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Report of the Scientific Council
of the High Council for
Strategic Education and Research
This report reflects a collective effort on the part of all the members of the Scientific Council who accepted to
contribute, intuitu personae, to the 2011 edition. It therefore expresses the great variety of positions or beliefs of
the 108 members of the CSFRS Scientific Council, and does not, of course, represent each individual member who
may have slightly different views from those generally expressed. The members of the CSFRS do not intend to
approve or disapprove the opinions expressed in this document: These opinions should be considered as those of
the members who have expressed them.
Scientific Council of the CSFRS
Chairman: Prof. Philippe Baumard
Un. Paul Cézanne, IRSN Chair, Ecole Polytechnique
General Section: Stéphane Lacroix, IEP Paris, Chaire Section VI
Nicole Chaix, Un. Paris II - VP Moyen Orient Méditerranée Olivier Blin, Un. Méditerranée - VP
Renaud Bellais, EADS Frédéric Ocqueteau, CNRS, CERSA Pascal André, SNCF
Valérie Derouet EDF Univ. Paris II Christine Bamière SGDSN
Dominique Dron, MEDDTL Jean-Luc Racine EHESS Jacky Casanova, IEFF
Xavier Raufer, U. Paris II Jean-Christophe Romer Un Eric Châtelet, UT Troyes
Strasbourg Corinne Lagache, SAFRAN
Section I P-V Tournier Univ. Paris 1 Patrick Lagadec, Ecole Polytechnique
Nicole Gnesotto, CNAM - VP François Lefaudeux, Académie des
Frédéric Charillon IRSEM Section IV Technologies
Isabelle Daoust-Maleval DAS Jean-Marc Suchier SAFRAN - VP E. Michel-Kerjean, Ecole
Philippe Delmas Jean-Louis Bruguière Igor Nikiforov, UT Troyes
Vincent Desportes Général (CR) Cédric Blancher, EADS Jacques Valancogne INERIS
Patrick Facon, Cesa Stanislas de Maupeou, THALES Jean Luc Wybo, Ecole des Mines,
Michel Foucher, IHEDN Yves Deswarte, LAAS-CNRS Polytechnique
Michel Goya IRSEM Jean-Michel Duccoroy, Ministry of the
Gilles Kepel IEP de Paris Interior Section VII
Julie Lebraly EMAA Nathalie Feyt, CNES-THALES Nicole El Karoui, Ecole
Valérie Niquet FRS David Hotte BPCE Polytechnique - VP
Bruno Paulmier SG Mer (PM) F. Bernard Huyghe, Un Paris IV Michel Aglietta, Un de Paris X
Sophie de Lastours, Historienne, Sylvie Diatkine, Un. Paris XII
Section II ARCSI Stève Gentili, BRED
Rémy Pautrat - VP Hélène Martini, Ecole des Hervé Juvin, EuroGroup Institute
Laetitia Atlani-Duault Un Paris X Commissaires de police Jean-Hervé Lorenzi, Un. Paris-
Frank Bournois Un. de Paris II Ludovic Mé, Supélec Dauphine
Philippe Caduc ADIT Martine Monteil, Préfet Catherine Lubochinsky, Un. Paris II
Philippe Combessie Un Paris VIII Olivier Oullier, Un de Provence André Orléan, EHESS
Eric Delbecque INHESJ Jean-Pierre Pochon Anne Perrot, Conseil de la
Isabelle Guion de Meritens GDD des Christophe Soullez, INHESJ Concurrence
Yvelines Charles Prats, Ministère du Budget
Christian Harbulot EGE Laure Quenouëlle-Corre, Un. Paris I
Farhad Khosrokhovar EHESS Section V Jacques Rojot, Un. Paris II
Sébastien Laurent Un. Bordeaux François Darrort, ESCOM - VP
Claude Riveline Ecole des Mines de Catherine Baumont, Un. Bourgogne Section VIII
Paris Maguy Bourbigot, Veolia Edwige Bonnevie, CEA - VP
Vivianne Seigneur Lucile Hofman-Simon, Orange Vincent Bouatou, SAFRAN
François Thual Sénat François Lhoste, Uni. René Descartes Catherine Brechignac, Ac. des Sciences
Michel Wieviorka MSH Sandrine Paillard, INRA Denis Clodic, Ecole des Mines de Paris
Catherine Feuillet, INRA Hervé Dumez, CNRS Ecole
Section III Isabelle Herlin, INRIA- LIME Polytechnique
Catherine de Wenden CERI IEP- Isabelle Laudier, CDC Claire Dupas, ANR
VP Hervé Le Treut, Un. P.M. Curie Patrice Hummel
Bertrand Badie IEP de Paris Serge Planton, Météo France Éléonore Mounoud, Ecole Centrale
Rémi Brague Univ. Paris I Emmanuelle Reynaud, Un. Paul Denis Randet, ANRT
Eric Brousseau Un de Paris X Cézanne Jean Roman, INRIA Bordeaux
Colette Depeyre Un. Paris Dauphine Pascal Royer, UT Troyes
Anne Dulphy IEP Paris Michèle Sebag, Un. Paris Sud
Gérard Koenig Un Paris XII
Report of the Scientific Council of the High Council for Strategic Education and Research 2011
Contents
FOREWORD BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL 5
CONTRIBUTION OF THE GENERAL SECTION 6
Vice-President: Nicole Chaix, Un. Paris II 6
SECTION I: GEOPOLITICS AND GEOSTRATEGY, LONG TERM FORECASTING AND
CONFLICTS, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND MILITARY POLICIES 14
Developments in the international system 14
Redistribution of world power and the future of the West. 14
The strategic thinking of others 15
Impact of political realignments in the Arab/Muslim world 16
Chinese risk as understood in the duality of the term 17
The future of the world nuclear equation in question 17
The National context: The conditions of French power 18
What are the “untouchables” of French power? 18
Assessment of the adaptation of our defence tool 19
Critical analysis of the formatting model of the French Armed Forces and avenue for the necessary evolutions 20
SECTION II: SOCIETAL AND SOCIAL RISKS AND ASSETS, COHESION AND
SUSTAINABILITY 21
Identification and stimulation of vitality and social performance processes 21
The elephant and the street lamp: What every one of us senses and what yet eludes everybody 21
The (over) cautious building of a common political future 22
A slow, inexpressible and usual erosion of the living-together 23
France shows signs of vitality 24
Exiting social patterns 25
Global challenges do not necessarily call for global answers 26
Regenerating critical research and public debate 27
Welfare is a neglected strategic lever 27
Nothing is possible without real decentralisation 28
Questioning power from the perspective of the model of society 29
Preservation of independence versus enhancement of power 29
Must the notion of power be redefined? 30
Limitations of fragmented or transitory governance issues 31
SECTION III: GOVERNANCE, MIGRATIONS, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
POLICIES 32
Social governance and human security 32
Governance and stability 33
Understanding the Arab revolutions 35
Who is the Other? 36
What are the challenges of migratory flows in future decades? 37
The demographic challenge 38
Environmental risks 39
The inequalities of human development 39
Political crises and violence 40
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Report of the Scientific Council of the High Council for Strategic Education and Research 2011
Migration as a way of life 41
The increasing role of business ecosystems in governance challenges 42
Governance and business policy – where economic and social spheres meet 43
SECTION IV: CONTEMPORARY THREATS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES, NEW
CRIMINALITIES 45
Two global and cross-functional vehicles: New types of violence and cyber defence 45
Will cyber security become the power equaliser of the 21st century? 45
The necessity for a national strategy on cyber security 46
Protocols and infrastructures for critical operators 47
National observatory 47
Measurement of the level of system security 47
Create a HR field of cyber security 48
Liberation of competencies and relaxation of regulatory constraints 48
Make evaluations in real conditions possible 48
National cyber defence governance 48
Exposure to terrorist threats 49
Extensive training programmes which must get rid of ideological stamps 50
Development of a framework of reference for the themes, domains and methods for training students 51
Development of global availability of training covering all the domains and adapted to the challenges, with
various levels of specialisation 51
Awarding a label to make programmes of excellence recognisable 52
SECTION V: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: SPATIAL ORGANISATION OF SOCIETIES,
CLIMATE, BIODIVERSITY, ENERGY, FOOD SAFETY. 53
Spatial organisation and territorial interaction 54
Sustainable development and transport 55
Sustainable development and virtualities 55
Biodiversity and the concept of ecosystem service 56
Climate and the need for interdisciplinary expertise at international and national levels 58
Reducing energy dependence 59
World food safety 61
SECTION VI: COMPLEX SYSTEMS, DISASTER AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT, HEALTH AND
NATURAL RISKS 64
From technical security to major risks 64
From major risks to very large-scale crises 65
A few illustrative examples 66
Defining the intention: Strategic development and defence of complex systems 66
Resilience 66
Management of uncertainty and misuse of the "precautionary principle" 67
Improving resistance by supervision 68
Avoiding consanguinity 68
The search for simplicity in systems and without excessive risk (uncertain control) 68
Development and promotion of models 68
Organisation and management of systems 69
Decision-making and antidote to resistance 69
Crisis management and citizen impact 69
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Report of the Scientific Council of the High Council for Strategic Education and Research 2011
France, Europe and major crises 70
SECTION VII: RISKS AND ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 72
Controversies on global imbalance 72
Overall structural problems 73
• Organising regional currency areas 74
• Reinforcing financial regulations and making them compatible 75
• Preparing the outlines of international monetary governance 75
French socio-demography in mid-stream 75
Increasingly rigid decision-making systems 76
The urgency of reinventing a French socio-economic model 78
SECTION VIII – COMPETITIVENESS AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT: 81
INFLUENCE, SECURITY HERITAGE 81
The major clusters of French research and their transformation dynamics 81
A crisis of financing and investment first and foremost 81
Breakdown of efforts between the public and private sectors: it all boils down to the R&D tax credit… 82
Allocation of public expenditure 83
Financing industrial research 83
International comparison of public financing of industrial research 84
Increased financing of public research by means of calls for proposals 85
Numerous reforms, lack of strategic visibility 86
After bringing stakeholders together, we need strategic thinking 86
A "top-down" concept of networks 86
The case of the CNRS 86
The quest for a strategy: between programming and assessment 86
Promoting genuine research strategies that can be tested 86
Programming gone adrift 87
The strategic challenge of research and research policy assessment 88
The scale of assessment is becoming is key issue 88
The commitment to develop research assessment has a cost 89
Example of a strategic challenge: the nanotechnologies sector 90
French Research and Technology at a crossroads 91
The issue at hand: Choosing priorities and resources 91
A disturbing neo-quantitative logic 92
Conclusion: Questioning the solidity of the bases of French science strategies 92
CONCLUSION 95
Notes 98
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Report of the Scientific Council of the High Council for Strategic Education and Research 2011
FOREWORD BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL
This report of the Scientific Council of the CSFRS constitutes a unique experiment, for several
reasons. By collectively and clearly expressing our fields of agreement as well as our differences,
we have succeeded in creating a living document. We have avoided the trap Borges was
dreading, that of producing a text which collective exhaustion or theology would have rendered
sterile. Sharp and different visions of the world feature jointly in this report and this was indeed
the objective we sought to achieve when we decided to undertake this experiment soon after the
creation of the CSFRS and the establishment of its Scientific Council.
The task of the Scientific Council of the CSFRS is to support the mission of the organisation by
issuing advice and recommendations concerning the broad orientations of its scientific policy and
its yearly programme of action. The Scientific Council prepares a yearly document dealing with
the orientation of strategic researchi. This is probably the only similarity with committees and
commissions of which we usually have an often outdated perception.
The 108 members of the Scientific Council volunteered to contribute to what might be termed a
"citizen strategic formulation" exercise. This process is neither of the Anglo- Saxon think-tank
type in which participants represent with more or less conviction the interest of the group they
belong to, nor an advisory committee where individual voices are lost in the circumvolutions of
discursive strategies of the Yes, Ministerii type. Within this Scientific Council, each member was
appointed intuitu personae. This report was therefore written with genuine freedom of expression
and the guarantee that no schizophrenic administrator was going to delete any contents which
would not have been previously agreed upon. We could thus avoid the tyranny of consensus
known as group think which leads to all public reports resembling one another, expressing neither
too much shock, nor provocation, reports in which the intelligent things written are more
reflections of the writers than of the object of their studies.
We have not avoided what constitutes the very richness of this report: The numerous diverging
points of view, the expression in the same text of ideas belonging to completely opposed schools
of thought, the tensions, the uncertain futures and all the diverging points left for the reader to
interpret. The objective of the Scientific Council of the CSFRS is not to give a magisterial lecture
on the future and to express learned reflections on the present, it is rather to conduct the
extremely difficult exercise of asking strategic questions. There is no specific methodology
consisting in asking “interesting questions”. There is rather a continuous search for what seems
incongruous, even if making sense, for that which “disturbs” convictions often too widely
adopted without having been discussed, for that which creates profound disagreement and causes
people to look embarrassed or to turn away.
What is strategic is the fact that we will no longer be able to ask tomorrow the questions we wish
to ask today. The debate is open and it will carry on for three years during which the members of
the Scientific Council of the CSFRS will contribute to future editions by writing articles. I wish
to take this opportunity to thank them all collectively: The vice presidents of the theme groups
who dedicated large portions of their time to turn this initial experiment into a success story as
well as each man and woman who has taken part in this exercise and has operated without any
initial framework and without a safety net.
Prof. Philippe Baumard
Paris, May 23, 2011
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2011 Report of the Scientific Council of the High Council for Strategic Education and Research
CONTRIBUTION OF THE GENERAL SECTION
Vice-President: Nicole Chaix, Un. Paris II
Editorial Members: Renaud Bellais, EADS; Valérie Derouet, EDF; Dominique Dron, Secretary-General for Sustainable
Development; Xavier Raufer, Un. Paris II
The strategic issues the Scientific Council examined have in common one thing which is
especially sensitive for politicians: Practically all these issues ultimately threaten two of the
critical pillars of democracies: Social cohesion and territorial robustness, and, by their nature
and their scale, they do so in a way our modern societies have sometimes not witnessed
before.
The reflections conducted by the Scientific Council have one common denominator: They are
all striving to understand what the foundations of “resilience” are, they are looking at the
threats to the nation and at the necessary or possible policies which could be implemented to
increase France’s resilience. Resilience is defined as “the will and ability of a country, a
society and authorities to resist the consequences of an attack or a major disaster and to then
promptly restore its capacity to function normally, or at least in a socially acceptable way iii. It
therefore involves numerous aspects and a great number of stakeholders which are
heterogeneous in their nature and objectives and go beyond the sphere of defence or security.
The world is changing at a fast pace, from a quantitative point of view (increasing scarcity of
natural resources, new distribution of wealth, demography) as well as from a qualitative one
(invasive technologies, evolution in social links and representations, growing insecurity
regarding the transport of goods, persons and information, redistribution of power among
countries, questions related to growth …)
We therefore have to change our points of view and the way in which we approach issues and
this appeared very clearly in the debates within the different sections. Although the
discussions were not comprehensive, they nevertheless brought to the fore major issues
regarding strategic research as well as other points which must not be neglected if we want to
work towards the necessary change in perspective. This chapter will therefore attempt to
identify and study further the major strategic themes common to the discussions of the
different sections of the Scientific Council. We will successively deal with the legal,
economic and societal issues we need to examine and take into account, as this will shape our
future and the state of our society.
Security norms and standards: A major challenge
At a time when the free exchange of data and flows at global level makes borders disappear,
more specifically thanks to the Internet and to free circulation of persons and goods in vast
areas of the world, the need to set up and strengthen a global structured system of reference
based on security norms and standards defined and recognised by the different States has
never been more present. The fact that goods manufactured in various scattered and faraway
countries appear on the market on the other side of the world calls for a common system of
reference grading the quality of such goods. These specifications are issued by non-
governmental organisations which are often simply created by private stakeholders. With
regard to security norms and standards, we witness stakeholders engaged in political and
industrial rivalries which impact on the balance between national sovereignty and the
international "frame of reference".
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2011 Report of the Scientific Council of the High Council for Strategic Education and Research
In the specific case of nuclear energy, the events which occurred in Japan on March 11, 2011
have contributed to accelerate the creation of a security frame of reference which the USA,
international organisations and NGOs have already advocated. The process has already
started and it will lead to a new “Post Fukushima frame of reference”.
In this context, the norms and standards relating to security, safety and nuclear non
proliferation are going to become an absolute must and an essential aspect of the global
security frame of reference of each nation and therefore eventually of the whole planet. These
norms and standards will undoubtedly trigger an industrial “economic war” never witnessed
before which will affect all the domains linked directly or indirectly with nuclear energy, and
therefore with security, as well as the domain of defence.
The foundations of the global nuclear order - as laid by the Non Proliferation Treaty and the
NPT Review Conference, implemented by international institutions like the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or strengthened through bilateral or multilateral agreements
between States, but also structured by all the agreements initiated by the USA like for
instance the “Bush-Putin” Alliance (the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism:
GICNT), or the World Nuclear Security Summit - are going to be amended by all the parties
regarding themselves as legitimate, and they are going to become an integral part of what will
be the future global frame of reference regarding defence and security. It is therefore
imperative that these elements are taken into account when examining the issues relating to
“defence and security” and that all spheres are being encompassed (technical and regulatory,
capacity, economic and industrial, political and institutional aspects, etc).
Moreover, standardisation is being sought not only because of the legibility it will bring but
also for the economies of scale it will create. To what extent does it reinforce or weaken
production and innovation, on the one hand because of the presence of generic defects or
competition issues and on the other because of its impact on creativity? This very issue is
akin to other concerns of the Scientific Council, issues relating to innovation, economy and
sustainable development.
Economy and global security: Risks, evolutions and challenges
The economy is at the same time a resource, a means and a possible target when it comes to
resilience challenges. It is therefore placed as a "node" of strategic thinking. This leads us to
ask ourselves what relevant studies should be undertaken to understand the challenges and to
formulate possible responses from an economic point of view, whether it be by mobilising the
knowledge we already have or by engaging in new targeted studies.
A tenuous link between resilience and loss of economic competitiveness
From an economic point of view, the nation’s resilience is mostly shown in its capacity to
master technologies and to meet production requirements. Cases like epidemics or the
identification of risks of that type show that resilience goes beyond mere defence needs, even
when these are extended to the issue of security. Although the industrial and technological
basis which is the foundation of defence enables us to initiate a response, it is by no means
sufficient. Beyond this, we have to ask ourselves whether private investment must be the only
force driving the evolution of the national industrial and technological basis. Since Public
effort is not sufficient to meet the challenges, from a budgetary as well as from an
organisational perspective, we must examine any type of partnership between the State and
private companies which would enable us to lessen the risk of experiencing gaps in
production tools. In this context, what are the most efficient incentives in comparison with
the different possible intervention levels (R&D, industrial investment, building inventories,
implicit knowledge….)?
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2011 Report of the Scientific Council of the High Council for Strategic Education and Research
By the same token, the growing interdependence between economies, via intra-sector
exchanges, leads to risks of interruptions in the supply originating outside of the country as
well as to a loss of expertise, these two factors constituting critical links in the production
line. It would be useful to know the extent to which our economy is in a situation of
dependence as a result of internationalisation of the production process and to assess the
nature of the risks stemming from it. The purpose of this study is to identify suitable
solutions (private, public, mixed) and, for each solution, to define the role(s) the State will
have to play.
A more specific analysis can be conducted regarding technologies. Although the Ministry of
Industry regularly carries out prospective studies regarding key technologies, this process is
only part of the answer. It is equally important to know which technologies and competencies
are essential to ensure that production or, more widely, critical economic activities are under
control. For example, how can the notion of dependence be defined with regard to access to
technologies and strength of the industrial base? We could approach this issue by examining
again the notions of “National Innovation System” and of “strategic Autonomy” from the
angle of industrial and technological security.
In other respects, is there a threshold effect as far as investments and industrial capabilities are
concerned? We do not have a sufficient number of studies regarding the systemic effects of
public and private investment or disinvestment (especially in connection with the international
shift in the chain of values) at industry level as well as for the economy as a whole.
A strategic priority: Financing innovation
How can the economic and technological vulnerability of an economy be assessed and taken
into account? Economic globalisation shows that it has become necessary to reassess the
notion of industrial policy, in particular of technological policy. Choosing national
“champions” seems an adequate option to achieve the consolidation of industries and of large
groups, but such a choice could also weaken the other parties involved in the technological
industries. The role of SME and Medium Sized Enterprises is essential in industries as the
large groups subcontract some 70 % of their turnover, and recent studies have shown their
fragility related to size (too small), capitalisation prospects (too limited) and innovation.
From the start of the new century, France has been attempting to get to the root of this issue.
This has led, in particular, to creation of competitiveness clusters. It is important that the
effectiveness of such clusters in consolidating and strengthening industry and research in
France is well understood. Besides, such a response could not be sufficient alone, considering
the diversity of existing companies and activities. We therefore need to think of incentive
mechanisms encouraging financing of innovation in a context of financial and budgetary
crisis, of constraints concerning return on investment for companies and of population ageing.
Beyond the creation of innovations arises the question of how to develop them and to ensure
they contribute to the resilience of our country. How can we benefit from technological
breakthroughs to conquer new markets, which is always easier to do when the markets are
emerging? While R&D is a structural driving force of French competitiveness, the
technological prism of innovation constitutes a limit. The studies dealing with the
knowledge economy show the plurality of the forms of knowledge. It would be useful to
establish some mapping of fields of knowledge to shed light on public policies like the
dialogue between State and industry.
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2011 Report of the Scientific Council of the High Council for Strategic Education and Research
A Strategic Mission: The regulation of financial exchanges
The financial markets are being driven by a dwindling number of real stakeholders that follow
recognised similar practices; they emphasise trends instead of balancing them out, seeming
more and more disconnected from the real economy, and all the more from the strategic needs
of societies and territories in terms of strength, since they follow only their own signals. A
strategic study must therefore lead us to ask ourselves “in reverse” the question of the
regulation of financial markets and to search for ways to strengthen societies in a constantly
changing context.
The supervision of financial institutions in the banking sector as well as in that of insurance is
being debated at the moment at European level. New regulations are being progressively
implemented to better control the operations in these sectors. We must strive to understand
whether the rules thus defined will be able to truly regulate the world of finance, what their
limits and weaknesses are and which additional measures are required to avoid systemic risks.
Beyond that, we must also devise new means of financing the debt (public and private) which
would fuel the development and resilience of societies. This is also linked to the
developments in global banking and financial regulations. By defining uniform rules, these
developments could end up imposing an Anglo-Saxon type model which is not necessarily
compatible with the French or German forms of capitalism and would create new constraints
for our companies.
Ecology and sustainable development: What resilience strategies should be adopted?
From a strategic point of view, the issue of sustainable development consists in continually
finding and identifying the “non sustainable” elements and their impacts in producing
depletion of resources and loss of control. The conquest of space has made us aware of the
fact that our planet is a finite entity (a convex, closed entity with marked boundaries) not very
different from a space capsule in which 5 billion people would embark for a journey that
would last billions of years without a service station to be found anywhere along the way.
The interactions of the Earth system, societies included, are innumerable, and there is no
certainty concerning their ability to return to a stable state in spite of the physical, chemical
and biological disruptions linked with anthropic pressure. Climate upsets and the degradation
of ecosystems, which trigger mostly accelerative retroactions are preoccupying examples of
such a state of affairs.
To deal with these issues, the separation of disciplines and the fragmentation of reasoning
introduced by the Enlightenment must be urgently supplemented by ways of approaching the
issue which would be more integrative and more attached to the interfaces and would
therefore possibly lead us to question some set of scope reducing axiomsiv. The stakeholders
in society are not systematically informed of the interweaving of challenges and there is no
sufficient recognition of the part they play in the creation of knowledge. Science and society
thus deprive themselves of abilities which are crucial in our world today: Practical innovation
and a total rethinking of paradigms, as well as of an additional factor, that of individual
participation to social cohesion which is a major resilience factor when an extreme
destabilising phenomenon such as the Japanese tsunami occurs.
This research can be applied to several issues which have been identified as important
components regarding the resilience of our societies and economies.
a) Town planning and resilience: Urban concentration is an efficiency factor (energy,
depollution of concentrated flows, presence of economic activities in the
neighbourhood and potential availability nearby of housing, services and jobs…);
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2011 Report of the Scientific Council of the High Council for Strategic Education and Research
urban density is therefore an attractiveness factor, which the way town planning is
conducted can increase or degrade [in the Paris region, the centre of Paris (Marais) has
a density three times superior to that of the large complexes in the periphery]; it is also
a potential element of vulnerability (dependence concerning exterior vital supplies,
operating complexity with regards to networks, electronic systems, distance from the
coasts…).
b) Agricultural land: How to maintain and/or restore fertility and intensity, how to
reopen the range of possible options thanks to the diversity of scientists and
practitioners at our disposal; how to increase efficiency with regards to resources
(water, phosphates, land, biological functioning, especially of soil…) not only of a
given farm but of an entire territory as well; how to deal with land confiscation, water
resources and access to seeds from a social, political and geostrategic point of view.
c) Energy and sustainability: Energy efficiency being easier to generalise and leading to
less conflicting situations than access to energy sources, how can we give it the
genuine scientific and political priority it should have, especially in Europe and in
Japan; how can we come to the most resilient and sustainable decisions with regard to
production and energy distribution systems; how can we anticipate the socio-
economic, environmental and strategic repositioning effects of the Japanese tsunami.
d) Biodiversity, ecosystems exploitation and territorial robustness: While economic
valorisation constitutes a useful, even if very limited expression of services to
ecosystems, it is nonetheless not a tool which can be used to preserve or restore the
natural functioning on which we depend; between shared indicators (IPBES), quotas,
“queues”, prohibitions, which approaches can be adopted and on what scales?
e) Dealing with complex risks: With regards to prevention (known risks), we are mostly
faced with the following question: How can we devise predictive models enabling us
to prevent a risk and/or to organise a response without making the system rigid or
having to use bypass tactics? With regard to precaution (which applies to a risk which
is not clearly identified, usually very unlikely to materialise, whose impact is
potentially serious and/or irreversible, all the more if it arises from decisions taken by
multiple stakeholders and affects a large number of people not having taken part in
these decisions, often confused with prevention when the risk is identified and its
probability has been established), what are the possible reactions of the various
stakeholders and the impact on societal resilience?
As an example integrating all these issues, we can look at the Mediterranean Basin which
constitutes for Europe a mandatory exercise in sustainable development: What directions must
we immediately prioritise in the new context?
Focus on a strategic issue: The supply of raw materials
The recent financial and economic crisis has led to a review in the allocation of assets which
modifies investment flows. Some new geo-economic reasons like the security of supplies
have been added to the financial reasons like diversification, search for better returns and for
security and this has contributed to a much stronger demand for real assets: Arable land,
forests, property, exploitation rights of ground, sea, water and subsoil. The movement in that
direction has been accompanied by pressure in favour of deregulation in the transfer of real
assets, the privatisation of such assets, and the replacement of food crop concerns meant for
local or regional needs by industrial firms focused on international markets.
The pressure caused by an overabundance of liquidities on the real assets markets is being felt
everywhere in the world. In France as well, we witness the purchase of industrially exploited
lands by investment funds. Such a situation makes it more difficult for local populations to
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2011 Report of the Scientific Council of the High Council for Strategic Education and Research
acquire property, institutes concentration patterns contrary to town planning policies and most
of all increases the pressure to exploit all available resources in a financially very productive
way so as to accelerate return on investment. We must study to what extent financial logic
can, when applied to real assets, lead to downright operations of “liquidation” of the natural
heritage: Depleted land and ground water, overexploited seas, etc, and also to the liquidation
of social structures: Volatile prices, ensuing gaps between income and heritage, dependence
towards outside markets, etc. In the short, medium and long term, the impact of the
financialization of real assets, their property and their exploitation rights on the living
surroundings, but also on the sovereignty and autonomy of populations is a topic of strategic
importance, both as an opportunity and a threat. It must therefore be dealt with, and means to
stem its causes have to be found. Our strategic preoccupation demands that the consequences
of this trend weighing heavily on social relations and the functioning of our society be
systematically examined.
With regards to mineral resources, the questions we must especially ask will have to be:
How to identify and protect/manage/negotiate the access to raw material resources
(mineral for instance) which have not yet been classified as strategic?
Does systematised circular economy produce an end result which is sufficiently
successful in achieving peaceful management of vital resources (for instance: Rare
metals used in electronics) or must we supplement it with other concepts which would
be more cultural and operational?
For the EU, what is the feasible way of approaching issues related to new deposits,
especially those located in the oceans or at the poles: Taking into account the high
exploitation costs to be expected, what role will the applications for exploration
permits come to play?
With regard to living resources:
How can rapidly dwindling resources, like fishing resources be managed: What part
must be given to the constitution and the international sharing of the results observed?
What is the objective as far as access to resources of the local populations is concerned
and what tools must therefore be used? Must the high seas be shared among nations?
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as a strategic challenge and as an element of
power projection: The diversity of productions and systems is opposed to a conception
based on massive import-export productions and circuits: What are the new elements
constituting the power/resilience couple?
If they can afford to do so, acquiring land on a global scale is part of the strategies
used by numerous public or private entities in order to secure power; under what
conditions could this trend be made compatible with geopolitical security and
retaining the fertility of soils?
Transformations, hybridizations, new globalized criminality
The years between now and 2016 are what one might term "the controllable horizon". The
blindness of the international community could lead to aggravation of the phenomena of
criminalisation of fundamental systems, and developed democratic societies will not be able to
avoid this danger. From now on, it is no longer possible to consider terrorism, whichever it
may be, as a separate category distinguishable from the other global dangers and threats.
While these two criminal phenomena existed in separate and rather impenetrable spheres
during the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the accelerated pace of globalisation put
an end to this comfortable reality.
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If we want to understand this threat and be able to fight it efficiently by 2016, we need to work
together to examine the variants of terrorism and organised crime, and the hybrid
combinations of both. During its first ten years (1990-2000), globalisation gave rise, visibly
and as a form of counter shocks, to spectacular waves of terrorism. What has been triggering
them has not been capitalism itself but rather the exclusively individualistic representation
associated with itv. Some groups could interpret this state of affairs as a "commercial and
pornographic apocalypse" and use terror as a response to it: This is the case, for instance, of
the Salafi-Jihadivi, the Buddhist sect Aum Shinrikyo, or of extreme American Evangelists.
At the same time, a profound and silent globalisation of large-scale criminal trafficking is
taking place: Human beings, drugs, weapons, stolen vehicles, cultural assets, plundering of
natural resources, counterfeiting in all its facets, etc. This globalisation is all the more
neglected because terrorism as a show takes up the main part of the international media and
“traffickers”, “victims of trafficking” and trafficking itself are drowned in the migratory
flowsvii. Unable to see criminal globalisation, the leaders of democratic societies start
realising at a late stage the severe consequences this reality has led to after ten years, with the
September 11 attack. This traumatic shock has given rise in the US to a new doctrine of
action, the War on terror which has been affecting for the last ten years the Muslim countries
as a whole, from Mauritania to Mindanao and has probably created more Jihadists than it has
eliminated, as a sinister self-realising prophecy had predicted. For ten years, while America
seems to be obsessed by the Jihadistsviii- this clumsy “war” has been self maintaining,
changing a somatic reaction into an endemic problem: While the Salafi-Jihadi current is
getting weary after thirty-two years of war, the image of Bin Laden is nonetheless enough to
lead Washington to errors in diagnosis in Afghanistan and Iraq: By assimilating a resistance
war against invasion waged by Muslim tribes on the one side to a warlike Jihad on the other,
while these are in fact two different types of conflict.
