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West Coast Free Evidence
WMD Topic Part 2
NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN RUSSIA ENDANGER US ...........................................................................................3
  THE COLLAPSE OF RUSSIA’S CONTROL OF WEAPONS IS DANGEROUS ..................................................3
  RUSSIAN MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COLLAPSE THREATENS LOOSE NUKES ...........................................4
  THE RISK OF AN ACCIDENT IS HIGH ................................................................................................................5
  PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES RISK AN ACCIDENT .............................................................................................6
  RUSSIAN NUCLEAR MATERIAL WILL BE DIVERTED TO ROGUE STATES...............................................7
  RUSSIAN NUCLEAR LEAKAGE IS THE KEY PROLIFERATION THREAT ...................................................8
  THE RISK FROM RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS AT ITS GREATEST LEVEL .......................................9
  THE RISK FROM RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS AT ITS GREATEST LEVEL .......................................9
  PROLIFERATION IS DISASTROUS .................................................................................................................... 10
  NUCLEAR SMUGGLING IS A HIGH RISK ........................................................................................................ 11
  TERRORISTS WILL USE MATERIALS TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ............................................. 12
  THE U.S. IS VULNERABLE TO NUCLEAR TERRORISM ................................................................................ 13
  THE HABIGER REPORT IS OVERLY OPTIMISTIC .......................................................................................... 14
  DE-ALERTING WEAPONS IS CRITICAL TO GLOBAL SECURITY ............................................................... 15
  ABANDONING ACTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS WOULD BE BENEFICIAL .................................. 16
  ACTIVE DEPLOYMENT IS UNNECESSARY TO MAINTAIN A DETERRENT ............................................. 16
  A NO-FIRST-USE POLICY WOULD INCREASE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ......................................... 17
  ELIMINATING FORWARD DEPLOYED NUCLEAR FORCES IS IMPORTANT ............................................ 18
  EFFECTIVE MONITORING TECHNOLOGIES AND VERIFICATION ARE POSSIBLE ................................ 18
  THE CISAC IS A HIGHLY QUALIFIED BODY .................................................................................................. 19
NUCLEAR STIGMA DISADVANTAGE ANSWERS .............................................................................................. 20
  WE MUST MOVE AWAY FROM THE COLD WAR DETERRENCE NOTION ............................................... 20
  REDUCING OUR AGGRESSIVE STANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS BEST ........................................... 21
  DETERRENCE AGAINST TERRORISM IS POINTLESS ................................................................................... 21
  THE U.S. CAN DEAL WITH THREATS EVEN WITH MASSIVE CUTS .......................................................... 22
THREAT CONSTRUCTION KRITIK SHELL .......................................................................................................... 23
  THREAT CONSTRUCTIONS ARE NOT OBJECTIVE, THEY ARE LINGUISTIC........................................... 24
  THREATS ARE CREATED AS A FUNCTION OF IDENTITY SOLIDIFICATION .......................................... 25
  RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE SECURE ............................................................................................... 26
  THE TERRORIST THREAT IS MINIMAL ........................................................................................................... 27
  THE DIVERSION RISK IS MINIMAL.................................................................................................................. 28
  RUSSIA IS NOT A MILITARY THREAT ............................................................................................................ 29
  THE RISK OF ACCIDENTS AND MISCALCULATION IS LOW...................................................................... 30
  THE RISK FROM RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES IS DECLINING .................................................................. 31
  RISK OF ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH IS MINIMAL ............................................................................................... 32
  RUSSIAN WEAPONS ARE UNDER CONTROL................................................................................................. 33
  NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE EMPIRICALLY DETERRED CONFLICT ........................................................ 34
  NUCLEAR WEAPONS DETER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION .......................................................... 35
  NUCLEAR WEAPONS DETER CBW PROLIFERATION .................................................................................. 36
  BALLISTIC MISSILES THREATEN THE U.S. ................................................................................................... 37
  ROGUE NATIONS POSE A BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE US ....................................................... 37
  CHINESE BALLISTIC MISSILES THREATEN THE U.S. .................................................................................. 38
  INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS UNDERESTIMATED THE TRUE THREAT .............................................. 38
  THE ABM TREATY PREVENTS DEVELOPMENT OF A CREDIBLE DEFENSE........................................... 39
  BMD IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE OUR SURVIVAL ...................................................................................... 40
  THE NAS REPORT IS REACTIONARY NONSENSE ........................................................................................ 41
  NAS RECOMMENDATIONS ARE ILL ADVISED ............................................................................................. 42
  DISASSEMBLING WEAPONS IS A POOR POLICY MOVE ............................................................................. 43
  THE NAS REPORT ACTUALLY MAKES THE CASE FOR BMD DEVELOPMENT ...................................... 43
  A RUSSIA-CHINA ALLIANCE DAMAGES WORLD PEACE ........................................................................... 44



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“NO FIRST USE” POLICY IS DANGEROUS AND REDUCES DETERRENCE ............................................... 46
DE-ALERTING WOULD BE A DISASTROUS MOVE ....................................................................................... 47
DE-ALERTING POLICY IS DISADVANTAGEOUS FOR MANY REASONS .................................................. 48
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY IS A VITAL ASPECT OF DETERRING CONFLICT ............................................. 49
THE U.S. MUST NOT SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE OUR NUCLEAR CAPABILITY .................................... 50
DETERRENCE REDUCES THE CHANCES OF ALLIED PROLIFERATION .................................................. 51
STIGMATIZING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A MOST RISKY POLICY COURSE ........................................... 51
WE MUST NOT RELAX OUR NUCLEAR POSTURE TOWARD RUSSIA ...................................................... 52
CTR EXPANSION SOLVES RUSSIAN NUCLEAR LEAKAGE ........................................................................ 53
CTR EXPANSION INCREASES RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SAFETY ..................................................................... 54
CTR EXPANSION CONTROLS RUSSIAN NUCLEAR RISKS .......................................................................... 55
DEALERTING OUR NUCLEAR ARSENAL REDUCES WAR RISKS .............................................................. 56
RUSSIA WON’T COOPERATE ON NUCLEAR SECURITY ............................................................................. 57
DEALERTING INVITES CBW ATTACKS .......................................................................................................... 57
DE-ALERTING INCREASES NUCLEAR RISKS ................................................................................................ 58
DE-ALERTING INVITES ATTACKS BY ROGUE STATES .............................................................................. 58
U.S.-SINO RELATIONS ARE KEY TO PEACE .................................................................................................. 59




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NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN RUSSIA ENDANGER US
THE COLLAPSE OF RUSSIA’S CONTROL OF WEAPONS IS DANGEROUS

1. THE DETERIORATION OF RUSSIA INCREASES THE POSSIBILITY OF UNAUTHORIZED USE
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, A standing committee of the National Academy of Sciences
created in 1980 to bring the Academy's scientific and technical talent to bear on crucial problems of peace and
security, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, 1997, p. 17.
Another disturbing possibility is the theft or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Although no nuclear weapons
state is immune to such risks, the general decline of morale in the Russian military is cause for special concern. It is
generally believed that Russian nuclear weapons are accorded high levels of protection and security, but a further
degeneration of the economy, domestic politics, relations with neighboring states, or civilian control over the
military could dramatically increase the chance that a group, either inside or outside the military, might try to steal,
use, or threaten to use nuclear weapons.

2. STOCKPILES AND POOR COMMAND AND CONTROL INCREASE THE RISK OF WAR
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT: FINAL REPORT,
December 1997, p. 19.
A pervasive sense that progress has been made in reducing the dangers posed by superpower arsenals belies the
menace posed by nuclear proliferation. Weapons stockpiles, loose or nonexistent controls, and the lucrative market
in trafficking nuclear materials and know-how create a substantial potential for two kinds of nuclear threats:
deliberate use and inadvertent use.

3. THE DETERIORATION OF RUSSIA'S COMMAND AND CONTROL ENHANCES THE DANGER
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, A standing committee of the National Academy of Sciences
created in 1980 to bring the Academy's scientific and technical talent to bear on crucial problems of peace and
security, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, 1997, p. 17.
More serious, the committee believes, is the risk of erroneous use of nuclear weapons. Unlike accidents, an
erroneous use of nuclear weapons would result from conscious decisions by military or political leaders, but these
decisions would be based on incomplete or inaccurate information, faulty reasoning, misinterpretation of the
intentions of other countries, and careless or hasty decision making, perhaps influenced by the unintended
consequences of prior actions. Possible examples include a decision to launch nuclear weapons in response to false
or ambiguous warning of actual or impending attack, or misinterpreting a demonstration shot, unauthorized attack,
or an attack on another country as a massive attack on one's own country. The reported deterioration of Russia's
missile attack warning system is particularly troubling in this regard.




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RUSSIAN MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COLLAPSE THREATENS LOOSE NUKES

1. RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR COMPLEX WILL COLLAPSE WITHOUT ADDITIONAL FUNDS
Oleg Bukharin, researcher, Princeton University's Center for Energy and Environmental studies, BULLETIN OF
THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, May/June 1997, p. 41.
Russia has excellent scientists and good facilities, and Russian scientists would like to initiate a plan similar to the
US stewardship program. But economic difficulties make that possibility remote. In fact, unless needed investments
are made soon, the situation in the Russian nuclear weapons complex may deteriorate so badly that the capacity to
maintain the stockpile could be lost. Russia's nuclear complex is in a deep economic crisis--there is a real danger
that it will collapse unless urgent measures are taken to improve the situation. The crisis has been caused by sharp
reductions in state defense orders and dramatic changes in Russian society.

2. LACK OF FUNDS THREATENS COLLAPSE OF THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR COMPLEX
Oleg Bukharin, researcher, Princeton University's Center for Energy and Environmental studies, BULLETIN OF
THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, May/June 1997, p. 46.
There is, however, no uncertainty with respect to two facts. First, Russia is in no position to replicate the Science
Based Stockpile Stewardship program that is being implemented by the US weapons laboratories, and it will have to
make do with existing resources. Second, the main danger to a Russian stockpile stewardship program stems from
the decay of technical infrastructure and the loss of human resources due to the deep social and financial crises at its
nuclear weapons facilities. The Russian nuclear weapons complex will simply collapse without downsizing and
restructuring, defense conversion, and timely financing of defense programs by the federal government.

3. INSUFFICIENT RESOURCES THREATENS A COLLAPSE OF THE NUCLEAR COMPLEX
Joseph C. Anselmo, NQA, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, June 23, 1997, p. 47.
Allison was a co-author of a 1996 Harvard University study that contended a state or terrorist group could be ready
within months to detonate a nuclear explosion with a budget of just a few hundred thousand dollars. The report cited
poor security at most of the several hundred locations in the former Soviet Union where nuclear weapons and highly
enriched uranium and plutonium were stored. Allison believes the overall security situation at Russian nuclear
facilities has actually worsened in the past year, despite some physical improvements from U.S.-sponsored
activities. ''Whatever security system one imagines, if the operators of the system are not being paid in a regular
fashion, the system has become stressed,'' he said. Joseph Cirincione, a defense analyst at the Henry L. Stimson
Center, agrees. ''Despite the substantial progress that is being made, the situation is getting worse,'' he said. ''The
infrastructure is collapsing faster than we can fix it.''




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THE RISK OF AN ACCIDENT IS HIGH

1. THE RISK OF ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR IS SIGNIFICANT
Christoph Bluth, professor at the graduate school of European and International Studies at the University of
Reading, JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, December 1, 1997, p. 548.
For the time being, therefore, the risk of accidental nuclear war still persists. While the changes in the international
environment have reduced the risk of crises developing, the changes in the domestic environment in Russia have
significantly increased the risk of accidental launches and other malfunctions of the system, which could result in
the use of nuclear weapons without any political motivations.

2. TOP RUSSIAN EXPERTS ADMIT THE CRISIS POINT WILL ARRIVE SOON
Pat Roberts, Senator from Kansas and member of the Armed Services Committee, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD,
March 17, 1998, p. S2099.
Within days, Defense Minister Igor Rodionov took an extraordinary step. He too was frustrated. He had devoted his
career to the conventional army, but it was disintegrating before his eyes. Yeltsin was ill, and Rodionov could not
reach him on the phone. Finally, he wrote an alarming letter to Yeltsin. He said the command-and-control systems
for Russia's nuclear forces--including the deep underground bunkers and the early-warning system--were falling
apart. "No one today can guarantee the reliability of our control systems,'' Rodionov said. "Russia might soon reach
the threshold beyond which its rockets and nuclear systems cannot be controlled.'' A retired colonel, Robert Bykov,
who had worked in some of the military's electronic command systems until 1991, echoed Rodionov's comments in
an article he wrote for a mass-circulation newspaper, Komsomolskaya Pravda. Bykov said Rodionov was
"absolutely correct.''

3. ACCIDENTAL LAUNCHES ARE LIKELY WITHOUT IMMEDIATE ACTION
Christoph Bluth, professor at the graduate school of European and International Studies at the University of
Reading, JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, December 1, 1997, p. 548.
In February 1997 the then Russian Defense Minister, Igor Rodionov, made a number of alarming statements about
the reliability of control over Russia's strategic nuclear forces. He implied that, unless more funds were made
available to maintain the security and stability of command and control systems and the missile forces themselves,
accidental launches might occur.

4. RUSSIA IS STILL ON LAUNCH-ON-WARNING
Pat Roberts, Senator from Kansas and Member of the Armed Services Committee, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD,
March 17, 1998, p. S2099.
What makes the radar and satellite gaps worrisome is that Russia still adheres to nuclear doctrines of the Soviet era.
The overall deterrence concept is known as Mutual Assured Destruction, under which each side is held in check by
the threat of annihilation by the other. One part of this cocked-pistols approach is "launch-on-warning,'' in which
both sides threaten that if attacked they will unleash massive retaliation, even before the enemy warheads arrive. The
idea is that such a hair-trigger stance will discourage either from attempting to strike first. Russia also inherited from
the Soviet Union a second, related approach, which is to preserve the ability to launch a retaliatory strike even after
the enemy's warheads have hit. This is called "launch-on-attack.'' In Moscow, massive underground bunkers and a
secret subway were built to protect the Soviet leadership so they could launch a retaliatory strike.

5. WARHEAD REMOVAL HAS NOT YET OCCURRED
Christoph Bluth, professor at the graduate school of European and International Studies at the University of
Reading, JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, December 1, 1997, p. 548.
A significant step toward dismantling the threat of strategic nuclear exchanges and substantially reducing the risk of
accidental nuclear war would be to remove the warheads of ICBMs and store them separately from the missiles.
Such a step was suggested by several academic experts and, to everyone's surprise, Yeltsin announced at the signing
of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997 that the Russian Federation would do so. Soon after this statement,
however, clarifications were issued to the effect that, rather than remove the warheads, Russia would no longer
target the signatory states. Since such commitments had already been made earlier, it is unclear that anything has
changed.




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PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES RISK AN ACCIDENT

1. RUSSIAN OFFICERS ARE PSYCHOLOGICALLY UNSTABLE
Christoph Bluth, professor at the graduate school of European and International Studies at the University of
Reading, JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, December 1, 1997, p. 548.
Officers on duty are working in difficult conditions and their living standards have declined dramatically. Duty
schedules at launch-sites manned by the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN) have been increased from the
recommended maximum of eight hours to 12 hours. It is no wonder that Colonel Robert Bykov, himself formerly an
officer in the RVSN, warned that very few realize the danger of the unstable psychological state of the officers on
routine duty at strategic nuclear control stations.

2. THE NORWEGIAN WEATHER LAUNCH PROVES THE RISK OF ACCIDENTAL WAR
Curt Weldon, Congressman from Pennsylvania and member of the Committee on National Security,
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, March 26, 1998, p. H1634-35.
In January, 1995, Norway announces to Russia in a written communication that they are going to launch a multi-
stage weather rocket from an island off the coast of Norway. It is a courtesy to notify a neighboring country. The
date of the launch comes about, and Norway launches this multi-stage weather rocket. Russian intelligence, with
systems that are not being properly maintained, sees this multi-stage rocket taking off and mistakes it for an
American multi-stage ICBM coming from one of our submarines at sea. The Russian security system puts the
system in Russia on a full alert, which means that they activate the black boxes, the cheggets, that control the
Russian nuclear arsenal which are in the hands of Boris Yeltsin, at that time Pavel Grachev, the defense minister,
and General Kolesnikov, the chief of the command staff, which meant that Russia had 15 minutes within which was
the time period allocated to call off a nuclear response against America to a weather rocket that they had been
forewarned of by Norway. Mr. Speaker, this is not a Stephen Spielberg science fiction movie, this is what occurred.
The Russians have acknowledged this.

3. MISSILE OFFICERS SUFFER EXTREME PRIVATION AND MAY TAKE ROGUE ACTION
Christoph Bluth, professor at the graduate school of European and International Studies at the University of
Reading, JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, December 1, 1997, p. 548.
Launch sites for ICBMs are heavily protected by passive defenses such as barbed wire, electrified fences, minefields
and other unknown facilities that are said to require specialized equipment to move across. The guards on duty have
the order to physically eliminate anyone who does not respond to the first order to freeze and await the arrival of
guards. The forces defending the missile launch centers are said to be sufficient to deal with a large and well-
organized attack. This does not mean that ICBM launch sites can be considered to be completely safe, however. The
officers of the RSVN have also experienced severe social problems, such as lack of housing and scarcity of food.
Local authorities have at times refused to permit food supplies to pass to the missile bases, causing the officers to go
on strike. As mentioned previously, the length of the duty shifts for RSVN officers has been extended. The absolute
loyalty of the service personnel can therefore not be taken for granted.

4. THE NORWEGIAN CRISIS WOULD HAVE GONE NUCLEAR IF TENSIONS HAD BEEN HIGHER
Pat Roberts, Senator from Kansas and member of the Armed Services Committee, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD,
March 17, 1998, p. S2099.
Bruce Blair, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington who has written extensively on the Soviet
and Russian command-and-control systems, said a signal was sent to the Russian strategic forces to increase their
combat readiness, but the crisis then ended. Blair said the significance of the episode was the confusion that marked
the period during which Yeltsin would have had to make a real "launch-on-warning'' decision. Blair pointed out that
the Soviet Union and Russia have been through coup, rebellion and collapse over the last decade, and a leader may
well be called on to make crucial decisions at a time of enormous upheaval. Postol said, "The Norwegian rocket
launch is an important indicator of a serious underlying problem. It tells us something very important: People are on
a high state of alert, when there is not a crisis. You can imagine what it would be like in a high state of tension.''




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RUSSIAN NUCLEAR MATERIAL WILL BE DIVERTED TO ROGUE STATES

1. EVEN IF WEAPONS THEFT IS UNLIKELY, PLUTONIUM THEFT IS A SIGNIFICANT RISK
Thalif Deen, staff writer, JANE’S DEFENSE WEEKLY, February 11, 1998, p. 5.
He pointed out that, until recently, most experts downplayed the risk of theft or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons
from Russia's arsenal. He believes that a more likely risk is the diversion of weapons-usable material from the
hundreds of tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium at dozens of sites throughout the former Soviet Union.

2. LEADERS WITH NUCLEAR ACCESS ARE BEING FORCED ONTO THE BLACK MARKET
Curt Weldon, Congressman from Pennsylvania and member of the Committee on National Security,
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, March 26, 1998, p. H1634.
With the economic chaos in Russia today, more and more of Russia's conventional military is being decimated. The
generals and admirals who were the key leaders in the Soviet military have been forced out of their positions with no
pensions, with inadequate housing, in most cases no housing. In many cases, as General Lebed testified before my
subcommittee last week here in Washington, and as he has told me on two other visits in Moscow and Washington,
they have now had to resort to criminal activities to take care of their families. So these generals and admiral, who
know where all the technology is in Russia, who know where the nuclear materials are in Russia, are now resorting
to selling those materials on the black market because they feel betrayed by the motherland. We are seeing
technology transfer occur at a rate now that we have not seen in the past 50 years. This is not being fostered by Boris
Yeltsin, it is occurring because of instability in Russia, because of Russian military officers who feel betrayed by
their country.

3. RUSSIAN BLACK MARKET SALES ARE EMPIRICALLY PROVEN
Curt Weldon, Congressman from Pennsylvania and member of the Committee on National Security,
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, March 26, 1998, p. H1634-1635.
Because of the instability in Russia, many individuals and entities are looking to sell off technologies and products
to rogue nations. Two years ago, we caught Russian institutes and individuals transferring guidance systems for
rockets to Iraq. In fact, the Jordanian and Israeli intelligence intercepted these devices which are very expensive, that
had been taken off of Russian SSN-19 rockets, very sophisticated long-range rockets that were being shipped to
Iraq. Three times the CIA caught Russia transferring sets of guidance systems to Iraq. One hundred twenty sets of
these guidance systems, Mr. Speaker, went from Russia to Iraq, to allow Iraq to improve the accuracy of their Scud
missiles which killed our 27 Americans 7 years ago.

4. ENTIRE WARHEADS HAVE GONE MISSING - ACCOUNTING IS INADEQUATE
Christoph Bluth, Professor at the Graduate School of European and International Studies at the University of
Reading, JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, December 1, 1997, p. 548.
There is no adequate accounting for all the warheads, many of which were withdrawn under emergency conditions
and dumped at the sites. There are persistent reports of missing warheads, such as 23 warheads that disappeared
from a depot at Komsomolsk-na-Amure in March 1992 and 12 warheads based in East Germany that could not be
accounted for prior to the withdrawal of all warheads from Eastern Europe.




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RUSSIAN NUCLEAR LEAKAGE IS THE KEY PROLIFERATION THREAT

1. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR LEAKAGE IS A SUBSTANTIAL PROLIFERATION RISK
Fortney Pete Stark, Congressman from California, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, March 4, 1998, p. E295.
The breakup of the Soviet Union left an undetermined amount of nuclear materials scattered throughout the former
Soviet territories. Large quantities of nuclear weapons, weapons materials, and technology in the former Soviet
Union are all potential proliferation problems. There are terrifying reports that nuclear materials have been illegally
stolen and transferred from Russia to rogue states. The sluggish economic conditions in Russia have provoked
Russian nuclear and missile experts in accepting employment offers in rogue nations.

2. RUSSIAN LOOSE NUKES ARE THE DEFINING PROLIFERATION THREAT
Paul Mann, staff writer, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, October 20, 1997, p. 76.
Hence the latest warning of Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), a leading congressional authority on the spread of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD): ''The defining danger of nuclear proliferation is not Iran's purchase of civilian nuclear
reactors [from Russia] that may assist Iranian nuclear ambitions in the decade hence; it is a threat today or tomorrow
that Iran, Libya or Hamas will purchase nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or materials from some fragment of
the current or former [Soviet] military.''

3. THE RISK OF NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS AND TERRORISM IS SIGNIFICANT
Daniel Fine and Julian Eligator, Physicians for Social Responsibility, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, March 25,
1998, p. A15.
The combination of a world awash with nuclear weaponry, missiles on high alert, unsecured and disseminated
plutonium and enriched uranium, and decay of the Russian nuclear establishment is a formula for disaster. Military
experts have warned that today the accidental, erroneous or unauthorized launch of nuclear warheads poses an even
greater threat than nuclear terrorism.

4. WE MUST ENHANCE PROTECTION OF PLUTONIUM TO AVERT PROLIFERATION
Thalif Deen, staff writer, JANE’S DEFENSE WEEKLY, February 11, 1998, p. 5.
Under Secretary General Jayantha Dhanapala, the head of the UN's Department for Disarmament Affairs, told JDW
that Annan has warned of new security threats from "uncivil" society. "This is a new challenge in the proliferation of
weapons, and the international community must enhance the physical protection of nuclear material and technology,
and cooperate over export controls," he said.

