where
T'
V
V
g
= pre blast aircraft velocity, = acceleration of gravity,
N = maneuver nonnalload factor,
and a dot indicates differentiation with respect to time. It should be noted that N is tht" maneuver normal load, and not the load factor, tI, used to calculate the intercept envelopes. N is related to the load factor n by
N = n -1.
•
II
If the equation for =
where
ta
VIa
r
of arrival of the blast wave at the intercept point; i.e., the time required :Ul Lile blast front to propagate to the intercept point. For the special case when the aircraft is not performing a maneuver (N = 0), the equations for the position of the burst point in the burst frame simplify to
= time
it is necessary to adopt an indirect procedure. Since the intercept-time envelopes derme a volume in space, this entire volume may be transformed into an equivalent volume in the burst frame. The burst-time envelopes then may be determined as the intersection of this volume with the planes in which burst-time envelopes
arMiired. The most convenient way of performing this volume transformation is to take "slices" through the intercept-time volume parallel to the XI - Z[ plane, for selected values of Yl' Each of these slices may be resolved directly into a slice of the burst-time volume in a plane corresponding to the same value of YB • Defmition of the burst-time envelopes in several Y B planes is equivalent to defming the burst-time volume. The data required to perform the analysis include:
II
V = preblast aircraft velocity (ft/sec)
By means of the above equations, the burst frame coordinates (X B' YB' ZB) may be found for any point on an intercept-time envelope (XI' Y t , Zt). Unfortunately, a general planar bursttime envelope cannot be obtained by merely tJansfonning an intercept envelope point by point. For maneuvering aircraft, only those .. ", .."I'"'!'.... ;n tl,e XI - ZI plane (side view) or parallel to the XI - Z[ plane, may be resolved directly into corresponding planar envelopes in the X B - ZB plane or paraJlel to it. All other intercept-time envelopes will transform into three-dimensional surfaces in the burst frame. In the case of no maneuver, any intercept-time envelope parallel to the X J axis may be resolved directly into a burst-time envelope in the same plane. This includes envelopes in both the XI Zl plane (side view), and the XI - Y1 plane (top. view). However, in neither case can the Y B - ZB plane (front view) envelope be obtained directly. ~;: .j~·.!;"l te· fmd the burst envelopes for side, front, and top views (or in any arbitrary plane),
h = aircraft altitude (ft)
W n
= weapon yield (kt)
= aircraft
preblast load factor; for straight and level flight, n = 1 (dimensionless)
XI' Y1• Zl = coordinates of points on intercept-time envelopes, as defmed in Figure 13-21 (ft).
The analysis is perfonned in a series of steps, as follows. 1. Determine the ambient atmospheric conditions at altitude h from Table 13-1. 2. Calculate the maneuver normal load fae-tor, N.
II
N=n-l.
3. Calculate the radius of turn, r (not required if N O.).
=
V2
r = 32.2N'
1.3-69
•
•
4. '" Select a point on the X, - ZJ plane (side view) intercept-time envelope. Its coordinates are (Xl' Y,. Z,), witH' Y r =O. S. Determine the slant range, R, from the center of burst to the selected intercept point.
9. Calculate the coordinates of the point in the burst frame (X s ' Y B , 2 B ). a. If N = 0,
6. Calculate the equivalent range for a 1 kt burst in a sea level atmosphere by the scaling procedures described in paragraph 2-14, Chapter 2,
b.
If N =1= 0,
Xs = XI cos IfJ + (r - ZI) sin (stens 5-8', are the same for all points on the intercept-time volume, and the sphere transforms into a sphere of the same radius in the burst frame. The coordinates of the center of the sphere are
XB
;:; T sin
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II
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L)
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•
1ft)
Figure 13-25c.
..,6
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II =
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4.000 Feet
II
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Volume at YB = 6,00') Feet •
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II
Fi!ure 13-25f. Slice Through Burst-Time Volume at YB ::; 10,000 F e e t .
