critical to long-term success. Among
other things, we must make continued progress to realize the modern
scientific tools of stockpile stewardship which will help guide a future
transition from warhead refurbishment to replacement. By clarifying the
path forward, the SSP will ensure safe, secure and reliable nuclear
forces for the foreseeable future. Q: How did you come to realize that
this new RRW approach was needed? A: The pursuit the RRW concept is based
on the collective judgment of the directors at our national labs, and of
Gen. Cartwright advised by a group of distinguished experts who comprise
his Strategic Advisory Group. It derives from lessons learned from ten
years of experience with science-based stockpile stewardship, and from
many years of effort in planning for and carrying out the life extension
programs for our legacy stockpile. The path we are currently on--
successive refurbishments of the Cold War legacy stockpile--presents
increased risk in our being able to assure the continued safety and
reliability of that stockpile over the very long term without nuclear
testing. Nor will that path permit transition to a truly "responsive"
(and cost effective) nuclear weapons infrastructure as called for in the
NPR. Q: If we are going to implement an RRW strategy, with warheads
easier to certify, does this mean that we can forego large investments in
the scientific tools of stockpile stewardship? A: No. The scientific
tools we are developing and fielding as part of stockpile stewardship for
the legacy stockpile are the same tools we will use to design, develop
and certify replacement warheads. Moreover, the use of simpler, easier to
manufacture and certify, RRW designs will help ensure that the tools we
are developing will suffice for the long term. Q: Isn't the stockpile
stewardship program, and now RRW, just "white-collar welfare?" A: SSP and
RRW are not "jobs programs" for the labs--they are essential elements of
our strategy to ensure safe, reliable nuclear forces for as long as the
United States requires a nuclear arsenal. If we do not sustain key R&D
capabilities, we would place at serious risk our capabilities for
stockpile stewardship in the future. We will use the RRW effort to train
a new generation of nuclear weapons designers, engineers and production
staff. It is critical to do this now because we are losing expertise
rapidly; the last few designers and engineers who honed their skills
during the period of nuclear testing are eligible to retire in the next
few years. Indeed, we have done very little warhead design and
development work in the past 20 years and the life extension programs for
the legacy stockpile do not exercise all of the critical needed skills.

Official Use Only
Official Use Only RRW and Life Extension Programs (LEPs) Q: Are the LEP
programs going to be abandoned?

10

A: No. NNSA has recently completed the LEP for the W87 and is on track to
deliver the firstproduction unit (FPU) for the B61-7/11 this fiscal year,
and for the W76 LEP in FY07. We plan to begin later this decade a major
life extension program for the W80 warhead. If, in the 2012-15 timeframe,
we demonstrate the capability to design, develop, produce and certify
replacement warheads without nuclear testing, it will provide
opportunit