During this second decade hypnotised by this type of terrorism, the globalisation of criminal
flows and practices is getting more serious, featuring wealthier and more active criminal
entities, contaminating new territories and establishing larger flows with considerable
ramifications. The persistent failure of the international community to recognise the issue of
cross-border organised criminality as a governance priority is leading to complete disaster.
All over the world (North of Mexico, Coast of the Gulf of Guinea, Somalia, East Timor, Haiti,
Karachi with its huge suburbs, Favelas of Brazil, etc), States in complete disarray, huge cities
where anarchy reigns, immense areas of “informal settlements” (slums) fall lastingly under
criminal control (cartels or gangs) or under that of hybrid organizations (guerrillas). The big
powers seemed indifferent to the problem, at least until the UN issued a belated anguished
warning; organised crime controls fiefs (in developing countries) and diasporas (in the
developed world). In this way, since 2008 approximately, the second wave of criminal
globalisation has been able to gather momentum. Among the main trends of this second wave
which we must examine carefully, we can identify the following:
Industrialisation of major illegal productions, especially “criminal manufactures”
which require capital (dangerous counterfeited items, drugs, etc); intensification of the
illegal commercial flows towards Europe, North America and the developed part of
Asia.
Increased hybridization between “political” (guerrillas, armed gangs) or “religious”
activities (various fanaticism-driven entities, Jihadists) and multiple criminal
trafficking activities. The resilience of criminal or hybrid entities to shocks of any
nature is noteworthy: Three weeks after the terrible earthquake in Haiti, the brothels,
placed under criminal control, were working normally amid the worst possible
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anarchy. Can we draw conclusions from this as to the resilience of our own
structures?
A cross-border criminal force always being the result of dynamics between a fief and a
diaspora: Reinforced control of gangs and degenerate guerrillas in uncontrolled
territories in developing countries, strengthening of their influence on “their”
diasporas which have emigrated to the large developed centres, especially in
neighbourhoods and urban areas which are out of control.
Weakening and gradual criminal degeneration of the Salafi-Jihadi movement; at the
same time, strengthening of the “political” trend of salafism (Muslim Brothers).
The programmed end of Al Qaida automatically creates opportunities and openings for
stakeholders who were previously discreet and whose voice was not heard; they have suddenly
acquired a form of legitimacy and have been given still unsuspected development margins.
They may express themselves through the electoral process as well as through violence.
Although it may seem reassuring as far as the attractiveness of the democratic system is
concerned, this first option will not necessarily lead to peaceful relations with the West. We
cannot in this regard ignore the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood, or that of the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Each of these two stakeholders has gained access to the political arena
through peaceful means but they could also be tempted by other options. In the past, Iran has
shown great adroitness in staking its claims by using asymmetric and violent strategies in
processes either of negotiation (Paris terrorist attacks of 1985/86) or of revenge (Argentina
terrorist attacks of 1992 and 1994). Unresolved disputes between Iran and the West as well as
with a large portion of the Arab World are too numerous for this option to be ignored.
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SECTION I: GEOPOLITICS AND GEOSTRATEGY, LONG TERM FORECASTING AND
CONFLICTS, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND MILITARY POLICIES
Vice-President: Prof. Nicole Gnesotto, CNAM
Editorial Members: Frédéric Charillon, IRSEM; Isabelle Daoust-Maleval, DAS; Vincent Desportes General (Ret); Patrick
Facon, Cesa; Michel Foucher, IHEDN; Michel Goya, IRSEM; Julie Lebraly, EMAA; Valérie Niquet, FRS; Bruno Paulmier,
Rear Admiral, Deputy Secretary General of SG Mer (PM);
Members: Philippe Delmas; Gilles Kepel, IEP Paris.
Globalisation continues to shatter the three foundations of the international system at an ever
increasing rate: The economic and financial crisis, which started in 2007, is challenging
principles which were formerly deemed inviolable as to the excellence of the market
economy. The environmental crisis reinforced by the acceleration in the growth rate of
emerging countries, raises certain questions about the durability of natural resources and the
ultimate survival of our planet.
Since the beginning of the century, strategic upheavals have been accumulating: Islamic
international terrorism, massive security degradation in the broader Middle East area (Iraq,
Afghanistan, Lebanon, Israel-Palestine), risk of nuclear proliferation from Iran and North
Korea, sometimes sudden changes of opinion of Russia in Europe, etc. Recent political
revolutions in the Maghreb and in Egypt have in the last few weeks been contributing to
uncertainty about the validity of certain conventional strategic analyses.
These global developments have direct implications in respect of the method of analysis and
strategic anticipation. The great challenge for the years to come is indeed to have the
capability to understand the extreme complexity and global nature of all the parameters.
Strategic expertise can no longer be limited only to politico-military data: To be relevant all
dimensions (economic, political, strategic, cultural, institutional, ethical) of the international
system as remodelled by globalisation, must be integrated. This global approach capability
also governs the level of effectiveness of international action.
Developments in the international system
Among the host of questions raised as a result of developments in the world, some are
crucially important for the development of the French strategic posture. It is indeed important
not to be mistaken about the world and to use suitable concepts, in particular given that there
are numerous examples of developments likely to cast doubt on the most traditional tenets of
the Western strategic approach. Questions formerly unthinkable are no longer so: Is military
power the most important of the strategic tools? Is Chinese power irreversible? Are strategic
alliances in Europe, the Middle East and Asia permanent? Is the democratisation of the world
the ultimate objective of Western countries? Are nations able to cope with the strategic
challenges of globalisation? Etc. In order to make an assessment, whether positive or
disturbing, of current strategic developments, the group proposes that the five/six following
issues be highlighted:
Redistribution of world power and the future of the West.
The issue of the new world organisation and of the redistribution of power will be raised very
soon in the second decade of this century.
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The long engagement of the United States of America and US-led coalitions in the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars has definitely put an end to the “Unipolar moment” and has accelerated the
decline of Western powers. The relative global influence of the latter (therefore their
legitimacy for organising the world and imposing their will) was based on the triptych
“demographic power, economic power, military power”. This influence decreased at the very
rate at which the difficulties experienced by Western powers in these three domains made
other powers emerge: These powers are currently in competition with the West in all three
domains and have the capability to constantly claim increased control over more geographic
areas.
In particular, due to an occurrence of sudden acceleration following the American
engagement in Iraq, one of the major comparative advantages of Western powers - military
power - has been strongly depreciated as the result of the serious difficulties experienced in
the achievement of the desired strategic and political results. These nations have thus
progressively lost deterrence, persuasion and coercion capabilities. The image of Western
powers in the world has accordingly been devaluated as much. The capability of major
powers and international organisations to impose a world order has been strongly degraded.
Downstream, the degradation of military power resulted in the “devaluation” of Western
values, since these values depend upon power capable of upholding them. In addition, as
already noticeable in the discourse of the highest American authorities, the United States of
America will suffer from the Iraqi-Afghan syndrome for a long time in the same manner it
suffered in the past from the Vietnam syndrome. Barring a miracle, the conditions to exit the
Afghan conflict are going to lead to adoption of far less interventionist postures which
moreover correspond with the evolution of mentalities in the American population.
Finally, due to irrefutable demographic logics, the natural bond between the United States of
America and Europe will become weaker: In 2040, Americans of European origin will be in
the minority and the United States of America will turn more positively towards its South and
West, with only a marginal interest for old Europe. Under these circumstances, the issue is
clearly raised as to the world organisation that will emerge in the second decade of this
century, since no power is likely to be in a position to impose leadership at world level. Will
there be a new distribution of influence and security areas by consensus between major
powers, with each enforcing order and spreading own values? Will the highly probable
weakening of the transatlantic bond leave Europe in a position of alarming political and
military weakness if it fails to get organised and to timely acquire the means to establish itself
as a “European power”, and as one of the major stakeholders in the world in on-going
crystallisation?
The strategic thinking of others
How do China, India and Russia analyse the world? What are their priorities and their
concerns? To what extent do their visions differ, on the one hand, from the Western strategic
approach and on the other, from the French approach? We regard these questions as
mandatory preliminaries not to be mistaken about the world. By taking the vision of others
into account, one is in a position to understand what is conveniently called the number one
“geopolitical project” of the States which combines strategic intention with interests beyond
the sphere of close vicinity. It is also acknowledging that our vision is based, in the best case,
on a strategic projection mainly inspired by American thinking, since the capability of the
United States of America to place States in the hierarchy according to its interests (emerging
power, emerged power, key stakeholder...) still holds true. But it only takes comparing
Western visions with the real projects undertaken by the States concerned, for a more realistic
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picture of the international situation to emerge. It then becomes obvious that the new
stakeholders, while acting according to their State interests, know how to analyse the state of
the world which is no longer binary, as typically and continuously represented by Westerners,
but more complex and more subtle. The key word is “interaction”: Taking advantage of the
strength of others. “In China, everything takes place only between opposites, interacting with
one another, and forming poles”. The Chinese way, as described by François Jullien,
expresses the strategy of the new stakeholders, who adhere to our visions and partnership
proposals strictly as far as, and for the duration of, the convergences offered. But they will
never claim to be “Westerners”, in spite of appearances of new modes of consumption. And
in their discourse, loaded with a long history, the East, the Orient or the South are
representations with which they fully identify. Distinction is always made from the West,
“the West” being an expression frequently used in these countries. Their economic growth,
based on the necessary access to Western markets and investments, provides the means for
great emancipation. We must therefore get used to this, in a clear-sighted manner, by clearing
up misunderstandings.
Impact of political realignments in the Arab/Muslim world
In the last number of years, several strategic realignments have affected the “close foreigner”
of the European Union, in this case the South-East Mediterranean region and beyond it, the
Arab/Muslim world. The following have been observed in succession: A) An increase in
importance of non-Arab Muslim foreign policies (Iran, Turkey, but also further away,
Pakistan) to the detriment of traditional Arab powers (Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Iraq). B) Failure
to propose conflict resolutions in this area by both Western external powers (United States of
America, European Union) and regional initiatives (Arab League, Saudi Arabia). C) Finally,
a triple deadlock (political, economic and social) in the countries in the region, led to an
uprising of the people which spread to (almost) all of the rest of the Arab world, while giving
new life to the Iranian protest. This “revenge of the societies” raises several questions, which
must be addressed in a forthcoming research agenda:
What is the nature of the various on-going insurrectional processes (sociological,
economic, political...)? What triggered the respective outbreaks (balance of power
between armed forces and police? Longevity and legitimacy of the regime? Extent of
the mobilisation and organisation of crowds? ...)?
What are the parameters on which the positive or negative evolution of these processes
for France and Europe will depend? Maintenance of current relations between some
of these countries on the one hand, and Europe and the United States of America on
the other? Maintenance of the engagement of some of these countries in the peace
process with Israel and the anti-terrorism fight? Factors of a rather internal nature
(construction of a viable democracy)?
What are in fact the priority expectations of Europe from these processes: A
democratisation/liberalisation of the countries concerned? An evolution of their
foreign policies in a direction more favourable to Europe and its allies? A better
economic governance of societies?
What issues will inevitably be affected by these realignments, and in what way: Will
the Israeli-Palestinian issue resurge strongly, driven by firmer Arab foreign policies in
the aftermath of the recent protest movement of the people? Will the energy issue also
be more firmly controlled for the sake of national interests, or in a more pragmatic
way, by less state control inclined regimes? Will the Union for the Mediterranean be
boosted by this process, or conversely be buried by new regimes wishing to
renegotiate?
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What are the main unknown parameters in the present processes? At least four emerge. Will
the role and influence of the United States of America in the region be strengthened,
benefiting from President Obama’s “image effect”, or conversely be reduced as new regimes
are under street pressure to adopt a less conciliatory posture towards the “West” than their
predecessors? Will protest and radical non governmental movements (Hamas, Hezbollah)
emerge diminished from these processes in which they were not involved, or will they
capitalise on their organisational advantage, in a new dispensation presently without
structured leadership? Will Arab foreign policies regain initiative, especially regarding
Turkey and Iran? How will political realignments between Arab regimes take place?
Presently, Saudi Arabia appears to be the main supporter of “reaction”, and Egypt to be the
spearhead of transformation: How will others position themselves?
Chinese risk as understood in the duality of the term
To what extent is China a threat to the West, or to countries in the region? To what extent is
China threatened by internal tensions likely to extensively destabilise the country/the
economy/the region? The emergence of the People’s Republic of China clearly appears to be
irreversible. This impression is reinforced by the financial and economic crisis which has
particularly affected the Western world and developed countries, but also by the advances
made by the PRC well beyond its traditional zones of influence, from Africa to Latin America
through Central Asia and Eastern Europe. Beijing could take advantage of States with
bankrupt or weakened institutions and export a “Beijing model” which is a potential factor for
crises as demonstrated by the events in the Arab world.
The PRC, in its area, to ensure its image of power, benefits from the juxtaposition of a growth
rate of an emerging country, vital for maintaining political stability, and from that of a mature
Japanese power, of a less impressive nature. The gap between the two performances
reinforces the image of a reversal of the fundamental balances in Asia while contributing to
the re-emergence of contingency strategies of Chinese power which causes concern due to a
lack of real integration into the world system and of adherence to the principles governing it.
In view of these developments, three sets of questions must be asked to allow for a better
understanding of the factors of evolution of the external strategy of Chinese power. These
questions are about:
the tools of Chinese power and their evaluation;
the influence of the specificities of the political system and its permanent features in
the definition of the PRC foreign strategy, beyond the developments stemming from
the reform policy, and the unavoidable prospects of political transition;
the evaluation of the reality of the Chinese threat or of the “Chinese uncertainty
factor”. This unknown factor affects both the strategic priorities of the neighbours of
Beijing in the broad sense of the term (and indirectly the definition of our own Asian
policy), and finally major global equilibriums due to the power multiplier given by the
PRC status as a permanent member of the Security Council.
The future of the world nuclear equation in question
The future of the world nuclear equation must be addressed in its two dimensions:
Proliferation dynamics on the one hand, future of deterrence and disarmament dynamics on
the other. For a long time the defence world has been the bridge of a balance between
maintaining a credible deterrence adapted to the status of the threat and the willingness for
disarmament, in a context of general and total disarmament. The modernisation of arsenals,
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both in the offensive and the defensive domains, and the willingness of some countries to be -
a minima - at the nuclear threshold, leads France to constantly reassess its deterrence posture.
A nuclear Iran, beyond only the consideration of regional destabilisation, could only result in
other stakeholders following suit. In addition, on another level, the Japanese crisis is shaking
the civilian nuclear energy community, with some even proposing to do away with nuclear
energy. The temptation to mix civilian and military nuclear energy becomes very strong. The
real challenge henceforth is to have a fair and balanced debate as to the impact of the first on
the second. From these elements, several questions can be asked, which can structure a
research agenda:
Is French nuclear deterrence still adapted to the future financial and political
constraints? France is preparing for the replacement of the sea and air deterrence
components. In the present financial context however, would a study of the ratio of
cost versus adaptation to threat, not be warranted? Retaining both components can
indeed be debated. Notwithstanding, it is clear that political power must benefit from
all the options in the use of resources.
Do the return of France to NATO, the American statements on Global Zero, the
antagonism of some of our European partners (in particular Germany) towards nuclear
military energy (all in the backdrop of growing opposition in public opinion towards
civilian nuclear energy in the aftermath of the Japanese accident) not constitute a body
of factors which is making contemporary France, given its stance, a “nuclear isolate”?
What is the real future of proliferation elsewhere? Recent work (notably by Benoît
Pélopidas) underlines the fact that the proliferation paradigm is far from being a
reality: The interest for a State to acquire nuclear weapons is neither inevitable nor
necessarily prevalent. What factors are in favour of arguing for the acquisition of
nuclear weapons in the world today, what are those that conversely are for negotiating
to abandon this ambition, to gain a certain number of advantages, one of which is
reintegration into the international community?
The National context: The conditions of French power
Three years ago, the White Paper on French security policy decided on the implementation of
several important changes in the French strategic posture. The General Review of Public
Policies, conducted simultaneously, represented another factor of change. In view of these
decisions and of the new developments in the international context, the group is proposing
that the three following domains be retained as priority items for studies:
What are the “untouchables” of French power?
The issue of the “untouchables of French power”, implies defining the terms (“untouchable”
and “power”), as interpreted from the French point of view. The notion of “untouchable
components” refers to several facets: The capability of public opinion and of the elite to
accept a possible evolution in doctrines; the capability of the country to adapt its ambitions
and instruments of action to the constraints of resources without challenging an ambition of
retaining minimal power. The second notion, that of power, can be divided into several
questions: How does France define the type of power it wants and what is the desired
threshold? This definition must include both intensity and direction. What is the power
threshold and what type of power is involved? Is France a major military and diplomatic
power; a medium military and cultural power but a major economic and diplomatic power? Is
this power supposed to be exercised only at national level, or within a membership group (the
European Union), or in an alliance (NATO), or more broadly, within the international
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community, a vision which would favour the “influence” component, notably at the UNO?
By combining these various points, it is appropriate to contemplate the elements which appear
to be the most “sacrosanct”, both because challenging these would be accepted with great
difficulty and because it would undermine the security of the country and its vital interests.
While only an in-depth study (especially a study of public opinion and the elite) would allow
for answering these questions, several key notions are at the centre of the questioning:
• Nuclear weapons: What part does the possession of nuclear weapons play in the
international recognition of France (which ensures a permanent seat at the UNO)?
Does deterrence capability always guarantee autonomy of decision and intervention in
an international system characterised by asymmetry and complex interdependence? Is
the sanctuarization of the credits allocated to nuclear deterrence still part of deterrence
credibility? While the importance of nuclear deterrence regarding these questions
seems to have decreased a lot in objective terms during the last few years, does it not
remain unchanged at a symbolic level? Yet, while deterrence capability is
“untouchable” in the public debate, is its modernization envisaged?
• European and Atlantic solidarity: Is this solidarity seen as a power multiplier by the
elite and in public opinion in France or as a constraint? In the considerations
regarding national security, must distinction be made between European solidarity and
Atlantic solidarity? Are the present institutions (EU, NATO) perceived to be adapted
to the forthcoming strategic challenges? In other words, would withdrawing from one
of these two solidarities, or would a decision made between them by arbitration, be
accepted?
• Overseas territories: Is the possession (and the administration) of remote and
scattered overseas territories a factor of power/influence, or a strategic burden? Is it
possible to Europeanise this control, while retaining the strategic advantage? Is
France prepared to mobilise in the event of a threat against its overseas possessions,
and to what extent?
• The French-speaking world: Is the defence of the French-speaking world perceived
as contributing to French power? Will the abandonment of a French-speaking world
policy, or the decline of this French-speaking world in the wider world, be perceived
as hazardous? Is there a link between a French-speaking world and power? Has this
link, for example, an impact on the attachment of public opinion and of the elite to
retain the specificity of the French external action in Sub Saharan Africa and in the
Mediterranean Basin?
Assessment of the adaptation of our defence tool
The French defence tool remains an instrument of interstate war designed for the European
theatre and has partially been transformed, since the beginning of the nineties, to meet the
requirements of power projection. Implemented within the framework of the “peace
dividends”, this transformation consisted mainly in preserving, to the greatest possible extent,
the major industrial programmes from the cold war while entirely professionalizing the
personnel.
What is the outcome of the reforms undertaken, notably since the White Paper of 2008? What
are the gaps? What adaptations are necessary with regard to the new geopolitical
developments? What would the military tool best adapted to a post-Afghanistan world be?
What is the present cost/effectiveness ratio of the reform of the French Armed Forces? The
underestimation of the costs of professionalization and of the most modern equipments did
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not allow for safeguarding all the capabilities, especially those of the tactical and strategic
transport of forces. The tactical gains achieved through increased skills and availability of
professional soldiers were first offset by a “fracture” of the equipments, split between ageing
equipments with extended lifespan and modern equipments with delayed commissioning.
The maintenance cost of the equipment increased significantly, contributing to increased
budgetary problems, without necessarily avoiding a general reduction of availability rates. It
turns out that the French Armed Forces of 1990 would certainly have defeated those of 2010,
should there have been a confrontation between the two. Apart from very high-performance
equipments, the French defence tool indeed shows gaps, partially compensated for by action
in coalition and, most often, by American support. The price to pay for these contributions
from the Allies is, however, a collective decision process, slower than the national process
and the obligation, under the guise of interoperability, to conform to the processes and then to
the strategy, of the most powerful ally.
The priority given to projection, since the White Paper of 1994, has permitted to have real
capabilities in respect of stabilisation operations (that is to say operations without an enemy).
The French Armed Forces, and more particularly the Army, have on the other hand been
downgraded in respect of war operations. One can indeed legitimately wonder against which
adversary, whether it be a State or not, we would be able to prevail on our own.
Critical analysis of the formatting model of the French Armed Forces and avenue for the necessary
evolutions
The purpose of the military tool is to conduct war missions against political structures,
whether States or not, or stabilisation missions, that is to say missions without an enemy and
therefore without a dialectic process. In this respect, the definition of the operational contract
of the Armed Forces in terms of the force volume to be projected is very limiting and
encourages mere renewal of the existing force model, with an update in the figures according
to budgetary constraints.
Without abandoning this modus operandi, it appears necessary to supplement it by returning
to the force utilisation scenarios method in order to face different types of enemy or to cope
with certain missions. Each scenario will have to state qualitatively the required resources
and skills, and possibly the quick acquisition and development methods thereof. The
scenarios will have to take into account the nature of the French strategic insularity by
describing strategic projection capabilities and theatre action capabilities. The major positive
factors which will allow for facing the unexpected are the intrinsic technical and tactical
versatility of the forces, but also the capability to very quickly mobilise available industrial,
human and scientific resources in French society.
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SECTION II: SOCIETAL AND SOCIAL RISKS AND ASSETS, COHESION AND
SUSTAINABILITY
Vice-President: Rémy Pautrat
Editorial Members: Pascal André, SNCF; Christian Harbulot, EGE; Sébastien Laurent, Univ. Bordeaux; Isabelle Guion de
Meritens, GDD des Yvelines; Frédéric Ocqueteau, CNRS/Cesdip; Claude Riveline, Ecole des Mines de Paris;
Vivianne Seigneur.
Members: Laetitia Atlani-Duault, Univ. Paris X; Frank Bournois, Univ. de Paris II; Philippe Caduc, ADIT; Philippe
Combessie, Univ. de Paris VIII; Eric Delbecque, INHESJ; Farhad Khosrokhovar, EHESS; François Thual, Senate; Michel
Wieviorka, MSH.
Identification and stimulation of vitality and social performance processes
The elephant and the street lamp: What every one of us senses and what yet eludes everybody
What allows for the “building of a society”? What allows for “holding it together”, for living
and for better living together? This might be termed social cohesion. We will clarify and
modulate this term later. This social cohesion seems to be the obvious core and key of
politics, but is obviously as difficult to define as the elephant in the parable, palpated by
different people in the dark who can each distinctively feel a part of it but who cannot
understand the whole, just like the key relentlessly looked for under the street lamp, at the
place which has the advantage of being lit and marked, but which is not the place where the
key is.
The purpose of the report in our section is to show that to highlight social cohesion is of
strategic importance. We give to “highlight” an instrumental meaning which is to better shed
light on a problem to guide action more effectively, as well as, most importantly, to give a
teleological intention which is to redirect attention in order to refocus the objectives of the
action. The idea here is not to embrace an interrogation which includes all the aspects of
social and political sciences, but to prepare the ground for a strategic use of knowledge and
know-how. We will give some preliminary indications of the multiple ways in which social
cohesion is made visible.
In a climate of competition for positions, of fear of demotion, of changes in unifying values
and logics of belonging, many parents, primarily those with the social and economic capital to
do so, embark on strategies to choose the school their children will attend, to protect them
from an environment deemed harmful, to allow them to benefit from conditions more
conducive to success. When aggregated, these individual choices heavily influence and shape
the social landscape.
In a society in a permanent state of symbolic, economic and demographic tensions, the
promotion and protection of diversity automatically highlight the frictions and uncertainties
about the norm, about the relationship between the individual and the collective, about the
universality of the principles assumed by the society, about the very legitimacy of these
references.
In a context of increased contractualization in occupational and commercial relations where
partners and users become clients, in a context where individual desires are the compass for
the production of goods and services, the delivery of an egalitarian service to the whole
population has become a tough, and for many front line stakeholders, an exhausting exercise
because it is silently deprived of meaning.
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In our section we thus propose to affirm, as a major strategic axis, the renewal of an active
socio-economic fabric and of territories that are alive in a context of globalisation of the
market economy for goods and services. This axis of new strategic research should curb the
increase in policies centred on employment and not on work, downsize a centralising
administration of public action, prevent disjunction between consumption logics and
employment logics, reduce the widening of the social gap between the prescribing elite and
the rest of the population. Regarding the question of the norms of public and private security,
Section II of the Scientific Council of the CSFRS therefore replies that the solution to social
and societal risks resides in systems based on strong cohesion, in promotion of a model of
society where the factors of vivacity are not based on a backward-looking perception of
“quality of life”, but on a return to a collective commitment to a desired, secured and dynamic
living-together.
The (over) cautious building of a common political future
Without enumerating factors which are all worthy of questioning and for which an inventory
is not enough at this stage to establish common goals, we are interested in:
o the desire and the ability to live together according to a globally shared set of values,
references and behavioural norms; the confidence in the recourse and the assistance an
individual can find through the other members of the collectivity;
o the sense and desire of belonging to a collectivity, the sense of solidarity in terms of a
political future; the capacity to make coexist, and to regulate, in an accepted common
framework and according to common rules, a diversity of interests, aspirations and
references; the modes of belonging and the social structures favouring the expression of
freedom in the journey of the individual;
o the link between different, intersecting or tiered levels of personal belonging felt for them
to be globally consistent with belonging to the encompassing political entity (in particular
at national level); the link between specific belonging and universality of status.
But also:
o the feeling of responsibility, the desire and capability to act for the collectivity, capability
to see acceptance and acknowledgement of one’s contribution; the feeling and the
effectiveness of reciprocity in interactions;
o the capability to act together, to manage and regulate together, with own resources,
incidents, disagreements, diverging interests; having a set of shared and compatible scales
of values for action;
o the capability to promote the interests and values of the collectivity, to act on behalf of the
collectivity; the capability to act for sustainability of the collectivity, including through its
evolutions.
What we therefore understand by social cohesion includes as much symbolic as practical
aspects, aspects which are strongly coupled, where the manner of positioning oneself and
being in and through a group, as much as that of acting in and for this group, are at stake.
Social cohesion, which will sometimes be more meaningfully called “social vitality”, is a
measure of the trust in the public space and of the agility of the capability to act in this
common space. A society which cannot act, cannot have self-confidence; on the other hand,
without confidence, action is hindered.
We intend to keep our reflection as far from vapidity as from metaphysics: Making the fabric
of the conjunctive forces holding society the matter and purpose of strategic efforts is neither
the source of development of an additional touch of humanity nor that for first truths or last
finalities. Conversely, it is a matter of looking into dilapidated staircases, counters where
tensions exist, busses and schools, dynamic workshops and dynamic associations, and also
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into fears and energies, into the depth of the civility and the life skills that make every day
bearable, into the recesses of a shared space, into the frustrations and aspirations which are the
breath of a democratic nation.
The convictions which support our analyses are as follows:
Cohesion and social vitality are of a strategic nature.
These notions seem to represent fundamental conditions for:
o legitimacy and therefore institutional stability;
o political influence and economic dynamism, capability of attracting resources and
exporting values and goods;
o resistance to exogenous or endogenous destabilising forces, both deliberate
destabilisation (terrorism, corruption, etc.) and “automatic” weakening (economic
globalisation, relocation of production, accelerated renewal of symbolic references...);
o resilience in the face of crises.
The idea that emerges here is that a static dimension of this cohesion, expressing the welfare
of the members and their inclusion in society, constitutes the base of a dynamic dimension of
this cohesion, made up of vitality, resilience and collective performance, expressing the
capability of the society to adapt and learn, to face stress and external disturbances of
political, social, economic or environmental nature and to know how to benefit therefrom.
The social bond transforms a population in a territory into a social group. It is the support for
both sharing of common values and citizenship, and it is maintained thereby. The erosion of
the social bond constitutes a major risk in terms of security.
It is at this level that strategic challenges are at stake, and not from a position of lookout for
“social and societal risks” whereby political strategy is confused with a form of anxious
seismology responsible for detecting eruptions and tremors, while the appropriate strategy
would consist in assuming the role of directly acting on the social tectonics.
A slow, inexpressible and usual erosion of the living-together
Social vitality and performance are mostly only seen negatively, through signs of friction or
signs of rupture, through visible manifestations of separation, through disassociation and
through the violations of codified norms (notably of the law). Both public debate and public
action institutions are thus structured by symptomatic interpretation which obscures the very
nature of social health and the systems governing its equilibriums, or those of the syndromes
affecting social health. When a disease is confused with its symptoms, the origin of the
disease is obscured. We thus think that politics is currently like medicine not knowing how to
diagnose the health status of the patient.
Considerable efforts in the country are therefore entirely mobilised in the chain dealing with
the processing of offences, with their perpetrators (prevention, detection, repression,
judgment, sanction), with their direct consequences (insurance, care, compensation), and with
the various levels of generation of discourse inspired thereby (political, scientific,
institutional, media). Yet most of the difficulties experienced in living together by many
citizens are found elsewhere, in their daily and normal interactions. It is also true that a part
of the national effort is focused on employment, needs, restraints and injustices, and chiefly
on job loss and its direct consequences, the systems of compensation, the systems of support
or of curbing the fluctuations of employment. Yet what is fundamental is not a work contract
(a large part of society could be supported even if not working) but what work represents as a
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process of socialisation, of building of oneself and of collectivities, of establishing individuals
as stakeholders, of providing a base for anchoring oneself in traditions and for projecting
oneself into a future. In these two examples, the efforts, all legitimate and necessary, are
more focused on the defect than on the bond; on the employment and not on the activity.
“What makes a society”, this conjunctive fabric, contrary to the symptoms its weaknesses
produce, is therefore nobody’s problem. Notwithstanding recurring evocations of laments on
the malfunctions of society and permanent invocation of words for mobilisation, social
cohesion is not in concrete terms the subject of work, debate or negotiation, it is not an object
of investigation as such, it does not give rise to any objectivization, nor is it an objective for
action.
France shows signs of vitality
Social vitality is stronger than it seems but it is not a spontaneous fact: It must be built,
maintained and developed. Our proposition is a counterpoint to the present discourse on the
exhaustion and crisis of the French Republican idea, discourse that leads to forget the fact that
for two centuries, the Republican regime has devised a certain conception of the manner in
which sociability can be created.
