Document of The World Bank Report No.: 26260 PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 3217) AGRICULTURAL SECTOR INVESTMENT PROJECT (LOAN 3661) NORTHWEST MOUNTAINOUS AREAS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 3691) NATIONAL RURAL FINANCE PROJECT (LOAN 3892) JUNE 26, 2003 Sector and Thematic Evaluation Group Operations Evaluation Department Currency Equivalents (annual averages) Currency Unit: Tunisian Dinar (TND) 1990 US$1.00 TND 0.87 1991 US$1.00 TND 0.92 1992 US$1.00 TND 0.88 1993 US$1.00 TND 1.00 1994 US$1.00 TND 1.01 1995 US$1.00 TND 0.94 1996 US$1.00 TND 0.97 1997 US$1.00 TND 1.11 1998 US$1.00 TND 1.14 1999 US$1.00 TND 1.19 2000 US$1.00 TND 1.37 Abbreviations and Acronyms AVFA Agence de la Vulgarisation et de la Formation Agricole (Agricultural Extension and Training Agency) BNA Banque Nationale Agricole (National Agricultural Bank) CRA Centre de Rayonnement Agricole (Local Extension Unit) CRDA Commissariat Regional de Developpement Agricole (Regional Agricultural Development Commission) CTV Cellule Territoriale de Vulgarisation (Sub-Regional Extension Unit) GDA Groupement de developpement agricole (Agricultural Development Association) GDP gross domestic product GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Assistance) ICR Implementation Completion Report IRESA Institut de Recherche et de l’Enseignement Superieur Agricole (Institute of Agricultural Research and Higher Education) MNA Middle East and North Africa Region, World Bank MNSRE Rural Development, Water and Environment Group of MNA NGO nongovernmental organization ODESYPANO Office du Developpement Sylvo-Pastoral du Nord-Ouest (North-West Forestry and Pastoral Development Agency) OED Operations Evaluation Department PMU Project Management Unit PPAR Project Performance Assessment Report T&V training and visit extension methodology Fiscal Year Government January 1 – December 31 Director-General, Operations Evaluation : Mr. Gregory K. Ingram Director (Acting), Operations Evaluation Department : Mr. Nils Fostvedt Manager, Sector and Thematic Evaluation : Mr. Alain Barbu Task Manager : Mr. John Heath i OED Mission: Enhancing development effectiveness through excellence and independence in evaluation. About this Report The Operations Evaluation Department assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank’s self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank’s work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, OED annually assesses about 25 percent of the Bank’s lending operations. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons. The projects, topics, and analytical approaches selected for assessment support larger evaluation studies. A Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) is based on a review of the Implementation Completion Report (a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department) and fieldwork conducted by OED. To prepare PPARs, OED staff examine project files and other documents, interview operational staff, and in most cases visit the borrowing country for onsite discussions with project staff and beneficiaries. The PPAR thereby seeks to validate and augment the information provided in the ICR, as well as examine issues of special interest to broader OED studies. Each PPAR is subject to a peer review process and OED management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is reviewed by the responsible Bank department and amended as necessary. The completed PPAR is then sent to the borrower for review; the borrowers’ comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public. About the OED Rating System The time-tested evaluation methods used by OED are suited to the broad range of the World Bank’s work. The methods offer both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. OED evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (more information is available on the OED website: http://worldbank.org/oed/eta-mainpage.html). Relevance of Objectives: The extent to which the project’s objectives are consistent with the country’s current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). Possible ratings: High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible. Efficacy: The extent to which the project’s objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. Possible ratings: High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible. Efficiency: The extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. Possible ratings: High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible. This rating is not generally applied to adjustment operations. Sustainability: The resilience to risk of net benefits flows over time. Possible ratings: Highly Likely, Likely, Unlikely, Highly Unlikely, Not Evaluable. Institutional Development Impact: The extent to which a project improves the ability of a country or region to make more efficient, equitable and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources through: (a) better definition, stability, transparency, enforceability, and predictability of institutional arrangements and/or (b) better alignment of the mission and capacity of an organization with its mandate, which derives from these institutional arrangements. Institutional Development Impact includes both intended and unintended effects of a project. Possible ratings: High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible. Outcome: The extent to which the project’s major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. Possible ratings: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory. Bank Performance: The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry and supported implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of the project). Possible ratings: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory. Borrower Performance: The extent to which the borrower assumed ownership and responsibility to ensure quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development objectives and sustainability. Possible ratings: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory. iii Contents Principal Ratings................................................................................................................v Key Staff Responsible ........................................................................................................v Preface.............................................................................................................................. vii 1. Background ................................................................................................................ ix 2. Agricultural Services ...................................................................................................3 3. Rural Water Management ..........................................................................................6 4. Area Development........................................................................................................8 5. Rural Finance .............................................................................................................11 6. Ratings ........................................................................................................................14 Outcome .................................................................................................................14 Sustainability and Institutional Development........................................................16 Bank and Borrower Performance..........................................................................17 7. Findings and Lessons.................................................................................................19 Findings for Tunisia...............................................................................................19 Lessons of General Relevance for Bank Operations .............................................21 Annex A: Agriculture and Rural Development Overview of Tunisia.........................23 Annex B: Results Matrices..............................................................................................25 Annex C: Supplemental Tables ......................................................................................31 Annex D: Basic Data Sheets ............................................................................................36 Box 1. Village Development at Traia, Bizerte ...............................................................10 Box 2. Response from the Region (MNSRE) to OED’s Comment in Paragraph 7.4 20 Table 1. Evaluation Design................................................................................................2 Table 2. How the Outcome Rating is Derived ...............................................................15 v Principal Ratings Outcome Institutional Sustainability Bank Borrower Development Performance Performance Impact Agricultural Research and Extension Project ICR* Satisfactory Modest Likely Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately ES* Modest Unlikely Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Satisfactory PPAR Unsatisfactory Modest Unlikely Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Agricultural Sector Investment Loan ICR Satisfactory Substantial Highly Likely Satisfactory Satisfactory ES Satisfactory Substantial Highly Likely Satisfactory Satisfactory Moderately PPAR Substantial Likely Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory Northwest Mountainous Areas Development Project ICR Satisfactory Substantial Likely Satisfactory Satisfactory Moderately ES Substantial Likely Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory PPAR Satisfactory Substantial Likely Satisfactory Satisfactory National Rural Finance Project ICR Unsatisfactory Substantial Unlikely Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory ES Unsatisfactory Modest Unlikely Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Highly Highly Highly PPAR Neglibible Unlikely Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory * The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible operational division of the Bank. The Evaluation Summary (ES) is an intermediate OED product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR. Key Staff Responsible Team Leader Sector Manager Country Director Agricultural Research and Extension Project Appraisal J.P. van der Veen Rory O’Sullivan Kermal Dervis Completion Charles Ameur Mark D. Wilson Salah Darghouth (Acting) Agricultural Sector Investment Project Appraisal Stephen D. Mink Odin K. Knudsen Harinder Kohli Completion Shobha Shetty Doris Koehn Christian Delvoie Nothwest Mountainous Areas Development Project Appraisal Mathewos Woldu Odin K. Knudsen Harrinder Kohli Completion Idah Pswarayi-Riddihough Petros Aklilu Christian Delvoie National Rural Finance Project Appraisal Bernard Dussert Odin K. Knudsen Daniel Ritchie Completion Stephanie Gober Dean N. Jordan (Acting) Christian Delvoie vii Preface This is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) of four projects in the Republic of Tunisia: • The Agricultural Research and Extension Project, for which Loan No. 3217-TU in the amount of US$17 million equivalent was approved on June 5, 1990. The loan was closed on June 30, 1997, one year behind schedule. The final disbursement took place on October 31, 1997, at which time a balance of US$1.7 million was canceled. • The Agricultural Sector Investment Project, for which Loan No. 3661-TU in the amount of US$120 million equivalent was approved on November 18, 1993. The loan was closed on December 31, 2000, eighteen months behind schedule. An undisbursed balance of US$1.3 million was rolled into the follow-on sector investment project. • The Northwest Mountainous Areas Development Project, for which Loan No. 3691-TU in the amount of US$27.5 million equivalent was approved on December 23, 1993. The loan was closed on June 30, 2001, one year behind schedule, and a balance of US$1.3 million was canceled. • The National Rural Finance Project, for which Loan No. 3892-TU in the amount of US$55.0 million equivalent was approved on May 23, 1995. The loan was closed on June 30, 2001, twenty-one months behind schedule, and a balance of US$7.6 million was canceled. The PPAR presents the findings of a mission by the Operations Evaluation Department that visited Tunisia in February-March 2003. The mission was conducted by Mr. John R. Heath. The findings draw on interviews with beneficiaries, project staff, officials of the Government of Tunisia and Bank staff. The collaboration of these persons is gratefully acknowledged. In addition, the PPAR draws on appraisal documents, implementation completion reports, and other background data. This cluster of projects was selected to provide background for the agriculture and rural development section of OED’s FY04 Country Assistance Evaluation for Tunisia. The report incorporates data that was not available when the completion reports were written. Following customary procedures, copies of the draft PPAR were sent to the relevant government officials and agencies for review and comment. ODESYPANO expressed its satisfaction with the report but made no substantive remarks. No other comment was received. ix Summary This is the Performance Assessment Report prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) on the above four projects. The Agricultural Research and Extension Project was approved in June 1990, and closed in June 1997, one year behind schedule, at which time US$1.7 million was canceled. The Agricultural Sector Investment Project was approved in November 1993, and closed in December 2000, eighteen months later than expected; the undisbursed balance (about US$5 million) was rolled into the second agricultural sector investment project. The Northwest Mountainous Areas Development Project was approved in December 1993, and closed in June 2001, one year behind schedule, with cancellation of US$175,000. The National Rural Finance Project was approved in May 23, 1995, and closed in June 2001, twenty-one months later than expected. The objective of the Agricultural Research and Extension Project was to improve the institutional framework of these services, principally by creating coordinating agencies for research and extension, strengthening regional facilities, and improving the link between research and extension. The project was of modest relevance, correctly identifying the need to decentralize, but spreading resources too thinly, and failing to give regional research institutes the budgetary autonomy they needed. The scope for closer linkage between research and extension was constrained by the lack of adaptive research, which reflects the academic bias of the research institutes. In view of the modest performance in achieving project goals, OED rates outcome as unsatisfactory. Sustainability is rated unlikely because the vehicles financed by the project are not being replaced and a government-wide recruitment freeze stops the hire of laboratory technicians and extension agents. Institutional development impact is rated modest because the required rationalization of the administrative structure was not carried out, leaving regional research poles inadequately equipped, experimental stations run down, and local extension offices abandoned. Bank performance is rated unsatisfactory because a firmer line should have been taken on administrative restructuring. Borrower performance is rated unsatisfactory because of substantial delays during implementation. The objective of the Agricultural Sector Investment Project was to support sector growth by financing a set of indispensable public investments, improving the policy framework, and