5. DIVERSION TO A ROGUE STATE IS THE GREATEST RISK
Dr. Thomas Cochran, director of the Nuclear Program of the Natural Resources Defense Council and former
Chairman of the International Task Force Appointed by the Moscow Nuclear Safety Summit, FRONTLINE -
LOOSE NUKES: INVESTIGATING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR SMUGGLING, 1998,
http://www2.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/nukes/, accessed April 20, 1998.
Everyone should be worried about it because once these materials are stolen and diverted out of Russia, they can be
manufactured into nuclear weapons anywhere--in the Middle East, in the Far East, in the United States, and anyone
can then become a target, a terrorist target, or a target by a rogue state. The scenario that concerns me the most is not
the Unabomber and his little house up in the mountains, making an atomic bomb. But it's that someone would divert
this material, sell it to an Iran, an Iraq, or Libya, North Korea, and the weapon would be manufactured by one of
these rogue states, and then could be transported by terrorist groups.

6. RUSSIAN MATERIAL RISKS PROLIFERATION IN THREE WAYS
Alan Philps, Moscow correspondent, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, April 23, 1998, p. 4.
There are three causes for concern: Ample supplies of weapons-grade nuclear material may fall into the hands of
rogue would-be nuclear states such as Iran, Libya or Iraq. The thousands of highly qualified but ill-paid nuclear
technicians may sell their services to these states. The vast quantities of nuclear waste literally lying around northern
Russia may cause an ecological disaster.




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THE RISK FROM RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS AT ITS GREATEST LEVEL

1. RUSSIA IS A GREATER RISK NOW THAN ANY TIME SINCE 1948
Curt Weldon, Congressman from Pennsylvania and member of the Committee on National Security,
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, March 26, 1998, p. H1634.
The Cold War is over. But does that mean Russia is no longer a threat? Mr. Speaker, I do a significant amount of
work with Russia. I formed and chair the initiative with their Duma. I have been to Russia 14 times, four times in the
last year. My undergraduate degree is in Russian studies. I know the language, and I am working right now on a
number of positive programs to help stabilize Russia. I do not see Russia as an evil empire, Mr. Speaker. But let me
say this: Russia is more destabilized today than at any time in the last 50 years. We need to understand that, not from
fear of having Russia mount an all-out attack on America. I do not believe that is in any way, shape, or form what
Boris Yeltsin or any other leader would want to do. But there is a heightened opportunity or a heightened potential
for incidents involving and as a result of the instability in Russia today.

2. THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR THREAT IS GREATER NOW THAN DURING THE COLD WAR
Steve Macko, ERRI Risk Analyst, “FBI DIRECTOR WARNS RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME THREATENS
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY,” ERRI DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT-ERRI Risk Assessment Services-
Friday, October 3, 1997, http://emernet.emergency.com/rusn-mob.htm, accessed April 21, 1998.
He also said that U.S. law enforcement agencies take "very seriously" the possibility that nuclear weapons could fall
into the hands of Russian criminal gangs and added, "We have to take drastic steps to prevent and detect that."
When asked if he thought that the U.S. is under a greater threat "from nuclear detonation now than at the height of
the Cold War," Freeh replied, "If you describe that detonation as a criminal or terrorist or rogue operation, I think
the answer would be yes. The controls that were in place for many of these weapons and structures don't apply to a
terrorist, or organized criminal, or an opportunist who could get access to them." The FBI Director also said the
Russian syndicates conduct the most sophisticated criminal operations ever seen in the United States, based on their
access to expertise in computer technology, encryption techniques and money-laundering facilities that process
hundreds of millions of dollars.

3. THE RISK OF ACCIDENTS AND PROLIFERATION IS THE GREATEST IN 50 YEARS
Curt Weldon, Congressman from Pennsylvania and member of the Committee on National Security,
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, March 26, 1998, p. H1634-35.
Mr. Speaker, that is the threat. The threat is from an accidental launch. The threat is from a rogue Nation getting a
capability that threatens our troops, our allies, and our people. That is why we need to continue to focus on national
security. Not because Russia is the "evil empire,'' because they are not. Not because China is coming after us,
because they are not. But because there are risks in the world today that I would argue are greater than what they
have been for the past 50 years, mainly because of the lack of cohesion inside of Russia and with the Russian
Government and its military.

4. THE RISK OF DIVERSION FROM RUSSIA IS MUCH HIGHER THAN FROM THE U.S.
Dr. Thomas Cochran, director of the Nuclear Program of the Natural Resources Defense Council and former
Chairman of the International Task Force Appointed by the Moscow Nuclear Safety Summit, FRONTLINE -
LOOSE NUKES: INVESTIGATING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR SMUGGLING, 1998,
http://www2.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/nukes/, accessed April 20, 1998.
Russia made more nuclear weapons and more nuclear weapons material than the United States. The peak stockpile
of U.S. nuclear weapons was something like 32,000 in 1967. We believe Russia made around 45,000 nuclear
weapons. We made a 100 tons of plutonium. They made 200 tons of plutonium. They made about twice as much
highly enriched uranium. They have more facilities where their plutonium was made; more enrichment plants. So
they have more places where this material can be stolen from. And the facilities don't have adequate physical
security, they don't have adequately material accounting. And so the risk of diversion from a Russian facility is
much, much higher than it is in the United States for example.




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PROLIFERATION IS DISASTROUS

1. THE FIRST INCIDENT WILL BREAK THE NUCLEAR TABOO, CAUSING MORE INCIDENTS
Dr. David Kay, former head of the Evaluation Section of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Deputy
Leader of the Iraqi Action Team, FRONTLINE - LOOSE NUKES: INVESTIGATING THE THREAT OF
NUCLEAR SMUGGLING, 1998, http://www2.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/nukes/, accessed April 20,
1998.
We've been very lucky with regard to nuclear weapons. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a period of revulsion set in
and although both the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the British and the French and Chinese spent a
tremendous amount of money in building up military nuclear forces, in fact, we have not seen the use of nuclear
weapons. There is always the danger in the world that, after the first use, when the barrier against use comes down,
the next time doesn't seem as horrific and particularly if the first time, some group has gained their aims, political
extortion, terrorism, whatever their aims may be. We've seen this in almost every terrorist group.

2. EVEN A SINGLE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT COULD TRIGGER A GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR
Daniel Fine and Julian Eligator, Physicians for Social Responsibility, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, March 25,
1998, p. A15.
Other authoritative studies currently in progress project the effects of a plausible scenario in which four nuclear
warheads, launched accidentally by a Russian Delta IV submarine, explode over targets in the Pittsburgh area. There
would be 375,000 immediate fatalities and double that number of total ultimate deaths. Such scenarios of nuclear
devastation in Pittsburgh are not just far-fetched fictional nightmares. Referring to the bombs used in Oklahoma City
and the World Trade Center, President Clinton said ''imagine the destruction that could have resulted had there been
a small nuclear device exploded.'' Numerous past ''broken arrows'' - the military term for nuclear weapons mishaps -
and recent events suggest that computer or human error could accidentally send a flight of missiles on the way and
trigger a full-scale nuclear war. This almost happened on Jan. 25, 1996, when a U.S. weather rocket from Norway
was erroneously identified as a submarine-launched attack on Russia. For the first time in history, a ''nuclear
suitcase'' was activated, and President Boris Yeltsin was given 12 minutes to decide whether to launch a nuclear
attack on the United States.

3. ROGUE STATE PROLIFERATION IS A TERRIFYING PROSPECT
John Correll, editor in chief, AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, April 1998, p. 4.
As retired Gen. Russell E. Dougherty, himself a former commander of Strategic Air Command, says, "The thought
of a nuclear-disarmed United States being confronted and coerced by a nuclear-armed rogue nation is terrifying."
Rogue nations want weapons of mass destruction because that is the easiest way for them to trump US conventional
superiority. In a newspaper column last year, Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kanter said that "it is precisely when
others have forsworn nuclear weapons that those who want to change the world -- or at least their place in it -- will
find possession of nuclear weapons most desirable."

4. HALTING PROLIFERATION OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS OUR TOP PRIORITY
Mark S. Mellstom, Physicians for Social Responsibility, STAR TRIBUNE, March 16, 1998, p. 8A.
The leakage of nuclear materials from Russia is occurring and may get worse. There is a high risk of theft of enough
plutonium and enriched uranium to make bombs, which would probably not be detected due to inadequate Russian
safeguards. "Halting the proliferation of nuclear materials, missiles and technology is clearly our No. 1 foreign
policy challenge since the breakup of the Soviet empire.




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NUCLEAR SMUGGLING IS A HIGH RISK

1. SMUGGLING WILL BE THE DELIVERY MECHANISM OF CHOICE
Morton Halperin, senior vice president of the Twentieth Century Fund, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, November
17, 1997, p. 25.
Nuclear threats from terrorists or rogue states. The nuclear danger from terrorists or rogue states is real and one that
the Clinton administration should take prudent steps to meet. Building an ABM defense for the United States is not
such a step. It certainly is not an effective counter to terrorist groups, which cannot build or deploy an ICBM on
their own. Even a rogue state is very unlikely to threaten the United States by building an ICBM. Rather, any state
or group that decided on the risky course of seeking to coerce the U.S. government by threatening nuclear
destruction would seek to smuggle a nuclear device into the United States or demonstrate a capacity to explode one
offshore; an ABM defense thus would not be an effective defense.

2. CHANCES OF INTERCEPTING FISSILE MATERIALS AT THE BORDER ARE VIRTUALLY NIL
Dr. David Kay, former head of the Evaluation Section of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Deputy
Leader of the Iraqi Action Team, FRONTLINE - LOOSE NUKES: INVESTIGATING THE THREAT OF
NUCLEAR SMUGGLING, 1998, http://www2.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/nukes/, accessed April 20,
1998.
Q: If something does get smuggled out, what are the chances that we could detect it at our borders? MR. KAY: I
think you have to say--it's a two-part answer. If you have no clue that it's missing, that is, the Russians don't pick it
up, someone in the group involved doesn't talk and it just simple comes in blindly, there's almost a zero chance that
you will pick it up. If on the other hand, the Russians know so you have a long lead time to set up your guard, to try
to look, pick up patterns of movement, then there's a greater chance. But it's still, in my view, right now a very low
chance.

3. THE RUSSIAN MAFIA IS COMPLETELY CAPABLE OF SMUGGLING NUCLEAR MATERIAL
Paul Mann, staff writer, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, October 20, 1997, p. 76.
Despite the scant evidence of systematic Russian criminal involvement with illicit nuclear traffic, the CSIS contends
that the threat to the U.S. is grave because the major factor distinguishing Russian organized crime from its
international counterparts is its potential access -- its physical proximity -- to WMD (nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons). Allison pointed to the select capabilities possessed by Russian crime groups that would enable
them to enter the nuclear arena virtually at will. ''There are scores of criminal gangs and groups who are able to get
precious metals through Estonia, launder money through Cyprus, are export-oriented and know how to find their
way through the interstices of the international [trading] system and laws,'' he said. ''That creates a big challenge for
international anti-crime efforts.''

4. DRUG SMUGGLING PROVIDES ACTUAL METHODS OF NUCLEAR SMUGGLING
Dr. David Kay, former head of the Evaluation Section of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Deputy
Leader of the Iraqi Action Team, FRONTLINE - LOOSE NUKES: INVESTIGATING THE THREAT OF
NUCLEAR SMUGGLING, 1998, http://www2.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/nukes/, accessed April 20,
1998.
That is very frightening. And you think, how many hundreds of thousands of containers enter this country without
inspection. How many thousands of bales of marijuana cross our border without detection? I've often said, my
preferred method for delivering a nuclear device is, I would hide it in a bale of marijuana, contract it out to the drug
lords and move it. Marijuana is a good shielder actually for radiation. The drug lords have a superb record for
delivery. They're not Fed Ex, but they're awfully close to it. And contract it out and get it across the border.




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TERRORISTS WILL USE MATERIALS TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. TERRORISTS COULD STEAL RUSSIAN PLUTONIUM
Matt Berger, Washington correspondent, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, March 10, 1998, p. 10A.
Mr. Thornberry, R-Clarendon, said Russian facilities that hold plutonium or highly enriched uranium had wooden
doors and broken windows, making the risk of theft for sale on the black market to terrorists a major concern. "I
knew it was bad, but I was surprised at the condition of the facilities," he said. "Basic maintenance is not
happening."

2. TERRORISTS COULD ACQUIRE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Richard G. Lugar, Senator from Indiana, THE HILL, February 25, 1998, Reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD, February 25, 1998, p. S1002.
As a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet totalitarian command and control society, a vast potential
supermarket of weapons and materials of mass destruction has become increasingly accessible. Religious sects,
organized crime and terrorist organizations can now attempt to buy or steal what they previously had to produce on
their own. The available technology allows a small number of conspirators to threaten large populations, something
heretofore achievable only by nation-states.

3. THE RISK OF SMUGGLING RUSSIAN NUCLEAR ASSETS IS HIGH
Mark S. Mellstom, Physicians for Social Responsibility, STAR TRIBUNE, March 16, 1998, p. 8A.
More than 10,000 nuclear warheads remain in Russia, where nuclear security has eroded, and underpaid scientists
and security guards may be tempted to smuggle weapons to rogue nations or to terrorists. Gen. Alexander Lebed,
former head of Russia's Security Council, asserts that 84 of 132 portable nuclear weapons produced by the Soviet
Union are missing.

4. THE RISK OF RUSSIAN MAFIA NUCLEAR ACQUISITION IS SIGNIFICANT
Steve Macko, ERRI Risk Analyst, “FBI DIRECTOR WARNS RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME THREATENS
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY,” ERRI DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT-ERRI Risk Assessment Services-
Friday, October 3, 1997, http://emernet.emergency.com/rusn-mob.htm, accessed April 21, 1998.
Appearing before the House Committee on International Relations on Wednesday, FBI Director Louis Freeh warned
that Russian organized crime poses a risk to U.S. national security and added that the risk of a nuclear attack by an
terrorist/guerrilla group is now greater than at anytime during the Cold War by the old Soviet Union. Freeh's
testimony echoed a recent report on the international threat posed by Russian organized crime that was issued by
Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies. The report warned that, if left unchecked, crime
networks will turn Russia into a "criminal-syndicalist state" -- a nation controlled by gangsters, corrupt government
officials and crooked businessmen who accumulate vast amounts of wealth "by promoting and exploiting corruption
and the vulnerabilities inherent in a society in transition."

5. NUCLEAR TERRORISM WOULD BE MUCH WORSE THAN OKLAHOMA CITY
Dr. Frank Von Hippel, former Assistant Director for National Security in the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy and present Professor of Public and International Affairs at Princeton, FRONTLINE - LOOSE
NUKES: INVESTIGATING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR SMUGGLING, 1998, http://www2.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/nukes/, accessed April 20, 1998.
Q: You said that if it were to be a nuclear explosion and terrorist incident, for example, it would dwarf Oklahoma
City. Is it possible to explain that in a way that people would understand? MR. VON HIPPEL: For a small nuclear
explosion, the smallest one you could expect from even a terrorist bomb would be on the order of a thousand tons of
TNT equivalent. That would mean that the area affected, to the degree that around that the area around that
explosion in Oklahoma City was affected would be a hundred times larger. If you went to a Nagasaki-type bomb
with plutonium or Hiroshima with highly enriched uranium, it would go out another--it would go out maybe 20 or
30 times the radius and so a thousand times the area of the Oklahoma City bomb.




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THE U.S. IS VULNERABLE TO NUCLEAR TERRORISM

1. TERRORISTS ARE LIKELY TO USE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Thalif Deen, staff writer, JANE’S DEFENSE WEEKLY, February 11, 1998, p. 5.
"The object of terrorist attacks is normally to achieve an immediate dramatic impact, and this can best be done by
using weapons of mass destruction or radioactive material," Ambassador Sergey Lavrov, the Russian envoy said in a
letter to Secretary General Kofi Annan. The use of nuclear weapons or an attack on a nuclear plant is "particularly
attractive" to terrorists, Lavrov warned.

2. THE JAPANESE SUBWAY BOMBING PROVES THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Bernd Schmidbauer, head of German Intelligence, FRONTLINE - LOOSE NUKES: INVESTIGATING THE
THREAT OF NUCLEAR SMUGGLING, 1998, http://www2.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/nukes/, accessed
April 20, 1998.
If nothing happens and we are unable to work together on this problem, then in the near or long term future, in a few
years there will be countries able to produce weapons of mass destruction. They do not need the technology for it. If
they have the material, they are jumping over several stages in development and will then be in a position to threaten
us all, including by the associated terrorists, who will be able to use it. And whoever still needs examples of how
this happens, he can look at Japan and the problem with the Aum cult, where what we considered the worst scenario
became reality.

3. AMERICA IS EXTRAORDINARILY VULNERABLE TO NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Thalif Deen, staff writer, JANE’S DEFENSE WEEKLY, February 11, 1998, p. 5.
"The former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons and material stockpile is at risk, and America is extraordinarily
vulnerable to terrorists employing weapons of mass destruction," said William Potter, director of the Center for
Non-Proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

4. WE ARE ILL-PREPARED TO COPE WITH NUCLEAR TERRORISM
David Marcus, staff writer, THE BOSTON GLOBE, March 21, 1998, p. A3.
The exercise was designed to test how US intelligence specialists and scientists would work together, how
international laws would hold up, and whether US agencies monitoring the borders would detect the entrance of
illegal nuclear materials. The results? You might not want to know. "We were ill-prepared to cope with what would
be the most devastating thing in the history of mankind: a nuclear attack on the United States," said Arnaud de
Borchgrave, the flamboyant correspondent, novelist, editor, and academic who directed the project. It was plotted
out by a team of specialists and sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a bipartisan
Washington think tank, and conservative groups such as the John M. Olin foundation.




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THE HABIGER REPORT IS OVERLY OPTIMISTIC

1. HABIGER’S REPORT IS OPTIMISTIC - THE SYSTEM IS SLIDING DOWNHILL
Pat Roberts, Senator from Kansas and Member of the Armed Services Committee, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD,
March 17, 1998, p. S2099.
Russian officials have repeatedly denied that the strategic forces command system is weakening. They say it has
rigid controls against an accidental launch or theft. The U.S. strategic forces commander, Gen. Eugene Habiger,
visited Russian command centers last fall and said they were "very much geared to a fail-safe mode'' in which any
command level "can inhibit a launch'' of a missile. But Sergeyev has acknowledged the system is growing old; most
of the command posts were built more than 30 years ago. The rocket forces are also suffering shortages of trained
personnel and severe social problems such as a lack of housing for 17,000 officers. A well-informed Russian expert
on the command system said, "Today it's not dangerous but tomorrow it might be. It is going down. It has not
reached the critical point. But the trends are down--days when designers are not paid, when money is not allocated
for upkeep.''

2. EQUIVALENT VISITS SHOW A LACK OF INTERIOR SECURITY
Dr. Frank Von Hippel, former Assistant Director for National Security in the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy and present Professor of Public and International Affairs at Princeton, FRONTLINE - LOOSE
NUKES: INVESTIGATING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR SMUGGLING, 1998, http://www2.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/nukes/, accessed April 20, 1998.
Well, the most dramatic visit I had was to a plutonium storage facility at one of the formerly secret cities in the Ural
mountains. It is one of the three cities where the plutonium for Russian, for Soviet nuclear weapons was produced. I
went to one 50 year old warehouse, one of the oldest buildings at the site and, you know, went--and found 12,000
canisters, coffee can-sized canisters of plutonium there, 30,000 tons. So, you know, any two of these 12,000
canisters would be sufficient to make a Nagasaki-type bomb. They had lots of guards around. There was even a
fence around the city. So, they were well-protected against some kind of attack, you know, the Green Berets or
something like that, but they had almost no protection against an inside job. They had no surveillance, no television
cameras or sensors inside the building to detect if there was somebody in there that shouldn't be.

3. RUSSIA LACKS ADEQUATE SAFETY AND SECURITY
Alan Philps, Moscow correspondent, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, April 23, 1998, p. 4.
"The industry has never acquired the culture of safety which is required," said Lidia Popova, director of the Centre
for Nuclear Ecology and Energy Policy. "So far we have not had significant thefts of nuclear material. But you
cannot underestimate the problem." The most shocking example of Russian laxity is the practice of the Northern
Fleet of dumping its nuclear waste on open ground, sometimes only 25 miles from the Norwegian border.

4. THE THREAT FROM INSIDERS IS REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL
Nikolai Bondarev, Director of Security at the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, FRONTLINE - LOOSE
NUKES: INVESTIGATING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR SMUGGLING, 1998, http://www2.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/nukes/, accessed April 20, 1998.
If we are talking about two categories of violators, insiders and outsiders. We've just analyzed our new situation, and
the results are this: At the inception of this institute, the problems of criminals within did not exist. First, there was
total secrecy. Everything was classified. An attempt, not even to steal but just to find out information, could have
been seen as an intrusion on the authority of the government, and its secrets. This was what protected the institute,
and besides, there was a very stringent selection process. You had to get two recommendations from people who
already worked here, plus, you were checked out by the KGB. All those factors, and the patriotism workers felt so
strongly - the problem of an inside criminal didn't exist. There was solidarity, and this worked for us. Really, in 50
years, there were no serious infractions. Today, if you look at the system, almost everything has been disrupted, and
today, because of the low salaries, and the influx of young people who don't really have security clearance at all, and
whose stable character is not guaranteed, today, before us is the problem of the insider - the criminal. That's what is
happening in the rest of the country with the leakage of radioactive materials, we cannot discount the possibility of
that happening here.




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DE-ALERTING WEAPONS IS CRITICAL TO GLOBAL SECURITY

1. DE-ALERTING IS AN IMPORTANT STEP SUPPORTED BY MANY EXPERTS
Mike Moore, editor, THE BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, March/April 1998, p. 2.
De-alerting would buy time in a crisis. If missiles on both sides are verifiably de-alerted, neither side would fear a
disarming first strike. As early warning systems decay and its submarines rot from a lack of maintenance, that will
be especially important to Russia. De-alerting is not a radical idea. The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of
Nuclear Weapons endorses it, as does a passel of U.S. and Russian generals and admirals, active duty and retired.
The National Academy of Sciences is for it. Stansfield Turner, a former director of the CIA, like it. Lee Butler, the
former head of the Strategic Air Command, loves it. Former Sen. Sam Nunn, Mr. Hardliner himself, is in favor.

2. DE-ALERTING WEAPONS WOULD ENHANCE GLOBAL SECURITY
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, A standing committee of the National Academy of Sciences
created in 1980 to bring the Academy's scientific and technical talent to bear on crucial problems of peace and
security, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, 1997, p. 62.
In assessing the risks associated with nuclear arsenals, the operational and technical readiness of nuclear weapons
for use is at least as important as the number of delivery vehicles or warheads. Elimination of continuous-alert
practices should be pursued as a principal goal in parallel with, but not linked to, START III. It would reduce the
perceived danger of short-warning-time attacks; it would make detecting preparations to use nuclear weapons easier
and thereby increase the time available for political solutions; it would reduce pressures on command-and-control
systems to stand ready to respond quickly and thus would decrease the chance of erroneous launch of nuclear
weapons or a launch in response to a spurious or incorrectly interpreted indication of impending attack; it would
allow both sides to increase barriers to unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; and it would enhance the political
relationship by eliminating the assumption that the other side might launch a surprise attack.