Indeed, the Republican ideological project has since the 19th century been bringing unique
ideas on the matter, and also concrete accomplishments in order to build the willingness to
live collectively. The free, non-denominational and compulsory school system and the
military service have been part of this spirit, but also the non-denominational youth clubs,
associations of conscripts and people from the same region and the French Republican
celebrations. By granting the right of association in 1901, the authorities intended at the same
time to show that sociabilities and social cohesion were not only dependent on initiatives and
frameworks provided by the State. We can ask ourselves what remains today of these great
Republican institutions, but we observe that the capability of individuals and parts of society
to create social bonding is still alive, which may already be sufficient to moderate pessimism
and declinism. France shows obvious signs of vitality.
The magnitude of volunteer work, the generosity of donations to medical and humanitarian
causes and the growing number of associations all attest to this vitality. The original great
ideological and political ideals are no longer found in the above, but an aspiration to get over
the contemporary form of individualism, that is, over narcissism, remains. These examples of
vitality of both association networks and artistic and cultural production must not be
interpreted only as the result of democratisation of leisure, but also as the power of a society
to give to a growing number of its members plenty of time to “do democracy”. The aspiration
to be useful to the community and to have a sense of non individualism in one’s actions is
very strong, including (and maybe mainly) in a society of individuals.
More generally, and concomitantly with real processes of individualisation and of weakening
of generational integration, we acknowledge that rituals and, in particular, the need for rituals
are very strong. The fact that certain domains of values and ritualization are dominated
(subverted and perhaps perverted) by commercial activity and that the entertainment industry
seems to dominate the creation of unifying totems, in fact show the strength of the need for
affiliation, belonging to a community and shared references.
While some social relations have clearly become tougher - and above all more complex -
patient observation of collective spaces shows (not a contrario but at the same time) that there
is constant proliferation of daily civility, invisible but dynamically active. These spaces are
places of regulation at micro-level, of adjustment competencies and adaptation of individuals,
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a "bond" essential for the real functioning of public life in the street, public transport, service
spaces...
It is also in the interfaces that the forces of pressure and internal cohesion can best be seen:
The unique appeal of France as a tourist or occupational expatriation destination is as much a
strategic advantage to be developed as it is an indication of the fertility and depth of the
cultural nurturing, of a way of life much more intense than a mere “relaxed pace”, of a quality
of social life (urban and rural) not reduced to the picturesque (despite not even always
knowing how to be welcoming...).
By detaching from “symptomatic” interpretations focused on problems and regressions, it is
urgent to refocus on an all-encompassing health which will again reveal the vitality, the
strength, the potential for regeneration and evolution... of the social. “What works” can then
be studied based on the conviction that what works, in terms of public peace of mind,
collective resilience, power strategy, capability for adaptation and innovation, requires that
the human being be the subject. On the other hand, rising above the “functionalism” that
divides public life into organs whose actions often become their own ends, this focus fully
integrates the symbolic dimension and provides a common orientation to the various actions
around their real political finality. In this sense, working on social cohesion makes it possible
to federate efforts towards clarified ends.
Exiting social patterns
Several dead ends are evident and it is perhaps in the capability of avoiding them that the
greatest part of the tactical challenges of this strategic axis will lie. Stating the necessity of
reinforcing “social performance” will hardly be questioned. Declaring that this objective
must come first, and that entire sections of public action should be modelled on it, has serious
and less comfortable consequences. But the real challenges of the redefinition of objectives,
as often, are found in the path that must be opened.
Defining and measuring good social health, stating the components of social cohesion and
vitality, can lead to a major methodological trap. Health is firstly the silence of organs, pain
is indeed a vital alert, and furthermore many moments of pain are stages necessary to achieve
perfect health. In other words, a “social ataraxy” would not only be impossible to define (due
to lack of signals) but on top of that, very remote from what characterises a living and
dynamic society.
Focusing on vitality and social performance is a product of a great reversal in relation to the
French centralist and technocratic tropism: The shape taken by social health, in the street and
in families, at the workplace, in services, is first defined locally. Its capability to act, the
focus of its activity, the strength of integration and emancipation of its affiliations is more
defined and prepared by stakeholders themselves, through their perceptions and
representations than through their practices. The path does not therefore begin by defining the
objectives and the scales of values in a centralised manner, remote and out of touch with
grass-root realities.
In this regard, this bottom-up approach is a negotiated joint construction that is about
finalities, responsibilities and customs. It therefore clearly differs from the tools of
“consultation” whose sometimes compulsive use, in public actions and in internal interactions
in companies, proves to only facilitate top-down policies that do not permit real ownership by
the in situ stakeholders. The issue is therefore not to “reinvent” consultation (or participation)
but to guard against its erring ways. The creation of virtuous dynamics for the Nation cannot
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work with groups artificially created by central bodies, but in a territory-based action by
networks and stakeholders committed to their local realities.
One of the gaps that is the most serious and lasting obstacle to this possibility of reversal is
what strikes us as a serious level of illiteracy in social sciences among managers in the public
as well as in the private sector. Political and business management skills are mainly based on
administrative, budgetary and technical expertise. Human resources management is to a very
large extent based on self training, supplemented by, in the higher levels of the hierarchy,
some tools and training based on an extremely poor conceptual framework whose often
sterile, sometimes toxic oversimplification, precisely obscures the psychological and
sociological depth of individuals and collectivities.
A first benefit of the necessary rebalancing of the training contents and the selection criteria
of managers would be a promotion of medium and long term political objectives, that is to say
the timeframe par excellence of social issues. This need constantly comes up against the
hiatus between the timeframe necessary for public action and the political timeframe
influenced by democratic systems that today do not operate in impressive logics but in the
panic of the pack; the heterogeneous logics of the big media, of the social network and of the
next election day. In this respect, the present development of a compassionate State is not a
solution either, because the will to deal with the short term, whatever the nature of the crisis
might be, by making collective passions a criterion for public action, reduces the assessment
capabilities based on objective criteria, curbs the reflection and the necessity to identify
strategic axes of action. It is thus necessary for the political authority to realize that by not
trying to firmly include its action as part of the long-term prospects of social cohesion, it risks
facing a multiplication of social crises or situations of necrosis affecting parts of the society,
like a health policy that would have developed only the resources and reactions of the
emergency services.
Global challenges do not necessarily call for global answers
It is not easy to outline, based on such an assessment, a public security policy, when facing
vague, elusive and sometimes extremely violent distortions whose instantaneous perception
by a hyper present social network can lead to think that we are still dealing with a “global”
phenomenon. Talking about “internal security” has little meaning when the mere evocation
of the idea of border seems to label its proponent as biased in favour of a reactionary attitude.
But speaking of “global security” raises another eyebrow, fuels another suspicion: Is the
proponent suggesting that the threat is everywhere and that the response should be of an
immediate, instantaneous and panoptical nature? It is urgent to question the verbalisation, the
language we use to describe security risks, frames of reference and public security norms. In
this respect, the use of the term “global” is ambiguous for defining a security frame of
reference, because the (alleged) entirety of the challenges must under no circumstances
suggest the “panoptical” entirety of the responses. Similarly, the idea of a Defence and
security continuum, while well suited to the communication of the defence industries to the
market rating agencies, can lead the public to think that there is a merger of both domains,
which does not correspond to reality and can conversely promote investment logics on ill-
conceived engagement escalations. The protection of civil society must first be achieved by a
strategy of societal cohesion, and not by a strategy of transfer of the means of control reserved
for armed conflicts to civil society.
An over encompassing frame of reference, a factor of causal ambiguity, that can suggest that a
fundamental concept of democratic societies has been made a commercial brand, can
engender within the nation “men of resentment” and fuel an ill-considered mistrust towards
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the State. In this respect, the concept of “global security” could have given the impression of
diluting the borders instituted within a legally constituted State, between State, private, and
police and military domains. It is henceforth important to understand up to where “the open
social order” (depicted by North, Wallis et Weingast), supposed to have underpinned and
developed our democratic societies much more significantly than the so-called capitalist
economic progress, is today on the verge of being deeply destabilised in its foundations.
Similarly, great caution is called for regarding a possible confusion between ends and means,
in the use of concepts such as the public and private joint construction of security policies,
and the precautionary principle, that can be diverted for a purpose of unfair competition,
exclusion of candidates, forbidding occupational groups access to markets, under a principle
of “safeguard”, of “immediate safety”, of “detection” of a hygiene, security and public health
hazard.
Regenerating critical research and public debate
It is important to reflect on the boundaries of the human and exact sciences disciplines used in
the study of security and criminality events. In this respect, the examination must be
undertaken a priori in respect of epistemological approaches which were the origins of the
disciplines of the sciences of crime in Europe. Thus, constructivism, behavioural
psychosociology, sociology of deviance, and the scientific instrumentations thereof, must
always be used as references for possible redefinitions of the field of knowledge. The
understanding of phenomena leading to an improved level of security of people and goods
supported by better protection of the fundamental freedoms of all, should not be based on
fragmented knowledge, with parts falling outside transparent and critical scientific
knowledge. The processes and contradictory debates on ways to achieve inseparable
interactions between the fields of study of crime and that of control of crime must be re-
established. The pragmatism and the immediacy of the responses of State and market to
threats and risks, however legitimate the empirical responses might be, must not leave the
door open to only short-term expert and evaluation processes without any real possibility of
parliamentary, citizen and/or academic control.
Welfare is a neglected strategic lever
In a society where interconnectivity is no longer the prerogative of a social and occupational
group, of a club or a minority, the problem of public security cannot be addressed in a static
manner by protecting the impermeability of “slices” of society, but must indeed ensure a
social performance that erases compartmentalisation. The measure of social performance is
not, for all that, a straightforward sum of the parts; the common good is not built by adding up
individual interests. The notion of common good is generally not part of the measures; it is,
however, the social “strategic” reserve. Similarly, the stimulation of ethical social dynamics
is built on positive sociabilities, decision capabilities, trust, etc; and these elements draw
strength from the common good.
However, the development of studies whereby indexes are proposed that include subjects
ranging from “quality of life” to “environmental sustainability”, suggests more important
avenues: For example, the Human Development Index, the Index for Social Health or also the
Adjusted Net Savings. For all that, all these indexes present the same difficulty: Which index
can claim to represent the “welfare” of a population? This measurement is not independent of
a certain implicit vision of the world. A takeover by experts with a battery of indexes where
the question of our choice of society would be banished from "what really counts", is not an
answer. A consultation based on the realities in the field is democratically and scientifically
indispensable here.
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Nothing is possible without real decentralisation
For all that, the issue here is not to “reinvent” consultation (or participation) but to guard
against its erring ways. The creation of ethical dynamics for the Nation cannot function with
groups artificially put together by authorities in Paris, but in a decentralised action of
networks and stakeholders in touch with local realities.
France is the European nation with the most centralised power, while the solutions to
problems are increasingly local and the skills in the regions are increasingly in abundant
supply. We therefore need to decentralise. But the ways things have been done for centuries
cannot be easily corrected, all the more because this centralisation has beneficial aspects,
especially in maintaining the equality of access to public services. The model of access to
higher education, including to our Grandes Ecoles, is a French achievement to be proud of
collectively. And at a time of a disturbing growth of populist, or even explicitly xenophobic
parties in most democracies, in Sweden and in the United States of America with the Tea
Party; the importance of this model and the fundamental differences with the Anglo-Saxon
model, must be reaffirmed.
One must translate the excessive return of centralisation in the daily life of French people, in
the evaluation of research policies and in a mode of government that makes laws in a somatic
and rushed manner, not as a reaffirmation of a French style sovereignty, but indeed as a
symptom of its failure. Two notions of the sovereign Good are indeed clashing. One,
inherited from the French Revolution, places the unity of mankind, founded on the reign of
Reason, unique and universal in nature, above all. In this respect, collective life should
distinguish between the public space, where everybody is governed by the same rules, and the
private space where each individual lives as he pleases. The other school of thought, more
prevalent in the Anglo-Saxon world, puts the emphasis on individual liberties, and
encourages, in this regard, public affirmation of diverse cultural identities, which coexist as
the result of respect for a minimum of common rulesix. This is the fundamental difference
between the Anglo-Saxon equity and the French equality. The notion of multiculturalism,
which refers to Anglo-Saxon doctrine, makes trivial for the English people (who accept very
well the visible coexistence of diverse cultures) what is agitating many French people. The
Republican egalitarianism was therefore a nice dream of the Members of the Constituent
Assembly of 1789, shattered by daily ostracism, discrimination, inequality of opportunities;
but the multiculturalist solution is not more satisfactory because the Anglo-Saxon solution is
that of “instituted walls”, of legalised indifference, of the ghetto made commonplace where
the “equitable” model imposes iron rule; that of contentment with minimum participation in
society. The merits of decentralisation must therefore be reaffirmed loud and clear; also the
urgency to return to mayors and members of local government the desire and pride to take
charge of their future, in understanding what forges French culture and institutions.
Decentralisation is a realistic approach to take advantage of the wealth of French social and
societal assets. Social dynamics function with human complexities, largely ignored by the
leaders because they are informal, involve associative aspects, are out of the commercial
system or are also of an unusual nature. “Literacy” of human sciences leaders would
undoubtedly facilitate better integration of the space-time of social issues with promotion of
medium to long term social and societal objectives or aims, that is to say the time par
excellence of social issues. And this time is often subjected to the constraints of political time
influenced by democracy governed by opinion polls and the iron rule of re-election.
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Questioning power from the perspective of the model of society
In conclusion, we consider it useful to re-establish, in a historical and geopolitical context, the
link between a model of society and power, to shed light on our development of social
cohesion and vitality as national strategic challenges. Military power is no longer sufficient to
guarantee the permanence of a model of society both externally and internally. In other
words, the study of power involves reassessment of its transformation, in the way in which it
is experienced by citizens as a factor of integrity and stability, and by countries that
implement power or are subjected to it.
The study of power, strongly based on the expression of military force, went through an
evolution based on competition between models of society during the cold war. The United
States of America won this competition by becoming the leader in globalisation through a
certain type of standardisation of commercial practices, systems of mass consumption,
educational practices and structuring of the information society through the Internet.
This model of power is today confronted by the collapse of its appeal capability. In addition
to a financial crisis, the subprime crisis is a crisis of models of life or society. The American
political power tried to artificially preserve access to property by underprivileged citizens of
the country. The industrial decline in the Western world is having consequences on the
societal equilibrium of the North-American world. The poverty in the ghettos and the state of
survival of some of the unemployed in the heart of the industrial ruins like in Detroit, stands
alongside the world of interconnected people and minorities enriched during the last decades.
And this progressive fragmentation of the American society is spreading to the other side of
the Atlantic and irradiates European societies. This model stopped making sense once the
disconnection between market and societal performance became structural, and inseparable
from its sustainability. From a model used as a lever for conquest, influence and for swinging
West Africa to an Anglo-Saxon logic, we moved to an era of the model which is senseless,
without an owner, booed and regretted by its formerly most enthusiastic supporters. Dryness
of thoughts and ideological vacuums fuel revolutions, are levers for protest, while societies
who did not know how to defend their original “way of life” are struggling to reconcile a
failed imported model with a growing accumulation of their sovereign debt.
Preservation of independence versus enhancement of power
French thinking in respect of power is the result of a historical progression, proven to have
been much influenced by the events that have shaped the nature of political regimes. The
French Revolution first created a contradiction between discourse and effects, the discourse
claiming freedom for the people and the wars following the Revolution resulting in the
occupation of territories and the subjection of populations. From this contradiction emerged
an ideological rejection of the power supposed to represent the enemy (the monarchies) which
clouded our approach of the finality of power (the welfare of the French people).
France and the United States of America are both subscribing to Universalist models, and
both nations are distinguishable by the comparable intensity of individualism and the desires
to promote the influence of their value systems. The difference is that American universalism
originated from the resistance to colonial presence. It was therefore, from the onset, a model
aiming at demonstrating “that another model is possible”. This manifest destiny called for
replication, and was transformed into a pass for new global capitalism during the cold war.
France gradually retreated into a vision of power associated with the preservation of
independence while the United States of America was preparing to challenge the power of the
European colonial empires on the basis of the principles of American democracy and the
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defence of individual liberties. It has never been possible for the sword of independence to
counter the winning of minds through a model of society.
The thought matrix of French power was therefore not adapted to understand the challenges
of competition between models of societies as they were going to crystallize during the cold
war. And this competition between models of society became the critical element of power
from the time when the risk of nuclear confrontation neutralised extremist postures as well as
strategic recourse to the most extreme expression of military force. In this disconnection of
challenges of power, the governments of the Republic gave priority to deterrence over
influence. The nuclear deterrence policy supported national independence. The same applied
to the information technology industry. At the beginning of the 5th Republic, General de
Gaulle took into account this new challenge by launching the IT planning policy and
supporting the creation of the Bull public enterprise. But this willingness to preserve our
independence in terms of technology revealed the gap that exists between a vision centred on
protection of the national heritage and a policy to increase power articulated around an
approach aimed at winning world markets. This conquest policy of the USA was integrated
in the implementation of a model of society based on standardisation of technologies enforced
by American companies. Thoughts of independence do not, for all that, mean creating a
dynamic of power enhancement. General de Gaulle could indeed verify this when
acknowledging the failure of his third path proposal as an alternative to the projects of society
of the Eastern and Western blocs. While this attempt was perceived at the time as a policy of
power in terms of a model of society, it failed because French society was unable to mobilise
to outline a better model than the American reference model or to give constructive answers
for its shortcoming or flaws.
Must the notion of power be redefined?
While the question of the third path is no longer an issue, the fact that models of society as
instruments of power are outdated, is an issue that gains increasing importance with regard to
the topicality of geopolitical and societal crises. In the highly fluctuating and uncertain
context of the globalisation of exchanges, it is difficult not to think of a way of preserving, or
even increasing the economic power of a country to ensure the security of people and goods.
In other words, it is necessary to rethink our approach in respect of power and to challenge
what Abbot Grégoire stated during the French Revolution: “France is a whole and is self-
sufficient. Nature gave barriers that do not make expansion necessary, so the interests and
principles of France are in accordance”.
The gains of the French model (social protection, health system, public security, lifestyle) are
not immutable. It is difficult to imagine a preservation of these gains only through market
dynamics. The persistence of all sorts of crises and the negative effects of globalisation is
returning to politics an importance which was lost during the management of the development
of a territory. Politics had in the past a critical importance in ensuring the unity of a territory
like France. Henceforth it has a similar importance to ensure its cohesion and survival.
Without a prevailing reference model, power can be considered as a governance exercise.
After all, some would say, Belgium managed to live for months without a government.
Would the Belgian exception outline an anti model of power? The absence of power has not
yet been considered to be a guarantee for stability in the history of mankind. The persistence
of strategies based on increased power, reduces the impact of the declarations on governance
and puts the prospects of pacified international relations into perspective.
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While competition between models of societies is a notion about to become obsolete, the
theme of power does not necessarily merely consist, as in the past, of military problems. The
loss of credibility of the American reference model is not compensated for by an influence of
another nature. This means that the strategies of influence on standards, education,
structuring of the information society or legal systems (to mention but a few examples) will
have vital consequences for the manner in which powers will assert their position on the
world chess board. We have to note that the Western world is weakened by the loss of
reference points in terms of the reference model of society. Democracy is not exportable
everywhere. The organisation of the market economy appears to be standardised but it is
challenged by the power enhancement policies of newcomers like China or countries in search
of a new status like Iran or Russia.
Limitations of fragmented or transitory governance issues
Without a prevailing reference model, power can be considered as a governance exercise.
However, the persistence of strategies based on increased power reduces the impact of the
declarations on governance and puts the prospects of pacified international relations into
perspective, and fragmented or transitory governance issues are bound to be subjected to the
law of the strongest. No force has succeeded in replacing recurrent and intrinsic instruments
of power of a State. Multinational companies, structures emanating from civil society and
criminal organisations have not, until now, contradicted the fact that the State, and not the
market, always has the last word. But for how long will this idea persist, and will the powers
subordinated to the States not some day have the capability to equal, if not dominate them?
The example of Europe, not yet a power but rather a more or less fragmented governance
system, clearly demonstrates this point. For lack of political legitimacy, the European Union
remains a fragile group that can disappear. The apparent absence of motivation to address the
issue of power together is considered a weakness by the rest of the world.
The opposition to the USSR has for a long time been the cement of the Western world. Its
disappearance restored the historical nature of the old power struggle between powers; that is
the search for supremacy over countries, geographical areas or sections of the population, and
the creation of bonds of durable, material, financial and virtual dependency. From this
situation which the study of power has permitted to define in its entirety, resulted a significant
part of the questions raised in Section II of the CSFRS.
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SECTION III: GOVERNANCE, MIGRATIONS, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC POLICIES
Vice-President: Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, CERI IEP
Editorial Members: Bertrand Badie, IEP de Paris; Colette Depeyre, Univ. Paris Dauphine; Gérard Koenig, Univ. de Paris XII;
Stéphane Lacroix, IEP Paris, Chair Middle East Mediterranean area; Jean-Luc Racine, EHESS; Jean-Christophe Romer,
Univ. Strasbourg
Members: Eric Brousseau, Univ. de Paris X; Rémi Brague, Univ. Paris I.; Anne Dulphy, IEP Paris; Frédéric Ocqueteau,
CNRS-CESDIP.
Social governance and human security
Globalisation has transformed the international stage in many ways and firstly by changing
the very nature of diplomatic agendas. In the traditional international game, States of equal
capability were confronting each other: Equilibrium and competition were therefore key
elements which were assessed in traditional terms of power. Today, interaction on the world
stage takes place between States that are so different that the social contrasts opposing them
become the main challenge in international relations. Socio-economic inequalities and effects
of the cultural divide carry higher risks than the much better controlled, conventional politico-
military challenges. International diplomacy must therefore become “intersocial”, mobilised
so as to reduce, or at least manage, social gaps between States.
From this perspective, human security constitutes a real source of conceptual innovation.
Human security as defined since 1994 in the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), confirms that security today refers neither mainly to military parameters nor to
traditional ways of approaching enmity. Security is henceforth conditioned by deficits which
affect fulfilment of fundamental social needs (in the food, health, environmental and
education, as well as in the human rights, domains). It is interdependent and no longer
national, no longer depends on the defence effort of each nation shut off from the rest of the
world, but on the common participation of all for the protection and the support of the
weakest. Promoting social development thus becomes a useful instrument to reinforce the
security of the strongest.
This reappraisal of security, which takes into account social pathologies, warns of the
increasingly strong connection linking international social violence and human insecurity,
where the first surpasses military pressure as the main source of global instability. Human
insecurity and social violence are noticeable in practical terms (too little access by some to
subsistence goods), but also in symbolic terms (lack of respect, inequality felt between human
beings, chiefly in death, dramatic when certain populations are affected, insignificant and
acceptable when others in much larger numbers are affected)...
Humiliation thus becomes one of the major causes of violence and conflict in our world of
inequalities. It is the symbolic expression of the dramatic social contrasts associated with
globalisation and the oligarchic organisation of world governance. Humiliation which very
prominently fuelled and drove recent revolutions in the Arab world, has been and remains the
main source of all radicalisms.
It is about time to admit that with globalisation, governance must adapt to the social
timeframe which has become more important than the political timeframe. Recent revolutions
caused diplomatic malaise in Europe, and probably beyond, due to the detrimental effects of
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excessive confidence in the "modernizing autocracies" supposed to have put in order, through
political force, social spaces considered to be backward. In reality, the contrary had to be
emphasised: The dynamics of societies, the risk to see them thwarted by social pathologies
which authoritarianism did not reduce, but fed on. The standardisation of human security is
as fundamental a condition for international stability as it is for the reduction of violence: It
becomes – or must become – the essential paradigm of the new inter-social diplomacy. In
foreign politics, social self-interest is more profitable than political self-interest.
Governance and stability
The crisis in progress in the Arab world which started with the Tunisian movement brought an
old problem, worth revisiting, to light: What dialectic must govern the connection between
good governance and search for stability? Everything is a matter of degree; perfect stability
under good governance is of course, probably a utopian idea in particular in societies
experiencing transitions with a greater or lesser degree of difficulty. Everything is also a
matter of temporality: The search for stability can be a short term objective, either to maintain
an established situation or in an end of crisis situation, when the pursuit of good governance
can take a long time, once it is necessary to operate in a degraded situation. This being said, it
is clear that the definition of the priorities of French diplomacy – beyond the events of the
moment – can benefit from thorough assessment of the dialectic between governance and
stability. A few scenarios can help to prepare the ground in this respect.
Afghanistan after 2001 is a textbook case. Once the Taliban were defeated, it was understood
that if the hunt for al Qaeda was to continue in the interest of regional stability and global
security, the stabilisation of the country was both a prerequisite for its securitisation and an
objective. How could such a situation be resolved, but through incomplete and pragmatic
advances? The pursuit of better governance, with the reconstruction of State organisations
likely to bring real sustainable and country wide progress to the population, was supposed to
play here a decisive part. What happened is well known. But one knows less about providing
the keys to the disappointing developments: While the strategic errors of Washington and the
difficulties of NATO are well documented, much remains to be done to clarify the parameters
by which attempts at good governance would have been more effective.
Some analysts are criticising the exaggerated importance generally given to the tribal factor.
Others think that the establishment of a presidential government as recommended by the
international community, for the benefit of Hamid Karzai, was doomed to failure, in a country
where regional and ethnic fragmentation are combined, yet without denying national identity.
In terms of strategy and diplomacy, the Afghan experiment is therefore much more complex
than the traditional model which is in the process of collapsing in many Arab countries:
Supporting authoritarian and predatory regimes for the sake of the necessary stability and the
anti-Islamist fight. Almost ten years after the international intervention, there is neither good
governance nor stability in Afghanistan: Regimes have been changing in the last thirty years
without any effect on these issues.
Another scenario: The Indian “model”. Whatever the weaknesses (inequalities, insurrections,
communitarian tensions) of Indian democracy might be, the parliamentary paradigm is
working. Part of a Constitution in which the dialectic between unity and pluralism is defined
with fine balance, parliamentarianism in a multiparty regime absorbs the shocks, including
those resulting from gaps in governance: Although governments can be unstable (three
general elections between 1996 and 1999), the instability has not affected the State apparatus
and national cohesion. The definition of a diplomatic approach regarding such a type of
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regime is simpler, but pitfalls nevertheless exist. They are part of the management of the
increase in power of emerging countries.
The case of Pakistan is special in many respects. No authoritarian regime, including a
military regime, lasted for more than about ten years, in a context where multipartism remains
one of the foundations of political life. But the strategic paradigm that was defined a long
time ago by the armed forces, irrespective of the regime in power (military or civilian), is
obscuring the issue of social governance through the grand strategy, with the use of the armed
Islamist groups to serve this grand politics finally turning against the power of the State. The
strategic challenges consequently place the international community, and in particular the
United States of America, in the uncomfortable situation that is presently known: Pakistan
must be economically supported while imposing conditions for better governance to avoid its
failure, for the sake of the required stability in the country and the region, even though the
strategic paradigm still brings instability, well beyond the defence of the legitimate interests
of the country.
In a very different context, the case of China illustrates in its own way the
governance/stability problem, while raising a difficult question: Does economic growth, once
it allows for redistribution of benefits, make an authoritarian regime based on a single party
more bearable? Many observers of China tend to think that a possible significant slowing
down of growth would create a serious problem for the regime, and it is known that the
politburo pays particular attention to what can improve local governance without weakening
the hegemony of the party. At the same time, a dictatorial regime like that of Omar el-Bechir
is accepting the partition of Sudan, while in central Asia the apparatchiks of the Soviet regime
have quickly and lastingly adopted the nationalist model. In Kyrgyzstan, as elsewhere, the
“colour revolution” (that of tulips in this case) has not always fulfilled the initial aspirations.
Beyond the noticeable diversity of these scenarios, a few remarks, if not recommendations,
can possibly be put forward.
The principle of stability, based on strong legitimacy, must constantly be assessed, since it
endorses situations of socio-economic deadlock and of excessive political control (opposition,
media, internet), too readily considered as lasting. It would be appropriate here to compile a
typology of the strength and weaknesses of authoritarian regimes, which are in fact extremely
diverse.
The call for good governance cannot be incantatory. It is important to evaluate in each case
who the stakeholders are – whether marginalised or not – who carry the seed of aspiration for
better governance. Beyond its empirical dimensions, the aspiration often relates to the
concepts of justice and dignity. The correct political analysis also requires a sociological
view to reposition, in the development of civil society, the often young stakeholders (who are
not necessarily from opposition parties), who cause the wind of change to blow (including on
the Web).
There is still the issue of democracy. Beyond the illusion of exporting an approved model,
the European - and not only the French - reserve towards the present developments in the
Arab world, shows that political leaders are petrified when confronted with the populist
discourse structured around two obsessive fears of the old continent: Islamism and
immigration. No one knows what the final outcome of the movements shaking the Arab
world today will be, but the strength and stability of the Iranian counter model, intersecting
with European fears used by political self-interest, only contribute to question the image of
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Europe, often accused of double talk. With all the caution required in view of uncertain
futures, we once more run into a strategic question: Is the conceptual framework supporting
Realpolitik really a guarantee to efficiently come to grips with a changing world?
Understanding the Arab revolutions
The Arab world has, since December 2010, been in the grip of unprecedented democratic
protest movements which caused, in the case of Tunisia and Egypt, the fall of authoritarian
leaders who had been in power for decades.
As admitted by all, whether researchers or activists, the timing of these developments was
absolutely not predictable. But even worse: For many, the occurrence of such developments
was in itself unthinkable. In addition, ironically, these occurred at the very time when a
whole body of writings “celebrating” “authoritarian consolidation” was developing in
political science applied to the Middle-East. It is therefore not surprising that politicians and
diplomats were taken by surprise, navigating by sight during the weeks following the onset of
the crisis.
Without doubt this denotes a flaw in strategic thinking about the region. Is the first necessity
today to permanently abandon the idea of an Arab or Middle-Eastern “exceptionalism”? This
does not mean that we must automatically move to the extreme opposite, burning Huntington
to embrace Fukuyama: Democratisation is no more inevitable today than yesterday, and even
less so its Western corollaries – notably economic liberalisation and secularisation. But we
must at least admit that in the present state of affairs in the Middle East, any development is
possible.
Therefore the question must be: How can we prepare for it? Firstly, by finally taking
seriously Middle-Eastern societies that have been considered as negligible entities for
decades, in view of authoritarian States enthroned as the sole parties France and the West
would speak to. This must result in a position of principle: We must multiply political
partners. However, all partners do not have the same status, and those who seem to have
decisive influence today are not necessarily those who will matter tomorrow. Identifying the
latter necessitates an analysis of the profound developments presently affecting Middle-
Eastern societies.
A central element of these developments is the increased importance of a new political
generation who no longer subscribes to the prevailing ideologies in the region – particularly to
Islamism in its “traditional” form – and for whom religion is no longer a political issue (even
if many of these young people display individual piety, notably by wearing the veil).
Everywhere, this new generation has been the origin of the mobilisations during the past
weeks. Very quickly however, we witnessed the strong return of “traditional” stakeholders –
especially of Islamists of the “Muslim Brothers” type. It would nevertheless be incorrect to
think that the situation has returned to the initial state. In fact, if this emerging political
generation does not come to power tomorrow, it will probably continue to gain increased
importance, carried by the “revolutionary legitimacy” it now owns (as these young people
now never fail to bring to mind). In this sense, while it is not yet certain that we have just
witnessed the 1989 of the Arab world – with the “old regimes” still in place almost
everywhere - the May 1968 of the Arab world has just taken place, in the sense of a true
cultural revolution. Moreover the traditional stakeholders, led by the Muslim Brothers, who
today force themselves to adopt the language of the youth by discarding the ideological
overtones of the past, are the first ones to realise this.
