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                AUGUST 10, 2005
                               Table of Contents
Introduction                                                                                                1
Executive Summary                                                                                           4

Discussion                                                                                                  9

Part One – Establishing New Information Sharing Requirements and Processes                                  9
      I. The Imperative for Creating a Formal and Objectively
           Manageable Homeland Security Intelligence/Information
           Requirements Process                                                                             9
      II. Different Considerations for Threat Information
           and Vulnerability Information                                                                   15
     III. Diversity Within the Private Sector
      III.                                                                                                 17
     IV. Developing a Resilient and Integrated Network for
           Information Sharing                                                                             18

Part Two – Required Changes to Laws, Rules & Policies                                                      22
      I. Regarding Private Sector Representatives as Partners
       I.                                                                                                  22
      II. Liability Concerns                                                                               22
     III. Implementing the Critical Infrastructure Information Act                                         24
     IV. DHS’s Caution, Lack of Clarity Regarding Other Freedom
           of Information Act Exemptions                                                                   26
      V. Federal Advisory Committee Act Issues                                                             27
     VI. Lack of Coordination Within DHS and Between
           DHS and Other Agencies                                                                          33
      VII.Requirement for Clearer Justification for Information
    VII.                                                                                                   34
      VIIICompletion of SSI Rulemaking
   VIII.                                                                                                   34

Part Three – Partnering with the Media                                                                     37
      I. Findings
       I.                                                                                                  37
     II. From “Media and First Response Program” to a
           Sustained Partnership                                                                           38
     III. Need for Regular Background Briefings                                                            39
     IV. Role of Local Officials and Trusted Authorities
      IV.                                                                                                  39
      V. Refining the Homeland Security Advisory System                                                    40

Glossary of Acronyms                                                                                       41
Attachment A: Information Sharing Task Force/Subject Matter Experts                                        43
Attachment B: Public/Private Information Sharing Process                                                   45
Attachment C: Protecting Private Security-Related Information from
                Disclosure by Government Agencies                                                          49
Attachment D: Categories of Security-Related Information Sought by
                Government from Private Critical Infrastructure Entities                                   79

                                          H O M E L A N D    S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
                      P R I V A T E   S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N   S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
“We will build a national environment that enables the sharing of essential homeland
security information. We must build a ‘system of systems’ that can provide the right
information to the right people at all times. Information will be shared ‘horizontally’
across each level of government and ‘vertically’ among federal, state, and local
governments, private industry, and citizens.”
                                  — The President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security
    Origin of Report; Authorship. Because the                       It then discusses at length the legal and related
Private Sector controls the great majority of the                obstacles that have impeded information flow in
Nation’s critical infrastructure, effective cooperation          existing channels and, unless effectively addressed,
between the Federal Government – particularly the                will continue to do so in the proposed architecture.
Department of Homeland Security – and the                        Finally, the report addresses the role of the media in
Private Sector is essential to protecting those assets           this process.
from terrorist attack. Nowhere is that cooperation
more vital than in the area of information sharing.                 In conducting this analysis, the Task Force
And yet that cooperation has been hampered by a                  defined “government” to include Federal, State and
variety of legal and procedural obstacles. The                   local entities. While the focus of this report is
Homeland Security Advisory Council charged its                   information sharing between government and pri-
Private Sector Information Sharing Task Force on                 vate sector critical infrastructure entities, we also
March 21 to understand the nature of those obsta-                recognize that state and local governments operate
cles and to propose solutions to them. The Task                  some critical infrastructure, and hence may find
Force concluded that the best way to understand                  themselves on the “private,” as well as the “govern-
these obstacles – which could be real or perceived –             ment,” side of the equation.
was to ask the Private Sector about them.
Accordingly, the Task Force assigned several of its                 The Task Force recognizes that some office
members, led by Rick Stephens, to reach out to                   and/or agency names and responsibilities referred
lawyers and others representing private sector criti-            to in the report may change with pending 2SR
cal infrastructure companies and associations. This              implementation.
ad hoc Group of Subject Matter Experts comprises
aeronautics, banking, chemicals, commercial avia-                   Methodology of the Work. The Task Force deter-
tion, electric power, refining, telecommunications,              mined that its work encompassed four key issues:
broadcasting, food products, and state and local                   • Information collection and sharing require-
government. (See Attachment A for the roster of                       ments (up and down)
the Task Force and its Subject Matter Experts.)                    • Public/private information sharing
    Scope of Report. The Task Force concluded that                 • Laws, rules, policies that affect public/private
the question of which legal obstacles impair infor-                   information sharing
mation sharing could not be addressed in isolation                 • Partnering with the communications media
from the channels by which information flows                          on an ongoing basis
from government entities to private ones and vice-                 The Task Force assigned members to lead work
versa. The Task Force’s report therefore evaluates,                on each of these key issues and decided to defer
and makes recommendations regarding, the                           a fifth issue, training the private and public sec-
requirements and processes for information sharing                 tor on the collection, analysis, dissemination,
between government and private entities.                           and use of homeland security information.

                                              H O M E L A N D      S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L      1
                        P R I V A T E   S E C T O R       I N F O R M A T I O N   S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
         The Task Force divided its work into two phases:               Categorization of Recommendations. This report
         • Phase I (Current State) -- Determining the                provides concrete recommendations to address each
            “as-is” environment of information sharing               of the issues we identified. These recommenda-
            between government and the Private Sector.               tions are classified by the type of change they call
            In this connection, Task Force members:                  for, in order to provide some perspective regarding
                • Conducted numerous interviews of                   how easily and quickly they could be implemented:
                   Federal and Private Sector officials;                    • L (legislative): Changes to the U.S. Code.
                • Met and spoke with representatives from                     This would require Congressional action,
                   DHS offices (e.g., Information Analysis                    and is thus the most difficult and time-
                   and Infrastructure Protection                              consuming to accomplish.
                   Directorate, Homeland Security                           • R (regulatory): Changes to the Code of
                   Operations Center, National                                Federal Regulations. This would require
                   Infrastructure Coordination Center) and                    DHS or another agency to conduct rule-
                   the Private Sector; and                                    making. While rulemaking is within a
                • Reviewed studies and reports (e.g.,                         given agency’s control, it nonetheless
                   GAO’s July 2004 report on information                      requires time and resources for compli-
                   sharing,1 the draft Interim National                       ance with the Administrative Procedure
                   Infrastructure Protection Plan).                           Act and other requirements.
         • Phase II (Future State/Recommendations) --                       • M (mechanical): This refers to guidelines,
           Defining requirements, roles, and responsibili-                    policies or other explicit procedures that
           ties of the Private Sector and DHS for effective                   do not require rulemaking.
           information sharing. In this phase, the Task                     • A (attitudinal): These are changes in atti-
           Force:                                                             tude or organizational culture, rather than
                • Expanded its membership to include                          particular agency processes. They can
                   Federal, State, and local representatives                  best be effected by clear statements from
                   and Subject Matter Experts from the                        the Secretary and other senior leaders.
                   Private Sector; and
                • Received input from key stakeholders                  Appreciation for DHS’s Work to Date. The Task
                   through Task Force meetings and confer-           Force emphasizes that its recommendations, while
                   ence calls.                                       critical at times of DHS processes, are not intend-
                                                                     ed to be critical of DHS personnel or their
        Role of DHS Participants. Several representatives            motives. DHS staff have worked extremely hard,
    from DHS provided the Task Force with helpful                    in good faith and with the best of intentions, to
    factual information regarding DHS, its current                   stand up new processes in uncharted areas. They
    information sharing processes, and its views regard-             have worked under intense time pressures, strin-
    ing particular legal issues. This assistance was vital           gent budget and personnel limitations, and impa-
    to our work, and we appreciate it. We emphasize,                 tient public scrutiny. The report respects that
    however, that these DHS representatives did not                  service. But we would dishonor it if we were not
    participate in the Task Force’s deliberations, and               completely frank regarding the legal and other
    that the analysis and recommendations presented                  challenges that confront information sharing. For
    here are entirely those of the Task Force’s non-                 the same reason, we have not compromised or
    Federal participants.                                            hedged our recommendations for how those
                                                                     obstacles should be overcome.


2       H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
        P R I V A T E   S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N     S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
   Information Sharing with the Broader Public.                    Coordination with Other Entities. Consistent
The Task Force emphasizes that the purpose of this              with its charter to address and provide recommen-
report is not to promote the greatest possible with-            dations on the spectrum of Homeland Security
holding of private security-related information                 issues, the Homeland Security Advisory Council
from release by the government. The Task Force                  (HSAC) has created a Critical Infrastructure Task
recognizes that DHS, like all Federal agencies,                 Force (CITF). The CITF is focused on the trans-
                                                                formation and advancement of national critical
must effectuate long-standing principles of open
                                                                infrastructure policy. This transformation is
government. As discussed below, the Task Force                  intended to go beyond protection to provide for
believes that the government overclassifies or oth-             the resilience and continuity of operation of the
erwise restricts from disclosure information that               Nation’s critical infrastructure. The recommenda-
should be provided to Private Sector entities                   tions of this Task Force and the CITF have been
which own or operate critical infrastructure.By                 closely integrated. That integration must continue.
extension, some government information that is
“security-related” likely could safely be made pub-
lic without jeopardizing the security of private sec-
tor infrastructure – especially if it is summarized
or abstracted in a way that does not create undue
risks. On the other hand, while different people
will draw the line at different places, ultimately all
(or virtually all) observers would agree that there
are circumstances in which security-related infor-
mation provided by private entities to the govern-
ment must be protected from unrestricted public
release. Further, the government needs to listen
carefully to the Private Sector to understand the
sensitivities that are at stake when the government
is considering disclosing information about pri-
vate entities. These issues are among those that
the Task Force will consider further in the context
of “responsible information sharing,” a future
work item.

                                            H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L    3
                       P R I V A T E   S E C T O R       I N F O R M A T I O N   S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
                         Executive Summary
    Because the Private Sector controls the great                  3. Different considerations apply for sharing
majority of the nation’s critical infrastructure, effec-              threat information and vulnerability infor-
tive cooperation between the Federal Government                       mation.
– particularly the Department of Homeland
Security – and the Private Sector is essential to pro-             4. The Task Force supports the State and Local
tecting those assets from terrorist attack. Nowhere                   Information Sharing Working Group’s prin-
is that cooperation more vital than in the area of
                                                                      cipal finding: State, Local and Tribal
information sharing. And yet that cooperation has
been hampered by a variety of legal and procedural                    Governments – and the Private Sector –
obstacles. The Homeland Security Advisory                             require homeland security threat and indi-
Council charged its Private Sector Information                        cations and warning (I&W) information
Sharing Task Force on March 21 to understand the                      that, to the maximum extent possible, is
nature of those obstacles and to propose solutions                    UNCLASSIFIED, timely, actionable/tai-
to them.                                                              lored and updated frequently.

    The Task Force concluded that the best way to                  5. Intelligence/information sharing between
understand these obstacles – which could be real                       DHS and the Private Sector involves policy,
or perceived – was to ask the Private Sector about                     process, and technology and the creation
them. Accordingly, the Task Force assigned sever-                      and maintenance of a trusted partnership
al of its members to reach out to numerous pri-
                                                                       between all concerned.
vate sector critical infrastructures, as well as State
and local government.                                                 • A number of statutory, regulatory, policy
                                                                         and attitudinal improvements are needed.
   The Task Force during its deliberations                            • It will be difficult or impossible to make
reached the following general findings:                                  significant progress on many other topics
                                                                         until these obstacles can be overcome.
    1. Significant information sharing activities
       and work are underway in DHS and in the                     6. A stronger working relationship between
       public and Private Sectors. But it is not                      DHS and the media will increase the likeli-
       clear that there is an aligned “architecture”                  hood that preparedness, threat and crisis
       or clear understanding of who has the                          information provided to a diverse public is
       responsibility to create one. Such an archi-                   accurate, timely, actionable and in context.
       tecture should address:
                                                                        • Provide a reassuring sense that govern-
          • Organizational accountabilities and
            relationships with other organizations                         ment, business and civic leaders are
          • Systems and information flow (process-                         working well together.
            es, information systems and data)                           • Improve service to the public in a crisis.
          • Other Federal Agency information                            • Refinements in the Homeland Security
            resources, requirements and needs                              Advisory System are needed.
                                                                        • A national community-based threat
    2. Significant work is required to align rela-                         and preparedness campaign.
       tionships between DHS and the Private

4       H O M E L A N D      S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
        P R I V A T E    S E C T O R    I N F O R M A T I O N     S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
    7. Relationships and interaction between the                               (SCCs) and other Private Sector organi-
       Private Sector and state and local agencies                            zations and stakeholders must coordinate
       are less problematic and, therefore, the                               their efforts and define Private Sector
       focus of the Task Force was on the                                     requirements for DHS so that specific
       DHS/Private Sector relationship.                                       Private Sector entities can formally request,
                                                                              track and receive only that information
  The Task Force issued the following recom-                                  requested. This will require doing a better
mendations:2                                                                  job of articulating what types of informa-
                                                                              tion they want from government and with
    1. DHS and the Private Sector should work                                 what frequency. (M/A)
       in collaboration to develop a formal, and                            • The process should include a greater bias
       objectively manageable, homeland securi-                               toward disseminating more information
       ty intelligence/information requirements                               in unclassified form. The solution should
       process.                                                               not primarily be to investigate more peo-
         • The process should place a premium on,                             ple and issue more clearances. (M/A)
            and leverage, superior Private Sector                           • Where information must be classified,
            information resources, expertise in busi-                            • DHS and other agencies should
            ness continuity planning, and under-                                   work harder to produce unclassified
            standing of the operations of infrastruc-                              versions. (M/A)
            ture sectors. (M/A)                                                  • The President should continue to
         • The process must recognize the diversity                                implement on a timely basis the pro-
            of the Private Sector. (A)                                             visions of the Intelligence Reform
         • DHS should partner with the Private                                     law designed to expedite the clear-
            Sector in developing an integrated archi-                              ance process. (M)
            tecture for information collection and
            sharing. The Task Force understands                       2. DHS should adopt a tiered approach to
            that this is how Homeland Security                           infrastructure vulnerability information
            Information Network (HSIN) is being                          sharing.
                                                                           • Carefully consider the known and
            developed and how HSIN-CI (Critical
                                                                              potentially exploitable vulnerabilities of
            Infrastructure) (with 40,000+ members)
                                                                              database technologies, and the conse-
            operates. The Task Force supports that
                                                                              quences of compromise of a “national
            approach. (M/A)
                                                                              asset database” of vulnerabilities. (L/M)
         • The Private Sector and DHS need to
                                                                           • Maintain appropriate Federal informa-
            integrate and align their requirements for
                                                                              tion at the DHS level, State informa-
            information collection and sharing. (M/A)
                                                                              tion at the State level, local informa-
         • Information Sharing & Analysis Centers
                                                                              tion at the local level, and Private
            (ISACs), Sector Coordinating Councils
                                                                              Sector information at the Private Sector
            (SCCs) and other Private Sector organiza-
                                                                              level. (L/M)
            tions and stakeholders must coordinate                         • To enhance the security of vulnerability
            their efforts and define Private Sector                           information, maintain public sector
            requirements for DHS so that specific                             infrastructure information at the city
            Private Sector entities can formally request,                     and municipal level and Private Sector
            track and receive only that information                           information with trusted third
            requested. This will require doing a better                       party/non-governmental entities.
            job of articulating what types of informa-                        (L/M)
            tion they want from government and with                        • Establish an appropriate organization or
            what frequency. (M/A)                                             process for cross-sector and government
         • Information Sharing & Analysis Centers                             information exchange. (M)
            (ISACs), Sector Coordinating Councils

Highest priority recommendations are italicized.

                                                   H O M E L A N D   S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y     C O U N C I L      5
                         P R I V A T E     S E C T O R      I N F O R M A T I O N   S H A R I N G    T A S K    F O R C E
    3. DHS needs to be flexible and responsive                             • DHS should hold regular collaborative
       in accommodating diversity within and                                 sessions (start monthly) with each Private
       among Private Sector critical infrastruc-                             Sector coordinating organization (e.g.,
       ture sectors.                                                         SCCs, ISACs). (M)
         • HSPD-7 calls for two functions: infor-                          • DHS should hold regular, detailed threat
           mation sharing and sector coordination.                           briefings with each sector.
         • Sector Coordinating Councils in every                           • Representatives of IA and IP should meet
           sector may not be able to perform all                             with selected security and continuity of
           the functions DHS desires. At a mini-                             operations personnel of critical infrastruc-
           mum, DHS must allow each sector to                                ture service providers. (M)
           determine the nature, functions, and                            • These sessions should be held more often
           rules of its council and its relationship                         than every six months, and should be
           with its ISAC and SSA (Sector Specific                            held separately for each sector. (M)
           Agency). (M/A)                                                  • They should involve more specific infor-
                                                                             mation than is currently presented in
    4. DHS should continue to develop a net-                                 classified sector briefings. (M)
       work integrated information model for                               • They should be oriented less toward presen-
       information flow.                                                     tation and more toward dialogue. (M/A)
         • Significant work is required:
            • DHS should employ a “hub and spoke                     5. DHS should promptly and decisively
              model” for information flow, as used in                   revise its rules and policies for informa-
              HSIN and HSOC. (M)                                        tion sharing.
            • Information should flow from the                            • Regard Private Sector critical infrastruc-
              Private Sector and other government                            ture facilities, companies and their asso-
              sources to the DHS hub for analyses,                           ciations as partners with legitimate inter-
              and then be distributed back to the                            ests in policy formulation and implemen-
              Private Sector on a targeted basis. (M)                        tation – and as the only entities capable
            • DHS needs Private Sector input and                             of implementing most policy in the sub-
              presence at the hub. (M/A)                                     ject area. (A)
         • As a national priority, build a resilient/sur-                 • Respond to Private Sector concerns about
           vivable Homeland Security Operations                              liability risks associated with sharing
           Center (HSOC) and Homeland Security                               security information with DHS
           Information Network (HSIN). (M)                                    • DHS should ensure that critical infra-
             • In their current condition, both                                  structure information is only used to pro-
                are single points of DHS opera-                                  tect or ensure the operational resilience of
                tional failure – an unacceptable                                 critical infrastructure. (R)
                circumstance.                                                 • Critical Infrastructure Information Act
         • Leverage the unparalleled success of,                                 (CIIA) regulations must be simple and
           and invest in expanding, HSIN-CI.                                     broadly agreed-upon before they will be
           (M)                                                                   used. (R)
             • HSIN-CI is a trusted and proven                                • Educate potential submitters regarding
                model for effectively gathering and                              the protections afforded by all existing
                sharing information.                                             laws and potential risks. (M)
         • Statewide intelligence/information                             • Fully implement the Critical
           fusion centers should be integrated into                         Infrastructure Information Act (CIIA):
           national information sharing efforts.                              • Do not require all CIIA submissions
           (M/A)                                                                 to be validated. (R)

6        H O M E L A N D      S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
         P R I V A T E   S E C T O R    I N F O R M A T I O N      S H A R I N G    T A S K    F O R C E
         • Declare that information submitted by                        and should undertake such coordination as
            SCCs and ISACs and maintained on                            early as necessary, without waiting for affected
            HSIN by sector representatives will be                      entities to initiate it. (M/A)
            deemed CII. (R/M)                                         • DHS should determine if it needs particular
          • Allow “class” CIIA determinations in                        information to do its job, or whether some
             advance of submittal. (R/M)                                other governmental or private entity is doing
          • Allow “indirect” and electronic sub-                        that job adequately. DHS should not request
             mission under CIIA. (R/M)                                  information because it can, or because it
          • Roll out the CIIA program as quickly                        would be “nice to know,” but only where it is
             as possible to all DHS entities, to other                  necessary to enable DHS entities to perform
             sector-specific agencies, and to states                    essential functions. (M/A)
             willing to execute memoranda of agree-                   • The Sensitive Security Information (SSI) rule-
             ment (on behalf of themselves and local                    making conducted by the DHS Transportation
             governments within the State). (M)                         Security Administration (TSA) should encom-
          • Authorize all personnel of its                              pass all modes of transportation. (R)
             Information Analysis & Infrastructure
             Protection Directorate who interact with                 6. DHS should pro-actively invest in a bet-
             critical entities to be CIIA portals. (M)                   ter-informed and more engaged media
• In consultation with DOJ and the Private Sector,                       through specific targeted programs aimed
  adopt broad, Department-wide positions regarding                       at developing a stronger working relation-
  the applicability of the confidential business informa-                ship between the government, the media
  tion and law enforcement sensitive exemptions under                    and the Private Sector in major incidents.
  the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). (M)                             (M/A).
• Resolve questions about how the Federal                                   • Upon completion of an assessment, the
  Advisory Committee Act (FACA) applies to                                     government and local media should scale
  SCCs and ISACs.                                                              their existing National Academies of
      • The ongoing Private Sector/Government                                  Science media engagement program into a
         operating relationship is critical to an                              sustained campaign in all UASI (Urban
         effective homeland security operation and                             Areas Security Initiative) media markets.
         is hobbled by FACA issues.                                         • Government officials at both the nation-
      • SCCs and ISACs are not covered by FACA                                 al and local levels should conduct a sys-
         because they are not “utilized” by the                                tematic program of background briefings
         Executive Branch and are primarily oper-                              for members of local media including,
         ational, rather than advisory. (M)                                    among other things, the National
      • If challenged, DHS should use one of                                   Response Plan and National Incident
         three possible authorities to exempt SCCs                             Management System, potential threat
         and ISACs from FACA. If this requires                                 and response scenarios, scientific informa-
         amending the CIIA rules, DHS should do                                tion regarding biological, chemical and
         so promptly. (R/M)                                                    radiological materials, a glossary of
      • Given the above, under no circumstances                                homeland security and citizen protective
         should DHS employ FACA “work                                          actions, and other FAQs.
         arounds” like treating SCCs as subgroups                           • Local elected officials and trusted author-
         of the National Infrastructure Advisory                               ities (public and Private Sector) should
         Council or seeking only the views of indi-                            be trained on how to conduct press brief-
         vidual companies. (M)                                                 ings during an incident in order to pro-
• DHS offices and staff should identify coordi-                                vide (1) timely and actionable informa-
  nation needs with DHS, with other Federal                                    tion and protective action recommenda-
  agencies and with State and local governments,                               tions to the Private Sector and the public
                                                                               and (2) contextual material needed to
                                                                               maintain public order and confidence.

                                               H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y    C O U N C I L     7
                       P R I V A T E     S E C T O R        I N F O R M A T I O N   S H A R I N G    T A S K   F O R C E
             • DHS, local elected officials and national                       Coordinating Councils and Information
               and local media should develop protocols                        Sharing & Analysis Centers) to establish
               for the timely confirmation or correction                       joint DHS/Private Sector teams to work
               of unconfirmed information or rumors                            on the highest priority recommendations.
               during the course of an incident.                         •     In consultation with these teams, DHS
                                                                               should build an action plan, with mile-
      7. The Homeland Security Advisory System                                 stones, to address all the recommenda-
         should be refined to provide more specific                            tions discussed below.
         guidance to the Private Sector and to the pub-                  •     Task Force members stand ready to support
         lic, including changes in warning levels. (M).                        this effort.
             • Warning levels should be adjustable on a                  •     In the future, the Task Force will address
                sector-specific, geographic or time-limited                    the issue of training the private and public
                basis (or on another basis, as appropriate).                   sector on the collection, analysis, dissemi-
             • Warning level changes should include a                          nation, and use of homeland security
                specific advisory to the public regarding                      information.
                the purpose for the change and the steps,                •     Additionally, the Task Force will review, and
                if any, that the public is expected to take                    determine whether to develop recommenda-
                as a result of such a change.                                  tions regarding, the following issues:
             • DHS, State and local officials and the                           • Creation of a domestic counterpart to
                Private Sector should meet, confer and                            the Overseas Security Advisory Council.
                develop common understandings and                               • Ensuring implementation of a formal
                expectations regarding the readiness or pre-                      intelligence requirements process for the
                paredness levels associated with different                        Private Sector, including both physical
                warning levels.                                                   mechanisms and educating stakeholders.
             • Any refinement of the Advisory System                            • Ensuring responsible information shar-
                should be accompanied by a clear, easy-                           ing, so as to satisfy legitimate public
                to-understand public communications                               right-to-know goals without creating
                plan.                                                             even greater risks to the public through
                                                                                  the release of information that could
       The Task Force identified the following                                    assist terrorists.
    next steps:                                                                 • Supporting the State and Local
                                                                                  Information Sharing Working Group’s
         • The Task Force urges DHS to reach out                                  initiatives, particularly Private Sector
           to Private Sector entities that represent                              roles and responsibilities in state and
           critical infrastructure (i.e., Sector                                  local fusion centers.

8    H O M E L A N D      S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
     P R I V A T E   S E C T O R    I N F O R M A T I O N      S H A R I N G     T A S K   F O R C E

I. The Imperative for Creating a Formal and                        ∑        about threats, and information coming
Objectively Manageable Homeland Security                                    from the Private Sector as primarily about
Intelligence/Information Requirements Process                               vulnerabilities.

    A huge amount of information currently flows                            Reflecting the wide-ranging differences
    in both directions between private sector critical                      among them, different industries and com-
    infrastructure entities and the Federal                                 panies want varying levels of threat infor-
    Government. Attachment B to this paper is an                            mation. Many smaller companies want
    outline of the most important of these flows. (It                       only specific, actionable information con-
    does not include the great volume of informa-                           cerning immediate threats that affect them
    tion moving in each direction in the form of                            individually. Some companies and indus-
    press releases, briefings, and general public affairs                   tries desire government assessments of secu-
    campaigns.) Much of the information described                           rity and business-continuity capabilities,
    in Attachment B is part of the process of legal                         but only when and as requested. Some
    and regulatory enforcement (but not the prom-                           want information that is a bit more gener-
    ulgation of rules or regulations); much falls into                      al, but which nonetheless is refined by
    the definition of “critical infrastructure informa-                     time, region or sector, or focused on threat
    tion.” Despite – or perhaps because of – the                            trend and technique analyses.
    sheer volume of this information, it is not clear
    that there is an aligned “architecture” for sharing                     Some, however, want almost all information
    it, nor a clear understanding of who has the                            available — the broad spectrum of threat
    responsibility to create one.                                           and risk information.

  Members of private sector critical infrastructure                         These companies (or industries) view them-
  have a wide variety of requirements regarding                             selves as fully able to decide whether it is rel-
  information that they want from government                                evant to them and how to respond. While
  and information that they are willing to share                            recognizing that the Private Sector is a source
  with government. As a general rule, the Private                           of and has a responsibility to provide infor-
  Sector wants information (both from govern-                               mation to the Government, until the govern-
  ment and other Private Sector sources):                                   ment’s new information dissemination and
∑     • to change business behavior when                                    sorting methods are refined, these companies
        necessary;                                                          want DHS to spend more effort on the
∑     • on things which would affect businesses;                            process of getting information out to the
        and                                                                 Private Sector, letting the Private Sector sort
∑     • to respond/react/initiate resilience.                               through applicability and share information
                                                                            across sectors or within regions. Even with
∑       A. Requirements regarding threat information                        this group, however, there was a desire that
                                                                            shared information be as specific, timely and
           The Private Sector generally views infor-                        actionable as possible, so that it assists those
           mation coming from DHS as primarily                              responsible for adjusting their security and
                                                                            operational continuity measures to respond

                                               H O M E L A N D         S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y    C O U N C I L       9
                         P R I V A T E    S E C T O R       I N F O R M A T I O N    S H A R I N G     T A S K   F O R C E
                 The Private Sector also needs to be able                            Analysis of the data, however, should
                 to get threat information from State and                            always be reviewed by the company (usu-
                 local sources, as well as from DHS. To                              ally under the terms of the NDA) to avoid
                 avoid confusion, especially during times                            incorrect conclusions. In one instance
                 of crisis, this will require Federal-State                          where such review was not obtained, a
                 cooperation and coordination.                                       government analyst’s assumption that a
                                                                                     telecommunications cable crossed a
                 Too often threats and warnings seem                                 bridge (when in fact it was buried under
                 based on sector rather than geography.                              the stream crossed by the bridge) led him
                                                                                     to erroneously conclude that destroying
               B. Requirements regarding criticality/                                the bridge would destroy connectivity.
                                                                                   C. Requirements regarding unclassified and
                 The process of determining which infra-                              classified information
                 structure elements within a given sector
                 are “critical” or “vulnerable” needs to be                          The Private Sector, recognizing it has its
                 better defined and made only with the                               own “insider” security concerns, needs
                 input of Private Sector expertise. While                            information — unclassified to the maxi-
                 DHS has made progress in building its                               mum extent possible — that is action-
                 organizational and oversight capacity                               able; i.e., enabling it to respond in the
                 regarding the Private Sector, the fact is                           best way based on local trusted relation-
                 that, by necessity, the Private Sector will                         ships. As discussed below, Congress and
                                                                                     the Government Accountability Office
                 always understand its operations better
                                                                                     (GAO) have emphasized the need for
                 than DHS (or other government agen-
                                                                                     DHS and other agencies to issue more
                 cies). As the government learned during
                                                                                     security clearances to State, local and pri-
                 the Y2K transition, empowerment of and
                                                                                     vate individuals, and such clearances are
                 trust in the Private Sector’s superior
                                                                                     clearly needed by many who do not have
                 knowledge of its own infrastructure and
                                                                                     them. But DHS should not proceed on
                 inclusion of its expertise will produce
                                                                                     the basis that issuing more clearances will
                 optimal decisions and objectively sustain-                          resolve this obstacle. There are simply
                 able results. Exclusion of that expertise,                          too many people in the tens of thousands
                 or dictation to those holding it, will                              of critical infrastructure entities for DHS
                 assure the continuation of suboptimal                               to clear them all – and new people go to
                 decisions, expenditures of resources, and                           work for these businesses and govern-
                 effects. For example, DHS’s National                                ments all the time. Equally problematic,
                 Communications System (NCS) main-                                   for homeland security information to
                 tains a database about network configura-                           produce the intended benefits, recipients
                 tion entitled the “Network Design &                                 of it need to be able to relay its substance
                 Analysis Capability” (NDAC). The data                               to colleagues within their own organiza-
                 comes to DHS by purchase from compa-                                tions and sectors, within interdependent
                 nies under nondisclosure agreements,                                sectors, and within State and local gov-
                 from public sources such as the Local                               ernments. It is not very helpful if cleared
                 Exchange Routing Guide (LERG), and                                  people cannot tell non-cleared people what
                 by voluntary submissions.                                           they know.3

      This was the clear consensus of participants in a panel convened by the American Bar Association’s Section of Administrative
     Law and Regulatory Practice on the new “information sharing environment.” Participants in the March 16, 2005 event were
     William Leonard, Information Security Oversight Office, National Archives & Records Administration; William Dawson, Deputy
     Intelligence Community CIO and Special Assistant for Information Sharing to the Director of Central Intelligence; Larry Halloran,
     Staff Director and Counsel of the House Government Reform Committee’s Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats
     and International Relations; and Mary DeRosa, Senior Fellow, Technology Program, Center for Strategic and International
     Studies and a consulting expert to the Markle Foundation’s Task Force on National Security in the Information Age. Audio
     available at

10       H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y      C O U N C I L
         P R I V A T E   S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N        S H A R I N G     T A S K    F O R C E
           The primary solution to this obstacle                                Task Force’s view, have received insuffi-
           needs to be giving people unclassified,                              cient attention.
           timely and actionable information to
           clear them all – and new people go to                                First, when Congress enacted the
           work for these businesses and govern-                                Homeland Security Act, it created the
           ments all the time.                                                  “Homeland Security Information Sharing
                                                                                Act” (HSISA), a free-standing law intend-
           In particular, the Private Sector feels that                         ed to promote the distribution of such
           government should trust it and provide                               information, whether classified or unclas-
           access to “Law Enforcement Sensitive” and                            sified, to the public and private owners
           “For Official Use Only” information.                                 and operators of critical infrastructure.