II
\..J
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(ft)
Figure 13-268. Burst-Time Envelope (Front View)
II II
Figure 13-26b. Burst-Time Envelope (Top View)
II II
UI
f
•
BIBLIOGRAPHY •
Atkinson, G. W., and. H. G. Laursen, Nomographs for Determining the Relationships Between pressMure Range, Altitude, and Yield in the Shock Front Resulting from a Nuclear Dt:wtU.wu" NAVWEPS Re 8295 Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility, Albuquerque, New M~xlco, January 1965 Ayvazian, M., E. S. Criscione, and N. P. Hobbs, Comparison Between Predicted and Measured Structural Responses of a Supersonic Delta to Blast Loads, AFFDL-TR-65-2l2, Kaman AviDyne, Burlington, Massachusetts, March 1966 Criscione, E., and J. Putukian, Preliminary Estimates of the Effect of Blast-ThermallnteraClion on the Vulnerability of High-Speed Aircraft in the Vicinity of a Nuclear Deto ASD-TR-61-135, Inc., Burlington, Massachusetts, January 1962 Davis, H. T., W. C. Kaufman, An Experimental Determination of the Maximum Safe Thermal Radiation Loads for a Fighter-Bomber Cockpit, ASRMDS-TM-63-4, Flight Dynamics LabUIiHuiY, HHt;.iH" Patterson, Ohio, January 1963
---Hobbs, N. P., G. J.
De Hart, R. C., N. L. Basdekas, Response of Aircraft Fuselages and Missile Bodies to Blast Loading, ASD TDR-62-458, Southwest Research Institute, San Antonio, Texas, January 196~
Donovan, A. F., and H. R. Lawrence, eds., Aerodynamic Components of Aircraft at Volume VII of High Speed Aerodynamics and Jet Propulsion, Princeton University Pre
Speeds,
-..
Ill. .
)
Friedman, M. D., and J. R. Ruetenik, An Analysis of Measured Blast Loads on Swept Wings at High Subsonic Speeds, AFFDL-TR-65-170, MIT/A TR-I02assachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, March 1
Handbook for Analysis of Nuclear Weapon Effects on Aircraft AviDyne, Burlington, Massachusetts, Aprill
DASA 2048, KA-TR-50A; Kaman
Hobbs, N. P., and K. R: Wetmore, Lethality Criteria for Aircraft Exposed to Nuclear Blasts. AFFDL-TR-66-22 1, Kaman AviDyne, Burlington, Massachusetts, APril196~
and E. S. Criscione, Effects Blast Lethality Envelopes chusetts, February 1964 Nuctear Weapons BIllsI Phenomena, DASA 1200-1, DASIAC, Santa Barbara,
Nuclear Weapons Blast Phenomena, Volume II. Blast Wave
Santa Barbara, California, 1 December 1
13-86
01 Variations in Aircraft Parameters on
Inc., Burlington, Massa-
..
Int~ ..n,.tl"
•
•
Nuclear Weapons Blast Phenomena, Volume III, Air and Subsu
1200-1II D Santa Barbara, California, 1 March 1970
Pugh, E. J., and G. B. Bennett, Vulnerability of Aeronautical Systems to Methods of Structural Analysis. RTD-TDR-64-1, January 1 E. J., and D. H. Whitford, The Vulnerability of Parked Army Aircraft to Nuclear De WADC-TR-56-3S4, University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio, June 1956 Sears, W. R., ed., General Theory of High Speed namics and Jet Propulsion, Princeton University Witmer, E. A., J. F. Duvivier, and M. Ayvazian, The Effects of Atomic Explosions on the Main Rotor of Helicopters in Flight.WADC-TR-58-301, MIT/ASRL, November 1958 Whitaker, W. A,and R. A. Deliberis, Jr., Aircraft Thermal Vulnerability to Large High-Altitude Detonations . AFWL-TR-67-85, Air Force Weapons Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, Augu 1967
PAGE
13-" INTENTIONALLY
LEFT BLANK
13-87
•
Chapter 14 DAMAGE TO MILITARY FIELD
1
EQlJlPM~T
_
_
II
One of the primary uses of nuclear weapons would be for the destruction of military field equipment. This chapter describes how a nuclear explosion can damage military field equipment and provides techniques for estimating certain types and categories of damage. Section I provides a description of the mechanisms of air blast damage to military field equipment, and some examples of variations in damage with weapon yield and exposure conditions. Section II provides the techniques for estimating the various categories of air blast damage to military material. Section III provides a brief description of damage that might be caused by missile (01). jects translated by the blast wave). fire, and other secondary effects. Section- IV discusses transient radiation effects on electronic systems (TREES).
II
INTRODUCTION
II
the types of equipment listed above. while techniques for predicting the damage are given in Section II.
