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					The question of self-awareness has constantly resonated throughout human history. Socrates gave us his famous, “Know thyself” quote, and the Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu stated, “To understand others is to have knowledge; To understand oneself is to be illumined.’ Clearly, the meaning and nature of self-awareness has long occupied the collective attentions of great philosophers, but today issues of self-awareness are no longer the purview of philosophy. Psychologists also wrestle with self-awareness; whether from a cognitive, social or evolutionary perspective, we search to better understand the origins and implications of human self-awareness. In the Alcibiades, Socrates asserts that self-knowledge is wisdom, and draws a connection between self-awareness and self-knowledge, “if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know our own good and evil?” Socrates’ quote suggests that our awareness, particularly in regards to abstract thinking, depends upon elfknowledge. If such is true, decades of research on self- and group-knowledge should uniquely position modern psychology to answer questions regarding selfawareness(Clement & Krueger, 2000, 2002; Hogg & Turner, 1987; J. Krueger, 2000; J. I. Krueger, 2003; Markus, 1977; Markus & Kunda, 1986). Modern psychology often splits human awareness into self versus group categories (self-perceptions vs. group-perceptions, self-judgments vs. group-judgments). Of these categories, we will concern ourselves with self-knowledge (what we know about ourselves) and group-knowledge (what we know about others). Examples of the former include self-schema theory and social projection (Clement & Krueger, 2000; J. Krueger, 2000; J. I. Krueger, 2003; Markus, 1977; Markus & Kunda, 1986), while examples of the latter include self-stereotyping theory and social categorization theory (Biernat, Vescio, & Green, 1996; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Lorenzi Cioldi, 1991; Pickett, Bonner, & Coleman, 2002). One branch of social cognition argues that relative to group-knowledge, self-knowledge is more constant and concrete (Gaertner, Sedikides, & Graetz, 1999); and the other branch maintains that self-knowledge is more contextual and malleable (Onorato & Turner, 2004). For ease of discussion, let us call the first branch the Selfknowledge Is Stable (SIS) branch, and the other the Self-knowledge Is Malleable). Also,

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each of these branches naturally extends the following arguments: If self-knowledge is more stable than group-knowledge, than self-knowledge is primary and thus informs and determines both self and group judgments (SIS), If self-knowledge is less stable than group-knowledge, then group-knowledge is primary and thus informs and determines both self and group judgments (SIM). The distinction between these two branches is not facetious. If self-knowledge is less stable then associated psychological processes should also be unstable, e.g., selfperceptions and self-judgments would also be unstable. Likewise, if self-knowledge is more stable than group-knowledge, then self-perceptions and self-judgments are also more stable than group-perceptions and group-judgments. For example, social projection theory states that individuals use self-knowledge to infer aspects and attributes of the group. While in direct contrast, the self-stereotyping theory states that individuals use group knowledge to infer personal aspects and attributes. Given that self- or group-knowledge is often discussed in the analysis of human perception and judgment, ascertaining the relative stabilities of self- and groupknowledge is critical to understanding our social cognitive processes. Many assertions of social cognition, like social perception or social judgment, depend upon assertions regarding self- and group-knowledge. However, these assertions are anything but uniform. As indicated by the SIS versus SIM branches of social cognition, psychological research is divided into those who regard self-knowledge as relatively stable and those who regard self-knowledge as relative malleable. The hypothesis and conclusions of both branches have important implications for social cognition, but given their polar separation, they both cannot be true.

The Present Quandry
The present research intends to further clarify this contradiction by investigate the relative malleability of self- versus group-knowledge. To this end we seek to address the following question: Is self-knowledge malleable or not? To answer this question, we will operationally assess malleability of selfknowledge through the measure of self- and group-ratings. Regarding the measure of self- and group-ratings, our research corresponds to this main hypothesis:

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If self-ratings fluctuate more than group-ratings, then self-ratings are less stable than group-ratings, and thus self-knowledge is less stable than group-knowledge.