           Those and similar restrictions some-times
           lead law enforcement or other sector-spe-                            HSISA declares the sense of Congress
           cific agencies to prevent Private Sector                             that Federal agencies should share, to the
           access, even though many within the criti-                           maximum extent practicable, information
           cal infrastructure security organizations                            that:
           understand how to handle sensitive                                    • Relates to terrorist threats;
           data.(Indeed, such companies are equally if                           • Relates to the ability to prevent or
           not more concerned about this informa-                                   disrupt terrorist activity;
           tion being publicly released.) DHS should                             • Would improve the identification or
           explore the value of nondisclosure agree-                                investigation of suspected terrorists; and
           ments as a means of limiting subsequent                               • Would improve response to terrorist
           dissemination of information it provided                                 attacks.5

           to selected critical entities. Such agree-
           ments are mandatory when classified infor-                           Essentially, HSISA instructs the President
           mation is shared, and could be useful for                            to develop homeland security information
           sharing unclassified information as well.                            sharing systems to promote the sharing of
                                                                                both classified and sensitive but unclassi-
           The Task Force is not alone in its belief                            fied information. 6

           that DHS should share more information
           with the Private Sector. Congress has                                While the President has issued Executive
           twice acted since 9/11 to encourage                                  Order 13311 delegating the relevant
           greater information sharing. Before dis-                             authority to the Secretary of DHS,7 the
           cussing the obstacles to such information                            Task Force is unaware that any further
           sharing, it is worth discussing these two                            steps have been taken explicitly to imple-
           Congressional directives which, in the                               ment the law.

 While HSISA speaks of sharing such information with “State and local personnel,” that term is defined to include “employees
of private sector entities that affect critical infrastructure, cyber, economic or public health security, as designated by the
Federal government in procedures developed pursuant to [HSISA].” 6 U.S.C. § 482(f )(3)(F).
 Id. §§ 481(c), 482(f )(1).
 These systems are to have the capability to limit distribution to specific subgroups of people based on geographic location,
type of organization, position of recipient within an organization, and need to know. Id. § 482(b). They may also condition
distribution on limitations on redistribution. Id. The procedures can include issuing additional security clearances for classi-
fied information or entering into nondisclosure agreements for sensitive but unclassified information. Id. § 482(c). The law
clarifies that information distributed through these procedures remains under the control of the Federal Government and may
not be released under state open records laws. Id. § 482(e).
 68 Fed. Reg. 45149 (July 31, 2003). See esp. § 1(f ).

                                                 H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y     A D V I S O R Y     C O U N C I L       11
                          P R I V A T E    S E C T O R     I N F O R M A T I O N       S H A R I N G      T A S K   F O R C E
                 Second, the Intelligence Reform and                                In the two Congressional enactments just
                 Terrorism Prevention Act, passed in                                discussed (HSISA and the Intelligence
                 December 2004, requires the President to                           Reform law), Congress emphasized the
                 establish an “information sharing envi-                            need for the Federal Government to more
                 ronment” (ISE) within the Federal                                  broadly disseminate unclassified information, as
                 Government to facilitate sharing of infor-                         well as classified information.
                 mation about terrorists, and the threats                           Unfortunately, the culture of the classified
                 they may pose, “among all appropriate                              world still adversely influences handling of
                 Federal, State, local, and tribal entities,                        unclassified information.12
                 and the Private Sector.”8 The ISE is                                 • “Need to know” attitude. Much, if not
                 intended to “promote a culture of infor-                                most, unclassified security information
                 mation sharing.”9 Compliance with the                                   is still restricted to those that the pos-
                 ISE is mandatory on Federal agencies that                               sessor of the information determines
                 possess or use terrorism information.   10
                                                                                         have a need to know, often not includ-
                 The law establishes a series of milestones                              ing the Private Sector. The problem
                 for implementation of the ISE.11                                        with this way of thinking is that the
                                                                                         possessor of information may not
                 The Task Force calls on the Administration                              know who else may find information
                 to implement HSISA and the Intelligence                                 useful or why.13
                 Reform law. In doing so, and in other                                • Need for originator permission for broad-
                 ways, DHS should take clear steps to                                    er dissemination. This constraint makes
                 increase the amount of homeland security                                further dissemination of information
                 information that it shares with Private                                 much more difficult. The Task Force
                 Sector owners and operators of critical                                 believes that voluntary private submit-
                 infrastructure. To do so, DHS will need                                 ters of sensitive information to the
                 to overcome the following legal obstacles.                              Federal Government ought to be able
                 The discussion below identifies the Task                                to condition or limit subsequent dis-
                 Force’s recommendations in these regards.                               semination of that information, since
                                                                                         they bear the risk if information is mis-
     1. Sensitive But Unclassified Issues                                                used. But information that the govern-
                                                                                         ment originates should not be subject
                 Where information has not been classi-                                  to continuing originator control.
                 fied, the Task Force believes that DHS
                 has been overly reluctant to share it with
                 owner/operators of critical infrastructure.

      Pub. L. No. 108-458, 6 U.S.C. § 485(b)(2) (emphasis added).
      Id. § 485(d)(3). 10Id. § 485(i).
       The ISE is to be run by a program manager designated by the President. Id. § 485(f ). (The President designated John
     Russack on April 15, 2005.) It is to be overseen by the “Information Sharing Council,” a new name for the “Information
     Systems Council” established by the President last August to strengthen sharing of terrorism information. Id. § 485(a)(1), (g).
     The Program Manager was supposed to issue an initial report on establishment of the ISE by June 15, 2005, containing
     among other things “a description of the technological, legal, and policy issues presented by the creation of the ISE, and the
     way in which these issues will be addressed.” By September 13, 2005, the President is due to “leverage all ongoing efforts
     consistent with establishing the ISE” and issue guidelines for promoting information sharing. The guidelines must “ensure
     that information is provided in its most shareable form, such as by using tearlines to separate out data from the sources and
     methods by which the data are obtained”; and “reduc[e] incentives to information sharing, including over-classification of
     information and unnecessary requirements for originator approval . . . and . . . providing affirmative incentives for information
     sharing.” Id. § 485(d). By the end of 2006 and annually thereafter, the President must report on “the extent to which . . .
     information from owners and operators of critical infrastructure is incorporated in the ISE, and the extent to which individuals
     and entities outside the government are receiving information through the ISE.” Id. § 485(h)(2)(G).
        This section of the report applies to all unclassified security-related information that warrants being safeguarded, regardless
     of precise label used to describe it (i.e., “sensitive but unclassified,” “for official use only,” etc.).
        See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 417 (2004).

12       H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y     A D V I S O R Y     C O U N C I L
         P R I V A T E   S E C T O R    I N F O R M A T I O N       S H A R I N G      T A S K    F O R C E
           • Bias against disclosure to private                               There is a widely shared perception, by Task
             owner/operators. Because classified                              Force members and others, that the current
             information is rarely provided to mem-                           classification system results in too much
             bers of the Private Sector, many per-                            information being classified by the govern-
             sons within the government charged                               ment. This perception is not new or exclu-
             with managing unclassified informa-                              sive to private businesses. For example, the
             tion are reluctant to share it readily                           9/11 Commission Report found that
             with private personnel.                                          “[c]urrent security requirements nurture
           • Indiscriminate use of FOUO, SBU                                  overclassification and excessive compart-
             labels. “For official use only” and “sen-                        mentalization of information among agen-
             sitive but unclassified” are labels that                         cies.”17 The official in charge of classifica-
             provide a basis for safeguarding infor-                          tion policy across the Federal Government
             mation (i.e., managing it carefully).                            has made the same point.18 Incentives to
             Many within government do not                                    overclassification were also highlighted in
             understand that these labels are not,                            the Intelligence Reform law.19
             however, a legal basis for withholding
             information from private persons.14                              In large measure, the obstacle arises from the
       These legacy issues continue to be a problem.                          fact that, pre-9/11, terrorist threat informa-
       For example, representatives of the natural                            tion was generally classified and of interest
       gas utility industry were given the initial list                       to very few people outside the Federal
                                                                              Government. Now, however, that informa-
       of DHS “protective security advisors,” but
                                                                              tion is vitally necessary to representatives of
       were told that the list could not be dissemi-                          critical private entities. They need this
       nated within the industry, nor shared with                             information in order for their vulnerability
       other interdependent sectors (e.g., the elec-                          assessments to be well-informed and their
       tric utility industry).                                                security measures targeted. They also need
                                                                              it for both these efforts to be an efficient use
        The Intelligence Reform law15 and the 9/11                            of resources, rather than a blunderbuss
        Commission Report16 both urge greater                                 approach.
        reliance on trusted information sharing net-
        works where, once individuals or organiza-                            A second reason for this obstacle is that a
        tions are accredited members of the net-                              number of the individuals who originally
        work, they are trusted to determine who                               were detailed to the White House Office of
                                                                              Homeland Security and who were involved
        else can see information. Part of this solu-
                                                                              in the creation of DHS came from the mili-
        tion may be broad acceptance of definitions                           tary, law enforcement and intelligence com-
        of FOUO and SBU that affirmatively urges                              munities. All of these communities are
        sharing within such networks.                                         experienced in adversary tactics and are
                                                                              highly disciplined. Thus, they have been
2. Classification Issues                                                      heavily trained on national policies regard-
                                                                              ing classification and clearances, and are
      A. Perception that too much information is                              used to operating on a need-to-know basis.

  See James W. Conrad, Jr., “Protecting Private Security-Related Information from Disclosure by Government Agencies,” 57
ADMIN. L. REV. — (Summer 2005) (in press) (Attachment C), at 17-18.
  See 6 U.S.C. § 485(d)(3).
  See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT at 418.
  Id. at 417.
  J. William Leonard, Director, Information Security Oversight Office, National Archives & Records Administration, “Information
Sharing and Protection: A Seamless Framework or Patchwork Quilt?” Remarks at the National Classification Management
Society’s Annual Training Seminar, Salt Lake City, Utah (June 13, 2003), available at
  See 6 U.S.C. § 485(d).

                                                 H O M E L A N D        S E C U R I T Y     A D V I S O R Y     C O U N C I L        13
                           P R I V A T E   S E C T O R      I N F O R M A T I O N       S H A R I N G     T A S K     F O R C E
               While the best at what they do, these com-                     To varying degrees, Task Force members
               munities do not have long traditions of reg-                   and their organizations have experienced
               ulating or otherwise interacting with the                      this problem first hand.
               Private Sector on a regular basis. Those
               practices and attitudes, while useful in their             Recommendations
               original applications, are not conducive to                1. DHS and the Private Sector should work
               effective information sharing with critical                   in collaboration to develop a formal, and
               Private Sector entities.                                      objectively manageable, homeland securi-
                                                                             ty intelligence/information requirements
             B. Disseminating unclassified summaries                         process.
                                                                                • The process should place a premium on,
                Where information must be classified,                             and leverage, superior Private Sector
                DHS and other agencies should work hard-                          information resources, expertise in busi-
                er to produce unclassified versions. In                           ness continuity planning, and under-
                some cases, information will continue to                          standing of critical infrastructure sector
                need to be classified. In such cases, govern-                     operation and resiliency. (M/A)
                ment staff should be trained to maximize                        • The process must recognize the diversity
                the amount of that information that can be                        of the Private Sector. (A)
                shared in an unclassified manner, by “writ-                     • DHS should partner and collaborate
                ing for release,” producing abstracts or                          with the Private Sector in developing an
                digests, use of tear sheets that do not reveal                    integrated architecture for information
                sources and methods, etc. Again, these are                        collection and sharing. The Task Force
                fundamentally attitudinal and cultural                            understands that this is how HSIN is
                issues, but may need to be implemented via                        being developed and how HSIN-CI
                new policies.                                                     (with 40,000+ members) operates. The
                                                                                  Task Force supports that approach. (M/A)
             C. The slow clearance investigation and adjudi-                    • The Private Sector and DHS need to inte-
                cation process                                                    grate and align their requirements for
                                                                                  information collection and sharing. (M/A)
                Congress, the GAO and others have repeat-                       • Information Sharing & Analysis Centers
                edly found that the Federal Government –                          (ISACs), Sector Coordinating Councils
                especially outside DHS -- has been too slow                       (SCCs) and other Private Sector organi-
                in issuing security clearances to enable criti-                   zations and stakeholders must coordinate
                cal infrastructure owners and operators to                        their efforts and define Private Sector
                have access to classified information. This                       requirements for DHS, so specific Private
                was a principal finding of the Intelligence                       Sector entities can formally request, track
                Reform Act. The GAO came to the same
                                                                                  and receive only that information
                conclusion recently in its examination of                         requested. This will require doing a bet-
                information sharing in the maritime securi-                       ter job of articulating what types of
                ty context, in which it concluded that                            information they want from government
                “[t]he major barrier hindering information                        and with what frequency. (M/A)
                sharing has been the lack of security clear-                   • The process should include a greater bias
                ances for nonfederal members of [area mar-                       toward disseminating more information
                itime security] committees or [interagency                       in unclassified form. The solution should
                operational] centers.”21                                         not primarily be to investigate more peo-
                                                                                 ple and issue more clearances. (M/A)

      See 50 U.S.C. § 435b.
      ING REQUIRES FURTHER ATTENTION, “What GAO Found” (GAO-05-394) (April 2005).

14        H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
          P R I V A T E   S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N     S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
         • Where information must be classified,                             all of which are tens of pages long and seek
              • DHS and other agencies should                                enormous amounts of information.22 (These
                work harder to produce unclassi-                             documents are not attached because they are
                fied versions. (M/A)                                         labeled “For Official Use Only.”) Many
              • The President should continue to                             within the Private Sector, however, are reluc-
                implement on a timely basis the                              tant to comply with such requests, for the
                provisions of the Intelligence                               following reasons:
                Reform law designed to expedite                                 • It is still uncertain on what basis such
                the clearance process. (M)                                        information can or will be kept confi-
                                                                                  dential, and few companies are willing
II. Different Considerations for Threat                                           to risk the legal, business, or other con-
    Information and Vulnerability Information                                     sequences from an inappropriate dis-
                                                                                  closure. See Part Two, § II below.
      A. Vulnerability Information Is Uniquely                                  • Neither DHS nor any other agency
         Sensitive                                                                could properly store, much less even
                                                                                  begin to analyze, the vast amount of
        The Private Sector makes a key distinction                                information it would receive if it got
        between threat and indications and warning                                everything it is seeking.
        (I&W) information and vulnerability infor-                              • The data being requested changes too
        mation. The former, absent sources and                                    often and too quickly for DHS (or any
        methods, is more important and should be                                  other agency) to create a stable, useful
        less problematic to share. As a philosophical                             database.
        matter, Government has a clear                                          • DHS already knows, or should know,
        Constitutional duty to “provide for the com-                              where to get specific, detailed industry
        mon defense” and, implicitly, to warn citizens                            information when it is truly needed,
        about and protect them from hostile forces,                               but does not (or does not appear to) do
        both foreign and domestic.                                                so, do so consistently, or appropriately
                                                                                  share such information it may receive
        As to the latter, while the Homeland                                      with relevant offices within DHS.
        Security Act sets out broad mandates for
        DHS’s Information Analysis &                                         In general, the risks of sharing such infor-
        Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP)                         mation seem to outweigh the benefits.
        (or its 2SR successor), it is clear that the                         Risks identified by members of the Private
        most effective manner of complying with                              Sector include:
        those mandates has not yet been developed,                             • Vulnerability information provided to
        and unclear that IAIP must or can perform                                 the government might be used against
        all aspects of this task itself.                                          companies in other contexts. For
                                                                                  example, the government might decide
        The government continues to ask industry                                  not to contract with a company that it
        to provide a vast array of information, up to                             determines is too vulnerable in some
        and including all possible information con-                               respect.
        cerning its critical facilities. Attachment D                          • Companies are not confident that gov-
        is a summary list of desired information, but                             ernment will help industry fix any
        interested readers should review any of sev-                              problems that are found.
        eral official DHS ‘requirements’ documents,

  E.g., “Terrorist Threats to the U.S. Homeland – Reporting Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource Owners and
Operators,” forwarded under a January 24, 2005 memorandum from Under Secretary Frank Libutti; “Priority
Intelligence/Information Requirements, January 2005-July 2005,” forwarded under a January 7, 2005 memorandum from
Assistant Secretary Patrick Hughes.

                                                H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y     A D V I S O R Y     C O U N C I L    15
                          P R I V A T E    S E C T O R     I N F O R M A T I O N       S H A R I N G     T A S K   F O R C E
                • Knowledge of vulnerabilities could lead                          This is not a sound assumption.
                  to inappropriate government interfer-                            Accordingly, a growing number of deci-
                  ence with business operations. For                               sion makers within the Private Sector
                  example, some vulnerabilities do not                             simply do not want to assist in the cre-
                  warrant remediation under any reason-                            ation of what could become a “target
                  able cost/benefit analysis of the proba-                         list” featuring them.
                  bility they will be exploited, the conse-                      • How can the currency of such a large
                  quences if they were, and the cost of                            database possibly be maintained, given
                  remediation.                                                     the number of facilities covered and the
                • Although some vulnerabilities may                                fact that their vulnerabilities change
                  need Federal involvement, most are                               over time as the facilities and their oper-
                                                                                   ations change?
                  regional or local and need, at most,
                                                                                 • Is the creation of this massive data base
                  only state or local government involve-
                                                                                   seen as an end in itself? Such a database
                  ment. Even there, state sunshine/open-
                                                                                   is not useful to the Private Sector, mem-
                  ness laws create disincentives for the                           bers of which as a matter of sound busi-
                  Private Sector to share information, and                         ness practice constantly conduct their
                  for government-owned entities to assess                          own risk analyses as part of operational
                  or review their own vulnerabilities.                             continuity programs.

           B. National Asset Database vs. Other Means                        The Task Force recognizes that the statutory
              of Storing Vulnerability Data                                  responsibilities of the Under Secretary for
                                                                             Information Analysis and Infrastructure
             As the portions of the emerging NIPP and                        Protection include “carry[ing] out compre-
             the Sector Specific Plans (SSPs) dealing with                   hensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of
             vulnerability assessment are being rewritten,                   the key resources and critical infrastructures
             the respective roles and responsibilities of the                of the United States [and] integrat[ing] rele-
             Private Sector and IAIP (and of specific com-                   vant information, analyses and vulnerability
             ponents within IAIP and elsewhere in DHS)                       assessments (whether . . . provided or pro-
             need to be carefully re-evaluated to deploy                     duced by the Department or others) in
             public and private resources most efficiently                   order to identify priorities for protective
             and economically — and to avoid creating                        and support measures by the Department .
             greater risks. The Task Force is particularly                   . . and other entities.”23 On the other hand,
             concerned about the wisdom and feasibility of                   however, it is unclear that the most effective
             creating and maintaining a “national asset                      manner of complying with those mandates
             database” of critical infrastructure assets and                 has yet been developed, or indeed that IAIP
             key resources:                                                  must or can perform all aspects of this task
               • Exploitable vulnerabilities in cheaply                      itself. At a minimum, the Task Force
                                                                             believes that the bolded language quoted
                 produced, foreign-written software and
                                                                             above signals Congress’ intent that DHS
                 the level of attack sophistication grow
                                                                             allow this work to be carried out by those
                 daily. Databases of all varieties are com-
                                                                             critical entities where they have the capabil-
                 promised continually. National asset and                    ity and willingness to do so.
                 vulnerability databases will become the
                 number one target of terrorists and hos-                    Understanding that DHS is, in part,
                 tile nations (either to access or disable).                 responding to Congressional directives,
                 While one can understand Congress’                          the Task Force suggests (a) a review of the
                 intent in directing the creation of such                    government’s Y2K transition information
                 databases, it obviously did so with the                     sharing success and (b) a legislative effort
                 assumption that such databases could                        to relieve DHS of some of the vulnerabili-
                 be completely secure and thus not                           ty data-gathering and maintenance
                 become principal instruments of the                         requirements imposed on it by the
                 Nation’s destruction.                                       Homeland Security Act.
      6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(2), (3).

16    H O M E L A N D        S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
      P R I V A T E     S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N      S H A R I N G    T A S K   F O R C E
Recommendations                                                       Paragraph 25 of Homeland Security
  2. DHS should adopt a tiered approach to                            Presidential Directive/HSPD-7 mandates that
     infrastructure vulnerability information                         DHS and other Sector-Specific Agencies
     sharing.                                                         (SSAs) “collaborate with appropriate Private
       • Carefully consider the known and                             Sector entities and continue to encourage the
         exploitable vulnerabilities of database                      development of information sharing and
         technologies, and the consequences of                        analysis mechanisms.” In addition, that para-
         compromise of a “national asset data-                        graph provides that sector coordination mech-
         base” of vulnerabilities. (L/M)                              anisms should “ a) identify, prioritize and
       • Maintain appropriate Federal informa-                        coordinate the protection of critical infrastruc-
         tion at the DHS level, state informa-                        ture and key resources; and b) facilitate shar-
         tion at the state level, local information                   ing of information about physical and cyber
         at the local level, and Private Sector                       threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, potential
         information at the Private Sector level.                     protective measures, and best practices.” It is
         (L/M)                                                        thus understandable that, in drafting the
       • To enhance the security of vulnerability                     NIPP, DHS would attempt to combine these
         information, maintain public sector                          functions (and more) in a symmetrical array of
         infrastructure information at the city                       “Sector Coordinating Councils” (SCCs), each
         and municipal level and Private Sector                       paired with a “Government Coordinating
         information with trusted third                               Council.” A recent presentation by the
         party/non-governmental entities.                             Director of IAIP’s Infrastructure Coordination
         (L/M)                                                        Division (ICD) listed the following roles for
       • DHS devote a substantial effort to                           SCCs:
         establishing an appropriate organiza-                            • serving as a “single forum into sector for
         tion or process for cross-sector and                               entire range of HS issues,
         government information exchange. (M)                             • institutionalizing the sector’s coordina-
                                                                            tion of policy development, sector wide
III. Diversity Within the Private Sector                                    strategy and planning,
                                                                          • program promulgation and implemen-
     The Private Sector is not monolithic. There                            tation,
     are significant differences both across and                          • monitoring of progress,
     within sectors. In addition, there are often                         • provision of best practices and guide-
     crucial differences between roles and capabili-                        lines,
     ties of trade associations and those of                              • requirements for information sharing,
     owner/operators. DHS must respect these                                research and development,
     differences as it develops a process for sector                      • point of cross sector coordination.”
                                                                      It is not clear that a single entity will (or
     The Task Force understands that, from gov-                       should) be able to perform all these functions
     ernment’s point of view, given competing                         — which go beyond the role prescribed in
     demands and limited resources, “one stop                         HSPD-7 — for a critical sector in an effec-
     shopping” for information exchanges with the                     tive, efficient, and expeditious manner. The
     Private Sector is a desirable goal. However, as                  scope outlined by ICD includes a broad array
     DHS rewrites the National Infrastructure                         of policy, operational, strategic and tactical
     Protection Plan, it must carefully reconsider                    functions, many of which can only be per-
     how feasible or desirable such a goal is in light                formed by those who own and operate specif-
     of the divergent evolution of Sector                             ic Private Sector infrastructure elements. As
     Coordinating Councils, Information Sharing                       discussed in Part Three, moreover, there are
     & Analysis Centers and similar bodies.                           significant benefits to limiting SCCs (and
                                                                      ISACs) to primarily operational issues.

                                            H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y    C O U N C I L      17
                       P R I V A T E   S E C T O R       I N F O R M A T I O N   S H A R I N G    T A S K   F O R C E
        Different sectors have organized themselves in                         companies. In general, there are many
        a variety of ways to accomplish the informa-                           more companies than trade associations.
        tion sharing and coordination functions                                Indeed, information technology is so
        described in HSPD-7:                                                   pervasive in our economy that the sector
            • The Food and Agriculture SCC, for                                is still debating criteria for inclusion
               example, includes two representatives                           (e.g., whether the majority of a compa-
               and one alternate from each of seven                            ny’s income comes from producing IT
               sub-councils, and has a six-page state-                         components — hardware, software, or
               ment of governing principles and proce-                         services — the extent in which IT is
               dural rules. Its decisions must be by                           used in a company). The sector is also
               consensus of representatives of all sub-                        considering membership in the context
               councils, rather than by a majority of all                      of funding. The IT/ISAC requires
               members. Most of the members are                                funding to operate and, as such, mem-
               trade associations.                                             bership is limited to those who con-
            • The Financial Services SCC was founded                           tribute (with some exceptions).
               by the Treasury Department, while the                           However, many feel that the IT SCC
               Financial Services ISAC predates it and                         should be more broadly based and free.
               was founded by the banking and finance
               industry itself. The majority of the                     This diversity highlights the need for DHS to
               Financial Services SCC members are trade                 provide flexibility for the different sectors.
               associations; the majority of the Financial
               Services ISAC members are individual                Recommendations
               banks and financial institutions.                     3. DHS needs to be flexible and responsive
            • The IT and Communication                                  in accommodating diversity within and
               Infrastructure (formerly telecommunica-                  among Private Sector critical infrastruc-
               tions) Sectors are still in the process of               ture sectors.
               forming and have just formed their                         • HSPD-7 calls for two functions: infor-
               SCCs, although each sector already has                       mation sharing and sector coordination.
               its own ISAC and dedicated DHS com-                        • Sector Coordinating Councils in every
               ponent (NCSD and NCS, respectively).                         sector may not be able to perform all
                                                                            the functions DHS desires. At a mini-
         These last two sectors offer some interesting                      mum, DHS must allow each sector to
         contrasts.                                                         determine the nature, functions, and
            • The Communications Infrastructure                             rules of its council and its relationship
               sector, with a relatively small number of                    with its ISAC and SSA. (M/A)
               companies and four associations (wire
               line carriers, wireless carriers, equipment         IV. Developing a Resilient and Integrated
               manufacturers, and now internet service                 Network for Information Sharing
               providers) has a long history of coopera-
               tion and National Security/Emergency                     A. Range of Views Regarding Need
               Preparedness (NS/EP) coordination
               under the NSTAC and the NCS in the                       The Private Sector has varying desires regarding
               Defense Department. The                                  the best communication mechanisms for receiv-
               Communications Infrastructure SCC                        ing threat information.
               makes it very clear that it will address
               policy matters only, that operational                         • Some feel the need for a new communica-
               matters will be handled by the                                  tion mechanism similar to the State
               Communications Infrastructure ISAC,                             Department’s OSAC. They feel that the
               and that while they will coordinate,                            new Homeland Security Information
               they will remain separate.                                      Network—Critical Infrastructure (HSIN-
             • The IT sector includes hardware and                             CI) will be able to serve that function
                software manufacturers, internet service                       (especially to the extent that it can operate
                providers, network providers,                                  across sectors within regions, similar to
                telecomm companies, cable companies,                           how some InfraGard chapters and Area
                data security companies, and service                           Maritime Security Committees function at
                                                                               the local level).

18   H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
     P R I V A T E   S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N     S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
    • Others appear to be better at commu-                           & local governments (especially law enforcement
      nicating with DHS, and believe they get                        and emergency response). The path of least
      sufficient information through existing                        resistance in such cases would be for DHS to
      mechanisms, whether formal or informal.                        work with those other governmental units rather
      Private Sector representatives who are                         than initiating a new relationship directly with
      already comfortable with existing mecha-                       the business. For any new relationships, DHS
      nisms are concerned that new mechanisms                        would need to show why that relationship was
      could lead to new turf battles. Similarly,                     not redundant, why it added value to the business
      most feel that sharing with State and local                    and why it was equally trustworthy.
      constituencies seems to work well, and
      where it works there is felt to be no need                     C. Importance of Trust and Personal Relationships
      for new mechanisms.
                                                                     Several groups examining the question of infor-
Whether or not they felt new procedures are nec-                     mation sharing have emphasized how much the
essary, most Private Sector representatives believe                  process relies on trusted personal relationships. In
that existing communication mechanisms are                           many cases these arise from people having previ-
defective to some degree, or at least inconsistent.                  ously worked together, or for the same organiza-
Many feel that IAIP has not sufficiently focused                     tion (e.g., the Coast Guard). In other cases, they
on the interoperability/interdependence of critical                  simply have to grow out of an extended period of
infrastructure elements, and instead has become                      association. By and large, members of Private
too organized by sector “stovepipes.” Information                    Sector critical entities already have these relation-
must flow in the most effective and efficient man-                   ships with State and local governments, and, to a
ner. How that task is accomplished is ultimately                     lesser extent, with their sector-specific agencies. By
DHS’ job, but the current organization is                            and large, they do not have them with DHS or
duplicative and confusing. In the telecommuni-                       its contractors, except in those cases where a
cations sector, for example, the Network Design                      Private Sector individual worked with a DHS
& Analysis Capability is maintained by the                           employee in some prior capacity, or both worked
National Communications System, but under the                        for the same organization. DHS simply has not
current interim Sector Specific Plan for the                         been around long enough in stable form for trust-
telecommunications sector, it is unclear whether                     ed relationships to have developed in a great
that data will also be maintained by IAIP’s                          many cases. That problem has been exacerbated
Protective Services Division or put in the                           by frequent reorganizations within DHS and
National Asset Database.                                             high turnover or transfer of DHS staff.

B. Satisfaction with Existing Arrangements                           In a growing number of cases (e.g., the DHS
   Outside DHS                                                       sector specialist for the chemical sector), the
                                                                     private and public personnel involved have
Many critical infrastructure sectors currently com-                  worked long and closely enough together that
municate among themselves about security issues                      these sorts of trust relationships have been
through means to which the Federal Government                        established. Time and stability should pro-
has limited access (e.g., via ISACs). The existence                  duce additional such relationships.
of such capability creates reluctance within those
sectors to move to a Federally-operated or over-                     However, and despite the foregoing, many in
seen system (e.g., the Homeland Security                             the Private Sector feel there is too much
Information Network). It also means that sys-                        reliance on preexisting personal relationships
tems like HSIN are redundant to that extent. If                      rather than on the creation of effective mech-
DHS hopes to encourage entities within these                         anisms (i.e., that there is often more willing-
sectors to switch to a Federally-sponsored or oper-                  ness to rely on existing trusted personal rela-
ated system, it will need to explain why its system                  tionships, rather than attempting to build
will serve the sector’s needs better and why the                     trust in some new, untested communication
prospect of Federal access does not create a less                    mechanism). Whatever the case, it is clear
attractive proposition.                                              that any new model for information sharing
                                                                     will need to address the trust issue (as HSIN-
Businesses with many critical infrastructure sec-                    CI has done), and not simply assume that
tors already have trusted relationships with other                   people will use a new and untested system
sector-specific agencies, FBI field offices, and State               because the Federal Government created it.