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All this presents a remarkable challenge to Western politics with regard to the region. Today,
they have a role to play in supporting transitions, and - since everything is still to be done – in
encouraging democratic outcomes (with a lot of subtlety because the perfect endogenicity,
which would be a pity to “sully”, is the strength of the revolutions in progress). This must be
all the easier as the rhetoric of the Arab revolutions clearly breaks with the until now
fashionable anti-West attitude, for claiming to follow a universalism wherein the West can –
and even must – recognise itself.
Who is the Other?
Beyond the immediate conjuncture (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya), there exists in France – as in the
whole of the Western world – a real difficulty with recognising the Other as a full role player
and in particular in admitting, except with tasteless condescension, a possible equality with
(re)emerging countries. This attitude is often due to representations by colonising countries –
but not only them – which have difficulties to break free from what was considered to be a
“civilising mission” especially with regard to States emerging as new stakeholders in the post-
bipolar world.
Small countries – even in Europe – or big countries are thus often seen as minor partners
whose relations with the “big” Western States are often characterised by a spirit of “unequal
exchange”. The clear identification of the Other as Other requires both introspection (to know
oneself) in a logic of equality and alterity, and to know (recognise) the culture of the Other as
different in a non hierarchical order. This necessity to recognise the Other as Other is not new
as it was already found expressed some twenty-five centuries ago by Sun Zi in what is
considered to be the first treatise on the art of warfare. But to this recognition of a State or of
a nation as Other, which is essential for proper functioning of international relations, must be
added a recognition of alterity in general, alterity of new developments or concepts which
require, beyond the words, a receptiveness for basic reflections in the domain of social
sciences.
The historian Michael Howard had been one of the first, during the past ten years, to have
identified this obligation in an article (“What’s in a name”) published in the Foreign Affairs
magazine issue no. 1 of 2002 in which he reflected upon the nature of the operation that had
just started in Afghanistan by showing the importance of the choice of words when defining
things. The operation, which began in October 2001, was from the onset called a “war”. This
term could only create confusion, both in the minds and in the actions, since it was then rather
an international policing operation. Besides, a war operation is not conducted in the same
way as a policing operation, even when international. While international security and
internal security are closely related, the one could not be mistaken for the other.
Admittedly since then, both in the United States of America and in France, there have been
reflections on the issue of war and the definition thereof. What has changed: The definition of
war itself, or have new methods of using armed violence emerged? As is often the case with
political decision makers, easy ways out, allowing for the evaluation of a real debate on old or
new concepts, have prevailed. And these conceptual approximations have indeed
significantly contributed to the looming failure notably in Afghanistan, because an operation
can be successful only when both the alterity and similarities thereof have been clearly
defined and identified. Both conceptual approximation and representation of the Other, result
in confusion in action, which in the best case scenario is voluntary and used in order to both
create doubt or confusion in a hostile Other and perhaps also in his ally in order to divide or
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harass to rule better. In worst case scenario, this confusion is the result of the inability to
think long term, when the media timeframe too often prevails against the historical/strategic
timeframe. In the course of history, Europe has been a source of ideas. It is about time that
ideas are given centre stage again in order to reflect upon both alterity and modernity in their
complexity, by looking for what distinguishes and not for what confuses or amalgamates.
What are the challenges of migratory flows in future decades?
In the beginning of the 21st century, international migrations intensified, to the point of
spreading worldwide and becoming one of the major challenges in the world. There are 214
million migrants in the world today, three times more than forty years ago. 120 million
international migrants were counted at the end of the nineties and 150 million at the beginning
of the first decade of the century. We may have entered, according to some, the second big
wave of migrations between 1980 and today, the first wave having taken place between 1880
and 1914. These waves are divided into South-North migrations, 62 million, South-South, 61
million, North-North, 53 million, North-South, 14 million, the remaining consisting of East-
West and hardly ever West-East migrations. These international migrations are part of a trend
towards the globalisation of the forms of mobility, as migrations take place throughout the
world. In addition, almost all the countries in the world are affected by the departure,
reception or transit of people, and internal migrations in States concern 740 million people,
including 240 million in China. One billion people of the world are on the move.
International migrations contribute to the “rapprochement of the world in the world”. The
report of 2009 of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) emphasised that
migrations have become an essential factor of human development and that one should
therefore “lift the barriers” rather than close them, as all studies have shown that development
and migrations go hand in hand, the one is certainly not the alternative of the other. But
migrations are also part of a complex process of contradictory globalisations, where political
objectives are confronted with economic, social and cultural imperatives. Migrations are part
of the social texture of international relations because the economic, social, political and
cultural dimension thereof strongly challenge the normal frameworks of the international
space. In the necessity to “humanise globalisation”, mobility became for some people one of
the big platforms for human rights, for others, a world asset to be managed through a global
and multilateral governance of the stakeholders, and finally for some others, an evil that must
be fought in view of the uncertainties of integration. For their part, illegal immigrants and
those supporting them look like a global social movement being reconstructed around the
right to mobility, the status of those who move in relation to those who are geographically
stable, the necessity of living together without exclusion, and questioning the notions of
borders, sovereignty and citizenship. New divides appear: East-West, South-North, South-
South; outlining regional and global geopolitical fractures.
In this world marked by continuous political crises and risks of social secessions, the
economic crisis brought a new dispensation. The mobility of people has often been linked to
periods of chaos to ease the major fracture lines of the world: Refugees, stateless people,
isolated women and minors, economic migrants, members of an elite; to such an extent that
the normal categories of migrations have become blurred because many migrants belong, at
the same time or in the course of their lives, to several of the categories with little difference
between profiles. The distinction between host country, country of departure and transit
country has also become more blurred as many countries have been these all at the same time.
Has the global financial crisis of the summer of 2008 changed the dispensation? The impact
of the crisis on migratory flows is still difficult to analyse as a whole. One can nevertheless
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observe a decline in irregular migrations in respect of the search for employment in
destinations like Mexico, Spain, Italy and Malaysia, and a decrease in fund transfers
(328 billion Dollars in 2008, 337 billion in 2007) causing difficulties for the families and
communities depending on them (West Africa, the Philippines). The continuation, or even
the acceleration of policies of expulsion and deportation has been noticed, in particular
regarding illegal immigrants. There has also been a reduction in the rights of migrants and in
the efforts to gain new rights and finally, a long-term reversal of globalised policies and a
return to protectionist national policies, although some people predict a new wave of
globalisation once the recession is over.
New problems have appeared: Environmentally displaced persons, internal Chinese
migrations, recent contradictions in migratory policies – in a more restrictive sense but taking
into account the necessity to open borders in countries more affected by ageing – and
transformations specific to certain regions of the world or to certain groups of migrants.
These problems are creating avenues for analysing population flows in the future decades.
The demographic challenge
First observation: Demography which had little influence in the past on the decision-making
factors regarding migratory policies, has today become an inevitable element. The
realization, since the publication of the report by the United Nations Population Department
in 2000 on replacement migrations, that the world population is ageing, and notably in
Europe, Russia and Japan, has created a new dispensation; it brought to an end the dogma of
“zero immigration” as an objective to be achieved by the States in Europe. The Population
Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs also constructed
various scenarios as to the size of the world population by 2050, based on various hypotheses
in respect of fertility rates and other factors influencing demographic growthx. In the “low
variant” scenario, by 2050 the earth will be populated by about 8 billion people (7.959
billion), which presupposes a fertility rate of 1.54 children per woman, which is far less than
the fertility rate of substitution (2.1). Today, the fertility rate in the world is 2.56. In a second
medium variant scenario, giving 9.15 billion inhabitants in 2050 and a fertility rate of 2.02,
fertility in the less developed regions will drop to 2.73 children per woman between 2005 and
2010, and to 2.05 in the period 2045-2050. To achieve such results, the Population Division
considers that it is essential to increase access to voluntary family planning services, notably
in the least developed countries. According to a report by the United Nations General
Secretariat on world population and the action programme of the Cairo Conference of 1994
on population, 106 million married women in developing countries have an unsatisfied need
for access to family planning. The “high variant” scenario predicts 10.461 billion inhabitants
in 2050, with a fertility rate of 2.51 children per woman.
But these variants will affect the regions of the world in different ways: Africa should have
one billion inhabitants in 2050 and two billion by the end of the century, India with 1.6 billion
in 2050 will overtake China, which is today the most populated country with 1.3 billion
inhabitants and whose population will start ageing due to the one child policy. Europe is
ageing and so are Japan and Russia. In 2050, these regions will be less populated than today
while the United States of America will maintain the same level as today due to immigration,
and the developing countries will experience a demographic transition (less births and a
reduced mortality rate). Without immigration, the population of the European countries will
decrease at the 2025 horizon compared to the present figures.
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Another development linked to this evolution is the progress of the urban compared to the
rural world. A general movement of urbanisation is taking place, including in rural regions
like Africa where the population will be 70 % urbanised between 2050 and the end of the
century while it was 70 % rural fifty years ago. Cities with a population of ten million are
mainly found in Asia, the biggest demographic reservoir of the planet (Tokyo, Seoul,
Shanghai, Bombay, Delhi, Djakarta, Osaka, Manila, Calcutta, Dhaka, Teheran, Karachi,
Beijing). But there are also many megacities in the Americas (Mexico City, New York City,
Sao Paulo, Los Angeles, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro), while Europe (with London,
Moscow, Paris, Istanbul) and Africa (Cairo, Lagos) do not feature prominently yet. These
cities are hubs for present and future internal, and then international migrations in the
developing countries. Furthermore, the quick population explosion of some cities is having
an impact on global warming.
Environmental risks
Mankind, as the consumer of energy, is the main cause of global climate warming. If
temperatures continue to increase up to 6.4 degrees by 2100, the consequences will be the
most severe for the poorest in the world in developing countries because most of the
environmental risks are there: Rising sea levels as in Tuvalu or the Maldives, floods in areas
located below sea level as in Bangladesh, cyclones, tornadoes, earthquakes, volcanic
eruptions, desertification. Other consequences linked to warming like the thawing and
melting of glaciers will affect both the Great North and South (Himalaya).
Concern related to climate change has increased in the world: Stopping the emission of
greenhouse gases by 2015, re-forestation etc. Many cities are located in low coastal areas and
are thus threatened by floods of the delta of rivers or rises in the seawater level: Izmir,
Jerusalem, Jeddah, Aden, Karachi, Colombo, Chennai, Calcutta, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Ho
Chi Minh City, Singapore, Djakarta, Taipei, Seoul, Tokyo, Sapporo. The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts migratory flows linked to environmental changes
equalling the total of present international migrations by the end of the century (more than
200 million), and 50 to 150 million of environmentally displaced people by 2050. The IPCC
also emphasises that man will not be responsible for all these flows: While de-forestation has
a direct impact on desertification, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and floods, on the other
hand, are as old as the memory of man and occurred through the ages. Walter Kälin, a
representative of the United Nations General Secretariat for human rights of displaced
persons, identified five scenarios of climate change affecting human migrations: Hydro
meteorological disasters, degradation of the environment, loss of national territory (islands),
identification of “high risk” areas, violence and ethnic conflicts resulting in shortage of and
decrease in natural resources.
The inequalities of human development
The inequalities of human development are measured by the UNDP on the basis of three main
criteria: Longevity, level of education and standard of living. When combined, these indexes
allows for measuring inequalities in the world. If plotted on a map of the world, Sub-Saharan
Africa is in the worst position [Human Development Index (HDI) between 0.3 and 0.4], while
the HDI of Europe, the United States of America, Australia and Japan ranges from 0.9 to 1.
Progress in access to information, education and transport and cross-border migratory
networks result in migratory imaginings giving pride of place to Eldorados where life is
better, often at the price of perilous odysseys. Migratory waves are the strongest along the
major fracture lines of the world (Mediterranean Basin, American-Mexican border) and the
richest regions will continue to be the main attraction. The report shows that in 2009, the
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African continent had 19 million international migrants, Asia 61.3 million and Europe 69.8
million. The BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India China) are beginning to attract migrants
and the Persian Gulf is one of the major poles of migrations between developing countries. In
decreasing order, the countries that in 2010 attracted the greatest number of international
migrants are the United States of America, the Russian Federation, Germany, Saudi Arabia,
Canada, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, India and the Ukraine. The countries with the
highest percentage of international migrants in their population are, in decreasing order,
Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Jordan, the Palestinian Territories, Singapore,
Israel, China (including Hong Kong), Oman and Saudi Arabia. All this leads to the belief that
these trends will continue during the coming years, although the conditions for permanent
immigration are not favourable in the Gulf countries, and other countries, like the Ukraine,
experience pendulum migrations, since Ukrainians themselves go to work in Western Europe
and in Poland.
Political crises and violence
Finally, political crises and violence, especially violence against women, also cause
migrations, internal for the most disadvantaged persons in countries in crisis, and also
international. A part of the 740 million internal migrations constitutes forced displacements,
including those in countries at war or countries confronted with very serious internal crises
like in Darfur. In 2007, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
counted 40 million forced displacements including 17 million refugees (most of them non
statutory refugees). Afghanistan (with 6 million departures since the end of the seventies), the
Near and the Middle East (and notably Iraq with 4 million departures since 2002) are at the
root of the largest number of asylum seekers in the world. The Great Lakes region in Africa,
the Balkans, the Kurdish regions, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Sri Lanka also produced
many internal and international refugees. Decrease in the number of asylum seekers depends
on resolution of these conflicts (the Atlas of crises and conflicts of the IRIS of 2009 identifies
about thirty conflicts)xi. France is, after the United States of America, the country that has
attracted the greatest number of asylum seekers in the last years, with 42 000 applications in
2009 (and 47 000 if reapplications are included). But Europe, with 246 200 applications in
2009, i.e. 3 % more than in 2008, is ahead of the USA and is becoming the biggest host region
for asylum seekers in the world, even when, due to very restrictive policies, less than a quarter
of them obtains the status of refugee. Twenty years ago, after the fall of the Berlin wall,
Europe received 500 000 asylum applications per year, with notably Germany (438 000
applications in 1992), first country for immigration in Europe and first host country for
asylum seekers from 1945 up to the 2000’s. The European countries which are going to be
the most affected by new applications are those with linguistic, colonial, cross-border ties
with the seats of crises (migrant workers and families already in the country). The UNHCR
policy whereby internal protection close to the zones of crisis (internal asylum) is encouraged,
nevertheless reduces the appeal of Europe, the United States of America and Canada.
Violence against women and children also cause migrations, internal and international, which
can be similar or not to those involving refugees. The feminisation of migrations, the
development of the phenomenon of unaccompanied children are as many consequences of
this malaise in poor countries, a situation likely to become increasingly extensive in the years
to come because their cause is beginning to be heard.
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Migration as a way of life
Finally, among the trends that emerged during the last ten years, return and pendulum
migrations, adopting mobility as a way of life seems to attract all those who want to live
“here” and “there” when their status (dual nationality, long stay permits, multiple entry visas)
allows for it and when cross-border economic activities support this project of life. From one
shore of the Mediterranean Sea to the other, in Europe, from East to West but also from North
to South (jobs that can be done from a distance), a multitude of activities permitting multiple
forms of migrations are developing: Seasonal, round tripping, permanent for retirement as an
extension of tourism. Many of these people on the move do not settle permanently in the host
country; some live permanently in-between, in a double or triple space centred on a migratory
link built by cross-border economic, cultural and family exchanges. These migratory flows
have been increasing in the past twenty years, as a way of life which seems to appeal to a
young and active population and which is bound to develop further taking into account the
difference of opportunities in certain sectors which are difficult to delocalise (care drain for
elderly people, building industry, agriculture, cross-border shops and businesses).
Living together.
In the migration issue, flows are not necessarily the major challenge, chiefly if migration
policies permit a greater fluidity of movement, as called for by the United Nations
Organisation through the Global Forums on Migration and Development since 2007, the
UNHCR, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the International Organisation for
Migrations (IOM) and many non governmental organisations (associations for the defence of
human rights). These organisations are seeking to make mobility a world public asset by
defining a world governance of migrations, which is multilateral and associates host States
and States of departure as well as civilian society.
The issue of population stocks, that is, the management of populations settled in a friendly
living-together, will become a major challenge at the horizon of 2020: Evolution of the
definition of citizenship by moving towards plurality of allegiance, possibly including
citizenship compatible with mobility, development of dual citizenship and right of the soil,
both already on the increase, struggle against discriminations, ethnicisation of social
inequalities and urban violence, and encouragement of associative life. The issue of
statelessness (about 13 million, notably in Bangladesh and in Myanmar) and of illegal
immigrants will also take centre stage, as well as birth incentives in countries like Russia and
Japan, most affected by ageing. Integration policies are non-existent in developing countries
of emigration which recently also became countries of immigration. A big project will
therefore start at the horizon of 2020.
International migrations, in the diversity of their forms and of the populations concerned, are
likely to continue, as the causal factors are not about to disappear at the horizon of 2020 or
2050. New causes of migrations, such as the environment, have emerged while the awareness
that mobility can offer better opportunities than staying in the home country, has spread in
underprivileged countries. The population no longer accepts the fate of being born in a badly
governed and/or poor country. One might think that with progress in education, information
and increased urbanisation, the decision to migrate will concern larger layers of the
population who until now have been less mobile such as ill people, women and children and
the poorest categories who were previously less inclined to migrate.
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The increasing role of business ecosystems in governance challenges
In the present world, the issues of governance cannot be tackled without dwelling on the
increasing role played by business ecosystems in decision-making on world regulations, being
economic, political or even predatory on resources and destructive of fundamental
equilibriums. Competition is decreasingly at play between firms while increasingly at play
between business ecosystemsxii. The stakeholders in contemporary competition are
combinations of both competing and cooperating firms, sharing common interests, not always
with corresponding geographical or historical roots. The idea is not new. It was already
envisaged by Berle and Meansxiii (1932: 313): “The emergence of modern enterprise is
accompanied by a concentration of economic power that can be in competition with a modern
State on equal terms”. What is new is both the magnitude and the generic nature of this new
governance. The affirmation of both the democratic nature of the governance and the
existence of a common destiny is contradicted by multiple observations. Furthermore it is far
too general to be used in the framework of a strategic deliberation.
The manner in which the stakeholders are interdependent determines the type of development
of the ecosystem: Mutual interdependence goes hand in hand with a more qualitative mode of
development based on consolidation of relations, while the “pool” interdependence of
Thompsonxiv favours a more quantitative mode of development according to a proliferation
process. The question of the capability of States to regulate their behaviours has to be asked.
The big technological platforms of electronic trading mostly bypasses the logics of domestic
control. For all that, the deterritorialization of the ecosystems is not necessarily accompanied
by the disappearance of the hub of the operations. While it becomes difficult for a State to
impose a jurisdiction, for example fiscal, the control of these big business ecosystems is
frequently exercised on the basis of the retention of strategic resources.
We are neither in the “global-local” beginnings of globalisation, nor in the very quickly
discarded utopia of multinational companies with global citizenships. Even companies that
showed high respect for social responsibility “at home” were subjected to enquiries and
sanctions because of destructive behaviours in respect of social, environmental and regional
political equilibriums in other parts of the world. Without completely bypassing borders, such
business ecosystems raise the issue of a citizenship of businesses which becomes very
difficult to promulgate. The more the ecosystem encompasses a diversity of territories,
identities and different technical systems, the more it tends to bypass the logics of domestic
control, and the more it will develop instrumental positioning with regard to supra-ordinal or
supra-national challenges.
Henceforth, there is a risk that the discourse on democracy and pacification will become an
ideological front for hiding strategies of pre-emption or predation of key resources of the new
world economy. The strategic issue is no longer that of dialogue between multinational firms
and their “hosts”, but really that of the complete separation of business ecosystems from the
rest of the domestic economies and of the local, national, fiscal, or even military or security
logics.
Indeed, while the diversity of the theoretical perspectives is proven, the explanatory capability
thereof is less so. To avoid this difficulty, it seems that two “epistemological obstacles” must
be overcome. The first one is accepting, as going without saying, the idea that such
ecosystems are organisational arrangements which can be dedicated to innovation, while there
are good reasons to believe that they are characterised by a functional ambivalence (they can
be used to maintain the status quo) that should precisely be questioned. The second obstacle
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is that the concept of business ecosystem represents very different organisational realities, the
specificity of which is in the firms best interest to analyse if they want to ensure the relevance
of their strategies. In conclusion, it seems urgent to conduct research on the different types of
business ecosystems in which firms can participate without prejudging their effects, whether
innovative or not, in order to be able to offer practitioners the conceptual tools they need to
formulate their strategies.
Governance and business policy – where economic and social spheres meet
The issues of governance and business policies are today linked in the field of business social
responsibility. This field has developed throughout the 20th century, notably with the
pioneering work of Howard Bowen in the fifties in the United States of America. At that
time, he already emphasised that entrepreneurship cannot be reduced to economic self
interest, as the action of business is to be based on ethical foundations which must be
understood, explained, or even directed. Then the questioning broadened beyond the domain
of morality and ethics, to include that of respect for the environment. A body of
developments resulted in the questions of social responsibility and integration of actions into
society being inevitably relevant today for the stakeholders in the economy.
Societal rating agencies and “green” or “social” indexes are multiplying, the standards to be
adhered to by business are progressively formalised (ISO 14000 then 26000 standard,
standards of reporting like the GRI) and reporting tends to become compulsory (reports on
sustainable development to supplement annual activity reports). The existing conceptual
proliferation shows the importance of the issue of social responsibility for companies: There
are talks of corporate citizenship, stewardship, stakeholders, societal performance, triple
bottom line (profit, people, planet), etc.
In view of the issue of social responsibility, companies can adopt a reactive posture taking
great care to respect the various (more or less formal) regulations, which in itself requires a
significant and often still difficult effort. Companies can also adopt a more proactive posture,
by then participating in setting new norms and developing new strategies suitable to integrate
economic, social and environmental spheres.
Thus, companies have not missed the opportunity to develop new strategies. Ecodesign
policies, aimed at optimising resource utilisation throughout the life cycle of products, are
found at the intersection of economy and the environment. Green fields of activities also are
developing, providing more environment friendly technologies. At the intersection of
economy and the environment are found fair trade policies or “bottom of the pyramid”
strategies aimed at aiding the most underprivileged consumers. Company policies are even
going as far as placing economic issues second, or even dividing spheres in order to act in a
more relevant manner applicable to each (refer for example to philanthropic actions made
possible by the accumulation of resources in the commercial sphere).
Creation of both economic and social value is thus sought, in a “win-win” perspective. But
these innovative strategies do not go without raising questions showing all the complexity of
the integration of the actions of companies in society. Many tensions are emerging that
causes the relevance of practices to be questioned. The ecological argument can result in
incomplete solutions (solving one problem but ignoring another), fair trade can destabilise the
economic and ecological situation in certain regions, the bottom of the pyramid strategies can
contribute to weaken the recipients targeted for aid, etc. The outcome is contrasted and
ambiguous, and the issue of the evaluation of the performance criteria remains open.
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Equally, in developing such practices, companies are expected to take responsibilities
including some that should be more those of public stakeholders. Some issues of society are
out of the political sphere and the action of taking responsibility by some stakeholders can
result in eroding the responsibility of others. The questions of the manner in which interests
are represented, of the decision-making processes, of the legitimacy of stakeholders and of the
initiative of regulation, are posed. What are the elements that companies can legitimately act
on? Is this a delegation of responsibilities or an independent action? How will reporting be
organised and which stakeholders must participate? In addition, the problem must be handled
in a dynamic manner, since present practices are resulting in the development of
competencies for some and a loss for others, which can change the power games and restrict
future adaptations.
Reconciliation of economic, social and environmental interests can constitute finding a
positive solution. Intelligent and innovative strategies are pursued by companies. For all that,
the impact of practices on society remains ambiguous and complex; the decisions made
cannot be dissociated from the judgements of value involved.
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SECTION IV: CONTEMPORARY THREATS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES, NEW
CRIMINALITIES
Vice-President: Jean-Marc Suchier SAFRAN
Editorial Members: Cédric Blancher, EADS; Jean-Louis Bruguière; Yves Deswarte, LAAS-CNRS; Jean-Michel Duccoroy,
Ministry of the Interior; David Hotte, BPCE; F. Bernard Huyghe, Univ. Paris IV; Sophie de Lastours, Historian, ARCSI;
Hélène Martini, Ecole des commissaires de police; Stanislas de Maupeou, THALES; Ludovic Mé, Supélec; Jean-Pierre
Pochon.
Members: Nathalie Feyt, CNES-THALES; Martine Monteil, Prefect; Olivier Oullier, Univ. de Provence; Christophe Soullez,
INHESJ.
Two global and cross-functional vehicles: New types of violence and cyber defence
The considerable developments in information technologies during the past decades have
transformed the way of life of mankind, offering everyone a quasi limitless access to
information and to means of communication. These possibilities have quickly been
assimilated by the world of organized crime and terrorism, which today systematically uses
these technologies, that offer both finalities (to get easy money) and the means to very
efficiently and without risk (from a distance) achieve it. In addition, our growing dependence
on technology also creates vulnerability for society and has become a major target for
terrorism, or even for potential enemies. Two examples applicable to “cyber criminality” and
“terrorist threats and radicalization”, are highlighted below. A “training” theme, which is
cross- linked with the activities of the CSFRS, addresses the strategic requirements.
Will cyber security become the power equaliser of the 21st century?
In the last number of years, cyber attacks have become more professional and cyber space has
become a vast new field for confrontation. It is no longer a leisure activity for information
technology enthusiasts but an operational reality. Facts bear witness to this: We are today in
the centre of this activity! The malicious code called Stuxnet illustrates this point by
spreading via a USB key before attacking a product used to control the rotational speed of the
centrifuges in uranium enrichment plants. In France, it was acknowledged that the Ministry
of Finance had been the victim of targeted attacks in the framework of work conducted by the
G20.
The realisation of the value of assets to be protected and the true extent of the threats
to be evaluated are always the result of a successful attack. Recent examples of
penetration which affected French organisations showed without ambiguity that the
systems of sensitization, of awareness, of understanding risks and of regulation and
control are today neither efficient, nor understood or applied.
The nature of the threat has changed and by transiting via computer networks, also
increased exponentially. The society of information technology is based on unsecured
Internet protocols, and information systems are strongly interconnected: Security
measures must inevitably adapt to this mutation.
Internet has become a vital infrastructure but this realisation is not sufficiently
followed by actions measuring up to the challenges.
Computer networks are experiencing major acceleration with the emergence of “Cloud
Computing”. The objective of this development is to give to users easy remote access to new
processing power, to storage capacities and to applications via Internet or via private
networks. It is both a new economic model and a major technological development in which
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the information technology and Internet giants, as well as new stakeholders, are investing
huge amounts of money. At the scale of the Web, Internet giants constitute actual States
having the economic resources to regulate cyber space.
France must be fully involved in the securitisation of the cloud, failing which it risks
becoming functionally dependent (new technologies and competencies, control of
data, sovereignty, availability, continuity, resilience, etc.).
The homogeneity of protocols and tools constitutes a risk, especially to the resilience
of critical infrastructures.
Society is massively computerised way beyond solely computer networks, like for example,
in the world of health or transport. Information technology has become the nervous system of
our societies; an attack targeting these systems would cause damage likely to destabilize and
even paralyse the whole body. The dependence of the functioning of societies with regard to
information systems, combined with the reality of the threat, requires to improve the security
of these systems thoroughly and to significantly optimize the conditions for research in this
field.
Security can only be assured against threats that have clearly been identified and
cannot be based on fears or vague rumours. To better understand and accept the
security measures to be implemented, it is imperative to establish a connection
between the technical vulnerabilities and the roles of the State and/or the companies.
Note that security is generally voluntarily implemented when it is considered to be in
the interest of business.
As for other domains, cyber security comes at a cost! One cannot be content with
mortgaging the future, by systematically choosing lower cost. Security cannot only be
based on budgetary constraints at the risk of France losing all the technical advances.
There is here a risk of strategic rupture as there was during the last two world wars,
with the development of aviation and armour warfare.
We note that the organisations responsible, at national level, for the formulation,
implementation and control of security policies do not have the global and systemic
vision that would allow for increased levels of responsiveness and anticipation. This
is because the organizations are fragmented and probably have too weak an impact on
non governmental circles. In addition, more people must be recruited to work in these
organisations.
It is today difficult to effectively test the robustness of systems and to train the teams
responsible for identification of vulnerability of systems. Without the capability of
large-scale development, France will lose, to the benefit of foreign organisations, the
few competencies acquired in this domain.
The French legal framework is too much restrictive, as illustrated by the ban on
reverse analysis for security reasons. In addition, it is almost impossible to deal in a
proper and reasonable manner with the discovery and publication of new
vulnerabilities or new attack methods.
Finally, France does not know how to exploit and interconnect the work of the various
communities of experts and thus how to make the most of the diverse and rich
competencies, often found outside the traditional circles of reflection.
The necessity for a national strategy on cyber security
Cyber attacks, the vulnerability of our information systems and our dependence relative to
these very systems, are established facts. The challenge for our country is to remain a
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credible stakeholder in the securitisation of the cyber space in order to protect our own
systems in view of the emerging threats affecting the whole society, and to become one of the
world leaders in technologies of securitisation of information and systems. This ambition
requires a significant strengthening of the security of the presently deployed systems and a
real capability for anticipating and discovering new threats, and this until operational
evaluation. These developments must be part of a new national governance. The challenges
to be addressed require the implementation of ambitious actions involving human resources as
well as technologies and a legal framework. In view of emerging threats, these actions must
be conducted in cooperation with all stakeholders, without excluding anyone. It is a
significant investment effort for the country, a condition for credibility and defence.
Protocols and infrastructures for critical operators
In the last number of years, a convergence of the industrial process management systems with
Internet protocols, has been observed. Furthermore, security challenges affect both citizens
and States. It has become necessary to improve the resilience of critical infrastructures and to
avoid the “all Internet” option. This new network infrastructure would allow assurance of not
only the security of the sectors of vital importance (SAIV), but also the absolute necessity for
development and for internal or external data exchange. However, considering the significant
cost of such an infrastructure, research could be aimed at the development of innovative and
additional systems allowing for appropriate securitisation of critical infrastructures.
Design and develop protocols and systems appropriate for critical infrastructures in order to
acquire the imperative resilience of vital systems for the nation.
National observatory
The challenges of cyber security affect society as a whole. However, communication,
transparency and global coherence are today the domain of experts only. This observation
limits the understanding of threats and presents gaps. Cyber security must gain maturity by
following the example of other security domains like those of health or pollution. Information
technology is at the heart of our societies; citizens are entitled to be regularly informed of the
level of security of the vital infrastructures that directly affect them.
Create a national observatory for cyber security whose mission will be to verify the
implementation of security recommendations, to assess the cyber security level of society, to
report major incidents, to give recommendations to public and private operators, and to make
public the test results concerning the most critical systems. The members of this observatory
will be recruited from all stakeholders in the information society.
Measurement of the level of system security
In the framework of an approach of risk management and categorisation of critical
infrastructures, it is imperative to search for methodology and for a measurement of the level
of security, required and achieved, for a critical infrastructure at system level.