strengthening the Ministry of Agriculture and other institutions. No less than 83 percent of the final project cost was accounted for by hydraulic investments (irrigation perimeters, hill dams, drinking water supply systems). The project was highly relevant, building on the recommendations of sector work, particularly with respect to the need to increase water use efficiency. Physical achievements were substantial. However, the installed capacity of the perimeters is not being fully used, hill dams are not viable, and water user groups are not paying tariffs sufficient to cover maintenance costs: together these factors lower the return on the investments made. x OED rates outcome as moderately satisfactory, because the full potential of the hydraulic investments remains unrealized. Sustainability is rated likely, on the assumption that cost recovery will improve as user groups become stronger. Institutional development impact is rated substantial: contracting of soil and water conservation works to private firms, privatization of veterinary services, and strengthening of water user groups all had a positive impact. Bank performance is rated satisfactory reflecting the solid analytic underpinnings of the project and the generally adequate nature of supervision. Borrower performance is rated satisfactory, primarily because of the high commitment to the project. The objective of the Northwest Mountainous Area Development Project was to improve the well-being of the region’s population and involve the rural population in efforts to halt degradation of the natural resource base, through a mix of investments including tree planting and road building. The project was a relevant response to the acute erosion of watersheds in the Northwest, and made a worthwhile attempt to foster community-led development while taking appropriate steps to allow for the eventual transfer of the implementing agency’s functions to regular organs of government. Natural resource management goals were exceeded and income growth, although somewhat below target, was still substantial. OED rates outcome as satisfactory, primarily because the natural resource management targets were amply exceeded. Sustainability is rated likely because the participatory approach has built community ownership, helping to make project benefits more risk-resilient. Institutional development impact is rated substantial in view of the progress made with community development plans. Bank performance is rated satisfactory based on the quality of the participatory method developed and the attention to monitoring. Borrower performance is rated satisfactory, reflecting government’s commitment and the efficacy of ODESYPANO, the implementing agency. The objective of the National Rural Finance Project was to promote creditworthy investment in rural areas and strengthen the National Agricultural Bank (BNA). The project’s design was of negligible relevance because it failed to tackle the problems—particularly weak loan recovery—that were evident from four previous agricultural credit recovery projects. Only 26 percent of loans went to small farmers (compared to the appraisal target of 42 percent)and the recovery rate averaged a mere 39 percent—compared to 63 percent and 54 percent respectively for the Bank-supported third and fourth agricultural credit projects. A small component intended to explore the feasibility of village savings and loan associations was dropped. OED rates outcome as highly unsatisfactory because the project failed to improve on the deficient approach and mixed performance of the projects that preceded it. Sustainability is rated unlikely based primarily on the weak loan recovery rate. Institutional development impact is rated negligible because, although it introduced a portfolio monitoring system, the project failed to tackle the central problem of BNA’s inability to resist government interference in loan rescheduling. Bank performance is rated highly unsatisfactory because of the design deficiencies (reflected in hurried preparation). Borrower performance is also rated highly unsatisfactory, reflecting less on xi BNA than on government’s failure to allow BNA to function as a solvent commercial enterprise. Experience with these projects confirms four important OED lessons of particular relevance to future Bank assistance. First, a piecemeal approach to reform—trying to effect small changes under the cover of a number of investment operations—offers little leverage and is therefore unlikely to work. Piecemeal approaches to reforming land tenure and rural financial institutions have not worked in Tunisia. Second, attempts to strengthen monitoring are futile if the performance indicators monitored are not linked to the achievement of significant outcomes. Research and extension indicators, indicative water tariffs, and BNA portfolio indicators—all have significant drawbacks. For example, although the monitoring of research and extension has improved most of the indicators measure inputs rather than outcomes. Third, decentralization is an important objective, but it may be counterproductive if resources are spread too thinly. This is a particularly important issue for agricultural services, the structure of which needs to be rationalized. Fourth, where there are multiple projects overlapping in time and by theme, it is important to assess the overall impact of assistance: where there have been several interventions which are cumulative in effect it is reasonable for evaluators to have higher expectations of development effectiveness and to be correspondingly more demanding in their search for evidence of effectiveness. The upcoming Tunisia Country Assistance Evaluation will need to rise to this challenge. Gregory Ingram Director-General Operations Evaluation 1 1. Background 1.1 This performance assessment of four rural projects is intended to contribute to a broader, cross-sector evaluation of the Bank’s assistance to Tunisia since 1990.1 Tunisia occupies a strategic position in the Bank’s regional portfolio of rural projects. Adding up total lending in 1990–2003, Tunisia accounted for 18 percent of all rural projects in the Middle East and North Africa Region, and the same proportion of commitments.2 This is a strikingly large share, considering that Tunisia accounts for only 3 percent of the region’s rural population. Moreover, Tunisia is a good performer. Between 1991 and 2003, 86 percent of completed rural projects in Tunisia had a satisfactory outcome, compared to regional average of 63 percent and a Bank-wide average of 65 percent.3 1.2 With assistance from two Bank-supported agriculture structural adjustment loans, Tunisia has made a series of reforms to the sector since the late 1980s.4 Subsidies for fertilizer, animal feed, seed, irrigation, and mechanized services have been substantially reduced. The supply of farm inputs, collection of produce, and the provision of mechanized plowing and harvesting have been privatized. The role of private extension agents and veterinarians has expanded. Progress has been slower in liberalizing food marketing, the state remaining involved in cereals, olive oil, sugar, tea, coffee, tobacco, and wine. Limited security of tenure, holding fragmentation, and land titling and registration problems are issues that still await resolution. Water is a key constraint and the importance of an integrated management of ground and surface sources has been recognized.5 1.3 Three Country Assistance Reviews6 for Tunisia have broadly agreed on the following priorities for agriculture and rural development: • Increase the competitiveness of agriculture; • Promote sustainable use of water and soil resources; • Strengthen agricultural support services, with privatization where appropriate; • Improve living standards in remote rural areas; and • Pursue dialogue on land titling and tenure issues. 1.5 Three of the projects examined in this report were consistent with these priorities. The Agricultural Research and Extension Project and the Agriculture Sector Investment Project addressed competitiveness, efficiency of agricultural services (including privatization of veterinary services), and better use of scarce water resources. The Northwest Mountainous Areas Development Project aimed to improve resource use and raise living standards in the poorest region of Tunisia. On the other hand, the National 1. FY04 Tunisia Country Assistance Evaluation. 2. Business Warehouse data, April 2003. 3. OED ratings database. See also Annex C of this report, Table C1. 4. See Annex A, Agriculture and Rural Development Overview 5. World Bank, Tunisia, Country Assistance Strategy, March 28, 2000, Annex B9a, p. 4. 6. Dated April 1993, June 1996, and March 2000. 2 Rural Finance Project, with its focus on working through a state-controlled bank, does not fit well with the Bank’s assistance agenda. Also, there was no sustained dialogue on land tenure problems, although these issues received some cursory attention under the sector investment project and the northwest project. 1.6 The Bank’s analytic work suggests that the key challenge is managing the transition to a smaller, more efficient agriculture sector. The competitiveness study found that there would be an economy-wide gain from removing farm protection equal to as much as an additional 1.7 percent of GDP growth per year from 1998 to 2025.7 But the social and political cost would be substantial. There are some 470,000 farms in Tunisia out of which 85 percent earn less than US$4,500 per year but employ between 2 and 7 persons per farm. Many of these farmers would be driven out of business.8 Although labor would ultimately be absorbed elsewhere there would be considerable short-term pain—stress on urban infrastructure resulting from increased influx of workers from the countryside, possible increases in illegal migration abroad, straining relations with the European Union, and a worsening of the livelihoods of aged farmers, too old to adapt. Many of these stresses would be felt in the Northwest region—the granary of Tunisia— underlining the need for a program of area development to help smooth the transition. 1.7 The four projects assessed in this report form part of a series (Table C3) that overlap closely, in time and by theme. This report assesses each of the four projects in its entirety (see Chapter Six and Annex B). But the discussion in Chapters Two to Five gives pride of place to four cross-cutting topics that are central to the projects (Table 1). Annex B provides the complete list of objectives and components for the four projects. Table 1. Evaluation Design Evaluation Topics Projects Agricultural Rural Water Area Rural (Date Approved to Date Closed) Services Management Development Finance Agricultural Research and Extension Project X (Jun 1990 to Jun 1997) Agricultural Sector Investment Project X X (Nov 1993 to Dec 2000) Northwest Mountainous Areas Development Project X X X X (Dec 1993 to Jun 2001) National Rural Finance Project X (May 1995 to Jun 2001) 7. World Bank, Tunisia, Agricultural Competitiveness: A Policy Note on Transition Issues in the Process of Agricultural Liberalization, July 25, 2001, p. iv. 8. Data from Tunisia Poverty Strategy. The brunt of the adjustment would be borne by small-scale cereal farmers—cereals being the least competitive sector. 3 2. Agricultural Services 2.1 The appraisal report for the Agricultural Research and Extension Project identified the following weaknesses in the Tunisian program (c.1990): • Research topics selected without considering end users’ needs; • Too many experimental stations—46, many in the same ecological zone; • Poor pay pushing out the most-skilled research staff; • Excessive concentration of staff in Tunis; • Item by item clearance of expenditures required from the Ministry of Agriculture; • Lack of coordination between different extension agencies; • Extension messages not sufficiently adapted to local conditions, out of date; • No feedback from extension to research. 2.2 Thirteen years later—and following a commitment of almost US$40 million 9— none of these issues have been fully resolved. On the research front, some progress has been made in four areas; although, in each case, problems remain. 2.3 First, farming and agro-industry groups—the end users of research—have been given more say in the setting of the research agenda, and greater participation in the process for reviewing research results. Ten research themes of “national priority” have been identified, each accompanied by a commission in which end users are represented. However, the commissions are headed by scientists, not by users; because the scientists do not speak the language of the users, user attendance at, and participation in, commission meetings is limited. It was envisaged that users would account for 30 percent of the membership; but, in practice, only 5–15 percent of participants are users. 2.4 Second, the results of each research project are now presented and discussed in workshops. The workshops are well attended by users and by extension service staff. But the framework for evaluating research results (professional peer review, with recourse to foreign experts where necessary) is poorly developed; and no attempt has yet been made to measure the impact of research. 2.5 Third, the government has steadily increased the budget for research10 and waived the government hiring freeze to recruit 10 additional researchers each year: this makes for a relatively attractive work environment, and greater retention of the best staff. On the other hand, the freeze still applies to laboratory technicians, which means that researchers’ time is wasted doing tasks that do not correspond to them. 9. This comprises the actual cost of the Agricultural Research and Extension Project (US$20.9 million) and the agricultural service component of the second Agricultural Sector Investment Loan (US$7.5 million); plus the relevant components of the Agricultural Support Services Project (estimated at US$10.0 million). It does not include the cost of the adjustment operations, which also had some bearing on the evolution of agricultural support services. 10. Between 1988 and 1996, investment budgets allocated to agricultural research institutes increased by 28 percent in real terms. 4 2.6 Fourth, the proportion of researchers located in the regions has increased—40 percent now compared to 10 percent in 1990. But the majority of the 198 researchers in the system are Tunis-based. Also, at the regional level, there has been insufficient attempt to integrate higher education with research, reducing the scope for developing the critical mass of intellectual resources needed for programs to flourish. 2.7 The biggest constraint is the administrative structure of research, which has not evolved enough to permit effective use of resources. There is a cumbersome arrangement whereby power is divided between three theme-specific institutes (INRAT, INGREF, IO),11 and one coordinating agency (IRESA). IRESA controls research operating costs and therefore has an implementing as well as a coordinating role. IRESA is also responsible for recruitment and procurement, and for the agricultural schools. 2.8 I The research institutes enjoy substantial autonomy. Maintaining these separate institutes is not cost-effective. Each institute has its own network of research stations and own headquarters administration. Little progress has been made in rationalizing the network of experimental stations: out of the 46 stations that existed in 1990, only seven have either been closed down or given back to the Ministry of Agriculture. Budgets do not cover basic maintenance, so the stations tend to be rundown; also, scientific work tends to be squeezed out by covert commercial projects. There have been wrangles over whether to give the institutes budgetary compensation for the loss of farm income that would result from the closing of stations. 