                                            H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y      C O U N C I L       19
                     P R I V A T E    S E C T O R        I N F O R M A T I O N    S H A R I N G     T A S K    F O R C E
        D. General Design Considerations                                      deliberative policy advice or regulatory
                                                                              comments from the Private Sector which
        The Task Force identified several other con-                          can take weeks or months to prepare, dis-
        siderations relevant to design of a new model                         cuss and finalize. A comprehensive
        for information flow:                                                 model or vehicle for transmission of all
                                                                              types of information would need to
             • As explained above, DHS needs to
                                                                              encompass this range of data and opera-
               include the Private Sector in the “intel-
               ligence cycle” – especially the require-                       tional need.
               ments definition process – in order to
               better enable government to collect                     Clearly there is much that the Private Sector
               information for analysis and timely dis-                should do as well to improve the process, and to
               semination that will permit it to pro-                  help forge a meaningful two-way partnership.
               vide tailored, actionable answers to
               industry’s questions.                                   E. The Need for Regular, Interactive Threat
             • A means must also be created to allow
               greater State, local and tribal involve-                DHS and critical sectors must develop a mean-
               ment in filtering or analyzing data. It is              ingful process to have real time, detailed discus-
               simply too massive a job for, and
                                                                       sions about threats. Currently, IP conducts a sin-
               beyond the capabilities of, the Federal
               Government alone.                                       gle classified threat briefing semiannually for the
                                                                       combined electrical, energy and chemical sectors.
             • As the amount of information goes up,                   Such briefings are somewhat instructive and are
               the need for specialized communication                  very much appreciated. However, every six
               mechanisms increases.                                   months is too infrequent, and lumping three sec-
                                                                       tors into one briefing results in long sessions
             • New mechanisms may be more appro-                       much of which is not relevant to two-thirds of
               priate for future increases in threat level             attendees. Most problematic, the presentations
               if suicide bombing, etc., moves into the                still are frustratingly hypothetical, illustrative and
               U.S.                                                    general.
             • DHS needs to regularize processes and
                                                                       We believe that IAIP’s Information Analysis
               strive for high level consistency in
               processes, while maintaining flexibility                Division would be willing to conduct a dialogue
               in quantity and type of information.                    and share certain more detailed threat information
                                                                       with selected individuals in the security depart-
             • There needs to be a free flow in both                   ments of critical infrastructure companies, but a
               directions, and among all constituen-                   mutually satisfactory vehicle for doing so must be
               cies, regardless of the source of data, or              developed. The Infrastructure Protection
               who undertook the analysis.                             Division, as the primary interface with members
                                                                       of critical sectors, should arrange such interactions
             • There is a crucial time element at play in              (e.g., a question and answer session and discussion
               information exchanges involving both                    in some detail of the ability of terrorists to disrupt
               threat, indications and warning data and                the generation and/or transmission of electric
               vulnerability data. This element spans                  power in the Southeastern United States).
               the spectrum between near real time                     These sessions should be held more often than
               transmittal of threats from government                  every six months, and should be held separately
               at all levels and the Private Sector to                 for each sector.

20   H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
     P R I V A T E   S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N     S H A R I N G   T A S K    F O R C E
  4. DHS should continue to develop a net-
     work integrated information model for
     information flow.
   • Significant work required:
        • DHS should employ a “hub and spoke
          model” for information flows, as used
          in HIN and HSOC. (M).
        • Information should flow from the
          Private Sector and other government
          sources to the DHS hub for analyses,
          and then be distributed back to the
          Private Sector on a targeted basis. (M)
       • DHS needs Private Sector input and
          presence at the hub. (M/A)
   • As a national priority, build a resilient/surviv-
     able Homeland Security Operations Center
     (HSOC) and Homeland Security Information
     Network (HSIN). (M)
       • In their current condition, both are single
          points of DHS operational failure – an
          unacceptable circumstance.
   • Leverage the unparalleled success of, and
     invest in expanding, HSIN-Critical
     Infrastructure (CI). (M)
       • HSIN-CI is a trusted and proven
          model for effectively gathering and
          sharing information.
   • Statewide intelligence/information fusion
     centers should be integrated into national
     information sharing efforts. (M/A)
   • DHS should hold regular collaborative ses-
     sions (start monthly) with each Private Sector
     coordinating organization (e.g., SCCs,
     ISACs). (M)
   • DHS should hold regular, detailed threat
     briefings with each sector.
       • Representatives of IA and IP should meet
          with selected individuals in the security
          departments of critical infrastructure
          companies. (M)
       • The sessions should be held more often than
          every six months, and should be held sepa-
          rately for each sector. (M)
       • They should involve more specific infor-
          mation than is currently presented in clas-
          sified sector briefings. (M)
       • They should be oriented less toward pres-
          entation and more toward dialogue.

                                             H O M E L A N D      S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L    21
                        P R I V A T E   S E C T O R      I N F O R M A T I O N   S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E

      The second part of this report analyzes the legal                The lack of Private Sector involvement at both
      and related issues that the Task Force identified                levels plays a large and ongoing role in all the
      as impeding better information sharing                           other legal issues discussed in this part of the
      between government and critical infrastructure                   report. Building trust by recognizing Private
      entities. In many cases, it will be difficult or                 Sector representatives as partners, and consult-
      impossible to make significant progress on the                   ing with them early on and throughout the
      preceding recommendations until these obsta-                     policy formulation process, would allow those
      cles can be overcome.                                            entities to point out problems and concerns
                                                                       and to suggest workable solutions.
      I. Regarding Private Sector Representatives as                   Conversely, leaving them out of the process
         Partners                                                      means that DHS may have to reverse course
                                                                       or undo earlier decisions, as it has had to do in
                                                                       the creation of the National Infrastructure
         As noted earlier, many within DHS come
                                                                       Protection Plan. DHS’s Office of Private
         from intelligence, military, or law enforce-
                                                                       Sector Liaison has been very helpful at undo-
         ment backgrounds where they have had little
                                                                       ing these kinds of problems, but an effective
         regular, official contact with the Private                    strategy of partnership to prevent them must
         Sector. By contrast, most other sector-specific               be a Department-wide effort.
         agencies engage continually with Private
         Sector and other non-governmental stake-                    II. Liability Concerns
         holders through rulemaking, permitting and
         other interactive processes. Because of their                 More than anything else, the issue that most
         background, these DHS personnel often are                     affects private entities’ willingness to share sen-
         not accustomed to viewing critical infrastruc-                sitive information with the Federal
         ture owners and operators as real partners or                 Government is the concern that this informa-
         customers. This has effects at two levels:                    tion will somehow be used against them in
                                                                       some subsequent governmental enforcement
             • At the level of policy implementation. As               case or private civil action.
               an example, on occasion DHS staff has
               not provided advance notice to corpo-                         • Enforcement. Companies fear that infor-
               rate headquarters of a planned visit to a                       mation provided to DHS may some-
               corporate facility. This has caused                             how, whether advertently or inadvertent-
               delay, as the facility awaits direction                         ly, be obtained by some other govern-
               from headquarters, and may have                                 mental agency that may use the infor-
               engendered resentment or distrust.                              mation for enforcement of other, non-
                                                                               security-related laws or rules. EPA and
            • At the level of policy formulation. DHS                          OSHA are most commonly mentioned
              staff may not consult with companies                             in this connection, but any Federal
                                                                               agency that has oversight over any criti-
              (or their trade associations) in the devel-
                                                                               cal sector (Treasury, FCC, DOE) is
              opment of a policy that affects them. As
                                                                               potentially a source of concern, as are
              a result, the policy is likely to be less
                                                                               foreign, State and local governments. It
              effective and potentially even counter-                          was not generally clear to the Task Force
              productive. This point is particularly                           how information of the sort sought by
              significant, because a small amount of                           DHS might indicate noncompliance
              up-front consultation may avert a great                          with some other laws or rules, but this
              deal of delay and confusion later.                               fear is quite widespread, strong, and pos-
                                                                               sibly growing.

22   H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
     P R I V A T E   S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N     S H A R I N G    T A S K   F O R C E
           • Litigation. Companies similarly fear                               to share information with foreign, State
             that information provided to DHS may                               or local governments, since the question
             come into the hands of private litigants                           very logically then includes the adequacy
             – whether injured parties or sharehold-                            of those entities’ information security
             ers -- who might use it against the com-                           and protection capabilities.
             pany in the event that a terrorist attack
             does occur (or in other circumstances).                   These anxieties are heightened by the fact that
             Companies are concerned that vulnera-                     bills are regularly introduced to weaken existing
             bility assessments or security plans may                  protections (e.g., OPEN Government Act,
             be used to show knowledge of a risk and                   Restore FOIA Act), even in the face of known
             lack of due care in response to it. Of                    threats of enemy exploitation of publicly avail-
             course, the conduct of a vulnerability                    able information and growing vulnerabilities of
             assessment, and implementation of secu-                   information systems and networks.
             rity measures, can also be probative of
             due care, whereas the failure to take                     As a general matter, DHS should always consid-
             either step may show lack of the same.                    er, address as necessary, and explain to potential
             Nonetheless, many businesses feel that                    submitters of information how it has addressed,
             the likelihood of such information                        the prospect of disclosure by any potential
             becoming available to and being used by                   means. These include:
             adverse litigants is increased by sharing it          ∑    • FOIA requests from public to DHS,
             with the government.                                  ∑    • access by other Federal agencies (and for
                                                                            what purposes),
     To some degree, these anxieties appear to be                  ∑    • FOIA requests to those other agencies,
     based on misunderstanding of existing law and                 ∑    • access by foreign, State and local govern-
     procedure, and will be reduced when people                             ments (and for what purposes),
     understand how those laws and procedures actu-                ∑    • FOIA-like requests to those other
     ally work.                                                             governments,
                                                                   ∑    • civil discovery against any of the foregoing,
     On the other hand, these fears cannot be com-                 ∑    • criminal investigations (Federal or State).
     pletely assuaged by anything DHS does, for two
     reasons:                                                          In particular, the Critical Infrastructure
                                                                       Information Act (CIIA) provides that informa-
           • Legal uncertainty. Part of companies’                     tion submitted pursuant to it may be used by
             concern is the inherent uncertainty that                  Federal employees, and State and local govern-
             attaches to any legal rule – one never                    ment agencies, only “for the purpose of protect-
             knows for sure how a court will inter-                    ing critical infrastructure or protected systems,
             pret it. This is particularly true with                   or in furtherance of an investigation or the pros-
             many legal authorities in the homeland                    ecution of a criminal act.”24 While that last pro-
             security field, which are new and untest-                 viso will concern some, this language should pre-
             ed in court.                                              vent a Federal agency using this information to
                                                                       pursue a civil enforcement action based on other
           • “Falling through the cracks”. People are                  laws. DHS should (a) maximize the opportuni-
             also afraid that, even if applicable laws,                ties for information to be submitted pursuant to
             rules and policies on their face would                    that act, (b) should ensure that other agencies
             not allow information to be released to                   and governments afforded access to this informa-
             another agency or a potential litigant,                   tion abide by this restriction, and (c) publicize
             mistakes may occur that have this result.                 the restriction and DHS’s commitment to honoring
             These concerns grow when DHS is able                      and enforcing it.

 Id. § 133(a)(1)(D), (E).

                                                H O M E L A N D        S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L    23
                            P R I V A T E   S E C T O R     I N F O R M A T I O N    S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
          It would also be helpful if DHS would publicly                     for various reasons. One of these reasons is that
          commit to following CIIA submitters’ instruc-                      the statute has not yet been tested in court.
          tions regarding limitations on use and dissemi-                    DHS obviously cannot do anything about that
          nation of information. DHS should not by                           now. DHS can, however, do something about
          default incorporate submitted information into                     how the statute has been implemented, which is
          major databases accessible to anyone within                        not as Congress intended – a point noted in a
          DHS.                                                               May 25 letter to Secretary Chertoff from Tom
                                                                             Davis, Chair of the House Committee on
          III. Implementing the Critical Infrastructure                      Government Reform. Three problems have
               Information Act                                               dogged the CIIA’s implementation: it has been
                                                                             slow, it has not been well-coordinated, and it has
            The Critical Infrastructure Information Act is                   embodied narrow legal interpretations.
            a powerful law that offers unparalleled protec-
            tions to private information submitters. In                      1. Slow pace of implementation
            essence, it allows private owners and operators
            of critical infrastructure, or organizations rep-                The process of implementing the CIIA has
            resenting them, to voluntarily submit informa-                   been frustratingly slow. The statute merely
            tion to DHS regarding threats, vulnerabilities                   required DHS to issue “procedures” within 90
            and protective measures (critical infrastructure                 days of enactment, or by February 23, 2003.
            information, or CII), with assurances that the                   Nor did the statute condition its effectiveness
            information will be protected from public dis-                   upon issuance of those procedures. DHS
            closure. To promote integrated protection of                     instead chose to proceed through notice and
            critical assets, the law allows DHS to share this                comment rulemaking, a process that took over
            information with State and local governments                     a year. An “interim” rule was not published
            for such purposes without fear that these other                  until February 2004. DHS sought comments
            governments might have to disclose it. To                        at that time on an eventual final rule.
            protect this information, the law:
      ∑      • Effectively codifies the Critical Mass                      The rule described a phased rollout:
               decision nationwide,25                                     ∑ • Phase I: information would be shared only
      ∑      • Preempts state open records laws,26                            within IAIP
      ∑      • Blocks use by the government of protected                  ∑ • Phase II: information would be shared else-
               information in civil litigation, and27                         where within DHS
      ∑      • Creates criminal penalties for Federal                     ∑ • Phase III: information would be shared
               employees who knowingly disclose pro-                          with other Federal agencies and, pursuant
               tected information.28                                          to memoranda of agreement, with State and
                                                                              local governments
          Besides classification, no other federal program
          offers such protections. Yet the law is not widely                 The rules provided initially for submission only
          understood, and is regarded suspiciously by some                   on paper or other tangible media, but prom-
                                                                             ised eventually to allow electronic submission.

       Critical Mass holds that where information is voluntarily supplied to an agency, the only question the agency need ask, in
       deciding whether the information is protected as confidential business information under FOIA, is whether the information is
       “of a kind that would customarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained.” Critical Mass
       Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1992)(en banc). Critical Mass is only binding in the D.C. Circuit, whereas
       the CIIA applies nationwide.
       6 U.S.C.§ 133(a)(1)(E).
       Id. § 133(a)(1)(C).
       Id. § 133(f ).
       Id. § 133(e)(1).
       69 Fed. Reg. 8074 (Feb. 20, 2004).

24    H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y     A D V I S O R Y     C O U N C I L
      P R I V A T E     S E C T O R    I N F O R M A T I O N       S H A R I N G      T A S K   F O R C E
     Almost 18 months later, DHS has apparently                          2. Poor coordination within DHS
     made little progress. (DHS claims to be con-
     strained in describing the full state of current                    The slow pace of CIIA implementation has
     implementation due to the pendency of a final                       been compounded by a consistent lack of coor-
     rule, a position the Task Force does not under-                     dination among the various components of
     stand.) It is unclear to what extent DHS has                        DHS. At least initially, these components did
     allowed sharing of CII beyond IAIP but within                       not understand the relationship of the CIIA
     DHS. There is no evidence, however, that                            and other information protection regimes. For
     DHS has rolled the program out to other                             example, the preambles to the CIIA rule and
     Federal agencies. This been a problem for sec-                      the sensitive security information (SSI) rules
     tors whose sector specific agency is not DHS                        issued by TSA and DOT both made erroneous
     (e.g., electricity, whose sector specific agency is                 statements about the other rules.   34

     DOE).                                                               Implementation of the CIIA has not been well-
                                                                         coordinated even within IAIP. There is as yet
     Nor is there any evidence that DHS has rolled                       no intake capability for CII among the three
     the program out to State or local governments,                      major programs within IAIP’s Protective
     even though DHS has had a model MOA since                           Security Division: its Protective Security
     February 2004.31 This has led to problems in                        Advisors, its Buffer Zone Protection Plan
     several States. For example, the New York                           (BZPP), or its RAMCAP program. It would
     State Office of Homeland Security has been                          be quicker and administratively simpler for
     trying to establish a mechanism whereby it can                      facilities who want to do so to submit informa-
     get access to vulnerability information to be                       tion in the field, directly to their PSAs or to
     submitted by facilities to DHS under DHS’s                          visiting PSD staff administering the BZPP or
     Risk Analysis and Management for Critical                           RAMCAP programs. Instead, they still have to
     Asset Protection (RAMCAP) program,32 but                            submit paper copies to IAIP’s central “PCII
     does not yet have an approved MOA with IAIP                         Program Office,” and then all concerned must
     even though it submitted the paperwork six                          wait for that office to validate and forward it to
     months ago. Similarly, critical infrastructure                      the intended recipients.
     businesses in California have been seeking
     enactment of a state counterpart to the CIIA so                     3. Narrow legal interpretations
     that they can confidently share security infor-
     mation with that State’s Office of Homeland                       The third difficulty with implementation of the
     Security, since the State has apparently been                     CIIA has been a series of conservative legal
     unable to conclude an MOA with DHS.                               decisions by DHS:
     Maryland’s Emergency Management Agency                           ∑ • No indirect submissions. Most frustrating to
     shares the same frustration.                                         critical infrastructure sectors whose sector
                                                                          specific agencies are not DHS, the CIIA
     Finally, DHS appears still not to be accepting                       rule does not allow “indirect” submission
     CII electronically, even though the ISAC and                         via agencies besides DHS. So, for example,
     HSIN mechanisms it has promoted with criti-                          financial institutions cannot submit CII to
     cal sectors for sharing of threat and incident                       the Treasury Department, but must instead
     data are all electronic systems.33

  It is an appendix to the DHS PCII PROCEDURES MANUAL (Feb. 17, 2004).
  RAMCAP stands for “Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection.”
  The one exception to this statement is that DHS provides PCII protection for information that the telecommunications indus-
  try has been submitting electronically for years to the National Communications System.
  The CIIA preamble stated that SSI, unlike CII, “ordinarily will not be voluntarily submitted,” see 69 Fed. Reg. 8076, which is
  incorrect, since much information is submitted voluntarily to the Coast Guard as SSI by facilities regulated under the
  Maritime Transportation Security Act either directly or indirectly (because they are located in regulated ports). Similarly, the
  preamble to the SSI rules asserted that the CIIA “generally prohibits disclosure of properly designated CII outside the Federal
  Government,” see 69 Fed. Reg. 28069, which is also wrong since, as noted above, the CIIA explicitly anticipates CII being
  provided to state and local governments.

                                                  H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y     A D V I S O R Y      C O U N C I L       25
                          P R I V A T E     S E C T O R     I N F O R M A T I O N       S H A R I N G      T A S K    F O R C E
     ∑   send it to DHS, which is then supposed to                                 The last issue is particularly problematic for
         send it to Treasury (except that such intera-                             Sector Coordinating Councils (SCCs), ISACs
         gency sharing is not yet occurring to the                                 and similar bodies that represent critical infra-
         Task Force’s knowledge).                                                  structure sectors. DHS has thus far been
     ∑ • “PCII.” The CIIA rule invented the con-                                   unwilling to determine up-front that all or
         cept of “pro- tected critical infrastructure                              some of the information supplied by such enti-
         information” or “PCII” – a phrase not in                                  ties to DHS is CII. This refusal is frustrating
         the statute. This concept only confuses                                   because protecting such sharing is exactly what
         things, in the Task Force’s view, because                                 the CIIA was intended to facilitate. (Several
         now there can be “critical infrastructure                                 Task Force members were closely involved in
         information" that is not protected by the                                 Congressional consideration of the CIIA and
         CIIA. (It would be simpler to conclude                                    its predecessor bills over the course of several
         that information not meeting the definition                               years.) There is no evidence that DHS has
         of CII is not CII.)                                                       considered what proportion of SCC communi-
     ∑ • Validation of all CII claims. The CIIA rule                               cations to DHS would qualify as CII, or
         requires DHS to review and “validate” all                                 whether their charters could be amended to
         submitted CII. This approach is in contrast                               clarify when their communications to DHS
         to the way Federal agencies have imple-                                   would be considered CII.
         mented the closely analogous FOIA exclu-                              ∑
                                                                                   IV. DHS’s Caution, Lack of Clarity
         sion for “trade secrets and commercial or
                                                                                       Regarding Other Freedom of Information
         financial information [that is] privileged or
                                                                                       Act Exemptions
         confidential” – a.k.a. “confidential business
         information” or CBI.35 Under that practice,
                                                                                   Outside the CIIA, DHS has also not taken
         agencies simply note a CBI claim and treat
                                                                                   clear, firm positions on applicability of other
         the information accordingly, but do not
                                                                                   FOIA exemptions to information that private
         evaluate the merits of the claim unless and
                                                                                   critical infrastructure entities might submit to
         until someone submits a FOIA request for                                  DHS. Most prominent among these are the
         that information. Validating every CII                                    (b)(4) exemption for CBI and the (b)(7)
         claim up front could become an administra-                                exemption for law enforcement information
         tive problem if the program ever gets busy.                               the release of which “could reasonably be
     ∑ • No “class validations.” The CIIA rules do                                 expected to endanger the life or physical safety
         not provide for (although they do not                                     of any individual.”37 Both of these exemptions
         exclude) the notion that particular cate-                                 would seem to be broadly applicable to security
         gories of information could be deemed, in                                 information submitted by private entities and
         advance of submission, to be CII. This is                                 potentially strongly defensible.38 For example,
         peculiar, because the TSA/DOT rules                                       the (b)(7) exemption could be sweepingly
         regarding “sensitive security information”                                applied if all of DHS were a “law enforcement”
         establish several ‘categorical inclusions’ – if                           agency, which is a reasonable interpretation of
         information falls into one of these cate-                                 an obscure provision of the Homeland Security
         gories, it is automatically SSI.36 The concept                            Act.39 Notably, when the FBI ran the National
         of class determinations regarding the appli-                              Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), it
         cability of FOIA exclusions (e.g., CBI) is                                took the position that information submitted
         also well-established at agencies like EPA.                               to it via ISACs would be protected from
       U.S.C § 552(b)(4).
       These include “vulnerability assessments . . . directed, created, held, funded, or approved by the DOT [or] DHS, or that will
     be provided to DOT or DHS in support of a Federal security program,” 49 C.F.R. §§ 15.5(b)(5), 1520.5(b)(5), and “any informa-
     tion held by the Federal government concerning threats against transportation or transportation systems and sources and
     methods used to gather or develop threat information, including threats against cyber infrastructure,” id. §§ 15.5(b)(7),
       5 U.S.C § 552(b)(7)(F).
       See Attachment C at 11-16.
       See 6 U.S.C. § 122(c) (stating that the Secretary of Homeland Security “shall be deemed to be a Federal law enforcement . . . official”).

26    H O M E L A N D         S E C U R I T Y      A D V I S O R Y       C O U N C I L
      P R I V A T E     S E C T O R       I N F O R M A T I O N         S H A R I N G       T A S K    F O R C E
     release by both of these exemptions. The Task                      Like FOIA, FACA serves important and long-
     Force is not aware of any statement by DHS                         standing open government goals, and should not
     regarding how ISAC data is protected from                          be evaded. On the other hand, neither should it
     release now that the NIPC has become the                           impede vital communication between DHS and
     National Infrastructure Coordination Center                        critical sectors of information that should not be
     and is housed within IAIP.                                         made public. This is particularly problematic in
                                                                        the case of Sector Coordinating Councils, but the
                                                                        same problem arises with ISACs or any other sec-
     DHS has not reached out to the Private Sector                      tor-representative group with which DHS wants
     — or the public — for comment on these very                        to consult or otherwise exchange information.
     important questions. Rather, its decision
     process is opaque and apparently closely-held.                     As discussed below, DHS has ample reason to
     Moreover, the positions that DHS components                        take the position that SCCs, ISACs and similar
     or staff do communicate on these issues seem                       bodies are exempt from FACA. Alternatively,
     to be ad hoc and uncoordinated. This lack of                       or additionally, it has at least three means for
     clarity regarding what need not be disclosed                       exempting them from FACA. DHS should
     appears to have led to unfortunate disclosures                     not, however, adopt FACA “work arounds” that
     of private information that need not have been                     treat these entities as subgroups of advisory
     disclosed. All the foregoing undermines the                        committees, or that regard members of these
                                                                        entities as independent actors. These points are
     confidence of the Private Sector in DHS’s judg-
                                                                        explained below.
     ment and its willingness and ability to address
     and resolve issues regarding nondisclosure                         1. Non-Federal critical infrastructure coordina-
     under FOIA. These questions are not simple                            tion entities are not advisory councils
     ones, but they are too important not to answer.
                                                                        There are at least two reasons why non-Federal
     DHS, in consultation with the Department of                        critical infrastructure coordination entities are
     Justice, should adopt broad, Department-wide                       not advisory councils within the meaning of
     positions regarding applicability of (b)(4) and                    FACA – they are not “utilized” by DHS or
     (b)(7)(F) exclusions (at least). DHS (and                          other Federal agencies, and their activities are
     DOJ) should state their intent to assert these                     “primarily operational.” Each is discussed
     positions aggressively so as to effectuate the                     below.
     purposes of the Homeland Security Act. DHS
                                                                           a. SCCs and ISACs are not “utilized” by the
     should train and test its personnel on these                             government
                                                                        A group including Private Sector representatives
     V. Federal Advisory Committee Act Issues                           is an “advisory committee” subject to FACA
                                                                        only if it is “established or utilized” by a Federal
     Virtually all critical sector interaction with DHS                 agency.41 SCCs, ISACs and similar bodies have
     is slowed down and complicated by DHS staff                        been established by private entities, and so are
     concerns about compliance with the Federal                         not subject to FACA on that basis. But neither
     Advisory Committee Act (FACA). FACA                                should they be subject to it on the theory that
     requires that “advisory committees . . . established               they are “utilized” by DHS or other sector
     or utilized” by a Federal agency must meet in                      specific agencies. The leading Supreme Court
                                                                        decision on this issue recognized that the
     open session, after prior notice in the Federal
                                                                        Executive Branch “utilizes . . . in one common
     Register, and must make associated written mate-                   sense of the term” an American Bar Association
     rials public unless a FOIA exemption (other than                   committee for evaluating potential Federal
     the deliberative privilege exemption) applies.40                   judges.42 However, the Court concluded that

  5 U.S.C. App. 2, §§ 3(2), 10.
  Id. § 3(2)(C).
  Public Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 452 (1989).

                                                   H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y    C O U N C I L      27
                           P R I V A T E     S E C T O R      I N F O R M A T I O N   S H A R I N G    T A S K   F O R C E
          Congress intended this term only to reach enti-                   SCCs and ISACs generally have been formed
          ties that are “utilized . . . in the same manner as               privately; indeed, many ISACs predate DHS.
          a Government-formed advisory committee,”                          Most do not receive any Federal funding. But
          and are “the offspring of some organization                       most important, neither DHS nor other sector
          created or permeated by the Federal                               specific agencies strictly manage or control these
          Government.”43 The Court noted three factors                      private critical infrastructure sector entities.
          as particularly relevant in this determination:                   While the specific facts of each group differ,
          whether an entity was forme privately, rather                     these bodies determine their own memberships,
          than at the government's prompting, whether it                    set their own agendas, and decide what recom-
          receives Federal funds, and whether it is                         mendations or other information they will or
          “amenable to . . . strict management by agency                    will not provide the Federal Government.
          officials” along the lines imposed by an earlier                  Indeed, many of these bodies are spiritedly
          Executive Order regarding advisory committees.44                  independent of DHS, to DHS’s frustration in
                                                                            some cases. The Task Force is not aware of any
          Interpreting this decision, the D.C. Circuit has                  SCC, ISAC or similar group that is controlled
          focused on the last of those three factors, declar-               by DHS or any other Federal agency.
          ing that “utilized . . . is a stringent standard,
          denoting something along the lines of actual                      In conclusion, the D.C. Circuit has observed
          management or control of the advisory commit-                     that “the government has a good deal of control
          tee,” and only “encompass[ing] a group so                         over whether a group constitutes a FACA advi-
          closely tied to an agency as to be amenable to                    sory committee .... [I]t is a rare case when a
          strict management by agency officials.”45 Even                    court holds that a particular group is a FACA
          where government officials sit on a body and                      advisory committee over the objection of the
          hence influence it, the D.C. Circuit noted,                       executive branch."48 The Task Force emphatically
          “influence is not control.”46 District courts                     believes that this is not one of those rare cases.
          employing this demanding standard have regu-
          larly and recently found FACA inapplicable to a                       b. SCCs’ and ISACs’ functions are “primarily
          wide variety of private groups.    47

       Id. at 463-64 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 91-1731, at 9-10 (1970)).
       Id. at 457-58.
       Washington Legal Foundation v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1446, 1450-51 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (internal citations and
       quotations omitted).
       Id. at 1451.
       See, e.g., Washington Toxics Coalition v. EPA, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1273-74 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (task force composed of
       representatives of pesticide manufacturers not covered by FACA, even though EPA consulted with it on test methods for
       developing data and used data compiled by it to determine whether pesticides may be registered); Physicians Committee for
       Responsible Medicine v. Horinko, 285 F. Supp. 2d 430, 445-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (trade association and environmental group
       collaborating with EPA to design high production volume chemical testing program not subject to FACA; no evidence that
       EPA “was the driving force behind . . . meetings or that it exerted any control over who attended and what was discussed”);
       American Soc. of Dermatology v. Shalala, 962 F. Supp. 141, 147 (D.D.C. 1996) (although HHS sent an observer to each meet-
       ing of one American Medical Association group and had a panel position on the other, the AMA groups were run by the AMA,
       which appointed their members, provided staff, set the agenda, recorded the minutes, and maintained records), aff'd mem.
       116 F.3d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Huron Env’tl Activist League v. EPA, 917 F. Supp. 34, 40 (D.D.C. 1996) (even though EPA deter-
       mined the schedule for a group’s meetings and made other logistical arrangements for them, provided the meeting rooms,
       and spent public funds to retain a consultant to attend and assist with the meetings, “[n]othing in this case suggests that
       the working group is subject to actual management or control by the EPA, or that the industry representatives are so closely
       tied to the executive branch of the government as to render it a functionary thereof ”).
       Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 914 (D.C.Cir.1993).