14-1
Damage Mechanisms
II
II
SECTION I
AIR BLAST DAMAGE •
The military equipment that is included in • s section generally can be described as that material that is used by ground forces in the fie1d. The major types include vehicles (wheeled and tracked). artillery, small arms, communications, field radars, mines~ railroad rolling stock, generators, and other rniscel1aneous items. Types of equipment that are specifically excluded are stationary structures, aircraft, and missile systems. The blast and thennal effects on these three types are discussed in Chapters 11. 13, and 1 6, respectively. This section discusses the causes and categories of blast-induced damage to
Most damage to military equipment is • cau by the deforming action of blast overpressure or by target movement associated with - the air in motion within a blast wave, i.e., the dynamic pressure. The sudden application of high pressure to the surface of a target as a blast wave envelops it can cause crushing, distortion. or buckling of components and subsystems. These may be either closed components and subsystems whose strengths are less than the forces imposed by the differenti.al pressure between the outside and the inside of the element (e.g., fuel tanks), or open elements on which differential forces occurring during the time taken for the blast wave to envelop the element are large enough to cause failure. This type of damage predominates for very low yield weapons or for short duration pulses. If the weapon yield is greater than severil hundred tons, however, the predominant type of damage to targets in the open results from the drag force caused by dynamic pressures. These drag forces may be large enough to move properly oriented, unshielded targets great distances. They may slide, roll, or bounce along the ground surface and may be damaged seriously by the violent motions. There have been instances in which heavy equipment has been picked up and thrown dozens of feet, and then has hit the ground with sufficient force to be dismembered. Stresses induced by dynamic pressure on other types of equipment, e.g., radar or
II
14-1
-
radio antennas, can be large enough to cause fail· ure even though the target is not crushed and no grilamovernent occurs prior to failure. • The preceding discussion shows that the thiee most important parameters involved in damage to equipment from air blast are the 3:i.r blast environment, the characteristics of the target, i.e., those factors that influence its reactions to blast loadings, and the target exposure, Le., those factors, principally target orientation and shielding, that influence the target loading and the reaction of a target to a particular blast loading. 14-2
The various means by which air blast can damage a target can be developed most simply by considenng the idealized case in which a clas~ical, sharp fronted blast wave moving over the ground encounters a rigid, fixed cube, as previously described in Section 11 of Chapter 9. If the height of burst (HOB) and ground distance are scaled as the cube root of the yield. the overpressure Ap remains constant. but the shock wave duration t+ (as in Chapter 9, the positive and the positive phase overpressure duration are assumed phase dynamic pressure duration to be equal and are designated t+) varies as the cube root of the yield. Thus. as shown in Chapter 9, the total impulse is represented by
II
Air Blast Environment
II
t; t;
(W I13
increases. at a constant scaled HOB and ground distance, the total impulse also increases, with an increasing portion resulting from the dynamic pressure contribution . To maintain the same loading on a target as • yield increases (with a constant Will scaled HOB). the actual ground distance must increase at a faster rate than would be necessary to maintain peak overpressure constant, that is, faster than the cube root of the yield. In other words, if HOB is scaled as Wl/3 , ground distance where n > 1/3) to main· must be scaled as tain the same loading on the target . • This fact has been demonstrated by theoretical calculations of the relationships between yield and ground distance fof. a particular target, and a particular total impulse. Typical of such calculations is that perfonned for the blast wave from surface burst incident on a 20 foot fixed cube at distances such that the total impulse would be O.S psi-sec. The results of the calculation are shown in Figure 1+ 1. An excellent fit to the curve shown in Figure 14-1 was achieved with an equation of the fonn
wn.
II
Ground Distance
= (constant)(yieldf,
IT
,
= A _ [.0 + C
»).
where A is the area of the face of the cube nOfmal to the blast wave, B is the overpressure contribution to the impu1se~ and C is the dynamic pressure contribution to the impulSe. Thus, the contribution to total impulse from overpressure remains constant, while that from dynamic pres-sure increases as the cube root of the yield. For very tow fractional kiloton yields, the loading is highly impulsive with most of the load coming from the overpressure contribution. As the yield
14-2
where n = 0.4138. . . For many years, it has been observed tha"-:xperirnental data concerning damage to military equipment required ground distance scaling of about WO··. The closeness of this exponent to that derived above suggests strongly that the reason for the observed scaling is that the damage was related closely to total impulse. This hypothesis was confmned by curve-fitting analyses of the relationships between damage to various types of equipment and various air blast parameters. Typical of the results of these analyses is one for damage to 1/4-ton trucks whose sides were exposed to blast waves from weapons ranging in yield from 0.01 kt to 10M t. Damage
/
.'
1/
/
10'
-::
~
Q
!!:!