2.9 Decentralization has been held in check by the failure to grant autonomy to regional centers: the proposed number and shape of these centers has varied substantially over the past decade and there has been substantial delay in equipping them. The decision made in 1992 to move from three regional centers to seven “poles” was hard to justify. There are now supposed to be seven regional research poles but only two (Beja, Tozeur) are operational. The design is flawed because the poles have no budgetary autonomy and the coordinator in charge of each pole (paid by IRESA) has limited power to coordinate because his researchers are paid by, and respond to the agendas of, the various central institutes. 2.10 There is a vision of what the structure for research should be—a vision developed under the aegis of the Bank-supported Agricultural Support Services Project, which was approved in 2001. The three central institutes would be dissolved into a single executive agency. The regional poles would be given greater autonomy. The research commissions could be made more client-responsive by transferring leadership from the scientists to the farming and agro-industry groups. An independent scientific panel might be created to advise on research proposals generated within the commissions; and this panel could also organize expert review of research findings. The decree fusing the institutes was issued in January 2003; but it is not clear how long it will take to be implemented. The number of the regional poles, and their responsibilities, remains up in the air. The future role of IRESA is undecided: it might become a pure programming and evaluation body, ceding its procurement and recruitment responsibility to the new single research institute; this 11. There is a fourth institute devoted to animal health (IRVT) but this does little real research. 5 would also entail its handing over responsibility for agricultural higher education—but to who? There are still more questions than answers. 2.11 While there has been some progress with research, extension has stagnated. The Agricultural Research and Extension Project was committed to a training and visit model that has substantial limitations: it is a costly, blunt instrument, requiring large numbers of staff but incapable of delivering messages that treat the farm as a diversified business (it focuses on commodities in isolation).12 In principle, the T&V model fits the political structure like a glove. Tunisia’s regional administration comprises 24 governorates, each divided into delegations, which are further divided into wards (imadas). The extension service provides a coordinator who sits in the Agriculture Commission (CRDA) of each province, with the line of command running down to offices located, first, at the delegation level (the CTVs), then at the imada level (the CRAs). 2.12 In practice, the extension service is a shell. The extension coordinator cannot coordinate because the real power lies with the head of the CRDA (who can assign extension staff to other duties). Extension agents spend only half of their time “on task” (Table A4). There are insufficient staff to occupy all the posts on the organizational pyramid. CTVs are supposed to be headed by engineers but are often staffed with less qualified people. Many of the 768 local extension units (CRAs) are not staffed: in Beja, 32 out of 49 are functioning, in Sfax, 25 out of 50. 2.13 Under the auspices of the Agriculture Research and Extension Project, a central coordinating agency for extension and training (AVFA) was set up in 1991. AVFA has a monitoring system that annually tracks the work of each extension officer. It measures inputs (numbers of visits, information days, demonstration plots) but not outcomes. 2.14 Some progress has been made in improving research and extension linkage. CRDAs and extension services participate in the research committees. Farmers and extension agents attend information days at research stations. There is some ad hoc problem solving by researchers in response to problems identified by CRDAs. But the scope for closer linkage is constrained by the lack of adaptive research, which in turn reflects the academic bias of the research institutes (where staff evaluation is based primarily on publications’ record), and the continuing concentration of researchers in Tunis. 2.15 AVFA says that the technical summaries produced at the completion of each research project are hard to operationalize. IRESA says that it is not its job to develop extension messages. Developing new messages is not treated as a collaborative exercise. 12 The Region comments “The needs of the agricultural producers are evolving, given the changing environment (trade liberalization, the need to improve agricultural competitiveness and product quality). They need more specialized advice or advice on overall farm management”. 6 3. Rural Water Management 3.1 The 1991 expenditure review for the agriculture sector emphasized the need to raise the efficiency of water use—“This must be the government’s number one priority in the agricultural sector.”13 The hydraulic focus of the Agricultural Sector Investment Project—83 percent of final cost—was potentially consistent with this recommendation; but it has not made a significant contribution to raising efficiency. 3.2 The project’s physical achievements were substantial.14 The construction and rehabilitation of irrigated perimeters was the single largest cost item in the project. A recent impact evaluation examined a representative sample of 13 perimeters (3,485 hectares).15 The study finds that on none of the perimeters is the irrigated infrastructure being fully used (despite the 1999–2002 drought), and that there is little sign of crop intensification. Dividing cropped area by irrigated area yields on average a figure of 1.23, lower than what the feasibility studies projected (Table C7).16 The report observes that “irrigated” farmers are still behaving as if they were rain-dependent. Farmers are tending to favor low-margin crops that need less water (cereal and forage), rather than increasing the share of land in high-margin fruit and vegetables. In 9 of the 22 farm models studied, over one-half of the irrigated area was in cereals and forage. This may partly reflect deficiencies in the quantity and quality of water delivered. Of the 159 farmers interviewed for the study, only 30 percent said they were satisfied with the access to irrigation water. Moreover, the limited use of complementary inputs is depressing crop yields.17 3.3 One of the perimeters included in the study (Bougossa II) was visited during the mission. The perimeter has an equipped irrigable surface of 80 hectares; but, in 2002, only 30 hectares were actually irrigated. Combining the cost data supplied to the mission with the data from the farm models in the impact study shows that, at the present rate of 13. Agricultural Expenditure Review, May 20, 1991, p. iii. 14. See Annex B of this report. 15. CNEA, Etude d’evaluation d’impact socio-economique des perimeters irrigues (draft report, February 2003). The study has several limitations. It compared the situation before and after the project (rather than “with” and “without”). Also, there was no cost-benefit analysis: by themselves, the data on incremental crop revenues and employment shed little light in the absence of other data on how much the irrigation works cost to build, operate and maintain. 16. In 2000/01, the average rate of intensification for all perimeters—not just the sample in the impact study—was 91 percent (Ibid., p. 8). 17 The Region comments: “The mise en valeur question is serious. As the recent CNEA study points out, even irrigated farmers behave like rainfed farmers with an overall cropping intensity only at 90 percent. Again, this is highly variable but the fact remains that this valorization aspect has not been given the attention it deserves”. A consultant who worked on the implementation completion report for the follow-up to the Agricultural Sector Investment Project notes that although returns to the irrigation investment are below appraisal projections, revenues are nevertheless significantly above the pre-project level and it is still too early to judge the ultimate impact of the investment. He made a separate estimate of the level of intensification for 6 of the 13 perimeters referred to in the CNEA study (Table C7), finding that average share of the irrigated area in cereals was 21 percent (compared to CNEA’s finding of 35 percent). (Personal communication, Christian Lauwers). 7 underutilization, the financial rate of return is generally under the 12 percent opportunity cost of capital (Table C8). Bougossa II does not appear to be an exceptionally poor performer: 15 of the 32 farm models nationwide have per hectare returns lower than the lowest return model at Bougossa II (Table C7). Also, given the high level of input subsidies in Tunisian agriculture, the economic rate of return would be substantially lower than the financial rate of return. This suggests that, without fuller use of the installed capacity and crop intensification, the investment in the perimeters would not be economically justified.18 3.4 Similar doubts exist about the efficiency of investments in hill dams (14 percent of actual project cost). At completion, 14 of the 15 dams were inspected, and 9 were found not to have realized their potential. The completion report states that there were sporadic efforts by farmers to build irrigation works around the dams (this was not included in the project) but with little evidence that the expected agricultural benefits were being realized. The report also notes that, “sometimes,” development costs per hectare were high, cropping intensities were low, and the choice of dam sites paid insufficient attention to the potential impact on agricultural growth. A visit to the Massila Thibar dam in Jendouba revealed that of the irrigable surface of 180 hectares only 84 hectares had been equipped with spray irrigation. Dams of this type tend to silt up rapidly and one farmer suggested that about one-third of Massila Thibar’s capacity had already been lost. All in all, the investment was probably not worth it. The lengthy process of expropriating and compensating farmers whose lands would be flooded—306 farmers were affected although only one had to relocate—required close Bank supervision, pushing up administrative costs. Significantly perhaps, hill dams did not figure among the items to be financed in the follow-on sector investment loan.19 3.5 The project supported the creation and training of water user associations, both for drinking water supply (185 groups) and for the irrigation perimeters (73 groups). Each of the Regional Agricultural Development Commissariats (CRDAs) was equipped with a mobile multidisciplinary team that worked at strengthening the technical, administrative, and financial capacities of water user groups. The user groups still depend heavily on CRDAs for guidance, and for major repairs; and the CRDAs’ supervision capacity is 18 At Bougossa II, taking the perimeter as a whole, profitability is less than the average for other perimeters owing to the relatively high proportion of land in cereals (25 percent, compared to the average of 9 percent), and forage crops (25 percent compared to 12 percent). This helps to explain the low financial rate of return for this perimeter. On the other hand, the assumption in Table C8 that benefits remain constant from year 4 to year 20 may too pessimistic. (Lauwers, ibid. ) 19 The Region comments that there was an unrealistic assumption that irrigation works (not financed by the project) would be built by beneficiaries; these investments have not so far materialized so the benefit stream is lower than expected. On the other hand, the economic analysis failed to take into account other benefits—including improved access to potable water, protection of downstream areas against flooding, groundwater recharge—focusing exclusively on the direct impact on crop and livestock production. The economic analysis treated each dam in isolation rather than considering what role it played in the broader catchment area or small river basin of which it was a part. These considerations were taken into account in design of the follow-on project—in which hill dams initially figured prominently; but the component was dropped before the project was approved owing to the anticipated difficulty in meeting legal requirements for resettlement of the affected population. 8 severely overextended.20 User groups in charge of the drinking water systems have been less effective at recovering costs than those in charge of the irrigation perimeters; and even the latter are far from being financially autonomous. 3.6 A key policy objective was to increase water tariffs to ensure adequate coverage of operations and maintenance costs. The project set a target of achieving an annual 9 percent real increase in the tariffs applied to public schemes (those managed by CRDA). This was achieved in 1994–98. The average increase rose to 14 percent in 1998/99, but then fell back: to 3 percent in 1999/00, 6 percent in 2000/01 and then with no increase in 2001/02 (a concession to the continuing drought). 3.7 In 1991–2001, the actual price paid for water was less than the indicative tariff. The indicative tariff published each year for perimeters managed by the CRDAs averaged TD 0.103/m3 (US$ 0.07/m3) in 2001. This same year, the price paid in the 13 perimeters included in the impact study—DT 0.070/m3—was one-third less than the indicative price (Table C7). Data from another source show that, in 2002, in Jendouba, for 11 perimeters managed by user groups, the tariff averaged only TD 0.061/m3.21 These findings suggest that, despite claims to the contrary,22 there is insufficient provision for maintenance. A similar problem exists for drinking water supply systems: only 20 percent of the 185 user groups created under the project charge a tariff high enough to cover operations and maintenance costs; one-third of them recover less than 50 percent of operating costs.23 4. Area Development 4.1 The project assessed in this evaluation is the third of four Bank-supported Northwest development projects. The first project sought to persuade rural communities to intensify livestock raising by improving pasture on the middle slopes. This would free the upper slopes for reforestation, while (intensified) cropping would be limited to the 20. Etude d’Evaluation d’Impact Socio-Economique des Perimetres Irrigues, February 2003 draft, p. 44. The Region agrees that the extension program has not kept pace with the rapid growth in the number of water-user groups, noting that the number of groups per CRDA extension agent rose from 20 in 1997 to 30 now. Also, ancillary service provision is often weak. The part of the Agriculture Ministry responsible for irrigation (DGGR) “needs to work on broadening inter-ministerial support for the GICs [user groups]. In governorates where this has happened, especially at the delegue level, the program moves forward”. 21. Rapport de Suivi, Annexes GIC d’Irrigation, Jendouba, 2002 (Draft supplied to mission). 