28    H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y     A D V I S O R Y     C O U N C I L
      P R I V A T E     S E C T O R    I N F O R M A T I O N       S H A R I N G     T A S K   F O R C E
     The General Services Administration’s rules                     ∑ • “consult[ing] with [IAIP] to ensure appro-
     implementing FACA provide that entities                             priate exchanges of information, including
     whose functions are “primarily operational”                         law enforcement-related information, relat-
     rather than “advisory” are exempt from FACA.      49
                                                                         ing to threats of terrorism against the United
     The rules define “operational functions” as                         States”;56
     “those specifically provided by law, such as mak-               ∑ • providing “additional information . . . relat-
     ing or implementing Government decisions or                         ing to threats of terrorism”; and57
     policy.”50 The Homeland Security Act (HSA or                    ∑ • “coordinat[ing] with elements of the intelli-
     the Act) specifies a long list of functions for the                 gence community and with Federal, State
     Under Secretary of Information Analysis and                         and local law enforcement agencies . . . as
     Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), and that list                     appropriate.”58
     repeatedly establishes roles for “Private Sector
     entities” – as opposed to “the public” -- to play.                 The operational partnership spelled out in the
     Under the Act, these entities have distinct roles                  Act has been implemented by the President via
     in:                                                                Homeland Security Presidential Directive/
                                                                        HSPD-7. That document instructs the Secretary
∑ • providing “intelligence . . . and other infor-                      of DHS to “coordinate protection activities for
    mation” for analysis;51                                             [listed] critical infrastructure sectors.”59 HSPD-7
∑ • taking “protective and support measures”52;                         also requires DHS and other sector specific agen-
∑ • “in cooperation with” IAIP,                                         cies generally to “collaborate with appropriate
    “recommend[ing] measures necessary to pro-                          Private Sector entities . . . .”60 In particular, it
    tect the key resources and critical infrastruc-                     requires them to “continue to encourage the
    ture of the United States”;53                                       development of information sharing and analysis
∑ • receiving “warning information, and advice                          mechanisms,” and “to continue to support sector
    about appropriate protective measures and                           coordinating mechanisms,” whose functions it
    countermeasures,” as part of the Homeland                           specifies as “(a) to identify, prioritize, and coordi-
    Security Advisory System;54                                         nate the protection of critical infrastructure and
∑ • receiving “information analyzed by the                              key resources; and (b) to facilitate sharing of
    Department . . . in order to assist in the                          information about physical and cyber threats,
    deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or                           vulnerabilities, incidents, potential protective
    response to, terrorist attacks against the                          measures, and best practices.”61
    United States”;55

   41 C.F.R. § 102-3.40(k).
  See 6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(1).
   Id. § 121(d)(3).
   Id. § 121(d)(6).
   Id. § 121(d)(7)(B).
   Id. § 121(d)(9).
   Id. § 121(d)(11).
   Id. § 121(d)(13).
   Id. § 121(d)(17).
   Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7, § 15 (Dec. 17, 2003).
   Id. § 25.

                                                 H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y     C O U N C I L      29
                          P R I V A T E    S E C T O R      I N F O R M A T I O N     S H A R I N G     T A S K   F O R C E
          Based on the foregoing, DHS has ample basis to,                    Disclosing this sort of information would defeat
          and should, take the position that SCCs, ISACs                     the purpose of those communications by giving
          and similar bodies are primarily operational in                    our nation’s enemies information they could use
          nature. The Homeland Security Act and HSPD-                        to most effectively attack a particular infrastruc-
          7 have clearly established a range of functions                    ture and cause cascading consequences across
          that private critical infrastructure sectors are                   multiple infrastructures.
          intended to serve, in cooperation with DHS and
          other agencies. These functions are not primarily                  In coordination with the FACA Committee
          about providing DHS or the President with                          Management Secretariat, managed by GSA,
          broad “advice or recommendations on issues or                      DHS should officially determine that SCCs,
          policies” – to quote the FACA regulations.62 As                    ISACs and similar bodies exercising functions
          discussed above, some of these bodies may also                     under the HSA provisions referenced above are
                                                                             not advisory committees under FACA.
          serve broader policy functions, but that function
          should be seen as secondary to fulfilling their
                                                                             Alternatively, or in addition, DHS should also act
          statutory roles. Moreover, as one court has just
                                                                             to exempt SCCs, ISACs and similar bodies from
          noted, “[a]s long as a committee is not a Federal                  FACA. It could do so in any of three ways, listed
          advisory committee under the legal standard                        below in rough order of preference from the Task
          delineated [by the Supreme Court], the Court                       Force’s perspective.
          does not find anything in the statute to indicate
          that Federal agencies may not consult with such                    2. “Communications of critical infrastructure
          committees regarding policy issues without sub-                    information.”
          jecting those committees to FACA regulations.”63
          SCCs and ISACs are certainly not intended to be                    Subtitle II of the HSA has two subtitles. Subtitle
          stakeholder bodies in the way that advisory com-                   A, just discussed, describes the functions of the
          mittees are generally understood to be, and the                    IAIP Directorate and the roles of the Private
          touchstone for their constitution is representa-                   Sector in those functions. Subtitle B is the CIIA
          tiveness or inclusion, not “balance.”64                            – demonstrating the important linkage between
                                                                             the roles of critical sectors and the CIIA as a
          Fundamentally, the challenge of ensuring the                       means of effectuating those roles. The CIIA
          resilient/reliable operation of critical infrastruc-               includes a FACA exemption intended to enable
          ture is unique, as it requires close communication                 “information sharing and analysis organizations”
          and coordination between critical private sector                   (not necessarily “ISACs”) to share “critical infra-
          entities and the Federal agencies charged with                     structure information” with DHS.65 This exemp-
          regulating them. Those communications, more-                       tion was enacted precisely to enable the coordina-
          over, must remain non-public in order for those                    tion purposes of Subtitle A. Moreover, the
          functions to be served. As specified in statute,                   exemption is analogous in function to a compa-
          these communications are to involve intelligence                   rable FACA exemption in the Maritime
          and law enforcement information, and are to                        Transportation Security Act, currently being used
                                                                             by the Coast Guard to allow it to interact confi-
          serve warning, preventive and protective func-
                                                                             dentially with Area (i.e., port) Maritime Security

       See 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.25.
       Washington Toxics Coalition v. EPA, 357 F. Supp. at 1274.
       Cf. 5 U.S.C. App. 2, § 5(b)(2) (requiring advisory committees to be “fairly balanced in terms of the points of view
       represented and the functions to be performed by the advisory committee”).
       See 6 U.S.C. § 133(b)(“No communication of critical infrastructure information to [DHS] made pursuant to [the CIIA] shall be
       considered to be an action subject to the requirements of [FACA].”).
       46 U.S.C. § 70112(g)(1)(B)). This exemption references those committees, rather than referring to the type of information
       being communicated, as the CIIA FACA exemption does. This difference is not significant, however. The MTSA references the
       precise entities to which it applies because the MTSA also created those entities. By contrast, when the CIIA was enacted
       (in 2002, as part of the Homeland Security Act), it was unclear – as it remains today -- exactly what entities would be serv-
       ing as representatives of critical infrastructure sectors. The CIIA exemption permits the diversity of approaches sought by the
       various sectors by focusing on type of information being communicated, rather than on name of the entity doing it.

30    H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y     A D V I S O R Y     C O U N C I L
      P R I V A T E     S E C T O R    I N F O R M A T I O N       S H A R I N G     T A S K    F O R C E
     The statutory definition of “CII” is quite broad,                     3. Generic FACA Exemption
     and encompasses the topics covered in HSA
     Subtitle A and HSPD-7, and of greatest impor-                         Section 871 of the Homeland Security Act pro-
     tance to critical sectors and DHS.67 Therefore,                       vides simply and generically that the Secretary of
     DHS can and should rely on the CIIA’s exemp-                          DHS may establish and use the services of advi-
     tion to free SCCs and ISACs from FACA provi-                          sory committees, and may exempt such commit-
     sions. This approach has the virtue of simultane-                     tees from FACA.70 Consistent with the default
     ously solving both of the problems created by                         rule established by FACA,71 such committees
     FACA: open meetings and public disclosure of                          expire by law after two years, but the Secretary
     documents.                                                            may extend their existence in additional two-year
                                                                           increments indefinitely.72 This approach would
     The Task Force understands that some within                           have the advantage that it would not be based on
     DHS are concerned that its “PCII” rules and
                                                                           the substance of the communications involved.
     procedures now make it administratively compli-
                                                                           The Task Force understands that this exemption
     cated to rely on this exemption. In response, the
                                                                           authority has never been exercised, apparently
     Task Force notes first that the exemption is writ-
     ten in terms of “communications” of CII rather                        due to some sort of understanding between
     than “submissions,” a word used elsewhere in                          Congress and the Administration, struck at the
     that section of the Act, suggesting that Congress                     time the law was enacted, that it would only be
     intended the FACA exemption to operate as                             used in extraordinary cases, if at all. The Task
     broadly as possible and not to be constrained by                      Force believes any such understanding should be
     whatever procedures DHS developed to imple-                           renegotiated or abrogated and that DHS should
     ment that section.68 The Task Force also notes                        use the discretion it has under this provision to
     that the section only called for “procedures,” not                    take such actions as it reasonably deems necessary
     regulations, and that Congress may not have                           and appropriate to protect and ensure the
     intended the complex submission and validation                        resilient operation of the Nation’s critical infra-
     process established by current rules.69 Finally, the                  structure and key resources.
     Task Force contends that, if this is a problem, the
     right solution is to go back and amend those rules.

   The full definition is “information not customarily in the public domain and related to the security of critical infrastructure or
   protected systems--
     (A) actual, potential, or threatened interference with, attack on, compromise of, or incapacitation of critical infrastructure or
     protected systems by either physical or computer-based attack or other similar conduct (including the misuse of or unau-
     thorized access to all types of communications and data transmission systems) that violates Federal, State, or local law,
     harms interstate commerce of the United States, or threatens public health or safety;
     (B) the ability of any critical infrastructure or protected system to resist such interference, compromise, or incapacitation,
     including any planned or past assessment, projection, or estimate of the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or a protect-
     ed system, including security testing, risk evaluation thereto, risk management planning, or risk audit; or
     (C) any planned or past operational problem or solution regarding critical infrastructure or protected systems, including
     repair, recovery, reconstruction, insurance, or continuity, to the extent it is related to such interference, compromise, or
   6 U.S.C. § 131(3). “Protected system--
     (A) means any service, physical or computer-based system, process, or procedure that directly or indirectly affects the
      viability of a facility of critical infrastructure; and
      (B) includes any physical or computer-based system, including a computer, computer system, computer or communications
      network, or any component hardware or element thereof, software program, processing instructions, or information or
      data in transmission or storage therein, irrespective of the medium of transmission or storage.”
   Id. § 131(6).
   Compare id. § 133(a) (information “submitted”) with § 133(b) (“communication” of information).
   See id. § 133(e)(1).
   6 U.S.C. § 451(a). The Secretary must publish a notice in the Federal Register announcing the establishment of the
   committee and identifying its purpose and membership. Id.
  See 5 U.S.C. App. 2, § 14(a)(1).
   6 U.S.C. § 451(b).

                                                   H O M E L A N D        S E C U R I T Y      A D V I S O R Y      C O U N C I L        31
                           P R I V A T E     S E C T O R      I N F O R M A T I O N        S H A R I N G      T A S K    F O R C E
          4. Defense Production Act                                             antitrust violations), be noticed in the
                                                                                Federal Register and be transcribed
          The third way to provide SCCs and similar enti-                       verbatim.78 Implementation of plans and
          ties with a FACA exemption is through the                             agreements must be rigorously overseen by
          Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA). The                             DOJ and the FTC, with documents made
          DPA was enacted to enable the Federal                                 public unless certain FOIA exemptions
          Government and industry representatives to                            apply.79 The DPA approach may be the least
          jointly develop preparedness programs to assure                       preferable option for this reason.
          the availability of capacity and supply of
          resources and products critical to national defense              5. DHS should not devise “work arounds”
          at levels beyond those required by civilian
          demand.73 The DPA creates a process whereby                      Instead of determining that FACA does not apply
          members of an industry sector and designated                     to critical sector organizations under HSPD-7, or
          government officials may establish a “voluntary                  availing itself of any of the three exemption
          agreement,” which can then be implemented by                     options discussed above, DHS is instead pursuing
          a “plan of action.”74 The DPA further provides                   two other, ill-advised approaches.
          that activities conducted under a voluntary agree-
          ment or plan of action are exempt from FACA                      The Interim National Infrastructure Protection
          when conducted in compliance with the DPA, its                   Plan (NIPP) envisions the dozen or so SCCs
          implementing rules, and the provisions of the                    communicating with a “NIPP Leadership
          agreement or plan.75 The CIIA provides that the                  Council” made up of various Federal entities.
          President or the Secretary of DHS may designate                  DHS’s current FACA “work around” is proposing
          a component of DHS as a “critical infrastructure                 a “Sector Partnership Model” under which the
          protection program,”76 and that the President                    NIPP Leadership Council would become a FACA
          may delegate to that program the authority to                    advisory committee, and the SCCs would be
          enter, along with representatives of the Private                 treated as subgroups of that committee. This
          Sector, into a voluntary agreement or plan of                    would allow SCC meetings to be exempted from
          action, as those terms are defined under the                     FACA on the basis of judicial decisions holding
          DPA.77                                                           that, while advisory committees must comply
                                                                           with FACA, subgroups of advisory committees do
              The DPA establishes elaborate procedural                     not need to do so.80 DHS’s Infrastructure
              requirements for the establishment of these                  Protection Division has requested the National
              agreements and plans, as well as for meetings                Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) – a body
              associated with carrying them out. These                     whose Designated Federal Officer is a DHS
              requirements are highly burdensome. For                      Employee — to evaluate an interim approach
              example, the meetings to establish a volun-                  under which the NIAC would serve as this FACA
              tary agreement must be attended by repre-                    body, and the various SCCs would be “study
              sentatives of the Department of Justice and                  groups” of the NIAC. This is a bad idea for sev-
              the Federal Trade Commission (to avoid                       eral reasons:

       50 U.S.C. App. § 2158(c)(1).
       Id. § 2158(b)(2).
       Id. § 2158(n).
       6 U.S.C. § 132. Section 29.4(a) of the CIIA rules designates the IAIP Directorate as responsible for directing and
       administering the “critical infrastructure protection program.” See 6 C.F.R. § 29.4(a); see also 68 Fed. Reg. 18524 (April 15,
       6 U.S.C. § 133(h). The President delegated his powers under DPA to the Secretary of DHS in Section 24 of Executive Order
       13286 (Feb. 28, 2003).
       50 U.S.C. App. § 2158(e).
       Id. § 2158(h).
       See, e.g., National Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Executive Committee of President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711
     F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

32    H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y     A D V I S O R Y      C O U N C I L
      P R I V A T E    S E C T O R     I N F O R M A T I O N        S H A R I N G     T A S K    F O R C E
∑ • As explained above, SCCs and ISACs are intend-                    generally shown a disappointing lack of coordina-
    ed by HSPD-7 to be operational bodies, serving                    tion within itself and with other agencies. In
    to facilitate two-way communication between                       some cases it appears to be due to simple over-
    their respective sectors and DHS.                                 sights attributable to doing too much with too
∑ • SCCs and ISACs were never intended to                             little, or not fully establishing or understanding
    interface with the NIAC. These entities must                      priorities. In many other cases, however, the Not
    be able to have real-time or very fast turn-                      Invented Here Syndrome and claiming and pro-
    around communications with DHS. Having                            tecting turf seems like the most likely explana-
    to communicate through the NIAC frustrates                        tion. These problems happen at all levels.
    that considerably.
∑ • Most problematic, running SCC and ISAC                         ∑ • Within DHS: Companies represented by
    communications through the NIAC means                              group members, in various sectors, have all
    that these communications would, as a gener-                       reported cases where a DHS contractor
    al rule, have to be made public at the NIAC                        showed up, without any prior notice to the
    sessions. To prevent release of sensitive infor-                   plant or its corporate headquarters, to validate
    mation, therefore, these communications                            their National Asset Database data. The
    would have to be scrubbed before they offi-                        Science & Technology Directorate typically
    cially reached DHS. Such an arrangement                            initiates research projects on matters that are
    would substantially defeat the purpose of                          the purview of other directorates without any
    SCCs and ISACs.81                                                  prior consultation. A good example is a grant
                                                                       to the National Academy of Sciences to prior-
     DHS’s second FACA “work around” is to ask the                     itize research needs for the chemical sector,
     various constituent companies or associations                     initiated without any consultation with
     making up an SCC or other critical sector body                    chemical sector specialists at IAIP (or the sec-
     to respond to DHS documents or questions indi-                    tor itself).
     vidually, on their own behalves, rather than pro-
     viding the consensus views of the sector. While                 ∑ • Between DHS & other Federal agencies:
     this approach may indeed avoid the application                      Critical sector groups experienced great diffi-
     of FACA,82 it fundamentally defeats the purpose                     culty getting DHS and FBI to collaborate
     of HSPD-7 and the sector bodies it calls for,                       on defining terrorist threat reporting triggers,
     which is precisely to ensure that DHS can obtain                    and agreeing on who to call and in what
     (to the extent it exists) the views of a sector, not                order. The FBI held three national work-
     just the views of individual sector members.                        shops on the triggers issue, in which DHS
     There is little point (or efficiency, from DHS’s                    participated only after much effort. While
     perspective), to creating sector bodies if DHS is                   the FBI staff working on the workshops
     going to studiously avoid using these bodies to                     were distilling their results, all concerned
     cultivate and communicate a sector position.                        were stunned by the release of the “Terrorist
                                                                         Threat Reporting Guide” under the signa-
     VI. Lack of Coordination Within DHS and                             tures of the FBI Director and the Under
         Between DHS and Other Agencies                                  Secretary for IAIP. Staff of both agencies
                                                                         and the sector are still working to reconcile
     Beyond implementation of the CIIA, DHS has                          these efforts.

  The head of the agency being advised by a FACA committee can close meetings and limit release of documents when a FOIA
  exemption would apply. See 5 U.S.C. App. 2, § 10(b), (d). As noted earlier, DHS has not yet taken definitive positions on
  when these exemptions would apply in the critical infrastructure context.
  GSA’s FACA regulations provide that FACA does not apply when an agency expressly does not seek the consensus views of a
  group. See 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.40(e).

                                               H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y    C O U N C I L      33
                          P R I V A T E   S E C T O R       I N F O R M A T I O N   S H A R I N G    T A S K    F O R C E
          ∑ • Between DHS and State/local governments:                   ∑ • Whether the simple existence of IAIP, and
              As noted earlier, several states have com-                     the PCII program in particular, is the basis
              plained about their inabilities to execute                     for these requests or expectations. That is,
              MOAs allowing them to receive CII.                             have staff adopted the view that, because
                                                                             IAIP has the statutory responsibility to assess
           Private critical sector entities spend much of their              vulnerabilities and security measures, there-
           time introducing DHS to itself, and bringing                      fore it should simply ask for any and all
           about coordination that should have happened                      information on these topics from all critical
           earlier. As a result, this coordination usually takes             sectors, without regard to the criticality of
           place under great time pressures or after the fact.               this information and DHS’s ability to under-
           This lack of coordination inspires further lack of                stand and assess it?
           confidence on the part of the Private Sector.
           Again, the Office of Private Sector Liaison has               ∑ • Whether existing mechanisms for gathering
           been helpful in this regard, but should not have to               information, especially via State and local
           fix problems that could have been averted.                        entities, are adequate? Wherever possible,
                                                                             DHS should obtain that information from
           VII. Requirement for Clearer Justification for                    other entities that have collected it, not ask
                Information                                                  the original source to supply it again.

           Frequently critical infrastructure entities receive           ∑ • Given the success of the Y2K Transition
           multiple requests from different DHS offices for                  information sharing construct, whether DHS
           the same or similar information. The justifica-                   itself needs particular information, or can it
           tion for these requests is not always clearly stated,             rely on (a) other sector specific agencies or (b)
           and in some cases does not always sound plausi-                   the sector itself to supply either the informa-
           ble to the Private Sector. Repeated requests for                  tion itself or a less sensitive version of the
           information, especially where the need for the                    information.
           information is unclear, raise concerns about how
           that information will be used and how well it will              VIII. Completion of SSI Rulemaking
           be safeguarded. In this connection, the Task
           Force urges DHS to seriously consider the follow-               The TSA/DOT rules regarding sensitive security
           ing questions:                                                  information (SSI)83 are proving to be very useful
                                                                           in the aviation and maritime contexts. Some of
      ∑ • What specifically does DHS intend to do                          these SSI rules apply to all transportation modes
          with information besides hold and share it?                      (including land modes), but others do not, report-
         ∑ • Beyond implementation of the Stafford                         edly due to bureaucratic issues involving OMB.
               Act, will the information be used to                        This is a serious shortcoming, as it means that
               develop Federal response plans to miti-                     some sensitive information regarding the security
               gate existing vulnerabilities or to pro-                    of land transportation is not being adequately
               vide assets to remediate the conse-                         protected from public release. It has been over a
               quences of infrastructure failures?                         year since these rules were substantially revised,
                                                                           and these agencies should act quickly to expand
      ∑ • Whether in fact information that DHS really                      the SSI rules to reach all transportation modes.
          needs is being shared, and whether the mere
          existence of the PCII Program Office is cre-
          ating a misleading expectation that more
          information could or should be shared.

      Id. §§ 15.13(c), 1520.13(c).

34    H O M E L A N D         S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
      P R I V A T E      S E C T O R    I N F O R M A T I O N      S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
     The only really controversial aspect of the SSI rules                           • Allow “class” CIIA determina-
     is their marking requirements, which are highly                                    tions in advance of submittal.
     burdensome (they require a lengthy footer for                                      (R/M)
     every page).84 TSA and DOT have indicated that                                  • Allow “indirect” and electronic
     they may relax this requirement in a forthcoming                                   submission under CIIA. (R/M))
     rulemaking. They should do so when they revise                                  • Roll out the CIIA program as
     the rules to encompass land modes. It would be                                     quickly as possible to all DHS
     sufficient for the rules to require printing a warn-                               entities, to other sector-specific
     ing legend once on the document, and then just                                     agencies, and to states willing to
     require a simple “Sensitive Security Information”                                  execute memoranda of agreement
     header or footer on subsequent pages.                                              (on behalf of themselves and
                                                                                        local governments within the
Recommendations                                                                         state). (M)
  5. DHS should promptly and decisively                                              • Authorize all personnel of its
     revise its rules and policies for informa-                                         Information Analysis &
     tion sharing.                                                                      Infrastructure Protection
       • Regard Private Sector critical infrastruc-                                     Directorate who interact with
          ture facilities, companies and their asso-                                    critical entities to be CIIA por-
          ciations as partners with legitimate inter-                                   tals. (M)
          ests in policy formulation and implemen-                           • In consultation with DOJ and the
          tation — and as the only entities capable                            Private Sector, adopt broad, Department-
          of implementing most policy in the sub-                              wide positions regarding the applicability
          ject area. (A)                                                       of the confidential business information
       • Respond to Private Sector concerns about                              and law enforcement sensitive exemptions
          liability risks associated with sharing                              under the Freedom of Information Act
          security information with DHS                                        (FOIA). (M)
          • DHS should ensure that critical infra-                           • Resolve questions about how the Federal
             structure information is only used to                             Advisory Committee Act (FACA) applies
             protect or ensure the operational                                 to SCCs and ISACs.
             resilience of critical infrastructure. (R)                              • The ongoing Private
                 • Critical Infrastructure Information                                  Sector/Government operating
                    Act (CIIA) regulations must be                                      relationship is critical to an effec-
                    simple and broadly agreed-upon                                      tive homeland security operation
                    before they will be used. (R)                                       and is hobbled by FACA issues.
                 • Educate potential submitters                                      • SCCs and ISACs are not covered
                    regarding the protections afford-                                   by FACA because they are not
                    ed by all existing laws and                                         “utilized” by the Executive
                    potential risks. (M)                                                Branch and are primarily opera-
       • Fully implement the Critical                                                   tional, rather than advisory. (M)
          Infrastructure Information Act (CIIA):                                     • If challenged, DHS should use
                 • Do not require all CIIA submis-                                      one of three possible authorities
                    sions to be validated. (R)                                          to exempt SCCs and ISACs from
                 • Declare that information submit-                                     FACA. If this requires amend-
                    ted by SCCs and ISACs and                                           ing the CIIA rules, DHS should
                    maintained on HSIN by sector                                        do so promptly. (R/M)
                    representatives will be deemed
                    CII. (R/M)

 Id. §§ 15.13(c), 1520.13(c).

                                                H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y    C O U N C I L       35
                           P R I V A T E   S E C T O R       I N F O R M A T I O N   S H A R I N G     T A S K   F O R C E
                     • Given the above, under no cir-
                       cumstances should DHS employ
                       FACA “work arounds” like treat-
                       ing SCCs as subgroups of the
                       National Infrastructure Advisory
                       Council or seeking only the views
                       of individual companies. (M)

            • DHS offices and staff should identify
              coordination needs with DHS, with
              other federal agencies and with state
              and local governments, and should
              undertake such coordination as early as
              necessary, without waiting for affected
              entities to initiate it. (M/A)

            • DHS should determine if it needs par-
              ticular information to do its job, or
              whether some other governmental or
              private entity is doing that job adequate-
              ly. DHS should not request information
              because it can, or because it would be
              “nice to know,” but only where it is nec-
              essary to enable DHS entities to perform
              essential functions. (M/A)

            • The Sensitive Security Information
              (SSI) rulemaking conducted by the
              DHS Transportation Security
              Administration (TSA) should encom-
              pass all modes of transportation. (R)

36   H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
     P R I V A T E   S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N     S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
                          PART THREE – PARTNERING WITH THE MEDIA

I. Findings                                                            • The media tend to regard public officials as
                                                                         trying to “hide the ball” regarding threat
  It is vital to the health and safety of the                            information or emergency preparedness
  American public that it receive timely, accu-                          planning and resource allocations.
  rate and actionable information during times                         • This shared perception deprives the
  of crisis. Erroneous information, false rumors                         media of important subject matter
  or exaggerated reports of the geographic, eco-                         expertise and relationships important to
  nomic and human impact of an incident risk                             it in communicating with the public
  loss of life and serious adverse economic,                             during an incident.
  social and national security consequences.                           • And this shared perception diminishes
                                                                         the ability of government to use the
  The government and the media, while not                                media as effectively as it might to com-
  “partners” in the normal sense of that term,                           municate accurate, timely and action-
  each have a responsibility during a crisis for                         able information to the public during
  addressing this public interest and can, consis-                       an incident.
  tent with their independent roles in our con-
  stitutional system, work together to serve the                    Pre-incident communications are needed in
  public.                                                           order to improve public communications in a
  It is critical to our national interest that the
  government and the media clearly understand                          • News organizations need coverage plans
  their respective responsibilities, roles and                           before an incident so that they can get
  operational relationships in a crisis so that                          the story right.
  each can execute its responsibilities to the                         • News organizations need emergency plans
  public with full knowledge of how the other                            and protective gear to protect their own
  will behave.                                                           first responder personnel.
                                                                       • News organizations need contingency
  The media is regarded by the public, the                               plans to continue operating if their
  Private Sector and most elements of the pub-                           broadcasting, publishing or server
  lic sector as their primary source of informa-                         capacities are damaged or destroyed.
  tion in a crisis – and should be regarded by                         • News organizations need ready-to-use,
  the government as a reliable participant in                            off-the-shelf access to scientific, emer-
  disseminating timely, accurate and actionable                          gency management and other expertise
  information. Information can be as critical as                         critical to reporting on an incident.
  food and water to potential victims in a crisis,                     • Government public information offi-
  and the media play a central role in the                               cials need to know which reporters will
  homeland security information system.                                  cover which element of an incident.
                                                                       • Government public information officers
  There is too little exchange of crisis information                     need to know logistical needs of the
  between the government and the media before                            media in order to provide public
  an incident takes place:                                               updates.
                                                                       • Government public information officers
      • Public officials tend to regard the media                        need to have a fully-informed, respon-
        as a potentially hostile or disruptive ele-                      sive media in order to provide action-
        ment in crisis communications.                                   able information to the public.

                                           H O M E L A N D      S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y    C O U N C I L      37
                     P R I V A T E   S E C T O R       I N F O R M A T I O N   S H A R I N G    T A S K   F O R C E
        The government and the media are neither                        If an “official” government spokesperson cannot
        “partners” nor “adversaries” in crisis communi-                 or does not have a prompt answer to a media
        cations; the relationship is subtle and dynamic.                inquiry, the media will find some “unnamed
                                                                        source” or “outside expert” to provide it.
              • During an incident, the media play
                both an informational and accountabil-                  Government public information officers need
                ity role.                                               a clear system to monitor press reports and
             • At the outset of an incident, the media                  correct erroneous reports or unconfirmed
               report information concerning the inci-                  rumors.
               dent and its immediate causes; as the
               incident progresses, the media report on                 As a consequence, government and the media
               the failures in the prevention system                    find it difficult to work together in communicat-
               that allowed the incident to occur; at                   ing consistent, accurate, timely and actionable
               some point, the media begin to investi-                  information to the public during an incident.
               gate who is to blame for the breakdown
               in the prevention system.                                Yet, media and media personnel are “civic mind-
             • Both the government and the media                        ed” and may be “force multipliers” in engaging
               must understand that each of these roles                 public in preparedness and incident response and
               is distinct and valuable, but that during                recovery.
               a crisis, communication to the public of
                                                                        Failure of a well-understood working relation-
               accurate, timely and actionable informa-                 ship between government and media may leave
               tion is critical to life and property and                the public:
               takes priority.
             • After-action reports, whether by the                           • less prepared prior to crisis,
               government in its self-improvement role                        • more anxious during a crisis and thus less
               or by the media in its investigatory and                         responsive to government protective
               accountability roles, are valuable tools as                      action recommendations, and
               well.                                                          • slower as consumers, employees and
                                                                                families to recover from the effects of an
        Different media have different roles, staffing,                         incident.
        skills, and training in crisis communications:
                                                                         A well-understood working relationship
                                                                         between the Government and a well-informed
            • Local broadcast media carry lion’s share                   media can provide timely, accurate and action-
               of role in informational period, but are                  able information to the public and a reassuring
               least prepared or staffed                                 sense that Government and business leaders are
             • National broadcast media play second-                     working well together to manage the response
                ary role in information phase, but are                   to an incident and its consequences.
                most staffed and skilled
             • Print media play greater role in later                II. From “Media and First Response Program”
                stages                                                   to a Sustained Partnership
             • National 24-hour cable media are faster
                but, with more time to fill, tend to “fill”             The Government and local media should
                with speculation                                        transform their current limited “media and
                                                                        first response program” into a sustained cam-
             • Talk radio, relying on listener input, are
                                                                        paign in all of the top UASI media markets to
                sometimes source of unfounded rumors                    enable key officials and local media personnel
                                                                        to better understand their respective roles and
                                                                        behaviors in providing information to the
                                                                        public during a crisis.

