Investment

Today’s Lecture Rules of Thumb Firm Valuation TIP If you do not understand something, ask me! Rules of Thumb  We will look at two typically used rules of thumb  Hurdle rates  Profitability Index 2 Fixing an arbitrary threshold  Consider the option to invest in a project with no operating cost that costs I.  Assume the decision to invest is made when the value of the project hits VA  Then the value of the option is V  W (V ,VA )  (VA  I )    VA   3 Effect of Mistakes  Since the shape of the curve is flat near the optimal, small mistakes do not have much effect.  Investing too early is more costly than investing too late. 4 Hurdle Rate Rule  This rule says invest whenever the NPV of the project is positive for discount rate γ. 5 Profitability Index  Invest whenever the ratio of the NPV of the project over the initial investment is greater than Π 6 The Idea  Model the firm as  Collection of ongoing projects  Options to invest in new projects --- Growth  Stochastic Interest Rate  Vasicek model 7 The Firm  Consists of a continuously evolving portfolio of projects.  Thus, the risk of the firm as a whole evolves as projects evolve.  Projects require an initial investment, I, and provide cash flows for a random amount of time.  Projects disappear randomly and independently of everything in the economy 8 Project Cashflow (while alive) Ci (t )  Ie 1  2   ( t ) C2 i i i  IID series of cashflows  It can be thought of as the optimal investment level (that results from an unmodeled optimization problem). 9 Expected Cash Flow of the Firm  Let j(t) be an indicator function describing whether the project taken on at time j is alive at time t, then the expected cash flow of the firm as a whole is t t C t i i i i 1 i 1  b(t) has a natural interpretation as the book value of assets. E  C (t  1)  (t  1)   e  I  (t ) 10   e b(t ) C Growth  Each period the firm has an option to undertake a one time investment in a project (i.e., invest I and receive the cashflow C(t) so long as the project is alive.)  The firm only under takes the investment if it has positive NPV.  The firm effectively owns a series of options. 11 Pricing  The price at date t of any cashflow C(T) is given by  z (T )  Et  C (T )  z (t )   where z(t  1)  z(t )e 1  2   ( t 1)  r (t ) 2 z z  Evolution of the short rate r(t) is given by the Vasicek model. 12 Vasicek Model (Discrete Time)  The evolution of the short rate is r (t  1)   r (t )  (1   )r   r (t  1) with  zr   r z cov( (t ), (t )) 13 Risk of an Individual Project The risk of a project's cash flows is given by its “beta:” i   i z cov( (t ),  i (t ))  is assumed to be drawn from a distribution F independent of everything else in the model. 14 Value of the jth Ongoing Project   z ( s) V j (t )  Et   C j (s)  j (s)   s t 1 z (t )   15 Consider a Particular Term  z ( s)  Et  C j (s)  j ( s)   z (t )   s t Ie C  j B( s  t , r (t )) 16 Summing over all terms gives V j (t )  Ie  Ie C  j s t 1 C  j   s t B( s  t , r (t )) D(r (t )) where D(r(t)) is the price of a declining perpetuity. 17 So what is the value of all ongoing projects?  To do this we need to keep track of which projects are alive.  If the project that arrives at time t is taken on we set t(t)=1 otherwise we set t(t)= 0  If the project at time t is alive at some later time  we set t()= 1 otherwise we set t()= 0  Then the value of all ongoing projects is just the sum over all projects that are alive 18 Value of all ongoing projects V  t    Ie j 0 t C  j D (r (t ))  j (t ) t  b(t )e D (r (t )) C j 0 I  j (t ) b(t ) e  j where  b(t )e t j 0 C   (t ) D(r (t )) e  j 19  (t )   ln  I  j (t ) b(t ) What affects the value of ongoing projects  Value changes as old projects die or new projects are added 20 Let’s keep track of the important assumptions  Each project has constant risk  Each project as constant expected cashflow --- no growth  So where is the growth coming from  addition of new projects  why does this make sense?  Risk changes as projects die or are added 21 Value of Growth Opportunities  The firm will therefore invest whenever the NPV of the investment is positive: Vt  t   I  Ie C  t D(r (t ))  I D(r (t ))  1  0   The initial investment merely determines the scale of the project.  Whether the NPV is positive is determined by the project's riskiness or beta.  I e  C  t 22 The Intuition  If we condition on beta, then these options are simply bond options, i.e.,  the strike is the interest rate for which the invest opportunity has zero NPV  it is in the money of lower interest rates and out of the money for higher interest rates  These options can be priced explicitly in the Vasicek model.  