22. « La mise en oeuvre de cette politique d’augmentation des tarifs de l’eau a permis d’améliorer de manière significative les taux de recouvrement des coûts de fonctionnement et d’entretien des périmètres publiques irrigues,” Pre-evaluation, Projet d’Investissement du Secteur de l’Eau, Note Technique: Tarification de l’Eau d’Irrigation (Draft supplied to mission in March 2003. p. 2) 23 The Region notes that recovery of operations and maintenance costs varies greatly between user groups in different regions. A study of 384 groups nation-wide found that 18 percent recovered less than half of the costs, 32 percent recovered between 51 and 80 percent, and 50 percent recovered between 80 and 100 percent. The average cost recovery rate is 82 percent. The Region describes this as “encouraging despite the fact that this does not include the cost of large repairs or depreciation which is still borne by the state”. 9 lower slopes. Classical soil conservation measures were installed, with limited participation of the local population. 4.2 OED’s evaluation report for this first project observes that the appraisal targets for infrastructure on public land (schools, drinking-water systems, and access roads) were exceeded; the project was less successful at installing erosion control works on private land (farmers would not accept tree planting but accepted stone contour terraces on uncultivated land because de-stoning of the adjacent land left it cultivable); and it failed to substantially change farming practices (farmers were not willing to stop cultivating upper slopes and cropping was not much intensified on the lower slopes). 4.3 The implementing agency, ODESYPANO is one of a group of agencies (Offices) set up to deal with specialized problems that are often deemed to be temporary in nature and limited to a particular region. The Offices are not part of the regular apparatus of government, although the length of their mandate is unclear. When ODESYPANO was created in 1981—the Bank’s support for it prevailing over the borrower’s initial resistance—its remit was to protect the fragile ecosystems of the Northwest region while promoting the development of rural infrastructure. OED’s first impression of ODESYPANO was that it was good at engineering, but ineffective as an extension agency because it was too centralized and not responsive enough to villagers’ needs. 4.4 The physical achievements of the Northwest Mountainous Areas Development Project were impressive.24 To reduce erosion, a key aim was to substitute temporary crops with permanent crops and improved pasture. As a share of the cultivable area, cereals went down from 48 percent in the 1996 baseline survey to 40 percent in the 2000 survey; tree crops increased from 10 percent to 22 percent—planting of olive trees being particularly widespread. 4.5 Income growth was to be promoted through crop and livestock development, and by off-farm activities, supported by improved financial intermediation. Crop incomes reached 56 percent of the target for farmers with holdings under 5 hectares; and 83 percent of the target for farmers with 5 hectares or more.25 Crop income in 2000 was 47 percent higher than the 1996 baseline, in the case of small farmers, and 50 percent higher for larger farmers. This partly reflects growth in yields: between 1996 and 2000, wheat output per hectare increased by 18 percent for small farmers and 50 percent for larger farmers. Milk and meat production also increased substantially.26 The impact on farm employment was substantial. The number of days spent working on-farm increased from the baseline of 136 per year to 285 per year at project end. 24. See Annex B. Targets quoted are those adopted after appraisal, in line with Quality Assurance Group efforts to retrofit key indicators for projects effective after 1994. 25. The targets were respectively TD2,900 per year and TD5,700 per year. The impact on incomes is derived from a 1996 baseline survey and follow-up surveys in 1998 and 2000, involving 259 farm families. 26. This might seem surprising given all the talk in Tunisia about the severe impact of drought in 1999–2001. However, for each of the three provinces in the ODESYPANO region (Beja, Jendouba, Le Kef), annual rainfall was higher in 2000 than it was in 1996 (Annuaire des Statistiques Agricoles, 2001, Table 1.3). 10 4.6 At appraisal and at completion, an economic rate of return was estimated based on models for small, medium, and large farms representative of the three geographic zones covered by the project. The cost stream included the agricultural production component, the watershed and rangeland management component (excluding the soil conservation aspects) and the cost of rural roads. The benefit stream covered incremental crop output, including fodder, and the savings in vehicle depreciation costs as a result of road works. The economic rate of return was 14 percent at appraisal and 16.3 percent at completion. The assumptions seem plausible, and the results consistent with the findings of the beneficiary surveys. OED did not re-estimate the rate of return. This positive outcome is only somewhat offset by the higher-than-expected unit costs of schools and health posts: the appraisal underestimated the charges that contractors would make for operating in difficult-to-access areas. 4.7 Strictly speaking, this is not an example of demand-driven development because ODESYPANO’s mandate for natural resource conservation is uppermost in shaping the village development agenda. Also, the community contribution (finance, labor, materials) is low. There is a long way to go. Community organization is still fragile and will continue to require capacity building to ensure that benefits are sustained. (Box 1). Box 1. Village Development at Traia, Bizerte The Development Committee was created in 1997 and the first community plan was prepared in 1998. There are 7 members (including 1 woman), representing 106 families, divided between three hamlets. At first, the villagers were difficult to mobilize. Agriculture development is difficult owing to the extreme fragmentation of holdings; so far, the government’s program to consolidate holdings has not touched hillside communities. Improved cattle have been introduced and olive trees planted, with respectively 50 percent and 85 percent of the investment cost subsidized by the government. The Development Committee hopes to acquire the legal status of an Agricultural Development Association (GDA), which would enable it to receive and manage funds. Significantly perhaps, when the mission visited this village, the presentation of the community development plan was made by ODESYPANO officials, not by the committee. The committee has taken initiatives on its own—for example, hiring the machinery needed to open a road—but they don’t yet have a treasury, there is no savings initiative, and the Development Committee has little outreach to government agencies other than ODESYPANO. 4.8 The project aimed to establish village Development Committees. The aim was to create 230 active committees, but only 162 were established. These committees required careful supervision. Rather than spread its resources thinly, the project team chose to work more intensively with a smaller number of committees. ODESYPANO argues plausibly that the number of committees formed is less important than the progress made with community development plans—now completed for one-third of committees (Table C6).27 Earlier attempts to finance investments before development plans were ready (using the system of Integrated Action Contracts) resulted in less viable projects— because technical assistance and training was lighter—and this approach was dropped. 27. This table refers to the whole ODESYPANO region, not the sub-region covered by the Bank-supported project (in which 162 committees were created). 11 4.9 Community capacity building is a slow process in all countries; in the highly centralized environment of Tunisia, what ODESYPANO has achieved in the space of six years is substantial.28 Prospects are good. A law passed in 1999 allows the committees to evolve into Agricultural Development Associations (GDA), empowered to receive and manage public funds. A further decree, issued in December 2002, stipulates the ceiling (equivalent to roughly US$50,000) that groups of this nature are able to manage. 4.10 The follow-on project is anticipating the eventual handover of ODESYPANO’s responsibilities, which makes benefits more likely to be sustained. Provision is made for the project’s schools and health posts to be operated and maintained by the relevant ministries. However, the key partners—the Regional Agricultural Development Commissariats (CRDAs)—are still poorly placed for the transition. They do not use a participatory approach and their extension agents are not as close to farmers as ODESYPANO. Also, they have not previously had any responsibility for the hillsides (focusing on the higher-potential bottomlands). Transfer is not expected to begin before 2005; but this date will probably be pushed back. A major re-zoning exercise is entailed because ODESYPANO’s administrative subdivisions do not correspond to those used by the CRDAs. 4.11 Road maintenance has been a problem. Roads were not built to specifications of the Equipment Ministry, which therefore resists a blanket assumption of maintenance responsibilities. A study is needed to classify all the roads built by ODESYPANO since 1981 and the corresponding level of maintenance that is deemed appropriate. Responsibility for feeder road maintenance could possibly be assumed by the Regional Agricultural Development Commissions (CRDAs). 5. Rural Finance 5.1 The five Bank-supported agricultural credit projects all worked through the National Agricultural Bank (BNA)—the largest commercial bank in the country with a network of 13 regional offices and 126 branches. Past evaluations of this institution—or, more appropriately, the broader institutional framework of which it is a part—have been remarkably forgiving. A profound rethinking of the approach to rural finance is long overdue. 5.2 In 1993, an OED mission concluded that, despite the weak loan recovery rates achieved by the third and fourth agricultural credit projects, their outcome was satisfactory. The mission’s recommendations for future operations included: • Raise BNA’s interest rates to market levels, thus increasing its incentive to lend to farmers, and to devote more staff time to loan recovery; • Encourage stricter loan appraisal by BNA by discouraging government from rescheduling or forgiving BNA’s bad loans; 28 The project was able to capitalize on lessons learned from a previous project supported by German technical assistance; with this experience behind them ODESYPANO staff were well placed to tackle the new project (Personal communication, Christian Lauwers). 12 • Increase the authority of branch offices in approving and administering loans; • Harmonize loan terms across all BNA programs; • Establish a private sector-operated calamity fund, with crop insurance paid by sub-borrowers, complemented by funds from the government budget; • Prepare a specific balance sheet for the agricultural portfolio—separating it from commercial and industrial loans—making transparent the losses that BNA makes on agricultural credit and the extent to which these are absorbed by government; • Increase BNA’s outreach to viable smallholders incorrectly regarded by BNA as non-bankable; • Address the problems posed by insecure land tenure and fragmented farm holdings; and • Reorient rural transfers by replacing subsidies granted through the credit system by transfers through other channels (e.g., rural infrastructure spending). 5.3 OED’s report welcomed the proposals for the forthcoming National Rural Finance Project, commending the planned reorientation of BNA’s training program toward small- farmer lending, diversification into non-farm rural finance, banking services for women, and involvement of new intermediaries. 5.4 However, the project did not come to grips with these challenges. There was no clear commitment by government to letting BNA assume responsibility for its rescheduling decisions, and for several years after the project was approved, BNA did not have the systems to allow it to distinguish between loans granted before and after the project, making it hard to track improvements in recovery performance. 5.5 The project failed to meet its objective of promoting creditworthy rural investment, first, because the share of loans directed to rural enterprise was lower than expected and, second, because the loan appraisal process was insufficiently rigorous, resulting in low repayment rates. 5.6 At appraisal it was estimated that 60 percent of project funds would be on-lent to farmers (42 percent to small and medium-scale farmers). By closing, 51 percent of Bank disbursements had been used to finance loans to farmers; and only 26 percent to small farmers. Agro-industries received the largest proportion of financing, absorbing 39 percent of funds disbursed from the Bank loan (compared to the 15 percent share envisaged at appraisal). 5.7 During implementation the repayment rate of sub-loans varied between 26 percent and 48 percent, averaging 39 percent by project close. BNA’s overall repayment rate (i.e., taking into account all sub-loans, not just those financed under the Bank project) was 74 percent. For the two preceding Bank-supported projects involving BNA the recovery rates averaged 63 percent and 54 percent.29 Many farmers regard loans as subsidies and the government’s willingness to reschedule and forgive reinforces this attitude. Recovery rates were substantially higher for loans to commerce and industry (averaging 95 percent 29 Rates for the Third and Fourth Agricultural Credit Projects, respectively (see OED Performance Audit Report, No. 11977, June 11, 1993, p. 34). 13 in 2000/01) than for loans to agriculture (averaging 45 percent). BNA acknowledges that it aims to offset its losses on the agriculture portfolio by lending to non-rural enterprises. 5.8 The completion report states that one of the project’s principal successes was the strengthening of BNA’s financial position. The mission updated a key table in the completion report, finding some slippage in relation to targets set in 1999 (Table C10). The proportion of loans overdue rose between 2001 and 2002 and there has been no improvement in the share of agricultural loans at risk (around two-thirds). In truth, this performance monitoring is no more than an academic exercise as long as BNA is unable to resist government interference in rescheduling and debt forgiveness. 5.9 The project made a very modest contribution to improving data processing and management information systems but spending was limited to US$111,000. The mission visited branch offices in Beja and Sousse, and observed that they are poorly equipped to track non-performing loans. 