38   H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
     P R I V A T E   S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N      S H A R I N G    T A S K   F O R C E
     • Doing so will develop working relation-                           • During these briefings, the media
       ships between government and media                                  should identify its needs for logistical
       personnel that will enable a more trusted                           information, subject matter expertise
       sharing of information during the early                             and personal protective requirements
       stages of an incident, including the bet-                           in various crisis scenarios.
       ter understanding and handling of
       ambiguous threat or incident informa-                       IV. Role of Local Officials and Trusted
       tion and of information that may be                             Authorities
       sensitive and important.
     • This campaign should include table-top                         Regular press briefings should be scheduled
       exercises, editorial board briefings, back-                    by local elected officials and trusted authori-
       ground sessions with on-air anchors, writ-                     ties (public and private) immediately upon
       ers, general and beat reporters, traffic and                   learning of an incident.
       weather reporters, assignment editors,
       bookers, producers, local public health                           • Communications to the public should
       officials, first responders, elected officials,                     be a critical priority in incident
       local FBI personnel, others responsible for                         response activities.
       local emergency operations.
                                                                      Even if information is ambiguous, uncon-
  To assure that those relationships are sustained                    firmed or incomplete, government and
  and that media expertise and readiness is                           Private Sector officials should be briefing the
  maintained, this program should put in place                        press on what is known, what is not known,
  a local team in each market to maintain a con-                      what is being done by emergency response
  tinuing series of exchanges between govern-                         personnel to respond to the incident and
  ment and local media.                                               what protective action, if any, is being rec-
       • Complacency is a powerful force under-                       ommended to the public.
         mining continuing readiness.
       • Continuing attention to proper govern-                          • Public information officials should be
         ment/media relationships can also extend                          included as a senior member in all
         to “all-hazards” events.                                          aspects of incident planning and
                                                                           response activities.
III. Need for Regular Background Briefings                               • Local elected leaders should undergo
                                                                           continuing crisis communications
   Government officials, at both the national                              training.
   and local levels, should conduct regular,
   ongoing background briefings for members of                        The ability to sustain public trust and to set
   the media.                                                         appropriate public expectations in a crisis is
                                                                      critical to increasing the prospect of a pre-
      • Background briefings should include:                          dictable public response to recommended
        potential scenarios regarding man-made                        protective actions and to minimize econom-
        or natural disasters, means by which                          ic and social impacts of an incident through
        any available threat or warning informa-                      rapid recovery and resiliency.
        tion will be delivered, default preventive
        and protective measures to be taken by                           • Working with the media, professional
        the public, consistent terminology for                             standards should be developed for
        alternative protective action measures                             “confirmed” and “unconfirmed” tags
        (e.g., shelter-in-place versus evacuation;                         in crisis reports, and clear “rumor con-
        in-place quarantine versus “see doctor”),                          trol” protocols should be developed to
        scientific background information and                              assure the accuracy and timely delivery
        known experts in the relevant fields,                              of actionable information to the public.
        logistics of government briefings during                         • During and after a crisis, the govern-
        crisis, possible technologies available to                         ment should issue regular updates on
        the media for the receipt and display of                           the consequences of the incident,
        crisis-related information and protective                          including deaths, injuries, economic
        measures for first-responding media                                and foreign policy impacts.

                                            H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L     39
                     P R I V A T E    S E C T O R        I N F O R M A T I O N   S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
          After-action reports following an incident                      between the government, the media and the
          should include an assessment of the nature,                     Private Sector in major incidents. (M/A)
          quality and management of public communica-                       • Upon completion of an assessment, the
          tions regarding the incident, including findings                    government and local media should scale
          regarding the public awareness, understanding                       their existing National Academies of
          and assessment of the incident, the protective                      Science media engagement program into a
                                                                              sustained campaign in all UASI (Urban
          actions the public understood it was to take
                                                                              Areas Security Initiative) media markets.
          during the incident and the timeliness, accuracy                  • Government officials at both the national
          and action-orientation of the information that                      and local levels should conduct a systematic
          was communicated to the public.                                     program of background briefings for mem-
                                                                              bers of local media including, among other
       V. Refining the Homeland Security Advisory                             things, the National Response Plan and
          System                                                              National Incident Management System,
                                                                              potential threat and response scenarios, sci-
          The color-coded threat notification system                          entific information regarding biological,
          should be significantly modified because it                         chemical and radiological materials, a glos-
          does not provide actionable information to                          sary of homeland security and citizen pro-
          the public.                                                         tective actions, and other FAQs.
                                                                            • Local elected officials and trusted authori-
                                                                              ties (public and Private Sector) should be
             • Available threat information important                         trained on how to conduct press briefings
               to the public should be made public, but                       during an incident in order to provide (1)
               it should also be made clear what actions                      timely and actionable information and
               should be taken by elected officials and                       protective action recommendations to the
               first responders, businesses in potentially-                   Private Sector and the public and (2)
               impacted sectors or regions or by the public.                  contextual material needed to maintain
             • If no action is to be taken by the public,                     public order and confidence.
               it should be made clear why the warning                      • DHS, local elected officials and national
               level is being changed.                                        and local media should develop protocols
                                                                              for the timely confirmation or correction
         The Department should organize and support                           of unconfirmed information or rumors
                                                                              during the course of an incident.
         a national community-based threat and pre-
         paredness campaign, working with local media                  7. The Homeland Security Advisory System
         partners, to engage employers and citizens in                    should be refined to provide more specific guid-
         reporting local suspicious activity and in                       ance to the Private Sector and to the public,
         enhancing their own preparedness.                                including changes in warning levels. (M)
                                                                            • Warning levels should be adjustable on a
              • Locally-executed campaigns, using local                       sector-specific, geographic or time-limited
                media and local community organizations,                      basis (or on another basis, as appropriate).
                are more likely to change behavior than a                   • Warning level changes should include a
                national media campaign alone.                                specific advisory to the public regarding
              • Locally-reported suspicious activity, care-                   the purpose for the change and the steps,
                fully crafted to avoid privacy concerns, can                  if any, that the public is expected to take
                                                                              as a result of such a change.
                be better quality-assessed by local law
                                                                            • DHS, State and local officials and the
                enforcement and will relieve overburdened                     Private Sector should meet, confer and
                national hotlines.                                            develop common understandings and
                                                                              expectations regarding the readiness or pre-
     Recommendations                                                          paredness levels associated with different
       6. DHS should pro-actively invest in a better                          warning levels.
          informed and more engaged media through                           • Any refinement of the Advisory System
          specific targeted programs aimed at devel-                          should be accompanied by a clear, easy-to-
          oping a stronger working relationship                               understand public communications plan.

40    H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
      P R I V A T E   S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N      S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
                                   GLOSSARY OF
2SR      Second Stage Review                             FinCEN  Financial Crimes Enforcement
AMA      American Medical Association                            Network
APA      Administrative Procedure Act                    FOIA    Freedom of Information Act
APRSAC   Academe, Policy and Research Senior             FOUO    For Official Use Only
         Advisory Committee                              FTC     Federal Trade Commission
BZPP     Buffer Zone Protection Plan                     GAO     Government Accountability Office
CBI      Confidential Business Information               GCC     Government Coordinating Council
CBP      Customs and Border Protection                   GSA     General Services Administration
CDC      Centers for Disease Control and Prevention      HSA     Homeland Security Act
CEII     Critical Energy Infrastructure Information      HHS     Health and Human Services
CI/KR    Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources           HSAC    Homeland Security Advisory Council
CII      Critical Infrastructure Information             HSAS    Homeland Security Advisory System
CIIA     Critical Infrastructure Information Act         HSIN    Homeland Security Information
CIO      Chief Information Officer                               Network
CIPO     Critical Infrastructure Programs Office         HSIN-CI Homeland Security Information
CITF     Critical Infrastructure Task Force                      Network-Critical Infrastructure
C-TPAT   Customs-Trade Partnership Against               HSISA   Homeland Security Information
         Terrorism                                               Sharing Act
CWC      Chemical Weapons Convention                     HSOC    Homeland Security Operations Center
DEA      Drug Enforcement Administration                 HSPD-7 Homeland Security Presidential
DHS      Department of Homeland Security                         Directive 7
DOE      Department of Energy                            I&W     Indications and Warning
DOJ      Department of Justice                           IA      Information Analysis
DOT      Department of Transportation                    IAIP    Information Analysis and
DPA      Defense Production Act                                  Infrastructure Protection
EAS      Emergency Alert System                          ICD     Infrastructure Coordination Division
EPA      Environmental Protection Agency                 IP      Infrastructure Protection
ERSAC    Emergency Response Senior Advisory              ISAC    Information Sharing and Analysis
         Committee                                               Center
FAA      Federal Aviation Administration                 ISE     Information Sharing Environment
FACA     Federal Advisory Committee Act                  ISP     Internet Service Provider
FAQ      Frequently Asked Question                       IT      Information Technology
FBI      Federal Bureau of Investigation                 JRIES   Joint Regional Information Exchange
FCC      Federal Communications Commission                       System
FEMA     Federal Emergency Management Agency             JTTF    Joint Terrorism Task Force
FERC     Federal Energy Regulatory Commission            LERG    Local Exchange Routing Guide
FIG      Field Intelligence Group                        MTSA    Maritime Transportation Security Act

                                       H O M E L A N D    S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L    41
                   P R I V A T E   S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N   S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
     MOA    Memorandum of Agreement                               RAMCAP Risk Analysis and Management for
     NAWAS  National Warning System                                      Critical Asset Protection
     NCAS   National Cyber Alert System                           RSPA   Research and Special Projects
     NCC    National Coordinating Center                                 Administration
     NCS    National Communications System                        SAV    Site Assistance Visit
     NCSD   National Cyber Security Division                      SBU    Sensitive But Unclassified
     NDA    Non-Disclosure Agreement                              SCC    Sector Coordinating Council
     NDAC   Network Design and Analysis                           SIOC   Strategic Information and Operations
            Capability                                                    Center
     NIAC   National Infrastructure Advisory                      SLSAC  State and Local Officials Senior
            Council                                                      Advisory Committee
     NICC   National Infrastructure Coordinating                  SSA    Sector Specific Agency
            Center                                                SSI    Sensitive Security Information
     NIMS   National Incident Management System                   SSP    Sector Specific Plan
     NIPC   National Infrastructure Protection                    TSA    Transportation Security Administration
            Center                                                UASI   Urban Areas Security Initiative
     NIPP   National Infrastructure Protection Plan               USCERT United States Computer Emergency
     NOAA   National Oceanic and Atmospheric                             Response Team
            Administration                                        WAWAS Washington Area Warning System
     NRP    National Response Plan                                Y2K    Year 2000
     NS/EP  National Security/Emergency
     NSIE   National Security Information
     NSTAC National Security Telecommunications
            Advisory Committee
     OMB    Office of Management and Budget
     OSAC   Overseas Security Advisory Council
     OSHA   Occupational Safety and Health
     PCII   Protected Critical Infrastructure
     PSD    Protective Security Division
     PSO    Private Sector Office
     PVTSAC Private Sector Senior Advisory

42   H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
     P R I V A T E   S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N     S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
                                                   Attachment A

C h a i r, Ma yo r Pa t r i c k M c Cro r y                     Ge o r g e Vr a d e n b u r g
      ( H SAC)                                                        ( P V TSAC )
V i c e C h a i r, He r b Ke l l e h e r                        Ja c k Wi l l i a m s
      ( H SAC, P VTSAC)                                               ( P V TSAC )
Ma yo r K a re n A n d e r s o n
      ( SL SAC )                                                H SAC STAFF
Di c k A n d re w s
      ( H SAC, ERS AC)                                          Da n i e l Os t e r g a a rd
Sh e r i f f Mi c h a e l Ca ro n a                                   Exe c u ti ve Di re c to r, H SAC
      ( ERSAC)                                                  Ca n d a c e St o l t z
Ja m e s Du n l a p                                                   Di re c to r, Pr i vate Se c to r In f o r m a t i o n
      ( SL SAC )                                                      Shar i n g Tas k Fo rc e
Do n n a Fi n n                                                 Je f f Ga y n o r
      ( SL SAC )                                                Mi k e Mi ro n
C h i e f Mi c h a e l Fre e m a n                              Katie Knapp
      ( ERSAC)
El l e n Go rd o n                                              SUB JE CT M AT T E R E X PE RTS
      ( ERSAC)
St e ve Gro s s                                                 Dre w A re n a
      ( PV TSAC)                                                     Ve r i zo n Co m m u n i c ati o n s
Dr. Do u g Hu n t t                                             L a u re n c e W. Brow n
      ( PV TSAC)                                                     Ed i s o n El e c tr i c In s ti tu te
C h i e f Ph i l Ke i t h                                       Ba r b a r a C o c h r a n
      ( ERSAC)                                                       Rad i o - Te l e vi s i o n Ne w s Di re c to r s
Mo n i c a Lu e c h t e f e l d                                      As s o c i ati o n
      ( PV TSAC)                                                Jo h n C o h e n
Pa u l Ma n i s c a l c o                                            Of f i c e o f the Gove r n o r, M A
      ( ERSAC)                                                  Ja m e s W. C o n r a d , J r.
C o m m i s s i o n e r K a re n Mi l l e r                          Am e r i c an Che m i s tr y Co u n c i l
      ( SL SAC )                                                Gre g G w a s h
Ma yo r Do n a l d Pl u s q u e l l i c                              T he B o e i n g Co m p an y
      ( SL SAC )                                                Ne i l Ga l l a g h e r
Ja c k Re a l l                                                      Ban k o f Am e r i c a
      ( ERSAC)                                                  Ava A . Ha r t e r
R i c k St e p h e n s                                               Dow C he m i c al
      ( PV TSAC)

                                              H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y     A D V I S O R Y      C O U N C I L       43
                        P R I V A T E   S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N       S H A R I N G      T A S K    F O R C E
     Di c k Ke t l e r
           Sout hwest Air lines
     Ma u r i c e M c Br i d e
           Nat iona l Petrochemica l & Refin e r s
           A s s ocia tion
     Su s a n Ne e l y
           A m e rica n Bever a ge Associa tion
     To m Pr i n c e
           Black well Sa nd er s Peper Ma r tin,
     Fr a n k Se s n o
           School of Public Policy/
           Ge orge Ma son Univer sity
     St e ve W h e e l e r
           Lock heed Ma r tin Aerona utics
           Com pa ny

44    H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
      P R I V A T E   S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N     S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
Attachment B
PUBLIC/PRIVATE INFORMATION SHARING                                     2. FEMA
PROCESS                                                                   • Emergency Alert System (EAS): dis-
                                                                             semination of alert and warning mes-
 Below is an outline that attempts to map exist-                             sages, Presidential messaging to the
 ing channels for security-related information                               nation, and state/local use. EAS
 flows. Included information covers: the flow                                operates at the national level through
 of information in both directions between gov-                              34 Primary Entry Point broadcast sta-
 ernment and the Private Sector on warnings,                                 tions.
 threats or reports of manmade or natural emer-                           • National Warning System (NAWAS):
 gencies, accidents, criminal acts, and attacks, as                          created to rapidly notify emergency
 well as information on design, location, and                                management officials of impending
 function of elements of the nation’s critical                               or threatened attack or accidental
 infrastructure. Not included is information                                 missile launch on the United States.
 flowing in either direction regarding rulemak-                              The three types of civil warnings sup-
 ing and the promulgation of regulations, nor                                ported by NAWAS are: (1) natural
 that contained in press releases, briefings and                             and technological emergency warn-
 other aspects of general public affairs activities.                         ing; (2) attack warning; and (3) fall-
                                                                             out warning.
 For each entry, the qualitative or quantitative                          • Washington Area Warning System
 sense of the number of reporting/disseminating                              (WAWAS): a 24-hour alert and warn-
 entities; the frequency and volume of                                       ing system for the Washington DC
 reports/releases; and whether they are mandato-                             area that coordinates federal and city
 ry or voluntary in nature will all vary. In addi-                           emergency operations in the Nation’s
 tion, certain restrictions are placed by                                    Capital.
 statute/rule/Executive Order/policy on the                            3. U.S. Secret Service; Financial Crimes
 information’s use by the recipient entity (public                        Task Force
 or private) and the ability of that entity to                         4. U.S. Coast Guard
 share it further.                                                        • Local Area Maritime Security
                                                                             Committees composed of federal and
 I. From Government to Private Sector                                        non-Federal port partners.
    A. From State to Local Governments                                    • Local Command Centers.
    B. From Federal Government                                            • Captains of the Ports.
      i. Department of Homeland Security                                  • Liaison at interagency operations
       1. IAIP                                                               centers.
          • ISACs, USCERT.                                                • Electronic bulletins.
          • HSIN (HSIN has multiple customers                             • 3 Interagency command centers
            at different levels. i.e. JRIES is for                           located at San Diego, Norfolk and
            Law Enforcement and State                                        Charleston (SC).
            Homeland Security Advisory, while                          5. Private Sector Office
            HSIN-CI’s primary mission focus is                            • HSIN-CI: Established and continued
            the Private Sector).                                             expansion to private sector members.
          • Warnings/Threat level.

                                           H O M E L A N D      S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L     45
                      P R I V A T E   S E C T O R      I N F O R M A T I O N   S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
                   • HSAS: Provided outreach/notifica-                            structure; and producing threat related
                     tion and coordination of private sec-                        information bulletins and advisories
                     tor leaders to changes in level.                             for Private Sector critical infrastructure
                   • Ready-Business: Shaped content,                              owners and operators.
                     messaging, outreach and partnerships                       • Infrastructure Protection (IP): in part-
                     for campaign to enhance private sec-                         nership with IA and the Private Sector,
                     tor preparedness and business conti-                         protects America’s critical infrastruc-
                     nuity.                                                       ture through the following:
                   • US-Visit: Fostered information and                        • Infrastructure Coordination Division
                     issue exchanges for the transportation                      (ICD)—serving as the hub of infra-
                     communities on the rollout, impact                          structure expertise by sustaining core
                     and benefits of the Program.                                sector capabilities, maintaining opera-
            ii. Department of Commerce                                           tional awareness, and fostering work-
                 National Oceanic and Atmospheric                                level relationships with the Private
                 Administration (NOAA) encompasses                               Sector, and State and local governments.
                 the National Weather Service.                                      • National Infrastructure
            iii. Department of Justice                                                Coordinating Center (NICC): a
                   • FBI: InfraGuard is part of HSIN-CI.                              24x7 watch operation center that
                   • privatesec-                               maintains operational and situa-
                     tor/InfraGard.php.                                               tional awareness of the nation’s
                   • Wanted lists; Joint Terrorism Task                               critical infrastructure key resources
                     Forces.                                                          (CI/KR) sectors. The NICC pro-
                                                                                      vides a centralized mechanism and
                   • HSIN-CI, HSOC is currently send-
                                                                                      process for information sharing
                     ing Joint FBI/DHS Sector.
                                                                                      and coordination between and
                   • Bulletins via HSIN-CI.
                                                                                      among government, Sector
             iv. Department of Transportation
                                                                                      Coordinating Councils (SCCs),
                 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
                                                                                      Government Coordinating
             v. Department of Energy
                                                                                      Councils (GCCs), and other
             vi. Department of Health and Human
                                                                                      industry partners.
                  Services                                                          • Infrastructure Coordination and
                  Centers for Disease Control (CDC)                                   Analysis Office: comprised of
             vii. Nuclear Regulatory Commission                                       Sector Specialists who have expert-
                                                                                      ise and/or established contacts in
     II. From Private Sector to Government                                            the CI/KR sectors. Additionally,
           A. To State & Local Governments                                            Sector Specialists analyze opera-
              i. Emergency Management Agencies                                        tional and situational information
              ii. Utility Regulators                                                  that is provided by the National
           B. To Federal Government                                                   Infrastructure Coordinating Center
              i. Department of Homeland Security                                      (NICC) to determine incident-
              1. IAIP                                                                 related impacts to the CI/KR sectors.
                  • Infrastructure Analysis (IA): analyzes                          • Critical Infrastructure Programs
                    intelligence from the United States                               Office (CIPO): supports informa-
                    Private Sector entities for information                           tion sharing and collaboration
                    regarding homeland security. IA also                              through sector partnership models.
                    collaborates with the Private Sector                              The owners and operators of the
                    by: ensuring that the appropriate                                 CI/KRs form the cornerstone of the
                    threat information with homeland                                  Sector Partnership Model. These
                    security implications reaches Private                             stakeholders own, operate, build,
                    Sector officials that protect the                                 and invest in the assets that provide
                    American citizenry and critical infra-                            the vital functions of the sector.

46    H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
      P R I V A T E   S E C T O R    I N F O R M A T I O N     S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
    • Sector Coordinating Councils                                   • National Security
       (SCCs): Under the National                                       Telecommunications Advisory
       Infrastructure Protection Plan                                   Committee (NSTAC): provides
       (NIPP), there are 17 SCCs that                                   industry-based advice and expertise
       assemble all the different actors in                             to the President on issues and prob-
       the Private Sector to instill informa-                           lems related to implementing
       tion sharing. DHS personnel work                                 national security and emergency pre-
       with asset owners and operators to                               paredness (NS/EP) communications
       identify vulnerabilities and provide                             policy. NSTAC is composed of up
       options for consideration.                                       to 30 industry chief executives repre-
    • Information Sharing and Analysis                                  senting the major communications
       Centers (ISACs): created in the                                  and network service providers and
       identified critical infrastructure sec-                          information technology, finance, and
       tors to coordinate industry and                                  aerospace companies.
       industry-government sector data                               • National Security Information
       sharing and analysis regarding vul-                              Exchange (NSIE): established as a
       nerabilities and incidents.                                      forum in which Government and
    • Protected Critical Infrastructure                                 industry share information in a trust-
       Information (PCII) Program: allows                               ed and confidential environment.
       DHS to receive protected and qual-                            • National Coordinating Center
       ifying information from disclosure                               (NCC): a joint industry-govern-
       and to be used by DHS, other                                     ment operation encompassing the
       agencies, State and local govern-
                                                                        U.S. telecommunications industry
       ments for securing critical infra-
       structure.                                                       and Federal Government organiza-
                                                                        tions involved in responding to the
• Protective Security Division (PSD)—
                                                                        Federal Government’s NS/EP
  reduces the nation’s vulnerability to ter-
                                                                        telecommunications service require-
  rorism by developing and coordinating
                                                                        ments. The operational arm of the
  plans to protect critical infrastructure
                                                                        NCC is its 24 x 7 watch and analy-
  and denying use of our infrastructure as
                                                                        sis operation, the “NCC Watch.”
  a weapon. PSD is also the Sector                                   • Communications-ISAC: facilitates
  Specific Agency (SSA) for five sectors:                               voluntary collaboration and infor-
  Commercial, Nuclear, Chemical,                                        mation sharing among its partici-
  Dams, and Emergency Services.                                         pants in the communications sector.
    • National Asset Database: the repos-                        • National Cyber Security Division
       itory of U.S. assets among the 17                           (NCSD)—acts as the single national
       CI/KR sectors.                                              point of contact for the public and
    • Sector Specific Plan (SSP): each                             Private Sector regarding cyber security
       SCC develops a SSP.                                         issues, including outreach, awareness,
    • Buffer Zone Protection Programs                              training, and the National Asset
       (BZPPs) and Site Assistance Visit                           Database.
       (SAV): performs SAV site specific                             • USCERT: partners between DHS
       write-ups called Common                                          and the public and Private Sectors
       Characteristics and Vulnerabilities                              to protect the nation's Internet
       Reports for a particular sector or                               infrastructure. US-CERT coordi-
       segment of that sector.                                          nates defense against and responses
• National Communication System                                         to cyber attacks across the nation.
  (NCS)—assists in the planning for, and                             • The National Cyber Alert System:
  provision of, national security and                                   US-CERT established a National
  emergency preparedness communica-                                     Cyber Alert System in January
  tions for the Federal Government under                                2004 to provide information to the
  all circumstances.                                                    public and the Private Sector.

                                    H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L      47
              P R I V A T E    S E C T O R       I N F O R M A T I O N   S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
                     • The US-CERT Portal: a secure,                           ii. Department of Justice
                        web-based collaborative system                              1. U.S. Attorney’s Office; Grand Jury
                        that allows US-CERT to share                                Investigations
                        sensitive cyber-related information                         2. Infraguard; JTTFs
                        with government and industry                                3. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco &
                        members.                                                       Firearms
                     • The US-CERT Control Systems                                     Firearms and Explosives Info
                        Center: plays a vital role in most                     iii. Department of Energy
                        critical cyber systems in the                          iv. Department of Transportation
                        nation’s infrastructure.                                  1. FAA
                     • US-CERT Public Website: serves                          v. Department of the Treasury
                        as a critical function to provide                         1. FINCEN Suspicious transaction
                        government, Private Sector organi-                           reporting; Bank Secrecy Act
                        zations, and the public with infor-                    vi. Department of Health and Human
                        mation they need to improve their                           Services
                        ability to protect their information                   vii. Federal Communication Commission
                        systems and infrastructures.                           viii. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                     • The National Cyber Alert System                         ix. Environmental Protection Agency
                        (NCAS): an operational part of                              Releases/spills toxic materials
                        the US-CERT Response System
                        that delivers targeted, timely, and
                        actionable information about inci-
                        dent and threats in a series of
                        periodic “cyber tips,” “best prac-
                        tices,” and “how-to” guidance
            2.   National Emergency Management
                 National Response Plan
            3.   HSIN-CI: uses the FBI’s TIPs program
                 on all websites, where members and the
                 general public can submit information
                 to both DHS (HSOC) and FBI
                 (SIOC) via this internet tool. The FBI
                 then sends the report to JTTF and
                 FIGs for investigation, while DHS
                 coordinates with IA; and the following
                 web link:
            4.   Transportation Safety Commission
            5.   U.S. Coast Guard Local Command
                 Centers; Captains of the Port National
                 Response Center 1-800-424-8802
            6.   DHS Law Enforcement Agencies U.S.
            7.    Private Sector Office
                 • Initiated exchanges of economic data
                    from multiple private sector groups
                    and companies as well as Federal
                    Departments (Commerce, Labor,
                    Agriculture) to assist PSO analyses on
                    the economic impact of DHS policies
                    and regulations (i.e. air transit pro-
                    gram; advance passenger information
                    systems, border wait times, etc).

48   H O M E L A N D      S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
     P R I V A T E    S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N      S H A R I N G    T A S K   F O R C E
                                                       Attachment C
                                                 JAMES W. CONRAD, JR.1

                                                  TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction                                                         IV. Other Laws that May Protect
                                                                         a Business’s Security Information
I. Executive Summary
                                                                         A. Laws Applicable to Particular Classes
II. The Freedom of Information Act                                          of Business Activities

    A. “Other Laws” Exemption                                               1. Larger public drinking water systems

    B. National Security Exemption                                          2. Facilities and vessels regulated under the
                                                                               Maritime Transportation Security Act
    C. Law Enforcement Exemption
                                                                            3. Shippers and carriers of hazardous materi-
    D. Confidential Business                                                   als required to prepare security plans
       Information Exemption
                                                                            4. Facilities regulated under the Chemical
    1. The exemption                                                           Weapons Convention Implementation Act

    2. Concerns about the exemption                                         5. Facilities regulated by the Federal Energy
                                                                               Regulatory Commission
        a. Is it really discretionary?
                                                                         B. The Critical Infrastructure Information Act
        b. Will courts follow Critical Mass?
                                                                            1. Background
        c. Is security information really
           “commercial or financial”?                                       2. Scope

        d. The culture of disclosure                                        3. Information Protections

    E. “Risk of Circumvention” Exemption                                    4. Implementation Issues

III. “Protections” that Aren’t, Really                                      5. No “Polluter Secrecy”

Assistant General Counsel, American Chemistry Council. The author very much appreciates the helpful comments he received
on earlier drafts of this article from Dion Casey, Transportation Security Administration; Daniel Metcalfe, Department of Justice;
and James O’Reilly, University of Cincinnati College of Law. Staff of the Department of Homeland Security’s Protected Critical
Infrastructure Information Program declined to comment officially. All opinions and any errors contained herein are exclusively
the author’s.

                                                 H O M E L A N D        S E C U R I T Y     A D V I S O R Y      C O U N C I L       49
                          P R I V A T E    S E C T O R      I N F O R M A T I O N       S H A R I N G      T A S K    F O R C E
       C. Sensitive Security Information

          1. Background

          2. Scope

          3. Operation

             a. SSI is partially self-implementing

             b. SSI can be submitted voluntarily
                to the federal government

             c. Persons able to obtain SSI

             d. The SSI rules bind private persons


50    H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
      P R I V A T E   S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N      S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
    Most of this nation’s critical infrastructure is               agency with responsibility for the security of a
privately held. It has become commonplace to                       particular type of infrastructure is likely to want
describe information about the security of these                   to be able to review and discuss security docu-
businesses – i.e., their vulnerabilities and the securi-           ments prepared by those businesses. It might also
ty measures they have taken – as a roadmap to ter-                 want to obtain a copy for its files – and it may
rorists. And yet this characterization is apt.                     have the power to do so. Finally, effective security
Security vulnerability assessments and security                    planning may require that the federal government
plans are among the most sensitive documents that                  be able to share this information – in a controlled
could ever be prepared about a facility, whether                   fashion – with state or local governments, or even
that facility is a chemical plant, a dam or railroad               with other private actors involved in securing the
storage yard. Comparable information about trans-                  asset in question.
portation modalities like trucking or rail may pose
even greater risks, given their ubiquity and the                      This article addresses what sorts of legal protec-
great distances over which shipments may be vul-                   tions may exist to prevent the public release of a
nerable. Security vulnerability assessments and                    private business’s security documents once they
plans generally describe the worst possible conse-                 are in the possession of an executive branch
quences that could result from an attack; where,                   agency of the federal government. It also notes:
when and how to attack to produce those conse-                           • when these protections may impose obliga-
quences; and what steps the business has taken to                          tions on the business submitting the infor-
deter or delay such an attack, or to minimize the                          mation, not just the government; and
consequences. A terrorist planning such an attack                         • when these protections envision the gov-
could not have a more useful guide.                                         ernment sharing information with certain
                                                                            non-Federal governments or private enti-
   In some cases federal, state or local law may                            ties for homeland security purposes, while
require a privately-held business to prepare these                          not releasing it to the public at large.
sorts of reports. In other cases, the business owner                        This concept requires a major cultural
or operator may have done so voluntarily, pursuant                          shift from the traditional binary notion
to an industry initiative such as the chemical indus-                       that information is either publicly released
try’s Responsible Care®‚ Security Code.2 Finally, the                       or held only by government -- but this
owner or operator may have independently recog-                             shift may be crucially important for
nized that its facilities or distribution methods                           ensuring security.
could be an attractive target, and that potential
legal liability or simply common sense impelled it                    The article focuses on legal protections avail-
to take protective measures.                                       able at the federal level, though it also points out
                                                                   when these protections extend to documents in
   Another familiar mantra is that security is a                   the hands of state or local agencies. As the discus-
shared responsibility between the public and private               sion reveals, this area of the law is particularly
sectors. In order to discharge this responsibility,                complicated, not only because of the number and
both sectors need to share information with each                   complexity of laws involved, and their interac-
other. Indeed, security planning – particularly in                 tions, but also by the distracting pervasiveness of
the area of response – cannot be conducted effec-                  labels that have some practical, though not consis-
tively unless each sector is aware of the other’s capa-            tent, meaning within government agencies, but
bilities and has cooperated in defining scenarios,                 yet provide no legal basis for withholding infor-
roles and actions. This means that a government                    mation from disclosure.