The security of information systems is today designed mainly around the right of access to
information: In broad terms, the right to write or to read. It would be more in line with reality
and more appropriate for security, to reason in terms of information flow. Finally, the
security certification of systems is the result of a normative work following the example of
what has been done for the products ISO 15408 and approved laboratories. It is in particular
necessary to develop continuous and realistic quantitative evaluation techniques.
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Create a national methodology for the evaluation of the security of information systems based
on an internationally recognized standard. Design a process of national certification involving
the French regulatory organization ANSSI (National Agency for the Security of Information
Systems) and approved certification organizations. Test regularly and realistically the
defence measures of critical systems.
Create a HR field of cyber security
There is a lack of coherence in the careers of people taking up cyber security without real
visibility of the prospects. This finding illustrates the gap between the statement of the
challenges in the country and the reality experienced during career development. This also
results in expatriation of experts, as conditions abroad are often more financially and
professionally rewarding.
Create a true HR field of study in liaison with schools, universities, public administration and
companies. This field will also become a source of interest for foreign experts and
researchers.
Liberation of competencies and relaxation of regulatory constraints
It is imperative to liberate researchers and experts both with regard to the work of
identification of new vulnerabilities and the exploitation thereof, by providing tools and attack
methods. The regulatory framework of research and publication of new vulnerabilities must
be defined to avoid the present ambiguities and obstacles: Obstacles to innovation and
research, with associated accelerated brain drain.
In liaison with all stakeholders in the field, adapt the legal and regulatory framework in order
to liberate innovation and attract talent.
Make evaluations in real conditions possible
There is a necessity to train teams dedicated to the identification of vulnerabilities and to their
real exploitation. It is equally essential to test the methods and tools on a realistic training
simulator. In a way it is a matter of designing a realistic tool to use for validation of concepts
and employment doctrines, training teams, testing defence capabilities, validation of postures
and evaluation of tools. These scenarios will also stimulate industrial and technological
development and will contribute to employment doctrines as well as to responsiveness in
times of crisis.
Create a platform for large scale computer training, allow for testing, validation and
improvement of the defence, reaction and attack methods. This testing space will have to be
linked to a network of analysis tools, throughout the Internet, permitting to contribute to the
analysis of the threat and the evolution thereof.
National cyber defence governance
A global vision of “national computer security” appears to be necessary. This can be assigned
to for example ANSSI whose capabilities will have to be strengthened. Noting the efforts
made in the last few years and the high technical level of the employees, we indeed think that
this organisation must be encouraged to go further in this direction. An entity with
prerogatives thus broadened must have a decisive role in the entire securitisation process:
Know the threat, define security policy, implement recommendations and, in a regular and
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systematic manner, audit organisations and companies. The increase of capabilities will
obviously be at a cost.
An all powerful "centralising" organisation should not exist without "counter-powers". The
counter-powers must therefore also be strengthened. In the same way that we deem necessary
to enhance the capabilities of ANSSI, it seems essential to significantly enhance the research
and industrialisation capabilities in the domain of Information Systems Security, taking into
considerations the bridges between these activities. This development necessarily includes
massive recruiting in the domain, implying an ad hoc training policy, which will of course be
very costly. We think especially that the structure of the French SME must be significantly
and durably strengthened. It is an illusion to believe that France will achieve convincing
results if human resources do not live up to ambitions in respect of both research and
industrialisation. We have already deplored that France does not know how to exploit and
interconnect the work of various communities of experts. The exchanges between the various
public, industrial and academic communities must therefore be encouraged. In our opinion,
these exchanges must be based on cooperative work on subjects of common interest. The
financing tools for diverse national programmes must be adapted in order to support
consortiums where a really balanced interaction of stakeholders from diverse communities is
possible.
Finally, a crucial point for us is to develop the offensive competencies in the three types of
communities, in particular in the academic community, where these competencies are
presently almost non existent. The purpose here is to both master the attack and mainly also
properly prepare the defence. The offensive competencies of France seem to us of course
very much inferior to those of the United States of America, but also to those of England or
Germany. There is here an important challenge to be taken up. In brief, France must very
significantly increase the number of experts in cyber security (researchers, engineers,
managers), must encourage these experts to master both offensive and defensive aspects, must
remunerate and secure the loyalty of these experts at such a level that brain drain will stop,
must bring the public, academic and industrial communities together in order to promote
continuous and productive exchanges.
Exposure to terrorist threats
The French system for fighting terrorism is based on a critical strategic choice of anticipation
of risk by a proactive policy, both in the intelligence gathering phase and at the level of
repressive actions. Conducting the early detection and repression phases in a concerted
manner, an unprecedented approach in Europe, has largely contributed to the success of this
policy. No terrorist operation of foreign origin has taken place in France since 1996. This
demonstrates that, even in extreme situations, the response can be legal and that there is no
antinomy between legality and effectiveness of actions. This strategy has been used against
all forms of terrorism and more specifically against the Islamist threat, which is more difficult
to define as it is spread by scattered, multiform and very mobile cells responding to organic
logics.
Operational relations between global intelligence organisations (G20), specialised police
services and centralised judiciary structures have not only reinforced the effectiveness of anti-
terrorist fighting, but have also contributed to the significant rapprochement between the
intelligence services of different nations, consequently convinced of the necessity of
cooperation. The old reaction of withholding information, gradually gave way to a better
attitude towards information sharing. The terrorist threat was increasingly seen as a puzzle
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whose pieces would be held by each of the services. This synergy has obviously resulted in
the reinforcement of international cooperation. Finally, the tool, although always perfectible,
is operating.
However, the tool is not an end in itself, as the field of intervention is facing a factual
evolution in more widespread access to information even in the heart of non democratic
regimes, due to the global technological jump in the ICT, dissociated from political control.
In this international context, a real risk exists for developing a complex of being under siege.
The Internet is a space of freedom. The revolutions in the spring of 2011 have shown that the
Internet can become a vehicle for freedom of expression and democracy; but the tool of
communication must be differentiated from the tool of influence. To merge the impressive
development of a broader and more shared human communication, with the new possibilities
for influence offered on all sides, can prove to be a dangerous position. The principles of
fundamental freedom within networks, as well as the enforcement of the law, must therefore
be strongly reaffirmed. For all that, the question about the appropriation of a free, but still
fragile, network space, with the objective of destroying democratic processes, must be asked;
but the manner of posing this strategic question involves very different strategies. The
systematic adoption of the position of "defender", behind a technological Maginot line which
is impossible to build, and impossible to implement, can have two consequences. The first
one is that of strategic blindness, where in the mind, the packaging takes the place of the
contents, where the technological fetishism forbids any thinking outside of a defensive
doctrine. The subjection to a main logic of "defensive position" can serve interests which are
not those of France, or are not exploiting its real assets of diversity, influence and
ingeniousness. This would be most unfortunate as the promoters of defensive logics are most
often those most active in the R&D investments in offensive logics. It must be affirmed that a
purely defensive strategy is an illusion in an open digital world. The only viable strategy is
that of mobility, agility and evolutivity. The analyses in Section IV thus propose a necessary
improvement of our proactive posture by taking into consideration the new contours of the
terrorist threat. This necessitates a greater investment by all public stakeholders, and
potentially, the study of a posture adapted to our diplomatic organisation.
In this context, we need to break away from silo logic as soon as possible, and to generalize
consideration of security problems including civilian, economic, military as well as terrorist
dimensions. This reinforced cooperation between jurisdictions, highly recognised today for
excellence in expertise, must result in joint training programmes between representatives of
the diplomatic Chancery, our intelligence organisations and defence attachés. The purpose
here is not to develop a “pan strategic” vision of threat processing, but indeed to take into
account new factors, such as cybercrime, financing of terrorism, new proliferations and to
adapt our legislation and implement new intelligence tools [European Terrorist Finance
Tracking Programme (TFTP)].
Extensive training programmes which must get rid of ideological stamps
To suppress the vulnerabilities and shortcomings that have been presented here, requires of
course, securing existing technologies and developing new ones. But, interestingly, it seems
also clear that one of the most effective fighting tools is to improve the organisation and
training of human resources. The barriers here are much more of a psychological and
political than of a technical or financial nature. As far as "defence and security strategy" is
concerned, training should include many fields: Geopolitics, intelligence, cybercrime, law and
penal responses, etc. Indeed, the problem is cross-functional and includes several aspects:
Civil, health and environmental security, economic security, energy security, information
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systems security, critical systems security, etc. The imperative is firstly to break away from
compartmentalization, which is in itself a vehicle for irrational training and propagation of
sterile viewpoints which weaken and reduce the legitimacy of actions, even if they were
undertaken with the best intentions.
France offers high-level academic training (Master and Doctoral degrees), specialising in the
technological (computer security, cryptography) or legal security domains, but neither
organisational reliability nor resilience or safety have any real economic or social value
beyond the micro-industries of the security services and defence. This has several
consequences: The first one is the dissemination of knowledge with no scientific base,
bordering on "esoteric" incantation making our industries and listed facilities more
vulnerable, rather than safer. The second consequence is that we do not question the status of
the security officers in French big business, which originated from rulings and decrees dating
from the post Second World War era. As a result, a French sub-culture was created in these
domains which became a force of inertia rather than a vehicle for change. The third
consequence is that no study field in research and development (academic research) was
created for these domains which as a result suffer from a poor image and lack of modernity in
practices.
Development of a framework of reference for the themes, domains and methods for training
students
It seems essential to us that training focuses, with different definitions and different emphases,
on the three following aspects: The acquisition of a genuine security culture for the watch –
alert – response cycle at all levels of responsibility, even at the highest; the recognition of the
importance of human and organisational aspects in security; the realisation that many types of
threats can be analysed and managed by similar approaches. The training of our future
operational staff and leaders, who will have to manage various organisations in the course of
their careers, should be centred around these three key ideas. This of course, does not
preclude concentrating, during the initial training, on whatever types of threat (technical,
financial,…), but always insisting on systemic watchfulness and vision as much as on
technology.
Development of global availability of training covering all the domains and adapted to the
challenges, with various levels of specialisation
Existing training programmes will have to be thoroughly identified and studied in order to
interconnect with the frame of reference. This will allow for identification of gaps, then for
proposing possible developments and/or creating training programmes. The objective is not
to uniformly train all the students in security; the training offer should range from merely
awareness training to "specialised" training (for example in computer security). The idea is to
create a "shared security culture" by taking an interest in a wide variety of domains. In
addition to specialised training programmes, more “general” training programmes including a
broader range of subjects are therefore, without any doubt also necessary. In any case, it will
be necessary to make sure that interdisciplinarity, inherent in security and defence, is
preserved. In particular, it seems important to give “technical people” (whatever their level
might be) the required knowledge of the law, of intellectual property, of regulations (in
particular in respect of the protection of privacy), of human resources management, as well as
of the issues of psycho-sociology or of defence of individual liberties. These studies must no
longer be limited only to Master degree type training, but must also be offered in Bachelor,
Master and Doctorate courses.
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The training of teaching staff will also have to be examined. Although academic and
industrial experts will naturally be used as teachers, they may be in short supply in relation to
the requirements. They will therefore also have to be involved in the training of new teachers.
Awarding a label to make programmes of excellence recognisable
Training programmes will have to be recognisable and differentiable. In the United States of
America, 36 universities are labelled as “Centres of Academic Excellence in Information
Assurance Education”. Each year, new institutions can claim this label. An annual
conference (National Colloquium for Information Systems Security Education) presents the
training programmes and is a forum for the various stakeholders (public, industrial, academic)
to exchange ideas on all aspects linked to security training. It would surely be beneficial to
have an equivalent organisation in France (and even in Europe). Criteria will therefore have
to be identified to award this label to universities or to Grandes Ecoles (volume of training,
theme, job opportunities - and therefore identification of security jobs - number and level of
the students, level of the intervening parties, etc.). Identifying the relevance of the selected
criteria requires many questions to be answered: Who are to be the recipients of this labelling:
Students, employers, supervisory bodies? Will it be a form of occupational certification?
Will it be a generic label or must the label "mention" the training followed and its orientation?
Is the intention to label a diploma/degree, a final training year, a course of several years?
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SECTION V: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: SPATIAL ORGANISATION OF
SOCIETIES, CLIMATE, BIODIVERSITY, ENERGY, FOOD SAFETY.
Vice-President: François Darrort, ESCOM
Editorial Members: Catherine Baumont, Un. Burgundy, Maguy Bourbigot, Veolia; Catherine Feuillet, INRA; Isabelle Herlin,
INRIA; Isabelle Laudier, CDC; Hervé Le Treut, Un. Pierre & Marie Curie; François Lhoste, Un. René Descartes; Sandrine
Paillard, INRA; Serge Planton, Météo France; Lucile Hofman-Simon, Orange.
Member: Emmanuelle Reynaud, Un. Paul Cézanne
If one considers that what is strategic encompasses "any element, advent or change foreseen
in the future state of the economic, social, defence and security environment, calling for
preparation and response today so as to ensure sustainability and adequate transformation in
light of the anticipated change", then Sustainable Development is in essence strategic.
Although sustainable development is today considered by our fellow citizens mostly as an
approach to foster conservation of natural resources, it is more comprehensive. Its objective
is to define and implement viable and lasting patterns, which bring together the "three pillars"
- economic, social and environmental - of human activities, that each individual, organisation
and institution must now take into account. The purpose of sustainable development is to
strike a dynamic, coherent and viable balance among these three challenges in the long term.
This is a process of perpetual transformation where management of natural resources, choice
of investments, orientation of technical and institutional changes and organisation of the
economy cater for the needs of the present, while preserving the capacities of future
generations to cater for their own needs.
Sustainable development calls for simultaneous modification of a host of factors and for a
change in our modes of thinking. It involves coordination of efforts at all levels of society,
thereby compelling institutions and organisations to mobilise stakeholders to encourage
cooperation and dialogue. It requires far-reaching changes in training and research structures.
In that sense, sustainable development is a new paradigm: The idea is not to patch up or
renew our current development modes, but to invent an economic development model
compatible with social justice and preservation of the environment, hinged on new "objects"
of reflection and making it possible to ensure that needs are met while placing Man and his
environment at the heart of development.
We are still having trouble grasping this new reality, because our modes of thinking are often
unipolar and compartmentalized, and they struggle to initiate multidisciplinary approaches
and to grasp cross-functional themes. We cannot, therefore, envisage probable discontinuities
or creation of new objects, which we cannot yet imagine in their final form. Systemic
repercussions of a given event or action on social stability, national security or economic
defence in the medium or long term are poorly assessed. Training and information of citizens,
politicians and media are mostly undertaken in a mode that is not adapted to decision-making
and taking positions in an uncertain environment.
The vision of sustainable development discussed in this document is integrated into this
paradigm shift, and should lead us to ensure French economic, social and environmental
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security efficiently, sustainably, flexibly and resiliently. In particular, it should allow us to
anticipate responses to unforeseeable risks by encouraging the necessary decision-making in
very uncertain conditions and environments. Within this framework, research and training
become strategic (again) and represent the base to support the short term, grasp the long term
and innovate. They must be developed with a direct link to development and anticipation
projects which will make it possible to systemically connect the essential components of
sustainable development.
In this section, we propose five examples of pathways to explore, addressing issues which we
consider to be priority topics to implement a strategy that will genuinely lead to more
sustainable development.
Spatial organisation and territorial interaction
The spatial organisation of human activities (agricultural, industrial and tertiary, residential) is
structured by the location of the players. These locations are driven by choices between
accessibility of resources and the need for interaction (social, economic, institution, cultural)
that is necessary to undertake any activity.
In a world of "backyard capitalism"xv, each location is, so to speak, an entire economy where
stakeholders make their choices in a reduced territorial space given that the geographic,
social, cultural and institutional proximity they need to undertake their activities are present.
This comes down to reducing, or even cancelling, the impact of costs linked to interaction, in
particular costs linked to distances. This " archipelago economy" does not exist.
On the contrary, the "tyranny of distances" is the reality all stakeholders and all activities
must face. There are multiple interactions at all territorial levels (local, regional, national and
international). In these conditions, the choice of location is an organisational choice which
must effectively combine the benefits and the overall costs linked to activities. Essentially,
these are costs/benefits of being located at a given place and costs/benefits of transport and
communication with all the other places where the stakeholders we interact with are located.
The drop in transport, travel and communication costs has been an unprecedented accelerator
of globalisation of interactions and of construction of a "global geography of segmentation of
the value chain", carried by the hypothesis of "Death of Distance". The relative advantages of
each part of the world in terms of installation benefits/costs (where and how to produce?) are
weighed up against the costs of access to markets (where to sell?) in all the other parts of the
world. Relocating back-office units to regions with low production and installation costs is an
example of this world geography.
In that regard, two preconceived ideas still have many followers today. The first is that the
costs of exchanges is trifling compared with the cost of production. The second is that the
global geography of the value chain clearly separates production locations (the "developing
countries" or "outskirts") from innovation or knowledge production locations (the "developed
countries" or "Centres").xvi A simplified or easy assessment of what exchange costs cover
and how they evolve is the main cause of these two preconceived ideas.
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The far-reaching developments to come in exchange costs are likely to renew the geography
of the value chain and therefore make the issue of better knowledge of these costs strategic.
We need to enhance awareness of at least four issues:
- the first is that we are moving towards an increase in transport and travel costs, which could
be compensated by identifying new "developing countries" with lower production and
installation costs, where production units would relocate. The recent relocation of a Quebec
factory to the south of the United States illustrates this;
- the second is that the developed countries of today are becoming a less significant partner in
light of the growth of exchanges between developing countries (Asia, Africa, South America);
- the third is that the social cost of the increase of global exchange is not accompanied by an
analysis in economic, social and environmental terms;
- the fourth is that costs that make it possible to reduce the risks inherent to an uncertain
world, which guarantee the quality of transactions, are becoming essential.
Developments in the geography of exchanges, whether at the level of higher transport and
travel costs, the cost of raw materials or in connection with the flexibility that will be
implemented in locating activities and individuals (made possible, in particular, with
information and communication technologies), appear to represent an essential strategic
dimension in sustainable development.
We associate two strategic research fields with what has just been said:
Sustainable development and transport
Three closely interlinked dimensions characterise transport:
- an environmental aspect: Transport is the first national source of greenhouse gas emissions
and is responsible for local pollution, in particular in cities, with a long-distance component
(case of nitrogen oxide in the ozone footprint). But the current dependence of transport on
production of fossil resources makes it vulnerable, in particular in terms of cost;
- an economic aspect: As a high-growth sector with globalisation, it is at the heart of the
vulnerability of networks, related to just-in-time logistics for raw materials and goods,
exceptional phenomena of natural origin (storms, volcanoes, earthquakes, …) or human origin
(terrorism, deterioration of railway signals; …). Development of new modes of transport
involves significant technological and economic challenges (for example, development of
batteries and rare-earth access);
- a social aspect: This is a very competitive sector with high job-creation potential, which
conveys "social benefits" ("right" to mobility). Conflicts can have significant impact
(blocking or slowing down traffic).
In general, the available studies offer in-depth analysis of only one of these dimensions. A
systemic approach is therefore a major research challenge, in particular on strategic
challenges for medium-term development of transport modes.
Sustainable development and virtualities
ICT are a tool for sustainable development to serve society and the business sectors of our
country. They involve several dimensions, however, which makes comprehensive
understanding difficult. In particular:
They allow exchange of information and replace, or supplement, other determining
factors of exchange by transforming mobilities and flows. They therefore also
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increase vulnerabilities related to the weaknesses of communication systems and to
Cybercrime. New uncertainties are created, and we do not for all that have a precise
vision of the genuine savings achieved by ICT on the cost of transactions. Network
security, of which traceability is a part, thus becomes a major challenge.
They result in standardization of lifestyles and thinking owing to the flow of
information. This will give rise to conflict with resistance on preservation of cultural
specificities and knowledge which are essential to preserve the comparative
advantages of territories.
They make it possible to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This means that
dissemination of ICT, if supported by good practice incentives, can contribute directly
to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 7% by 2020, i.e. a third of the French
objective of 20% according to the current protocolsxvii. But they also have a carbon
footprint: Consumption of the ICT sector represented 7.3% of French electricity
consumption in 2008. The latter increased at a slower pace than use: 19% over 3 years
compared to a 40% increase in user equipment and a boom in uses. It is important to
take these aspects into account for future technological developments, by imposing
software environments allowing activity of useful resources and temporary shutdown
of unused resources.
The systemic dimension of implementation of these technologies at all levels of society and of
the business world has not yet been studied in depth. For example, the knowledge produced
by scientific communities is not always accessible (access rights, access cost, formats). ICT
should allow interoperability of databases so as to allow decision-makers to have an overall
view of this knowledge without jeopardizing security. Similarly, in cities, ICT have a major
role to play to allow network managers to collect and use significant quantities of information
in real time while preserving the security and freedom of citizens. In the field of exchanges, it
is becoming essential to assess the contribution of ICT in the transformation of flows and
mobilities and to see to what extent NICT contribute to increased efficiency of exchanges:
The worst case scenario for sustainable development would be an increase in exchanges, with
an increasing share of inefficient exchanges. As ICT are a basic medium for all components
of sustainable development, France must define a specific research effort in Information
Sciences and Technologies integrating this component from the very start of basic research.
Biodiversity and the concept of ecosystem service
The objective of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment launched by the UN in 2001 and
completed in 2005 was to "assess the consequences of ecosystem change for human well-
being and the scientific basis for action needed to enhance the conservation and sustainable
use of those systems and their contribution to human well-being". This work focused on the
concept of ecosystem services, distinguishing three types: 1) provisioning services (food,
fibres, genetic resources, biochemicals, etc.); 2) regulating services (regulation of air quality,
climate, water, erosion, disease and pest control, natural risks, pollination, etc.); 3) cultural
services (spiritual, aesthetic and religious values, recreational experiences and ecotourism).
The transformation of ecosystems was to a large extent the result of meeting rising demand
for food, water and wood (provisioning services) and therefore contributed to major gains in
terms of human economic development and well-being. However, these transformations also
gave rise to (and turn out to be the main cause of) greater poverty in certain categories of rural
populations in developing countries, those who depend the most on ecosystem services and
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who are consequently most vulnerable to any modifications affecting them. They resulted in
a substantial loss of biological diversity, a large part of which is irreversible, along with
weaker resilience of ecosystems.
Most of the ecosystem services studied (15 of the 24) suffered unprecedented deterioration
during the second half of the 20th century and are currently being used unsustainably. The
effect of this deterioration will be to decisively reduce the benefits that future generations
could derive from these ecosystems.
Furthermore, the transformation undergone by the ecosystems increases the probability of
sudden, accelerated and potentially irreversible changes, such as disease, "dead zones" in
coastal waters and climate disturbance at regional level.
Awareness of the threats posed by deterioration of ecosystems and of the opportunities that
sustainable management could offer remains very limited, whether among citizens or among
politicians.
Since the Rio conference, negotiators now start from the principle that Protection of Nature
must concern all life, a universal genetic heritage whose preservation is an essential condition
for adapting to change. But processes for allocation of resources devoted to preserving
biodiversity are still in question. Developing countries tend to ask for an open system, which
developed countries contest as they want to be able to control amounts and uses of the funds.
This has given rise to the idea of innovative funding, through the concept of payment for
environmental services. The corresponding decisions will be postponed to the next COP xviii
in 2012, in New Delhi.
To implement this concept, we need to allocate an economic value to environmental services.
Although CO2 emissions, noise and atmospheric pollution due to vehicles have been allocated
an economic value, no such value has been allocated to preservation of landscapes and
biodiversity. This inevitably results in less attention being devoted to damage to biodiversity,
which is then less considered when economic decisions are made. The absence of economic
valuation for many ecosystem services (in particular regulating services) which are not the
subject of market exchanges, is a major disincentive to better management.
The effects of modification of ecosystems are slow to appear, are subject to threshold effects
involving a high degree of uncertainty, can arise at a distance from the modification location
and can constitute a loss or a gain depending on the stakeholders and time-related horizons
under consideration. These difficulties partly explain the gaps in our knowledge of
implications of modification of ecosystems and our faulty management. Clarification of
causality links in the erosion of biodiversity, for example, remains a difficult operation. We
can have no doubts as to our genuine ignorance of the scale of causes of the phenomenon,
even if metrology is slowly making progress in this field.
We need to enhance our knowledge of ecosystem services in order to assess them and take
them into consideration in economic measurement tools (GDP, operating costs, investment
decisions).
Biodiversity of the marine environment is well worthy of special attention as it is significantly
underestimated. Its role is not well known and is not used enough, despite its importance in
climate change and the functioning of marine ecosystems, for human health (toxicity of water
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and shellfish), for the economy (marine energies, mining resources, coastal tourism, fishing)
and for biotechnologies (biofuels, bioactive molecules, nanotechnology)xix.
Our understanding of such complex systems as the marine and coastal environment is
surrounded by an imprecise and uncertain context with multi-source information in terms of
quantity and quality, such as "expert opinions".
Refocusing research and training on enhanced understanding of the consequences of the
exploitation of marine and coastal environments on the economy, the environment and society
must allow France to acquire sustainable operational resources and coordinated sector-based
policies for surveillance of the marine and coastal environment and management of marine
resources.
Climate and the need for interdisciplinary expertise at international and national levels
Climate is probably the most widely shared environmental resource (albeit unequally) among
the countries of the planet. Understanding its evolution can be undertaken only in a global
context, by reference to intergenerational solidarity (given that CO2, the first greenhouse gas
emitted by human activities, has an atmospheric lifespan of over a century). The issue of
climate and of its anthropic change offers one of the most advanced examples of what
international research and expertise can involve, and how this can be connected with the
national context. The first regular measurements of the composition of the atmosphere date
back to 1957, and as early as the 1970s, the inexorable increase in atmospheric levels of
carbon dioxide had become an almost indisputable experimental fact. In 1979, Professor
Charney presented a first report to the American Academy of Sciences, the findings of which
are still valid today (and are reinforced by additional confidence due to climate change which
is essentially going in the direction already announced at the time). Very soon, the scientific
community started organising its work at international level with a dual mode, implementing:
coordinated research programmes at the level of major academic institutions, in
particular at the level of the ICSU (International Council of Scientific Unions), the
WMO (World Meteorological Organization), and the UNESCO Intergovernmental
Oceanography Commission. The World Climate Research Programme (WCRP),
focusing on physical aspects of climate change and the International Geosphere-
Biosphere Programme (IGBP), focused on certain chemical and biological aspects,
have made it possible to define coordinated action among the different countries to
study the atmosphere, oceans and continental surfaces. More recently, programmes
linked to collection of environmental data (GEO/GEOSS) were created. The action of
these international programmes is very often concrete and operational (coordination of
sea campaigns, satellite observation, etc.)
a panel of experts, the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), under the
aegis of the United Nations Environment Programme and of the WMO.
These initiatives arose not long before the Earth Summit in Rio (1992) and played a
significant role in implementation of a United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, which made it possible to organise "Conventions of Parties"xx almost annually. This
research structured at international level is rapidly evolving. Several years ago, a structure
called ESSP (Earth System Science Partnership) was created, aimed at uniting the action of
the WCRP, the IGBP, but also programmes linked to the study of biodiversity (DIVERSITAS
programme), to socio-economic aspects (IHDP, International Human Dimension Programme),
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around cross-functional themes such as water and availability of water, the carbon cycle. The
term "Earth System" now commonly defines all the components of the global environment of
the planet which interact through physical, chemical and biological mechanisms.
For a country like France, the connection and relationship of its national research with this
international research represents a strategic issue, namely that of independence of national
thinking.
French research represents approximately 4% to 5% of the international research effort, and in
this field concerning the global environment of the planet and involving all the different
regions of the world totally interdependently, it is impossible to be isolated. The challenges
of this research are huge and are affected by conflict of interest between States, industries and
different land uses. It is vital that France have an autonomous capacity to analyse them:
Breakdown of efforts to reduce greenhouse gases, global food safety, continuous access to
water resources, possible definition of a responsibility of developed countries in future
climatic accidents (for example, prolonged drought in North Africa, with the possible use of
"green funds" to prevent the consequences), anticipation of geographical changes with
significant economic consequences (for example, opening of new maritime routes in the
Arctic regions, mining or oil production in these regions, …), assessment of sector-based
impacts (agriculture, energy, health,…).
At the level of global environment sciences, France must have a research capacity and an
interdisciplinary expert assessment capacity (the two notions of research and expert
assessment must be differentiated at national and at international level). It must not lag
behind the work coordinated by international programmes, but must, on the contrary, be
capable of acting at all times upstream of the problems identified, and acquire the tools
required for international negotiations.
Reducing energy dependence
Without energy and in particular electricity, a region or country would be reduced to
functional helplessness. Without available electricity, all the major economic flows would be
totally disorganised, depriving the Nation of any possibility of coordination,
telecommunications, transport or production. The issue of strategy related to production,
storage and distribution of energy (electrical energy in particular) is therefore a priority, given
that all other activities depend on it.
In the field of energy, the strategy chosen is necessarily the result of a vision enlightened by
economic, environmental and societal considerations, which commits the future of the Nation
as an economic power. Acceptance, or even consensus, involves adequate information of
citizens, who are very influenced by one-off spectacular accidents. Coordination of all the
other flows, production, transport, information, command and consumption depend on
electricity supply. Reducing energy dependence and therefore vulnerability linked to
centralised distribution involves several channels: Promoting the concept of decentralised
energy, encouraging alternative productions that are as local and/or individual as possible,
improving network safety by creating local mega-storage units, organising the power
distribution system network as a grid and ensuring control of electricity demand.
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Decentralised energy benefits from significant attention in many countries because the costs
related to centralised systems are increasing: Renewal of facilities, transport, storage,
distribution, all sorts of constraints, in particular environmental and social, increase the costs
or even prevent the development of systems. The most significant example is that of creation
or strengthening of very-high voltage lines, which is often impossible owing to opposition
from the population.
In France, decentralised energy should be better integrated into the institutional and legal
framework. The issue is often considered only from the viewpoint of contribution to the
network of small production facilities, remaining within the framework of general
programming of production facilities and networks. We do not, however, place value on the
specific advantages of decentralised production from the viewpoint of territorial management
of energy, whether developing local resources, flexibility or secure supply, in a word, positive
externalities due to decentralised energy. The new development pattern should be based on a
"territory-based logic" stimulating the emergence of decentralised energy, but above all
control of electricity demand. A debate on adapting the by-laws of the national electricity
company EDF for that purpose could probably support development of this territorial logic.
Without prejudging the national strategy chosen for electricity production, production of
electricity of nuclear origin in low-power reactors (50 to 100 MW) could represent another
possible form of decentralised production. France indisputably has internationally-recognized
expertise in this field. It is important to keep this expertise by implementing adequate
research programmes in the field of constant improvement of safety, but also in the possible
design of these small nuclear reactors. We could consider this type of alternative to replace or
supplement the nuclear power plants currently in operation, which are very centralised and
very high-power reactors (often 4 units from 1250 to 1500 MW).
We need to reflect on the issue of decentralised energy production. This means: Deriving the
benefits of development of local resources and of the increase in self-consumed individual
production.
Diversification through use of new energies is recommended in order to reduce vulnerabilities
and lower dependence on accidental, political or economic events in the medium- and long
term. Such events could take very different forms: Slow drop in availability of available
resources or sudden crises. The energy bill linked to these new sources of energy must,
however, remain acceptable and allow the country to be competitive in a climate of social
peace.