5.10 The project sponsored a study of small-farm finance.30 It estimates that 22 percent of the total of 409,000 small farmers are “bankable.” But the study found that small-scale farmers make little use of credit (only 35 percent of those interviewed had taken loans). Second, 73 percent of credit users had difficulty in repaying the loans received. Third, input suppliers play a key role in providing credit and invariably are repaid (consistent with findings in many other countries). Finally, taking all sources of credit together, repayment rates are no higher for irrigated farmers than for rain-fed farmers: this raises doubts about the convention of attributing defaults primarily to drought (which typically affects rain-fed farmers more than irrigated farmers).31 5.11 The mission took a closer look at the relationship between drought and loan recovery levels. This is an important issue because drought is frequently invoked to explain the weak rate of loan recovery; and the recent “four years of drought” (1999–2002) prompted government to order a major loan rescheduling in August 2002. Twelve sites scattered throughout the country were selected, chosen because they each have a BNA branch office and a meteorological station, with a complete set of data for rainfall and the volume of loans recovered between 1994 and 2001. It might be expected that there would be a tighter correlation in rain-dependent areas than in irrigated areas; but there is no evidence of this (Table C9). With one exception (Jendouba), there is very little correlation between rainfall and recovery. Jendouba is indeed a rain-dependent, cereal growing area, reportedly badly affected by the recent drought. Therefore, the mission took an even closer look at this province, extending the enquiry to all branch offices. Of the six offices, only two of them have coefficients of 0.80 or higher; for the other four offices there is no evidence of a significant positive association between rainfall and loan recovery rates. Drought is a long way from being a sufficient explanation of BNA’s poor record. 30. This was substituted in October 1999 for the planned feasibility study of village-level group lending. 31. SCET, Etude de la Petite Agriculture a Caractere Familial et Social: Note de synthese des travaux de Phase I et de Phase II, October 2001, p. 8. 14 5.12 The obstacles to developing new forms of rural financial intermediation are considerable. First, the government has not shown itself to be interested. This helps to explain why the planned feasibility study of village savings and loan associations was shelved. In 1999, when the decision to drop the study was made, the government agreed with the Bank that BNA would sponsor a pilot to provide financing to agricultural service cooperatives. The mission found that this initiative has also failed to prosper. 5.13 There is a lack of political will to remove legal obstacles to mutualiste finance: a 1959 law restricts village groups from forming saving and loan associations. This explains why, in the Northwest Mountainous Areas Development Project, a plan to establish village (douar) credit unions was dropped. The alternative that was developed— extending subsidized credit to rural households through the Banque Tunisienne de Solidarite—also met with little success. Nongovernmental organizations were used to administer loans, but recovery rates were poor (70 percent at best; and reportedly as low as 30 percent in Le Kef), partly because loan proposals were not rigorously evaluated. Despite these setbacks, there have been some promising experiments—under ODESYPANO’s jurisdiction, GTZ successfully piloted a group-lending scheme in Nefza. But there is no prospect of scaling up until the law is revised. 6. Ratings Outcome 6.1 The outcome of the Agriculture Research and Extension Project is rated unsatisfactory. The project had only modest relevance (Table 2) because both the initial design and the modifications made during implementation worked against realizing the objectives of rationalization and decentralization. Efficacy was also modest because the key goals—improved programming, stronger regional facilities, and better linkage between research and extension—were only partially attained. The project did not include any explicit efficiency indicators, but the evidence (Table C4) is not encouraging. The administrative structure inhibits efficient resource use. 15 Table 2. How the Outcome Rating is Derived Relevance/1 Efficacy/1 Efficiency/1 Outcome/1 Agricultural Modest Modest Modest Unsatisfactory Research and Extension Project Agricultural Sector High Substantial Modest Moderately Investment Project Satisfactory Northwest Substantial Substantial Substantial Satisfactory Mountainous Areas Development Project National Rural Negligible Modest Negligible Highly Finance Project Unsatisfactory /1 See frontispiece for explanation of these OED concepts. 6.2 The outcome of the Agriculture Sector Investment Project was rated satisfactory in the completion report; but this presupposes that the project “makes effective use of resources (10 percent rate of return or better where it can be estimated).”32 The overall project rating will be driven primarily by the performance of the hydraulic investments: the share of water-related investments in total project costs rose from 71 percent to 83 percent between appraisal and completion. So far, it is not clear that a satisfactory economic rate of return is being achieved. On the other hand, the project’s objectives were highly relevant and they were substantially achieved. This points to an outcome rating of moderately satisfactory. 6.3 The outcome of the Northwest Mountainous Areas Development Project is rated satisfactory. When OED reviewed the completion report, it lowered the outcome rating from satisfactory to moderately satisfactory, arguing that farm incomes and user capacity were not enhanced as much as expected. Based on findings in the field, this assessment finds that OED’s initial verdict was too harsh. Fewer village development councils were created than expected, but what counts is the progress with community development planning. More important, the natural resource management component (accounting for 40 percent of project costs) amply exceeded its targets. The rate of return for representative farm models was over the 10 percent threshold. 6.4 The outcome of the National Rural Finance Project is rated highly unsatisfactory, a slight downgrade from completion report’s rating of unsatisfactory. The rating is driven by the credit line component, which accounted for 98 percent of the expected project cost.33 Many loans were made, but fewer than expected to small-scale farmers (modest efficacy), and recovery was low (negligible efficiency). Given the failure to address flaws identified by previous projects, the relevance of the project was negligible to begin with; and this diminished further in the course of implementation as the piloting of village group lending was dropped, and as large-scale agro-industry’s share of the loan portfolio increased. 32. Operations Evaluation Department, Guidelines and Criteria for OED Project Evaluations, July 1, 2000. (See Section 6, Outcome). 33. There is no data available on final project costs (expected costs were US$420 million). 16 Sustainability and Institutional Development 6.5 The sustainability of benefits generated by the Agriculture Research and Extension Project is rated unlikely. The freeze on recruitment—which bears on contract as well as permanent staff—has hit research less severely than extension; but the ban on hiring laboratory technicians compromises the research program. The viability of the extension service has been reduced by the failure to offset depreciation of the vehicle fleet and the failure to replace departing extension staff.34 6.6 Institutional development impact is rated modest, in view of the limited progress with efficient decentralization of research, and the slowness to address the need to rationalize the cumbersome apparatus of agricultural services. 6.7 The Agricultural Sector Investment Project is given a sustainability rating of likely. With respect to the hydraulic investments—where the burden of proof lies given their heavy share of total project cost—although the evidence suggests that the installed capacity is underused and costs are not being fully recovered, it is to be hoped that the situation will improve as user groups grow stronger. 6.8 The project’s institutional development impact is rated substantial, primarily reflecting the investment made in creating and training water user groups. Also, the project encouraged private sector development by ensuring that all soil and water conservation works were contracted to private firms; and by its support to the privatization of veterinary services. 6.9 Sustainability is rated likely for the Northwest Mountainous Areas Development Project. The participatory approach promoted by the project is now tried and tested, with community ownership helping to make benefits more risk-resilient. In particular, the rapid take-up of perennials by farmers, and their willingness to take other soil conserving measures (e.g., planting hedges) shows that they are committed. One caveat is the failure to reach agreement on which agency will be responsible for maintaining the roads built by the project. 6.10 Institutional development impact is rated substantial. The project aimed to enhance the capacity of ODESYPANO and of the community development committees. In the longer view, the second of these efforts is the more important and the project team is rightly emphasizing the process of community development planning. The legal framework is evolving in a manner that will enhance the project’s institutional 34 The Region disputes the rating of sustainability as unlikely: “OED bases its ratings on the fact that extension agents are ageing and are not replaced. This is a relatively crude and unsatisfactory measure of sustainability. As mentioned above, the information and communication needs of farmers have evolved. There will be a decreasing need for extension through CRDAs which should no longer be the only service provider. Indeed it may be a blessing in disguise that extension agents are retiring: it allows the Ministry to rethink its system”. 17 development impact. The contracting of soil and water conservation works helped to build private sector capacity. 6.11 For the National Rural Finance Project, the mission endorses the completion report’s rating of sustainability as unlikely, based primarily on the weak loan recovery rate. Low recovery is partly the result of a lack of rigor in appraising loan proposals, leading to the financing of projects with limited economic viability. Much of the lending that was achieved would have had a positive short-term impact on user incomes, without necessarily promoting a long-term improvement. 6.12 Institutional development impact is rated negligible. The completion report rated institutional development as substantial based primarily on the improvement in BNA’s overall financial condition. But progress in relation to the benchmarks established in 1999 has been limited (Table C10). The key failing is the government’s refusal to grant BNA the autonomy needed to manage its portfolio efficiently. Also, an opportunity was missed to experiment with alternative approaches to rural finance, leading to no improvement in the effectiveness with which resources are mobilized. Bank and Borrower Performance 6.13 For the Agricultural Research and Extension Project, performance by each party is rated unsatisfactory. The completion report indicates that Bank staff did not fully appreciate the difficulties involved in implementing some project components, especially in the case of research, where complex changes were envisaged. This seems consistent with a more general failure to grapple with the challenges of rationalization and decentralization. The completion report also notes that there was care to avoid introducing pure T&V, which was thought inappropriate for Tunisia. The marginal cost of the structure that was created may have been low—because it was grafted on to the existing CRDA system—but the whole structure needed reformulating because it spread resources too thinly. Furthermore, the Bank should not have allowed the original plan to create three regional research centers to be replaced by the proposed creation of seven separate poles. Also, a firmer line could have been taken over the rationalization of the experimental stations. 6.14 Borrower performance is rated unsatisfactory in the completion report. Although the government showed commitment during preparation, subsequently there was much foot dragging on decentralization and rationalization, calling into question the sincerity of the government’s commitment 6.15 For the Agriculture Sector Investment Project, OED endorses the completion report’s rating of Bank and borrower performance as satisfactory. Project preparation was satisfactory, building on a robust policy dialogue with government and based on solid analytic work. Supervision was also satisfactory, with regular twice-yearly missions staffed with a wide range of technical expertise—which helps to explain why supervision costs were double the regional average (Table C11). The primary shortfall seems to have been a delay in handling hill dam resettlement issues, but overall the Bank provided active and 18 competent supervision and maintained a sound working relationship with the borrower throughout. 6.16 The borrower was highly committed to the project, from preparation through closing. There were no delays or shortfalls in counterpart funding. The project was well staffed, with especially strong support from the General Directorate of Finance and Incentives, the department most directly responsible for implementation. The completion report notes, however, that coordination with the Regional Agricultural Development Committees and the entities in charge of the fisheries and livestock subcomponents was inadequate. 6.17 With respect to the Northwest Mountainous Areas Development Project, OED also endorses the completion report’s rating of Bank and borrower performance as satisfactory. Project preparation was satisfactory. The participatory method that was developed for working with communities improved significantly on the approach taken by the earlier projects. Supervision was also satisfactory—although supervision costs were almost double the regional average (Table C11), partly reflecting the need for a multidisciplinary team. The project team took special care with the baseline survey and two follow-up surveys, greatly facilitating the evaluation of project results. The emphasis placed on improving the quality of the Community Development Plans was highly appropriate. 6.18 Borrower performance was satisfactory during both preparation and implementation. With respect to government performance, the only shortfall was the lack of commitment to creating a legal basis for the village credit unions. Otherwise, government strongly supported the project approach, justifying an overall rating of satisfactory. The ICR rated the performance of the implementing agency, ODESYPANO, as highly satisfactory, a verdict that, in light of mission findings, OED fully endorses. The team was innovative and flexible and monitored project progress very carefully, producing a series of high-quality supervision reports. 6.19 Bank and borrower performance is rated highly unsatisfactory for the National Rural Finance Project, a somewhat severer verdict than that in the completion report (“unsatisfactory”). This fifth project was largely a facsimile of the four that had preceded it, and its design showed little sign that lessons from past experience had been incorporated. The time elapsed between identification and Board approval was extremely short (six months). More time was needed to work out the action plan for BNA restructuring, and to explore new approaches to rural finance. From 1995 to 1999 (i.e., for most of the period of project implementation), the completion report provides evidence that supervision was insufficiently rigorous. 6.20 On the borrower’s side, the shortcomings lie primarily with government, not with the implementing agency (BNA), because the latter’s hands have been tied by the former. For example, the completion report states that there was no clear commitment from the government that BNA would be allowed to make its own rescheduling decisions. 