3. DE-ALERTING WEAPONS SHOULD BE A PRINCIPLE GOAL OF US POLICY
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, A standing committee of the National Academy of Sciences
created in 1980 to bring the Academy's scientific and technical talent to bear on crucial problems of peace and
security, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, 1997, p. 6.
During the Cold War, reducing the risk of a surprise attack appeared to be more important than the risks generated
by maintaining nuclear forces in a continuous state of alert. With the end of that era, the opposite view is now more
credible. This has important implications for U.S. nuclear policy and calls for dramatically reduced alert levels.
Elimination of continuous-alert practices should be pursued as a principal goal in parallel with, but not linked to,
START III. As a related confidence-building measure, the United States and Russia should adopt cooperative
practices to assure each other that they are not preparing for a nuclear attack.




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ABANDONING ACTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS WOULD BE BENEFICIAL

1. DISASSEMBLING WEAPONS WILL ENHANCE THE BENEFITS OF DE-ALERTING MISSILES
Xia Liping, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director Department of American Studies at the Shanghai Institute for
International Studies INESAP BULLETIN, November 1997, p. 12.
Removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles. As the first step, the U.S. and Russia should physically
separate their deployed warheads from delivery systems, which will strongly reinforce the gains achieved by taking
nuclear forces off alert and make it assured that nuclear forces can be reconstituted to an alert posture only within
known or agreed-upon timeframes.

2. DEACTIVATION IS CRITICAL TO AVOIDING AN ACCIDENTAL ATTACK
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT: FINAL REPORT,
December 1997, p. 73.
Much of the deterrent effect of these weapons can be sustained without having active forces poised for massive
attack at every moment. The countries that maintain these active forces are the ones most threatened by the active
forces of other countries, but the entire world is exposed to the consequences of an operational accident or an
inadvertent attack. As long as any active deployments are maintained, moreover, the incentive and opportunity for
proliferation remain.

ACTIVE DEPLOYMENT IS UNNECESSARY TO MAINTAIN A DETERRENT

1. DISASSEMBLING WEAPONS COULD OCCUR WITHOUT UNDERMINING SURVIVABILITY
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, A standing committee of the National Academy of Sciences
created in 1980 to bring the Academy's scientific and technical talent to bear on crucial problems of peace and
security, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, 1997, p. 63
Reducing and eventually eliminating the possibility of surprise attack in a transparent and stabilizing fashion are a
challenging but achievable goal. A small survivable force sufficient to satisfy the core function can be deployed on
submarines at sea or mobile missiles out of garrison. Although this force need not—and should not—be
operationally capable of rapid use, it might be difficult, at least in the near term, to demonstrate to the other side that
these forces are incapable of prompt launch without compromising their survivability. However, the remainder of
the force—silo-based missiles, mobile missiles in garrison, missiles on in-port submarines, and strategic bombers—
can and should be rendered incapable of rapid launch in ways that would be readily verifiable. This has already been
accomplished for bombers, by removing the nuclear bombs and air-launched cruise missiles and placing them in
storage bunkers. In the case of ballistic missiles it is possible to remove warheads, shrouds, guidance systems, or
other key components. Inspectors or remote monitoring devices could then verify that the systems had not been
readied for launch and provide timely warning of any attempt to do so. A number of possibilities exist along these
lines, and the defense establishments of the nuclear weapons states should be directed to develop a range of
acceptable options as part of the reductions process.

2. DEACTIVATING WEAPONS WOULD REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT: FINAL REPORT,
December 1997, p. xxvii.
Since nuclear arms are the deadliest of weapons, they create an especially critical problem of prevention. The
Commission believes that preventative efforts against violence with conventional weapons or other weapons of mass
destruction would be strongly reinforced if fuller efforts were made to control the nuclear danger. For example, the
world would be a much safer place, and the risks of deadly conflict would be reduced, if nuclear weapons were not
actively deployed. Much of the deterrent effect of these weapons can be sustained without having active forces
poised for massive attack at every moment.




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A NO-FIRST-USE POLICY WOULD INCREASE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

1. A ‘NO-FIRST USE” STANCE WOULD NOT MAKE THE U.S. VULNERABLE
Stansfield Turner, former director of the CIA and retired admiral, THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS, March/April 1998, p. 17.
The argument against a no-first-use pledge is that nuclear ambiguity helps deter assaults on the United States by
weapons of mass destruction. The fact is, the United States can have its cake and eat it, too. In the real world, no
nation would undertake such an attack on the United States without assuming that it might respond with nuclear
weapons, no matter what a particular president had pledged. That is not to say that a no-first-use pledge would be
hollow. Such a commitment would serve important symbolic and diplomatic purposes in that it would help
delegitimize nuclear weapons except in their deterrent role.

2. A U.S. NO-FIRST-USE POLICY STRENGTHENS THE NPT AND RELATIONS WITH CHINA
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, A standing committee of the National Academy of Sciences
created in 1980 to bring the Academy's scientific and technical talent to bear on crucial problems of peace and
security, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, 1997, p. 71-72.
To this end, the United States should announce that the only purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear
attacks on the United States and its allies, adopting no first use for nuclear weapons as official declaratory policy. In
the post-Cold War era, when nonproliferation is a high priority and the credibility of the nuclear powers'
commitment to Article VI of the NPT is crucial to maintaining the international consensus behind the regime, a U.S.
no-first-use pledge could help remove both reasons and excuses for proliferation. It would also assist with the
dialogue with China and those nonaligned states that urged a no-first-use declaration during the negotiations on the
NPT and the CTBT and now propose a no-first-use treaty.

3. ADOPTION OF A NO FIRST USE POLICY IS CRITICAL TO FUTURE ARMS CONTROL
Frank Von Hippel, professor of public and international affairs at Princeton and former Assistant Director for
National Security in the White house Office of Science and Technology Policy, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS, May/June 1997, p. 36.
Finally, the United States should join China in adopting a no-first-use nuclear policy, and it should press Russia,
Britain, and France to join in. That would go a long way toward strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
After all, how can the role of nuclear weapons be de-emphasized elsewhere if the
world's most powerful nation insists that its security requires it to reserve the option of using nuclear weapons first?
During the Cold War, the U.S. first-use policy was directed primarily at the Soviet Union, the assumption being that
nuclear weapons might be needed to counter a massive Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe. Today, the
Soviet threat is gone. But U.S. think-tank warriors are endlessly creative. Now the possibility that a "rogue state"
might use chemical or biological weapons is often cited as the principal justification for preserving a first-use
option.

4. NON-NUCLEAR SECURITY GUARANTEES TO ALLIES WOULD BE SUFFICIENT
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, A standing committee of the National Academy of Sciences
created in 1980 to bring the Academy's scientific and technical talent to bear on crucial problems of peace and
security, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, 1997, p. 72.
U.S. positive security guarantees to such allies have been an important component of not only regional and
international stability but also U.S. nonproliferation policy: they relieve such states, and by extension the neighbors
of such states, of the need to consider developing independent nuclear arsenals. Changing to a no-first-use policy
will require consultation with allies to reassure them that the United States will meet, by nonnuclear means, its
obligations to come to their aid in the event of nonnuclear attack. The use of U.S. nuclear forces would be reserved
solely for deterrence of and response to nuclear attacks. So long as the conventional military superiority of the
United States and its allies remains largely unchallenged, the substantial benefits of a no-first-use policy would
outweigh its small risks, provided the proper political groundwork is accomplished with NATO, South Korea, and
Japan.




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ELIMINATING FORWARD DEPLOYED NUCLEAR FORCES IS IMPORTANT

1. REMOVING NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE ENHANCES COOPERATION
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, A standing committee of the National Academy of Sciences
created in 1980 to bring the Academy's scientific and technical talent to bear on crucial problems of peace and
security, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, 1997, p. 22-23.
On the nuclear side, timely and flexible pursuit of further strategic arms reductions should help overcome the
obstacles to Russian ratification of START II (about which more is said in Chapters 2 and 3). Attention to
nonstrategic and reserve nuclear weapons in these further discussions should also be helpful. If the United States and
Russia, in full cooperation with NATO, were able to agree to foreclose forward deployments of nuclear weapons in
Europe in a mutual, reciprocal, and verifiable manner, this step should contribute to deemphasizing the role of
nuclear weapons in Europe. It would be a clear signal that both Russia and NATO are committed once and for all to
denuclearization of the former East-West confrontation.

2. FOREGOING FORWARD NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENT IS CRITICAL TO RELATIONS
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, A standing committee of the National Academy of Sciences
created in 1980 to bring the Academy's scientific and technical talent to bear on crucial problems of peace and
security, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, 1997, p. 39.
The committee suggested in Chapter 1 that the United States, in full cooperation with its NATO allies, should give
serious consideration to seeking an agreement with Russia and other affected states that would prohibit the forward
deployment of nuclear weapons in Central Europe. Foreclosing such deployments in a binding, reciprocal, and
verifiable manner would be a clear signal that both Russia and NATO were committed to denuclearization of their
relationship.

EFFECTIVE MONITORING TECHNOLOGIES AND VERIFICATION ARE POSSIBLE

1. EFFECTIVE MONITORING TECHNOLOGIES MAKE VERIFICATION FEASIBLE
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, A standing committee of the National Academy of Sciences
created in 1980 to bring the Academy's scientific and technical talent to bear on crucial problems of peace and
security, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, 1997, p. 38.
Although no single measure would guarantee against cheating, taken together such measures would create a web of
access points and data, so that it would be increasingly difficult and risky to hide a strategically significant cache of
weapons. Significant advances in recent years in the technologies for remote and proximate sensing, tamper-proof
labeling, information processing, and long-range communication would in principle allow immediately verifiable
monitoring of all declared nuclear warheads and fissionable materials—if the U.S. and Russian governments
unreservedly agreed to collaborate in the comprehensive application of these technologies. Limited experiments in
cooperative monitoring have already been undertaken under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Nunn-
Lugar Act) and serve to
demonstrate its basic feasibility.

2. EVEN IMPERFECT MONITORING REDUCES UNCERTAINTY
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, A standing committee of the National Academy of Sciences
created in 1980 to bring the Academy's scientific and technical talent to bear on crucial problems of peace and
security, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, 1997, p. 37.
The very large numbers of nuclear warheads in today's nuclear arsenals leave little incentive to cheat, but as the
numbers are reduced verification will become an increasingly important issue. Since nuclear weapons can be small
and portable, and not easily detectable by technical means, a regime that would provide high confidence of locating
a small number of hidden warheads would be extremely difficult to achieve. Even an imperfect verification regime
would greatly reduce the uncertainties in present U.S. estimates of the number of Russian warheads, and enable
reductions to proceed further than otherwise.




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THE CISAC IS A HIGHLY QUALIFIED BODY

1. THE CISAC IS A STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
Bruce Alberts, President of the National Academy of Sciences, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
POLICY, 1997, p. v.
Unlike most National Research Council committees, which are formed to carry out a particular study and then
dissolved when their task is complete, the Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) is a
standing committee of the National Academy of Sciences. CISAC was created in 1980 to bring the Academy's
scientific and technical talent to bear on crucial problems of peace and security. The committee's objectives are to
engage scientists in other countries in dialogues that build a common understanding of security issues and work
toward common solutions to arms control and security problems, to develop recommendations and other initiatives
on scientific and technical issues affecting international security and cooperation, to respond to requests from the
U.S. government for analysis and advice on these issues, and to inform and foster the interest of scientists and
engineers in international security problems.

2. THE NAS COMMITTEE WAS WELL QUALIFIED
Mike Moore, editor, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, September/October 1997, p. 14.
The 110-page report, called The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, was prepared by the Academy's 16-
member Committee on International Security and Arms Control, and released June 17. John P. Holdren, director of
the Program in Science, Technology, and Public Policy at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of
Government, chairs the committee. Gen. William F. Burns, a former director of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, directed the study. The academy, a private, congressionally chartered institution, regularly
analyzes pressing scientific and technical questions and makes public-policy recommendations.

3. CISAC IS COMPOSED OF HIGHLY QUALIFIED INDIVIDUALS
Bruce Alberts, President of the National Academy of Sciences, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
POLICY, 1997, p. v.
The committee's rotating membership includes scientists, engineers, and policy analysts. John P. Holdren (Harvard
University) serves as chair of the committee, with John Steinbruner (The Brookings Institution) as vice-chair.
Together, CISAC's members have many decades of experience in nuclear policy, many in senior government
positions, dating back to the Manhattan Project (see Appendix A for biographies). All of them are currently involved
in security affairs on at least a part-time basis.

4. THE CHAIR OF THE CISAC NUCLEAR WEAPONS REPORT WAS EXTREMELY QUALIFIED
Bruce Alberts, President of the National Academy of Sciences, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
POLICY, 1997, p. vi.
Major General William F. Burns (USA, ret.) chaired this study for CISAC. He has been engaged in many aspects of
nuclear policy over the years; one of his first assignments was to an artillery battalion armed with tactical nuclear
weapons on the front lines of NATO and, after a distinguished military career, one of his last government
assignments was as director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. CISAC is deeply indebted to him for
accepting this demanding task and seeing it to completion with patience, good humor, and unflagging intellectual
engagement in shaping the committee's conclusions and recommendations. Every member of CISAC contributed to
the text of the study; Steve Fetter, John P. Holdren, Spurgeon Keeny, and Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky undertook
particularly heavy drafting assignments.




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             NUCLEAR STIGMA DISADVANTAGE ANSWERS
WE MUST MOVE AWAY FROM THE COLD WAR DETERRENCE NOTION

1. THE U.S. MUST MOVE AWAY FROM THE CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE STRATEGY
Fred C. Ikle, former Under Secretary of Defense and currently a distinguished scholar at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Summer 1997, p. 87.
Yet with or without START II, nuclear weapons will remain plentiful, are becoming more widely available, and
thousands of them will be kept ready for instant use. If just one or two nuclear bombs should explode somewhere -
whether by accident, because of a terrorist act, or as part of a military campaign - the international order would be
transformed more profoundly than by the collapse of the Soviet empire. The U.S. will be unprepared for this
contingency if it clings to the Cold War strategy of bipolar deterrence alone, based on the threat of mutual genocide.
The demise of the Soviet empire ought to have made it easier to develop strategies to complement or, where
necessary, substitute for deterrence. Alas, new thinking has been obstructed by the Cold War’s nuclear detritus and
by ingrained habits of thinking.

2. CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE CREATES DESTABILIZING UNCERTAINTY
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, A standing committee of the National Academy of Sciences
created in 1980 to bring the Academy's scientific and technical talent to bear on crucial problems of peace and
security, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, 1997, p. 25.
There is also the dilemma of deciding "How much is enough?" in the sense of how many nuclear weapons, of what
destructive power, delivered with what degree of assurance, against what set of targets will suffice to deter a
country's potential adversaries, in all the diversity and unknowability of their motivation and mental state. There is
the related dilemma of whether an amount judged to be enough, for purposes of making the retaliatory threat, would
ever be seen as proportionate or appropriate by the leaders who have to decide whether to carry out the threat after
deterrence has failed. The dilemmas of secrecy, wherein the adversary needs to know something of the plans for
retaliation in order to be deterred, but must not know too much lest this enable him to take countermeasures that
would reduce the retaliation's effectiveness—and, hence, the effectiveness of the threat—also arise. Finally, there is
the dilemma, discussed earlier, that the assertion by some countries of a need and right to practice nuclear deterrence
may eventually encourage additional countries to assert the same need and right, leading to proliferation of nuclear
weapons and, hence, a more dangerous world.

3. A FOCUS ON DETERRENCE AS A GENOCIDAL OPTION MUST BE REJECTED
Eric Markusen, professor of sociology and social work, Southwest State University, Minnesota, and David Kopf,
professor of history, University of Minnesota, THE HOLOCAUST AND STRATEGIC BOMBING, 1995, p. 272.
Maintaining the capacity for nuclear omnicide is justified on the grounds that it is necessary in order to deter conflict
from breaking out. By focusing on the alleged deterrent value of nuclear weapons, those responsible for them can
avoid thinking about their inherently genocidal nature as well as the implications of their use should deterrence fail.
As physicist and former defense scientist Herbert York stated, the "fixation on deterrence provides the hooker" that
enables humane, decent people to "produce … the most hideous and destructive kinds of weapons." Indeed, the
focus on the "healing" function of deterrence tends to push aside recognition that the very preparations for nuclear
"war," which create a state of "permanent war threat," run the risk of precipitating the very catastrophe the weapons
are designed to prevent.




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REDUCING OUR AGGRESSIVE STANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS BEST

1. REDUCING FORCES AND REVISING OPERATIONS REDUCES RISK OF DISASTERS
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, A standing committee of the National Academy of Sciences
created in 1980 to bring the Academy's scientific and technical talent to bear on crucial problems of peace and
security, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, 1997, p. 5.
First, reducing U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and revising operations for the mission of fulfilling only the core
function will decrease the continuing risk of accidental, erroneous, or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons for
several reasons. Smaller arsenals will be easier to safeguard and protect from accident, theft, and unauthorized use,
not only by virtue of reduced numbers of weapons to monitor at a smaller number of sites but also by permitting
retention of only those weapons with the most modern safety and security features. Reducing alert rates, decreasing
capacities to use nuclear weapons quickly and with little warning, abandoning plans for the rapid use of nuclear
weapons, and deploying cooperative measures to assure states that forces are not being readied for attack should
reduce the probability and consequences of erroneous nuclear weapons use—for example, on false warning of
attack. (Of course it is extremely important to take care that reductions in deployed nuclear warheads—and
dismantlement of the warheads made surplus as a result—do not lead to countervailing increases in the dangers of
theft and unauthorized use as a consequence of inattention to the challenges of safe storage of these weapons and the
nuclear materials removed from them.)

2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE LESS STRATEGICALLY USEFUL IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
Goodpaster Committee, the Steering Committee for the Project on Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction, THE
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Summer 1997, p. 93.
In our view, U.S. nuclear weapons are of declining military and political utility in both addressing the residual
threats of the Cold War and in countering emerging threats to the security of the United States. There is no need for
the United States to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear opponent; sufficient U.S. conventional forces can
and should be maintained to counter non-nuclear threats. In our view, the only military role of nuclear weapons
should be to deter nuclear threats to the population and territory of the United States, to U.S. forces abroad, and to
certain friendly states.

3. EMPHASIZING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL ENCOURAGE PROLIFERATION
Goodpaster Committee, the Steering Committee for the Project on Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction, THE
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Summer 1997, p. 94.
While would-be proliferators may be motivated primarily by developments in their immediate regions, the actions
and policies of the two largest nuclear powers could effect the health and durability of the nonproliferation regime
more generally. A re-emphasis, or even continuing emphasis, on nuclear weapons in U.S. policy, for example,
would undermine the United States’s ability to persuade other states to cap, to reduce, or to eliminate their nuclear
weapons capabilities.

DETERRENCE AGAINST TERRORISM IS POINTLESS

1. DETERRENCE POSTURE ACTUALLY ENHANCES THE RISK OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Douglas Roche, former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament and Member of the Canadian Parliament currently
Visiting Professor at the University of Alberta, INESAP BULLETIN, November 1997, p. 4.
The NWS claim that stolen fissile material could be acquired by a terrorist group and used to produce a bomb. This
can never be discounted, but if a terrorist organization did wish to kill on a mass scale, biological, and even
chemical, weapons would be a likelier choice than nuclear, since they are both simpler and less expensive to make.
The problem of terrorism is growing, but maintaining nuclear weapons cannot help to resolve it. How could a state
retaliate against terrorists with nuclear weapons? The very idea of using nuclear weapons to attack terrorists in the
middle of a populous centre is absurd. State retention of nuclear weapons is likely to increase, rather than decrease,
the risks of non-State nuclear terrorism.




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THE U.S. CAN DEAL WITH THREATS EVEN WITH MASSIVE CUTS

1. MASSIVE REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES STILL ALLOWS ADEQUATE DEFENSES
Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington,
D.C., ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Spring 1997, p. 84.
In the final analysis, the United States should take the lead in reducing its reliance on nuclear forces, not simply
because such a move may increase international support for nonproliferation efforts but because the transformation
to a post-Cold War strategic strike force will confer political and strategic benefits. By all means, the United States
should hedge, but it should also seize the opportunity to lead.

2. ARMS CONTROL AND DE-ALERTING WILL SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE NUCLEAR PERIL
Frank Von Hippel, professor of public and international affairs at Princeton and former assistant director for
National Security in the White house Office of Science and Technology Policy, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC
SCIENTIST, May/June 1997, p. 36.
The United States, which emerged from the Cold War as the only true superpower, must take the lead in launching
new initiatives to reduce these dangers by achieving an agreement with Russia to quickly take most nuclear weapons
off alert and by negotiating additional deep cuts beyond START III.

3. WEAPONS REDUCTIONS WILL BOLSTER THE GLOBAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIME
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, A standing committee of the National Academy of Sciences
created in 1980 to bring the Academy's scientific and technical talent to bear on crucial problems of peace and
security, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, 1997, p. 5.
Second, further reductions will bolster the nuclear nonproliferation regime. U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions
will not in themselves dissuade a state bent on acquiring nuclear weapons; today's undeclared nuclear powers and
would-be proliferators are driven above all by regional security concerns. In such cases, the denial of material and
technical resources and a combination of political and economic incentives and disincentives provide the greatest
leverage. But U.S. and Russian progress in arms reductions helps shore up global support for antiproliferation
measures; and lack of such progress can strengthen the influence of those arguing for nuclear weapons acquisition in
countries where this is under internal debate.

4. WE COULD STILL MAINTAIN STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES WITH MANY LESS WEAPONS
Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington,
D.C., ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Spring 1997, p. 84.
In the years ahead, the U.S. military may need to confront the threat of a rogue state with a small number of nuclear
weapons or deal with state-sponsored irregular forces capable of attacking U.S. territory with weapons of mass
destruction. In both these cases, deterrence, preemption, and retaliation could be supported by a small fraction of the
current U.S. nuclear arsenal.




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THREAT CONSTRUCTION KRITIK SHELL
A. FIAT IS UTOPIAN - THE JUDGE DOES NOT SIGN A BALLOT WITH THE CONCERN THAT AN
INCORRECT VOTE WILL CAUSE DEATH FOR MILLIONS FROM AN ADVANTAGE OR
DISADVANTAGE OF SIMPLIFIED POLICIES. INSTEAD, THE LANGUAGE DEBATERS CHOOSE TO
REPRESENT IDEAS IS THE ONLY ‘REAL,’ TANGIBLE EDUCATIONAL ISSUE IN THE ROUND. THESE
SPEECH ACTS REFLECT HOW DEBATERS THINK THE WORLD IS ACCURATELY CREATED AND
REPRESENTED. THE LANGUAGE USED HAS IMPLICATION FOR THE WAY THAT WE LOOK AT THE
WORLD. THESE SPEECH ACTS SHOULD BE THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF THE ROUND, BECAUSE OUR
ASSUMPTIONS MOTIVATE OUR CLAIMS AND INFLUENCE OTHERS IN THIS ROUND THROUGH
THEIR ARTICULATION.

B. THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE CONSTRUCTION IS A SPEECH ACT INVOKING THE IDEA OF A RUSSIAN
ENEMY THAT THREATENS OUR SECURITY. THIS IS ONLY A MORE RECENT MANIFESTATION OF
THE TYPE OF ENEMY CREATION ONCE PERFORMED ON AN EASILY REDUCIBLE KREMLIN SOVIET
STATE. SUCH CONSTRUCTS ARE BOTH FALSE AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.
Ron Lipschutz, associate professor of politics and Director of the Adlai Stevenson Program on Global Security, UC
Santa Cruz, ON SECURITY, 1995. p. 219.
Why are enemies so important to our collective selves? Why are we driven to find new ones when the body of the
old one is hardly yet cold (and might yet be revived, perhaps with our unwitting assistance)?: Consider what is said
to threaten our security today. An incomplete list would include terrorism (infection by fanaticism); nuclear
proliferation (infection by irradiation or, perhaps, blackmail – making us behave as we never would want to);
environmental degradation (infection by Nature or ourselves); immigration (by religion or culture); drugs (by
turning us into mindless robots); and AIDS (by tainting our bodily fluids). Consider how in the past, at one time or
another, many of these “threats” were said to be fostered and assisted by the Kremlin and its state and non-state
proxies. Now, when there is no one single enemy anywhere, there are enemies everywhere, inside as well as outside.
If this is so, then the threat of social chaos, the loss of self, can arise from within, from the “wild zones” inside of
each of us (shades of Hobbes!). Can the existence of such wild zones be tolerated by the “tame zones” of the
individual coalition proposed by Barry Buzan? Do the former not pose a threat to the very organizing principles of
the latter? Can they be contained or excluded? The chapters by Dan Deudney and Pearl-Alice Marsh remind us just
how difficult it can be discipline wildness and direct tameness, even when, to some, the world appears to be black
and white. Even as the nuclear doctrine sought to secure the United States against the enemy, it threatened the very
people it was intended to protect. And, even as U.S. security policy in southern Africa promised to protect the home
appliances apparently deemed so important to the American people by its leaders, so, too, did it also raise the
possibility of a cessation in the very mineral flows that made those appliances feasible and affordable. Contradictory
speech acts emerged from this process, undermining security policy and leaving behind less security, rather than
more.

C. THERE ARE TWO IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS

1. THE AFFIRMATIVE BOLSTERS AND CREATES THE PROBLEM IT TRIES TO SOLVE. BY INVOKING
FEARS OF SECURITY, IT ONLY BREEDS INSECURITY. EVEN ON A POST-FIAT LEVEL, THEIR OWN
WAY OF FRAMING A 1AC ADVANTAGE, THE NARRATIVE THAT THEY CONSTRUCT, TURNS BACK
ON ITSELF.

2. THE JUDGE MUST REJECT THE AFFIRMATIVE FOR INVOKING THE PROBLEM IT PURPORTS TO
ERADICATE. THEIR ENEMY CREATION AND DISCURSIVE ENACTMENT IS A COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
CONSTRUCT, AND SUCH CARTOONISH, SIMPLIFIED, AND DANGEROUS PORTRAYALS SHOULD BE
REJECTED. LANGUAGE SHAPES REALITY BY GIVING MEANING TO SITUATIONS AND BY NAMING
PEOPLE, COUNTRIES, EVENTS, AND PURPOSES. AN AFFIRMATIVE BALLOT WOULD ONLY
ENDORSE THE IDEA THAT THERE ARE ‘RUSSIAN THREATS’ LURKING IN THE SHADOWS IN NEED
OF ERADICATION.




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THREAT CONSTRUCTIONS ARE NOT OBJECTIVE, THEY ARE LINGUISTIC

1. INVOKING A SUPPOSED ‘INTERNATIONAL THREAT’ IS A TAUTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
James Der Derian, associate professor of political science, the University of Massachusetts in Amherst, ON
SECURITY, 1995, p. 25.
The rapidity of change in the international system, as well as the inability of international theory to make sense of
that change, raises this question: Of what value is security? More specifically, just how secure is this preeminent
concept of international relations? This evaluation of security invokes interpretive strategies to ask epistemological,
ontological, and political questions – questions that all too often are ignored, subordinated, or displaced by the
technically biased, narrowly framed question of what it takes to achieve security. The goal, then, of this inquiry is to
make philosophically problematic that which has been practically axiomatic in international relations. The first step
is to ask whether the paramount value of security lies in its abnegation of the insecurity of all values. No other
concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of “security.”
In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign
states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature – as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign
states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into
a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have
been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We
have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of
only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed,
within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida
“as a series of substitutions of center for center” in a perpetual search for the “transcendental signified.” From God,
to Rational Man, from Empire to Republic, from King to the People – and on occasion in the reverse direction as
well, for history is never so linear, never so near as we would write it – the security of the center has been the
shifting site from which the voices of authority, order, and identity philosophically defined and physically kept at
bay anarchy, chaos, and difference. Yet the center, as modern poets and postmodern critics tell us, no longer holds.
The demise of a bipolar system, the diffusion of power into new political, national, and economic constellations, the
decline of civil society and the rise of the shopping mall, the acceleration of everything – transportation, capital and
information flows, change itself – have induced a new anxiety. As George Bush repeatedly said – that is, until the
1992 presidential election went into full swing – “The enemy is unpredictability. The enemy is instability.” One
immediate response, the unthinking reaction, is to master this anxiety and to resecure the center by remapping the
peripheral threats. In this vein, the Pentagon prepares seven military scenarios for future conflict, ranging from
latino small-fry to an IdentiKit superenemy that goes by the generic ancronym of REDT (“Reemergent Global
Threat”).

2. THE NOTION OF DIFFERENCE IS USED TO CONSTRUCT A DANGER OR A THREAT
David Campbell, assistant professor of political science, Johns Hopkins University, WRITING SECURITY, 1992,
p. 2-3.
Furthermore, the role of interpretation in the articulation of danger is not restricted to the process by which some
risks come to be considered more serious than others. An important site of interpretation is the way in which certain
modes or representation crystallize around referents marked as dangers. Given the often tenuous relationship
between an interpretation of danger and the ‘objective’ incidence of behaviors and factors thought to constitute it,
the capacity for a particular risk to be represented in terms of characteristics that are reviled in the community said
to be threatened can be an important impetus to an interpretation of danger. As later chapters will demonstrate, the
ability to represent things as alien, subversive, dirty, or sick, has been pivotal to the articulation of danger in the
American experience. In this context, it is also important to note that there need not be an action or event to provide
the grounds for an interpretation of danger. the mere existence of an alternative mode of being, the presence of
which exemplifies that different identities are possible and thus denaturalize the claim of a particular identity to be
the true identity, is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.




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THREATS ARE CREATED AS A FUNCTION OF IDENTITY SOLIDIFICATION

1. EMPIRICALLY, FOREIGN POLICY ENEMY CREATION IS A FORM OF CRAFTING COLLECTIVE
IDENTIFICATION, RATHER THAT DEFINING AN OBJECTIVE THREAT
David Campbell, assistant professor of political science, Johns Hopkins University, WRITING SECURITY, 1992,
p. 186-187.
The text of post-war Foreign Policy reviewed in the first chapter demonstrates two interesting things about the
interpretation of the Soviet Union and its attendant dangers. Firstly, that it was the capacity of the Soviet Union to
manifest political chaos - and in the absence of the Soviet Union, another country, another group, or the threat of
anarchy per se - which were the motivating concerns of the time. Secondly, that concern for the forces of disorder
was represented in terms of the narratives of otherness which have been central to the American experience. The
conclusion was that the cold war was a struggle which exceeded any military threat of the Soviet Union, and into
which any number of political candidates - regardless of their strategic capacity to be a threat - were slotted as a
danger. In this chapter, that proposition has been supported by a consideration of the ‘domestic’ and cultural terrain
of the cold war. Because the modes of representation through which the danger of communism and the Soviet Union
have been interpreted replicate both the logic and the figurations of past articulations of danger, it has been argued
that the cold war was not dependent upon (through clearly influenced by) the Soviet Union for its character. Instead,
I have maintained that the cold war was an important moment in the (re)production of American identity animated
by a concern for the ethical boundaries of identity rather than the territorial borders of the state.

2. THE NOTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL ENEMY IS A QUICK-FIX FUNCTION OF IDENTITY
FORMATION
Ron Lipschutz, associate professor of politics and Director of the Adlai Stevenson Program on Global Security, UC
Santa Cruz, ON SECURITY, 1995, p. 218.
Defining oneself in such terms requires defining someone else in different terms; differentiation thus draws a
boundary between self and the Other. This Other is not, at first, necessarily a threat in terms of one’s own continued
existence, although ethnicity can and does become securitized. But the peaceful acceptance of an Other requires that
boundaries be drawn somewhere else, and that security, the speech act, specify another Other (as in, for example,
South Slavs against the Hapsburgs, or Yugoslavia against the Soviet Union). There are always implicit risks in the
peaceful acceptance of an other as a legitimate ontology, because doing so raises the possibility, however remote, of
accepting the Other’s characteristics as a legitimate alternative, and, consequently, of being taken over by the Other.
Given this epistemology of threats, it does not take much to be ‘turned.’ How else to account for the life and death
character of the distinctions among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia, which the untutored eye can hardly
detect? As Jame Der Derian puts it in his contribution to this volume, “The desire for security is manifested as a
collective resentment of difference – that which is not us, not certain, not predictable.” The loss of the Enemy can be
seen, therefore, as something of a catastrophe for an identity based on that Enemy, and it opens up a search for a
new Other that can function as the new Enemy. And, make no mistake about it: While the myths underlying
American identity are many, during the Cold War the strongest one had to do with not being, not becoming,
Communist, both individually and collectively. In a world dominated by Great Powers and balance-of-power
politics, as was the case prior to World War II, losing one enemy was not a problem; there were others to be found.
In the post-bipolar world, the search for enemies and new security threats is less easily solved, inasmuch as the
disappearance of the only other that counts leaves no Other that can credibly fill its place.




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RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE SECURE

1. ON-SITE INSPECTIONS PROVE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE AS SECURE AS OURS
General Eugene E. Habiger, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, AIR FORCE MAGAZINE,
February 1998, p. 74.
"During [NATO meetings in October], Secretary of Defense Cohen . . . asked Sergeyev's view of the safety and
security of their nuclear weapons and, as I recall, General Sergeyev said that his nuclear weapons were as safe and
secure as those in the United States. Secretary Cohen said, 'Well, General Habiger is going to be visiting you within
the next few weeks. Could you perhaps show him how you go about doing that?' General Sergeyev said yes." "I was
. . . not expecting . . . to actually go into a nuclear weapons storage site. On Friday, two weeks ago [Oct. 24], that's
exactly what I did. I went to a nuclear weapons storage site at . . . [an] SS-24 missile base at Kostroma, which is a
little over 300 kilometers northeast of Moscow. I was taken into the facility. I was shown the security.

2. THE PROBLEM OF THEFT IS BEING SOLVED BY RUSSIAN FACILITIES
Nikolai Kravchenko, head of the Nuclear Materials Division on the Russian State Customs Committee,
FRONTLINE - LOOSE NUKES: INVESTIGATING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR SMUGGLING, 1998, p. np.,
http://www2.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/nukes/, accessed April 20, 1998.
The problem of theft is being solved locally, at the nuclear facilities. On the other hand, in order to stop trafficking,
illegal shipment to other countries, we also have to tighten security at the facilities and equip our borders with
reliable technology. But let us not forget that Russia is a bridge between Europe and Asia.

3. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY IS BETTER NOW THAN IT HAS BEEN BEFORE
William M. Arkin, staff writer, THE NATION, September 29, 1997, p. 6.
Contrary to the doomsayers' contentions, security and control of nuclear weapons in Russia is probably better today
than five years ago. Nuclear weapons have all been moved to Russia; there are a tenth as many storage locations as
there were in 1991. Hustlers continue to attempt to smuggle nuclear materials from civilian institutions and reactors,
but even then the quantities are minute, and the bomb-making significance moot. At this point, it's customary to say
that no amount of vigilance is too great given the danger, and that the state of the Russian Army is cause for alarm;
but a more interesting question is: Who benefits from the fearmongering?

4. THE RUSSIANS TAKE NUCLEAR SECURITY EXTREMELY SERIOUSLY
General Eugene E. Habiger, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, AIR FORCE MAGAZINE,
February 1998, p. 74.
"I saw one site, and I was assured by General Yakovlev and General Kirillov, who is the commander of the 27th
Rocket Army [and] who accompanied me on this leg of the trip, that what I saw was representative. And if what I
saw was representative, yes, I have confidence in the safety and security of their nuclear weapons stockpile. "They
are deadly serious about this. This is a very valuable resource. It is something that in the wrong hands would be a
very dangerous resource, and they go to great lengths. The security personnel, I was told, and just from what I saw, I
would tend to believe, that they are elite. They call themselves the 10-Alpha Force. They are regularly tested by an
anti-terrorist group that comes around to these kinds of facilities and attempts penetration."




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THE TERRORIST THREAT IS MINIMAL

1. THE RUSSIAN MAFIA IS NOT INVOLVED IN SMUGGLING FISSIONABLE MATERIAL
Paul Mann, staff writer, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, October 20, 1997, p. 76.
A new investigation by a think tank here, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), found ''little or
no evidence of formal or prolific [Russian] organized crime involvement in the trafficking of fissionable material.''
The CSIS task force also found that the majority of reported thefts has involved materials below weapons-grade
quality, stolen by ''petty criminals who think there is a market for them.'' The task force report draws heavily on data
and information from the U.S. government, including the FBI, the Pentagon, National Defense University, the
Justice and State Depts. and the Senate permanent subcommittee on investigations.

2. RUSSIA IS PREPARED TO HANDLE TERRORIST ASSAULTS ON FACILITIES
General Eugene E. Habiger, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, AIR FORCE MAGAZINE,
February 1998, p. 74.
"On the down side, we tend to use high-technology devices much more than the Russians do. For example, we use
television sensors, low-light television cameras, to monitor certain areas. The Russians have not made that capital
investment. Manpower is relatively inexpensive for them, and they use more eyeballs, if you will. I specifically
asked if they use things like night-vision goggles, and I was assured that they do. "During the course of this little
exercise, when I asked what would you do if this were to happen, the two-star Russian Strategic Rocket Forces
general who was accompanying me directed them to show me exactly what they would do, and they went to the
extremes of not only getting their weapons out but issuing the ammunition and then pulling out an armored
personnel carrier that was in a garage right behind the facility where the troops were bedded down -- an experience
that I was impressed with.

3. THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM IS EXAGGERATED
NUCLEAR NEWS, February 1998 p. 61.
Some participants pointed out that terrorists would more likely opt to use other weapons of mass destruction, if only
because the materials were more readily available and probably easier to use. It was also said that fears of
substantial smuggling from post-USSR countries were exaggerated.

4. THE THREAT OF TERRORISM IS EMPIRICALLY DENIED
Colin McMahon, staff writer, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, September 24, 1997, p. 1D.
"If the Russian prime minister thinks he can sleep peacefully, then let him sleep. But one can sleep calmly only after
this information is checked." Shabdurasulov said that if any groups had such a weapon and were planning nuclear
blackmail, they would have been heard from by now. He also suggested such rumors were timed to put Moscow on
the defensive before the arrival of Gore and a brigade of U.S. officials for three days of high-level talks with
Chernomyrdin and their Russian counterparts.

5. THE CSIS STUDY PROVES THE RUSSIAN MAFIA HAS NO MOTIVE TO GET INVOLVED
Paul Mann, staff writer, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, October 20, 1997, p. 76.
Graham T. Allison, a former high-ranking Pentagon official and a Harvard authority on ''loose nukes,'' agreed with
the central CSIS finding. ''The happy surprise -- so far -- has been that [Russian] organized crime hasn't taken a more
active, aggressive interest in this arena and that's even been a puzzle,'' he said in an interview. ''It is not a case of 'no
interest,' but organized crime has been able to deal in other things, like precious metals.




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THE DIVERSION RISK IS MINIMAL

1. THE BRAIN-DRAIN SCENARIO IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY
Christoph Bluth, professor at the graduate school of European and international studies at the University of Reading,
JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, December 1, 1997, p. 548.
When the Soviet Union collapsed it was feared that some of the 2,000 people from the FSU who know how to build
a nuclear weapon could be tempted by attractive offers from other countries with clandestine nuclear weapon
programmes. The 'brain drain' of Soviet nuclear engineers seems less likely now, with some having founds jobs in
the West and others being more adequately supported in Russia, although lower-level technical experts may still be
tempted by offers from abroad.

2. THE "LOOSE NUKES" RHETORIC IS JUST A MONEYMAKING RUSE
William M. Arkin, staff writer, THE NATION, September 29, 1997, p. 6.
Rumors of nukes falling into the wrong hands started to circulate during the Soviet Union's last year, and a window
of danger definitely existed during its breakup, given an arsenal scattered over 600 sites throughout not just the
Soviet Union but Eastern Europe as well. Almost immediately, interested parties sought to capitalize on the
apprehension: Even though nationalistic strife was in the news, Gorbachev and his people, speaking to U.S. officials
off the record, justified crackdown and violence in Baku and elsewhere because of the need to protect nuclear
weapons from seizure. Hard-liners in the Bush Administration then used the loose-nukes nightmare to demonstrate
that they were right in supporting Gorbachev and a union. After the breakup, the new Russian government itself
learned to profit. Viktor Mikhailov, the J. Edgar Hoover-like atomic czar, uses loose nukes as a valuable fundraising
mechanism--the United States has spent $1 billion in Russia since 1993 to help keep the Pandora's box closed. And
as the sky-is-falling story circulates, those who benefit range from intelligence agencies (bigger budgets--adios
peace dividend) to the peace movement and the left (Oh my God, nukes must go!), the right (Oh my God, nukes
must stay!), the arms control community (a cottage industry is born again) and even the media (great story!).

3. THE LOOSE NUKES RUMOR IS FALSE
William M. Arkin, staff writer, THE NATION, September 29, 1997, p. 6.
Six years after the fall of the Soviet Union, loose nukes are still more smoke than fire. Journalists have chased down
countless rumors, coming up with nothing concrete. Fearmongering rules because it's virtually impossible to prove a
negative.

4. THERE IS NO RISK OF LOOSE NUKES
Carol J. Williams, staff writer, LOS ANGELES TIMES, September 24, 1997, p. A1.
Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev insisted after Yablokov's concern was revealed Monday that the Kremlin's
nuclear arsenal is under thorough control. Pena said Chernomyrdin and the Russian ministers responsible for nuclear
security assured Gore that there is no reason to fear the possibility of loose nukes landing in the hands of dangerous
elements.




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RUSSIA IS NOT A MILITARY THREAT

1. MANY INHIBITIONS PREVENT RUSSIAN AGGRESSION
THE ECONOMIST, January 3, 1998, p. 17.
It is by no means clear when, or even whether, Moscow will have a central government with enough authority to
make St. Petersburg, Vladivostok and Rostov-on-Don agree upon a single foreign policy. And ordinary Russians so
far seem uncommonly relaxed about the outside world. They have proved admirably resistant to the wave of
vengeful nationalism which a few years ago some excitable non-Russians thought was about to sweep over them;
remember that non-event, Vladimir Zhirinovsky? Whether Russia ever really rejoins the superpower club remains a
toss-up.

2. RUSSIA IS NO THREAT -- ITS MILITARY IS IN SHAMBLES
Sherman Garnett, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
March/April 1997, p. 61.
There are also military limits on Russian foreign policy. Russia remains a preeminent nuclear power, but the Soviet
Union's ability to project great conventional power is in ruins. Whether measured by quantitative standards like the
number of divisions, tanks, fighter aircraft, or ships at sea, or such qualitative factors as morale and fighting spirit,
the Russian military is in crisis. While its performance in Chechnya does not mean the military would fight poorly in
other circumstances, particularly if Russia faced a serious threat to its sovereignty, the shortcomings that the war in
Chechnya has exposed -- from poor morale to gross mismanagement -- would surely affect any military operation
conducted for at least the next decade.

3. WESTERN ANALYSES ARE BIASED; THERE IS NO THREAT FROM RUSSIA
Anatol Lieven, senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. and a former Moscow
correspondent for The Times of London, THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter 1997, p. 39.
Another reason for the lack of Western recognition that Russia is now a classic weak state is that it would mean
admitting that Russia has lost its position of central importance both on the world stage and for Western interests;
such recognition does not come easily to Western experts on Russia. (This recognition doesn't come easily to me
either -- after all, I have devoted a large chunk of my life to studying Russia, and my present livelihood depends on
Americans' continuing interest in the place.) For this reason, few Western experts will admit fully to Russia's
collapsed role, and of course neither will the Russians.

4. RUSSIA’S MILITARY IS INCAPABLE OF ENGAGING IN WAR
Anatol Lieven, senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. and a former Moscow
correspondent for The Times of London, THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn 1996, p. 49.
Today, however, the Russian army is a wreck, and in the estimate of both Russian experts an the Western military
attaches based in Moscow, it would take 10 years at least, even in optimal circumstances, to restore it as an effective
force capable of fighting a major war. In the meantime, with the help of local allies, it can probably maintain
existing positions in Transdniester, Abkhazia, and Tajikistan against weak and divided local states and opposition
forces; but the threat of military coercion against Ukraine and Uzbekistan, for example, has vanished--perhaps only
temporarily, but perhaps also permanently, given general changes in Russian attitudes and cultural patterns.




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THE RISK OF ACCIDENTS AND MISCALCULATION IS LOW

1. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) ASSURES NO RUSSIAN WEAPONS THREAT
Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense For Policy, THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE:
HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND
FEDERAL SERVICES OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS OF THE U.S. SENATE,
105TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION (February 12, 1997), 1997, p. 22.
First, Russia has made great progress and we do not regard it as a potential military threat under its present, or any
reasonably foreseeable government. We wisely invest substantially in the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, in
future arms control--and we share with the current Russian leadership (and most of their opponents) a determination
not to let our relations return to a state of hostility in which these weapons would be a threat.

2. RISK OF ACCIDENTS IS EXTREMELY LOW
Robert G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, director and deputy director of the Center for Counterproliferation Research
at National Defense University, ORBIS, Winter 1998, p. 12.
It is a truism that there is and always has been some level of risk of accident or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons.
But just as there is a risk of a major dam breaking or an accident at a nuclear power plant, the real issue is how to
manage and mitigate these risks. Current programs that make our stockpile and that of the former Soviet Union more
secure are essential. But reducing the numbers of warheads does not itself guarantee a reduction in risk. In any
event, the risk of accidents or unauthorized use, though real, must be judged low, and this risk must be measured
against national security benefits gained from retaining nuclear weapons.

3. CTR HAS ENHANCED STABILITY OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES
Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense For Policy, THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE:
HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND
FEDERAL SERVICES OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS OF THE U.S. SENATE,
105TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION (February 12, 1997), 1997, p. 44-45.
Nevertheless, through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, we are helping to enhance the stability of
the Russian nuclear arsenal by working with Russia on assistance projects to improve the security, control, and
accounting of their nuclear weapons. For example, CTR is providing assistance to improve security at nuclear-
weapon storage sites in Russia and to implement an automated inventory control and management system that will
enhance the Russian MoD's capability to account for and track their nuclear weapons. We are working with Russia
on a number of projects designed to enhance the security of Russian nuclear weapons and weapons components
while being stored or transported to
dismantlement facilities.

4. LIKELIHOOD OF ACCIDENTS HAS BEEN DRAMATICALLY REDUCED
Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense For Policy, THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE:
HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND
FEDERAL SERVICES OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS OF THE U.S. SENATE,
105TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION (February 12, 1997), 1997, p. 8.
We believe the likelihood of accidents has been dramatically reduced since the end of the Cold War, and I
detail the statements which we have made to that end in the statement. In addition, nuclear weapons security in
Russia has been a key element of the Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction program with Russia,
better known as the Nunn-Lugar program, from the beginning. It is clear that Russian's military and civilian leaders
themselves, and for their own reasons, place a high priority on preserving effective control over their nuclear
arsenal. It is every bit in our interest that they should do so. $100 million in CTR assistance has been made available
for projects to enhance security of nuclear
weapons under Ministry of Defense control in Russia.