For each potential source of production, we therefore need an economic analysis of the entire
production cycle, from obtaining and processing the raw material, building production
equipment (integrating the energy content of all the elements) and end-of-life processing of
the equipment (an important factor even for soft energies in particular owing to the energy
content of equipment components and/or to production of fuels (biodiesel)). In this way, we
have the effective (comparable) cost of the KWh produced by the different industries, after
having applied, in each case, the effective service factor (the actual utilization rate of the
equipment). This factor is obviously very different if one compares, for example, a nuclear
plant to a wind turbine or a power dam.
In-depth scientific assessment is therefore indispensable, and although several reports have
already been written on these themes, it is essential to update and complete them constantly.
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Even a temporary failure in the distribution network (terrorism, load shedding) would have
significant consequences. We therefore need to reinforce the reliability of the network by
installing energy storage equipment, for example very high power relay batteries (an existing
technology which is already used abroad). These high-power storage cells could safeguard
the operation of sensitive equipment in the event of power cuts and regulate the network (peak
shaving) by storing energy in off-peak times so as to return it at peak times, making it
possible to achieve better dimensioning of equipment. It would also make it possible to
improve the service factor of alternative energies (wind energy, photovoltaics), which provide
energy intermittently, or even randomly.
We need to reflect on the issue of improved reliability of the network through installation of
storage systems.
There is a need to maintain effective regulation and a right of access to public services.
Guaranteed service should be ensured based on reserve capacity, external supply or
emergency load curtailment. The distribution network could be organised as an
interconnected grid, where nodes would alternately be the client or the electricity supplier (of
the ElectraNet type).
Finally, combined with everything that has already been said, better use of energy would also
make it possible to reduce vulnerability. In this field, French policies are not very restrictive
and often focus on tax incentives, which are somewhat opportunistic and have limited
efficiency. Local production of electricity combined with the use of smart elements in and
around the electricity network could make it possible to reduce both energy consumption and
energy cost.
A major national research plan on energy savings should be launched, with quantified and
compulsory objectives, with a view to improving energy efficiency.
World food safety
The food crises of 2007-2008 and the threat of reoccurrence and worsening of such crises, in a
context of volatility of agricultural prices, have placed food safety challenges in the spotlight.
They raise the issue of a possible structural tension between the growth potential of
agricultural production and a marked and quick increase of food demand boosted by
demographic growth and economic development of emerging countries. They confirm the
figures published by the FAO which reveal that after the drop observed since the 1970s, the
number of malnourished people in the world is again on the increase since the middle of the
1990s and has reached approximately a billion people.
A certain number of factors justify the concern about our capacity to increase agricultural
production (again). First and foremost, after the marked increase of agricultural yields
promised by the green revolution, many studies observe a stagnation, or even a drop in yields
(per hectare) since the 1990s, for many types of crops. Then, the controversial development
of agricultural land devoted to production of agro-energies is likely to reduce the potential of
arable land for food purposes. Moreover, climate change has and will have increasing impact
on agricultural production. It has an impact both on yields and on availability of arable land.
Although this impact could be positive between now and 2050 up to certain temperature
increase levels and for certain parts of the world (particularly in developed countries), it will
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be negative in many developing countries, which are precisely those suffering the most
already from food insecurity. Furthermore, the deterioration of average yields linked to the
occurrence of extreme climatic events could increase in certain regions owing to increased
frequency and intensity of some of these events, related to climate change (in particular the
extension of drought areas and intensification of rainfall that could lead to flooding).
Climate change also has an indirect impact on agriculture through control policies. Above
and beyond the effects of biofuel development intended to reduce the dependence of transport
on fossil energies, the effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, in which agriculture must
play a part, has an impact on its development. According to the work of the IPCC, agriculture
today accounts for 14% of emissions at global level (approximately half of which are due to
the use of nitrogenous fertilizers), to which we need to add changes in land use (including
deforestation) which accounts for 18% to 20% of emissions by withdrawal, and is to a
significant extent attributable to extension of cultivated land. Increased scarcity and cost of
fossil energies reinforce the need to reduce the dependence of agriculture on input of fossil
origin. Finally, more generally, "modern" agricultural production systems put pressure on
natural resources and on the environment (pollution, loss of biodiversity, greenhouse gas
emissions, soil erosion, pressure on water resources, etc.) which sometimes irreversibly
deteriorates the ecosystem services on which our future agricultural production capacities in
fact depend.
Concomitant to the increase in constraints impacting agricultural production potential, the
demand for agricultural products continues to increase rapidly. On the one hand, the world
population doubled between 1960 and 2000, and will again be multiplied by 1.5 between
2000 and 2050, increasing from 6 to 9 billion according to the median projections of the UN,
which then forecast a drop in world population. On the other hand, economic growth and
rapid urbanisation in emerging countries have given rise to a change in diet of the urban
population, characterized by an increase in the total calorie intake and in the proportion of
products of animal origin. This "food transition" tends to reduce inequalities in access to food
(in particular of protein origin), which are still significant among the different regions of the
world, although this has not been accompanied by a drop in the number of malnourished
persons, 80% of which are rural. However, it raises the disturbing question of the pressure
that would be placed on natural resources if the diets of the world population as a whole were
based on the western model. In that respect, the share of products of animal origin in the diet
is decisive because today, at world level, approximately a quarter of the plant calories
produced are intended for animal feed whereas animal calories represent only 16% of calories
consumed on average. The increase in the share of animal products in our diet (which reaches
30% in the OECD countries) will therefore increase the need for land, water, and other
production factors and input.
Faced with this observation (increasing pressure on food resources and marked trend towards
increased food needs), it is not surprising that Malthusian concerns are now raised again: Will
our natural resources be enough to feed a population of 9 billion? It is not surprising either
that agricultural production is now again considered as a strategic activity, whether at
economic, financial or geopolitical level.
This renewed interest in agriculture should not, however, omit a certain number of realities
and challenges that are not expressed in the simple equation of supply and demand dynamics
at global level.
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First of all, the available resources (natural and technological) we have today would be
sufficient to feed 9 billion people properly (i.e. food availability of approximately 3000
kilocalories per person and per day), while reducing the pressure of agriculture on natural
resources. Secondly, food insecurity today is not due to insufficient production of foodstuffs
at global level, but to problems related to access to food for the poorest populations. To find a
remedy for these access problems, creation of wealth in developing countries is a decisive
factor, and in many of these countries, wealth creation opportunities are found essentially in
agriculture. Moreover, substantial yield increases can be achieved there with relatively low
investments. To quote but one example, reduction of post-harvest losses (which represent 20
to 40% of production in developing countries) by developing storage infrastructures offers
significant possibilities to increase food availability, without additional pressure on
ecosystems. More generally, as emphasized by Olivier De Schutter, the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, on the basis of a broad review of literature,
experiments to implement agro-ecological farming methods have proved their capacity to
increase the production and income of farmers in developing countries while protecting the
soils, water and climate. Finally, considering that convergence of diets towards the western
model will be the driving force that will define growth rates of world food demand in the
decades to come is clearly not unfounded in light of current trends, but is hardly compatible
with a sustainable development path. Western diets are marked by excessive calorie intake, in
particular of animal origin, compared with nutritional recommendations, which is reflected in
the increase of ailments related to excess weight and obesity (in 2005, 1.3 billion adults in the
world were overweight, 400 million of which were obese) and in a very disturbing increase in
the social and economic costs involved. Concomitantly, western food consumption modes are
marked by significant waste, which represents 20 to 35% of food purchased. It is therefore
not desirable for diets throughout the world to copy the western diet, whether for human
health or for the health of ecosystems.
Sustainably meeting the challenge of food safety is a particularly difficult objective to
achieve. Summing it up as an issue of increasing agricultural production at global scale will
not bring any improvement. As is the case for most sustainable development challenges, this
challenge compels us to design a strategy relying on levers within the scope of what we have
up to now tended to consider on a sector-based and compartmentalized basis: Agriculture,
energy, climate, regulation of exchanges, competing use of resources (in particular soils and
water), research, reducing losses and waste, food and nutrition, development and the fight
against poverty… to quote only the most obvious examples.
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SECTION VI: COMPLEX SYSTEMS, DISASTER AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT, HEALTH
AND NATURAL RISKS
Vice-President: Olivier Blin, Un. Méditerranée.
Editorial Members: Pascal André, SNCF; Christine Bamière, SGDSN; Jacky Casanova, IEFF; Eric Châtelet, UT
Troyes; Corinne Lagache, SAFRAN; Patrick Lagadec, Ecole Polytechnique; François Lefaudeux, Académie des
Technologies; Igor Nikiforov, UT Troyes; Jacques Valancogne, INERIS; Jean Luc Wybo, Ecole des Mines
Member: E. Michel-Kerjean, Ecole Polytechnique.
Systems, whether of the socio-technical or organisational type, are increasingly complex -
both at internal level and at the level of their environment. They evolve increasingly rapidly
and most often unforeseeably. These "systems" are therefore weakened with the risk of no
longer being able to meet the objectives set. Their resistance is all the more vital if they have
a strategic importance for the society and country they serve and if any malfunction could
have significant impact in the medium or long term.
Processes, the structure of organisations, the training of stakeholders who work in these
systems, the methods and tools used to design or manage them, already appear not to cater for
the level of complexity (everything is interrelated with multiple impacts), unpredictability,
uncertainty and developments (modification of one element can have an impact on other
elements). Moreover, technology, which has invaded all levels and all functions, has become
indispensable and weakens our systems when it fails.
It is therefore urgent and strategic to acquire new behaviour and knowledge, which will make
system design and maintenance easier by making systems less sensitive to changes in
paradigms or hypotheses, to various events, attacks and failures and to developments of all
types, and the challenges that concern them turn out to be strategic for the Nation.
To acquire such knowledge, we need to take into account the different types of events that can
threaten these systems. For the sake of convenience, we propose to distinguish two major
types, so as to go into more detail and better clarify challenges and necessities.
From technical security to major risks
The first domain is that of specific accidental events. The spectrum to be taken into account
(to confine ourselves to the technical and industrial fields) ranges from accidents that can
harm those who work in risk facilities to those that can create significant problems for certain
locations, dynamics or components of our societies. A great deal of work has been done in
this field in recent decades: Risk assessment, risk management, risk communication. Since
the end of the 1960s (Feyzin, 1966) and especially in the 1970s and 1980s (Flixborough,
1974; Seveso, 1976; Bhopal, 1984), special attention has been devoted to large-scale risks,
those that go beyond the industrial boundary and therefore raise new questions in technical,
economic and political terms. This is the field of "major risks".
This topic is well documented, the general and technical frameworks have constantly been
analysed in greater depth and detail, in particular through the development of comprehensive
and in-depth approaches grouped under the name of "science of danger" or Cindynics (JY
Kervern). "Best practices" have been increasingly fine-tuned and shared (in-depth defence,
lessons learned, simulation, teaching, etc.). Within this domain, research needs to be
continued, in particular with respect to issues related to steering complex systems, general
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regulation, empowering populations, communication in the Internet era and social networks.
This is what Thomas Kuhn describes as "normal science" working on residual anomalies
within established paradigms. This approach is very necessary as a lot still needs to be done
to constantly adjust our skills, to develop the culture of risks and of crises. Security, both here
and elsewhere, demands a constant and continuous investment.
From major risks to very large-scale crises
But a second domain, which is much more foreign to our thinking and action habits, must be
covered, namely that of events which no longer really fall within the previous category: Their
consequences go way beyond the "neighbourhood of the facility" or the fields of validity of
the pre-established plans or insurance cover taken out for exceptional circumstances. These
are very large-scale crises which could jeopardize the vital balance of our systems. Moreover,
the event-based approach is very insufficient here: The field of major crises is that of systems
which are themselves weakened in their balance, bases and fundamental texture.
This reality is not totally new, of course (Black Death, "Spanish" flu, crisis of 1929, etc.). But
everything seems to indicate (in particular world reinsurance files) that what was a totally
exceptional occurrence before is now tending to become much more common, and even the
principle of risks and crises observed today. Over the last decades, a few events have started
to stake out this territory: Chernobyl, 1986; the 1999 storms; the "mad cow" issue; the 2003
heat-wave, etc. A certain number of major shocks even more clearly marked the opening or
density of this vital shock front: The attacks of September 11, 2001, the explosion of the AZF
plant in Toulouse and its impact on the French aeronautics capital, the SARS and H1N1
epidemics in 2003 and 2009 marked at least by their quick propagation, if not by their
intrinsic seriousness, the financial crisis of 2008 and its considerable destruction potential, the
problem created by the volcano in Iceland and its effects on European and therefore
international aviation, etc.
As we speak, the triple shock in Japan, with its abyssal questions for the third world power,
and its possible aftershocks - for which none of us has a map - in the economies of the world
(given that the disaster affected the nerve centre for electronic components, of vital
importance for the world) emphasises to what extent our visions, our approaches, our tools,
have become totally inadequate to handle major security challenges. Risks and crises, which
were until now serious but secondary problems compared with major challenges such as
dissuasion and "national security", have suddenly become issues of a higher order.
Jushua Cooper Ramo emphasized in his book The Age of the Unthinkable: "Kissinger and his
generation had the dissuasion problem to deal with. Our generation has resilience on its
agenda". This new established fact raises considerable questions in terms of research. One
might even say, more precisely, in terms of "exploration", because we now leaving familiar
paradigms. To use the words of Thomas Kuhn, the idea here is to go beyond the mere work
on residual anomalies to consider the paradigms we need to build, and the new worlds of
knowledge and operational action we need to invent. This is basic and applied research
around issues of non linearity, complexity, "chaotic" dynamics which call for other types of
intelligence, leadership, information, operational action. What has already been undertaken in
terms of a "Quick Thinking Force", for example, is a first attempt at progress, but it is limited
compared with the issues at hand.
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A few illustrative examples
Mediator, a drug registered as a treatment for diabetes, but in fact mainly prescribed and
refunded as an appetite suppressant, was associated with the occurrence of valvular heart
disease. In 2011, this crisis was genuinely traumatic for the entire drug industry, whether
public or private. As a result, citizens lost confidence in that drug in particular, and in the
health system in general. The initial warning was given by the regional drug safety
monitoring centres, and was taken up by a "whistleblower". What went wrong here is the
time it took to assess the risk and the delay in the decision-making process, caused, amongst
other things, by lack of coordination among stakeholders, increased by division of institutions.
A number of tectonic plates that move slowly but surely, that accumulate pressure, provoke
faults and lead to disaster! This means that it is not by adding supervisory bodies that we will
better regulate the drug chain. It is by ensuring that they are consistent, complementary and
coordinated.
Another example is the H1N1 flu crisis, a model of representation of "danger flows" in three
themes: Threats, challenges and capacity for action. The background preparatory work
consisted of drawing up a plan. Management of the crisis was entrusted to other stakeholders,
who did not necessarily have in-depth knowledge of the plan, and who on top of that had to
deal with uncertainty on data. This clearly resulted in overestimating the threat or at least in
difficulty with managing uncertainty (reference to H5N1 and its possible mutations),
overestimating challenges (overestimation of the number of potential victims and the impact
on society) and opposite that, unsuitable capacity for action, in particular in terms of
communication and reaction: Inadequate anticipation based on the lessons learned in the
countries affected first, choice of a rigid vaccination plan, inappropriate communication,
insufficient epidemiological data (without systematic testing of the flu patients), exclusion of
certain health professionals from the system.
The Fukushima accident, which we are still experiencing now, is an example of a crisis that
combines kinetics which are both quick (damage to the facilities caused by the tsunami) and
slow (evolution of operating and maintenance conditions). We cannot learn lessons
immediately. Moreover, the specificities of Japanese culture add an element of complexity to
the analysis, in particular by the importance of the notion of "losing face" and by the
compulsory consensus dimension prior to any decision. This was observed during a previous
nuclear accident in Japan (criticality accident in the manufacture of fuel in Tokai-mura at the
end of the 1990s), which showed the disadvantage of too much regulatory and procedural
rigidity, pushing stakeholders to bypass by using a series of subcontractors and, finally, at the
end of the chain, by entrusting the work to staff who were not trained and not supervised.
The ash cloud due to the Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland in 2010 showed the weaknesses
of crisis coordination at European level, combined with another factor, which is typical of any
unforeseen crisis: The difficulty of obtaining precise data on the situation, as well as a
scientific expert analysis, within a very short time frame. This led to excessive use of the
precautionary principle in air transport.
Defining the intention: Strategic development and defence of complex systems
Resilience
The resilience of a technical, human or social system does not lie in its mere capacity of
sturdiness or "resistance" to phenomena that threaten its integrity and perenniality. The
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resilience of a system lies in its agility, both human and systemic, capable of undertaking the
necessary transformation before reaching its breaking point.
The problem with contemporary crises is not a problem of lack of knowledge or of
unpredictability: Most crises that contemporary societies have to face, although they are rarely
anthropocentric, show all the acceleration or triggering factors which are, to a greater or lesser
degree, linked to human phenomena or known ex ante. Uncertainty has therefore moved from
the probability of occurrence of a single event (e.g. earthquake on the San Andreas fault), to
uncertainty on possible resonance arising from variability and combination of events which
were until then considered to be autonomous, and managed separately.
The origin of variability can be natural, combination-based or contingent (for example, a
climate phenomenon combined with industrial vulnerability like at Fukushima), or interstitial
(the risk being generated at the interface of several high-risk systems). The response to this
type of risk or to systemic risk cannot be managed by merely and opportunistically moving
capacities. It requires far-reaching reform, not of management of civil security and safety, but
of human behaviour within all organisations, whether public or private, military or civilian.
The strategic challenge of the years to come is indeed to develop mutual attention, fair
processing of information, careful listening, both vertically and laterally, in our companies
and public authorities. The main weakness lies in refusing to learn from failure.
A resilient system cannot be optimal (this is a choice) with respect to production objectives
but can continue to operate in the event of serious disruptions (under stress, for example
terrorism, luggage abandoned in transport), even with a paradigm shift (hypotheses and
postulates).
How can we avoid effects due to habit, to clans that form, to system responses unadapted to
daily realities, to filtering, to more or less consistent or more or less accurate mental
illustration, to antinomic cultures, to restrictive and specialised languages, to reactions faced
with novelty?
Management of uncertainty and misuse of the "precautionary principle"
Management of uncertainty has an influence on decisions based on the time scales and on the
life cycle stages of the complex systems concerned:
in a design situation: The choice among the applicable methods and the relevance of
available information give rise to uncertainty as to the socio-technical organisation of
the future system designed, potentially a source of risk and of non resilience factors;
in a supervision and anticipation situation: The uncertainty related to behaviour and
available knowledge faced with a risk involve implementation of the "precautionary
principle", the role of which should be considered as a driving force to better grasp the
situation so as to decide and act (reducing uncertainties, better extraction of "weak
signals");
in a crisis situation: The lack of information on the situation and on reality in the field,
as well as inconsistency between the expected events (plans) and the actual events,
represent uncertainties that need to be managed.
We need to go beyond the usual tropisms:
purely governmental interpretation (maintaining institutional order, "strategy =
national defence" association, legislative action which is prescriptive and top-down),
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focus on crises/disasters (on material events that stand out) rather than on gradual
developments (accidents rather than phase transitions),
defensive logic (exogenous threat, restriction of activity under pressure, protection
rather than projection) to the detriment of a proactive logic.
A resilient system is a whole: We must simultaneously deal with prevention aspects (avoiding
the dreaded event), protection of vulnerable stakes and safeguarding (reducing the impact
related to the accident or crisis and increasing system robustness) with the ultimate objective
of furthering the development and competitiveness of systemsxxi. National weakness as
regards data and calls for tenders concerning direct observation and the qualitative primary
data must be corrected.
Improving resistance by supervision
Development of more effective technological and organisational supervision structures would
be fundamental, in order to better detect weak signals and to transform the data into
meaningful information. This calls for an overall vision in order to detect abnormal elements
among elements that appear to be "normal" by linking information and not neglecting any fact
a priori. Increased anticipation capacity involves having information that makes it possible to
characterize the situation and its evolution, if only to identify whether it corresponds to
established plans or whether it is necessary to implement other approaches. This implies that
means of receiving and conveying information are planned as soon as systems are designed
and also calls for clear progress in phenomenology.
Avoiding consanguinity
Diversification at the level of manpower, organisation and technology is necessary to be able
to better resist events, uncertainties, attacks and aspects which are more or less unforeseen.
This implies additional "genes", that are not necessarily totally appropriate in nominal
functioning, to be able to react more effectively to situations. For example, with regard to
skills, it is important to have people from different horizons and educational backgrounds in
order to avoid identical but inaccurate mental illustrations or solving a problem in the same
way but not appropriately in certain situations or having received certain information.
Likewise, excessively increasing the number of rules or procedures to cover everything that
has ever happened does not always allow appropriate reactions to what is foreseen (owing to
errors due to overlap) and is certainly not helpful when an unforeseen situation arises. What
trade-off should we adopt between requirements and initiative? A third aspect concerns the
decision-making process. Is a decision by a single player, even if s(he) is very well advised,
consistent with a very critical level of risk? Should we not have a broader consensus by a
multidisciplinary team?
The search for simplicity in systems and without excessive risk (uncertain control)
Objectives that are too strict as regards production, that restrict room for manoeuvre with
respect to risks, principles used to the limits or liable to generate excessive risks, give rise to
more complex systems, thereby reducing control. Special attention should be devoted to these
systems to examine whether other solutions could be considered: Different principles,
possible reduction of vulnerability or of the level of attack, threat or danger considered to be
weaker, reducing the risk by dispersing the risk …
Development and promotion of models
Models (mathematical, logical, statistic) make it possible to represent all the situations linked
to complex systems with a certain level of abstraction. They also make it possible to use the
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different theoretical mathematical tools to study and optimise the functioning of the different
objects that take part in the typical scenarios for resistance of complex systems.
Technological development inevitably goes hand in hand with work on the concept of
operation, compatibility with regulations and social acceptability.
Moreover, a certain number of questions must be answered: What are the limits of
probabilistic calculations on very small samples, and considering the level of knowledge of
certain phenomena? What is the level of independence of events? How can we assess the
influence of common modes given the overall objectives to be achieved? What complexity of
scenarios should be taken into account?
Organisation and management of systems
According to sectors, examine management processes and models (customer-supplier
relationship, steering by quantified objective) to determine their effect (positive or negative)
on responsiveness of organisations, their capacity to innovate and grow, their responsiveness
and resilience.
Decision-making and antidote to resistance
Modern societies are confronted with "the end of certainties" and weakened by a new
vulnerability. This leads to a conservative reaction with increasing "rigidity" of institutions,
turning in on oneself and harmful unadventurousness. Creativity and flexibility are vital to
think and act in the unknown, in instability or even chaos. Our public debates are dominated
by rhetoric whereas only well-founded communication is effective. These debates are
governed by the short term, immediacy and simplification, whereas we should extend our
action over a broad spectrum of time, from current events to geological time. France is
particularly individualistic: We have difficulty coping with the need for collective action.
Relying on ad hoc networks and on a science of risk and crisis is the only realistic way to
enlighten political, managerial and operational choices and to be able to implement them. In
fine, this context significantly hinders training of managers, on the one hand, and the
necessary organisational changes, on the other hand. We need to make this key action
compulsory. Managers need situation scenarios that instil new individual dynamics and
organisations need "control loops" such as lessons learned feedback (REX)xxii which reinforce
collective action, as long as this is done with suitable transparency, without taboo or blockage.
Managerial credibility and competence are clearly pushed to the front, but are also challenged.
In practice, strong recommendations include the feasibility study for implementation of a
"quick intervention network" with a lessons learned unit, to handle crises including those that
start outside French territory (H1N1, Fukushima,…), use of behavioural approaches to risk
that have proved their worth such as the "High Reliability Organization", development of
manager training and more generally inclusion of these themes in the curricula of schools that
train future managers.
Crisis management and citizen impact
Today, both the crisis and the after-crisis have been studied in great detail by governments.
Although they are not always homogenous, plans are available and have been tested
dispassionately on many topics (nuclear issues, CBRN, floods, terrorist attacks, computer
attacks). On the other hand, prevention and real application of these plans remains
perfectible, given that populations are not always well prepared for prevention and securing
reactions, faced with the suddenness of real crises. How can we ensure the social cohesion
necessary for resilience faced with natural events and human aggression?
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An idea to explore and to implement more resolutely is the public communication/trust
aspect, addressed from the experimental viewpoint, that of human sciences or epidemiology.
Confronted with stress, identify modifications in decision-making, cognitive, cultural
(individualism, education of the population) and sociological data that determine
behaviour/perception of populations in a crisis situation (the British during the Blitz, the
Japanese at Fukushima), factors that create social bonds, solidarity, or, on the contrary,
individualism, selfishness, or even denial. Although it is always easier to reach a consensus
on a negative vision or "Black-washing" - this is still a very general trait of the human mind -
the positive evolution of France and beyond that of Europe presupposes that a consensus be
reached on a positive ambition related to associated risks, which cannot be separated from the
exercise of choice, control, monitoring. What connections, what prevention is needed
upstream? What top-level commitment is required?
France, Europe and major crises
Given that crises are more numerous (origins and interconnection between events) and more
serious, we need to have quick action solutions available, both to prevent crises and to
manage them. In many cases, France will no longer be able to act alone, for lack of resources.
Deriving a benefit from the expertise and experience of other countries to define our national
strategy, especially within the framework of the CSFRS mission, is one of our priorities. This
involves developing the initial curiosity of leaders about what is happening abroad, and to
learn lessons in at least three fields: What organisation modes are they implementing, what
crises are they facing and what are (objectively) their successes and their failures.
Until recently, in particular in 2011 with the Fukushima crisis, it appeared illusory to consider
preparing a common strategy at European level, in light of what we have observed in terms of
weakness of the "European voice" and discord between countries, each time a crisis arises
(whether technological, natural, or military). Faced with crises as serious as the one that
Japan is facing today, it would appear to be desirable that international bodies be prepared to
face risks and crises that are not "part of the script", in fields where the threat is already
identified (civil aviation), at least at European level – and that this be included in the agenda
at top level - because without this inclusion, the issue will remain buried at tactical levels in a
difficult position to consider new rules of the game. The principles and rules of this
cooperation, introducing, in particular, the concepts of reciprocity, must be defined carefully
so as to strive for a global optimum in terms of anticipation and reaction, while developing
competitiveness of the nation.
How can we develop expertise and experience in different fields so as to legitimately
influence/determine European standards?
How can we teach and educate populations? How can we obtain media participation?
How can we increase our capacity to develop decompartmentalization between the
"public" and "private" sectors in France? To merge the competence and
responsiveness of our answers, very pragmatic elements are at stake: Increasing
recognition of qualifications, remuneration, "career" exchange, without losing
everything that has been gained. The diversity of experience and career paths must
become an acknowledged asset. First and foremost, we need to have a common
understanding of events, to create a "level playing field" among stakeholders to avoid
a rigid decision-making process.
We need to ensure smoother exchanges, intelligence, to design a modus operandi to imagine a
reinforced European consensus, which is more resilient and more innovative. What levers
does France have to reach this goal?
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We are currently experiencing a profound paradigm shift. Like at any turning point, the
reward will go to those who will best be able to decode the situation and offer new and
fruitful solutions. Forget the utopian and hackneyed idea of claiming to stop science and
technical development – it is pointless to think any further in that direction whose only merit
is that of being self-evident; don't imagine that the power of thought can remove risk: We will
have to carry on living with it! The search for a new path is perhaps at the crossroads
between methods of design, implementation, management and maintenance of major systems,
methods supported by precise digital simulation techniques, and training and information of
men and women, whether those who will be entrusted with such duties in and around systems,
those who govern, or, above all, citizens who benefit or, on the contrary, suffer.
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SECTION VII: RISKS AND ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REGULATION
Vice-President: Nicole El Karoui, Ecole polytechnique.
Editorial Members: Michel Aglietta, Un. de Paris X; Hervé Juvin, EuroGroup Institute; Jacques Rojot, Un. de Paris II.
Members: Sylvie Diatkine, Un. de Paris XII; Stève Gentili, BRED; Catherine Lubochinsky, Un. de Paris II; André Orléan,
EHESS; Charles Prats, Budget Ministry; Anne Perrot, Competition Council; Laure Quenouëlle-Corre, Un. de Paris I.
The French presidency of the G20 is under the auspices of imbalances: Balance of payments,
primary resources, levels of wealth in the world. We know that the third theme is a sort of
silly-season story that bears witness to the bad conscience of the leaders of rich countries. It
should be recalled that we will be nowhere near achieving the Millennium Development
Goals and that development aid is way below the already very modest commitments, with the
exception of the Scandinavian countries. In fact, we would go a long way towards solving
poverty problems by investing massively in the food product offer.
Controversies on global imbalance
The last five years were marked by financial crises which bear witness both to the
achievements and to the hazards of global finance. When finance is globalised, there is no
reason for savings and investment to be correlated if capital flows towards investments where
risk-adjusted return on capital is most favourable. The result is that favourable or
unfavourable trade balances can very well be in equilibrium. The notion of imbalance is not
an accounting concept. In global finance, the key flows that cause variation of accounting
balances are those at the bottom of the balance sheet. Imbalance can simply be explained by
the lack of efficiency of the capital flows which created deficits and surpluses. It is the
functioning of the international finance system that is the source of the problems we deplore.
Current deficits and surpluses are nothing more than the symptoms of dynamics which are not
viable and which provoke disorderly repercussions among countries:
• The blame should be on deficits if they come from uncontrolled credit financing financial
bubbles. The sudden rise in asset prices provokes liquidity crises, in particular when these
assets are no longer negotiable on the market. A founding principle of any money economy is
that "credits make deposits". This is also true of the world economy and could be stated
before the crisis as: "American deficits make Chinese surpluses". This is particularly true
given that both grew from 2004 to 2007, while the dollar depreciated by 20% in real effective
terms and the Yuan appreciated by 22% in the same terms.
• The monetary surpluses of certain countries should be blamed in a situation of nil interest
rates, resulting from a liquidity trap. If other countries cannot either lower their interest rates
to depreciate their exchange rates or stimulate their domestic demand through expansive
budgetary policies, international adjustment is blocked. Countries with current surpluses then
create deflationary pressure elsewhere. Adjustment is in fact that countries suffering from
insufficient growth and unemployment provoked by lack of demand lower their interest rates.
This reduction should depreciate their foreign exchange, appreciate that of surplus countries
and thereby destroy the surplus while restoring full employment. If this does not happen, it
means that the connections between financial interdependence and monetary policies are not
working properly. The typical case is obviously the Euro zone. Deficit countries do not have
their own currency and therefore do not have the capacity to lower interest rates and
depreciate their currency. They suffer German surpluses head-on without having the capacity
to force them to drop. As the surplus country is the leader and has made its surpluses the crux
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of its macroeconomic regulation, the Euro zone is the classic example of an economic
organisation that is vulnerable to the depressive influence of surpluses.
We can all observe this. What, then, is the relevance of proposals to limit the levels of trade
or current balances? This amounts to more or less the same thing as wanting to restrict the
variation amplitude of barometers to limit extreme fluctuations due to climate change. On the
contrary, the right method is to recognize that if surpluses and deficits are not balanced, it
means that the structure of the assets and liabilities supporting them is fragile. There can be
three types of reasons for this:
• Excessive use of financing by debt with respect to direct investments and equity portfolio
investments;
• Short-term capital flows rather than long-term;
• Monetary interdependence increasing imbalance dynamics instead of correcting them
through exchange rates that are not flexible enough, but also all through excessive
indebtedness levers ("carry trade").