Purpose: To determine the relative stabilities of self- and group-knowledge, data was collected in the form of self- and group-ratings, and statistical analysis was conducted to evaluate the relative stabilities of these self- and group-ratings. We reasoned that selfand group-ratings can be viewed as indices of self- and group-knowledge, thus following an experimental manipulation the relative stabilities of self- and group-ratings should reflect the stability of the knowledge upon which the ratings are based. Following an experimental manipulation, the aggregate of ratings (self or group) that demonstrate the most fluctuation should then be indicative of the less stable knowledge (self or group). In the current set of experiments, an emotional prime to the group was chosen as the experimental manipulation. We reason that the positive prime should increase the degree of correlation between self- and group-ratings, while the negative prime should decrease the correlation between self-and group-ratings. Of particular interest will be the pattern of results associated with the negative priming condition. Predictions:
Self ratings Self ratings Group ratings Group ratings

Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4

Positive priming Negative priming Positive priming Negative priming

Group ratings Group ratings Self ratings Self ratings

Desirability ratings Desirability ratings Desirability ratings Desirability ratings

American Ideals American Ideals American Ideals American Ideals

Table 1 Main Experimental Design

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Prediction One:

Positive priming to the group will produce high correlations between selfratings and group-ratings, and this effect will be greatest when self-ratings precede group-ratings, as per social projection theory (Group 1 mean Fisher r scores will be higher than Group 3 mean Fisher r scores). To control for simple effects of desirability, social desirability ratings will be used in partial correlation calculations between self-ratings, group-ratings, and desirability ratings. However, a higher mean score for Group 1 will still be expected.

Prediction Two B1) Negative priming to the group will decrease correlations between self-ratings and group-ratings, but self-ratings will be more resistant than group ratings thus this effect will be more pronounced for Group 2 than Group 4. If Group 4 mean Fisher r scores are lower than Group 2, then the data suggests that group ratings are more malleable than self-ratings (as per the social projection hypothesis).

B2) Self-knowledge and hence, group-ratings, is more influenced by group-knowledge than vice versa. If the data is in accordance with the self-stereotyping hypothesis, the average Fisher r scores of Group 4 will be lower than Group 2.

Participants: Time 1 Participants were undergraduate students (mean age = ), male (n = ) and female (n = ), derived from the Brown Psychology Department’s Subject Pool. Participants were presented with a questionnaire, and given course credit in exchange for their participation.

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Time 2 Participants were Internet users eighteen years of age or older (mean age = ), male (n = ) and female (n = ). Advertisements for this study were made to public Internet forums to solicit voluntary participation in the Time 2 phase of this experiment. All advertisements for the study contained a link to the actual study. No compensation was offered or given.

Materials: Procedure: Time 1 The study took place within a Brown Psychology lab. The main portion of the questionnaire was administered via computer, and participants’ responses were automatically encoded and stored in a database with no individual identifying information.

Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4

Self ratings Self ratings Group ratings Group ratings

Positive priming Negative priming Positive priming Negative priming

Group ratings Group ratings Self ratings Self ratings
Table 2

Desirability ratings Desirability ratings Desirability ratings Desirability ratings

American Ideals American Ideals American Ideals American Ideals

Table 2 demonstrates the main experimental design. Participants performed an emotional priming activity (independent measure) interspersed between sets of self- and group-ratings (dependent measure). The priming activity asked participants to write about five negative or five positive America contributions to world history. As shown in Table 2 the order of these self- and group-ratings were counterbalanced for two of the four treatment groups. Finally, to control for social desirability, participants will complete

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desirability ratings for the projection measures. A manipulation check will also be administered to assess degree of identification with American culture. Over all, the experimental design will consist of a social judgment measure (either self or group), followed by the nationality salience activity (positive, negative, or sham), the social judgment measure that complements the first (self or group, depending on the first projection measure), and finally the social desirability and manipulation check Following the experimental measures, participants will be debriefed and then dismissed. Upon completion of the data collection, statistical analysis will be used to evaluate the size effects of self-ratings and group-ratings. A simple questionnaire format was used to create the survey, and four sets of questions composed the bulk of the survey. Two sets of questions were the self- and group-ratings. Questions were fundamentally identical for both the self- and group-ratings, that is the base questions “ The order of these ratings was counter-balanced, such that roughly half of the participants produced self-ratings first, while the other half produced group-ratings first. The selfand group-ratings were also interspersed with a group priming activity. Statistical analysis based on the order of the ratings will allow us to determine which has a stronger effect. That is, do group-ratings influence self-ratings most, or do self-ratings influence group-ratings more? A group salience activity will also be interspersed between self and group ratings. Statistical analysis of the size effects based on type of ratings (self or group) and order (first or last), will allow us to determine which theory is more descriptive of human social inference.

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Results
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4

Self ratings Self ratings Group ratings Group ratings

Positive priming Negative priming Positive priming Negative priming

Group ratings Group ratings Self ratings Self ratings

Desirability ratings Desirability ratings Desirability ratings Desirability ratings

American Ideals American Ideals American Ideals American Ideals

Table 3 Main experimental design.

