Dylan B by RodneySooialo


									Curriculum Vitae                                                            Dylan B. Minor


                             Haas School of Business/ UC Berkeley
                                        2220 Piedmont Ave
                                        Berkeley, CA 94720


                      PhD Business Administration, UC Berkeley (current)

                           MS Business Administration, UC Berkeley

              BA Mathematics/ Economics (summa cum laude), UC Santa Barbara


                                       Research Interests:

 Behavioral Economics, Economics of Organizations, Contract Theory, and Corporate Finance.
  In particular, applications to market and non market strategy, corporate social responsibility,
                               corporate governance, and corruption.

                                        Working Papers:

  Do All Markets Ultimately Tip? Experimental Evidence (with Tanjim Hossain and John
Platform competition is ubiquitous, yet its outcome is little understood. Theory models typically
suffer from equilibrium multiplicity; platforms might coexist or the market might tip to either
platform. We use controlled laboratory experiments to study the dynamics of tipping in a class of
games that includes both markets with homogeneous and differentiated platforms. Our main
findings are: (1) Even when platform coexistence is theoretically possible, the markets inevitably
tip to a single platform; and (2) Even though tipping to either platform is theoretically possible,
consistently the markets ultimately converge to the Pareto superior platform.

                      CSR as Reputation Insurance: Theory and Evidence
There are over 100 studies attempting to relate corporate social responsibility (CSR) to firm
financial performance. Generally, little relation has been found. This presents a puzzle: why do
firms invest in a costly activity that does not seem to provide financial benefit? We posit CSR is
being used as a reputation insurance mechanism, helping firms better withstand the tumult of
negative business shocks. We formally model this conjecture and find although firms are ex-ante

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identical, in equilibrium we witness a mixture of high and low type CSR firms. High types
experience events less often and have less adverse changes in firm value, enjoying an
"insurance" benefit for their investment in higher CSR. Also similar to insurance, the classic
insured moral hazard problem persists: high types exhibit higher levels of negligence, not being
as careful as the "uninsured" low types. Nonetheless, the increased negligence is slight enough
where the low types still face events more often.
We empirically test these predictions under the setting of product markets. We find high type
firms experience events significantly less often than low type firms. In addition, high type firms
do indeed experience a lesser change in firm value: we find an increased standard deviation of
CSR reputation tends to save close to $200 million of firm value after a product recall.
However, we find disingenuous CSR slashes the median firm value by some $1 billion. If
actuarially fair, CSR insurance carries a premium of roughly $5 million per annum per unit of
increased CSR reputation.

               When Second Best is Best: On the Optimality of Larger 2nd Prizes
Contests are ubiquitous; from a true tournament to auctions, from competing employees to
competing firms, much can be cast as a contest. Consequently, there has been much literature
examining the optimal design of contests. Interestingly, few studies have considered the role of
convex costs or designer concave benefits, which is how we mostly model many real world
applications found in a contest setting. We show under such a setting, it is often best to offer a
larger second over first prize. However, in such a contest, non-monotonicities emerge, for which
we propose a solution. We then examine just when it is better to offer a larger second prize. We
also consider the setting of indivisible prizes, finding it is almost always best to offer a sole
second over a sole first prize. Finally, we provide some applications ranging from regulation to

Minor, Dylan. “Finding the [Financial] Cost of Socially Responsible Investing.” The Journal of
Investing, Fall 2007.
Socially responsible investing (SRI) is an increasingly important investment issue, gaining
popularity among both institutional and individual investors. In the past, SRI research has
almost exclusively focused on whether or not there is a financial "cost" in SRI. With rare
exception, no material cost has been observed. We find if we examine SRI in terms of total costs
and benefits (i.e., financial and social), there may not be a cost, but when considering only
financial cost, there must be a cost in SRI. We examine several economic principles that require
such cost, and estimate what this cost might be. Finally, we address why we have not "seen" a
financial cost in SRI thus far.

Minor, Dylan. “Transcending the Active/Passive Debate.” The Journal of Investing, Winter
We expose some common fallacies of index investing and show how strategically including index
and active funds can yield greater risk adjusted performance than using either type exclusively
via optimization techniques.

Minor, Dylan. “To Catch a Thief II.” The Journal of Investment Consulting, Summer 2003.

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We extend the previous study to include using the Capture Ratio for all major asset classes of
institutional money managers.

Minor, Dylan and Collette Barr. “To Catch a Thief.” The Journal of Investment Consulting,
Winter 2001.
We empirically examine using the Capture Ratio to select mutual funds ex-ante for ex-post
superior performance.

Minor, Dylan. “Beware of Index Fund Fundamentalists.” The Journal of Portfolio
Management, Summer 2001.
We compare the efficacy of using index verses actively managed funds.

                                    Teaching Experience

MBA 201A: Economics for Business Decision Making (core MBA class)

CPE for Attorneys and CPAs

                                  Professional Experience

NeunuebelMinor of Wachovia Securities
Santa Barbara, California
                                                        First Vice President, Investment Officer

Morgan Stanley (formerly Dean Witter Reynolds)
Santa Barbara, California
                                                                    Vice President, Investments

                                   Professional Education

Wharton Business School, University of Pennsylvania                                        1999
Philadelphia, PA
       Certified Investment Management Analyst (CIMA) executive education program

American College                                                                    1995-1997
Bryn Mawr, PA
       Certified Financial Planner License (CFP), Chartered Financial Consultant (ChFC), and
Chartered Life Underwriter (CLU) executive education programs

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American Economics Association

American Finance Association

Financial Planning Association


Investment Management Consultants Association


Family, tennis, food and wine, running and cycling, film (contemporary), music (listening and
performing), art (neo-impressionism and cubism), humor, reading, and Christianity.

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