The international monetary system which replaced the Bretton Woods system and has
continued since 1973 combines a small number of countries with flexible foreign exchange
and open capital markets and a large number of countries with capital control and more or less
flexible pegging to the dollar. This hybrid system, which we would call a semi dollar
standard, combines two types of malfunction: Exchange-rate misalignment and growth of
international liquidity which is systematically much quicker than that of the global GDP in
current dollars.
There is marked exchange instability between currencies which are fully convertible, beyond
a "mere" problem of volatility. This is characterised by huge persistent fluctuations between
the Dollar, the Euro and the Yen. But above all, financial imbalance has accumulated because
growth of credit to the private sector of the country issuing the key currency has
systematically diverged from that of the GDP. The United States have applied a very lax
policy, amplified by accumulation of foreign exchange reserves constantly on the increase.
After the beginning of the financial crisis, the entire creation of international liquidity came
from last resort loan operations from central banks. In this way, the Federal Reserve System
(FED), but also the Bank of England, tripled their balance sheets during the financial crisis.
Foreign exchange rates cannot correct trade imbalance caused by this type of credit
disruption. They are carried away by waves of appreciation in countries where the asset
prices increase the fastest. The only reasonable response of emerging countries, as long as the
semi dollar standard continues to create a liquidity offer that tags along behind the interests of
the shadow banking system, is to implement tougher capital control.
Overall structural problems
The overall problems of the global economy are structural. They are rooted in national
preferences and clashing economic policy regimes. One should recognize that it is dangerous
to force financial globalisation in this situation. The international monetary system cannot
provide the mutual advantages of the common good in a world of competing currencies issued
by countries with rival interests. In this configuration, it is impossible to combine far-
reaching globalisation, financial stability and ill-matched national preferences. The price for
the progress of globalisation, amplifying and spreading financial interests, followed by
unfettered expansion of credit, was the loss of financial stability. The crisis of the growth
regime financialised in the extreme has shown its lack of viability by unleashing the systemic
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risk. The structural changes set in motion by this crisis will force the hubs of the global
economy to undertake priority internal reforms. Internal reforms in dominant powers are the
starting point of any improvement in international governance. In this field, improvement
involves reinforcing financial market regulation, way beyond what was already decided by
Basel III but not applied. At monetary level, adaptation of globalisation involves regional
monetary arrangements. On this basis, the outlines of a minimal and concerted monetary
governance could be subsequently considered.
These internal reforms have priority because the three major economic regions of the world
have structural difficulties which make hopes of redefining international monetary rules
fruitless as long as these structural problems are not overcome. Today, the dollar is incapable
of asserting the role of key currency if the monetary policy remains in the same strategic line,
namely that of massive issue of liquidities at nil interest rate. The Wall Street model of market
finance, driven by the goal of extracting the maximum income from the global economy,
which led to the global financial crisis, has kept its power and its incentives intact. The path
of public debt in the United States is unsustainable in the long run and will be aggravated by a
tense political context. As for the Euro, it cannot claim the status of a "complete currency" in
the absence of political sovereignty. It depends entirely on reinforcement of common
governance. This would involve developing a Eurobond market so that European public debt
could become attractive and so that the Euro could fully play a role as a reserve currency. It
would also be relevant to consolidate a European macro-economic balance, and with the
merger of European quotas at the IMF, to appoint a political figure able to speak on behalf of
the Euro. China has begun the tremendous challenge of transforming its growth regime which
aims both to develop the social and environmental quality of the national economy and to
make Chinese companies global stakeholders. With that in mind, the Yuan is becoming
convertible for non-residents, with control maintained for residents. The objective is to make
Hong Kong the leading finance centre in Asia, with China then becoming the hub of a
regional foreign exchange system, as a springboard for the international dimension.
There are therefore forces of transformation of international monetary relationships leading to
the advent of a tripolar asymmetric system. The viability of this type of system is
problematic. It is moving away from the semi dollar standard, and moving towards flexible
exchange. There will probably be less accumulation of reserves focused on the Dollar. But
exchange could be much more unstable, because absence of pegging to a key currency will
trigger massive portfolio transfers sustained by the uncertainty caused by clashes in economic
policies. Therefore, if the sovereignties of countries are implacable, the viability of the
international monetary system will depend on trade-offs that will need to be invented to
combine an acceptable degree of financial globalisation and sufficient stability to avoid
systemic crises. There will be three types of trade-off: degrees of practicable globalisation vs.
strength of domestic financial systems, national financial regulations vs. acceptance of
international rules, national (or regional) monetary sovereignty vs. acceptance of governance
by international monetary institutions.
• Organising regional currency areas
If they are open and flexible, if they allow many forms of cooperation, these areas will be
compatible with assertion of competing currencies within the framework of globalisation.
They express a principle of subsidiarity in the sense that shocks starting in secondary
countries can be absorbed within the zone without global repercussions.
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• Reinforcing financial regulations and making them compatible
We need prudential regulation that is more complete than what was done in Basel III,
coordinated by the Financial Stability Council. The systemic risk councils created in the
United States and in Europe must be created in all the major financial centres and must have
the power to block speculative credit drifts and aggressive attitudes with respect to risk
leading to outrageous levers. "Too-big-to-fail" must be eradicated by forced reorganization
systems for fragile financial entities and by size and complexity limits. For their part, central
banks must adopt financial stability as a permanent objective. This involves a change of
doctrine: Monitoring the evolution of aggregate private sector credit, supervising quantitative
indicators (credit/assets and credit/income) and use quantitative instruments to monitor
banking levers and liquidity.
• Preparing the outlines of international monetary governance
The IMF, with its renewed legitimacy thanks to its coordination and proposal performance
during the crisis, thanks to a massive increase of its resources ($500 billion) and to its quick
reaction as an emergency lender, must consolidate its assets by becoming the global monetary
institution again. This entails that multilateral supervision of global imbalances and systemic
risk alerts give rise to genuine dialogue among its members. This also entails that the
function of last resort lender be institutionalised for countries with non convertible currencies,
therefore that the special drawing rights offer become more flexible by issues functionally
linked to the needs of international liquidity. This streamlining of its missions must be
supported by changes in governance to make them both legitimate and effective: consistency
between voting power and economic influence of the member countries, merging of Euro
zone quotas, abolishing vetoes exercised by a single country, reinforcing the powers of the
executive board, transparent and open appointment of the director general.
French socio-demography in mid-stream
The risk of conflict between monetary centres is not a merely abstract expression of changes
in centres of gravity of the global economy. It expresses, supports and reinforces imbalance
in wealth, affluence, primary resources of the world economy. In this context of a quest for
economic leadership of exchanges, investment, risk-taking and innovation are pillars of a
strategy of resilience and renewed growth. Is an ageing society able to meet such challenges?
Will developed economies be powerless faced with the economic energy of emerging
countries and their quick demographic growth? Population ageing is intuitively considered to
be an essential factor for the future of the majority of western countries. Despite a
comparatively high birth rate, which allows France to maintain and even increase its
population, we cannot escape a phenomenon which raises strategic issues such as the capacity
of an ageing society to design and lead collective projects, its aversion to risk, its openness to
the world, the resilience of the European "model" of a "society of well-being" and the
capacity to finance collective needs which are increased and transformed. It should be
mentioned that the work undertaken on this topic focuses on the financial effects for French
society (pension schemes, health insurance, dependence) of a development whose effects in
terms of foreign relations, international unity and resilience are equally problematic but
essentially unknown.
The first strategic effect of ageing is also the simplest: Increased unpredictability. We know
nothing about how societies with an average age of above fifty or even sixty function, how
they are organised, how they project themselves. We do not know how their priorities are
rearranged, how their need for security puts a strain on their defence capacities, how they
rebuild their internal unity and their social connection when four or even five generations live
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together. What we do know is that the physical aptitudes of a sixty-year-old human body in
2011 are probably similar to those of a forty-year-old body around 1900; and also that their
life expectancies are probably very similar. We know that it is unwise to link creativity,
innovative spirit and even the capacity for hard work to age; from Picasso to Galileo,
examples of old men who seek, find and create abound. And some are starting to say that
society sees age and ageing where calendars and the human body no longer do. Should we
stop mentioning age as a determining factor of a person, and beyond that of a society?
The second strategic effect of ageing is predictable in terms of direction, more than in terms
of effects: Our social systems, pension schemes, and above all our health insurance will have
to cope with huge pressure. Suffice it to say that in 2050 there will be one active worker for
each pensioner. This does not under any circumstances mean that the systems will be ruined
or destroyed; the pay-as-you-go system guarantees that pensions will be paid, but does not
state the amount; moreover, the French Pensions Orientation Council (COR) has validated the
scenario of continued balance of the current schemes in France until 2018. What it does mean
is that systems will be more costly and that they will provide lower benefits. It also means
that the share of individual old-age provision will increase. It means that the preference for
the body, well-being and physical appearance will put irresistible and problematic upward
pressure on health spending as a share of GDP (which systems with strong public regulation
can resist better than privately-dominated systems). It means that demands related to
consumption (standards, appellations of origin, sanitary control, etc.) will increase
significantly. And it also means that all our references related to age must change – for
example, concerning the concept of the legal pension age. Clearly, on the issue of health
spending as a share of GDP, means to finance long and very long life and end-of-life
assistance, collective choices will be indispensable, not so much to avoid a conflict of
generations, but to avoid withdrawal of active young workers from a system that is too heavy
for them to bear.
The third and unknown effect is appetence for risk and the capacity to lead projects. Here, we
lack points of comparison. Through German, Japanese, Swedish or Norwegian experiences,
in particular, we can anticipate a sharp rise in demands concerning midlife; rejection of
nuisances, health priorities, preservation demands. The aversion to inflation of persons of
private means is historically proved, their appetite for protection, security and precaution
should be studied. It is also likely that heritage income will be increasingly used to round off
life annuities. It is certain that appetite for life annuities, that guarantee income throughout
life, will increase, bring long-term and very-long-term capital flows to the market. On the
other hand, it would be unwise to anticipate consequences regarding asset management, as the
most certain aspects are not linked to age, but to life expectancy at a given age; for a manager,
the issue is not whether people are forty or seventy, the issue is their life expectancy and the
age at which they will stop working, which will determine the management objective applied
to pension savings. The investor often wants to know about the incentives attached to each
contract, which means that taxation will play a key role in this field (taxation which, in
France, unjustifiably favours interest rate products over shares).
Increasingly rigid decision-making systems
Appetence for risk becomes critical when strategic challenges are those of micro-economic
and investment dynamics, talent and creativity management, and the social attitude to novelty
and introduction of breakthroughs in societal and economic models. The genuinely strategic
issue is that of identifying whether a society "with two ages", the first age of building of
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assets, the second age of maturity, will also be a society of innovation, and not a society of
introversion, conservatism and aversion to risk.
Sociology and organisational behaviour research is divided on this issue. Contrary to a
preconceived idea of Californian venture capital, aggressive vulture investors who favour
hostile takeovers are not necessarily the youngest investors. Similarly, European family
capitalism is not devoid of a certain correlation between seniority and audacity on the part of
managers. This leads to a serious issue which is neither competence nor talent, but
demographic renewal of French leadership structures. We have noted that behaviour can be
more aggressive and more astute with seniority, and the consequence could be a certain
wariness with respect to the promotion of young managers: A France of investment and
business where seniority replaces competence as a criterion for access to executive positions.
In such circumstances, an age group soon becomes a place where acute segregation is
expressed, where depending on whether or not you are in a management position, the age of
fifty either becomes synonymous with protection and quick increase of income, or, on the
contrary, becomes synonymous with long-term unemployment and social exclusion.
The average age of SME managers in France is oddly stable. For the last ten years, it has
been in the vicinity of fifty. The average age is ten years higher for Board members of
medium-sized firms and major groups. Boards of directors in major companies regularly
increase the age limit for their chairmen. Operational managers generally consider that
employees of their own age or even younger than them are too old and do not hire them or
push them to leave, or consider that they have used up all their potential, and the non-
operational managers who supervise them are as old as employees when they retire. Are we
building a country that is ageing, sectarian, that opposes diversity, that has made its decision-
making systems more rigid?
A review of literature tends to observe that age is negatively related to the capacity to
integrate new information and to take decisions that involve risk. Flexibility decreases and
resistance to change increases with age. One should not, however, adopt a simplified view of
the consequences of age. In France, the phenomenon of increasingly young "older people"
being expelled from the workplace by people who are themselves old and who have
succeeded in crossing the critical age period can probably be explained by characteristics
specific to the decision-making system in public and private organisations, which is the result
of its history. Research into organisations has already emphasised the impersonal nature of
relationships, the bureaucratic formalism, the compartmentalization and the extreme
centralization of French organisation structures. These characteristics can be explained by
fear of conflict and facing others and by an absolutist conception of authority which is both
defensive (it cannot be challenged) and offensive (the one who holds authority does as he sees
fit and is not subject to the rules he has imposed on others). The consequences of this
formally hierarchical system are, on the one hand, the individual isolation of each person
while respecting a fastidious formal equality, leaving room in the background for a personal
quest for hidden privileges, and also a genuine weakness of central power. Decisions are
made by superiors who do not have, indeed cannot have, any hands-on knowledge of the
context of their action or of the variables likely to affect it. Those who do have knowledge do
not make decisions and have no incentive to share their knowledge with their superiors, and
those who decide do not know and cannot find out without jeopardizing their authority.
Faced with these malfunctions, reinforcement of impersonal relationships and increased
centralisation are the only possible courses. The result is centralisation of responsibility with
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leaders who have no relevant information and who will therefore give pride of place to
conservatism, opposition to change and imitation of competitors in the same sector.
There is also a selection of elites through the French Grande Ecole system, with pitiless
selection at a very young age, which then determines a destiny and a career for the rest of
professional life. Managers therefore share a tendency to manage organisations based on a
model where being the boss means, by definition, being the most intelligent person around
and consequently having to prove that constantly and therefore depriving themselves of real
colleagues, where employees can only be perhaps not stupid, but at any rate devoid of any
relevant ideas. This does not make it any easier to take over a company or a management
position.
A direct implication of this view is that it is ineffective to act through regulation, constraint or
exhortation in a macro-economic or macro-social context. This can only fail, or not work
well, by creating bypassing or game strategies around rules (hiring monopoly and
moonlighting in Italy, Delalande amendment in France). The seeds of solutions are to be
found at micro-social level, by acting on the behaviour of individuals within organisations.
They do not act as they do because they are horrible, stupid or vicious, but simply because
from their viewpoint, in their situation, they consider that it is generally to their advantage to
act as they do, even if they are mistaken.
Modification of incentives and organisational data will readjust behaviour. Of course, the
design of incentives must not be restricted to the financial and economic dimension, as this is
too often done under the influence of the dominant analysis model. Intangible or immaterial
incentives are much more powerful. They can have impact both on conscious behaviour and
on reactions to situation-based stimuli and determinants.
The urgency of reinventing a French socio-economic model
The impact of ageing on the strategic capacity of societies is dreaded, but unknown. It is
feared in the field of business creation, in openness to the rest of the world, in the will for
autonomy. Ageing is said to increase the fragility, weaknesses and failures of our societies
with respect to the outside world. It gives rise to population movement, to an unforeseen
extent, towards the south and towards the coast, which redefines territories, and at the same
time gives rise to a presence-based economy of human services which requires significant
young manpower, often from outside Europe. It gradually modifies the terms and capabilities
of strategic action, in particular because long life and very long life considerably increase
aversion to accidental death and to vital risk. It transforms the relationship with the future,
which constituted a powerful motivation in western democracies; the preference for the
present in western societies breaks with their appetite for progress. This is not the least of the
questions asked of our societies: What will be the price of the promise of a long or very long
life for 80% of an age group, which tends to become the implied promise of all European
governments? The price to pay is not only financial, it is above all strategic and it is urgent
that we clarify this issue.
The work of the institutions in charge of regulating the financial system is essentially focused
on stability and security of financing mechanisms and of bank and finance companies. In a
forward-looking approach, one could also consider that the ambitious purpose of regulation
could consist of refocusing on the long term. Whether preparing post-oil infrastructures or a
lifestyle without carbon, ensuring access, availability and protection of scarce resources for a
population of nine billion human beings, or financing the coming industrial revolution,
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increasing the commitments of our societies that were implied before and that are now
increasingly explicit involves finding solutions in extending financial assets and liabilities,
and refocusing on the long term as a key issue in legitimate regulation objectives. Nowhere
else is this issue as relevant, or even urgent, than in support to an ageing population. There is
a striking contrast between the blissful promise of a long, and even very long life for almost
an entire age group, and the short-term pressure which pushes companies on a quarterly basis,
which urges them to change portfolios as fast as possible and to liquidate the day's positions
every night.
The revolution in the ages of life projects us into the unknown. The most frequent mistake is
to reason based on familiar situations, along the same lines as a strategist who always
prepares the war that is already past, and who would win it… A man of 60 in 2011 is not the
same as a man of 60 in 1950. First of all, he still has a life expectancy of thirty years, whereas
a Russian of the same age has a life expectancy of …. four years! In the same way, a society
with an average age of 55 in 2020 (which is probable in several European societies) has
nothing in common with a society with an identical average age in 1950. The societies of
yesteryear, with populations harmoniously spread all along the age pyramid, have nothing in
common with contemporary societies which now only have an age tunnel; it is no longer true
that one dies at all ages in our European societies, and we behave as though the implied
promise of all governments is to ensure that we all have a life expectancy of 80 years in good
health, with full autonomy and total joy of life.
We do not know very much about what age societies will be; the discovery is too recent and
the territory unknown. We should only avoid easy analysis and proposals. It is
commonplace, but nonetheless useful, to remind those who have become alarmed at the
deterioration of the ratio between the active population and pensioners that if we were to
apply today the standard that applied when the pensions systems were created, the French
would retire at the age of… 75! Work productivity remains the other decisive variable, and it
is rising. It is also obvious that preconceived ideas on decline, conservatism and
underperformance of age societies are based on what Human Resources Managers have
learned to eliminate. The relationship between age, entrepreneurial spirit, curiosity, open-
mindedness, etc. is not established. In fact, will rapaciousness, immoderation and
aggressiveness be the lasting qualities of action is world of scarcity, limits and increased
sensitivity? Should we be concerned about the fact that an age society is less pugnacious and
less focused on growth, at a time when political conditions probably call for more internal
unity, and more external appeasement?
The questions posed within the economic system, and even more so within social engineering,
are in pace with the drastic changes of the 20th century. We should remember that we gained
"an extra life" in the space of a century: In developed countries, life expectancy increased by
twenty-two to twenty-six years! Absolute primacy of the body, health, beauty, physical
ability, within the economy; transformation of organisations, models and systems, but also of
relationships, as generations further apart build teams; development of an industry to convey
human life, with its property rights, its royalties, its market; adaptation of cities, transport,
signs, distribution, to senior and very elderly customers; management of income and of estates
and above all, long-term and very long-term guarantees, given that the annuity risk becomes a
risk over the age of a hundred… Some are financing issues; others are fundamentally
strategic. The issue of representation of ages and of the links between age and activity is one
of them. Another issue is that of the capacity of human societies to place market finance at
the service of their long-term challenges, i.e. of their autonomy. Without a doubt, by
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refocusing on the long term, bank and finance regulation can find a path towards credibility,
the collective interest and manifest usefulness. In that respect, it would be an important, and
perhaps even decisive, strategic relevance factor.
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SECTION VIII – COMPETITIVENESS AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT:
INFLUENCE, SECURITY HERITAGE
Vice-President: Edwige Bonnevie, CEA
Editorial Members: Vincent Bouatou, SAFRAN; Denis Clodic, Ecole des Mines de Paris; Hervé Dumez, CNRS-Ecole
Polytechnique; Claire Dupas, ANR; Patrice Hummel ; Éléonore Mounoud, Ecole Centrale; Denis Randet, ANRT; Pascal
Royer, UT Troyes; Michèle Sebag, Un. de Paris Sud.
Members: Jean Roman, INRIA Bordeaux ; Catherine Brechignac, Ac. des Sciences.
The major clusters of French research and their transformation dynamics
After 20 years of stability, we have since 2005 experienced major institutional changes to
remedy what was perceived as a lack of efficiency of French research and insufficient appeal
of its universities: Programme law on research, law on freedoms and responsibilities of
universities (LRU), creation of the National Research Agency (ANR), of competitiveness
clusters, new status of foundations, increased R&D tax credit, resources devoted to Oseo,
implementation of the Campus plan… In 2008, faced with the economic crisis, the
government implemented a recovery plan giving pride of place to research and innovation
activities (early repayment of the R&D Tax Credit, government loan, now called Investments
for the future). The significance of these reforms gives rise to several questions. What are
their genuine effects? Can they change the long-term path of the French R&D system? What
are the limits of public intervention? Despite the crisis, are innovation and R&D still
priorities for businesses? To what extent does the R&D tax credit give businesses incentive to
undertake more R&D than they would have done spontaneously?
The thrusts of the reforms are quite clear:
autonomy, enhanced responsibility, selection, breaking with a long tradition of
centralism, micro-management and egalitarianism;
upgrading of material resources in higher education and public research, that had
deteriorated owing to years of lack of management and to the constant priority given
to staff numbers;
cooperation between the public and private sectors, constitution of ecosystems,
whereas France stands apart owing to the separation between the public and private
sectors and to compartmentalization of the public sector;
allocation of resources for young talents, to remedy the imbalance of ages.
A crisis of financing and investment first and foremostxxiii
In 2010, R&D investment in France, as a percentage of GDP, came to approximately the level
of 2001 (and 1990). Gross Domestic Expenditure on research and development (GERD) as a
percentage of GDP is a usual comparison indicator among countries. For lack of a better
comparison, because we would prefer to compare results rather than spending! The European
strategy referred to as Lisbon, which in 1999 set the objective to make Europe the "most
competitive knowledge economy in the world" within the next ten years, will be remembered
only for the objective of taking that indicator to 3 %: 1 % for public spending, 2 % for private
spending. The approach was artificial, but the indicator had a deeper meaning: It reflects the
composition of the industrial portfolio, given that, for example, in micro-electronics and
medicine, R&D spending exceeds 15% of turnover, whereas in construction or energy, it is
below 1 %. The objective of 3 % involved increasing the share of industries with high R&D
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intensity. The mistake was to imagine that we could achieve that in the space of 10 years,
spurred by decisions made by public authorities.
xxiv
Figure 1. Evolution of GERD (as a % of GDP)
Figure 1, borrowed from Futuris 2010, shows the evolution of the GERD to GDP ratio for
France. In 2010, it reached the remarkable value of 2.41 %. Two factors were involved: The
drop in GDP and the increase in the R&D tax credit, which we included in spending given its
significance, contrary to international statistic conventions. We therefore reach the record
level of 1990, just before the end of the cold war. The chances that this level will be
maintained in the years to come are slim. With this level, French R&D intensity is
significantly higher than the EU average (1.76 %) and the United Kingdom (1.8 %); it
remains substantially below Japan (3.3 %). But it is not very far from the levels observed in
the United States (2.6 %) or Germany (2.5 %).
Breakdown of efforts between the public and private sectors: it all boils down to the R&D tax
credit…
This breakdown is remarkably stable: 53% for budgetary public financing and 47% for private
self-financing, which, compared with the reference countries, means that the burden of public
spending is too high. The R&D tax credit has not, however, increased the share of public
spending; this is an investment within the investment, because it is expected to produce a
future increase in private spending.
xxv
Figure 2. Breakdown of GERD financing
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2011 Report of the Scientific Council of the High Council for Strategic Education and Research
Allocation of public expenditure
Excluding the R&D tax credit, the structure of government spending on these major
objectives was remarkably stable over the period from 2000-2010. The creation of the
National Research Agency (ANR) and of the single interministerial fund (competitiveness
clusters) had little impact on the breakdown of credits per major category of beneficiary. If
we include the R&D tax credit, the analysis is very different: R&D support for businesses
increased from 3 % of public research expenditure in 2000 to 23 % in 2010, ahead of civilian
technological development programmes (10%), targeted research (12%) and defence R&D
(18%). Only academic research, at 37%, still represents a higher amount.
xxvi
Figure 3. State financing per major objective (M€ in 2010)
Financing industrial research
The R&D Tax Credit today represents one of key tools for the State to support industrial
R&D. There are others:
Tax aid for start-ups (in particular new innovative businesses). This aid now exceeds
one billion Euros.
Incentive credits (Eurêka, ANR, Oseo loans). This type of aid is lower (700 to 900
million Euros), but is more constant.
Public R&D contracts linked to major defence or civilian programmes (civilian
technological development programmes), in particular aerospace and nuclear
programmes. Contracts with businesses, with very little variation, reached 4 billion
Euros throughout the period considered.
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In constant 2010 Euros (billions) As a % of R&D spending of businesses
10,0 35%
Commandes publiques Commandes publiques
9,0 Crédits incitatifs Crédits incitatifs
Mesures fiscales hors CIR 30% Mesures fiscales hors CIR
8,0 CIR CIR
7,0 25%
6,0
20%
5,0
15%
4,0
3,0 10%
2,0
5%
1,0
- 0%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Figure 4. Public financing of industrial research
Source: OECD – FutuRIS Treatment
International comparison of public financing of industrial research
According to OECD statistics, some countries, such as Korea, Canada, Belgium and Japan,
have implemented very ambitious systems for tax support to industrial R&D (figure 5). The
increased importance of the R&D tax credit will allow France to join this group, within which
tax support exceeds 0.12 % of GDP. Other countries, such as Germany, Switzerland, Sweden
or Finland, on the contrary, do not use it at all.
0,4
0,35
0,3
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0,2
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Contractual financing Tax measures
Figure 5. Direct and indirect government financing of industrial research
(2008, as a % of GDP) Source: OECD.
Direct support, i.e. through government contracts, generally varies from one country to
another. It reaches significant proportions in particular in countries with significant R&D
activity in the defence sector, for example the United States, France, Sweden or Korea. If we
extrapolate the evolution of this data, we can conclude that by the end of 2010, barring a
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slowdown related to other factors, France will become the OECD country where public
financing to businesses is the highest (approximately 0.4 % of GDP), overtaking even Korea.
Increased financing of public research by means of calls for proposals
Although reforms have increased the share of financing, France remains, with Germany, one
of the countries where calls for proposals still represent the lowest share of government
financing of public research.
Government financing of academic total
research
Project-based (%) Institutional* (%) %
France 6 to 7 94 to 93 100
Germany 7 93 100
Austria 10 90 100
The Netherlands 20 80 100
Switzerland 27 73 100
Canada 45 55 100
Ireland 50 50 100
Australia 53 47 100
Belgium 66 44 100
Korea 83 27 100
Table 1. Structure of national public financing of research in the academic sector,
in 2008 Source: OECD. * also called "recurrent"
This table shows a dichotomy between a "Rhine" tradition, where the proportion remains
below 30%, and an Anglo-Saxon model where the rate is above 45 %. Belgium and Korea
are even way above that figure. The project financing rate, however, varies from one country
to another: In the United States, the figure can exceed 100 %, as universities add overheads
that can reach up to 52% of contractual budgets. Calls for proposals other than those of the
State, such as the European framework programme (approximately 400 M€), local
government (approximately 200 M€) and industrial contracts (approximately 200 M€) finance
at approximately the same levels. Although a total of 14% of public research resources come
from proposals, the forces committed to these projects represent approximately a third of its
potential. A noteworthy fact in France is that out of the 35 billion Euros of the government
loan, 21.9 are devoted to research, but a large part consists of capital where only the interest
will be distributed.
Research and higher education 21.9
Theme excellence projects 6.55
Theme excellence institutes related to decarbonated energies 1.0
Equipment of Excellence 1.0
Space 0.5
Health and biotechnologies 1.55
Research in the field of aeronautics 1.5
The nuclear industry of tomorrow 1.0
Excellence clusters 15.35
Initiatives of Excellence 7.7
Operation Campus 1.3
Saclay plateau 1.0
Laboratories of Excellence 1.0
University hospital institutes 0.85
National technology transfer fund / technological research institutes 3.0
Carnot Institutes 0.5
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Table 3. Government loan financing for higher education and research
xxvii
(in billions of Euros)
Numerous reforms, lack of strategic visibility
There have been many reforms in French research. They reflect three objectives: To give
universities responsibility for their research; to reinforce international visibility and appeal;
and to foster the creation and development of ecosystems. To achieve them, many tools have
been used: Competitive selection; competitiveness clusters, thematic networks for advanced
research, Carnot institutes, the Campus plan, the various sections of the Investments for the
Future operation which are all based on calls for proposals, whose financing is generally
ensured by agencies which are state bodies. It is for example noteworthy that the map of
major competitiveness clusters is almost identical to the map of the national centres for
technological research "granted" by Claude Allègre en 1999. What has changed everything is
that stakeholders now have the initiative.
After bringing stakeholders together, we need strategic thinking
To remedy the fragmentation of 1968, but also perhaps to conform to the views on "critical
mass" reinforced by a quick interpretation of the Shanghai ranking, it was suggested that
universities create higher education and research clusters (PRES). Today, there are about
twenty such clusters in France, which corresponds approximately to the number of French
regions; even if this does not coincide exactly, it is a factor of legitimacy. Four were the
beginnings of a merger, the others pool only part of their operations, in particular the doctoral
schools. The future of these clusters will depend on the evolution of university governance:
They would be better suited to a federal system like the University of California.
A "top-down" concept of networks
Europe adopted the consortium notion: The Commission, Eurêka, and its current expressions
(strategic agendas, JTI…). This encouraged cooperative research which polarised the action
of agencies, contrary to what is happening in the United States. With the exception of long-
standing local initiatives that continue without interruption, such as Grenoble with micro, then
nanotechnologies, clusters, thematic networks for advanced research, the association of
Carnot institutes, and what will come out of the investments for the future operation: Labex,
Idex, IRT, SATT are other embodiments of the same principle, which is expressed either at
local level (clusters) or by crossing borders.
The case of the CNRS
The French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS) is present everywhere, is
involved in all the reorganisations, based on an initial position which is original in the world.
It is therefore an important element in evolution of the system. To grant universities greater
autonomy, its powers have had to be reduced, but its professionalism in programming,
assessment and technology transfer is a strength that will have to be put to good use.
The quest for a strategy: between programming and assessment
Promoting genuine research strategies that can be tested
The concept of a research and innovation strategy is not easy to handle. To begin with, it
implies powers that are to a large extent imaginary in public authorities. We recently
observed several developments:
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At the end of 2008, definition of a national research and innovation strategy (SNRI),
under the aegis of the Minister of Research. No figures (this was forbidden by the
Ministry of Finance), many interesting contributions, but a very tame final abstract.
This initiative was somewhat reminiscent of the initiative taken in 1981 by then
Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement, who had defined three major priorities:
Biotechnologies, microelectronics and new energies.
All countries, in fact, have more or less the same "strategic axes", by extending
biotechnologies to health, microelectronics to nanotechnologies and information
technologies, and new energies to sustainable development. It is therefore rather
obvious that the genuine strategy in fact lies in the way in which these issues are
addressed, namely in writing strategic scenarios which are not afraid of notions of
power, positions, competitiveness, and possibly reorientation.