19 7. Findings and Lessons Findings for Tunisia 7.1 Raising agricultural efficiency will not be possible without an institutional framework that is both lighter and more decentralized than at present. The administrative structure for agriculture is overly elaborate: the organization chart has too many cells in relation to the number of qualified personnel, a circumstance aggravated by the government-wide hiring freeze. Agricultural research remains heavily centralized and insufficiently responsive to user needs. Agricultural extension is largely decentralized; but its staff are aging, under resourced and poorly coordinated. Linkage between research and extension remains weak. 7.2 A key aspect of decentralization is helping local organizations—water user groups and village development committees—assume responsibility for their development. Community-driven development is a new concept in Tunisia that needs time to take root. The recent northwest development projects are pointing the way, organizing communities to draw up their own development plans. On the other hand, the deeply ingrained tradition of government subsidy works against the principle of communal self-reliance and cost recovery; this is particularly evident in the weak performance of water user groups. 7.3 The government has been slow to ease the (interconnected) constraints of poorly performing land markets and weak rural financial intermediation. In the northwest, 72 percent of farm holdings under 10 hectares are untitled; the same is true for 50 percent of holdings over 100 hectares.35 Only in the past year or so has government begun to tackle this problem.36 Another problem concerns the lack of political will to remove the legal impediments to group-lending schemes, which use peer pressure rather than land as a loan guarantee. The authorities remains too heavily committed to a lending institution (the National Agricultural Bank) that is unable to serve the needs of most of the rural population, and whose solvency is compromised by the government’s policy of debt forgiveness. 7.4 Tunisia plays a major role in keeping MNA’s rural portfolio afloat, which poses a risk as much as an opportunity. From the Bank’s perspective, Tunisia has the attraction of being both a regular client and an above-average performer—qualities that are to be appreciated in a region where aggregate lending is small and highly volatile, and performance is below par. Relations between the Bank and Tunisia are highly cordial; but the Bank’s influence is limited given Tunisia’s easy access to cheaper, less conditional 35. Project Appraisal Document, Northwest Mountainous and Forestry Areas Development Project, September 26, 2002, p. 16. 36 The Region comments: “Regarding land markets, the issue is that on-farm investment in productivity- increasing technology is seriously constrained by declining farm sizes, fragmented through inheritance. A recent Government decree provides for minority title holders to cede their holdings to the majority (over 51 percent) but this has not yet been implemented” 20 European Union and bilateral aid. This may encourage the Bank to push money toward Tunisia, a suspicion that is reinforced by the relatively large number of rural projects overlapping closely in time and by theme. The time has come for the Bank to step back and evaluate the long-term effectiveness of its program of assistance to the sector. Box 2. Response from the Region (MNSRE) to OED’s Comment in Paragraph 7.4 “The OED report suggests that the Bank needs to step back and evaluate the long-term effectiveness of its program of assistance to the sector. On this last point, MNSRE has a slightly different view. True, we agree that an evaluation of Bank lending for the rural sector is needed, but perhaps not for the same reason as OED suggests. OED points to two main reasons : (i) the overlapping projects in time and by theme; (ii) Tunisia’s access to cheaper and less conditional funding, which results in the Bank being less discriminating than it should be in lending to Tunisia. We do not perceive that our present portfolio, with four projects in the agriculture sector: Natural Resource Management, Water Sector Investment, Agricultural Support Services and Northwest Mountainous Area Development Project, represents a large number of projects, overlapping in objectives. The Water Sector Investment addresses the crucial issue of agricultural water shortage in Tunisia and agricultural production riskiness under difficult climatic circumstances. The Agricultural Support Services Project purports to upgrade agricultural services with the perspective of trade liberalization. The Natural Resource Management and Northwest Mountainous Area Development Project may appear as overlapping with their objectives: improving NRM and reducing rural poverty in difficult marginal areas. However, the agro ecological zones are different and above all, the type of implementing agency is different. Given the fact that the CRDAs are present everywhere, the question has been whether in other marginal regions the approach of ODESYPANO can be implemented by CRDAs, without having to create an Office? On OED’s second point, the nature of the Bank's relationship with Tunisia is evolving. Precisely because of the availability of other more attractive sources of funds and the Bank's comparative advantage in global knowledge, there is a move beyond traditional lending. Tunisia looks to us to support innovative, often pilot operations which are not so easily done with other donors (e.g., Natural Resource Management, Water Sector Investment, Agricultural Support Services and Northwest III). Our Tunisian counterparts have consistently highlighted that they want to continue borrowing from the Bank, for certain key operations, even though they may have sources of easier and cheaper financial services, precisely because the Bank is bringing qualified advice and support with its funding. In our view, we need to think through our support to the agricultural sector and rural space in Tunisia on the basis of the results of the competitiveness study. The study points towards a two-pronged evolution. (i) There will be considerable labor displacement from removing all farm subsidies and the opening of trade. In the long run, the displaced labor would be absorbed either by the rural economy through backward and forward linkages, or in the urban economy (secondary or tertiary sectors). However, during the transition period, measures of social protection will have to be provided. Indeed, the social and political burden from removing too rapidly farm protection may be even higher than mentioned in paragraph 1.6 of OED report. There are some 470 000 farms in Tunisia out of which 85 % earn less that $ 4500 a year, but employ between 2 and 7 persons per farm. (ii) The study also points out that there could still be a vibrant small-holder agricultural sector because of diversification and demand for quality agricultural products, in particular high value fruit and vegetables and processed products (wine, olive oil) for exports, for the tourist industry as well as for the domestic market (increasing demand for quality products due to increased incomes). Given the above, the Bank team and the GOT need to direct their thinking towards a two-pronged approach aimed at identifying: (i) the proper social safety net strategy to be implemented under cross-sectoral rural development 21 programs that will address the welfare needs of the rural society and economy as a whole (such as under the Northwest Mountainous Areas Development Project) (ii) an investment strategy, to help small-scale farmers with potential to evolve towards more competitive production systems and produce quality agricultural products for which there is a market. Such a strategy would certainly include among other actions, (a) legislative and institutional reforms, decentralization and devolution of responsibilities to liberate private sector and civil society dynamism; (b) a rethinking of government services’ role to ensure the needed policy and regulatory framework; (c) land tenure reforms; as well as perhaps, (d) some well focused transition measures aiming at replacing public intervention with private activity so that privately financed solutions become viable. Such an approach has been started under the Agricultural Services Support Project and the Water Sector Investment Project but there is still a long way to go. - Lessons of General Relevance for Bank Operations 7.5 A piecemeal approach to reform—trying to effect small changes under the cover of a number of investment operations—offers little leverage and is therefore unlikely to work. In Tunisia, following the two agricultural structural adjustment operations, there has been no lending vehicle that has allowed for sustained policy dialogue. This may be partly because Tunisia has ample access to alternative, less conditional, sources of finance. 7.6 Policy reform has primarily been treated as an adjunct of investment, rather than as a precondition for it: little attempt has been made to delay loan effectiveness until agreed policy conditions have been met. Good illustrations of this are the Bank’s tacking on of small land reform and rural finance initiatives to investment operations whose primary objective lies elsewhere: land reform was tacked on to Northwest Mountainous Areas Development (a successful pilot—but with no assured replicability) and the Agricultural Sector Investment Loan (component dropped). The attempt to develop new forms of rural financial intermediation—in the Northwest and National Rural Finance projects—was also small-scale and ineffectual, lacking any government commitment. A GTZ initiative in the Northwest—conducted outside the Bank-supported project—may have been successful; but there is no government undertaking to scale it up: the message is that the legal impediments to the mutualist experiment have to be tackled centrally— and top-down—rather than through pilots. 7.7 Attempts to strengthen monitoring are futile if the performance indicators monitored are not linked to the achievement of significant outcomes. The monitoring of research and extension has improved; but most of the indicators are input based, rather than outcome based. The push for annual increases in the indicative water tariff is only a meaningful indicator of progress if there is a proportional increase in the tariff that users actually pay. This is not the case: negotiation of the indicative tariff occupies a separate track from negotiations made by each water user group. Monitoring the performance of BNA’s portfolio does not enhance the capacity of BNA management to raise performance; because key decisions on rescheduling are made by government, not by BNA. 22 7.8 Decentralization is an important objective; but it may be counterproductive if resources are spread too thinly. Research and extension best exemplifies this: the number of regional research poles envisaged probably exceeds the capacity to fill them; staff shortages leave many of the local extension offices empty. ODESYPANO wisely chose to target the quality of village development councils rather than the quantity—avoiding the temptation to create as many councils as possible, which would have spread supervision resources too thinly. The capacity of the Regional Agricultural Commissariats to supervise water user groups—both in the irrigated perimeters and in the rural drinking water supply schemes—shows signs of being overstretched. 7.9 Where there are multiple projects overlapping in time and by theme, it is important to assess the overall impact of assistance: where there have been several interventions which are cumulative in effect it is reasonable for evaluators to have higher expectations of development effectiveness and to be correspondingly more demanding in their search for evidence of effectiveness. With respect to the projects examined here, it is difficult to attribute outcomes to specific operations. It is reasonable to expect that the effect of these overlapping projects will be cumulative, meaning that toward the end of the series, the outcomes expected should be more substantial than if the project had no close forerunners. This implies that the evaluative bar should be raised over time. When evaluating a series of overlapping projects, each with satisfactory outcomes, evaluators must be prepared to rate the sequence as less than satisfactory if the expected cumulative development impact has not materialized. This underlines the need to address the whole program of assistance—the approach that will be followed by OED in the FY04 Country Assistance Evaluation—rather than merely focusing on individual projects. 23 Annex A Annex A: Agriculture and Rural Development Overview of Tunisia There are three ecological zones. The North covers 25 percent of Tunisia’s land area and is the most fertile part of the country. Rainfall is relatively high (400–1,000 mm/year). The main products are milk, vegetables, grapes, citrus, meat, and cereals. The northwest corner of this zone (an area of high poverty) contains productive natural pastures and forests. The Tunisian dorsal (an extension of the Atlas mountains) separates the North from the Center zone, which is bounded on the south by a series of large salt lakes (shotts). The Center, which covers 15 percent of Tunisia, receives between 200 and 400 mm/year of rainfall, and the natural vegetation consists of esparto grass and large shrubs. This zone is devoted mainly to cereals, olive trees, and pasture. The South accounts for 60 percent of the country’s land area. It is a pre-desert zone receiving less than 200 mm of rainfall each year. The sparse vegetation consists mainly of small shrubs. There is some extensive grazing, and some irrigated agriculture based on groundwater drawn from wells.37 The population is becoming increasingly concentrated along the eastern littoral, with 43 percent living in Tunis or along the mid-east and north-east coast.38 Over one-quarter of the land (5 million hectares) is cultivated, while just under one- quarter (4.2 million hectares) is pasture or forest. One-third of arable land receives more than 400 mm of rain per year (compared to 59 percent in Morocco). Only 7 percent of cultivated land (345,000 hectares) is irrigated—a small proportion compared to the Middle East average—and the output of rain-fed agriculture fluctuates sharply from year to year according to rainfall. Around 20,000 hectares of agricultural land or pasture are lost each year through erosion, desertification, salination, or urbanization.39 The agriculture sector has shrunk substantially in recent decades. Tunisia has a population of almost 10 million, one-third of which lives in rural areas. The share of the labor force in agriculture declined from 61 percent in 1961 to 25 percent in 1999. Agriculture value added accounted for 12 percent of GDP in 2000, down from 16 percent in 1990. Between 1990 and 2000, agriculture GDP grew at an average annual rate of 2.4 percent compared to economy-wide growth of 4.7 percent.40 Tunisia has undertaken reforms in agriculture since 1989. Subsidies for fertilizer, animal feed, seed, irrigation, and mechanized services have been substantially reduced. The supply of farm inputs, collection of produce, and the provision of mechanized plowing and harvesting have been privatized. The role of private extension agents and veterinarians has expanded in recent years. Progress has been slower in liberalizing food marketing, the state remaining involved in cereals, olive oil, sugar, tea, coffee, tobacco, and wine. Limited security of tenure, holding fragmentation, and land titling and 37. World Bank, Tunisia, Agricultural Sector Survey, September 29, 1982, p. 26. 38. Economist Intelligence Unit, Tunisia Country Profile 2002, p. 17. 