Results Time 1 Raw self and group-ratings were correlated ideographically across subject, and the resultant scores were then transformed using the Fisher transformation for correlation scores. Individual Fisher transform scores were then summed within conditions. The means and standard deviations are reported in Table 4.
Fisher Scores Time 1 Mean Fisher Z 0.5221 0.2782 0.5557 0.4496
Table 4

Group 1 2 3 4

SD 0.4261 0.3660 0.3449 0.2944

In line with our predictions, Group 2 (Self-Group, Negative Prime) demonstrated a large depression in the correlation between self- and group-ratings, as judged by a simple comparison of mean Fisher scores. However, t-tests did not confirm this difference to be significant (Table 6).

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Univariate Analysis of Variance, Fisher Scores Time 1
Emotion: Positive Mean = 0.5221 SD = .4261 Mean = 0.5557 SD = .3449 Emotion: Negative Mean = 0.2782 SD = .3660 Mean = 0.4496 SD = .2944 Order of Ratings Self-Group Group-Self
Total

N 12 16 28 N

Order of Ratings Self-Group Group-Self
Total

INTERACTION
F = .433, P = .514

10 11 21

MAIN EFFECT Emotion
F = 2.795 P = .101

MAIN EFFECT Order
F = .960 P = .333

Table 5

Based on our prior predictions, we were particularly interested in the differences between Group 2 and Groups 1, 3, and 4, as well as the difference between Group 1 & 3. However, as displayed in Table 6 we did not find a significant difference for any of these comparisons. The difference between Group 2 and 3 did begin to approach significance (t = -1.95, p = .063). This finding, coupled with the finding that Groups 3 and 4 are not significantly different (?X), suggests that The low N and high variance are the most likely confounds.
Significance (Two Tailed) 0.17 0.159 0.063 0.819

Group 2&1 2&4 2&3 1&3

t 1.423 -1.475 -1.95 -0.231

df 20 17 24 26

Mean Difference 0.2438 -0.2203 -0.2775 -0.0337

Table 6 Independent Samples t-test for Equality of Means (Fisher Scores Time 1)

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Figure 1

Given that the social desirability of an item may lead to higher endorsements simply because that item is desirable, we also controlled for the effects of social desirability by partialing the social desirability ratings from the correlation scores between self and group-ratings (this procedure was preformed ideographically by individual). These individual partialed scores were once again transformed via the Fisher transform and summed and average by treatment condition (Table 7).
Fisher Partialed Scores (Desirability) Time 1 Mean Fisher Z SD Group 1 0.4983 0.4887 2 0.1898 0.2746 3 0.5200 0.3554 4 0.3069 0.3518
Table 7

Although, the means seem to follow a pattern similar to the unpartialed scores

Group 2&1 2&4 2&3 1&3

t 1.772 0.844 -2.501 -0.136

df 20 19 24 26

Mean Difference 0.3086 0.1172 -0.3303 -0.0217

Significance (Two Tailed) 0.092 0.409 0.02 0.893

Table 8 Independent Samples t-test for Equality of Means (Partialed Scores Time 1)

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Figure 2

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Univariate Analysis of Variance, Fisher Partialed Scores (Desirability) Time
Emotion: Positive Mean = 0.4932 SD = .4887 Mean = 0.5200 SD = .3555 Emotion: Negative Mean = 0.1898 SD = .2747 Mean = 0.3069 SD = .3518 Order of Ratings Self-Group Group-Self
Total

N 12 16 28 N

Order of Ratings Self-Group Group-Self
Total

INTERACTION
F = .189, P = .666

10 11 21

MAIN EFFECT Emotion

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F = 5.647 P = .022

MAIN EFFECT Order
F = .400 P = .530

Table 9

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Results Time 2
Fisher Scores Time 1 Group 1 2 3 4 Mean Fisher Z 0.3547 0.3369 0.4335 0.4152
Table 10

SD 0.4365 0.4341 0.3915 0.4061

Group 2&1 2&4 1&3 3&4

t 0.259 -1.218 -1.328 0.328

df 164 175 193 204

Mean Difference 0.0178 -0.0783 -0.0785 0.0182

Significance (Two Tailed) 0.796 0.225 0.186 0.743

Table 11 Independent Samples t-test for Equality of Means (Fisher Scores Time 1)