In 2009, the Juppé-Rocard commission focused on proposing vectors, ways of
working, rather than topics and contents, with the exception of some obvious sector-
based choices. Their work had a genuine impact.
One cannot say the same of the general assembly of industry at the end of 2009, which
fell into more or less the same trap as the national research and innovation strategy,
although we have not reached the end of the story yet.
What assessment can we make? The first and most imperative conclusion is that too few
research units have a strategy, in the very simple sense that they know who they are and who
they want to be. Too often we see units literally transformed into scientific fairy tales, which
correspond neither to their assets, nor to their history, nor to their talents. Lack of
watchfulness, complacency and consanguinity have encouraged these facades in the French
research landscape and have put a severe strain on national competitiveness.
The specifications of the investments for the future are directed at enhanced strategic thinking
and more discriminating control of the "beliefs" of the units, but they implement structures
that are too often artificial, and a unit does not inherit a strategy merely by being a part of
something. The result is a strategic discourse where reality, achievements, assets, can
unfortunately exist only on the brochure or website of the centre. It is therefore necessary to
alert agencies to the fact that they express priorities, but that under no circumstances is it their
task to define the strategies of the units. One could fear dispersive effects, with teams going
in the direction where they think they will be able to find money.
Programming gone adrift
For a unit, strategy and programming are supposed to act together. In practice, the
programming of public research starts from the base. And we know what is said – quite
rightly – about the limits of such programming:
The usefulness of programming is linked to the amount of resources committed. In
other words, risk exploration, the genuine "white proposal", should have total freedom
as long as it does not want to mobilise significant resources;
What reaches the agencies is more research with a probable result than "blue sky"
exploration. Do we do enough blue sky, which requires the greatest creativity? Do
we know how to take from blue sky what deserves to go further, what will be
genuinely new, instead of having similar variations on already well-known themes?
An important factor of future development will be the creation of alliances, in France and in
Europe. It is noteworthy that this is done on the initiative of research institutions and not by
government order. We can observe that universities have devoted their best teams to this.
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These alliances will not have all virtues, but uniting information capabilities and giving
visibility to different stakeholders on all actions will avoid repetition and will allow each
stakeholder to better focus his work.
The strategic challenge of research and research policy assessment
Decisions made today in terms of research policy, which are huge (Government loan,
excellence laboratories and initiatives) will in fact be assessed twenty-odd years from now in
the form of an answer to a dual question: During the decade from 2030-2040, how many
Nobel prizes will France win and where will the technological competitiveness of French
industry be, compared with its competitors? The challenge of the research policy and of its
assessment is therefore a major strategic issue.
Assessment systems have been created over the last few years. They aim to specify the
objectives of research policy, to define assessment criteria, and to better focus investments
based on the expected quality of the research undertaken. Will these systems give rise to the
dual result expected for 2030-2040? Several strategic thinking axes appear to be important
thrusts for development: Defining objectives, assessment criteria, assessment scale,
assessment cost and its temporal horizon.
Should assessment of research be undertaken based on defined objectives and if so, how and
by whom? It appears natural that the party funding the research should also be the one who
sets the objectives. But the issue is not quite as simple as that. Financing of research is both
public and, increasingly, private. Is it up to the State or to businesses to set the priorities for
the research? Independence of research could be threatened and a major problem related to
multiplication of conflicts of interest could arise (this already exists in pharmaceutical
research). Should researchers be entirely free to determine the objectives of their research
themselves? A strategic challenge in research evaluation concerns the balance we need to
strike in defining scientific objectives among researchers, the State and the private sector.
The system implemented must guarantee the independence of research, conquered in the
Middle Ages against royal and church power, while maintaining incentives around
programmes that are strategic for the State and for businesses.
What are the criteria to assess research? In the space of a few years, assessment of
researchers and teams has focused on assessment of publications, essentially in international
peer-reviewed journals. The problems linked to this type of assessment are well-known:
Fractioning research to increase the number of articles, research strategies focused on the
short term, following scientific fashions, conventionality, lack of relevance of the research
with respect to concrete issues. Evaluation of research appears to be mainly subcontracted to
journals, whose operation is in fact not exempt from criticism. Can research dynamics be
ensured in the long term if this assessment criterion clearly dominates all others, and can the
links between research and industry be maintained? Balanced diversity of research
assessment criteria should be sought.
The scale of assessment is becoming is key issue
The Shanghai ranking, but also the difficulty of assessing small teams and the aim to avoid
allocation of small amounts to many different investments and budgets have resulted in
grouping research units, most often at local level. These large-size groupings have not,
however, made assessment any easier. How can a large structure be assessed when some of
its teams are particularly dynamic and others less? How can a group of assessors understand
the diversity and complexity of research in a large structure in the space of one or two days?
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Should the overall grade that summarizes the assessment reflect the dynamic work of certain
teams and ignore the others, or base the assessment on the latter and penalize the former? If,
as one might think, dynamics in research relies essentially on the drive of small teams,
research policy cannot be solely focused on large infrastructure or platform projects: How can
it reach the fabric of small research teams and what role can assessments play at this scale?
The commitment to develop research assessment has a cost
Over the last few years, the creation of bodies specialised in research management has
increased steadily in the different countries. Private structures have also appeared (consulting
firms advise research teams on their files for European calls for tenders). The cost is not only
financial, but also time-related: Participation of researchers in research evaluation and
financing committees "eats up" more and more research time. The trend is exponential
because gradually mechanisms to assess the research assessment bodies are being
implemented, in which the assessed researchers are required to participate. The issue has now
become: Should we invest in research or in research financing and evaluation bodies? An
answer could be, in the next stage: If we want to limit research evaluation costs, we need to
automate the process: Create hierarchical lists of journals with points awarded to each
publication of an article depending on the category of the journal, points awarded depending
on the impact factor, etc. The effect of automation has been studied in Australia and it
appears to be disastrous, with a generalised increase of published articles without scientific
impact. There again, how can we strike a balance between the focus on reasoned public and
private research investment and the cost of quality qualitative assessment (administrative cost
and cost in time for the researchers involved)?
The last dimension in assessment of research policies is the time horizon. The idea that
appears to stand out is that financing of research must be undertaken in terms of projects and
programmes, with a time-frame of a few years (four to five years). The pace of assessment of
teams and researchers themselves has gradually aligned itself within the same time frame.
Often projects are required to list "deliverables" in one-year instalments, and sometimes six-
month instalments. Given that getting a project started takes six months to a year and that the
final assessment is prepared six months ahead of time, the general trend is to focus on low-
risk projects, or projects already undertaken that are presented as future projects (which
facilitates presentation of "deliverables" like clockwork because they were already done
before the project was financed). Financing of research, which is supposed to be forward-
looking, could take on an increasingly retrospective nature. Are we still able to finance risky
long-term projects, which will make it possible, twenty or thirty years from now, to ensure
international influence of French research and competitiveness of industry?
The strategic challenge of research policy is to give a country a twofold competitive edge
compared with its competitors, a scientific advantage and industrial competitiveness. The two
conditions for this advantage are a research policy guaranteeing originality and a difference
compared to what is done in other countries and a long-term approach. The idea here is not to
let researchers alone and autonomously determine the objectives of this policy, its assessment
criteria, its organisation principles and the time frame for deployment. But if we want
national research to constitute the basis for a scientific advantage and competitive edge, we
need to find the balance that will guarantee both control of administrative costs for
management and assessment of research and the breath of fresh air research needs to be
genuinely innovative.
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Example of a strategic challenge: the nanotechnologies sector
Nanotechnologies represent a specific case example of a very vast R&D and innovation sector
that has boomed over the last twenty-odd years, concentrating all the major issues linked to
industrial development and competitiveness. First, this is a hub of convergent and integrative
technologies, involving a significant spectrum of knowledge and techniques falling within the
scope of physics, chemistry, biology, ICT, engineering and intrinsically human and social
sciences. This field, by making products available and catering for new uses as from the
2010-2020 decade, should radically change most aspects of our lives, from medicine to
communication modes, industrial production, security, energy management and the
environment. The economic, regulatory, societal and ethical aspects of these technologies are
increasingly important as they develop and new products appear. The evaluated financial
volume of markets arising from this sector is in the vicinity of 250 billion dollars for 2009 and
3000 billion dollars by 2020. This has led to very tough international competition in the field
of nanotechnologies, and over 60 countries have adopted an R&D and support-to-businesses
strategy in this field, with significant investments (12 billion dollars in the United States,
including 1.8 billion for 2011 alone). No civilian technology sector has benefited from such
investment in the US since the Apollo programme. This field is the scene of fierce
competition between Europe, the United States, Japan and the BRIC countries.
In France, significant efforts have already been made to foster research and innovation (ACI
Nano and RMNT, followed by a relay through ANR, RTB programmes, financing of national
platforms, NanoInnov initiative). If we want more companies to develop in the many fields of
nanotechnologies and to successfully launch products on the markets, we absolutely need to
continue significant efforts and to focus them on several points:
constantly uphold major technology hubs at international level, and open up to
businesses;
develop multiphysical simulation tools on a nanometric scale, nanocharacterization,
and technological integration, as command of these tools has become an essential
condition for scientific breakthroughs and future technologies;
Focus on applications that are not sufficiently developed to date: Energy production
and storage, electricity production and artificial photosynthesis, electronics and
information technology (beyond Moore so as to respond to new paradigms in data
processing), display and optical communications as well as photovoltaics;
multifunctional nanomaterials which are most robust, light and sustainable; mechanics
(resistance of materials, tribology); defence and security; new modes of low-cost
industrial production; agri-food, etc. It is noteworthy that nanotechnologies will give
rise both to revolutions (theragnostics, for example), allowing creation of new
businesses, but also to drastic changes in more traditional industrial sectors (energy
and transport, instrumentation, production engineering, etc.).
It is therefore urgent to undertake a detailed analysis of the situation of the French industry in
these fields, as this has recently been done in Germany, so as to identify the sectors we need
to develop:
develop databases of simulation software and components, open to public laboratories
and to businesses;
forward-looking participation in work on definition of standards, which will to a large
extent condition the development of companies in the sector; reflection on regulatory
and legal aspects, on patentability and IP in a sector where products will be
particularly progressive;
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forward-looking development of research in characterization and toxicology of nano-
objects to protect consumers and the environment, failing which it will not be possible
for markets to grow;
seek financing of SME by venture capital, even if we know that such investment is
very low in France;
resolutely develop training for technicians, engineers and researchers, legal experts in
businesses, given that the needs for staff trained in the specific aspects of these fields
will increase significantly;
introduce training and information for the public, at primary school and high-school
level, so that the public can participate more effectively in the public debate on this
issue.
In conclusion, nanotechnologies are a very strategic sector for innovation and competitiveness
of businesses. They are the subject of very tough international competition, which has only
just started. They include all the complexity of an integrative field that is rapidly evolving.
For nanotechnologies and for other major sectors of current industrial development, there is a
full set of aspects, ranging from pure sciences and techniques to regulatory, ethical and
societal aspects, with financial incentives. All this must be handled simultaneously if we
want our businesses to benefit in terms of markets and jobs, and the public to benefit in terms
of enhanced quality of life.
French Research and Technology at a crossroads
The conclusions of the work of Section VIII, for this first year of analysis, suggest both a very
competitive and inventive France, which has achieved many transformations, with examples
of high-performance and enthusiastic ecosystems, and a motionless France, with unhappy
research ecosystems, experiencing a crisis both of authority and of scientific employment.
The different assessments of Section VIII members on the dynamics created by the ANR, the
Labex, Idex or Equipex can be explained, amongst other factors, by the diversity of academic
situations: Between physics and chemistry, between biology and IT, the nature of the
relationship with industry and the culture of technology transfer of scientific results vary
significantlyxxviii. For that reason, establishing uniform rules for all disciplines would be
absurd. In some disciplines (e.g. experimental physics or oceanography), the community has
been structured for a long time, in particular owing to the size of the equipment necessary.
Other disciplines are spearheaded by small and medium-sized teams. If the best approach for
a given theme is unknown, the idea is to maintain a "portfolio" of approaches; in certain
fields, economies of scale are counter-productive; the first effect of grouping teams working
on the same category of themes on the same campus would then be to reduce their
performance.
The issue at hand: Choosing priorities and resources
That having been said, let us consider the management of science in terms of objectives and in
terms of resources. In terms of objectives, the first question is to identify whether
programmatic research is more successful in the time frames we are concerned with than
research based on incentives to serendipity, i.e. based on dynamics of discovery giving pride
of place to proliferation of ideas and wisdom. The way we state the problem (how to steer
research?) leads us to suppose that programmatic research is better by far; but no
longitudinal, historical or statistical study supports that hypothesisxxix, or contradicts it. The
difference between a North-American cluster and a French competitiveness cluster speaks for
itself. While the Palo Alto or Boston cluster is an object where many incentive and discovery
mechanisms proliferate and compete, the French cluster is most often "programmatic" on a
"four-year" basis, on a forced march towards a strategic objective decided by a committee.
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Of course, a research steering strategy can be approached more rationally than implementing
a "serendipity" strategy, but successful transfer of discoveries to an invention and
entrepreneurship logic cannot be decreed. In other words, programmatic logic will always
come up against the wall of intrinsic lack of motivation. Resources can be programmed, but
not enthusiasm.
A disturbing neo-quantitative logic
Programming strategy itself has been transformed since 2005 by ideological stamps, such as
what has become a dogma of "avoiding thin spreading of funds". Within less than four years,
we have seen the behaviour of researchers change and the logic reversed. Given that results
are required, existing results are sold to buy the "time credit" which is so precious, so absent,
and which then allows "proliferation" exploration. Turning a blind eye to this type of
situation perhaps explains the difficulties encountered in hiring and retaining young
researchers. How can you devote your work to discovery, to the quality of research, when the
rewards go to reverse engineering on past results and skill in building institutional facades?
Obviously, it is difficult to be young and to have a "proven track record", to use an Anglo-
Saxon expression. As suggested by Miroslav Radmanxxx, we could surrender to the idea of
mechanical distribution of funds and responsibilities based on the number of publications, or
on success rates in research calls for tenders. The effects are knownxxxi. By focusing the
attention of young researchers on a purely quantitative measurement of their performance, we
are putting France at risk of losing cultural assets in terms of research: The assets of quality,
of teamwork driven by vocation, and not by "positioning" and "ranking" games in the order of
writers in a publication. If we decide to adopt this type of strategy, we must at least ensure
that all the assessors, whether members of National University Councils, AERES, or national
agencies, pass the criteria they are supposed to apply to the staff under evaluation themselves.
The percentage of researchers published in A or B level journals is disturbingly low in French
institutions. The effect is doubly discouraging: On the one hand, because the "excellence"
bonuses distributed do not comply with the general policy announced by the administration
and on the other hand, because they are the subject of "local" arbitration which, within the
framework of autonomy of universities, has become a genuine subservience ceremonial.
Based on the results of a survey in the framework of Futuris 2010, the AERES evaluations are
a powerful tool for university presidents who find publicly supported reasons to reorganise
their teams, close a given laboratory, or devote more resources to another laboratory. They
have become a component of their authority. Should this be viewed as a success of AERES,
or as a disturbing weakening of local governance mechanisms? And even if publications play
an excessive role in assessments, let us as least consider that research is more or less assessed.
Teaching is not.
Conclusion: Questioning the solidity of the bases of French science strategies
All the measures implemented do not have the same future. Some are only what one might
term scaffolding, which will be removed once the house is ready. It is probable that this will
be the fate of everything that cannot be understood by a foreign observer. The government
has chosen to reform by addition rather than by substitution. This method is less painful, but
it is temporary. There are at least two problems:
Superposition of structures and multiplication of affiliation. We need to be able to see
clearly, not only from outside, but also from inside. The word "governance" is
misused: It is impossible to live without confusion if you answer to several different
authorities.
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Money will become scarce, and we cannot continue to grant additional resources to the
best performers without taking money away from those who are not as good, i.e.
without reorganising our forces.
Selection then gives rise to the problem of what happens to those who are not selected. We
need to bear in mind that most budgets are not allocated to competitive selection, even in
investments for the future, except for technological research institutes (IRT) and SATT
technology transfer structures. One of the future challenges is therefore to see how leaders of
higher education and research institutions (who, even if they are more "autonomous" will
have to talk to a government that still provides over 80% of their resources) will allocate
recurrent annual budgets: According to the priorities of competitive selection, according to
their own personal strategies, according to the levelling tradition of consoling the losers? On
the other hand, not every institution can be a Major International University of Excellence.
The missions and performance sought will not be the same for everybody, which again raises
the issue of assessment of education, at the different levels of higher education.
Drawing inspiration, transposing, comparing is always a hazardous exercise. There is value
only if the far-reaching differences between the systems analysed are clearly understood.
North-American education plays an essential role as a fairness mechanism in society. The
United States is almost the only country where juvenile imprisonment statistics are
systematically presented alongside those of university education. This heavy and symbolic
function is accompanied by drastic measures so that this founding mechanism of American
civilization and of its "manifest destiny" is never found wanting. Teaching staff assessments
by students are undertaken in most universities in the presence of a security officer. The mere
mention in a published article of data taken from a thesis, by the professor supervising the
doctoral student, earned a very reputed member of the Berkeley staff an immediate layoff and
almost three hundred thousand Euros in compensation. For a young doctor, it is almost
impossible to be a candidate in his own institution, and many institutions organise viva voce
examinations without the presence of the doctoral thesis supervisor. The National Science
Foundation forbids more than four participations, for an entire career, in the same jury,
thereby fighting nepotism, inertia and the temptation for "networks" to control assessment
bodies. It is true that the NSF is constantly supervised by Congress, with surprise visits,
double-blind testing of the work of assessors… And despite all the qualities of such systems,
blindly transposing is still not the right solution.
Another factor which is rarely taken into account in transpositions is the tremendous fluidity
among institutions of all types, as well as departments and schools, within Anglo-Saxon
universities. Nearer France, at the Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale in Lausanne (EPFL), new
professors are required to undertake a joint project with a teacher from another discipline, so
as to encourage decompartmentalization. It is probably also on these "frontiers", which no
decree can erase, that we need to focus our efforts: The borders of preconceived ideas on the
skills expected, of what is "programmable" and of "proliferation of ideas", those of
"excellence" and of "quality". The power of university presidents in terms of hiring and
appointments is an important factor in this necessary development. We have yet to implement
genuine management of human resources in public research. Beyond that, one could say,
equally truly, that this has yet to be done throughout the public service. The standard of living
of institutions has been impacted by a rash recruitment policy, and the "more jobs" slogan is
still audible. We need to bear in mind that this was because jobs did not cost the units
anything. In theory, those times are now past, but behaviour takes more time to change, and
there are not only different situations from one region to another, but also from one discipline
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to another. In a context where age imbalance will not be corrected soon, French research,
whether public or private, civil or industrial, needs to make development of technical
professions, engineering and research an absolute priority, by offering young researchers
guarantees of fairness, reward and access to responsibilities, failing which the future of
French research is in jeopardy.
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CONCLUSION
This first edition of the report of the CSFRS Scientific Council brought together, intuitu
personae, academics and leaders, men and women with experience of military command,
crisis management, corporate leadership, hands-on experience, day-to-day life, State agencies
supervising research, environmental issues, security… The result is the image of France as it
is felt by a prism freed of any jurisdictional or disciplinary shackles. This France is disturbed
by the dilution of its fundamental principles, of its social cohesion, of the mutual attention that
its citizens no longer appear to devote to each other. At the same time, the report projects a
resolute France, with assets, talents and strategic capabilities that it intends to use to meet the
challenges of defence, security, resilience, economy and society with which it is confronted.
"Yet another report…. More ideas, recommendations, whistle-blowing which will not give
rise to any decisions, to any changes". We can already hear the protests of those "who will
not be taken in again", those who have seen it all, who have already written it all, who are
prompt to condemn any new idea as the expression of learned minds, who no longer want to
read because they already know, because they come from the right place, because they have
had the right career path, were graduates of the right class: The vintners of inertia, the
guardians of all things reasonable, the upholders of the precautionary principle.
To them, we say that this is not just another report, but open questioning: Unresolved issues,
questions set aside, questions forgotten, questions that hurt or that annoy; in short, strategic
issues.
The Members of the Scientific Council who took part in preparing this report did not take "the
mountain path" of Shi Nai’an. They devoted their time, skills, experience, impertinence and
also their wisdom to collective questioning. In a document where expression is not masked
by signatures and stamps, this collective gift is a genuine act of citizenship. Here, we are not
in the soft consultation of "stakeholder" theory, where finally not much is "held" except the
opportunity to be used by heavy, yet very light, "consultation". Here, the exercise involves
risk, without a safety net, the framework is not predefined; no-one can hide behind the
prerogatives of a status, a code, a position. For all those who took part, it was also a
marvellous moment of friendship, whether we agreed or disagreed.
What are these strategic issues? Where did the differences of opinion lie? The first is
certainly the realignment of world powers, both in their arbitration mode and in the very
exercise of political, military and economic power (p.16). The future of the nuclear equation
is clearly challenged. The conditions of French power are called into question, and its
"untouchable" principles are challenged (p.19). The members of Section I of the Scientific
Council conclude that the defence tool must be adapted if it intends to be sustainable.
What are the societal and social risks? To that question, the members of the Scientific
Council provide a straightforward answer: The question is not well-asked; it imposes a bias, it
dictates an answer that confines social issues to the field of danger, when they should blossom
in the field of assets. This is not at all an issue of a French-style "manifest destiny", but of
using social cohesion and vitality as strategic levers, and not as security bogeys. Section II
concludes that there is a "misdeal" on the outdated, old-fashioned and rigid concepts of
power, while the strategic strength of Europe lies in its society models first and foremost.
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When we suggest that human insecurity has just outclassed military insecurity at global level,
is this not a totally new outlook? Let's stop playing dominos, doctrine tectonics: It is daily
humiliation that moves lines and cracks. In Section III, we discover a world where it is no
longer possible to organise one's own little local governance "on the quiet", where there are
no more islets of discretion, where governance mechanisms clash and fight for legitimacy.
The issue of "Others" becomes the strategic issue, whether in the field of migrations,
inequality in human development or resistance to environmental predation. Here again, we
need to shift the paradigm and not beat ourselves with aspirin. If migration becomes the
dominant lifestyle, we will have to adapt our systems of governance, welcome, generosity,
business, economy and responsibility.
Will such a world become more serene, because it is more open? Will this tremendous
immediate knowledge lead to appeasement? "Not exactly", conclude the members of Section
IV. Although a digital world offers new opportunities, it also offers new vulnerabilities. We
are not ready. We are not equipped. We are not "learners". In a unique strategic diagnosis of
French cyber-security, the members of the Scientific Council have warned us: We need to
adopt a principle of reality; we need to stop telling ourselves tall stories; we need to develop a
national cyber-security policy and industry. Should digital technology lead us to forget the
real world? The terrorism threat is still with us. It is added to new forms of criminality, and
even transforms them. This is the new challenge of security-related training and cooperation:
We urgently need to move away from silos, get rid of ideological shackles, build a solid and
cross-functional frame of reference for all jurisdictions.
But what about the base? Do defence, social issues, governance and security have any
meaning in a world that is not able to ensure its own sustainability? Is there any point in our
strategic thinking if we are not even able to preserve the life that supports us? The members
of Section V propose a synoptic perspective of sustainable development. We have been
warned: There is no archipelago economy. The drop in transport costs is nothing more than
an illusion. Insularity exists only in the accounting that we choose to apply to the issue of
resilience; the economics of "just don't get caught" have no future. Sustainable development
is the base of the economy and of society, and not an ideological walled garden used as a
spillway for whatever is "not strategic". Biodiversity is a challenge both for survival and for
defence; a climate which must be imagined with the strength of independent analysis; an
energy strategy which must be redesigned under the paradigm of efficiency, and not the
predation of consumption; global food safety under threat, and the problem stated in realistic
and blunt terms.
Does this mean that we are in a "crisis-prone" world? Should we just get used to that fate and
live with it? Should we accept that destiny linked to our technological complexity? The
members of Section VI vehemently reject the view of abandonment, false distance and inertia.
True, they say, we do have to face "mega-crises", but no, we do not lack knowledge. The
obstacles are behavioural, institutional, corporatist and industrial. That is what we need to
change, by refusing tropisms, by refusing misuse of the precautionary principle, to serve
industrial interests. This is not a change of course, it is a change of crew, ship and rudder.
Defence challenges, security challenges, the subject of conflict: The economy has suddenly
arrived under the umbrella of strategic research. International adjustment is blocked.
Selfishness is all the rage. Countries with surplus create inflation in neighbouring countries,
then speculate on it. We use debt like we use aspirin after a party where we have had a little
too much too drink… Section VII gives us a straightforward warning: It is dangerous to force
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2011 Report of the Scientific Council of the High Council for Strategic Education and Research
financial globalisation in this context. We need to solidify, close the gaps, reinforce financial
regulation and make it compatible. France does not have great room for manoeuvre. With
socio-demography "in mid-stream ", France is ageing, becoming more rigid, it is not prepared
for a second working life; it denigrates seniority, it resists risk-taking, and there again, the
issue is more behavioural logic than demography. The French socio-economic model must be
reinvented.
We could not end our strategic questioning without focusing on an issue that underpins
everything: Our knowledge economy, our research, our human and technical heritage. Faced
with these pressures, has French research withstood the impact? The members of Section
VIII tell us that research is currently in a process of major transformation, but it is struggling
to hold up the walls, saved by tax expedients, the R&D tax credit, advances, public contracts,
the "future" interest on the capital of the French government loan… The world of research,
whether public or private, is anxious. There are many reforms, but reduced strategic
visibility. Greatest common denominators which have never really existed encourage fairy
tales, facades, while all European countries are pursuing the same strategic objectives. All the
same, there is a France of technological entrepreneurship; it is envied; it achieves great
success abroad; it lives through the cooperation between businesses and universities in
France.
Through these nine sections, the Scientific Council of the CSFRS has taken us on a long
journey to the heart of strategic issues stated clearly, straightforwardly, sometimes even
bluntly, but always with a focus on being fair and representative of the tensions and
disagreements in the diagnosis. They represent a contribution to a strategic research
orientation. They are not a new doctrine, or the property of any of us, or a new framework
intended to replace existing dynamics. The philosophy is not to point fingers. It is not to
make a final a learned statement, or to speak as a critic or tutor. It is the expression of
strategic questioning of citizens.
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2011 Report of the Scientific Council of the High Council for Strategic Education and Research
Notes
i
. According to Article 31 of the Constitutive Convention of the High Council for Strategic Education and Research, as deliberated by the
Board of Directors on February 23, 2010.
ii
. Yes, Prime Minister is a British satirical television series written for the BBC by Antony Jay and Jonathan Lynn (1980-1982).
iii
White Paper of 2008, p. 64.
iv
See for instance, Nissim Amzallag, the Reform of the Truth: An enquiry into the Sources of Modernity, Paris: C.L. Mayer, 2010.
v
Universalism, ”open” and individualistic society, claiming to be the only reference which could ensure the progress of humanity, and
founded on the individual desires and choices which are decreed to be the only value, etc.)
vi
First attack targeting the World Trade Centre, February 1993; Tokyo Underground, March 1995; Oklahoma City, April 1995.
vii
In 2010, global migrations involve about 214 millions of people; + 37% in 20 years (+37% in Europe, +80% in North America). In 2009,
the financial flows they generate amount to 317 billion dollars: Three times the total amount of development aid.
viii
See President Obama National Security Strategy (May 2010), or the Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence (February 2010). Two crucial
documents regarding threats, in which about 48 pages out of 50 are hypnotized by Bin Laden and assimilated movements.
ix
. Extract of C. Riveline, “About the book by Philippe d’Iribarne, Les immigrés de la République (The immigrants of the Republic)”, in: Le
Jaune et le Rouge, Oct. 2010.
x
. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, International Migration 2009
xi
. Pascal Boniface, Hubert Védrine, Atlas of crises and conflicts: .Paris, Armand Colin/Fayard, 2009
xii
.Published for the first time in 1993 in an article by James Moore: “Predators and Prey: A New Ecology of Competition”, the concept of
“business ecosystem” is frequently used today in academic literature (Torres-Blay, 2000; Gueguen and Torres, 2004; Iansiti and Levien,
2004; Teece, 2007; Pierce 2009)..
xiii
AA Berle and GC Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1932.
xiv
Thomson, J. D. Organizations in Action. Social Science Base of Administrative Theory, New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1967.
xv
Capitalism in which each household or small group produces most goods for itself.
xvi
More generally, the geography of segmentation of the value chain opposes "centres", where front-office units are located, and "outskirts"
where back-office units are located. This geography can therefore characterise urban centres, regions, nations, continents and the world.
xvii
Survey conducted in 2009 by IDATE and BCG for the French Telecommunication Federation. It describes the electricity consumption of
the ICT industry in France and its impact on greenhouse gas emissions.
xviii
Conference of Parties
xix
There is still no genuine maritime policy in France, although the statement of decisions of the Interministerial Committee on the Sea
(CIMER) of 8 December 2009 observes that sustainable preservation and use of the resources of the sea and of the coastline involve
knowledge and supervision of these complex environments. Sector-based policies are superimposed: Transport, fishing, minerals, pleasure-
boating, energy… but we lack a consistent vision and a genuine expressed commitment in a country that has the 2 nd exclusive economic zone
in the world.
xx
The most well-known are Kyoto, Copenhagen and Cancun.
xxi
One can refer to the collective work "Risques et complexité" (risks and complexity) with Harmattan and more particularly the chapter on
"In-depth defence and risk control policy in complex socio-economic systems"
xxii
REX: lessons learned
xxiii
This first paragraph is a condensed adaptation of Chapter II of: Jacques Lesourne and Denis Randet (Dir.) FutuRIS 2010: La Recherche et
l'innovation en France (Research and Innovation in France), Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 2010 written by Rémi Barré, Violette Nemessany
and Vincent Charlet.
xxiv
Sources: financements publics (public financing), BCRD documents from 2000 to 2005, then MIRES documents as from 2006. 2010
figures are estimated. FutuRIS Processing.
xxv
Sources: financements publics (public financing), BCRD documents from 2000 to 2005, then MIRES documents as from 2006. 2010
figures are estimated. FutuRIS Processing.
xxvi
Sources: financements publics (public financing), BCRD documents from 2000 to 2005, then MIRES documents as from 2006. 2010
figures are estimated. FutuRIS Processing.
xxvii
. Source: corrected draft budget bill for 2010.
xxviii
For more details: V. Becquet & C. Musselin, Variations autour du travail des universitaires, Paris, Convention MENRT, ACI ”Travail”,
2004. Musselin implemented the methodological recommendations made by Michel Crozier, La crise de l’intelligence - Essai sur
l’impuissance des élites à se réformer. 1995.
xxix
See the absence of the word " Internet" in the White Paper entitled Livre blanc CNRS de prospective en informatique, end of the 1990s.
Source: Alain Fuchs, April 2011.
xxx
. http ://www.csl.sony.fr/Events/OpenHouse2004/abstract.html, quoted hereinafter.
xxxi
See, in particular, Maya Bacache-Beauvallet, Les stratégies absurdes : Comment faire pire en croyant faire mieux, Paris : Seuil, 2009.
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