39. Economist Intelligence Unit, Tunisia Country Profile 2002, p. 18. 40. World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2002. 24 Annex A registration problems are issues that still await resolution. Water is a key constraint and the importance of an integrated management of ground and surface sources has been recognized.41 While all urban homes have piped water, the figure is only 24 percent in rural areas. Some 5 percent of village homes are still more than 3 kilometers from their nearest water source.42 Substantial progress has been made in reducing poverty—which is now primarily a rural phenomenon.43 The percentage of persons under the national poverty line fell from 40 percent in 1960 to around 7 percent in the late 1990s. In 1995, the incidence of rural poverty was 13.9 percent compared to 3.6 percent in urban areas, and more than 70 percent of the poor live in rural areas. The incidence of poverty is highest in the mountainous north-west, and above the national average in the hilly and desert areas of the center-west and the south. Poor rural households typically have access to land but their holdings average only 2 hectares, are rarely irrigated and show low productivity.44 41. World Bank, Tunisia, Country Assistance Strategy, March 28, 2000, Annex B9a, p. 4. 42. Economist Intelligence Unit, Tunisia Country Profile 2002, p. 30. 43. M. Ayadi et al., “Putting robust statistical methods into practice: poverty analysis in Tunisia,” Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 137, No. 3, September 2001, pp. 463–482. The authors note that “poverty in Tunisia is clearly a rural phenomena and this contradicts the finding of governmental institutions,” p. 478. 44. World Bank, Tunisia, Country Assistance Strategy, March 28, 2000, p. 6. 25 Annex B Annex B: Results Matrices RESULTS MATRIX—AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT (L3217) Objectives. Improve the institutional and organizational framework needed to increase the effectiveness of research and extension. Component Activities Targets Outputs Outcomes (a) Research Improve Set up IRESA to IRESA to be created before IRESA operational by IRESA’s coordinating programming improve coordination 12/31/1990 03/91 powers limited, little and between research leverage over central budgeting facilities research institutes Upgrade Decentralize and Strengthen central research Central institutes Regional research Research rationalize the facilities better equipped capacity remains Facilities administrative Open 3 regional centers Regional target weak, poorly framework for Close around 30 of the 46 changed: 7 PRRs to administered research experimental stations. be set up, of which 2 in operation. No progress on station closures. Strengthen Recruit and train staff Recruit 42 new staff, inc. 6 47 staff recruited, inc. Staffing strengthened staffing agro-economists 3 agro-economists but incentive to work 75% to be posted outside 28% posted outside outside Tunis limited Tunis Tunis 243 man-months of training 57 man-months of training Strengthen IRESA will Seminars used to Linkage still fairly links between disseminate research disseminate research loose; AVFA and research and results. results, with IRESA do not extension A Research Council participation of collaborate in and an Extension extension service; preparing extension Council to be created more ad hoc contact messages in MinAg. between two services. (b) Extension Equip central Assign & train staff & AVFA set up in 1991 Monitoring system in monitoring provide equipment place, but remains unit (AVFA) input oriented Strengthen Assign & train staff & Support to 15 of the 23 Target met Benefits are regional provide equipment CRDAs plus 104 sub- dissipating owing to centers regional units (CTVs) failure to replace staff, (CRDAs) vehicles Strengthen Set up offices, provide Upgrade 550 existing CRAs 60 CRAs improved Many CRAs not local units vehicles and training Build 54 new CRAs 40 new CRAs built staffed, resources (CRAs) spread too thinly Rural Introduce pilot 1993 target: 3 zones Expanded to cover 8 Still covers 8 zones. women’s extension program zones by 1996. There are now 29 program Demand-driven female extension approach, high agents, 12 in the field. participation. Only 11 of 38 female extension workers work in the field. Final Costs (US$ million, % of total) Research 11.2m (54%) Extension 9.7m (46%) Total 20.9m (100%)* *Investment costs only, no data on actual operating costs (estimated cost was US$12.9m). 26 Annex B RESULTS MATRIX—AGRICULTURAL SECTOR INVESTMENT PROJECT (L3661) Objectives Support growth through assuring availability and improving management of public resources […support public investment in activities where the State has a justifiable role to play…improve the incentive framework…strengthen institutions, primarily the Ministry of Agriculture. Components Activities SAR Targets Outputs (ICR) Outcomes (a) Investment Irrigation and Build hill dams. 15 dams completed. Considerable expansion water use Bore tubewells. Bore 150 318 tube wells sunk. of infrastructure with efficiency Boost perimeters. tubewells. 47 perimeters created, large potential growth Monitor groundwater. covering 4,809 has. impact. Supply potable water. Create 30 21 perimeters rehabilitated, perimeters, improving 2,750 ha. Hill dams silt up rapidly covering 2,500 57 meters installed. and are not ha 44m cu.m. extra p.a. economically viable. (groundwater) 185 potable water projects, Irrigation perimeters are 231,000 benefited. underused, reducing Natural Develop fisheries. /1 36 ports upgraded rate of return on resource Conserve soil & water. 416 flood control & investment. management Consolidate farm holdings. groundwater recharge structures built, Crop intensification 34,000 ha of watershed averages 123% on ASIL benefited perimeters (cf 90% on all perimeters). Animal health Give compulsory vaccinations. Upgrade 19,162 2 animal health labs built. and production Boost disease surveillance. has of 15,429 has upgraded, with Improved rangeland Improve public hygiene. rangeland. 5,241 beneficiaries. management, but Upgrade rangelands. heavily subsidy Genetically enhance breeding. dependent. (b) Policy Reform Water sector Raise CRDA water charges /1 Water tariff up by 9% pa, Apply binomial tariff structure 1994–98 Indicative tariff raised; Livestock sector Privatize veterinary services c.110,000 54,617 contracts with but tariff paid by water Recover cost of services given contracts with private vets. users is much less, and Set up disease surveillance private vets for often does not cover network artificial operations and Strengthen Directorate for insemination maintenance costs. Veterinary Public Hygiene Strengthen National Program for Privatization of livestock Genetic Improvement services is proceeding Fisheries sector Review incentive framework /1 EU certification obtained slowly. Introduce a Quality Assurance Program (to boost access to EU Fish exports to EU markets) stable but not Soil and water Submit Code for Water and Soil /1 100% of conservation increasing. conservation Conservation to Chamber works contracted. Deputies Land reform component Land reform Strengthen legal framework for /1 AFA & ODESYPANO was too small to have a land consolidation piloted attempts at significant impact. .45 voluntary consolidation (c) Institutional Development Investment Finance design and installation /1 monitoring of monitoring system 45. There is some disagreement about actual results. The completion report (p. 10) states that the project “supported the successful development of a pilot intervention approach of voluntary consolidation of fragmented parcels”; but Annex Table 2 on project costs shows that nothing was spent on the land reform component (originally budgeted at US$600,000). The implementing agency (DGFE) was unaware of any significant land reform initiative. 27 Annex B Decentralization Study how to strengthen CRDAs /1 CRDA study dropped CRDAs not Investment Various capacity building /1 strengthened planning measures. User groups Prepare strategy for promoting /1 Water user groups are water user groups gradually growing in strength, but CRDA supervision efforts are overstretched. Final Costs (US$ million, % of total) Dams, 24.3m (14%) Perimeters, 44.7m (25%) Hydraulic studies, 41.4m (23%) Drinking water, 36.4m (21%) Livestock, 4.9m (3%) Fisheries, 11.4m (6%) Soil and water conservation, 12.4m (7%) Land reform, 0.0m (0%) Resettlement, 0.0m (0%) Other, 1.5m (1%) Total, 177.0 (100%) /1 No targets were defined at appraisal. Items in italics cover activities where targets were set and outputs quantified. CRDA Regional Commissariat for Agricultural Development 28 Annex B RESULTS MATRIX—NORTHWEST MOUNTAINOUS AREAS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (L3691) Objectives To alleviate poverty, improve the well-being of the region’s population, and to arrest degradation of the natural resource base with active involvements of the population. To this end the project would: (i) promote measures to increase on-farm productivity and off-farm income supporting activities; (ii) improve the management and productivity of range and farm land; (iii) promote measures to reduce erosion, run-off, and reservoir sedimentation; (iv) improve social conditions of the disadvantaged population by providing basic infrastructure and social services; and (v) promote increased involvement of village organizations to take on development responsibilities. Component Activities Targets Outputs Outcomes (a) Agricultural Development Livestock Increase milk and 53,500 natural and Improved techniques production meat production via 15,500 artificial (a) artificial inseminations. Increased farm insemination & (b) Milk production from incomes. improved fodder hybrid cows :1469 production kg/yr/cow. Titling of remaining Meat production from pilot area complete hybrid animals: 109 kg carcass weight/animal Crop Improved techniques: Wheat 15.4 q/ha production wheat, barley, food Barley 15.5 q/ha legumes, olives Dissemi- Set up on-farm 1,500 on-farm crop 609 plots nation of demonstration plots demonstration plots research results & new techniques Land con- Surveys & mapping None 2,100 ha reviewed, solidation (by Agence Fonciere titles given for 1,200 pilot Agricole) ha (900 ha pending) (Increased All of above TD2,900/yr for small & TD1,633/yr for small agricultural TD5,700/yr for medium & TD4,724/yr for income) farmers medium (b) Watershed and Rangeland Management Conservation 8 measures to control Soil & water conservation Soil & water Interest in agro- erosion, conserve works on 26,400 has; conservation works forestry stimulated. water Increase perennial crops by on 53,044 has; 11,200 ha; 80% of works Increase perennial Works built by local executed by small local firms crops by 19,718 ha; firms, boosting 100% of works capacity executed by small local firms (c) Income-Generating Activities Provide Set up Douar Credit Component canceled village micro- Union (DCU not legal) credit Provide Funding of small 657 applications Rural finance remains alternative projects by (a) micro- reviewed by BTS, 320 constrained financing credit from Banque approved, 174 (after above Tunisienne de completed, 77 was Solidarite (with NGO underway; canceled) intermediation) and (b) Fonds d’appui Fonds d’appui a l’API supported 1 (Approche beekeeping coop & 6 participative integree) soil & water conservation associations (d) Applied Research Support demand- 13 research themes “Reasonable” driven short-term contracted, 12 adoption rates (might research, contracted completed. Highlights: be higher if farming out to research Improved implements systems approach organizations for animal-traction, were used) 29 Annex B improved pasture seed, technique for measuring impact of soil and water conservation, guide for preparing Community Development Plans (e) Rural Infrastructure Rural roads Build new roads and 300 km built; 650 km 383 km built; 638 km Responsibility for rehabilitate existing rehabilitated rehabilitated maintenance remains ones in isolated rural undefined. areas Water supply Various measures Identify and equip 35 springs; 50 springs identified 7,800 people given Sink 28 wells; Build 19 AEP and equipped; 7 wells better water supply, potable water systems; Build sunk (shortfall 5,400 from AEP 15 hill dams compensated by systems, 2,400 from building of 477 water tanks. tanks, exceeding mid- term estimate of 300); 4 hill dams built Schools & Build schools and Reduce illiteracy rate to 45% Targets cut because Illiteracy rate cut from health health centers of high unit costs of 60 to 44%. centers construction Achieved: 50% of MTR target for N of schools built; 72% of MTR target for N of health centers (f) Institutional Strengthening Training Training (a) for village 980 beneficiaries Steady progress in development trained, including 160 improving capacity of committees and (b) young women; 650 village development ODESYPANO staff staff trained committees and M&E Develop management 2 surveys (1998 and community planning tools, inc. GIS, MIS 2000) to measure process. and audit systems progress in relation to 1996 baseline. Studies Various, including use 9 studies completed of participatory approach, land consolidation Final Cost (US$ million, % of total) Rural infrastructure, 21.8m (46%) Watershed/rangeland,18.3m (39%) Agricultural development, 3.7m (8%) Institutional strengthening, 3.0m (6%) Applied research, 0.3m (3%) Income generation, 0.0m (0%) Total, 47.1m (100%) 30 Annex B RESULTS MATRIX—NATIONAL RURAL FINANCE PROJECT (L3892) Objectives To assist Tunisia in promoting creditworthy private investment in rural areas and in strengthening, on a sustainable basis, the financial viability and institutional reform process of the Banque Nationale Agricole. Components Activities SAR Targets Outputs (ICR) Outcomes (a) Credit Line Finance farm and off-farm Inc. US$15.0m No data on counterpart Weak loan recovery investments, including agro- to large farmers, funding, but of Bank loan, (39% average) suggests industry, rural coops, fisheries, US$10.5m to US$11.7m went to large many non-viable women’s enterprise, housing small farmers farmers, US$12.5m to proposals were financed and US$15m to small farmers and agro-industry US$18.7m to agro-industry (b) BNA Institutional Development Improve management, with Various portfolio performance indicators were No sign of sustained decentralization to branch developed at mid-term and monitored improvement in portfolio offices; develop plan to absorb subsequently (see Annex C, Table C10) quality, reflecting BNA’s BNA arrears; separate lack of autonomy in government credit lines from relation to government regular operations (c) Study Assess the feasibility of village- Original study dropped, Challenge of developing based group-lending, including substituted by a study on alternatives to BNA existence of informal financial financing of small-scale finance not met markets and legal and agriculture regulatory framework Final Costs (US$ million, % of total) No data on final costs. Of money disbursed from Bank loan, US$47.2m financed the credit line, and US$0.1m was devoted to institutional development. 