                                                 H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L     51
                          P R I V A T E      S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N   S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
         The article begins by discussing the Freedom of                  And in most cases, the government can “write for
     Information Act, which provides the overall                          release” by summarizing sensitive information or
     framework for deciding when the federal govern-                      abstracting from it in a way that does not create
     ment may or must protect information from pub-                       undue risks. (Indeed, critical infrastructure represen-
     lic disclosure. It focuses particularly on several                   tatives frequently complain that the government
     exemptions from disclosure under FOIA. The                           should do this more often with threat information
     next part of the article addresses a variety of labels               that it possesses.) On the other hand, while different
     that may appear to justify withholding informa-                      people will draw the line at different places, ulti-
     tion but really do not. Finally, the article explains                mately all (or virtually all) observers would agree that
     at varying lengths a number of statutes that give                    there are circumstances in which security-related
     the government the ability to protect certain types                  information provided by private entities to the gov-
     of security information from public release. This                    ernment must be protected from unrestricted public
     part of the article focuses on two recent and con-                   release. This article addresses whether and how well
     troversial programs regarding “critical infrastruc-                  that purpose can be served under existing law.
     ture information” and “sensitive security informa-
     tion.”                                                                       I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

         This article does not attempt to provide an                              FOIA. The Freedom of Information Act is
     exhaustive description of every program or authority                         the starting point for any analysis of whether
     it discusses. Readers interested in how they may be                          an executive branch agency must or may
     affected by the topics discussed below are encour-                           withhold a particular document from public
     aged to review the underlying laws or rules before                           disclosure. FOIA requires an agency to
     making important decisions about them.                                       release a record in its possession upon
                                                                                  request by any member of the public unless
                                                                                  an exemption applies. Five FOIA exemp-
         Finally, let me emphasize that the purpose of
                                                                                  tions are potentially applicable to business
     this article is not to promote the greatest possible
                                                                                  security information:
     withholding of private security-related information
     from release by the government. The 9/11
                                                                                  “Other Laws” (exemption (b)(3)): FOIA
     Commission,3 the official in charge of classifica-
                                                                                  does not apply where another law prohibits
     tion policy across the federal government,4 and                              an agency from disclosing a document or
     commentators writing in this journal5 all have                               establishes particular criteria for withholding
     expressed concern that the government overclassi-                            that type of information. Several of these
     fies or otherwise restricts from disclosure informa-                         laws are potentially applicable to business
     tion that safely could — and should — be                                     security information, and are summarized
     disclosed to the public in order to effectuate long-                         under “Other Statutes” below. A business
     standing principles of open government. Certainly                            concerned about the security of its informa-
     some privately-generated information is “security-                           tion in the hands of the government should
     related” and yet could be made public without                                always check to see whether one or more of
     jeopardizing the security of the generator or others.                        these laws applies.

      National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 417 (2004).
      J. William Leonard, Director, Information Security Oversight Office, National Archives & Records Administration, “Information
      Sharing and Protection: A Seamless Framework or Patchwork Quilt?” Remarks at the National Classification Management
      Society’s Annual Training Seminar, Salt Lake City, Utah (June 13, 2003), available at
      Christina E. Wells, “National Security Information and the Freedom of Information Act,” 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1195, 1198-1205

52       H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y      C O U N C I L
         P R I V A T E   S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N        S H A R I N G     T A S K    F O R C E
National Security (exemption (b)(1)):                            “Risk of Circumvention” (exemption
Documents classified for national security                       (b)(2)): Most federal jurisdictions protect
reasons are exempt from disclosure under                         government information whose effectiveness
FOIA. There is no formal process for a busi-                     requires that it be maintained confidential.
ness to request that information it submits to                   The government is relying on this exemp-
the government be classified, however, and                       tion to protect security-related information
                                                                 that it generates, whether about public or
access to classified documents is strictly lim-
                                                                 private infrastructure. It is questionable,
ited. This exemption is unlikely to be useful                    however, whether this exemption would be
to most businesses in most cases.                                of any use to protect documents that are
                                                                 generated privately and submitted to the
Law Enforcement (exemption (b)(7)(F)):                           government, especially if the substance of
FOIA exempts from disclosure information                         the report has not been integrated into a
generated for civil or criminal law enforce-                     government document.
ment purposes the release of which could
jeopardize the life or physical safety of a per-                 Protections that Aren’t. The federal govern-
son. This exemption may well be applicable                       ment maintains different levels and types of
to business security information submitted to                    safeguards for various categories of informa-
the government, provided that the informa-                       tion, depending principally on the agency in
                                                                 question. Common example categories are
tion can be said to have been generated for
                                                                 “sensitive but unclassified” (SBU) and “for
purposes of enforcing some law, federal or                       official use only” (FOUO). While agencies
state. This proviso is most easily accom-                        may in fact handle such information careful-
plished where the agency in question has the                     ly to avoid inadvertent release, these labels
authority to enforce some law relevant to                        do not provide a basis for an agency to with-
homeland security. There may be some                             hold a document from release in response to
question whether all components of the                           a FOIA request. Information must fall into
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)                            a FOIA exemption to be withheld.
have this authority.
                                                                 Other Statutes. Numerous statutes provide a
Confidential Business Information (exemp-                        basis, under the (b)(3) exemption noted above,
tion (b)(4)): Between FOIA and the Trade                         for agencies to withhold business security-relat-
                                                                 ed information from public disclosure.
Secrets Act, it is a crime for a government
employee to release confidential commercial                         Specific statutory exemptions exist for:
information about a business. For the most                            • Larger public drinking water
part, information about the security of a                                systems;
business should fall into that category.                              • Facilities and vessels regulated under
Moreover, the federal government’s position                              the Maritime Transportation
– and the law in the D.C. Circuit – is that                              Security Act;
business information that is voluntarily sub-                         • Shippers and carriers of hazardous
mitted to an agency will be protected from                               materials required to prepare securi-
release so long as it is the kind of informa-                            ty plans; and
tion the business would not customarily                               • Facilities regulated under the
release. Thus, this exemption should be                                  Chemical Weapons Convention
                                                                         Implementation Act.
broadly useful in protecting business security
information from being released by a federal                       While it does not have a special basis for
agency. However, this conclusion is not free                       withholding information from release, the
from doubt in any given case, and a business                       Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
would do well to determine if any other                            has established innovative rules for manag-
grounds exist for the government withhold-                         ing FOIA-exempt information submitted
ing the business’s security information from                       by facilities it regulates.

                                      H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y     C O U N C I L      53
                 P R I V A T E   S E C T O R       I N F O R M A T I O N   S H A R I N G    T A S K    F O R C E
                 Two other programs, established by statute,                              basis under a nondisclosure agree-
                 provide a basis for exempting security-                                  ment. The SSI rules are also self-
                 related information across a wide range of                               implementing, meaning that classes of
                 businesses. Businesses should always con-                                information are SSI by definition,
                 sider the possible applicability of these pro-                           without anyone having to apply for
                 grams:                                                                   such treatment. As with classified
                                                                                          information, private entities possessing
                     Critical infrastructure information                                  SSI have legal obligations to protect it
                     (CII). This program, administered by                                 – even if it is their own information.
                     DHS, protects security-related infor-
                     mation about critical infrastructure                         II. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
                     when it is voluntarily submitted to
                     DHS. This program provides an
                                                                                     The starting point for any analysis of
                     unprecedented level of protection,
                                                                                     whether an executive branch agency may
                     although partly as a result it has been                         or must release information in its posses-
                     slow to get up and running. It has                              sion is the Freedom of Information Act or
                     great potential, however, to enable fed-                        FOIA.6 This law provides the overarching
                     eral, state and local governments to                            framework for deciding whether a federal
                     share, in a secure fashion, information                         agency may refuse to publicly disclose a
                     about the assets they need to protect.                          document. Enacted in 1966, and sparking
                     This law has been strongly challenged                           a series of other “open government” laws,
                     by those who believe it will lead to                            FOIA generally embodies a Congressional
                     undue secrecy or even immunity from                             policy decision that all government
                     enforcement under other laws. In                                “records” should be made publicly available
                     fact, however, the law and its imple-                           – some automatically, and the rest (includ-
                     menting rules have been carefully                               ing, potentially, private security records)
                     crafted to avoid those outcomes.                                upon request by any person.7

                     Sensitive Security Information (SSI).                           Assuming a federal agency comes into
                     This program, administered by both                              possession of a business’s security report,
                     the Department of Transportation                                therefore, the default position is that the
                     and the Transportation Security                                 report is available to a FOIA requester,
                     Administration, enables these agencies                          unless the report is covered by one of
                     to protect from disclosure information                          FOIA’s exemptions from disclosure.
                     they obtain or generate the release of                          FOIA has nine exemptions, of which five
                     which could jeopardize the safety or                            are potentially relevant to businesses’ secu-
                                                                                     rity information.8 Each is discussed below.
                     security of transportation. Private sec-
                                                                                     How useful any of them may prove to be
                     tor representatives may be able to
                                                                                     in a given case is uncertain, however, for
                     have access to SSI on a need-to-know
                                                                                     several important reasons:

      5 U.S.C § 552. All federal agencies have issued regulations governing their implementation of FOIA. FOIA does not apply to
      the legislative or judicial branches of the federal government (or, thus, to entities within those branches like the Government
      Accountability Office (GAO)).
      “Any” person in this case really means any person, whether or not a U.S. citizen, and without any requirement to provide,
      much less substantiate, a need for the record. See U.S. DOJ, FOIA GUIDE AND PRIVACY ACT OVERVIEW 44-47 (2004 edition),
      available at This comprehensive document is issued every other year by the Justice
      Department’s Office of Information & Privacy, which coordinates the development and implementation of, and compliance
      with, FOIA policy throughout the executive branch. It provides useful insight into the government’s position on FOIA issues.
      Much of this article’s discussion of FOIA is derived from it. Another valuable reference is JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL INFOR-
      MATION DISCLOSURE (Thomson West 3d. ed 2000).
      FOIA also contains three “exclusions” that flatly forbid release of information, but they are unlikely to be relevant to private
      security information. (Two concern criminal investigations or proceedings and the third addresses certain classified informa-
      tion possessed by the FBI. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c).)

54       H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y      C O U N C I L
         P R I V A T E   S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N        S H A R I N G     T A S K    F O R C E
          • First, the exemptions are from FOIA’s                   many, an ideal solution to concerns about protect-
             mandate to disclose, meaning that the                  ing business security information. For this reason,
             government retains the discretion                      since 9/11 Congress has enacted or amended sev-
             under FOIA to disclose exempt infor-                   eral other statutes, and federal agencies have issued
             mation, unless some other legal author-                several regulations, to provide greater measures of
             ity affects the agency’s power to release              protection for some kinds of security-related docu-
             it.9 Many such authorities exist in the                ments. These other statutes and regulations are
             security area, fortunately, and are noted              summarized in Part A immediately below and dis-
             below where relevant.                                  cussed in Part V of this article.
          • Second, most FOIA exemptions have
             been construed narrowly by agencies                              A. The “Other Laws” Exemption
             and courts in their efforts to effectuate
             Congress’s openness policy. Agencies                              The most reliable FOIA exemption
             now in the business of obtaining or                               potentially relevant to private security
             reviewing private security information                            information is the “(b)(3)” exemption,
             generally have indicated an intention                             which exempts from FOIA’s disclosure
             to apply relevant FOIA exemptions                                 mandate any information the release of
             aggressively, and the Justice                                     which is controlled by another federal
             Department has stated its intent to                               law. In essence, this exemption ensures
             defend exemption decisions “unless                                that FOIA does not override any other
             they lack a sound legal basis.”10                                 law that either “(A) requires that the
          • Still, whether an agency will protect a                            matters be withheld from the public in
             given document is its decision to make,                           such a manner as to leave no discretion
             and whether a court will agree is obvi-                           on the issue, or (B) establishes particular
             ously uncertain. This difficulty is com-                          criteria for withholding or refers to par-
             pounded by the fact that different fed-                           ticular types of matters to be with-
             eral circuits can and do construed                                held.”12 A multitudeof statutes come in
             FOIA differently, and a lawsuit seeking                           through this door. Some of these are
             to compel disclosure of a business’s                              outright prohibitions on release, using
             security information could be filed by a                          unambiguous language like “shall not be
             plaintiff anywhere he or she resides.11                           disclosed,” and many include civil or
          • Finally, each exemption has its own                                even criminal penalties for government
             peculiarities, deriving from statutory                            employees who violate them.13 Others
             language and years of evolving (and                               speak of documents “being exempt from
             divergent) agency practice and judicial                           disclosure” under FOIA, and may allow
             interpretations.                                                  disclosure under certain circumstances.
   As a practical matter, it seems reasonable to                               A business concerned about protecting
assume that a court, faced with deciding whether                               information it might provide to the gov-
to release information that the federal government                             ernment should first determine whether
argues should be protected to avoid facilitating a                             any of these laws apply. Several of them
terrorist attack, would find some FOIA exemption                               are applicable to private security informa-
to apply. Nonetheless, the upshot is that FOIA                                 tion, and are discussed in Part V below.
and its exemptions alone are not, in the view of

 Even more exasperating, only some of these other authorities flatly forbid the federal government from releasing certain
 information under any circumstances. Many of them merely provide that information “is exempt” from disclosure under FOIA,
 and in the view of the Justice Department, at least, such a law does not necessarily deprive the government of the discretion
 to disclose the information outside of FOIA if the other statute permits such discretionary disclosure. See FOIA GUIDE, supra
 note 9, at 229-31 and 683-91, esp. p. 684. This may be an academic point, since agencies generally treat a statute saying
 that information is “exempt” from disclosure under FOIA as a flat prohibition on disclosure in all cases.
   Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, for Heads of all Federal Departments and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001),
   available at
  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
   Id. § 552(b)(3).
   See, e.g., the Trade Secrets Act and the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, discussed respectively in foot-
   notes 42 and 72 and accompanying text.

                                                H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y     A D V I S O R Y    C O U N C I L       55
                         P R I V A T E    S E C T O R     I N F O R M A T I O N       S H A R I N G     T A S K   F O R C E
                   B. National Security Exemption                                               • an active security clearance at the
                                                                                                   requisite level (e.g., “secret” level
                   FOIA exempts from disclosure docu-                                              for documents that have been
                   ments that have been properly classified                                        classified at the secret or confi-
                   for reasons of national defense or foreign                                      dential level)
                   policy.14 Thus, government records that                                       • a need to know; and
                   are “top secret,” “secret” or “confidential”                                  • signed a nondisclosure agree-
                   need not be disclosed under FOIA – and                                           ment (NDA).18
                                                                                            • No one else can see the document –
                   in fact other authorities establish a range
                                                                                              even the person who prepared it. That
                   of sanctions if they are.15 While on first
                                                                                              means that if a private person with-
                   blush this “(b)(1)” exemption might                                        out a security clearance prepared a
                   seem an ideal way for the government to                                    vulnerability assessment of his facility
                   protect privately-generated “homeland                                      and submitted it to a government
                   security” documents like vulnerability                                     agency, and the agency classified the
                   assessments from release while in the                                      document, the submitter could not
                   government’s possession, classification                                    get it back. Obviously, this is not
                   actually has a number of serious limita-                                   conducive to effective security or
                   tions:                                                                     information sharing.

                    • Only some federal agencies can classify                             And meeting the first two access require-
                      a document. The only way a docu-                                    ments is not easy or quick. First, there is
                      ment can become classified is if a                                  a tremendous backlog of persons seeking
                      federal agency that has “original clas-                             security clearances: more than three
                      sification authority” affirmatively acts                            years after 9/11, federal agencies with
                                                                                          classification authority still do not have
                      to classify it.16 While the
                                                                                          adequate resources or budgets to process
                      Department of Homeland Security
                                                                                          the many applications that they have
                      (DHS) and most other federal agen-                                  accepted. And the requisite background
                      cies have this authority, some do                                   checks – the source of most of the delay
                      not.17 A private entity cannot classify                             – will always take some degree of time.19
                      its own document. Nor is there any                                  Many applications have languished for
                      established process for private entities                            long periods of time. And even if a per-
                      to request an agency to classify a doc-                             son does have a clearance from one fed-
                      ument.                                                              eral agency, other federal agencies have
                                                                                          often been disinclined to accept them
                    • Access to classified documents is very                              readily, even though they have been
                      tightly controlled. Once a document                                 legally bound by executive order20 – and
                      has been classified, the only people                                now a federal statute21 – to grant such
                      who can see it are those who have:                                  “reciprocity.”
       5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). The current authorities governing the classification of documents are Executive Order 12958, as amend-
       ed by E.O. 13292 (68 Fed. Reg. 15315, March 28, 2003), and rules issued pursuant to those orders by the National Archives
       & Records Administration’s Information Security Oversight Office, located at 32 C.F.R. Part 2001. E.O. 12958 explicitly refer-
       ences information that “reveal[s] current vulnerabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, or projects relating to nation-
       al security.” Id. § 3.3(b)(8).
       Sanctions for unauthorized disclosure of classified documents are discussed in Sections 4.1(b) and 5.5 of E.O. 12958.
       Criminal penalties exist for certain disclosures of classified information. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 793(d), 798; 50 U.S.C. § 783.
       E.O. 12958, § 1.1(a)(1).
       For example, EPA only recently received this authority.
       E.O. 12958, § 4.1(a).
       The statute enacted last year to implement some of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations contains provisions intended to
       improve the number and timeliness of security clearances. See 50 U.S.C. § 435b. An inherent part of the delay is that,
       among the federal law enforcement personnel who conduct or manage the process, doing background checks is often
       regarded as boring, low-status work compared with the more results-oriented work most of them signed up expecting to do.
        See E.O. 12968 (1995).
       See 50 U.S.C. § 435b(d).

56        H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y     A D V I S O R Y       C O U N C I L
          P R I V A T E   S E C T O R    I N F O R M A T I O N         S H A R I N G      T A S K    F O R C E
            Second, it is not necessarily easy or sim-                          C. Law Enforcement Exemption
            ple to get a federal agency to agree that
            you have a need to know. As the 9/11                                Another FOIA exemption of partial use
            Commission and other critics have point-                            in protecting private security documents
            ed out, the classified world has evolved                            is the one covering information compiled
            over the years into one where individual                            for civil or criminal law enforcement pur-
            agencies are loathe to share information                            poses (conventionally referred to as “law
            with each other, much less with private-                            enforcement sensitive” information).
            sector individuals.22 (The Commission’s                             This exemption applies to a half-dozen
            report calls for a new, “need to share” cul-
                                                                                categories of documents, but one is of
            ture, and the statute passed by Congress
                                                                                particular relevance to the facility security
            last December to implement many of
            those recommendations contains provi-                               predicament: records the release of
            sions intended to create an “information                            which “could reasonably be expected to
            sharing environment.”23)                                            endanger the life or physical safety of any
                                                                                individual.”27 While this “(b)(7)”
           Third, agency rules and procedures                                   exemption was originally crafted to pro-
           regarding access to classified documents                             tect law enforcement personnel, it has
           are quite burdensome and cumbersome.                                 been broadly interpreted to justify agen-
           Someone who meets the three require-                                 cies’ refusing to disclose law enforcement
           ments for access listed above has to con-                            records whenever their release could rea-
           struct an appropriately secure facility                              sonably be expected to result in harm to
           where the documents must remain at all                               any person.28 In the homeland security
           times, with access controls and record-                              context, a federal court recently held that
           keeping requirements.24 People cannot                                Bureau of Reclamation “inundation
           even discuss classified information over the                         maps” detailing areas that might be
           telephone unless they have secure telecom-                           flooded if the Hoover or Glen Canyon
           munications capabilities, which are expen-                           Dams failed catastrophically were covered
           sive and time-consuming to install.25
                                                                                by this exemption because disclosure of
                                                                                the maps “could reasonably place at risk
            Finally, persons who violate these rules, or
            the terms of their NDA, can face very seri-                         the life or physical safety of . . . individu-
            ous consequences – even if they are                                 als,” communities, or infrastructure
            famous, as individuals such as Sandy Berger                         downstream of the dams.29 A business’s
            and John Deutsch have demonstrated.26                               security vulnerability assessment could
                                                                                well fall into this category also, and
            It should thus be obvious that classification is                    indeed federal agencies have made known
            a very poor tool for promoting the security                         their intention to assert this defense
            of private businesses.                                              where relevant.30

  9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 416-419.
  Id.; see also 6 U.S.C. § 485.
  See 32 C.F.R. §§ 2001.41(b), 2001.43. These are often referred to as “secure compartmentalized information facilities” or
  Id. §§ 2001.41(c), 2001.49. These are often called “secure telecommunications units” or “STUs.”
  See note 15 supra. E.g., “Berger Will Plead Guilty to Taking Classified Paper,” Washington Post, A1 (April 1, 2005).
  5 U.S.C § 552(b)(7)(F).
  FOIA GUIDE, supra note 7, at 660 n. 20.
  See Living Rivers, Inc. v. United States Bureau of Reclamation, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1321-22 (D. Utah 2003).
  For example, when the FBI housed the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), it stated that it would assert this
  defense, among others, if anyone sought information supplied by private facilities regarding threats or similar incidents.

                                                  H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y     C O U N C I L     57
                          P R I V A T E     S E C T O R        I N F O R M A T I O N   S H A R I N G      T A S K   F O R C E
                   The problem with this exemption is that                              • Facilities manufacturing or storing
                   it can only be asserted when the private                                certain chemical weapons precursors
                   information in question could plausibly                                 (regulated principally by the
                   be argued to be have been generated or                                  Commerce Department’s Bureau of
                   compiled in connection with some law                                    Industrial Security under the
                   enforcement purpose. This is likely to                                  Chemical Weapons Convention
                   be only sporadically true in the security
                                                                                           Implementation Act).35
                   context. Most notably, the FBI has gen-
                   eral authority to investigate violations of                        (Apart from the law enforcement con-
                   federal law, and so could plausibly assert                         text, these laws often also provide an
                   this exemption in a range of cases.                                independent basis for the government to
                   Another prominent example is the Coast                             withhold information from disclosure, as
                   Guard, which has authority to enforce                              discussed in Part IV.A below.)
                   the Maritime Transportation Security
                   Act (MTSA), applicable to facilities and                           U.S. Customs & Border Protection
                   vessels that may be involved in a mar-                             (CBP), located within DHS, has author-
                   itime transportation incident.31 The                               ity to enforce a host of customs and for-
                   Coast Guard is mandated to receive,                                eign trade-related statutes. While none
                   review and approve security plans (which                           of these laws directly authorize it to regu-
                   include vulnerability assessments) under
                                                                                      late the security of trade-related facilities
                   the MTSA, and thus could reasonably
                   assert this exemption, particularly to the                         or distribution mechanisms, CBP
                   extent it was using the report as part of                          administers a voluntary program (the
                   an investigation or enforcement action                             “Customs-Trade Partnership Against
                   under the law. Other types of businesses                           Terrorism” or C-TPAT) through which
                   whose security is subject to enforceable                           participants obtain preferential treatment
                   federal authority include:                                         under these laws (e.g., reduced inspec-
                                                                                      tions) in exchange for submitting to
                     • Larger public drinking water systems                           CBP detailed information about their
                       (regulated by EPA under the Safe                               security programs (which CBP protects
                       Drinking Water Act);32                                         from disclosure) and acceding to CBP
                     • Shippers and carriers of hazardous                             verification of those programs.36
                       materials required to prepare trans-
                       portation security plans (regulated
                       by DOT’s Research and Special                                  On the other hand, many facilities
                       Projects Administration (RSPA)                                 whose security could be important are
                       under the Hazardous Materials                                  not subject to any of the laws referenced
                       Transportation Act);33                                         above, and many federal agencies do not
                     • Facilities manufacturing or storing                            have law enforcement authority associat-
                       certain drug precursors (regulated by                          ed with facility security. Most problem-
                       the DOJ’s Drug Enforcement                                     atic, the Department of Homeland
                       Administration under the                                       Security (DHS)’s Directorate of
                       Controlled Substances Act);34 and                              Information Analysis and Infrastructure

       The MTSA is 46 U.S.C. §§ 70101-70117. The Coast Guard’s implementing rules are located at 33 C.F.R. Parts 101-106.
       See 42 U.S.C. § 300i-2.
       DOT’s authority to regulate hazardous materials transportation security is found at 49 U.S.C. § 5103(b). The security plan
     rules are located at 49 C.F.R. Part 172.
       The Controlled Substances Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 801-971, and DEA’s rules are codified at 21 C.F.R Parts 1300-1316.
       The CWCIA is found at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6701- 6771. BIS’s rules are at 15 C.F.R. Parts 710-722

58        H O M E L A N D     S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y     C O U N C I L
          P R I V A T E   S E C T O R   I N F O R M A T I O N      S H A R I N G      T A S K   F O R C E
           Protection (IAIP), the federal office                                exploring the usefulness of this approach
           broadly charged with securing the                                    in connection with “Buffer Zone
           nation’s critical infrastructure and key                             Protection Plans” that it is developing, in
           resources – and the lead or “sector-specif-                          coordination with state and local author-
           ic” agency for the chemical, transporta-                             ities, for especially critical facilities.
           tion, emergency services, postal and ship-
           ping sectors,37 has no specific authority                            D. Confidential Business Information
           to investigate or enforce any law. There                                Exemption
           is some basis to argue that all DHS com-
           ponents are law enforcement agencies,                                   1. The exemption
           but that conclusion is not assured.38 If
           IAIP were not viewed as a law enforce-                                  Although much maligned by some,
           ment agency, it could only assert the law                               one FOIA exemption does offer
           enforcement sensitive exemption to the                                  potential protection to any private
           extent the information in question had                                  business: the “(b)(4)” exemption for
           been compiled for purposes of enforcing                                 “trade secrets and commercial or
           a law, like those listed above, that some                               financial information [that is] privi-
           other governmental entity had authority                                 leged or confidential” – a.k.a. “confi-
           over. This is not an ideal arrangement                                  dential business information” or CBI.
           for the agency that is most commonly in                                 The landmark Critical Mass case inter-
           the position of receiving (or requesting)                               preting this exemption holds that
           facility security documents.                                            where the information in question is
                                                                                   voluntarily supplied to the agency, the
           Importantly, however, the (b)(7) exemp-                                 only question an agency need ask is
           tion applies in connection with the                                     whether the information is “of a kind
           enforcement of any law — federal, state                                 that would customarily not be
           or local. Clearly, all levels of government                             released to the public by the person
           have important roles to play in enforcing                               from whom it was obtained.”40 Since
           laws that protect private operations from                               no business in its right mind would
           the actions of terrorists or other crimi-                               customarily release actionable security
           nals. To the extent that a federal entity                               information to the public, this means
           like IAIP possesses information that is                                 that voluntarily submitted private
           also possessed by state or local law                                    security information should categori-
           enforcement — or is able to share infor-                                cally be covered by this exemption.
           mation with such entities — the federal                                 And, as noted above, all information
           agency may be able to assert the (b)(7)                                 submitted to DHS’s IAIP is voluntarily
           exemption premised on the enforcement                                   submitted, since IAIP has no power to
           of state or local laws. IAIP is reportedly                              compel the submission of information.

  See Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7 (Dec. 17, 2003), § 11, available at
  The Homeland Security Act provides that the Secretary of Homeland Security “shall be deemed to be a Federal law
  enforcement . . . official,” but it is unclear whether that grant is universal or limited to the three statutes referenced
  in that provision, and whether it automatically flows down to all DHS components. See 6 U.S.C. § 122(c).
  5 U.S.C § 552(b)(4).
  Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1992)(en banc). See generally FOIA GUIDE, supra note 7, at
  281-84. The Justice Department and most courts have concluded that information can be voluntarily submitted even where
  an agency has the power to require its submittal, if the submission was not made in response to exercise of that authority.
  See FOIA GUIDE at 284-99.

                                                H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y     A D V I S O R Y     C O U N C I L      59
                          P R I V A T E    S E C T O R    I N F O R M A T I O N       S H A R I N G     T A S K    F O R C E
                     Pursuant to Executive Order, all feder-                               with the CBI exemption.43 This
                     al agency FOIA regulations provide                                    means that if information falls with-
                     that the agency will notify a submitter                               in the scope of the CBI exemption,
                     if someone has requested information                                  it is a federal crime – a felony, in fact
                     provided by the submitter for which                                   – for a federal employee to release it
                     the submitter has claimed CBI protec-                                 under FOIA. So the “discretionary”
                     tion, giving the submitter a reasonable                               nature of the (b)(4) exemption
                     period of time to object. If the agency                               should not be a basis for concern
                     determines to release the information                                 among would-be submitters – but it
                     notwithstanding an objection, the                                     is, in the author’s experience, by
                     agency must notify the submitter in                                   some who do not appreciate the
                                                                                           Trade Secrets Act angle.
                     advance of a specified release date so
                     the submitter can file a “reverse FOIA”
                                                                                           b. Will courts follow Critical Mass?
                     lawsuit to block release.41
                                                                                           A second basis for concern is that the
                     2. Concerns about the exemption                                       Critical Mass decision, while of great
                                                                                           persuasive precedential value, is only
                     While the (b)(4) exemption, as con-                                   binding precedent within the D.C.
                     strued in Critical Mass, would seem to                                Circuit. While other federal district
                     provide clear protection for voluntari-                               courts and one circuit have followed
                     ly-submitted business security informa-                               it,44 it is not necessarily the law of the
                     tion, many representatives of private                                 entire homeland. Indeed, district
                     interests have expressed skepticism                                   courts in California, Maine, New
                     about whether this is really the case.                                York, and Virginia have refused to
                     As discussed below, some of these concerns                            follow it absent its adoption by their
                     are probably unfounded or overwrought,                                respective circuit courts.45 As noted
                     but others have at least some merit.                                  earlier, a lawsuit seeking to compel
                                                                                           disclosure of a business’s security plan
                          a. Is it really discretionary?                                   could be filed by a plaintiff anywhere
                                                                                           he or she resides.46
                          Some representatives of potential
                          CBI submitters note with concern                                 Thus it is entirely possible that a
                          the seemingly discretionary nature of                            court somewhere in the U.S. would
                          the CBI exemption – meaning that                                 decline to follow Critical Mass and
                          an agency may, but is not required                               instead direct the agency to follow
                          to, refuse to disclose information                               prior law, which required agencies to
                                                                                           assay whether disclosure would likely
                          covered by that (or any other) FOIA
                                                                                           “impair the Government’s ability to
                          exemption. While this is technically
                                                                                           obtain necessary information in the
                          true, looking only within the four                               future” or “cause substantial harm to
                          corners of FOIA, it is also true that                            the competitive position of the per-
                          courts have construed the federal                                son from whom the information was
                          Trade Secrets Act42 to be coextensive                            obtained.”47 Needless to say, many are
       See Executive Order 12600 (June 23, 1987), 52 Fed. Reg. 23781 (June 25, 1987).
       18 U.S.C. § 1905. Many environmental statutes have similar protections for CBI (e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136h (FIFRA), but it is ques-
       tionable whether business security information would be covered by one of those statutes. The federal hazardous waste
       regulations require access control at hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities (see 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.14,
       265.24), but beyond that, environmental laws and rules do not to the author’s knowledge address security.
       E.g., CNA Financial Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See generally FOIA GUIDE, supra note 7, at 358-60.
       See FOIA GUIDE, supra note 7, at 284-304. The Tenth Circuit adopted the Critical Mass distinction between voluntary and
       involuntary submission in Utah v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 256 F.3d 967, 969 (10th Cir. 2001), although both sides in that case
       agreed that the submission involved was an involuntary one.
       See FOIA GUIDE, supra note 7, at 299-300.
       See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
       National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

60        H O M E L A N D        S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L
          P R I V A T E     S E C T O R    I N F O R M A T I O N      S H A R I N G   T A S K    F O R C E
                uncomfortable risking the disclosure                                 in other contexts. Many agencies,
                of vital information on outcome of                                   especially EPA, have zealously fol-
                such subjective tests.                                               lowed judicial admonitions to inter-
                                                                                     pret exemptions from FOIA narrow-
               c. Is security information really                                     ly. Persons who are familiar with
                  “commercial or financial”?                                         these agencies’ policies and practices
                                                                                     likely will impute them to DHS or
                A third basis may be that potential                                  other agencies and be reluctant to
                submitters do not think of security-                                 trust those agencies with such sensi-
                related information as “commercial”                                  tive information. This concern is
                or “financial” information, since for                                heightened by FOIA’s requirement
                the most part it does not involve                                    that agencies release “reasonably seg-
                cost or price data, product formulas,                                regable portion[s] of a record.”50 A
                or other sorts of information that                                   submitter cannot therefore assume
                would typically be regarded as valu-                                 that an entire document will be with-
                able to competitors. Obviously,                                      held from disclosure just because one
                information regarding security meas-                                 or more portions of it contain CBI.
                ures a business has taken could well                                 Indeed, in such a case, the submitter
                be competitively sensitive, as could                                 may anticipate arguments with the
                data on process modifications a                                      agency – if such a document is
                plant made to reduce the inherent                                    requested under FOIA – about por-
                hazard it presents. More generally,                                  tions whose CBI status is debatable.
                most courts have concluded that
                “commercial” information covers                                      For all these reasons, the (b)(4)
                anything “pertaining or relating to or                               exemption is both (a) potentially
                dealing with commerce.”48 However,                                   applicable to a broad range of busi-
                one federal district court has con-                                  ness security information but (b) of
                cluded that “factual information                                     somewhat uncertain reliability.
                [supplied to the FAA by airlines]
                regarding the nature and frequency                               E. “Risk of Circumvention” Exemption
                of in-flight medical emergencies”
                was not commercial information.49                                A somewhat unlikely FOIA exemption
                The uncertainty about how such                                   that may have limited utility in protect-
                cases might apply to threat informa-                             ing private security documents is the
                tion, and potentially some vulnera-                              “(b)(2)” exemption protecting records
                bility information, is a cause for con-                          “relating solely to the internal personnel
                cern.                                                            rules and practices of an agency.”51 Over
                                                                                 the years, many courts have interpreted
               d. The culture of disclosure                                      this exemption to cover not only ministe-
                                                                                 rial agency papers (so called “low 2”
                Finally, some potential submitters are                           materials), but also “high 2” materials:
                no doubt put off by associations that                            i.e., those “predominantly internal”
                they have with the (b)(4) exemption                              records that are effective only if they
                deriving from their experience with it                           remain confidential.52

   American Airlines, Inc. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd, 588 F.2d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 1978). See generally FOIA GUIDE, supra note 7,
   at 271-73
   Chicago Tribune v. FAA, No. 97 C 2363, 1998 WL 242611, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 1998).
   5 U.S.C § 552(b).
  Id. § 552(b)(2).
   See FOIA GUIDE, supra note 7, at 204-26, U.S. DOJ, FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 3, at 3-4 (“OIP Guidance: Protecting
   Vulnerability Assessments Through Application of Exemption 2.”).