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THE RISK FROM RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES IS DECLINING

1. PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL HAVE DRAMATICALLY IMPROVED
Paul Mann, executive news editor, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, May 4, 1998, p. 37.
Prospects have improved for major U.S./Russian nuclear arms reductions now that the latest leadership crisis in
Moscow has abated, high-ranking Russian officials and U.S. nuclear experts say. With a new Russian prime minister
in place, the second American/Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START 2) is more likely to be taken up by
Russia's parliament, the State Duma, Russian officials predict. Stalled for months in Duma committees, START 2
would slash each side's deployed nuclear warheads to 3,500 and pave the way for further cuts under a follow-on
START 3 accord. At the moment, Russian officials are suggesting a notional START 3 framework that would
reduce deployed (as distinct from stored) nuclear warheads to 1,000-1,500 for each side. A sublimit would affix
1,000-1,200 warheads on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs) combined.

2. U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION IS ON-TRACK
Karl von Vorys, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1997, p. 142.
As of July 1, 1996, Russia had 5,169 ICBM warheads, 2,496 SLBM warheads, and 921 bomber-carried warheads
for a total of 8,106. For the first time we had rough equivalence in warheads. Indeed, mutual confidence was
growing that the targets set for 2003 would actually be met-no more than 3,500 nuclear warheads on each side. Most
significantly the United States and Russia pledged to dismantle all MIRVd missiles by 2003. To be sure,
circumstances may change, but as of now there is a genuine prospect that MIRV temptation and a first-strike
capability for Russia are altogether obsolete-and, in fact, that Russia has no interest in them.

3. YELTSIN IS BEGINNING TO PUSH START II TOWARD DUMA RATIFICATION
Paul Mann, executive news editor, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, May 4, 1998, p. 37.
START 2's improved prospects stem from the Russian parliament's grudging acceptance Apr. 24 of President Boris
N. Yeltsin's nomination of Sergei N. Kiriyenko to be the new prime minister. Kiriyenko, an economic reformer and
ex-energy ministry official with little national experience, succeeded the recently ousted Viktor S. Chernomyrdin,
who lost his post in late March in one of Yeltsin's habitual cabinet shakeups. Yeltsin had threatened to dissolve
parliament if it rejected Kiriyenko. That would have delayed START 2 indefinitely, perhaps fatally. Plans are afoot
for ''a very strong push'' in late May by the Yeltsin government to win the Duma's ratification of START 2,
according to Sergei Rogov, director of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Science. He
said the lobbying would be led by Russian Defense Minister Igor D. Sergeyev, former head of Russia's Strategic
Rocket Forces, and by Foreign Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov.




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RISK OF ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH IS MINIMAL

1. RUSSIA HAS MULTIPLE FAIL SAFES - ANY COMMAND CENTER MAY ABORT LAUNCHES
General Eugene E. Habiger, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, AIR FORCE MAGAZINE,
February 1998, p. 74.
"I was also exposed to their command centers, from the national level command center down to the command center
in a road-mobile missile, and also a rail-mobile missile, and at all levels [I] saw the individuals on duty, talked to
them, asked them questions. Every question I asked was answered in depth, and the thing that struck me about going
into their command centers, command-and-control centers, is that they are very much geared to a fail-safe mode.
And what I mean by that is that any one of the command centers, from the national level down to the unit level, can
inhibit the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile."

2. AN UNAUTHORIZED LAUNCH BY THE HIGH COMMAND IS IMPLAUSIBLE
Christoph Bluth, professor at the graduate school of European and International Studies at the University of
Reading, JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, December 1, 1997, p. 548.
It is generally assumed that the high military command in the General Staff would be able to initiate the launch of
ICBMs if it chose to seize control of the arsenal because otherwise there would be no retaliatory capability if the
national command authority (the president and the defense minister) were incapacitated or killed in a first strike.
Moreover, the General Staff holds all the codes and provides the inputs into the KAZBEK system. For this reason
alone it would be able to subvert the chain of command. This was vividly illustrated during the 1991 coup when
President Gorbachev's nuclear suitcase was removed and disconnected from the system. Even though the military
leadership clearly could seize command and control over nuclear weapons in this way and launch or threaten to
launch at the USA, such a scenario currently lacks plausibility.

3. RUSSIA HAS SECURE SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED LAUNCHES
General Eugene E. Habiger, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, AIR FORCE MAGAZINE,
February, 1998, p. 74.
"I went into a nuclear weapons storage bunker and saw an operational nuclear weapon. Actually, there were eight of
them on an SS-24 missile. I went in to talk to the security people who were guarding the facility, as a matter of fact,
and every one of my questions was answered." "I was shown a lot of things that I was impressed with. "For
example, in the United States we have a two-person policy involving nuclear weapons. In other words, you have to
have a minimum of two people in order to get close to a nuclear weapon. In Russia it's the three-person policy. . . .
I'm talking about access to a nuclear weapon itself. The launching of a nuclear weapon is very complicated. It is
very -- the controls are very robust. There are a lot of safeguards built in.

4. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL DISAPPEAR IN THE STATUS QUO
Tom Daschle, Senator from South Dakota and intelligence committee member, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD,
March 27, 1998, p. S2700.
According to these articles, knowledgeable experts in the United States and Russia have concluded that, "regardless
of whether the United States and Russia move ahead on bilateral arms-control treaties, a decade from now Russia's
forces will be less than one-tenth the size they were at the peak of Soviet power.'' Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal is
expected to decline from a cold war high of nearly 11,000 weapons in 1990 to a low of roughly 1,000 by 2007--less
than 10 years from now. As evidence, experts point to growing number of Russia's nuclear-powered submarines
piled up in port unfit for patrol, her strategic bombers incapable of combat, and a steady deterioration of her land-
based missile force. In addition, they note that Russia is dedicating few resources to address this decline by
developing new strategic systems. In short, Russia's strategic triad could cease to exist within the next 10 years.




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RUSSIAN WEAPONS ARE UNDER CONTROL

1. RUSSIAN MISSILE FORCES ARE PROFESSIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY MONITORED
General Eugene E. Habiger, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, AIR FORCE MAGAZINE,
February 1998, p. 74.
"In the United States, we have a thing called a personnel reliability program where we monitor our people medically
for any kind of abnormal behavior that would make them unstable around nuclear weapons. The Russians do not
have a program that's exactly like ours, but they have a similar program. Before missile crew members or before
security personnel go on their alert tours, which are three- or four-day cycles, they are personally interviewed by a
medical doctor and a psychologist. "I actually saw a demonstration of the capability of their security forces. It was
not something that was planned; it was something that I asked for at the spur of the moment, and I was very
impressed with these nine young men, the security force that was tasked with guarding this particular facility. The
detachment of nine individuals was commanded by a senior lieutenant, all very professional. They knew what they
were doing."

2. THERE IS LITTLE DANGER FROM RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES
Kathleen C. Bailey, senior fellow at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, FEDERAL DOCUMENT
CLEARING HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, March 31, 1998, p. np.
In August 1997, Major General Vladimir Dvorkin, Chief of the Fourth Central Research Institute (for the Strategic
Rocket Forces) of the Russian Ministry of Defense, made a trip to the United States to address a group of defense
specialists at the US Naval Postgraduate School. His speech dealt extensively with Russian C3. Points he made
included: Russia does not rely principally on launch on warning, but rather on the survivability of its mobile forces;
the US view of Russian C3 vulnerabilities is erroneous; C3 is very centralized in Russia and there is no possibility
that "underlings" can gain control; Russian warning systems are multi-layered; there are positive and negative
hardware controls on tactical nuclear systems that prevent their misuse. He closed with the remark that the United
States should do a better job of understanding the complexity and competence of the Russian C3 system. Efforts to
do just that began in earnest in late 1997, with an exchange of visits involving the head of US Strategic Command,
General Habiger. His impressions of the Russian C3 system were quite positive. He was able to view first-hand the
extensive degree of control over Russian nuclear weapons. While there may always be room for improvement in
nations' C3 capabilities, care must be taken to avoid concluding erroneously that there is "hair-trigger" danger.

3. DANGERS OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE EXAGGERATED
Kathleen C. Bailey, senior fellow at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, FEDERAL DOCUMENT
CLEARING HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, March 31, 1998, p. np.
It is important to consider all evidence regarding Russian C3 before reaching the conclusion that there is significant
danger of an unwarranted, unauthorized, or accidental launch. There are on-going efforts in Russia to modernize
nuclear C3. For example, Russia submarines reportedly no longer have the ability to launch without receipt of
enabling information from the General Staff. Additionally, we should look at what Russian leaders say about C3.
Rodionov's statement-which appears to have been motivated, at least in part, by a desire to increase the amount of
US funding to Russia-was immediately repudiated by high-level Russian officials. The then-Strategic Rocket Forces
Commander and now Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev said the C3 system was not on the verge of failure. His
remarks were supported by President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. Rodionov, in March, declared that
the Russian nuclear forces are "reliable and stable" and excluded "the possibility of unusual situations." Later,
during a trip to the United States in May, Rodionov reassured the United States that the C3 system was not a
problem.




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NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE EMPIRICALLY DETERRED CONFLICT

1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE PREVENTED A NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST
Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary Of Defense For Policy, THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE:
HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND
FEDERAL SERVICES OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS OF THE U.S. SENATE,
105TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION, February 12, 1997, p. 21.
Some argued, even in the Cold War, that the danger of a nuclear holocaust was so great that the risk of possessing
these weapons far outweighed their benefits. I do not agree. Nuclear deterrence helped buy us time, time for internal
forces of upheaval and decay to rend the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and bring about the end of the Cold
War.

2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUCCESSFULLY DETERRED CONFLICT DURING THE COLD WAR
Robert G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, director and deputy director of the Center for Counterproliferation Research
at National Defense University, ORBIS, Winter 1998, p. 8.
While it is impossible to prove what would have happened had nuclear weapons not existed during the Cold War,
the reality of what did not happen--World War III--would seem to vindicate those who advocated a strong nuclear
deterrent. In the first half of the twentieth century tens of millions of combatants and civilians perished in war. In the
second half of the century, millions more died in regional conflicts in which nuclear deterrence did not pertain. Yet
in Europe--arguably the most volatile Cold War battleground and potentially the deadliest because of the enormous
concentration of armed forces there--war did not occur. the threat of escalation and nuclear annihilation made the
prospects of war too horrific and reinforced caution in decision makers on both sides.

3. ABSENCE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE RISKS A GLOBAL CONFLICT
Robert G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, director and deputy director of the Center for Counterproliferation Research
at National Defense University, ORBIS, Winter 1998, p. 11.
Yet, within this realm of considerable ambiguity, policymakers during the Cold War were forced to decide where
the greater risk lay and make decisions with real consequences. Given the awful consequences of failure, the choice
was not simple. On the one hand, nuclear deterrence could fail. In the aftermath of such failure, it was possible (but
by no means certain insofar as a conscious choice for use would have to be made by political authorities) that
nuclear weapons would be unleashed on civilian populations with truly catastrophic consequences. On the other
hand, in the absence of a credible nuclear deterrent, conventional deterrence could fail, as it had so often in the past,
twice globally, resulting in another devastating war with casualties perhaps even greater than those in World War II.

4. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION WAS INHERENTLY MORAL
Robert G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, director and deputy director of the Center for Counterproliferation Research
at National Defense University, ORBIS, Winter 1998, p. 11.
Looking back, one might even argue that those who condemned nuclear weapons as immoral were simply wrong.
The Western Alliance's nuclear weapons were in fact the moral weapon of choice. They worked precisely as
intended by deterring an immoral totalitarian state from attacking Western Europe and undermining the peace,
values, and freedom which democracies cherished. Indeed, given the tens of millions of innocent noncombatants
killed in two world wars, one can argue that the possession of nuclear weapons to deter yet another outbreak of mass
slaughter by conventional weapons, either in Europe or Asia, was squarely in the just war tradition.




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NUCLEAR WEAPONS DETER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

1. AMERICAN NUCLEAR FORCES DETER NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
General Eugene B. Habiger, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, STRATEGIC FORUM, April
1997, p. 4.
America's nuclear forces also extend an important deterrent guarantee to U.S. allies-many of whom would otherwise
face disturbing and potentially destabilizing questions about whether they needed their own nuclear weapons for
their security against both regional and global threats. Thus, in a way not appreciated, America's nuclear forces
complement efforts to restrict nuclear proliferation. At the moment, there is no alternative.

2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE HAS BEEN CRITICAL TO COMBATING PROLIFERATION
Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary Of Defense For Policy, THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE:
HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND
FEDERAL SERVICES OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS OF THE U.S. SENATE,
105TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION (February 12, 1997), 1997, p. 7.
Another important role of U.S. nuclear capability in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons should not go
unnoticed. The extension of a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent to allies and friends has been an important
nonproliferation tool. It has removed incentives for key allies in a still dangerous world to develop and deploy their
own nuclear forces, as many are quite capable of doing from a technical point of view. Indeed, our strong security
relationships have probably played as great a role in nonproliferation over the past 40 years as the NPT or any other
single factor.

3. DETERRENCE DECREASES THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary Of Defense For Policy, THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE:
HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND
FEDERAL SERVICES OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS OF THE U.S. SENATE,
105TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION (February 12, 1997), 1997, p. 7.
What about the argument that our weapons promote proliferation? The more compelling case seems to me that
proliferant states acquire nuclear weapons not because we have them but for reasons of their own: to counter
regional adversaries, to further regional ambitions, and to enhance their status among their neighbors and in the
world. And insofar as our nuclear capability is an issue, if a successful proliferator knew he would not face the
nuclear potential of the United States, that would scarcely reduce incentives to
acquire a WMD capability. The incentives to proliferate would increase dramatically if a rogue state would through
a successful nuclear weapons program acquire a nuclear monopoly and not just a token capability facing far stronger
forces possessed by the United States and other world powers.

4. NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL DETER ROGUE STATE PROLIFERATION
Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary Of Defense For Policy, THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE:
HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND
FEDERAL SERVICES OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS OF THE U.S. SENATE,
105TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION (February 12, 1997), 1997, p. 7.
Some people claim that once proliferation does occur, U.S. nuclear forces lack any utility in deterring rogue leaders
from using those weapons because those leaders would not regard the costs even of nuclear retaliation as sufficiently
great. Of course, their calculations of risk and rewards undoubtedly differ from our own, and we must take that into
account. But experience suggests that few dictators are, in fact, indifferent to the preservation of key instruments of
their State control or to the survival of their own regimes or indeed their own persons and associates. Thus, I believe
the reverse is true. Our nuclear capabilities are more likely to give pause to potential rogue proliferants than to
encourage them.




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NUCLEAR WEAPONS DETER CBW PROLIFERATION

1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS DETER THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Robert G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, director and deputy director of the Center for Counterproliferation Research
at National Defense University, ORBIS, Winter 1998, p. 15.
Turning to the contribution of nuclear weapons in a counterproliferation role, one can draw on the real world case of
Desert Storm. Iraqi leaders attribute their decision not to use chemical weapons--and we now know biological agents
as well--to the coalition's nuclear capabilities and warning of catastrophic consequences if Iraq were to use such
weapons. General Wafic Al Sammarai, former head of Iraqi military intelligence, has stated that Iraq did not arm its
Scud missiles with chemical weapons "because the warning was quite severe, and quite effective. The allied troops
were certain to use nuclear arms and the price will be to clear and too high." In retrospect, it appears that Saddam
Hussein simply could not count on the United States (or perhaps Israel) refraining from responding with nuclear
weapons, especially given the view of the world and demonstrated absence of constraints in the use of force to
achieve his personal objectives.

2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN POSE A CREDIBLE DETERRENT TO CBW USE
Robert G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, director and deputy Director of the Center for Counterproliferation Research
at National Defense University, ORBIS, Winter 1998, p. 15.
Yet, what was important for deterrence was what Saddam Hussein believed. In this context, Secretary of Defense
Richard Cheney's position is perhaps the most thoughtful. He states that nuclear weapons use was never seriously
considered but that, had chemical or biological weapons been used against the United States, a nuclear response may
have come under consideration. This is clearly the right message to send if the objective is to strengthen deterrence.

3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE NECESSARY TO COMBAT THE PRODUCTION AND USE OF CBWS
Robert G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, director and deputy Director of the Center for Counterproliferation Research
at National Defense University, ORBIS, Winter 1998, p. 16.
In Desert Storm, the coalition was unsuccessful in its airstrikes against underground targets which cannot in many
cases be destroyed by conventional attack. The technology does not exist today-a fact recognized by states such as
Libya, which are placing their chemical and biological weapons facilities increasingly underground. In response to
chemical attacks against American troops or biological attacks against U.S. population centers, the United States
may want to destroy such targets promptly and with absolute certainty, rather than leave them operational even for a
short time. It may also want to strike other military targets, perhaps even those that could be attacked with
conventional forces, to cause shock and send a clear signal to all that any use of chemical and biological agents will
be severely punished. What is essential is that the United States retain the option to respond and that this capability
be known to potential adversaries. If one rules out these options, deterrence is undermined and the likelihood of
conflict occurring increases, as well as the likelihood that chemical and biological agents will be used against the
United States and its allies.




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BALLISTIC MISSILES THREATEN THE U.S.

1. EVEN IF NOT ARMED WITH A WMD, BALLISTIC MISSILE POSE A SIGNIFICANT THREAT
R. James Woolsey, former director of Central Intelligence, ABM TREATY AND U.S. BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSE: HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES
SENATE, 104TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION (September 24 and 26, 1996), 1997, p. 12.
First, although ballistic missiles are normally discussed in the same breath with weapons of mass destruction, it is
important to realize that it is not always necessary to deploy nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological warheads in order
to use ballistic missiles -- even with current accuracies -- as weapons of tenor and blackmail. The Chinese, for
example, have admitted that they were using these recent missile launches near Taiwan to attempt to influence
Taiwan's Presidential elections and to affect Taiwan's conduct of its relations with other countries. Saddam's SCUD
attacks on Israel, using conventional high-explosive warheads, were clearly an attempt to provoke an Israeli
response and to split the coalition against Iraq, which included a number of Arab states which would have had great
difficulty fighting alongside Israel against another Arab nation.

2. THE ABSENCE OF A BMD SYSTEM LEAVES THE U.S. VULNERABLE TO WMD
Jesse Helms, U.S. Senator (R-NC) and Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ABM TREATY AND
U.S. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE, 104TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION (September 24 and 26, 1996), 1997, p. 2.
Well, such assumptions are wrong. The Clinton Administration in fact has aggressively blocked every effort by the
Republican Congress to implement a national missile defense system to protect the American people from this very
real threat. The Clinton Administration appears to be ready to leave the American people strategically naked as
hostile nations rush forward in their relentless pursuit of nuclear, chemical, and biological-tipped missiles.

3. BALLISTIC MISSILES POSE A SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO THE U.S. AND ALLIES
R. James Woolsey, former director of Central Intelligence, ABM TREATY AND U.S. BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSE: HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES
SENATE, 104TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION (September 24 and 26, 1996), 1997, p. 12.
With such guidance improvements, it is quite reasonable to believe that within a few years Saddam or the Chinese
rulers will be able to threaten something far more troubling than firings of relatively inaccurate ballistic missiles.
They may quite plausibly be able to threaten to destroy, say, the Knesset, or threaten to create, in effect, an
intentional Chernobyl incident at a Taiwanese nuclear power plant.

ROGUE NATIONS POSE A BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE US

1. ROGUE NATIONS ARE IN THE MARKET FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES
R. James Woolsey, former director of Central Intelligence, ABM TREATY AND U.S. BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSE: HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES
SENATE, 104TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION (September 24 and 26, 1996), 1997, p. 14.
But in the cold war's aftermath, Russia, China, and North Korea are in the export business for missile technology
and components, and for some technologies related to weapons of mass destruction as well.. Moreover, with respect
to some such exports the degree of control exercised by Moscow. and perhaps by Beijing, may not be at all
complete. Consequently, transfers deserve more attention than they did during the cold war.




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CHINESE BALLISTIC MISSILES THREATEN THE U.S.

1. CHINA POSES A BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE U.S.
Jesse Helms, U.S. Senator (R-NC) and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ABM TREATY AND U.S.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE, 104TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION (September 24 and 26, 1996), 1997, p. 2.
Second, it boggles the mind that this Administration can make decisions about the ballistic missile threat to this
country while explicitly ignoring the arsenals of declared nuclear powers. Red China, for example, has dozens of
ballistic missiles along with several modernization initiatives ongoing, including development of MIRV-technology.
Red China is the same regime, remember, that has just flexed its military might by conducting live missile firing
exercises in the Straight of Taiwan (and threatening the United States of America with its nuclear arsenal). Indeed,
on February 28, 1996, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, Richard Cooper, started "Many of China's
long-range systems are probably aimed at the United States."

2. THE THREAT OF A CHINESE MISSILE ATTACK SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN LIGHTLY
Jesse Helms, U.S. Senator (R-NC) and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ABM TREATY AND U.S.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE, 104TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION (September 24 and 26, 1996), 1997, p. 2.
This past winter, when I introduced legislation to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, I wondered how the Clinton
Administration could possibly make a decision to veto the missile defense provisions in the Defense Authorization
Act while at the same time acknowledging that China continues to threaten the entire United States with ballistic
missiles. Well, I, for one, cannot regard the Red Chinese menace in such cavalier fashion.

3. CHINA HAS SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO USE BALLISTIC MISSILES
R. James Woolsey, former director of Central Intelligence, ABM TREATY AND U.S. BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSE: HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES
SENATE, 104TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION (September 24 and 26, 1996), 1997, p. 12.
But the main point here should never have been what the consequences would be in the event that China turned out
not to be able to hit even a square in the ocean 20 miles on a side. The main point is what the consequences arc
when such tests go right. The key issue is that off Taiwan this past March, as well as in the streets of Tel Aviv and
Riyadh in early 1991, we have been given an important insight into the future of international relations. It is not an
attractive vision. Ballistic missiles can, and in the future they increasingly will, be used by hostile states for
blackmail, terror, and to drive wedges between us and our friends and allies. It is my judgment that the
administration is not currently giving this vital problem the proper weight it deserves.

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS UNDERESTIMATED THE TRUE THREAT

1. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS ON THE LOW BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT ARE WRONG
R. James Woolsey, former director of Central Intelligence, ABM TREATY AND U.S. BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSE: HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES
SENATE, 104TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION (September 24 and 26, 1996), 1997, p. 13.
It is with these considerations in mind that I have some thoughts about NIE 95-19 covering "Emerging Missile
Threats to North America During the Next Fifteen Years." The answers provided to the questions that were asked --
based on the public record -- during the process of writing this NIE may well be the best consensus that the,
Intelligence Community could produce. and may be consistent in many ways with earlier work. One major reason, it
seems to me, why this estimate seems to differ in important ways from the major assessments during my tenure as
DCI, lies much more in the questions that were asked. To focus an NIE on the threat to the contiguous 48 states, in
my judgment, is to focus on a sub-set, and not a particularly useful sub- set, of the strategic problems that are posed
for U.S. by other countries' possession of ballistic missiles in the post-cold-war era.




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THE ABM TREATY PREVENTS DEVELOPMENT OF A CREDIBLE DEFENSE

1. THE ABM TREATY PREVENTS DEVELOPMENT OF A CREDIBLE BMD SYSTEM
Caspar W. Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense, FORBES, December 15, 1997, p. 37.
While the U.S. has chosen negotiations with Saddam Hussein rather than anything effective, our State Department
has been quietly pursuing a pact that will guarantee our defenselessness against a nuclear, chemical or biological
missile attack that could be launched by any number of countries. Only the U.S.
Senate can stop this deadly policy. In September Secretary of State Madeleine Albright signed a group of
agreements designed to take care of the awkward fact that we are still adhering to the ABM Treaty long after the
other signatory, the Soviet Union, has died. Secretary Albright's agreements designate Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus
and Ukraine as our ABM Treaty partners in place of the collapsed U.S.S.R. Adhering to the 1972 ABM Treaty
prevents the U.S. from deploying any antiballistic missiles -- except one ineffective ground-based system in North
Dakota, which could be used only to try to protect that particular region from nuclear, chemical or biological
missiles.