31 Annex C Annex C: Supplemental Tables Table C1. Key Project Ratings Comparing Tunisia with Elsewhere FY1991–03 N of projects Outcome Sustainability Institutional Borrower Development Performance Impact (Implementation) % Satisfactory % Likely % Substantial or % Satisfactory better Tunisia: Rural 14 86% 64% 50% 71% Tunisia: All 41 83% 73% 43% 70% MNA: All 242 68% 53% 32% 63% Bank-wide: All 2,835 70% 53% 37% 64% Source: OED Ratings database. Table C2. Ratings of Projects Relevant to this Evaluation Rating Outcome* Sustainability Institutional Borrower Source Development Performance (Date) Impact (Implementation) Third Agricultural Credit PAR Satisfactory Uncertain Substantial Satisfactory (L1885) Jun 93 Northwest Rural PAR Marginally (Unlikely) (Modest) (Unsatisfactory) Development (L1997) Jun 93 Unsatisfactory Northwest Agricultural PCR Unsatisfactory Unlikely Negligible Highly Production (L2502) Mar 94 Unsatisfactory Agricultural Sector PAR Satisfactory (Likely) (Substantial) (Satisfactory) Adjustment (L2754) Feb 93 Fourth Agricultural Credit PAR Satisfactory Uncertain Substantial Satisfactory (L2865) Jun 93 Second Agricultural ICR Satisfactory Likely Modest Satisfactory Sector Adjustment Feb 96 (L3078) Agricultural Research ICR Moderately Uncertain Modest Unsatisfactory & Extension (L3217) Dec 97 Satisfactory Agriculture Sector ICR Satisfactory Highly Likely Substantial Satisfactory Investment (L3661) Jun 01 Northwest ICR Moderately Likely Substantial Satisfactory Mountainous Areas Dec 01 Satisfactory Development (L3691) National Rural Finance ICR Unsatisfactory Unlikely Modest Unsatisfactory (L3892) Dec 01 Second Agricuture PSR Satisfactory N/A N/A N/A Sector Investment Oct 02 (L4278) Agriculture Services PSR Satisfactory N/A N/A N/A (L7063) Sep 02 Northwest Mountainous PSR Satisfactory N/A N/A N/A and Forestry Areas Oct 02 Development (L7151) Source: OED Ratings Database. PAR Performance Audit Report; PCR Project Completion Note; ICR Implementation Completion Report; PSR Project Status Report; N/A Not Applicable. * In case of PSR, outcome refers to progress toward the project’s development objectives. Ratings in parentheses are imputed: they are not explicit in the evaluation report. 32 Annex C Table C3. Timeline of Tunisia Rural Projects, 1980–2003 BANK FINANCIAL YEAR (1980–2003) 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 Third Ag. Credit (L1885) Northwest Rural Development (L1997) Northwest Agricultural Production (L2502) Agricultural Sector Adjustment (L2754) Fourth Ag. Credit (L2865) Second Agricultural Sector Adjustment (L3078) Agricultural Research & Extension (L3217) Agriculture Sector Investment (L3661) Northwest Mountainous Areas Development (L3691) National Rural Finance (L3892) Second Agricuture Sector Investment (L4278) Agriculture Services (L7063) Northwest Mountainous and Forestry Areas Development (L7151) 33 Annex C Table C4. Research and Extension Indicators 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 N of new technologies/N of NA NA NA 21% 25% 16% researchers (%) Mobility of extension agents (Days 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 per agent per week with access to a vehicle) Time devoted to extension/Time at 55% 55% 53% 50% 50% 50% work (%) Source: Aide-Memoire, ICR mission, ASIL2 project, March 2003. Table C5. Northwest Mountainous Areas Development Project: Cost by Component Component (1) Estimated Cost (2) Actual Cost (2)/(1) US$ million US$ million (%) Agricultural Development 6.0 3.7 62% Watershed & Rangeland Mgmnt. 12.3 18.3 149% Income Generating Activities 1.5 0.0 0% Applied Research 1.3 0.3 23% Rural Infrastructure 21.3 21.8 102% Institutional Strengthening 5.3 3.0 57% Unallocated 3.0 0.0 0% Total 50.7 47.1 93% Source: Implementation Completion Report, Table C6. Capacity of ODESYPANO Development Committees Development Status Committees Community Area Covered Population Covered of Committee Development (Hectares) Plans Completed Good 114 (44%) 89 (74%) 148,319 (46%) 103,290 (54%) Moderate 52 (20%) 32 (26%) 72,106 (22%) 39,811 (21%) Poor 94 (36%) 0 (-) 104,316 (32%) 46,959 (25%) Total 260 (100%) 121 (100%) 324,741 (100%) 190,060 (100%) Source: ODESYPANO, March 2003 34 Annex C Table C7. Performance of Selected Irrigation Perimeters Perimeters/ Gross Revenue Tariff % of irrigated Intensification Farm models margin per m3 (dinar/m3) area in (dinar/ha) (dinar) cereals and forrage Lezdine 1 3,852 0.896 0.130 57% 100% 1,814 0.703 0.130 92% 100% Ferinana 6 427 0.160 0.062 NA 115% 599 0.244 0.062 NA NA 503 0.263 0.062 NA NANA Eddissa 428 0.178 0.020 67% 84% Negagta 564 0.195 0.075 0% 150% 2,195 0.519 0.075 12% 141% 519 0.212 0.075 0% 144% El Aguila 1,592 0.305 0.018 57% 117% 951 0.208 0.018 47% 158% 310 0.070 0.018 30% 147% Teboulba 9,910 4.731 0.150 0% 120% 7,377 2.598 0.150 0% 127% 6,970 2.753 0.150 0% 131% Beni Othman 560 0.246 0.100 0% 164% 882 0.455 0.100 0% 129% Sidi Amor B S 724 0.355 0.050 NA NA 527 0.216 0.050 NA NA 695 0.295 0.050 NA NA Sidi Aissa 1,917 0.458 0.075 0% 133% 2,032 0.508 0.075 13% 123% 1,753 0.616 0.075 0% 100% Bougossa II 2,771 0.857 0.070 100% 100% 1,431 0.532 0.070 80% 125% 1,177 0.475 0.070 70% 122% El Azima 1,016 0.770 0.120 74% 100% 745 0.660 0.120 72% 100% Mnasria 2,122 0.617 0.040 NA NA 1,210 0.482 0.040 NA NA 1,908 0.571 0.040 NA NA El Hajeb 955 0.362 0.045 NA NA N of Farm 32 32 13 22 23 Models (Perimeters) Mean 1,889 0.703 0.070 35% 123% Variance* 117% 134% 59% 104% 17% Source: Etude d’evaluation d’impact socio-economique des perimeters irrigues, 2003 NA Not available * Variance is standard deviation/mean Table C8. Financial Rate of Return, Bourgossa II Perimeter, Jendouba. Farm Model 1 Farm Model 2 Farm Model 3 Cereals (ha) - 2.0 3.5 Forage (ha) 0.5 2.0 2.5 Olives (ha) - - 0.3 Fruit & vegetables (ha) - 1.0 2.2 Incremental gross margin per hectare, US$/1 804 958 1,940 Investment cost (tube well & works), Year 1, US$, 396,720 396,720 396,720 Maintenance cost, Years 2–20, US$ 3,316 3,316 3,316 FRR at full use (80 hectares) 13% 16% 28% FRR at current use (30 hectares) 1% 3% 12% Source: Jendouba Monitoring Report, 2002; Impact study, 2003 /1 Based on the difference before and after the project, with project benefits constant from year 4 to year 20 /2 Assuming present level of intensification (each hectare cropped 1.25 times per year). 35 Annex C Table C9. Rainfall and BNA Loan Recovery, 1994–2001 Location* Annual Rainfall (mm), 1994–2001 Annual Loan Recovery (Dinars), 1994–2001 Correlation Mean Variance** Mean Variance** Coefficient*** Tabarka 952 0.239 8,591 1.167 0.39 Bizerte 562 0.247 15,393 0.641 0.42 Jendouba 482 0.237 43,204 0.454 0.80 Thala 364 0.234 13,086 0.967 -0.16 Monastir 318 0.491 11,558 1.035 0.18 Kairouan 277 0.422 114,096 0.420 -0.05 Sidi Bouzid 227 0.264 10,506 0.762 0.74 Sfax 211 0.422 65,899 1.057 0.28 Gabes 163 0.448 11,150 0.665 -0.02 Gafsa 140 0.514 31,963 0.401 -0.01 Medenine 134 0.343 4,583 0.907 0.26 Tozeur 75 0.453 874,407 1.002 0.35 Source: Rainfall from Annuaire des Statistique Agricoles, 2001; loan recovery data from BNA * Meteorological station and BNA branch office. **Variance=Standard deviation/Mean. ***Rainfall correlated with recovery of agricultural for each of the seven years, 1994/95 to 2000/01. Table C10. BNA’s Loan Portfolio Quality Indicators 12/31/1999 12/31/2000 12/31/2001 09/30/2002 Base Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual Past-dues <360 days* 5.9% <5% 4.6% <5% 4.9% <5% 6.1% >360 days* 24.4% <22.4% 20.0% <20.4% 19.1% <18.4% 20.2% Portfolio at Risk Overall 39.5% <36.5% 34.5% <33.9 30.0% <30.9 NA Commercial & Industrial Loans 27.1% <27.1% 19.4% <2000 15.6% <2001 NA Agricultural Loans 66.9% <66.9% 68.0% <2000 67.0% <2001 Na Source: BNA *Non-budgetary loans. NA Not available. Table C11. Bank Preparation and Supervision Costs Project Preparation Costs Annual Supervision Cost Project (Region Mean)* Project (Region Mean)* US$’000 US$’000 Ag. Research & Extension 212.1 (NA)** 65.1 (43.0) Northwest Development 318.2 (379.0) 91.7 (49.4) Ag Sector Investment 457.6 (379.0) 96.9 (49.4) National Rural Finance 539.0 (513.8) 74.6 (53.5) *Mean cost for rural projects in MNA region (preparation costs refer to FY of project approval, supervision costs refer to average annual cost, for relevant years in period FY93-FY99). ** No data for rural project preparation costs in FY90, when this project was approved; in FY91 the mean preparation cost for agriculture projects in MNA was US$243, 800). Source: ICRs; Region means taken from OED, Rural Development: From Vision to Action? (Phase II), June 22, 2000, Annex E. 36 Annex D Annex D: Basic Data Sheets TUNISIA: AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 3217) Key Project Data (US$ millions) Appraisal Actual or Actual as % of estimate current estimate appraisal estimate IDA Credit 25.9 15.3 59 Cofinancing - 1.0 0 Government 8.1 4.6 57 Total Project Costs 34.0 20.9 61 Project Timetable Original Actual Identification/Preparation August 23, 1988 August 23, 1988 Appraisal September 23, 1988 September 23, 1988 Approval September 24, 1990 September 24, 1990 Effectiveness May 21, 1991 May 21, 1991 Mid-term review Credit closing June 30, 1996 June 30, 1997 Staff Inputs (staff weeks) Actual weeks Actual US$000 Through appraisal 25.9 66.7 Negotiations to Board 60.0 145.4 Supervision 118.7 390.6 Completion 4.0 15.7 Total 208.6 618.3 37 Annex D Mission Data Performance rating Date No. of Specializations represented Implementation Development (month/year) persons status objectives Identification/ July 7, 1987 - Preparation/ August 23, 1988 Appraisal Supervision 1 April -May 1991 1 A S S Supervision 2 October 1991 2 A, R HS S Supervision 3 July 1992 3 A, R, F HS S Supervision 4 March-April 1993 3 A, R, F S S Supervision 5 September 1993 3 A, R, F n.a n.a Supervision 6 April 1994 4 A, R, F, M&E HS S Supervision 7 October 1994 2 A, Ec S S Supervision 8 June 1995 2 A, Ec S S (Mid-term review) Supervision 9 October 1996 3 A, Ec, F S S ICR May 1997 2 A, Ec - - Specializations represented: A: Agronomics; Ec: Economics; F: Financial Analyst; R: Research; M&E: Monitoring. Performance ratings: HS: Highly satisfactory; S: Satisfactory; n.a.: Not Applicable. 38 Annex D TUNISIA: AGRICULTURAL SECTOR INVESTMENT LOAN (LOAN 3661) Key Project Data (US$ millions) Appraisal Actual or Actual as % of estimate current estimate appraisal estimate IDA Credit 120.0 115.8 97 Cofinancing - - - Government 81.5 61.3 75 Total Project Costs 201.5 177.1 88 Project Timetable Original Actual Identification/Preparation October 23, 1992 Appraisal May 28, 1993 Approval November 18, 1993 Effectiveness April 13, 1994 Mid-term review October 1, 1996 Credit closing June 30, 1999 December 31, 2000 Staff Inputs (staff weeks) Actual weeks Actual US$000 Identification/Preparation 40.7 183.1 Appraisal/Negotiation 61.0 274.5 Supervision 145.4 654.1 ICR 17.3 77.9 Total 264.4 1189.6 39 Annex D Mission Data Performance rating Date No. of Specializations represented Implementation Development (month/year) persons status objectives Identification/ November 1992 4 TM, IR, IS, AMS Preparation Appraisal/ June 1993 6 TM, LFS, IRS, LRS, HS, IS Negotiation Supervision 1 April 1994 2 Es HS S Supervision 2 November 1994 2 AE, LFS S S Supervision 3 October 1995 4 TM, LFS, SCS, LTS S S Supervision 4 May 1996 4 TM, LFS, IRS S S Supervision 5 November 1996 2 TM, LFS S S Supervision 6 April 1997 4 TM, IR, ES, DRS S S Supervision 7 May 1998 4 TM, LFS, RI, DS S S Supervision 8 October 1998 2 TM, GWS S S Supervision 9 May 1999 4 TM, AS, IRS S S Supervision 10 December 1999 4 TM, E, S, IR S S Supervision 11 July 2000 4 TM, IR, PMS, A S S Supervision 12 December 2000 4 TM, S, IR, IRS S S ICR December 2000 4 TM, S, IR, IRS Specializations represented: TM=Task Manager; IR=Irrigation Speciation; IS=Institutional Specialist; AMS=Agribusiness and Marketing Specialist; LFS=Livestock & Fisheries Specialist; IRS=Irrigation Research Specialist; LRS=Land Reform Specialist; HS=Hydraulics Specialist; E=Economist; AE=Agriculture Economist; SCS=Soil Conservation Specialist; LTS=Land Tenure Specialist; ES=Environmental Specialist; DRS=Drainage Research Specialist; RI=Resettlement Irrigation; DS=Drainage Specialist; GWS=Ground Water Specialist; AS=Agriculture Specialist; S=Sociologist; PMS=Project Management Specialist; A=Agronomist. Performance ratings: HS: Highly satisfactory; S: Satisfactory. 40 Annex D TUNISIA: NORTHWEST MOUNTAINOUS AREAS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 3691) Key Project Data (US$ millions) Appraisal Actual or Actual as % of estimate current estimate appraisal estimate IDA Credit 27.5 24.7 302 Cofinancing 3.7 4.6 124.3 Government 19.5 17.8 246.2 Total Project Costs 50.7 47.1 672.5 Project Timetable Original Actual Identification/Preparation June 19, 1992 Appraisal/Negotiation June 9, 1993 Approval December 23, 1993 Effectiveness April 30, 1994 August 23, 1994 Mid-term review June 30, 1996 July 5, 1997 Credit closing June 30, 2000 June 30, 2001 Staff Inputs (staff weeks) Actual Weeks Actual US$000 Identification/Preparation 106.4 118.7 Appraisal/Negotiation 70.0 199.9 Supervision 178.0 618.9 ICR 10.0 30.0 Total 364.4 967.1 41 Annex D Mission Data Performance rating Date No. of Specialization represented (month/year) persons Implementation Development status objectives Identification/ June 1990 7 A, E, RI, EX, EE, AL, W Preparation Appraisal/ June 1993 7 E, E, AL, EX, U(3) Negotiation Supervision 1 May 1994 4 NRM, A, E, S S S Supervision 2 December 1994 2 E, S HS HS Supervision 3 April 1995 3 NRM, A, E S S Supervision 4 May 1996 2 OA, E S S Supervision 5 January 1997 3 E, AL, NRM S S Supervision 6 June/July 1997 4 OA, E, A, FN S S (MTR) Supervision 7 May 1998 3 OA, NRM, A S S Supervision 8 February 1999 5 NRM, OP, AL, E, G S S Supervision 9 September 1999 3 AE, OP, E S S Supervision 10 May 2000 3 NRM, E(2) S S Supervision 11 January 2001 4 NRM, E, S, W S S ICR March 2001 4 E, AL, FN, S S S Specializations represented: AE=Agricultural Economist; E=Economist; EX=Extension Specialist; RI= Rural Infrastructure Specialist; F=Forestry Specialist; FN=Finance Specialist; NRM=Natural Resources Management Specialist; OP=Operations Officer; P-Procurement Specialist; U=Unidentifiable; AL=Agronomist/Livestock Specialist; S=Sociologist; OA=Operation Analyst; G=GIS Specialist; W=Women Micro-enterprise Specialist; MTR=Mid-term Review; N.A= Not Applicable. 42 Annex D TUNISIA: NATIONAL RURAL FINANCE PROJECT (LOAN 3892) Key Project Data (US$ millions) Appraisal Actual or Actual as % of estimate current estimate appraisal estimate IBRD Credit 65.0 No data in ICR Cofinancing 319.5 Government 35.5 Total Project Costs 420.0 Project Timetable Original Actual Identification/Preparation November 18, 1994 Appraisal/Negotiation November 30, 1994 Approval May 23, 1995 Effectiveness October 4, 1995 September 21, 1995 Mid-term review April 30, 1997 October 20, 1998 Credit closing September 30, 1999 June 30, 2001 Staff Inputs (staff weeks) Actual Weeks Actual US$000 Identification/Preparation N.A. N.A. Appraisal/Negotiation N.A 539 Supervision N.A 373 ICR N.A 18 Total 918 43 Annex D Mission Data Performance rating Date No. of Specialization represented (month/year) persons Implementation Development status objectives Identification/ July 1991 4 BS, ACS, CIS, RFS Preparation Appraisal/ March 1995 5 Negotiation Supervision 1 November 1995 4 FA, MS, ACS, BS S S Supervision 2 May 1996 4 FA, MS, ACS, BS S S Supervision 3 July 1997 2 FA, FSS S S Supervision 4 March 1998 3 FA, FSS(2) S S Supervision 5 October 1998 3 FA, FSS, PSD S S Supervision 6 June 1999 2 PSD, FSS U U Supervision 7 September 1999 1 FSS S S Supervision 8 June 2000 1 FSS S S Supervision 9 November 2000 2 FSS, RDE S S ICR ** ** Note: ICR mission planned for 9/01 was cancelled due to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States. Specializations represented: BS=Banking Specialist; ACS=Agricultural Credit Specialist; CIS=Crop Insurance Specialist; RFS=Rural Finance Specialist; FA=Financial Analyst; MS=Micro enterprise Specialist; FSS=Financial Services Specialist; PSD=Private Sector Development Specialist; RDE= Rural Development Expert. Performance ratings: S: Satisfactory; U: Unsatisfactory.
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