                                                 H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y     A D V I S O R Y     C O U N C I L    61
                          P R I V A T E    S E C T O R     I N F O R M A T I O N       S H A R I N G     T A S K    F O R C E
                Immediately after 9/11, the Justice                                  to the government, the exemption might
                Department advised other federal agencies                            apply if the substance of the private
                that this exemption is “well-suited for                              report was integrated into a government
                application to the sensitive information                             report. It may also be that a facility
                contained in vulnerability assessments,”                             owner could prepare a report in sufficient
                and that agencies should “avail themselves                           cooperation or partnership with the gov-
                of the full measure of Exemption 2’s pro-                            ernment that the exemption would apply.
                tection for their critical infrastructure                            However, establishing agreement among
                information as they continue to gather                               the relevant government officials – and
                more of it, and assess its heightened sensi-                         their counsel – on the legal defensibility
                tivity, in the wake of the September 11                              of this approach, and the mechanics of
                terrorist attacks.”53                                                making it work, could be long and
                                                                                     involved process. Thus this exemption is
                DOJ’s interpretation of Exemption 2                                  not likely to be of reliable use in protect-
                applies clearly to vulnerability assess-                             ing privately-generated assessments.
                ments and other security information
                that a government agency generates                                III. PROTECTIONS THAT AREN’T,
                itself, and would seem to apply even if                                REALLY
                the critical infrastructure that is the sub-
                ject of the report is privately owned.                            Understanding the rules for when govern-
                Since 9/11, DHS and other agencies                                ment agencies can withhold information is
                from time to time have been requesting                            complicated by the existence of several labels
                information from private entities that                            that, while frequently referenced by govern-
                the agencies can roll up or incorporate                           ment agencies seeking to protect informa-
                into sectoral or regional analyses the                            tion, do not actually authorize those agen-
                agencies are preparing, and this exemp-                           cies to withhold records from release under
                tion should be useful in protecting that                          FOIA.
                information when supplied for such pur-
                poses. This exemption would also seem                             Many government documents are promi-
                applicable to analyses developed by fed-                          nently captioned “For Official Use Only,” or
                eral agencies regarding a single facility;                        “FOUO,” and contain legends like this one:
                e.g., a Buffer Zone Protection Plan pre-
                pared by DHS or a DHS contractor                                      Warning: This document is FOR OFFI-
                regarding a privately-held oil refinery.                              CIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). It con-
                                                                                      tains information that may be exempt
                On the other hand, not all circuit courts                             from public release under the Freedom
                have adopted the “high 2” concept, and a                              of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).
                district court recently refused to apply it                           It is to be controlled, stored, handled,
                to “inundation maps” prepared by the                                  transmitted, distributed, and disposed of
                Bureau of Reclamation illustrating areas                              in accordance with [agency] policy relat-
                below the Hoover and Glen Canyon                                      ed to FOUO information and is not to
                Dams that could be affected by cata-                                  be released to the public or other person-
                strophic failures of the dams.54 Moreover,                            nel who do not have a valid “need-to-
                it is not at all clear whether this exemp-                            know” without prior approval of an
                tion could apply to a report developed by                             authorized [agency] official. No portion
                a private business. Since cases have inter-                           of this document should be furnished to
                preted the exemption as applying to                                   the media, either in written or verbal
                reports that are “predominantly internal”                             form.
       U.S. DOJ, FOIA Post (Oct. 15, 2001), available at See also FOIA GUIDE,
       supra note 7, at 214-15, 223-26.
       See Living Rivers, supra note 29, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1317 (maps not sufficiently related to Bureau's "internal personnel rules
       and practices").

62    H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y     A D V I S O R Y     C O U N C I L
      P R I V A T E    S E C T O R     I N F O R M A T I O N       S H A R I N G     T A S K    F O R C E
                    While this language sounds grave-                        FOUO, SBU and similar labels are basically
                    ly important and may trigger                             intra- or intergovernmental tools for “safe-
                    visions of locked file cabinets and                      guarding” documents; i.e., ensuring that
                    armed guards, FOUO does not                              they are closely held and not disseminated
                    represent a category of informa-                         more broadly than intended.55 These labels
                    tion that is exempt from release                         have originated in a variety of ways,56 and
                    under FOIA. If no FOIA exemp-                            have neither any government-wide defini-
                    tion applies, an FOUO document                           tion or any agency whose job it is to inter-
                    would have to be produced in                             pret them.57 These labels typically trigger a
                    response to a FOIA request that                          set of agency rules or procedures – which
                    adequately describes it.                                 could include sanctions for employees who
                                                                             violate them – to physically or practically
        A similarly intimidating but legally ineffec-                        limit access to information. But they are
        tual label that is commonly used in and out                          not themselves a legal basis for denying
        of government is “Sensitive But                                      access to the documents under FOIA, if
        Unclassified,” or “SBU.” As described in                             someone asks for them.58
        Part II.B above, there are three types of clas-
        sified information: top secret, secret, and                          Many documents that are exempt from
        confidential. A document properly classified                         FOIA are labeled FOUO or SBU so that
        at one of these levels is exempt from disclo-                        government employees don’t inadvertently
        sure under FOIA thanks to the (b)(1)                                 release them. But many FOIA-releasable
        exemption. But there is no “sensitive but                            documents are also labeled FOUO or SBU.
        unclassified” exemption to FOIA – an                                 This is not necessarily bad, but it is confus-
        “SBU” document that does not fall into a                             ing. And many, perhaps most, government
        real FOIA exemption is just as releasable                            employees do not understand these distinc-
        under FOIA as an office holiday party                                tions, adding to the confusion.59

  Other common labels that do not necessarily correlate with any FOIA exemption are: “Official Use Only” (OUO), “Sensitive
  Homeland Security Information” (SHSI), “Limited Official Use” (LOU), “Safeguarding Information” (SGI), “Unclassified
  Controlled Nuclear Information” (UNCI), and “restricted data.”
  For example, “sensitive but unclassified” appears to have first been used, by Congress at least, in the Computer Security Act
  of 1987. See 15 U.S.C. § 278g-3(d)(4); see generally Wells, supra note 5, at 1209-1212.
  A post-9/11 memo jointly issued by the National Archives’ Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) and the Justice
  Department urges all federal departments and agencies to “maintain and control” “sensitive but unclassified information,”
  balancing “[t]he need to protect such sensitive information from inappropriate disclosure” and “the benefits that result from
  the open and efficient exchange of scientific, technical and like information.” Memorandum from Laura Kimberly, ISOO and
  Richard Huff and Daniel Metcalfe, DOJ, regarding ”Safeguarding Information Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and
  other Sensitive Records Related to Homeland Security” (March 21, 2002), available at
  post10.htm. The memorandum provides no guidance, however, regarding what constitutes SBU information.
  See FOIA GUIDE, supra note 7, at 190-191.
  Wells, supra note 5, argues that increased use of labels like SBU will lead to overwithholding, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. at 1212,
  and to overclassification, id. at 1211, and expresses concern that courts will “defer to . . . government claims” when “’sensi-
  tive but unclassified’ withholdings are made in the name of national security,” id. at 1212. It does seem likely that an
  agency faced with a FOIA request for a document that is labeled SBU will be more inclined than otherwise to look for a
  plausible basis for withholding it. This is intentional, and as a result agencies should exercise some judgment and not
  apply such labels routinely. On the other hand, an agency still must identify a defensible FOIA exemption before withholding
  an “SBU” document, since there is no “SBU” exemption. It seems unlikely, moreover, that an agency would choose to clas-
  sify a document that it has already determined is unclassified. And a court cannot “defer to . . . ‘sensitive but unclassified’
  withholdings,“ since as just noted SBU is not a basis for withholding a document from disclosure.

                                                 H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y     A D V I S O R Y      C O U N C I L       63
                          P R I V A T E    S E C T O R     I N F O R M A T I O N        S H A R I N G     T A S K    F O R C E
             III. OTHER LAWS THAT MAY                                                     safely expect that future such laws –
                  PROTECT A BUSINESS’S                                                    e.g., chemical facility security legisla-
                  SECURITY INFORMATION                                                    tion – will also have detailed informa-
                                                                                          tion protections.61 This part of the arti-
             As noted earlier, the (b)(3) exemption from                                  cle discusses four such laws, as well as
             FOIA protects documents from being                                           two innovative programs for managing
             released when some other statute governs                                     security sensitive information related to
             their disclosure. A number of these are                                      energy infrastructure
             specifically designed to protect security-sen-
             sitive information. Because these laws large-                                1. Larger public drinking water systems
             ly were enacted after 9/11, rules implement-
             ing them are still new or not yet complete,                                  The Safe Drinking Water Act requires
             and the responsible agencies in most cases                                   these systems to certify to EPA that
             are still struggling to determine their scope                                they have conducted vulnerability
             and operation – as are organizations that                                    assessments, and to provide it with
             generate or may possess covered informa-                                     those assessments.62 The identity of a
             tion. Part A below summarizes information                                    facility submitting an assessment and
             protections applicable to particular types of                                the date of the certification must be
             facilities or operations. Parts B and C                                      made public.63 Otherwise, however,
             describe two much more broadly applicable                                    EPA must develop protocols to ensure
             regulatory programs for protecting two                                       that these assessments, and informa-
             kinds of information: “Critical                                              tion derived from them, are kept in a
             Infrastructure Information” and “Sensitive                                   secure location, and EPA is prohibited
             Security Information.”                                                       from making this information “avail-
                                                                                          able to anyone other than an individ-
               A. Laws Applicable to Particular Classes                                   ual designated by the [EPA]
                  of Business Activities                                                  Administrator.64 (Designated individ-
                                                                                          uals need not be government employ-
               As Part II.C above explained, the “law                                     ees.) Criminal penalties are provided
               enforcement” exemption from FOIA may                                       if such an individual knowingly or
               apply where particular agencies have the                                   recklessly releases the information in
               ability to regulate security at particular                                 an unauthorized fashion.65 The law
               types of facilities or transportation modali-                              further provides that covered drinking
               ties. The laws granting such authority                                     water systems do not have to provide
               often contain their own information pro-                                   these assessments to a state or local
               tections applicable to information generat-                                entity “solely by reason of the require-
               ed pursuant to their authorities.60 One can                                ment” that they submit them to EPA66

        Neither the Controlled Substances Act nor DEA’s implementing regulations (see footnote 35 and accompanying text) contain
        particular information protections. Since DEA is part of the Department of Justice, security-related information supplied to
        DEA would be subject to DOJ’s FOIA regulations and procedures and protected to the extent it fell into one of the FOIA
        exemptions above in Parts III.B-E above (national security, law enforcement, CBI or anticircumvention).
       For example, S. 994, the “Chemical Facilities Security Act” reported by the Senate Environment & Public Works Committee on
       May 11, 2004 contained protections possibly exceeding those provided by any other statute for unclassified information. See
       §§ 3(i), 4(e), 7(c).
        See 42 U.S.C. § 300i-2(a)(2).
        Id. § 300i-2(a)(3).
        Id. § 300i-2(a)(5).
        Id. § 300i-2(a)(6)(A). Such an individual can disclose the information (i) to another designated individual, (ii) for purposes
        of conducting inspections or taking actions in response to imminent hazards, or (iii) in administrative or judicial enforcement
        actions under the act. Id.
        Id. § 300i-2(a)(4). This provision was designed to preempt state or local laws that say, in effect, ‘you must submit to us
        anything you have to submit to EPA.’

64    H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y      A D V I S O R Y     C O U N C I L
      P R I V A T E    S E C T O R      I N F O R M A T I O N       S H A R I N G      T A S K    F O R C E
               — but it does not prevent state or                                      portation security plans are not
               local entities from passing enactments                                  required to submit those plans to
               that specifically require submission of                                 DOT. DOT has stated that it
               these assessments. The law also                                         “[g]enerally . . . will not collect or
               authorizes designated individuals who                                   retain security plans,” and that its
               are government employees to “discuss                                        Inspectors . . . generally will not
               the contents of a vulnerability assess-                                     take copies with them or require
               ment” with state or local officials.67                                      companies to submit security
                                                                                           plans.70 In the rare instance that
               2. Facilities and vessels regulated by                                      RSPA enforcement personnel
                  the Maritime Transportation                                              identify a need to collect a copy of
                  Security Act                                                             a security plan, or if a company
                                                                                           voluntarily submits a copy of its
                                                                                           security plan, we will analyze all
               The MTSA declares that, “[n]otwith-
                                                                                           applicable laws and Freedom of
               standing any other provision of law,
                                                                                           Information Act exemptions to
               information developed under [it] is                                         determine whether the informa-
               not required to be disclosed to the                                         tion or portions of information in
               public, including . . . facility security                                   the security plan can be withheld
               plans, vessel security plans . . . port                                     from release. Prior to submission
               vulnerability assessments; and . . .                                        of a security plan to DOT in these
               other information related to security                                       unusual instances, companies
               plans, procedures or programs for ves-                                      should follow the procedures in 49
               sels or facilities authorized under [it].68                                 CFR 105.30 [the DOT FOIA
               Scattered provisions of the Coast                                           rules] for requesting confidentiali-
               Guard’s MTSA rules flesh out this                                           ty. Under those procedures, a
               declaration (which does not require                                         company should identify and
               regulations to be effective) by stating                                     mark the information it believes
               that various types of information gen-                                      is confidential and explain why.
               erated under the MTSA are “sensitive                                        We will then determine whether
               security information” (“SSI”) under                                         the information may be released or
               regulations jointly published by the                                        protected under the law.71
               DOT and the Transportation Security
               Administration (TSA).69 The SSI                                         Obviously this language is not terribly
               rules – which impose obligations on                                     reassuring to hazmat businesses.
               the generators of this information, not                                 However, there is a compelling argu-
               just agencies – are discussed in Part                                   ment that hazmat security plans
               IV.C below.                                                             obtained by or provided to DOT as
                                                                                       described above are currently protect-
               3. Shippers and carriers of hazardous                                   ed by the SSI rules referenced in the
                  materials required to prepare                                        previous section (discussing the
                  security plans                                                       MTSA). Also, DOT and TSA intend
                                                                                       to propose amendments to those rules
               Shippers and carriers of certain haz-                                   to expressly reference land modes of
               ardous materials required by                                            transportation. Both these issues are
               DOT/RSPA rules to prepare trans-                                        discussed in Part IV.C below.

   Id. § 300i-2(a)(6)(B).
   46 U.S.C. § 70103(c)(7).
   E.g., 33 C.F.R. § 105.400(c) (stating that facility security plans are SSI).
   68 Fed. Reg. 14517 (March 25, 2003).

                                                    H O M E L A N D         S E C U R I T Y   A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L     65
                            P R I V A T E     S E C T O R       I N F O R M A T I O N     S H A R I N G   T A S K   F O R C E
                    4. Facilities regulated under the                                          5. Activities regulated by the Federal
                       Chemical Weapons Convention                                                Energy Regulatory Commission
                       Implementation Act
                                                                                               Shortly after 9/11, the Federal Energy
                    The Chemical Weapons Convention                                            Regulatory Commission (FERC) ini-
                    Implementation Act provides that any                                       tiated two innovative, though contro-
                    “confidential business information” sup-                                   versial, approaches for managing
                    plied to or otherwise acquired by the                                      information related to the security of
                    United States government under the Act                                     energy infrastructure.78 Unlike the
                    or the Convention “shall not be dis-                                       authorities discussed above, these
                    closed” under FOIA.72 “Confidential                                        approaches do not provide a separate
                    business information” is defined under                                     basis for withholding information
                    the Act to include CBI as defined under                                    from disclosure. However, they are
                    FOIA (see Part II.D above), and specifi-                                   worth discussing in the interest of
                    cally also includes “any plant design                                      completeness.
                    process, technology, or operating
                    method,” which could well include plant                                    First, FERC has established special
                    security practices or procedures.73                                        FOIA rules for “Critical Energy
                    Exceptions to this prohibition allow the                                   Infrastructure Information” (CEII),
                                                                                               defined as information about critical
                    government to supply CBI:
                                                                                               infrastructure that:
                      • to the CWC Technical Secretariat or
                         other states who are parties to the
                                                                                                 • relates to the production, genera-
                         Convention (which has its own
                                                                                                   tion, transportation, transmission or
                         “Annex on the Protection of
                                                                                                   distribution of energy;
                         Confidential Information”);74                                           • “could be useful to a person in
                      • to Congressional committees and                                            planning an attack on critical
                         subcommittees, upon written request                                       infrastructure”;
                         of the chair or ranking member                                          • is exempt from disclosure under
                         (though committees and staff are                                          FOIA; and
                         prohibited from disclosing this infor-                                  • does not simply give the location
                         mation except as required or author-                                      of the infrastructure.79
                         ized by law);75
                      • to other federal agencies for enforce-                                 The CEII program does not expand
                         ment of any law, or when relevant to                                  the scope of information exempt from
                         any proceeding under any law (but                                     FOIA, since it only applies to infor-
                         in either case must be managed “in                                    mation that already falls into a FOIA
                         such a manner as to preserve confi-                                   exemption (usually, the (b)(4) exemp-
                         dentiality to the extent practicable                                  tion for CBI). In fact, the purpose of
                         without impairing the proceed-                                        the CEII rules is actually to facilitate
                         ing”);76 or                                                           the limited, but not general, disclo-
                      • when the government determines it                                      sure of information that FERC could
                         is in the national interest to do so.77                               simply refuse to release to anyone.

       22 U.S.C. § 6744(a).
       Id. § 6713(g). BIS’s rules implementing these provisions are at 15 C.F.R. Part 718.
       22 U.S.C. § 6744(b)(1).
       Id. § 6744(b)(2).
       Id. § 6744(b)(3).
       Id. § 6744(b)(4).
       See 18 C.F.R. §§ 388.112 & .113
       Id. § 388.113(c)(1). FERC’s definition of “critical infrastructure” closely tracks the definition in DHS’s Critical Infrastructure
       Information Act rules. See note 91 infra.

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      P R I V A T E      S E C T O R      I N F O R M A T I O N         S H A R I N G      T A S K     F O R C E
              Under the rules, a person submitting                               like any other public information,
              information to FERC – whether vol-                                 except that it does not include it in its
              untarily or not – who believes its                                 online “Federal Energy Regulatory
              information qualifies as CEII must                                 Records Information System.”85
              file, along with the information, a
              statement justifying special treatment                         B. The Critical Infrastructure
              of the information.80 Persons who can                             Information Act
              substantiate why they need particular
              CEII (typically, to participate in a                               1. Background
              ratemaking or similar FERC proceed-
              ing involving the infrastructure in                                As the nation prepared for Y2K, the
              question) can be given access to it,                               federal government sought to per-
              provided they provide FERC with                                    suade computer-dependent “critical
              personally identifying information                                 infrastructures” like banking, telecom-
              and, at the discretion of FERC’s CEII                              munications and electric power to
              Coordinator, sign a nondisclosure                                  share information with it about their
              agreement.81 As with any FOIA                                      vulnerabilities and preparedness.
              request for CBI, FERC will provide
                                                                                 These sectors had expressed reluctance
              the submitter of information with five
                                                                                 about doing so, however, due to con-
              day’s notice of the request (in case the
                                                                                 cerns about release of information
              submitter wants to object) and five
                                                                                 under FOIA and state open records
              days notice of a decision to release (in
                                                                                 laws. The government’s need for such
              case the submitter wants to sue).82
                                                                                 information grew dramatically after
              The CEII rules do not require a per-
              son claiming CEII treatment for                                    9/11, and so legislation first drafted
              information to abide by any safe-                                  before that date found its way into the
              guarding or similar obligations.                                   Homeland Security Act.
              Presumably, if a CEII submitter made
              that information widely available,                                 The “Critical Infrastructure
              FERC would not protect it as CEII if                               Information Act of 2002” (CIIA)86
              someone later requested it.                                        attempts to encourage critical infra-
                                                                                 structure sectors to share security-
              Second, FERC has created the catego-                               related information with DHS by
              ry of “non-Internet public” informa-                               providing the information with an
              tion for “maps or diagrams that reveal                             unprecedented type of protection.
              the location of critical energy infra-                             While the CIIA merely required DHS
              structure . . . but do not rise to the                             to “establish uniform procedures” for
              level of CEII.”83 A submitter must                                 implementing it by February 2003,87
              request “non-Internet public” treat-                               DHS chose to go through rulemak-
              ment as it would CEII treatment.84                                 ing. As a result, final CIIA rules were
              FERC treats “non-Internet public”                                  not issued until a year later.88

  Id. § 388.112(b).
  Id. § 388.113(d)(2).
  Id. §§ 388.112(d), (e).
  Id. § 388.112(a)(3).
  Id. § 388.112(b)(1).
  Id. See 68 Fed. Reg. 46457 (Aug. 6, 2003).
  6 U.S.C. §§ 131-34.
  Id. § 133(e).
  69 Fed. Reg. 8074 (Feb. 20, 2004). The website for the PCII Program is

                                               H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y    A D V I S O R Y   C O U N C I L      67
                         P R I V A T E    S E C T O R    I N F O R M A T I O N      S H A R I N G    T A S K   F O R C E
                       As things are turning out, the very                                  2. Scope
                      protections offered, particularly crim-
                      inal liability for government employ-                                 The CIIA applies to “critical infra-
                      ees, have slowed implementation of                                    structure information” that is “volun-
                      the law,89 driven a very cautious                                     tarily” submitted to the “Protected
                      approach to implementation, and (as                                   Critical Infrastructure Information
                      a result) led many to question its use-                               (PCII) Program” at DHS/IAIP.
                      fulness. In view of the substantial                                      • “Critical infrastructure information”
                      protections the law offers, however,                                       basically means information not
                      business owners and operators should                                       customarily in the public domain
                      carefully consider seeking its protec-                                     regarding threats, vulnerabilities
                      tions in applicable situations.                                            and related problems or solutions
                                                                                                 affecting critical infrastructure or
                                                                                                 the physical or cyber resources that
                       The CIIA has engendered a small
                                                                                                 support it.90 “Critical infrastruc-
                      storm of controversy, but in the
                                                                                                 ture” is defined very obliquely in
                      author’s judgment its critics are either                                   the law and DHS’s rules,91 but the
                      mistaken or at least overwrought, as                                       President has identified about a
                      discussed below. Their criticisms are                                      dozen critical sectors, most of
                      all the more remarkable, moreover,                                         which are privately held.92
                      given how slowly the statute has been                                    • “Voluntarily” means not in
                      implemented and how little it is                                           response to DHS’s exercise of its
                      apparently being used.                                                     power to compel access to or sub-
                                                                                                 mission of the information.93

        A trade press article reported that DHS had received only six CII submissions in the first three months the program was
        operative. “Response slow to DHS protected info sharing,” GOVERNMENT COMPUTER NEWS, May 24, 2004.
        The full definition is “information not customarily in the public domain and related to the security of critical infrastructure or
        protected systems--
            (A) actual, potential, or threatened interference with, attack on, compromise of, or incapacitation of critical infrastructure
            or protected systems by either physical or computer-based attack or other similar conduct (including the misuse of or
            unauthorized access to all types of communications and data transmission systems) that violates Federal, State, or local
            law, harms interstate commerce of the United States, or threatens public health or safety;
            (B) the ability of any critical infrastructure or protected system to resist such interference, compromise, or incapacitation,
            including any planned or past assessment, projection, or estimate of the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or a
            protected system, including security testing, risk evaluation thereto, risk management planning, or risk audit; or
            (C) any planned or past operational problem or solution regarding critical infrastructure or protected systems, including
            repair, recovery, reconstruction, insurance, or continuity, to the extent it is related to such interference, compromise, or
         6 U.S.C. § 131(3). “Protected system--
            (A) means any service, physical or computer-based system, process, or procedure that directly or indirectly affects the
            viability of a facility of critical infrastructure; and
            (B) includes any physical or computer-based system, including a computer, computer system, computer or communica-
            tions network, or any component hardware or element thereof, software program, processing instructions, or information
            or data in transmission or storage therein, irrespective of the medium of transmission or storage.”
         Id. § 131(6).
       The statutory definition references the USA PATRIOT Act definition, which does not mention any industry by name. See 6
       U.S.C. § 101(4), referencing 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e). The CIIA rules define “critical infrastructure” as “systems and assets,
       whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the[ir] incapacity or destruction . . . would have a debilitating
       impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” 6
       C.F.R. § 29.2.
        They are: information technology; telecommunications; chemicals; transportation systems, including mass transit, aviation,
        maritime, ground/surface, and rail and pipeline systems; emergency services; postal and shipping; agriculture and food;
        public health and healthcare; drinking water and water treatment systems; energy, including oil and gas and electric power;
        banking and finance, the defense industrial base; and national monuments and icons. See HSPD/7, supra note 37, at 3-4.
        6 U.S.C. § 131(7)(A).

68    H O M E L A N D        S E C U R I T Y      A D V I S O R Y      C O U N C I L
      P R I V A T E     S E C T O R      I N F O R M A T I O N        S H A R I N G      T A S K    F O R C E
                  • The Homeland Security Act does                                       • Civil liability protection. If sub-
                    not give DHS any general power                                         mitted in “good faith,” the sub-
                    to do this, though various ele-                                        mitted information cannot itself
                    ments of DHS (e.g., the Coast                                          be used “directly” in any federal,
                    Guard) have that power.                                                state or local civil enforcement
                                                                                           action, or in any private civil law-
               The rules carefully distinguish                                             suit, in federal or state court. (It
               between “critical infrastructure infor-                                     could be used in a criminal
               mation” and “protected critical infra-                                      action.) Presumably, the same
               structure information” (PCII), but in                                       “information,” in the sense of
               the author’s view this distinction is                                       facts or data, could be used “indi-
               more confusing than helpful and is                                          rectly” in a governmental or pri-
               not perpetuated in this article.                                            vate civil case if the plaintiff
                                                                                           obtained the information inde-
              3. Information Protections                                                   pendently; i.e., in some way
                                                                                           besides getting it from DHS.96
              The law creates a variety of protections                                     (For example, a plaintiff may be
              applicable to critical infrastructure                                        able to obtain a copy of the same
              information that is submitted to DHS,                                        document, through discovery,
              including the identity of the submitter.                                     directly from the submitting
              (DHS is also applying these protec-                                          party.97 )
              tions to transmittal documents.) The                                       • No waiver of privilege. The sub-
              protections encompass:94                                                     mitter cannot be held, by the act
                                                                                           of submitting information, to
                  • FOIA exemption. The informa-                                           have waived any privileges or pro-
                    tion is exempt from disclosure                                         tections supplied to it by law
                    under FOIA. Criminal penalties                                         (e.g., attorney-client privilege,
                    are established for federal employ-                                    work-product doctrine, trade
                    ees who “knowingly” release the                                        secret protection).
                    information.95                                                       • Restrictions on sharing and use.
                  • Preemption of state and local open                                     DHS can share the information
                    records laws. The information is                                       within the federal government
                    also exempt from disclosure                                            and with state and local govern-
                    under any state or local ‘FOIA’ or                                     ment — and contractors working
                    “sunshine” laws.                                                       for them — but all of these enti-
                  • Ex parte exclusion. The informa-                                       ties can only use it for purposes
                    tion is not subject to disclosure                                      of:
                    by operation of any rules about                                            • infrastructure protection; or
                    “ex parte” communications with                                             • investigating or prosecuting
                    agency officials.                                                             crimes.

  All of these bullets are derived from 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1) unless otherwise noted. Explicitly (or, presumably, implicitly) all of
  these protections can be waived by the consent of the submitter. See note 111 infra.
  Id. § 133(f ).
   This is DOJ’s interpretation of the issue. See USDOJ, FOIA Post (2/27/94), available at
   2004foiapost6.htm (“What must be remembered is that the same industry information can exist in two counterpart forms,
   identical in whole or in part. . . .”).
   See note 123 infra and accompanying text.