2. ABM TREATY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MISSILE DEFENSE FAILURES IN THE GULF WAR
Henry F. Cooper, former Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, ABM TREATY AND U.S.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE, 104TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION (September 24 and 26, 1996), 1997, p. 41.
Actually, it has probably already cost us lives--the 28 military personnel killed when an Iraqi Scud hit their barracks
during the Gulf War might have been spared if Patriot had not been dumbed-down and delayed because of ABM
Treaty concerns. And America's continuing vulnerability is making the ballistic missile the surest way to threaten
the U.S.--the weapon of choice for state terrorists. Building effective missile defenses should have a high priority in
our counter-terrorism efforts.

3. ADHERING TO THE ABM TREATY GRAVELY JEOPARDIZES US
Bruce Herschensohn, distinguished fellow at the Claremont Institute, LOS ANGELES TIMES, April 8, 1998, p. B7.
Let's do it. Let's give six months' warning. What are the extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the
treaty that have jeopardized our supreme interests? They should be obvious: The party with whom we signed the
treaty no longer exists. There is no Soviet Union. Further, when there was a Soviet Union, that government
continually violated its provisions, a fact now admitted by no less than the president of Russia. Moreover, ballistic
missiles have proliferated throughout the world, well beyond the two nations that signed the treaty. To appease a
power that no longer exists, we are gravely jeopardizing our ability to defend ourselves from other threats that do
exist.

4. THE ABM TREATY LEAVES THE U.S. VULNERABLE TO ATTACK
Editorial Desk, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, November 10, 1998, p. B6.
The 25th anniversary passed without much public notice. But the day deserves to be recognized as the second-most-
infamous moment in U.S. history - the time when the United States agreed in the anti-ballistic missile treaty to leave
its population centers vulnerable to nuclear attack. Not until March 1983, when President Reagan dared to suggest
an alternative to mutual assured destruction, did the idea of strategic defense take root.




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BMD IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE OUR SURVIVAL

1. BMD WOULD SIGNAL THE END OF THE MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION DOCTRINE
Bruce Herschensohn, distinguished fellow at the Claremont Institute, LOS ANGELES TIMES, April 8, 1998, p. B7.
I believe it was the greatest idea in the history of defense: a system not designed as a weapon, a system that would
not kill one living creature but rather meant to destroy an incoming missile after it was launched, but before it hit its
target. To this day, the system does not exist. The greatest stumbling block has been
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, signed as an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.
That agreement put severe restrictions on both nations from deploying anti-missile technology, in effect, freezing
both nations into what is called "mutual assured destruction."

2. BMD IS THE BEST CHECK AGAINST ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR LAUNCH
Robert G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, director and deputy director of the Center for Counterproliferation Research
at National Defense University, ORBIS, Winter 1998, p. 13.
Real solutions, not arms control gimmicks, are required to address the problems of the Russian nuclear posture. We
know from experience that dialogue and agreements must be governed by greater transparency, effective
verification, and realistic expectations. We also know from experience that we must hedge against failure, which is
why a missile defense system would be the best insurance against a Russian accidental or unauthorized launch. At
various times in the past, Nunn promoted such a light missile defense. Now that he has called for the end of Mutual
Assured destruction (MAD), the central foundation upon which the Antiballistic missile (ABM) Treaty was based,
there should no longer be any doctoral impediments to his support in procuring this insurance policy.

3. FAILURE TO DEVELOP AND DEPLOY A BMD SYSTEM IS DANGEROUS AND MISGUIDED
Editorial Desk, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, November 10, 1998, p. B6.
THAAD includes mobile interceptors capable of being airlifted to hot spots anywhere in the world. Based on ships
or trucks, the missiles would be able to protect U.S. or allied troops deployed in a particular area, similar to the way
Patriot missiles protected U.S. troops and its allies during the Persian Gulf War - only far more efficiently, given
new technologies and advanced defense systems. Navy Upper Tier makes use of the launch facilities, missiles,
radars and battle management system of the Aegis-equipped U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers that are deployed
around the world. Both are hit-to-kill interceptors with roughly comparable accuracies, though THAAD reportedly
has a new front end (kill package) and an acceleration booster that is in compliance with restrictions in the strategic
aspects of the ABM treaty. Upper Tier, on the other hand, has a higher acceleration rate. Managed from satellite
sensors, either could probably defend an area equal to Europe, but denied that cueing from sensors - as the Russians
are attempting to do in
negotiations - neither is much of an improvement over the Patriot system. The Clinton administration's delay in
development of these systems - especially development mandated by law - is dangerous and misguided.




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THE NAS REPORT IS REACTIONARY NONSENSE

1. THE CISAC STUDY IS REACTIONARY
The Center for Security Policy, "Decision Brief 97-D96: Clinton's Reckless Nuclear Agenda Revealed? Study Co-
Authored By Candidate For Top Pentagon Job Is Alarming," PUBLICATIONS OF THE CENTER FOR
SECURITY POLICY NO. 97-D96, July 12, 1997, Center For Security Policy Web Site, address:
http://www.security-policy.org/papers/1997/97-D96.html, accessed, May 26, 1998.
(Washington, D.C.): Last month, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and
Arms Control issued a report entitled The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy. This study advocating a series of
highly controversial actions with respect to the American nuclear deterrent -- steps that, taken together, could have
the result effectively of unilaterally disarming the United States -- might have been dismissed as just another
polemic by individuals who are by and large "the usual suspects" when it comes to anti-nuclear agitation but for one
signatory: Rose Gottemoeller, President Clinton's former Director for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs at the
National Security Council and his reported choice to fill the long-vacant position of Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Policy. The position that Ms. Gottemoeller hopes to fill at the Pentagon has traditionally
been the Department of Defense's senior position with day-to-day responsibility for U.S. nuclear weapons policy.
Her endorsement of the NAS study, at a minimum, demands careful consideration by the Senate Armed Services
Committee which would be obliged to consider the Gottemoeller nomination. More importantly, it should serve as a
warning that the views, judgments and recommendations contained in this document may be more consistent than is
widely recognized with the policies of the Clinton Administration concerning the future of U.S. nuclear weaponry.

2. NAS RECOMMENDATIONS ARE DEPLORABLE
The Center for Security Policy, "Decision Brief 97-D96: Clinton's Reckless Nuclear Agenda Revealed? Study Co-
Authored By Candidate For Top Pentagon Job Is Alarming ," PUBLICATIONS OF THE CENTER FOR
SECURITY POLICY NO. 97-D96, July 12, 1997, Center For Security Policy Web Site, address:
http://www.security-policy.org/papers/1997/97-D96.html, accessed, May 26, 1998.
The otherwise deplorable recommendations made by Ms. Gottemoeller and her associates in the NAS study may yet
produce some benefit if they cause the Clinton Administration's policy in this area to be subjected to close scrutiny -
- and urgent corrective action. The Center for Security Policy hopes to do its part in this regard with a High-Level
Roundtable Discussion it will be sponsoring in Washington, D.C. to address the question "Do We Still Need Nuclear
Weapons?" on Tuesday, 15 July 1997. It is imperative, however, that the Congress fulfill its critical oversight
functions with regard to this supremely high-stakes component of the Nation's national security posture. An early
opportunity to do so may be afforded to the Senate Armed Services Committee if Ms. Gottemoeller is indeed
nominated to a top Pentagon post and thus given a chance to explain the degree to which her radical views on the
future of U.S. nuclear weapons policy are shared by the Administration to which she might return.




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NAS RECOMMENDATIONS ARE ILL ADVISED

1. NAS RECOMMENDATIONS ON START III WILL NOT PRODUCE DESIRABLE RESULTS
The Center for Security Policy, "Decision Brief 97-D96: Clinton's Reckless Nuclear Agenda Revealed? Study Co-
Authored By Candidate For Top Pentagon Job Is Alarming ," PUBLICATIONS OF THE CENTER FOR
SECURITY POLICY NO. 97-D96, July 12, 1997, Center For Security Policy Web Site, address:
http://www.security-policy.org/papers/1997/97-D96.html, accessed, May 26, 1998.
Pentagon planners have repeatedly built their budgets for strategic forces on the assumption that American forces
will be reduced pursuant to successive arms control accords -- including some in prospect. This gives rise to
enormous pressure from a cash-strapped American military to implement the anticipated reductions whether the
Russians are doing so or not. The net result tends to be an attenuating U.S. nuclear force posture relative to that of
Russia -- an arrangement that clearly suits the Kremlin. Any recommendation, like the NAS' concerning START III
that tends to reward Russia for its bad faith and reinforces this pattern, is unlikely to produce desirable results in the
future.

2. NAS RECOMMENDATIONS WILL UNDERMINE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
The Center for Security Policy, "Decision Brief 97-D96: Clinton's Reckless Nuclear Agenda Revealed? Study Co-
Authored By Candidate For Top Pentagon Job Is Alarming ," PUBLICATIONS OF THE CENTER FOR
SECURITY POLICY NO. 97-D96, July 12, 1997, Center For Security Policy Web Site, address:
http://www.security-policy.org/papers/1997/97-D96.html, accessed, May 26, 1998.
The NAS study argues that future arms control efforts should shift from focusing on (relatively verifiable)
limitations on nuclear delivery vehicles (i.e., land- and sea-based launchers for intercontinental-range missiles and
strategic bombers) to (extremely unverifiable) limits on nuclear warheads. Ms. Gottemoeller and Company claim
that such a focus would "minimize the reversibility of reductions and diminish the possibility of rapid breakout." In
point of fact, this proposal would entail levels of transparency that would almost certainly work asymmetrically --
and to the detriment of American security interests. In the United States extremely sensitive information concerning
the status, design and vulnerabilities of nuclear weapons would likely be made available to the Russians. For its part,
the Kremlin can be expected to be as cagey, not to say duplicitous, as ever about the truth concerning the exact
whereabouts, numbers and characteristics of Russian nuclear weaponry.

3. NAS DE-ALERTING RECOMMENDATIONS ARE ILL ADVISED
The Center for Security Policy, "Decision Brief 97-D96: Clinton's Reckless Nuclear Agenda Revealed? Study Co-
Authored By Candidate For Top Pentagon Job Is Alarming ," PUBLICATIONS OF THE CENTER FOR
SECURITY POLICY NO. 97-D96, July 12, 1997, Center For Security Policy Web Site, address:
http://www.security-policy.org/papers/1997/97-D96.html, accessed, May 26, 1998.
The NAS team recommends degrading the "operational and technical readiness of nuclear weapons for use" as a
means of "decreas[ing] the chance of erroneous launch of nuclear weapons or a launch in response to a spurious or
incorrectly interpreted indication of impending attack." As has increasingly come to be the case with the agenda of
contemporary arms control activists, this proposal identifies a real problem -- the danger of Russian "loose nukes"
(i.e., Moscow's evidently deteriorating command and control of its nuclear arsenal) -- and proposes a "solution" that
will have an assured effect only on American defensive capabilities which are not the problem. With its stocks of
"non-deployed" (and unaccounted-for) intercontinental-range missiles, mobile launchers and nuclear warheads,
Russia could retain substantial capability to launch strategic nuclear strikes even if other elements of its arsenal were
genuinely "de-alerted."




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DISASSEMBLING WEAPONS IS A POOR POLICY MOVE

1. DISASSEMBLING OF WEAPONS PER NAS RECOMMENDATIONS IS DANGEROUS
The Center for Security Policy, "Decision Brief 97-D96: Clinton's Reckless Nuclear Agenda Revealed? Study Co-
Authored By Candidate For Top Pentagon Job Is Alarming ," PUBLICATIONS OF THE CENTER FOR
SECURITY POLICY NO. 97-D96, July 12, 1997, Center For Security Policy Web Site, address:
http://www.security-policy.org/papers/1997/97-D96.html, accessed 26, 1998.
Elsewhere in the report the authors actually go so far as to fall back on the prospect that "inherent nuclear
capabilities to rebuild" dismantled nuclear arsenals "could act as a deterrent to the outbreak of major wars" in the
event they turn out to be wrong about the peaceableness of a "nuclear-free" world. Since even the architects of this
report cannot envision a way to achieve a total nuclear ban, it is dangerous and irresponsible to lend credibility to
such a goal. Wiser heads argue for recognizing that -- under present and foreseeable circumstances -- nuclear states
must plan on retaining a credible nuclear arsenal and reject policies that would have the direct or indirect effect of
making it problematic to do so.

THE NAS REPORT ACTUALLY MAKES THE CASE FOR BMD DEVELOPMENT

1. THE NAS REPORT IMPLICITLY SUPPORTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BMD
The Center for Security Policy, "Decision Brief 97-D96: Clinton's Reckless Nuclear Agenda Revealed? Study Co-
Authored By Candidate For Top Pentagon Job Is Alarming ," PUBLICATIONS OF THE CENTER FOR
SECURITY POLICY NO. 97-D96, July 12, 1997, Center For Security Policy Web Site, address:
http://www.security-policy.org/papers/1997/97-D96.html, accessed, May 26, 1998.
As the Center has repeatedly noted in the past, the post-Cold War world is one in which the United States clearly
cannot afford to remain any more vulnerable to ballistic missile attack than can its allies and forward-deployed
troops. Ironically, the case for the U.S. promptly to deploy an effective, global missile defense is made -- at least
implicitly, and certainly unintentionally -- by the authors of the NAS study.

2. EVEN WITH NAS SUGGESTED REDUCED NUCLEAR DANGERS, A BMD IS STILL NEEDED
The Center for Security Policy, "Decision Brief 97-D96: Clinton's Reckless Nuclear Agenda Revealed? Study Co-
Authored By Candidate For Top Pentagon Job Is Alarming ," PUBLICATIONS OF THE CENTER FOR
SECURITY POLICY NO. 97-D96, July 12, 1997, Center For Security Policy Web Site, address:
http://www.security-policy.org/papers/1997/97-D96.html, accessed May 26, 1998.
Then, there is the whole question of what happens should the United States decide to eliminate its nuclear deterrent
altogether, as the National Academy's committee urges (see below). While the NAS study confidently declares that,
"In a world in which the number of offensive nuclear arms is reduced drastically and the role of nuclear weapons is
diminished, the ABM Treaty will continue to play a crucial role," it is not self-evident that the "continuing reality of
offense dominance" will apply should nuclear weapons be "prohibited." The United States would clearly want to
have the means of protecting against the sorts of "illegal" nuclear weapons that even the NAS team acknowledges
will exist in a "nuclear free" world.




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A RUSSIA-CHINA ALLIANCE DAMAGES WORLD PEACE

1. SINO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE ERODES STABILITY AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN ASIA
Richard Bernstein, Time Beijing Bureau Chief, Book Critic for the NY Times, and Ross Munro, U.N. Bureau Chief
and Time Hong Kong Bureau Chief, Beijing Correspondent for the Toronto Globe and Mail, THE COMING
CONFLICT WITH CHINA, 1997, p. 181-182.
At the same time, China's growing entente with Russia, while not explicitly aimed at Japan, is, by any strategist's
definition, contrary to Japan's interests. It further tilts the balance of power in Northeast Asia in China's favor and
against the interests of Japan and the United States. Even though it is in part coincidental and not causal, the
Sino-Russian entente seems to be running closely parallel to the Japanese-American entente. In deed, in 1996,
Russian president Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin declared a Sino-Russian strategic accord the same month, April,
that Clinton and Hashimoto issued their joint declaration in Tokyo.

2. A BALANCE OF POWER SHIFT IN ASIA WOULD BE DISASTROUS
C. Raja Mohan, NQA, THE HINDU, September 4, 1997, p. 10.
The fundamental challenge facing India via-a-vis Sino-U.S. relations is not the question of aligning with one against
the other. It is one of finding an effective balance of power in Asia through expanding India's own strategic
capabilities. As India and the United States begin a new round of political consultations, which some hope could
evolve into a "strategic dialogue", the question of China will inevitably loom large. This is natural, given the
dramatic rise of China in the global hierarchy and its unquestionable centrality to the evolution of the Asian balance
of power. But India should guard against two simplistic formulations in assessing the implications of the changing
Sino-U.S. relations on its foreign policy. One is the belief that as Washington and Beijing drift towards an eventual
confrontation, India will stand to gain by aligning with the U.S. against China. The other view too assumes an
inevitable deterioration of Sino- U.S. relations; but it calls on New Delhi to draw closer to Beijing as part of
structuring a wider bloc of states involving both Moscow and Teheran to counter the U.S. dominance in Asia. If the
Indian foreign policy is premised on either of these ideas, it could end up in a disaster. New Delhi could be the
biggest loser if it becomes either a drummer boy for American containment of China or a cheer-leader for Beijing's
rhetoric against the American hegemonism in Asia

3. ENCIRCLEMENT FEELINGS IN THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST RISK WAR
Kent Calder, professor of politics at Princeton, PACIFIC DEFENSE, 1996, p. 2.
Given the simultaneous importance and vulnerability of the Russian far east--conditions that are both likely to
persist or intensify in the near future--Russia will have difficulty resolving its twin territorial disputes with China
and Japan through concession or compromise. This uncertainty will leave a bitter residue of lingering tension,
especially between Russia and Japan, where a peace treaty formally ending World War II remains unsigned more
than fifty years after the guns were silenced. The two rising East Asian superpowers, for their part, are growing ever
more self-confident, and simultaneously disinclined to acquiesce in seemingly equitable relations with Russia.
Rising nationalism in the RFE, especially backlash against the increasing economic presence of China in the region,
may also reinforce this Russian rigidity and raise the overall level of regional unease in Northeast Asia. Slow
economic growth and inadequate incentives will inhibit defense conversion, creating the strong possibility of the
RFE's becoming an increasingly important source of military exports, especially defense components to China and
the volatile North Korean socialist hermit Kingdom next door. Russia's Far East, in short, will likely fuel still further
the already volatile cauldron of tensions that is the Northeast Asian Arc of Crisis.

4. THE CONVERGENCE OF CHINA AND RUSSIA STIFLES NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS
Peter W. Rodman, a former White House and State Department official, LOS ANGELES TIMES, March 25, 1996,
p. B5.
Both China and Russia, moreover, are big proliferators, finding another common cause in their defiance of U.S.
policies to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Both sell nuclear reactors to Iran and press for lifting
U.N. sanctions on Iraq; China sells nuclear technology to Pakistan and missiles to Iran. In 1994, neither gave real
support to U.S. efforts to squelch North Korea's nuclear weapons program. U.S. policy cannot be blamed for all the
fundamental geopolitical factors at work here, but clearly the Clinton administration has lost its grip on this
evolution. For the first time since the 1950s, China and Russia have better relations with each other than either has
with the United States, meaning the loss of the pivotal position and leverage the United States had gained in the
1970s.




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I. NUCLEAR STIGMA DISADVANTAGE
The plan undermines the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence thereby threatening conflict.

A. THE GLOBAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT WE HAVE ROBUST NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Robert G. Spulak, Jr., senior analyst at the Strategic Studies Center, Sandia National Laboratories, PARAMETERS,
Spring 1997, p. 111-112.
The need for nuclear deterrence will not disappear. There are still powerful nations in the world which are potential
adversaries, both immediate and future. The interests of these nations will, at times, be in conflict with the interests
of the United States. It is inevitable that another great power or a coalition of powers will arise to oppose the
hegemony of the United States. Although the Cold War is over, Russia still has the capability to destroy the United
States; the strong showing of the nationalists and communists in the Russian elections, the obvious failure of
reforms, the desire of Russia to be recognized as a great power, and replacement off the reformers in the Russian
government with officials from the communist era have refocused our concerns on this point. In a few years Japan, a
Western European state, or China could pose a strategic threat to our broad security interests; China is rapidly
modernizing its arsenal and could soon be a strategic nuclear threat. Since we will be cautious about attacking any
nuclear power with conventional forces, it will be difficult to deter even smaller nuclear powers such as North
Korea, Iran, or Iraq if our nuclear threat to them is not credible.

B. STIGMATIZING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A DANGEROUS THREAT TO U.S. SECURITY
Robert G. Spulak, Jr., senior analyst at the Strategic Studies Center, Sandia National Laboratories, PARAMETERS,
Spring 1997, p. 117.
There are many different dangers associated with nuclear weapons, including the danger that policies which
minimize and stigmatize nuclear weapons may exacerbate old threats and introduce new threats to U.S. security. All
choices involve risk. Stigmatizing all aspects of nuclear weapons may blind us to the extent that we overlook
policies that could actually reduce the danger of war or violence to the United States and the rest of the world. This
concept therefore interferes with our ability to formulate good policies to deal with national security and with the
myriad issues related to nuclear weapons.

C. REDUCING U.S. NUCLEAR OPTIONS JEOPARDIZES OUR ABILITY TO DETER CONFLICTS
Keith B. Payne, president of the National Institute for Public Policy at Georgetown University, FEDERAL
DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, March 31, 1998, p. np.
Eliminating the credible threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation, however, could easily mean the unexpected failure of
deterrence. The problem, of course, is that U.S. leaders will not know in advance those specific conditions and
opponents that will necessitate nuclear deterrence. Not knowing when and where nuclear threats will be essential to
deterrence success, they must be available to cast a shadow over any military crisis, to be made more explicit or to
remain "under wraps" as the challenger and context warrant. The quantity of nuclear forces also still matters for
deterrence. It is far from obvious that a relatively small number of U.S. nuclear weapons could provide the coverage
of targets necessary vis-a-vis Russia, China, and the variety of prospective regional challengers such as Iraq that we
will need to be capable of deterring in the future. The United States has reduced its nuclear stockpile considerably
since the end of the Cold War (continuing a downward trend which actually began in the late 1960s). Yet, to go
down too far too fast-or to remove too many forces from alert posture-could unnecessarily decrease the nuclear
flexibility that the United States has purchased over the past fifty years. That flexibility--entailing the capability to
tailor nuclear threats to specific circumstances-is likely to be required in some tough cases for deterrence
effectiveness. And we are likely to encounter tough cases as the United States confronts a wide spectrum of potential
foes and circumstances in the post-Cold War era.




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“NO FIRST USE” POLICY IS DANGEROUS AND REDUCES DETERRENCE

1. EMPIRICALLY ‘FIRST USE’ OPTION SAVED MANY AMERICAN LIVES
Jon Kyl, Republican Senator from Arizona and a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, ISSUES
IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Winter 1997-1998, p. 5.
Our experience in the Gulf War shows how the current policy, which allows for the possibility that the United States
would use nuclear weapons to respond to a nonnuclear attack, saved lives by deterring such an attack. Before the
war, president Bush, Secretary of Defense Cheney, and other senior officials warned Iraq that if it used chemical or
biological weapons, the U.S. response would be “absolutely overwhelming” and “devastating.” Iraqi officials later
conformed that these statement deterred Iraq from using chemical and biological weapons, because Baghdad had
interpreted U.S. threats of devastating retaliation as meaning nuclear retaliation.

2. WE MUST NOT TAKE A SOFT POLICY REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Jon Kyl, Republican Senator from Arizona and a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, ISSUES
IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Winter 1997-1998, p. 5.
The United States should be careful to resist the tendency in peacetime to adopt feel-good measures such as a ban on
the first use of nuclear weapons and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Both would jeopardize out security as
naively as did the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war. As long as the United States retains a sound, credible arsenal
of nuclear weapons, the Saddam Husseins of the world will have to think twice before unleashing weapons of mass
destruction against the United States or our allies. This is the value of nuclear deterrence.