So price em and add em up! 23 Value of Growth Options  Evaluating all such growth options provides V (t )  I (t )e J (r (t )) * c * where J*(r(t)) is the value of the portfolio of bond options. 24 Value of the firm  Summing the value of ongoing projects and the value of growth opportunities give the current value of the firm: C   (t ) P  t   b(t )e D (r (t )) c *  I (t )e J ( r (t ))  Note how interest rates affect value in two distinct ways:  discount rate  set of positive NPV investments. 25 Expected Return (or discount rate) of the firm  To compute the expected return we need to compute the expected price and cashflow one period hence.  For simplicity we will denote the expectation of any function (one period hence) with a subscript “e”.  For example, the expected price of the default consol bond is denoted: De (r (t ))  Et  D(r (t  1)) 26 Expected Return as a function of  E 1  Rt 1    b (t ) I 1  De (r (t ))e   J (r (t ))   b (t )   (t ) *  J (r (t )) I D ( r (t ))e * e 27   (t ) Limits lim Et 1  Rt 1    1  De (r (t ))e  D(r (t ))e * e *   (t ) b ( t )    (t )   J (r (t )) lim Et 1  Rt 1   b ( t ) 0 J (r (t ))  In general these two limits are not the same, they vary in time.  This implies a physical size effect  Sign depends on r(t). 28 Testability  The above expression for the price is untestable because it requires measuring the firms beta. Beta is unmeasurable because:  The pricing kernel is unobservable  Even if the kernel was observable, the firm's beta is the weighted average of all its projects and individual projects are not observable.  Luckily an expression for the expected return can be derived entirely in terms of observables. 29 Expected Return as a function of Fundamentals  De (r (t )) C  b(t )  E 1  Rt 1   e   D(r (t ))  P(t )   *  De (r (t ))   I  *  e  J e (r (t ))  J (r (t ))   P(t )  D(r (t ))     C 30 Expected Return with constant interest rates 1   e  1 b(t ) E  Rt 1     1   e K r  p(t )  1  e  p(t ) Constant r C Capital Depreciation Constant x B/M Current Projects Constant x 1/size Growth  This is the Fama-French regression equation! 31 Growth vrs Value  One implication of this work is that the current characterization of growth and value stocks is misguided  B/M is a measure of current assets more than a measure of growth  A better measure might be the coefficient on 1/size. 32 Empirical Performance of this model  The model is too new for a full empirical study  However, since the model does predict a relation that is already been documented, we know that the must be some empirical validity  This is also a problem --- how do we know that the empirical effect is consistent with the model 33 Numerical Assumptions  Distribution of : F ( x)  e  x *      *      Parameters are set by satisfying the following two conditions:  1 in 10 projects are taken on when r(t)=0  1 in 20 projects are taken on when r(t)= r=7.4% 34 Parameter Values 35 Beta Coef . Prob . 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 Fama- French 1 0.5 Beta -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 36 MV A: Coefficient FF - 0.2 - 0.1 0 0.1 37 MV and B/M BM MV -0.0359 0.028 0.383 0.802 -0.042 -0.11 -0.18 -0.25 -0.32 -0.39 1.22 1.64 2.06 2.48 10 Coef. Prob. 5 Fama- French 0 38 MV and Beta Beta 0.11 -0.375 -0.278 MV -0.181 0.049 -0.0838 0.0134 -0.011 0.111 -0.071 -0.13 -0.19 0.208 2 Coef. Prob. 1 Fama- French 0 39 Momentum 0.5 1. 0.75 0 - 0.25 0.5 - 0.5 - 0.75 0.25 - 1 0 5 10 15 Horizon y ears H L 0 25 30 20 40 F ra c t i o n o f P ro j e c t s S u rv i v i n g 0.25 P a y o ff $ H L

Related docs
Growth and investment
Views: 272  |  Downloads: 48
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES
Views: 7  |  Downloads: 0
INVESTMENT POLICY
Views: 6  |  Downloads: 0
investment portfolio
Views: 4  |  Downloads: 0
Investment Administrators
Views: 1  |  Downloads: 0
Investment Property
Views: 50  |  Downloads: 0
investment banking
Views: 60  |  Downloads: 16
Return on Investment
Views: 755  |  Downloads: 25
Investment Banking
Views: 125  |  Downloads: 17
Investment_
Views: 10  |  Downloads: 2
Investment
Views: 5  |  Downloads: 0
INVESTMENT
Views: 5  |  Downloads: 0
INVESTMENT-COMMITTEE
Views: 0  |  Downloads: 0
Other docs by RodneySo'oialo
Dirty Joke Doc I Got A Problem
Views: 2746  |  Downloads: 14
Board Resolution Declaring Dividends
Views: 332  |  Downloads: 2
Motion To Dismiss
Views: 446  |  Downloads: 10
Notice Calling Meeting of Board of Directors
Views: 256  |  Downloads: 6
Batmobile Side
Views: 578  |  Downloads: 6
Standard Form 18 Request for Quotation
Views: 602  |  Downloads: 21
Bay Area Multimedia Inc Ammendments and By laws
Views: 151  |  Downloads: 0