                                                  H O M E L A N D        S E C U R I T Y      A D V I S O R Y      C O U N C I L      69
                           P R I V A T E     S E C T O R     I N F O R M A T I O N        S H A R I N G      T A S K    F O R C E
                   DHS can also give it to Congress or                                       • At present, information must be
                   the GAO, presumably upon request.                                           submitted in hard copy or on
                                                                                               tangible electronic media. E-mail
                   The CIIA rules also lay out detailed                                        and oral submission is not gener-
                   physical and procedural protections                                         ally allowed now, though such
                   regarding safeguarding of the informa-                                      “eSubmissions” capability is
                   tion.98 These protections do not apply                                      imminent, according to PCII
                   to information submitters, who remain                                       Program staff.102 DHS has
                   free to release or otherwise handle their                                   worked out an arrangement to
                   CII as they choose.99                                                       receive electronic data on a con-
                                                                                               tinuing basis from one critical
                   The CIIA was also intended to enable                                        sector.
                   members of a critical infrastructure                                      • DHS’s rules at present require infor-
                   sector to meet and share sensitive                                          mation to be submitted directly to
                   information frankly among themselves                                        the PCII Program; they do not
                   and with DHS, whether through                                               allow “indirect” submissions
                   Information Sharing & Analysis                                              through other components of DHS
                   Centers (ISACs) or otherwise. It does                                       or other federal agencies, though
                   so in two ways not further discussed in                                     DHS has stated its intent to allow
                   this article: an exemption from the                                         this in the future.103 Private entities
                   Federal Advisory Committee Act100                                           can submit information through an
                   and an oblique antitrust exemption.101                                      “information sharing and analysis
                   The author is unaware of either provi-                                      organization,” like an ISAC104
                   sion being relied upon to date.                                           • To be eligible for protection,
                                                                                               information must be accompa-
                   4. Implementation Issues                                                    nied by an “express statement”
                                                                                               referencing the CIIA.105
                    The Act and DHS’s rules establish a
                    complex and rigid process for submit-
                    ting and sharing CII:

        6 C.F.R. §§ 29.7, 29.8.
        As noted below (see note 112 infra and accompanying text), DHS will stop protecting CII if it becomes publicly available
        through legal means.
          Communication of critical infrastructure information to DHS does not trigger the Federal Advisory Committee Act. 6 U.S.C. §
          133(b). Thus groups of industry sector representatives could meet with DHS to communicate CII without becoming subject
          to the open meetings or other requirements of FACA. DHS does not seem to set much store by this provision, however. In
          part, the constricted process that DHS has created for accepting and “validating” CII has undercut its ability to use this
          FACA exemption.
         The CIIA does not explicitly create an exemption from the antitrust laws. However, it does provide an indirect means of
         accomplishing that goal via a reference to the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2158. See 6 U.S.C. §
         133(h). The DPA process is quite innovative, but also highly burdensome (in order to assure that the antitrust defense the
         DPA provides is not abused).
         69 Fed. Reg. 8077.
         Id. at 8075.
         6 U.S.C. § 131(7)(A).
         Written information must be marked with language “substantially similar to the following: ‘This information is voluntarily
         submitted to the Federal Government in expectation of protection from disclosure as provided by the provisions of the
         Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002.’” Id. § 133(a)(2). The statute allows oral information to be protected if such
         a written statement is provided within a reasonable period. Id.

70    H O M E L A N D        S E C U R I T Y     A D V I S O R Y      C O U N C I L
      P R I V A T E     S E C T O R     I N F O R M A T I O N        S H A R I N G     T A S K    F O R C E
                  • Once the information is submit-                                            does not require submitters to
                    ted, DHS reviews the informa-                                              “portion mark” the CII-candidate
                    tion and “validates” it as protect-                                        sections (as many agencies require
                    ed CII.106 (It protects the infor-                                         when people submit information
                    mation presumptively as CII                                                that is partially protected by other
                    pending that determination.)                                               FOIA exemptions — for exam-
                    DHS will notify the submitter of                                           ple, CBI). Rather, DHS will safe-
                    its determination. A source can                                            guard, and in the event of a FOIA
                    withdraw the information while                                             request withhold from disclosure,
                    the determination is pending.                                              the entire submission.109
                    DHS may ask the submitter for                                            • The default generally established
                    more information to substantiate                                           by the rules is that CII will be
                    its CII claim, in which case the                                           maintained within DHS. The
                    submitter has 30 days to respond.                                          rules authorize DHS to share CII
                    If DHS determines that the                                                 with other federal agencies, and
                    information does not qualify as                                            with state and local governments,
                    CII, DHS says it will, at the sub-                                         that agree to provide the informa-
                    mitter’s direction, either maintain                                        tion with the same degree of pro-
                    it without protection or destroy it                                        tection (state and local govern-
                    in accordance with the Federal                                             ments must sign a standard
                    Records Act.107 (But DHS will                                              memorandum of agreement to
                    not return the information to the                                          this effect).110

                    submitter at that point.)                                                • DHS is considering piloting a
                  • If DHS determines that informa-                                            process of “class” validations that
                    tion, though not qualifying as                                             could be issued in advance of any
                    CII, could be withheld under                                               particular submission and that
                    another FOIA exemption, it will                                            would then automatically apply
                    do so in response to a FOIA                                                to all submissions falling within
                    request.108 It may also retain (and                                        that class.
                    safeguard) information that it                                           • The CIIA and rules do not dis-
                    considers to be law enforcement                                            cuss scenarios under which DHS
                    sensitive or that it believes should                                       could share protected CII with
                    be classified. This latter assertion                                       any nongovernmental entity
                    of authority has worried some,                                             besides the submitter, even under
                    although it probably should not                                            a nondisclosure agreement, for
                    be surprising.                                                             purposes of critical infrastructure
                  • Where a submission contains                                                protection.111 While this may be
                    portions that qualify as CII and
                    portions that likely do not, DHS

    Unless otherwise noted, this bullet is drawn from 6 C.F.R. § 29.6(e).
    Under that act, destruction by agencies of records in their possession is governed by schedules promulgated by the National
    Archives & Records Administration. See 44 U.S.C. § 3303a.
    6 C.F.R. § 29.3(b).
    69 Fed. Reg. 8078. PCII Program staff informally encourage portion marking of CII in large submissions, but they do so to
    expedite the validation process, not because only the marked portions will be protected.
    6 C.F.R § 29.8(b).
   The statute and rules do, somewhat inconsistently, speak of the ability of CII to be disclosed with the consent of the sub-
   mitter (e.g., 6 U.S.C. §§ 133 (a)(1)(C), (D), & (E)(ii); 6 C.F.R. §§ 29.3(c), 29.8(d)(1), (f )(1)(i), (k)), but the rules never discuss
   the circumstances under which such consent might be sought. PCII Program staff generally express an intention never to
   disclose CII to nongovernmental entities for any purpose.

                                                     H O M E L A N D        S E C U R I T Y       A D V I S O R Y       C O U N C I L        71
                            P R I V A T E     S E C T O R       I N F O R M A T I O N         S H A R I N G      T A S K     F O R C E
                         reassuring for most purposes, it                                     or the statute that supposedly pre-
                         does limit the ability of DHS and                                    vents disclosure, but under the
                         critical infrastructure entities to                                  Administrative Procedure Act,114
                         work collaboratively. As discussed                                   which generally authorizes judicial
                         below, the rules regarding “sensitive                                review of any final agency action
                         security information” do contem-                                     not otherwise reviewable.115
                         plate such sharing and as a result
                         are potentially much more useful                                 The complexity of the foregoing
                         for public/private partnership.                                  process has undoubtedly discouraged
                                                                                          use of the statute. Also, DHS entities
                      • DHS will stop protecting CII if it                                who might ask private entities to pro-
                        determines that the information                                   vide them with information meeting
                        was customarily in the public                                     the definition of CII have generally
                        domain, was required by law to                                    failed to coordinate adequately with
                        be submitted to DHS, or “is pub-                                  the PCII Program Office, further lim-
                        licly available through legal                                     iting the statute’s use. The program’s
                        means.” (Presumably “is” means                                    rollout has been excruciatingly slow,
                        “is” and not “is capable of                                       with little apparent action throughout
                        becoming.”) DHS will inform                                       all of 2004. Finally, many potential
                        the submitter if it makes this                                    submitters remain unconvinced that
                        determination.112                                                 the statute really offers any protection
                      • The CIIA provides that “nothing                                   over and above what might already be
                        in this [Act] may be construed to                                 available under other authorities.
                        create a private right of action for                              This skepticism appears to be ground-
                        enforcement of any provision of                                   ed less in any identifiable shortcom-
                        this Act.”113 Whatever this lan-                                  ings of the law or rules than in two
                        guage means, it does not mean                                     consequences of the their novelty: the
                        that a submitter is prevented from                                lack of any judicial decisions uphold-
                        filing a lawsuit to block DHS                                     ing DHS decisions to withhold, and
                        from disclosing information that                                  lack of longstanding, personal trust
                        it has determined does not qualify                                relationships between would-be sub-
                        as CII. In establishing the right                                 mitters and DHS officials. Only time
                        to file analogous lawsuits to block                               can address these factors.
                        imminent disclosures under FOIA                                   Notwithstanding all of the above, in
                        (so-called “reverse FOIA” law-                                    the author’s view the CIIA, appropri-
                        suits), the Supreme Court made                                    ately implemented, remains a poten-
                        clear that the ability to file them                               tially powerful tool and one that
                        arises not as a result of some pri-                               potential submitters should consider
                        vate right of action under FOIA                                   thoughtfully.

        6 C.F.R. § 29.6(f ). The rules do not clearly explain what happens after DHS decides to stop protecting CII that it has former-
        ly been protecting. Arguably, it must follow the submitter’s prior instructions regarding destruction vs. maintenance subject
        to release under FOIA. Id. § 29.6(e). The DHS PCII PROCEDURES MANUAL (Feb. 17, 2004) says if the PCII Program con-
        cludes that a protected document did not really warrant protection at the time of the Program’s initial determination, the
        Program will ask the submitter what it should do with the information if it was never used. If the information has been
        used, the Program will simply stop protecting it. Id. at 6-5 to 6-6.
        6 U.S.C. § 134.
        Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293-94, 316-18 (1979). The Court expressly held that the statute assertedly blocking disclo-
        sure in that case –- the Trade Secrets Act –- did not afford a “private right of action,” but the Court nonetheless authorized
        judicial review under the APA. Id. at 316-18.
        See 5 U.S.C. § 704.

72    H O M E L A N D       S E C U R I T Y      A D V I S O R Y     C O U N C I L
      P R I V A T E    S E C T O R      I N F O R M A T I O N       S H A R I N G      T A S K    F O R C E
               5. No “Polluter Secrecy”                                                     the CIIA.120 Any information so
                                                                                            provided to those other agencies
               Partly as a result of its facial potential,                                  could be used by them in enforce-
               the CIIA has been roundly denounced                                          ment actions, since it would have
               by the open-government and environ-                                          been obtained independently of
               mental communities as “likely to                                             the CIIA.121
               cause excessive secrecy regarding                                          • Government access to information.
               information only tangentially related                                        Federal, state and local agencies
               to national security”116 and as possibly                                     will continue to have all their
               leading to “a radical reversal of com-                                       existing powers under other laws
               mon law tort liability and open gov-                                         to obtain records and other infor-
               ernment requirements.”117 Bills have                                         mation that regulated entities are
               been introduced in both the 108th                                            required to make available to
               and 109th Congresses that would                                              them.122 This would seem to
               substantially curtail it.118 These critics                                   include information that states or
               assert that its protections will allow                                       local agencies – but not the feder-
               organizations to hide embarrassing                                           al government – require to be
               information or worse. These claims                                           reported. Again, it would seem
               are generally wrong or hyperbolic, for                                       that these documents (and the
               the reasons discussed below, and sug-                                        information they contain) could
               gest that those involved are less con-                                       be used in enforcement actions
               cerned about the CIIA itself as they                                         because they were independently
               are about using the CIIA to make                                             obtained.
               larger political points.                                                   • Private access to information. While
                 • Continued requirements to report.                                        the issue is less clear, it appears that
                    Regulated entities must continue                                        private litigants also retain under the
                    to report to the Federal govern-                                        CIIA whatever powers they have
                    ment any information that they                                          under other authorities to obtain
                    are required to report under any                                        critical infrastructure information
                    other law.119 Information submit-                                       directly from submitters and to use
                    ted or relied upon for permitting                                       it in lawsuits.123
                    decisions or in regulatory pro-
                    ceedings is also not covered by

   Wells, supra note 5, at 1214.
   Rena Steinzor, “Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors: The Homeland Security Act and Corporate Accountability,” 12 KANSAS
   J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 641, 643 (Spring 2003).
   See S. 622, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005); S. 609, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003).
   6 U.S.C. § 133(d). The rules also clarify that submitters may not try to claim CII protections in required submissions they
   make to other agencies. See 6 C.F.R. § 29.3. The rules do allow DHS to treat a document as CII even when the same doc-
   ument is also submitted to one of other agencies (see the last sentence of § 29.3) — but those other agencies would not
   be bound by any CIIA prohibitions and could freely use that document in any otherwise authorized fashion, including releas-
   ing it publicly. See 6 U.S.C. § 133(c), 6 C.F.R. § 29.3(d).
    6 U.S.C. § 131(7)(B)(ii). The CIIA also does not protect information contained in registration statements filed with the SEC or
    federal banking regulators or in disclosures associated with the sale of securities. Id. § 131(7)(B)(i).
   Id. § 133(c).
    Id.; see also 6 C.F.R. § 29.3(d).
    That seems to be DHS’s interpretation of 6 U.S.C. §§ 133(c). See 6 C.F.R. § 29.3(d). If this is true, however, one wonders
    why Congress included the words “or any third party” in part of the CIIA that prohibits DHS, “any other Federal, State or
    local authority, or any third party” from “directly” using CII in any civil action (see 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1)(C)) — especially since
    non-governmental parties have no lawful way to obtain CII from any government entity. Perhaps this language captures the
    prospect of third parties obtaining CII accidentally or improperly.

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                           P R I V A T E     S E C T O R      I N F O R M A T I O N         S H A R I N G      T A S K    F O R C E
                       • Protections not applicable to public (or                        CII. Some have predicted that compa-
                         customarily public) information.                                nies might also assert PCII status as a rea-
                         Information that has already been                               son for not supplying information to
                         disclosed lawfully to the public can-                           other companies in transaction or in dis-
                         not be “pulled back” or otherwise                               covery, although in the latter case this
                         protected under the law.124                                     defense would seem unavailing.
                         Information that is “customarily in
                         the public domain” is also not pro-                               B. Sensitive Security Information
                       • Linkage to critical infrastructure. In                            1. Background
                         order to be eligible for the protec-
                         tions of the CIIA, DHS must deter-                                 In 1974, the Federal Aviation
                         mine (through the validation
                                                                                            Administration was given the power
                         process) that the information fits the
                         definition of “critical infrastructure                             to prohibit the disclosure of infor-
                         information.”                                                      mation that, if released, could jeop-
                       • Good faith requirement. For the civil                              ardize the safety of passengers in air
                         liability protections to apply, the                                transportation. This authority has
                         information must be submitted in                                   been revised and expanded twice
                         good faith.126 DHS dropped a pro-                                  since that date. At present, both
                         posal to make submitters certify that                              DOT and TSA have statutory
                         a submission was made in good                                      authority to issue regulations
                         faith, but DHS noted that false rep-                               “[n]otwithstanding [FOIA]” that
                         resentations to it are a federal                                   “prohibit[] disclosure of information
                         crime.127                                                          obtained or developed in ensuring
                       • Whistleblower protection. The CIIA
                                                                                            security” [DOT] or “in carrying out
                         rules clarify that the PCII program
                         does not supersede the                                             security” [TSA] under authorities
                         Whistleblower Protection Act,128                                   they administer, if the Secretary of
                         and thus federal employees can dis-                                Transportation or the Assistant
                         close CII without penalty if they                                  Secretary of Homeland Security for
                         reasonably believe it evidences,                                   Transportation Security
                         among other things, a specific dan-                                Administration decides that “disclos-
                         ger to public health or safety.129                                 ing the information would . . . reveal
                                                                                            a trade secret or privileged or confi-
                   Business groups have also raised concerns                                dential information; or . . . be detri-
                   about how the CIIA will affect business                                  mental to transportation safety”
                   transactions. For example, if company A                                  [DOT] or “transportation security”
                   wants information from company B,
                   company B might require company A to
                   agree not to submit that information as

        See 6 U.S.C. §§ 133(c); see also 6 C.F.R. § 29.6(f ).
        6 U.S.C. § 131(3).
        Id. § 133(a)(1)(C).
        See 69 Fed. Reg. 8077.
        5 U.S.C. § 1213.
        6 C.F.R. § 29.8(f )(3). This provision is evidently premised on a savings clause in the Homeland Security Act stating that
        nothing in that act (which includes the CIIA) overrides the Whistleblower Protection Act. See 6 U.S.C. § 463(2).
        See 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(s)(1) (TSA), 40119(b)(1) (DOT). While the DOT language refers to transportation “safety” rather than
        “security,” the difference is probably not legally significant. These two statutes also protect information the disclosure of
        which would “[b]e an unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Id. §§ 114(s)(1)(A), 40119(b)(1)(A).

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               The two agencies have jointly issued                                   one of these categories, it is automati-
               rules implementing this authority.131                                  cally SSI. Two of these categories are
               For reasons not worth discussing                                       not limited to aviation or maritime
               here, the current rules largely address                                transportation:
               aviation security (regulated by TSA)                                    • Vulnerability assessments . . . directed,
               and maritime security (regulated by                                        created, held, funded, or approved by
               the Coast Guard under the MTSA –                                           the DOT [or] DHS, or that will be
                                                                                          provided to DOT or DHS in sup-
               see Part IV.A.2 above). Land modes
                                                                                          port of a Federal security program.”133
               of transportation (e.g., rail and truck)                                • “Threat information. Any informa-
               are not expressly referenced in the                                        tion held by the Federal government
               rules, but a few of the rules are writ-                                    concerning threats against trans-
               ten so generally that they apply in                                        portation or transportation systems
               any transportation setting. (This is                                       and sources and methods used to
               TSA and DOT’s view, as well as the                                         gather or develop threat informa-
               author’s.) TSA and DOT intend to                                           tion, including threats against cyber
               propose amendments that will                                               infrastructure.”134
               expand these joint regulations to
               apply to all modes.                                                    The other categorical inclusions are
                                                                                      restricted to aviation and maritime
                The rules are substantially different                                 security. The rules list over a dozen,
                than the CII rules, both in scope
                                                                                       • “Security programs and contingency
                and operation.                                                            plans . . . issued, established,
                                                                                          required, received, or approved by
               2. Scope                                                                   DOT or DHS.” (“Security pro-
                                                                                          grams,” at least, are largely limited
               The rules have both general and partic-                                    to aviation and maritime
               ular applicability. In general, they track                                 operations.135 ) These specifically
               the statutes by defining “sensitive secu-                                  include vessel and maritime facility
               rity information” as “information                                          security plans.136
               obtained or developed in the conduct                                    • “Security inspection or investigative
               of security activities, including research                                 information . . . . Details of any secu-
               and development, the disclosure of                                         rity inspection or investigation of an
               which TSA [or the Secretary of DOT]                                        alleged violation of aviation or mar-
               has determined would . . . [r]eveal trade                                  itime transportation security require-
                                                                                          ments of Federal law that could
               secrets or privileged or confidential
                                                                                          reveal a security vulnerability . . . .”137
               information obtained from any person;                                   • “Security measures. Specific details of
               or . . . be detrimental to the security [or                                aviation or maritime transportation
               safety] of transportation.”132                                             security measures, both operational
                                                                                          and technical, whether applied
               The rules also identify several ‘categori-                                 directly by the Federal government
               cal inclusions’ – if information falls into                                or another person . . . .”138
   49 C.F.R. Parts 15 (DOT) and 1520 (TSA), published at 69 Fed. Reg. 28066 (May 18, 2004).
   49 C.F.R. §§ 15.5(a)(2) & (3), 1520.5(a) (2) & (3). As with the statutes authorizing the rules, the regulatory definition of SSI
   also generally includes information the disclosure of which would “[c]onstitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Id. §§
   15.5(a)(1), 1520.5(a)(1).
   Id. §§ 15.5(b)(5), 1520.5(b)(5) (emphasis in original).
   Id. §§ 15.5(b)(7), 1520.5(b)(7) (emphasis in original).
   Id. §§ 15.3, 1520.3. They also include “transportation-related automated system[s] or network[s] for information processing,
   control and communications.” Id.
   Id. §§ 15.5(b)(1), 1520.5(b)(1) (emphasis in original).
   Id. §§ 15.5(b)(6), 1520.5(b)(6) (emphasis in original).
   Id. §§ 15.5(b)(8), 1520.5(b)(8) (emphasis in original).

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                           P R I V A T E    S E C T O R      I N F O R M A T I O N        S H A R I N G      T A S K    F O R C E
                       • “Security training materials. Records                            3. Operation
                         created or obtained for the purpose
                         of training persons employed by,                                   a. SSI is partially self-implementing
                         contracted with, or acting for the
                         Federal government or another per-                                      As noted above, the SSI rules
                         son to carry out any aviation or                                        define over a dozen categories of
                         maritime transportation security                                        information that are automatically
                         measures required or recommended
                                                                                                 SSI. As a result, information that
                         by DHS or DOT.”139
                       • “Critical aviation or maritime infra-                                   clearly falls into these categories is
                          structure asset information. Any list                                  SSI by definition, and qualifies for
                          identifying systems or assets,                                         automatic protection. Information
                          whether physical or virtual, so vital                                  not falling in these categories can
                          to the aviation or maritime trans-                                     be SSI if DOT or TSA determines
                          portation system that the incapacity                                   that it meets the statutory criteria
                          or destruction of such assets would                                    for SSI; i.e., that improper disclo-
                          have a debilitating impact on trans-                                   sure of the information would be
                          portation security, if the list is —                                   detrimental to transportation secu-
                                (i) Prepared by DHS or DOT;                                      rity. (Note: The DHS rules speak
                                    or                                                           of TSA making these determina-
                                (ii) Prepared by a State or local                                tions on behalf of DHS, but in
                                     government agency and sub-                                  practice the Coast Guard can and
                                     mitted by the agency to
                                                                                                 does make SSI determinations as
                                     DHS or DOT.”140
                       • “Trade secret information . . . and                                     well.)144
                          [c]ommercial or financial information
                          . . . obtained by DHS or DOT in                                   b. SSI can be submitted voluntarily to
                          carrying out aviation or maritime                                    the federal government
                          transportation security responsibili-
                          ties, but only if the source of the                                    The preamble to the SSI rules
                          information does not customarily                                       attempts to distinguish the CII
                          disclose it to the public.”141                                         rules by saying that SSI “for the
                                                                                                 most part . . . is created by TSA or
                   The rules authorize DOT or DHS to                                             the Coast Guard or is required to
                   determine that information has                                                be submitted to” the federal gov-
                   stopped meeting the definition of                                             ernment, and that “information
                   SSI.142 Even more interesting, the rules                                      constituting SSI generally is not
                   enable either of these agencies to deter-
                                                                                                 voluntarily submitted . . . .”144
                   mine that information is not SSI, even
                   though it appears to fall into one of                                         While these statements may be
                   the categorical inclusions listed above,                                      true in part, it is also true that
                   if it concludes that the information                                          information constituting SSI can
                   the information may be released in                                            be, and has been, submitted vol-
                   the interest of public safety or in fur-                                      untarily to DOT or DHS. And
                   therance of transportation security.143                                       the SSI rules do not prohibit this.146
         Id. §§ 15.5(b)(10), 1520.5(b)(10) (emphasis in original).
         Id. §§ 15.5(b)(12), 1520.5(b)(12) (emphasis in original).
        Id. §§ 15.5(b)(14), 1520.5(b)(14) (emphasis in original).
         Id. §§ 15.5(c), 1520.5(c).
         Id. §§ 15.5(b), 1520.5(b).
         As noted in Part IV.A.2 above, the Coast Guard has its own independent statutory authority to protect MTSA-related informa-
         tion, but uses the SSI rules to implement that authority.
         69 Fed. Reg. 28069.
         The rules do provide that if information is properly submitted to the PCII Program and validated as PCII, the more restrictive
         CII rules will apply, even if the information also qualifies as SSI. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 15.10(d), 1520.10(d).

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                 c. Persons able to obtain SSI                                        In any case, access to specific SSI is
                                                                                      limited to persons with a “need to
                    The SSI rules have been pur-                                      know” that SSI. Under the SSI rules,
                    posefully designed to facilitate                                  these include the following private
                    the protection by the federal                                     sector actors:
                    government of privately-held or                                     • persons carrying out, in training
                    operated activities such as com-                                      to carry out, or supervising, any
                    mercial aviation and maritime                                         transportation security activities
                    commerce. As a result, the rules                                      approved, accepted, funded, rec-
                    allow DOT and DHS to make                                             ommended or directed by DHS
                    SSI available to the relevant                                         or DOT;
                    players in these areas. In the                                      • persons providing technical or
                    maritime security context, these                                      legal advice to a covered person
                    “covered persons” include:                                            regarding any federal transporta-
                        • owners, operators and char-                                     tion security requirements; and
                          terers of vessels required to                                 • persons representing covered per-
                          have a security plan;                                           sons in connection with any judi-
                                                                                          cial or administrative proceeding
                        • owners and operators of
                                                                                          regarding those requirements.149
                          facilities required to have a
                          security plan;
                                                                                      Federal employees can have access to SSI
                        • persons participating on
                                                                                      whenever it is necessary for performance
                          national, area or port securi-
                                                                                      of the employee’s official duties. Federal
                          ty committees;
                                                                                      contractors and grantees can have access
                        • industry trade associations                                 if it is necessary to performance of the
                          representing the foregoing (if                              contract or grant.150
                          they have entered into a non-
                          disclosure agreement with                                   d. The SSI rules bind private persons
                          DOT or DHS);
                        • DHS and DOT; and                                             Like the procedures for classified infor-
                        • persons employed by, con-                                    mation, but unlike all the other infor-
                          tracted to or acting for any                                 mation protection authorities discussed
                          of the above.147                                             in this article, the SSI rules impose
                                                                                       obligations on private sector persons
                 Apart from transportation mode, the                                   who possess SSI — including the per-
                 rules also provide that SSI can be                                    sons who generate the information in
                 made available to any person for                                      the first place. These include:
                 whom a vulnerability assessment has                                   • Taking reasonable steps to safeguard
                 been “directed, created, held, funded,                                  it from unauthorized disclosure (this
                 or approved by DHS or DOT,” or                                          includes storage in a secure contain-
                 who provides an assessment to either                                    er, such as a locked desk or file cabi-
                 department.148                                                          net or in a locked room);

   See 49 C.F.R. §§ 15.7(c), (d), (f ), (g), (h) & (k), 1520.7(c), (d), (f ), (g), (h) & (k).
   See 49 C.F.R. §§ 15.7(l), 1520.7(l).
   See 49 C.F.R. §§ 15.11(a), 1520.11(a). These two subsections originally spoke only of aviation and maritime activities, see 69
   Fed. Reg. 28081, 28084-85, but that restriction was eliminated through a technical amendment, see 70 Fed. Reg. 1379 (Jan.
   7, 2005).
   See 49 C.F.R. §§ 15.11(b), 1520.11(b).

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                          P R I V A T E    S E C T O R     I N F O R M A T I O N       S H A R I N G      T A S K    F O R C E
                              • Disclosing it only to covered                    CONCLUSION
                                persons who have a need to                           Security-related information supplied by a busi-
                                know, unless otherwise author-                   ness to a federal executive branch agency may be
                                ized in writing by TSA, the                      protected from public release under a number of
                                Coast Guard or the Secretary                     FOIA exemptions, as well as one or more other
                                of DOT;                                          statutes or regulations, depending on the type of
                              • Complying with marking                           business, the subject matter of the information, the
                                requirements; and                                reason it was prepared, the agency to which it was
                              • Reporting unauthorized dis-                      submitted, whether it was submitted voluntarily,
                                closures to the applicable                       and a host of other factors. DOT/TSA “sensitive
                                DOT or DHS component.151                         security information” rules impose obligations on
                                                                                 submitters regarding their handling of the same
                             Many have complained that the                       information. A number of authorities envision
                             marking requirements are overly                     controlled sharing of information between the fed-
                             burdensome, as they require a                       eral government, on the one hand, and state and
                             lengthy footer for every page.152                   local governments and similarly-situated private
                             TSA and DOT have indicated that                     entities, on the other – a relatively unusual concept
                             they may relax this requirement in                  but one that can be valuable in promoting protec-
                             a forthcoming rulemaking.                           tion of private infrastructure.
                             The rules provide that violations                      Several of the potentially applicable authorities
                             of the SSI rules by private actors                  provide an unprecedented level of protection for
                             are “grounds for a civil penalty                    private information in government hands. How
                             and other enforcement or correc-                    well these protections will work, and in particular
                             tive action” by the relevant                        how courts will interpret them, remains to be seen.
                             agency. Notably, each agency                        To effectively secure the nation’s private critical
                             with authority regarding SSI is                     infrastructure, it will be crucial that all involved
                             responsible for policing the SSI                    parties work together to maximize the effectiveness
                             rules. So, for example, the Coast                   of these legal measures. This work will require rec-
                             Guard interprets and enforces                       onciliation of three competing goals: (a) protecting
                             compliance with the SSI rules at                    sensitive information from public release; (b) shar-
                             MTSA-regulated facilities.                          ing sensitive information, where appropriate,
                                                                                 among the relevant public and private entities, and
                                                                                 (c) ensuring that the first two goals do not lead to
                                                                                 unnecessary withholding of truly nonsensitive and
                                                                                 properly public information.

   See 49 C.F.R. §§ 15.9(a)(1), (2), (4) & (c), 1520.11(a)(1), (2), (4) & (c).
   See 49 C.F.R. §§ 15.13(c), 1520.13(c).
   See 49 C.F.R. §§ 15.17, 1520.17.

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Attachment D
1. Cyber Threats to U.S. Infrastructure

2. Terrorism

3. Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction
         1. Biological Weapons (BW) and dual-use or controlled technology transfers
         2. Criminal, terrorist, and foreign government BW research and development capabilities, programs
            and infrastructure
         3. Methods of finance and exchange and transfer networks

4. Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction
       1. Chemical Weapons (CW) and dual-use or controlled technology transfers
       2. Criminal, terrorist, and foreign government CW research and development capabilities, programs
          and infrastructure
       3. Methods of finance and exchange and transfer networks

5. Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction
        1. Nuclear Weapons and dual-use or controlled technology transfers
        2. Criminal, terrorist, and foreign government nuclear weapons research and development capabilities,
           programs and infrastructure
        3. Methods of finance and exchange and transfer networks

6. International Organized Crime
         1. Alien smuggling and human trafficking
         2. Money laundering and financial transactions in support of illegal activities
         3. Other crime with homeland security implications, i.e. conspiracy with terrorists, illegal arms
            trafficking, explosives theft

7. Illicit Drugs
           1. Production, storage, movement and transfer of illicit and illegal drugs, and precursor materials and

8. Economic Stability and Trade
        1. Efforts to circumvent U.S. restrictions on the trade of controlled technologies, equipment,
           munitions and dual-use items

9. Energy Security
        1. Indications and warnings of targeting or attacks on U.S. energy infrastructure

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                       P R I V A T E   S E C T O R    I N F O R M A T I O N    S H A R I N G    T A S K   F O R C E
     10. Money Laundering
            1. Financial transactions in support of criminal activities, terrorism, drug trafficking, rogue states and

     11. Demographics, Migration, and Population Movements
            1. Immigration pressures on governments
            2. Identity, origins, locations and characteristics of refugee and migrant groups
            3. Surging population growth
            4. Foreign governments reactions and policies toward such groups

     12. Environmental and Natural Resources
             1. Production, development, transport, and consumption of strategic natural resources, especially oil
                and natural gas and resources
             2. Production, release, illicit sale and disposal of pollutants and hazardous materials including their
                potential human health effects

     13. Agriculture and Food Security
             1. Infectious disease of crops and domesticated animals
             2. Research, development, testing and development of agriculture and food science technologies,
                including genetically
                modified organisms

     14. Infectious Disease and Health
              1. Location and status of infectious diseases that threaten U.S. national security, economic interests

     15. Humanitarian Disaster and Relief

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