3. NO-FIRST USE POLICY WOULD REDUCE U.S. DETERRENCE CREDIBILITY
Keith B. Payne, president of the National Institute for Public Policy at Georgetown University, FEDERAL
DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, March 31, 1998, p. np
When U.S. operational practices and declaratory policies limit the flexibility of U.S. nuclear forces and the
credibility of U.S. nuclear threats, they undermine the prospects for effective deterrence and increase the likelihood
of regional crises and wars. Tailoring the most appropriate deterrence threat to a particular challenger and crisis may
not be possible if the United States rules out, a priori, nuclear retaliation, or so limits its nuclear policies that U.S.
threats are not credible.

4. RISK OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION DEMANDS CREDIBLE DETERRENCE
Keith B. Payne, president of the National Institute for Public Policy at Georgetown University, FEDERAL
DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, March 31, 1998, p. np.
Because we can have little confidence in our capability to destroy challengers' WMD, we must make our deterrent
as foolproof as possible. A single illustration of the lethality of biological weapons will clarify why the U.S.
capability to deter regional challengers is critical: a single undeterred attacker delivering just over 200 lbs. of
anthrax spores over Washington could, under likely conditions, inflict from 1,000,000 to 3,000,000 fatalities-
creating a lethal area of approximately 300 square kilometers. In terms of population fatalities, such a biological
attack could be more deadly than a megaton hydrogen bomb. Recall that Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria
possess biological warfare programs. To risk understatement, deterrence is not less important in this post-Cold War
period. As former Secretary of Defense William Perry rightly stated, "Clearly the United States does not want to
spend the rest of the decade fighting regional conflicts. The key to avoiding such entanglements is to use its new
strength to deter these conflicts rather than fight them."




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DE-ALERTING WOULD BE A DISASTROUS MOVE

1. DE-ALERTING IS ONLY THE FIRST STEP TOWARD ELIMINATING ALL DETERRENCE
Caspar W. Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense, FORBES, February 23, 1998, p. 37.
President Clinton has asked the Pentagon to review his "de-alert" option. If it is adopted, we will lose the ability to
respond immediately to a missile attack -- nuclear, biological or chemical. De-alerting is only the first step toward
its proponents' real goal: the elimination of our nuclear deterrent. Dealer of Doom. A look at the leading advocate of
this disastrous elimination plan is telling: Paul C. Warnke, the man whom we at the Pentagon called the Apostle of
Unreadiness. Mr. Warnke has long opposed the restoration of America's military capability, which won the Cold
War. (He thinks this victory was achieved entirely through the U.S.S.R.'s internal weaknesses that caused it to
implode.) He also has long favored virtually any and all kinds of arms control agreements, even those permitting
increases in weapons. Warnke's current support of de-alerting is fully in keeping with his belief that our current state
of readiness is "completely unnecessary in the post-Cold War era." He believes that retaining alert capability "might
preclude disarmament below the approximately 1,000 deployed ballistic missile warheads necessary to maintain and
implement" an immediate response capability.

2. DE-ALERTING WOULD BE THE FINAL STRAW GUTTING OUR DETERRENCE STANCE
Caspar W. Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense, FORBES, February 23, 1998, p. 37.
Characteristically, Mr. Warnke's proposal says nothing about (a) verification or (b) the very shaky and uncertain
nature of Russia's government. Nor does Warnke ask why, if Russia won't ratify START II, we should, by crippling
our immediate-response capability, offer further inducements for it to attack. He also seems to have forgotten that
the ABM Treaty, which Clinton supports and wants to expand, precludes our having any effective defense against
nuclear missiles and relegates us to deterrence by retaliation -- a retaliation we could not make if we followed his
plan. Apart from whether or not our embattled President would accept Warnke's proposal, his earlier decisions to
adhere to the ABM Treaty; virtually to shut down our nuclear weapons production, conducting no tests for more
than five years; and to consider standing down our alert capability, which would render us incapable of a timely
response to a missile attack, all bode ill for our future security.

3. DE-ALERTING REDUCES DETERRENCE FAR TOO MUCH
Kathleen C. Bailey, senior fellow at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, FEDERAL DOCUMENT
CLEARING HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, March 31, 1998, p. np.
Proposed de-alerting measures have a number of significant detrimental effects, one of the most important being
their impact on deterrence. Deterrence occurs when a potential aggressor is dissuaded by being convinced that his
potential victim has both the capability and the will to retaliate with consequences that the aggressor views as
unacceptable. The capability must be ready; if not, the opponent may believe that the retaliatory capability can be
destroyed before it can be used. Thus, nuclear deterrent must be able to survive an attack and/or be launched quickly
enough to avoid destruction in a first strike. De- alerting undermines deterrence by reducing both survivability and
the ability to respond in a timely manner.




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DE-ALERTING POLICY IS DISADVANTAGEOUS FOR MANY REASONS

1. DE-ALERTING INCREASES THE RISK OF A FIRST-STRIKE
Kathleen C. Bailey, senior fellow at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, FEDERAL DOCUMENT
CLEARING HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, March 31, 1998, p. np.
First, a serious downside common to most, if not all, dealerting proposals is that they generate instabilities by
making a first strike more attractive to an aggressor. Because de-alerting reduces readiness, by definition, any de-
alerted forces that are not survivable make more inviting targets. The aggressor could undertake a first strike with
forces that have not been de-alerted-either known, declared systems or clandestine ones-or could regenerate quickly
in a break-out scenario. The incentive for an opponent to make such a pre-emptive strike would be particularly
pronounced in times of tension, when he might observe US regeneration of de-alerted forces, or may simply fear
that US regeneration may occur. The United States, knowing that its own regeneration of forces might be
destabilizing, could hesitate to re-alert, thus undermining the nuclear deterrent.

2. DE-ALERTING WEAPONS INCREASES THE RISK OF THEFT AND SABOTAGE
Kathleen C. Bailey, senior fellow at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, FEDERAL DOCUMENT
CLEARING HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, March 31, 1998, p. np.
Fourth, security also could be compromised by some dealerting measures. Having warheads separate from the
missiles could make them more vulnerable to theft or sabotage. Also, in crises requiring rapid regeneration, hasty
efforts to make weapons operable, in absence of having had extensive training and exercises in regeneration, could
lead to errors resulting either in an accident or a situation in which the regenerated systems do not work properly.

3. A DE-ALERTING POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA IS A DANGEROUS POLICY OPTION
Kathleen C. Bailey, senior fellow at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, FEDERAL DOCUMENT
CLEARING HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, March 31, 1998, p. np.
Because the Cold War has ended, pressures for rapid, irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons have increased.
With the negotiation of START II long finished, but not yet ratified by Russia, arms control advocates are unhappy
with the slow pace of disarmament. They are pressing not only to make deep cuts beyond 2000-2500 accountable
warheads-the limits outlined for START III at Helsinki-but also to de-alert our nuclear forces. Today I wish to make
three points that urge caution in making further deep reductions in our nuclear forces or in making our nuclear
deterrent less effective: * Extant and emerging nuclear, chemical, and biological threats require an effective US
nuclear deterrent. * Russia has a large, functioning nuclear weapons production complex; the United States does not.
And, we have no way to verify that there are no undeclared stockpiles in Russia. * De-alerting would profoundly
undermine deterrence, would generate serious instabilities, and, in some cases, introduce safety uncertainties.




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NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY IS A VITAL ASPECT OF DETERRING CONFLICT

1. CREDIBLE DETERRENCE REQUIRES A ROBUST U.S. NUCLEAR STANCE
Robert G. Spulak, Jr., senior analyst at the Strategic Studies Center, Sandia National Laboratories, PARAMETERS,
Spring 1997, p. 112-113.
Credible nuclear deterrence is robust, not delicate. Policies and actions that establish credibility couple with our
nuclear arsenal to create the possibility that in a war with the United States an enemy may face a risk of annihilation.
A potential enemy need not even be very rational to be deterred from action that ensure his own destruction (this is
not an argument for belligerence; we can keep the threshold for nuclear use high without undermining credibility.)
This creates extreme caution in the behavior of other states if they wish to threaten vital U.S. security interests, and
it substantially reduces the likelihood of miscalculation.

2. REDUCING THE CREDIBILITY OF U.S. NUCLEAR RESOLVE RISKS WAR
Robert G. Spulak, Jr., senior analyst at the Strategic Studies Center, Sandia National Laboratories, PARAMETERS,
Spring 1997, p. 108.
Insistence on minimizing the numbers of nuclear weapons provides a good illustration of the conceptual and analytic
problems related to stigmatizing nuclear weapons. Reducing numbers of weapons might reduce the chances of
nuclear war and improve overall safety and security of our nuclear arsenal - but then again it might not. Deterrence
of war is one of the benefits of nuclear weapons discussed below; for now it is enough to assert that action that
undermine the credibility of our deterrent may make nuclear war more, rather than less, likely in the long run.

3. CREDIBLE DETERRENCE IS VITAL TO U.S. SECURITY
Keith B. Payne, president of the National Institute for Public Policy at Georgetown University, FEDERAL
DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, March 31, 1998, p. np.
And, of course, there have been numerous recent proposals for nuclear disarmament and de- alerting. The arguments
underlying these proposals are: 1) U.S. movement away from nuclear weapons will help stop nuclear proliferation;
2) military deterrence is of declining relevance to U.S. security; and 3) U.S. conventional forces alone can ensure
deterrence of all but nuclear threats, i.e., nuclear deterrence is irrelevant to most regional security concerns. In fact,
U.S. nuclear disarmament or deep reductions could easily fuel nuclear proliferation; military deterrence remains
enormously important to U.S. security; and as the Gulf War demonstrated, in some tough cases nuclear weapons
will likely be essential to regional deterrence. Speaking in favor of a robust nuclear force is not fashionable. But
following the available evidence about deterrence -how it has failed and succeeded through the centuries and most
recently-leads to no other conclusion.

4. NUCLEAR STABILITY IS CRITICAL TO U.S. STABILITY
General Eugene B. Habiger, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, STRATEGIC FORUM, April
1997, p. 4.
With these new threats in mind, the United States must be prepared to pose unacceptable risks to any potential
adversary. Nuclear weapons are one-but not necessarily the only-means of doing that. As then-Defense Secretary
Perry noted on more than one occasion last spring, "Anyone who considers using a weapon of mass destruction
against the U.S. or its allies must first consider the consequences. We would not specify in advance what our
response would be, but it would be both overwhelming and devastating."




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THE U.S. MUST NOT SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE OUR NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

1. REDUCING LEVELS OF DETERRENCE INVITES CATASTROPHE
Robert G. Spulak, Jr., senior analyst at the Strategic Studies Center, Sandia National Laboratories, PARAMETERS,
Spring 1997, p. 108.
Further, a minimal stockpile, minimal deterrence, or a doctrine of defensive last resort intended to deter only the use
of nuclear weapons is not enough. In any war between major powers there is too great a possibility of
unprecedented, virtually terminal, devastation to civilization and mankind. The existence of nuclear weapons creates
the risk of catastrophe, but it also creates the only way to ameliorate that risk by minimizing the possibility of war
between the major powers. Nuclear weapons have this dual nature: they are the only possible solution to the problem
they pose.

2. ROBUST NUCLEAR OPTIONS ENHANCE US NATIONAL INTERESTS
Robert G. Spulak, Jr., senior analyst at the Strategic Studies Center, Sandia National Laboratories, PARAMETERS,
Spring 1997, p. 114.
The possession of a robust nuclear arsenal confers real diplomatic advantages on the United States. It is a vital
symbol and part of the substance of our world leadership. Diplomacy is always performed against the backdrop of
military capability. In addition, nuclear weapons, and the threats they imply, can be used explicitly (although not
without risk) to protect US interests. For example, during the superpower confrontation caused by the 1973 Arab-
Israeli war, increased US alert status, including nuclear forces, and hints of “incalculable consequences” probably
helped to deter Soviet intervention in Egypt. (Soviet nuclear capabilities also may have helped to motivate the
United States to world to prevent the destruction of the encircled Egyptian Third Army.) There has been widespread
speculation that allusions to nuclear use may have deterred Iraq from using chemical weapons in the 1990-91 Gulf
war. And, the US carefully refrained for several days from ruling out a nuclear strike against a Libyan underground
chemical weapons facility to increase the diplomatic pressure to stop confrontation. Nuclear weapons make it easier
for the United States to cooperate with other nations since they make it difficult for other nations to threaten central
US security interests.

3. REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS WILL SPARK WORLD-WIDE PROLIFERATION
Keith B. Payne, president of the National Institute for Public Policy at Georgetown University, FEDERAL
DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, March 31, 1998, p. np.
Similarly, if the United States gives up its capability to provide a credible nuclear umbrella to allies, such as Japan,
Germany, and South Korea, those countries will be motivated to "go nuclear" themselves for deterrence purposes.
This concern is not speculative; national leaders in Japan and South Korea have publicly stated as much.
Consequently, the United States could easily fuel nuclear proliferation by reducing its nuclear arsenal precipitously.

4. U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE MUST APPEAR HIGHLY CREDIBLE
Edward L. Warner III, Assistant Secretary of Defense, FDCH CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, March 31, 1998,
p. np.
Even if we could ignore a future threat from Russia, there is a range of other potential threats to which nuclear
weapons are a deterrent. China has a significant nuclear capability, and its future political orientation is far from
certain. In addition, the number of rogue states with actual and potential WMD programs is considerable. We do not
regard these states as undeterrable, either in their incentives to acquire a WMD capability or to use it. We believe
that the knowledge that the United States has a powerful and ready nuclear capability poses a significant deterrent to
proliferators. If any nation were foolish enough to attack the U.S., its Allies, or friends with chemical or biological
weapons, our response would be swift, devastating, and overwhelming. As Secretary Perry said in 1996, we are able
to mount a devastating response without using nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, we do not rule out in advance any
capability available to us.




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DETERRENCE REDUCES THE CHANCES OF ALLIED PROLIFERATION

1. REDUCING OUR DETERRENCE CREDIBILITY SPARKS PROLIFERATION
Robert G. Spulak, Jr., senior analyst at the Strategic Studies Center, Sandia National Laboratories, PARAMETERS,
Spring 1997, p. 108.
Many of the recommendations to “reduce nuclear danger” actually could work at cross purposes. One of the most
worrisome proposals - for a minimal US strategic stockpile - could actually interfere with nonproliferation by
withdrawing extended deterrence from nuclear-capable allies who might then be motivated to develop their own
nuclear deterrents.

2. ROBUST DETERRENCE HALTS OUR ALLIES’ PROLIFERATION IMPULSES
Edward L. Warner III, Assistant Secretary of Defense, FDCH CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, March 31, 1998,
p. np.
The U.S. nuclear deterrent also helps to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons among our Allies and friends. The
extension of our deterrent to those nations has removed any incentives they might have to develop and deploy their
own nuclear forces, as many are technically capable of doing. New Presidential guidance for the changed security
environment The Quadrennial Defense Review, completed last spring, examined U.S. nuclear strategy and force
posture and reaffirmed the continuing need for a robust and flexible American nuclear deterrent. In the QDR,
nuclear forces were examined as an integral part of an overall review of defense issues.

STIGMATIZING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A MOST RISKY POLICY COURSE

1. THE U.S. MUST NOT PURSUE POLICY BASED ON STIGMATIZING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Robert G. Spulak, Jr., senior analyst at the Strategic Studies Center, Sandia National Laboratories, PARAMETERS,
Spring 1997, p. 117-118.
This is not to say that there are no national security problems associated with US nuclear weapons. A serious
discussion that attempts to balance the dangers and benefits of nuclear weapons must be undertaken before
dramatically altering our security policy. Wishing that nuclear weapons didn’t exist will not alter the security needs
of the United States or the associated nuclear problems. The United States needs to exercise wise leadership in
formulating its policies and in promoting and protecting its worldwide interests. Policies of minimizing and
stigmatizing the sources of our strength will only make it more difficult to lead.

2. THE BURDEN OF PROOF LIES WITH ANTI-NUCLEAR ADVOCATES
Robert G. Spulak, Jr., senior analyst at the Strategic Studies Center, Sandia National Laboratories, PARAMETERS,
Spring 1997, p. 117.
Since we absolutely cannot achieve the goal of abolishing both nuclear weapons and the knowledge of how to
construct them, policies and actions that appear to move in that direction will always fail the test of plausibility. But
since these policies and actions would be undertaken in the name of “reducing nuclear danger,” they acquire a
respectability that they have not earned through critical examination. This is the reason it is necessary to reject the
emotional appeal reflected in Les Aspin’s assertion in 1992 that, in the new era, “the burden of proof is shifting
toward those who want to maintain” policies supporting US nuclear weapons and away from those who advocate
“four prescriptions of the left ... a comprehensive test ban, an end to production of fissile material ... removal of
forward-based tactical weapons, and renunciation of first use.” n 25 An assumption that the formulation of US
security policy is biased apriori toward a given set of policy recommendations is exactly the problem with nuclear
stigma.




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WE MUST NOT RELAX OUR NUCLEAR POSTURE TOWARD RUSSIA

1. RUSSIAN THREATS DEMAND A ROBUST U.S. DETERRENCE POSTURE
Kathleen C. Bailey, senior fellow at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, FEDERAL DOCUMENT
CLEARING HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, March 31, 1998, p. np.
The US nuclear deterrent is necessary to address a host of threats-nuclear, chemical, and biological-posed by an
increasing number of nations. To assure that the deterrent is as effective as possible, the US should clearly enunciate
a policy of reserving the option to retaliate with nuclear weapons against the use of any weapon of mass destruction.
The actual number of warheads or amount of materials for warheads possessed by Russia, and perhaps by others, is
not verifiable with current technologies. Great caution therefore should be exercised in any arms control efforts to
lower the numbers of nuclear warheads beyond the levels of 2000-2500. If the United States were to reduce to low
numbers of warheads while other nations obtained or retained larger numbers, US national security would be
gravely at risk. Additionally, efforts to de-alert our nuclear forces should be strongly resisted. De-alerting has a
severe impact on force readiness and stability, as well as a host of other problems. If we have concerns about C3
problems, we should address them through other means, not by reducing nuclear readiness, survivability, and safety.

2. EXTENDED DETERRENCE IS ESSENTIAL TO HEDGE AGAINST RUSSIAN NATIONALISM
Edward L. Warner, III Assistant Secretary of Defense, FDCH CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, March 31, 1998,
p. np.
As stated in the NATO Strategic Concept, the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe provide an essential
political link between the European and North American members of the Alliance. Russia has made great progress
toward the creation of stable market democracy, and we do not regard it as a potential military threat under its
present or any reasonably foreseeable government. We have made wise investments in the Cooperative Threat
Reduction program, and we share with the-current Russian leadership (and most other Russian centers of influence)
a determination not to let our relations return to a state of hostility in which these weapons would again be a threat.
Nevertheless, Russia still possesses substantial strategic nuclear forces and an even larger non-strategic nuclear
stockpile. Because of significant degradation in its conventional military capabilities, Russia appears to be placing
even more reliance on its nuclear forces. Russia's new National Security Concept, promulgated in December 1997,
states that "Russia retains the right to use all available-forces and means, including nuclear weapons, if armed
aggression launched against it threatens the very existence Of the Russian Federation as an independent, sovereign
state." It also states that "the main task of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is to ensure nuclear
deterrence, which is to prevent both a nuclear and conventional large-scale or regional war, and also to meet its
allied commitments. To accomplish this task, the Russian Federation should have a potential of nuclear forces which
can guarantee that planned damage will be caused to any aggressor state or a coalition of states. " We cannot be so
certain of future Russian politics as to ignore the possibility that we may once again need to deter the nuclear forces
of a hostile Russia should the current policy of democratic reform be replaced by a return to aggressive
authoritarianism. We do not believe that such a reversal is likely and we are working hard to avoid it. Nevertheless,
it is prudent to maintain a secure and capable nuclear force as a hedge against it happening.

3. WE SHOULD NOT RELAX OUR NUCLEAR DEFENSE POSTURE TOWARD RUSSIA
Kathleen C. Bailey, senior fellow at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, FEDERAL DOCUMENT
CLEARING HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, March 31, 1998, p. np.
Although our relations with Russia are now relaxed, we must continue to take Russia's weapons capabilities, not just
its intent, into account. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been important indicators that Russia is increasing
its reliance on nuclear deterrence and is improving its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems. In May 1997 Russia
announced that it would no longer adhere to a nuclear no-first-use doctrine. It continues to maintain several
thousand tactical nuclear weapons at a time when NATO has made dramatic reductions in this class of nuclear
forces. Giant, deeply buried, underground nuclear-related complexes in Yamantau and Kos'vinskiy Mountains, as
well as shelters, continue to be constructed at great cost. Russia conducted some sort of nuclear or nuclear-related
tests at Novaya Zemlya in 1996, and perhaps others since. Russia is not only remanufacturing existing warheads, but
also building new designs. Initial units of the SS-X-27, a highly accurate and reliable mobile ICBM, have already
been deployed. A new SSBN and SLBM are under development.




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CTR EXPANSION SOLVES RUSSIAN NUCLEAR LEAKAGE

1. EXPANDING CTR FUNDING WOULD STABILIZE NUMEROUS PROLIFERATION THREATS
James E. Doyle, senior analyst at Science Applications International Corporation and postdoctoral research associate
at Los Alamos National Laboratory, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, March 1998, p. 15.
Given our current understanding of the nuclear materials security problem in Russia and the NIS, planning should
begin for a second phase of the MPC&A program (from 2003 to 2007) funded at a level of approximately $50
million per year. While this would result in a total program cost of approximately $1.2 billion (over 15 years), it is a
small price to pay given the potential consequences of further proliferation or nuclear terrorism. This program
extension would allow rapid expansion and acceleration of two key MPC&A sectors in Russia: naval fuels and the
nuclear weapons complex. It would also improve the chances that rapid upgrades in Russia's large fuel facilities and
"nuclear cities" can be completed during the next three to five years. Finally, such an extension would allow for the
operational evaluation of newly installed MPC&A systems and the establishment of an indigenous infrastructure
that can sustain the effectiveness of these systems over the long term, including a further consolidation in the
number of sites and facilities containing weapons-usable nuclear materials.

2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE PROVES CTR EXPANSION REDUCES PROLIFERATION THREATS
Edward L. Warner III, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, DEFENSE ISSUES,
March 31, 1998, p. np.
CTR's bottom line is impressive. In 1991, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus together had 3,300 strategic and roughly
2,600 tactical nuclear warheads on their soil. They would have been respectively -- by far -- the third, fourth and
seventh largest nuclear powers in the world. Today, in what is probably the greatest nonproliferation achievement
the world has seen, these three states are completely free of nuclear warheads. In addition, START I eliminations are
well ahead of schedule. CTR assistance has specifically helped deactivate 4,700 warheads, and destroyed 252
ICBMs, 252 ICBM silos, 37 bombers, 80 SLBM launchers and 114 nuclear test tunnels. Much more is still to be
done. We must continue to encourage the dismantlement of excess nuclear warheads in Russia and the reduction of
its weapons-grade material, and to help ensure the safety and security of the warheads and fissile material that
remain. We must continue to help the states of the former Soviet Union fully implement their START I reductions,
and look forward to doing the same with START II. While the CTR program assists the recipient states, it is
fundamental to U.S. national security, ensuring the reduction in weapons of mass destruction that would otherwise
be arrayed against us or pose a serious proliferation threat.