Figure 3

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Univariate ANOVA
Emotion: Positive Mean = 0.3547 SD = .4365 Mean = 0.4335 SD = .3915 Emotion: Negative Mean = 0.3369 SD = .4341 Mean = 0.4152 SD = .4061 Order of Ratings Self-Group Group-Self
Total

N 97 98 195 N

Order of Ratings Self-Group Group-Self
Total

INTERACTION
F = .000, P = .995

69 108 177

MAIN EFFECT Emotion
F = 3.229 P = .073

MAIN EFFECT Order
F = .170 P = .680

Table 12

Partialed Data
Fisher Partialed Scores (Desirability) Time 1 Group 1 2 3 4 Mean Fisher Z 0.3150 0.2671 0.4282 0.3872
Table 13

SD 0.4588 0.4697 0.4029 0.3988

Group 2&1 2&4 1&3 3&4

t -0.656 -1.823 -1.832 0.733

df 164 175 193 204
Table 14

Mean Difference -0.0479 -0.1202 -0.1133 0.041

Significance (Two Tailed) 0.513 0.07 0.068 0.464

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Figure 4

Emotion: Positive Mean = 0.3510 SD = .4588 Mean = 0.4283 SD = .40289 Emotion: Negative Mean = 0.2671 SD = .4697 Mean = 0.3872 SD = .3987

Order of Ratings Self-Group Group-Self
Total

N 97 98 195 N

Order of Ratings Self-Group Group-Self
Total

INTERACTION
F = .006, P = .939

69 108 177

MAIN EFFECT Emotion
F = 6.664 P = .01

MAIN EFFECT Order
F = .966 P = .326

Table 15

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Group
1 High 1 Low 2 High 2 Low 3 High 3 Low 4 High 4 Low

N
44 48 34 30 48 45 52 50

Group Mean
0.1839 0.4587 0.1875 0.3760 0.3715 0.5022 0.3880 0.3779

Group SD
0.4188 0.4581 0.3730 0.5385 0.3519 0.4360 0.3710 0.3793
Table 16

Mean Group Difference
0.2748 -0.1885 0.1307 -0.0101

Significance (Two tailed)
t = 2.994 p = 0.004 t = -1.607 p = .113 t = 1.596 p = .114 t = -.126 p = .900

Group
1 2 3 4

N
97 69 98 108

Mean
1.9501 2.0350 1.9400 1.9608
Table 17

SD
0.6951 0.6429 0.6705 0.6502

Between American Within Ideals Measure Total

Sum of Squares 0.1170 2.5560 2.6740

df 3 45 48
Table 18

Mean Squares 0.039 0.057

F 0.689

Significance 0.563

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Biernat, M., Vescio, T. K., & Green, M. L. (1996). Selective self-stereotyping. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(6), 1194-1209. Clement, R. W., & Krueger, J. (2000). The primacy of self-referent information in perceptions of social consensus. British Journal of Social Psychology, 39(2), 279299. Clement, R. W., & Krueger, J. (2002). Social categorization moderates social projection. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38(3), 219-231. Gaertner, L., Sedikides, C., & Graetz, K. (1999). In search of self-definition: Motivational primacy of the individual self, motivational primacy of the collective self, or contextual primacy? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(1), 5-18. Hogg, M. A., & Turner, J. C. (1987). Intergroup behaviour, self-stereotyping and the salience of social categories. British Journal of Social Psychology, 26(4), 325340. Krueger, J. (2000). The projective perception of the social world: A building block of social comparison processes. In J. Suls & L. Wheeler (Eds.), Handbook of social comparison: Theory and research. The Plenum series in social/clinical psychology (pp. 323-351). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Krueger, J. I. (2003). Return of the ego--Self-referent information as a filter for social prediction: Comment on Karniol (2003). Psychological Review, 110(3), 585-590. Lorenzi Cioldi, F. (1991). Self-stereotyping and self-enhancement in gender groups. European Journal of Social Psychology, 21(5), 403-417. Markus, H. (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about the self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35(2), 63-78. Markus, H., & Kunda, Z. (1986). Stability and malleability of the self-concept. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(4), 858-866. Onorato, R. S., & Turner, J. C. (2004). Fluidity in the self-concept: the shift from personal to social identity. European Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 257-278. Pickett, C. L., Bonner, B. L., & Coleman, J. M. (2002). Motivated self-stereotyping: Heightened assimilation and differentiation needs result in increased levels of

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positive and negative self-stereotyping. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(4), 543-562.

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