3. EXPANDING THE TRAINING ELEMENT IS KEY TO LONG-TERM SOLVENCY
James E. Doyle, senior analyst at Science Applications International Corporation and postdoctoral research associate
at Los Alamos National Laboratory, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, March 1998, p. 16.
Expand Training Programs. The training of national personnel in the concepts and operations of modern MPC&A
systems is essential to the long-term improvement of nuclear materials security in Russia and the NIS. This has been
recognized from the beginning of MPC&A efforts and training programs are an integral part of the U.S.-supported
upgrades at each site. Dedicated training centers, such as the Russian Methodological and Training Center (RMTC)
at Obninsk have also been established. These programs can be expanded by broadening the curriculum to include a
greater range of safeguards techniques and by the development of mobile training teams and distance-learning
capabilities. Dedicated safeguards training centers should be temporarily established in most of the NIS and at least
one additional center should be opened in Russia east of the Ural Mountains to provide easier access for nuclear
sites in Siberia. Such a center is under consideration for Tomsk Polytechnical University.

4. NUNN-LUGAR IS OUR BEST CHANCE OF CONTAINING RUSSIAN NUCLEAR LEAKAGE
Kent Conrad, Senator from North Dakota, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, June 25, 1998, p. S7089.
In addition to the diplomatic pressure called for in my amendment, continuing and possibly expanding work under
Nunn-Lugar on tactical nuclear weapons is the best bet we've got to put this aspect of the Russian nuclear genie back
in the bottle. Funding for Nunn-Lugar is vital, and I congratulate the committee for fully supporting this
 program in their bill.




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CTR EXPANSION INCREASES RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SAFETY

1. EXPANDING CTR TO INCLUDE BORDER CONTROL WOULD IMPROVE NUCLEAR SAFETY
James E. Doyle, senior analyst at Science Applications International Corporation and postdoctoral research associate
at Los Alamos National Laboratory, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, March 1998, p. 18.
Although DOE and other U.S. government agencies have programs under way to deal with nuclear smuggling
(funded separately from the MPC&A program), it would be prudent for the United States to help create a stronger
second line of defense to prevent the unauthorized removal of nuclear material from Russia and the NIS. Following
a layered-defense concept with the first line being effective MPC&A systems at the sites authorized to contain
nuclear materials, the second line of defense should be placed along the national borders of Russia and the NIS.
DOE plans to work with the national laboratories to provide Russian and NIS customs officials and border guards
significantly improved capabilities for deterring, detecting and interdicting the smuggling of weapons of mass
destruction at ports and border crossings. Because of the length of these borders and the fact that large quantities of
goods move across at uncontrolled points, a second line of defense program can only be expected to make
incremental improvements to overall nuclear materials security. Nevertheless, because of the potentially dire
consequences of nuclear smuggling, and because border controls will improve over time, it is clearly in the U.S.
interest to seek the additional, limited protection. An additional $5 million to $10 million per year should be added
to the MPC&A budget for this effort.

2. CTR EXPANSION IS THE BEST INVESTMENT IN NUCLEAR SECURITY WE CAN MAKE
Kent Conrad, Senator from North Dakota, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, June 25, 1998, p. S7089.
Let me be clear: continuing the Nunn-Lugar program is absolutely critical. I can think of no better investment of
national security dollars than simply expending money for the destruction of horrible weapons capable of killing
millions of Americans. Continuing and fully funding the CTR program is especially important in light of the
Russian tactical nuclear dangers I have discussed. Although there are arms control agreements requiring Russian
strategic force reductions, there are no arms control agreements requiring reductions to Russia's tactical nuclear
stockpile.

3. THE VALUE OF EXPANDING THE CTR INITIATIVES CANNOT BE OVERESTIMATED
James E. Doyle, senior analyst at Science Applications International Corporation and postdoctoral research associate
at Los Alamos National Laboratory, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, March 1998, p. 18.
The unprecedented joint efforts by the United States and its Russian-NIS partners to improve nuclear materials
security, initiated during the Bush administration, have developed rapidly over the past four years and become one
of greatest successes of the Clinton administration's national security policy. The strategies for cooperation and the
mechanisms for jointly installing improved MPC&A systems have been proven effective. The MPC&A program
thus demonstrates that innovative approaches can be found to reduce the key threats of the next 50 years of the
nuclear age. These are the threats posed by continued nuclear proliferation and the need to safely dismantle and
dispose of the vast Cold War surplus of nuclear weapons, materials and infrastructure. Therefore, the value of the
cooperative working relationships that have been developed by MPC&A participants cannot be overestimated.

4. NUNN-LUGAR IS CRITICAL TO CONTAINING TERRORISM AND PROLIFERATION
John Kerry, Senator from Massachusetts, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, June 25, 1998, p. S7090.
Defending America from nuclear threats also means preventing fissile materials from falling into the hands of those
aspiring to develop nuclear weapons, be they aspiring countries or terrorists. The Indian-Pakistani attainment of
nuclear weapons does not cease our efforts; it means we should redouble them. In this sense, the security of Russia's
vast nuclear arsenal is very much in our interest. The Armed Services Committee has long recognized this fact
through the Nunn-Lugar program, and I will support restoration of full funding for Nunn-Lugar in this bill.




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CTR EXPANSION CONTROLS RUSSIAN NUCLEAR RISKS

1. CTR CONTROLS PROLIFERATION, FACILITATES START III AND INCREASES COOPERATION
James E. Doyle, senior analyst at Science Applications International Corporation and postdoctoral research associate
at Los Alamos National Laboratory, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, March 1998, p. 18.
These relationships aid the former Cold War rivals in expanding their partnership for nuclear materials security.
They will contribute to progress in other areas such as the safe and secure storage of dismantled nuclear weapons,
the removal of nuclear materials from weapons applications, the conversion of weapons-usable nuclear materials to
non-weapons-usable forms and the placement of excess weapons-usable nuclear materials under international
safeguards. The success of the MPC&A program also facilitates efforts to achieve another round of U.S.-Russian
nuclear arms reductions (START III). MPC&A cooperation is vital to all these efforts because without effective
controls over the resulting materials, the dismantlement of nuclear weapons could actually increase rather than
decrease proliferation threats. The MPC&A program also provides a model for cooperation that may be replicated in
the future with other nations that have inadequate nuclear material controls.

2. ONLY CTR CAN ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR THREAT
James E. Doyle, senior analyst at Science Applications International Corporation and postdoctoral research associate
at Los Alamos National Laboratory, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, March 1998, p. 18.
Meeting these challenges are goals for the next phase of the MPC&A program and will require many years of
sustained effort. Carefully planning this next phase of MPC&A cooperation will bring closer the ultimate objective
of effective, comprehensive and indigenously sustained MPC&A systems throughout Russia and the NIS. Only the
achievement of this objective will adequately resolve the threat of loose nuclear materials in the region.

3. CTR EXPANSION WILL REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR OR CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS
Stephen Sestanovich, special advisor to the Secretary of State for the New Independent States, HEARINGS
BEFORE THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, July 16, 1998, p. np.
Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), the United States has provided approximately $1.3
billion to help Russia and the other NIS states meet their obligations under START I by helping to destroy strategic
missiles, bombers, silos and submarines, and to provide secure storage for fissile material removed from dismantled
nuclear weapons. Other programs are helping Russia improve the security of fissile material and provide
opportunities for productive, non-weapons related work for laboratories, scientists and engineers. Destroying the
world's stockpiles of chemical weapons is another challenge that we're tackling with Russia, which ratified the
Chemical Weapons Convention in November. CTR will help Russia eliminate its chemical weapons production
capacity and will provide a facility which will eventually destroy 14% of Russia's chemical weapon stockpile. We
are also working with Russia and the international community to secure greater international funding for, and
involvement in, Russia's chemical weapons destruction effort.




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DEALERTING OUR NUCLEAR ARSENAL REDUCES WAR RISKS

1. DEALERTING SOLVES THE RISK OF NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION
Jonathan Landay, staff writer, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, February 20, 1998, p. 4.
Rocks and dirt don't sound like a recipe for averting an atomic cataclysm. Yet, piling tons of debris atop the lids of
nuclear-missile silos that would take days to clear is among a host of steps - collectively called "de-alerting" -
gaining support as ways in which the United States and Russia might advance post-cold-war stability. The idea: The
more time the sides require to mount massive nuclear attacks, the less danger of inadvertent conflict. Furthermore,
advocates say, taking most missiles off the high-alert hair-triggers on which they remain six years after the Soviet
Union's demise would encourage the former foes to slash armories below levels now being contemplated. Other de-
alerting measures include storing warheads, batteries, and guidance units apart from missiles; pinning open ignition
switches so that rockets could not be fired until the pins are manually extracted; removing shrouds that shield
warheads in flight; and placing mobile Russian launchers up on blocks after removing their tires.

2. THE U.S. AND RUSSIA MUST MOVE TO DEALERT OF ARSENALS
Brian D. Taylor, international security fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard,
BREAKING THE DISARMAMENT DEADLOCK: NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ARMS CONTROL, AND RUSSIA-
AMERICAN RELATIONS (published by the Council for a Livable World Education Fund), June 1998, p. 20.
Immediate steps should be taken by the United States and Russia to stand down from their Cold War nuclear
postures. Despite the sea change in bilateral relations in the last decade, and the dismantlement of tens of thousands
of nuclear weapons, one aspect of the nuclear postures of the two countries remains virtually unchanged: the hair-
trigger alert status of thousands of nuclear weapons. As Sam Nunn, the former chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, and Bruce Blair of the Brookings Institution pointed out in The Washington Post on June 22,
1997, “each country still maintains roughly 3,000 strategic nuclear warheads poised and ready to launch.” Nunn and
Blair argued: It is time for the United States and Russia to cast off the mental shackles of deterrence. To “de-alert”
our strategic forces and embrace a new formula that makes our nuclear relationship more compatible with our
political relationship. Maintaining the ability to incinerate rapidly the other country at a time of friendly relations is
nonsensical. The worry about a surprise nuclear attack that brought about these hair-trigger postures during the Cold
War is obsolete. Both countries could take steps to reduce the readiness of their missiles.

3. DEALERTING WILL SOLVE ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH RISK AND INCREASE RELATIONS
Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences, THE FUTURE OF
US NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, 1997, p. 62.
Elimination of continuous-alert practices should be pursued as a principal goal in parallel with, but not linked to,
START III. It would reduce the perceived danger of short-warning attacks; it would make detecting preparations to
use nuclear weapons easier and thereby increase the time available for political solutions; it would reduce pressures
on command-and control systems to stand ready to respond quickly, and thus would decrease the chance of
erroneous launch of nuclear weapons or a launch in response to a spurious or incorrectly interpreted indication of
impending attack; it would allow both sides to increase barriers to unauthorized use of unclear weapons; and it
would enhance the political relationship by eliminating the assumption that the other side might launch a surprise
attack.




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RUSSIA WON’T COOPERATE ON NUCLEAR SECURITY

1. RUSSIA EMPIRICALLY REJECTS NUCLEAR COOPERATION AS A POLITICAL LIABILITY
Frank von Hippel, professor of public and international affairs at Princeton, THE BULLETIN OF ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS, May/June 1997, p. 37-38.
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have repeatedly agreed in joint summit statements on a desire to make their warhead
stockpiles and reductions more "transparent." Their most detailed statement, issued after their May 1995 Moscow
summit, affirmed "the desire... to exchange detailed information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads [and]
stocks of fissile material... on a regular basis" and "to negotiate... a cooperative arrangement for reciprocal
monitoring of storage facilities of fissile materials removed from nuclear warheads and declared to be excess to
national security requirements. U.S. and Russian technical experts have conducted joint demonstrations of external
radiation measurements that could be used to confirm that sealed containers hold stored plutonium objects of the
approximate mass and size expected of "pits" extracted from dismantled nuclear warheads. However, the
implementation of this and other proposed transparency agreements awaits the conclusion of an "Agreement of
Cooperation" on the bilateral protection of the classified data that would be revealed through such measurements.
Unfortunately, as Russia became increasingly disillusioned about its security partnership with the United States- and
indeed public cooperation with the United States became a political liability for Russian officials- Moscow became
unresponsive to U.S. proposals to complete the agreement.

2. RUSSIAN SECRECY PRECLUDES VERIFICATION OF WEAPON DESTRUCTION
Richard F. Staar, senior fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford, STRATEGIC REVIEW, Spring 1998, p. 37.
But there are worrisome aspects regarding Russia’s nuclear modernization. As U.S. Defense Secretary William S.
Cohen noted in a press conference April 24, 1997, certain types of intelligence are difficult to gather in Russia
because the Kremlin does not permit inspections of its ICBMs or SLBMs. How then can the U.S. be certain that
these strategic systems are being destroyed under terms of the START I treaty, that Russia has “only” 6,000
strategic warheads remaining, or even that detargeting has taken place?

DEALERTING INVITES CBW ATTACKS

1. DEALERTING DESTROYS CREDIBLE DETERRENT, INVITING CBW ATTACKS
Kathleen Bailey, senior fellow at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE,
January 22, 1998, p. 6.
Moreover, the U.S. nuclear deterrent protects Americans not just from Russia but also from other nations' nuclear
arsenals, as well as from the chemical and biological weapons proliferating around the world. President Clinton's
recent revision of the nuclear-use doctrine recognizes the growing need to rely on nuclear retaliation to deter attacks
with other types of weapons of mass destruction. The speed with which nuclear retaliation can be executed can mean
the difference between the U.S. or its allies suffering one chemical or biological weapons attack or many.




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DE-ALERTING INCREASES NUCLEAR RISKS

1. DEALERTING CRUSHES U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENT, INCREASING RISK OF 1ST STRIKE
Kathleen Bailey, senior fellow at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE,
January 22, 1998, p. 6.
Since the U.S. still faces the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, it would seem only rational that it
continue to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent to protect itself. However, this logic seems to have escaped the
Clinton administration, which is now considering "de-alerting" America's nuclear arsenal. The idea is that the U.S.
would make nuclear-tipped missiles all but unusable through such measures as removing their nuclear warheads or
guidance systems. This would erode the U.S. nuclear deterrent and increase the risk of an early nuclear strike against
the U.S. Before taking such a step, the dangers should be debated widely and openly, not just behind the closed
doors of the executive branch. The primary reason that U.S. nuclear missiles are on alert-that is, ready to be fired
quickly- is that Russia retains as many as 10 times more tactical nuclear weapons than the U.S. does, an arsenal
capable of destroying America. Although Moscow presently shows no intention of using its nuclear arsenal, this
could change quickly given Russia's volatile politics. It is Moscow's nuclear capability- not just its intentions- that
must concern the U.S. There are clear signs that Russia is enhancing these capabilities and that its leadership intends
to rely increasingly on nuclear weapons. It is modernizing its nuclear weapons and delivery systems at high cost,
despite its financial woes. Moscow's refusal to ratify the Start II treaty and its abandonment of its nuclear no-first-
use pledge also introduce uncertainty.

2. VERIFICATION IS IMPOSSIBLE, INCREASING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR BREAK-OUT
Kathleen Bailey, senior fellow at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Wall Street Journal Europe, January 22,
1998, p. 6.
Proponents of de-alerting argue that even after its weapons were de-alerted, the U.S. could reconstitute its nuclear
missiles and bombs quickly enough to retaliate against an aggressor. This is patently false, even if other powers also
agreed to de-alert, because they could cheat on such a deal with virtually no risk of detection. If Russia agreed to
disable one set of mobile missile launchers, for instance, it could clandestinely manufacture another set. If it
removed one set of warheads, it could secretly produce and upload a second set. Alternatively, Moscow might not
declare all of its existing warheads or delivery vehicles. Iraq has already taught America the lesson that missiles
would be equally hard to find. Also, the U.S. currently has no technologies to locate undeclared, hidden stockpiles of
nuclear weapons or weapons materials.

DE-ALERTING INVITES ATTACKS BY ROGUE STATES

1. DE-ALERTING UNDERCUTS OUR CREDIBILITY OF RESPONSE AGAINST ROGUE STATES
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, January 20, 1998, p. A18.
"De-alerting" (a word so awkward only arms-control bureaucrats could have thought of it) could take a number of
forms and the suggestions being put forward are disconcerting. They include: removing the integrated circuit boards
from ICBMs and storing them hundreds of miles away; taking the warheads off the MX missiles or possibly the
Minuteman ICBMs; welding shut the missile hatches of some submarines; and doubling the number of orders a
hard-to-communicate-with submarine would have to receive before it could launch a missile. Any one of these
measures is the nuclear equivalent of giving a beat cop an unloaded gun and requiring that he radio back to
headquarters for bullets when he wants to use it. The gospel according to de-alerting evangelists is set forth in a long
article by Bruce Blair of Brookings and Frank von Hippel and Harold Feiveson of Princeton University in
November's Scientific American magazine. They urge the Administration to de-alert the long-range missiles
scheduled for retirement under the Start II agreement that the Duma refuses to ratify. The Russian command-and
control system is falling apart, they argue, and unilateral action on the part of the U.S. would encourage the Russians
to de-alert their own missiles, thus reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized launch. There are a number of
flaws in this argument, starting with the familiar belief that Russia will buy it and then abide by it. Russia is
spending heavily to maintain and modernize its nuclear arsenal even as some of its soldiers starve, as Kathleen
Bailey points out nearby. But the biggest flaw pertains not to Russia but to rogue states like North Korea, Iran and
Iraq, all of them developing long-range ballistic missiles. If the Saddam Husseins of the world believe that our
nuclear deterrent is susceptible to a pre-emptive strike, they at least have an incentive to try it, in the expectation that
any effort to reassemble a counterattack would be difficult and that in any event the arms controllers would try hard
to thwart any such reaction.




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U.S.-SINO RELATIONS ARE KEY TO PEACE

1. EXPERTS AGREE U.S.-SINO COOPERATION IS PROVIDING STABILITY IN ASIA
Kevin Chaffee, staff writer, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, August 12, 1998, p. C10.
"People in the U.S. aren't really aware of what's going on over there and how it's going to affect our own economy,"
said Barbara Franklin, who served as secretary of commerce during the Bush administration and sits on the boards
of several major corporations. The crowd of diplomats, businesspeople, think-tank staffers and Hill and
administration personnel agreed with Mrs. Chan's assessment of the area's political-security environment, which she
thinks has improved with the stabilization of relations not only between the United States and China and the United
States and Japan, but between China and Japan as well. It is essential, she said, because "Asia can't handle two crises
at the same time."

2. U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS ARE KEY TO WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY
James Morrison, staff writer, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, July 28, 1998, p. A14.
"I believe these discussions could take the two countries toward stronger relationships," Mr. Celeste said Sunday on
state-run Doordarshan television. "If you have to look at what the world would be in 2020 or 2030, it is hard to
imagine that the world would be peaceful and prosperous if there are no positive relations between India, China and
the United States, " he added. The ambassador also discussed Washington's efforts to act as a mediator between
India and Pakistan to persuade them to forsake future nuclear tests. But he urged both countries to deal directly with
each other to resolve the rivalry that led them to conduct nuclear tests in May, sparking fears of another India-
Pakistan war.

3. STRONG U.S. RELATIONS WITH CHINA ARE CRITICAL TO PREVENT WAR OVER TAIWAN
Chas W. Freeman, Jr., co-chair of the United States -- China Policy Foundation, and a former diplomat who served
as Deputy Chief of Mission at Beijing from 1981 to 1984 and assistant secretary of defense for International
Security Affairs from 1993 to 1994, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, August 1998, p. 6.
Until President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States in June 1995, Taiwan and the Chinese mainland had been
moving toward mutual accommodation through informal economic and cultural exchanges and dialogue. On both
sides of the strait there was a consensus on the ideal of "one China" and the imperative of realizing it through some
form of reunification. This consensus, endorsed by the United States, kept the peace and fostered an atmosphere
conducive to negotiation. The consensus has now collapsed. Taiwan seems convinced it can campaign for
independence with the military backing of the United States. If war is to be prevented, Washington must convince
Taipei as well as Beijing that it is time for them to work out a mutually acceptable relationship, and that no
unilateral change in the status quo -- precipitated by either side -- is acceptable.




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RUSSIA WILL NEVER LASH OUT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

1. RUSSIA IS COMPLETELY UNABLE TO STAND UP TO THE UNITED STATES
Judith Matloff, Staff Writer, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 7, 1999, p. 6.
Rather than returning a hero who helped find a way to end the fighting over Kosovo, Balkans mediator Viktor
Chernomyrdin limped home to accusations of betrayal. Instead of winning prestige, Russians could no longer deny
their nation's inability to stand up to its Western nemeses. "There is a widespread feeling that we are so weak that
we can only capitulate to the West," says Ivan Safranchuk, a foreign-affairs expert at the Center for Policy Studies in
Moscow. Adds one high-ranking government official: "This was no diplomatic triumph. We had no mechanism to
insist on our vision of the problem. NATO held all the trump cards."

2. RUSSIA IS SIMPLY INCAPABLE OF RESPONDING TO ANY U.S. ACTION WITH FORCE
Colin McMahon, Staff Writer, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 6, 1999, p. 14C.
Given the weakness of Russia's conventional military forces, an armed response to NATO's bombings was never
considered feasible. Russian leaders might have wanted NATO to suffer a humbling loss in Yugoslavia, but they
consistently promised not to respond with force.

3. KOSOVO PROVES THAT RUSSIA NO LONGER EVEN POSES A NUCLEAR THREAT
Judith Matloff, Staff Writer, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 7, 1999, p. 6.
Since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russia has waved its own trump card: the huge nuclear arsenal left over
from the cold war. But when the airstrikes began against Yugoslavia in March, dark hints by President Boris Yeltsin
of a World War III proved empty threats. While Russia continued to condemn the bombing, it quickly backed away
from a confrontation with the West. It assumed the humble role of messenger, ferrying peace proposals between the
two sides.

4. KOSOVO PROVES THAT RUSSIA REALIZES IT SHOULD NOT PROVOKE THE UNITED STATES
Andrew Higgins, Staff Writer, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 4, 1999, p. A14.
Appointed as Russia's Balkan envoy in early April, Mr. Chernomyrdin has himself frequently denounced NATO's
bombing and demanded that the bombing stop as a precondition for any peace settlement. His appointment,
however, signaled a clear desire by the Kremlin to prevent the Kosovo conflict from derailing relations with the
West. "He is more pro-Western than most of the ruling elite and understands negotiation," says Sergei Kolmakov of
Fond Politika, a Moscow- based think tank. "After two weeks of hysteria, the Kremlin realized that it is very
dangerous to take unpractical steps to help Serbia and ruin its relations with the West."

5. RUSSIA NEEDS MONEY FROM THE WEST, SO RUSSIA WILL NOT OPPOSE OUR POLICIES
Judith Matloff, Staff Writer, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 7, 1999, p. 6.
Now sidelined with NATO and Belgrade in direct contact, Russia has little say on any final settlement. An
underlying motivation for Russia's capitulation may have been a desire to appease the West to win desperately
needed loans.

6. RUSSIA DEPENDS ON OUR ECONOMIC AID TOO MUCH – WE HOLD THE UPPER HAND
THE ECONOMIST, May 1, 1999, p. 48.
On its own, this does not necessarily mean many headaches for the West. So long as Mr Yeltsin remains president, it
may seem, Russia is unlikely to do anything silly, whatever Mr Primakov or others may privately wish. Apart from
anything else, the West's financial clout, demonstrated by this week's talks with the IMF (see article), shows which
side really holds the upper hand.

7. RUSSIA IS UNABLE TO CHALLENGE THE WEST – ITS ONLY POWER IS IN EURASIA
Mortimer Zuckerman, Editor in Chief, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, May 10, 1999, p. 75.
It is unable to challenge NATO in the west or China in the east. Its economic malaise has constrained the Kremlin's
response to NATO's bombing in Serbia. But in southern Eurasia, off the political radar of the West, Russia is
making much of its limited resources in a region of weaker states where it still retains influence and remains
welcome.




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