..J
>100
/
V
/
10~1
/
/
10'
GROUND DISTANCE
(tNt)
Fltur. 14-1. • Surface Burst Ground Range as a Function of Yield for ~nstant Total 'mpul. of 0.50 psl-sec:
II
14-3
•
correlation was best with total impulse (with an index of determination, 1.0., of 0.77),· but the correlation was almost as good with dynamic pressure impulse (1.0.: 0.74). Much poorer correlation was achieved with dynamic pressure, diffraction impulse. and overpressure (with I.D.'s of 0.26,0.24 and 0.22 respectively). . Most of the foregoing discussion is con• ce with air blast phenomena in the Mach reflection region, where the majority of targets usually are found. In the regular reflection region, the overpressure portion of the total impulse usually dominates. This is because the target is exposed to both the incident and reflected air shock. and the horizontal components of dynamic pressure for the two shocks are small, largely because the horizontal component of dynamic pressure is proportional to the square of the sine of the angle (1 that the shock front makes with the surface. For example, if () is 4S-deg, the horizontal component of dynamic pressure would be about one-half as much as the dynamic pressure for a shock making an angle of 9O-deg with the surface (which is essentially the case in the Mach region). For 3o-deg, the horizontal component would be only about onefourth as much. In this review of the discussion of the • res nse of a simple cube to air blast a classical, sharp fronted shock wave was assumed to be incident on the cube. The influence 'of disturbed or non-classical wave shapes on the impulse delivered to a target can be extensive. If the wave form is not sharp-fronted, a considerable rise time may occur before the peak pressure is observed (see the wave sha~s in Figures 2.. 40 and 2-41 of Chapter 2). If the peak-.overpressure is not at the front of the wave, the '"relationships be tween reflected pressure~ shock velocity. sound speed, and overpressure are not valid. Furthermore, such nonideal shock waves usually are associated with precursors, within which peak dynamic pressure is not related to peak overpressure as it is with sharp fronted waves,
and the dynamic pressure impulse contribution to total impulse given in Section II of Chapter 9 for a simple cube is not valid. Damage still can be related to observed air blast parameters (observed overpressures and dynamic pressures) for such wave shapes, but these parameters are not interrelated as they are for ideal waves . 14-3 Target Characteristics __ ._ . _ Two types of target charailristics genera~ of importance: the overaliieometry Of the target, on which blast loadings depend; and the distribution of mass in the target. which· determines the kind of motions induced by the blast loading. (These can be interrelated in cases when the response of a target during loading Chin its geometry and therefore its loading.) es The influence of geometry can be illustra by considering two targets with the same cross-sectional area, one of which is composed of flat surfaces and sharp edges while the other has curved - surfaces and a more streamlined shape. The target with flat surfaces a.nd,~ edges wiH have a higher load because its shape will result in higher reflected pressures and drag coefficients than will occur on the smoother target. Consequently, the level of air blast required to induce motion in the non-streamlined target will be less than for the streamlined target. The influence of mass distribution in a targe can be' seen by noting that for two targets of the same shape, mass, and area, but with different centers of gravity. the one with the higher center of gravity is more likely to sustain damaging motions than the one with the lower center of gravity. Furthermore, a target with a low mass will undergo greater motions than one with a high mass, if the two. have the same area, shape, and location of the center of gravity. Figure 14-2 illustrates some of the types of blastinduced motion that may occur, depending
I
g
neu of fit of a cuneo The closer the lD is to the number one, the better the fit of the curw.
.~e index of determination
(ID) is used as a measure of
,"-'
0) TIPPING AND ROLLING
•
b) SLIDING
•
c-)
TIPPING AND LOFTING
d) SLIDING AND ROLLING
.) ROLLING AND SLIDING
•
•
Figure 14-2. _
fl WHEEL. ROLL.ING
Target Rasponta Modes "
14-5
upon geometry and mass distribution. A detailed assessment of the influences of metry and maSs distribution for each piece of equipment is not presented in this chapter. The damage assessment techniques that are pre· scnted in Section n for a variety of equipment types (e.g., wheeled vehlcles t artillery pieces, tanks) and for a number of items of equipment within each type, are all b;tsed on experimental observations. One purpose of this paragraph is to emphasize the fact that different items of equipment within a single type, and even different production runs of the same item of equipment, can exhibit significant differences in damage from the same blast loadings, but they .also can exhibit similarities. These differences and simi· larities are iJJustrated by several curves that show damage as a function of distance in a manner similar to Figure 14-3, in which damage on an increasing scale from none to severe is the vertical coordinate (the meanings of the damage categories shown in Figure 14-3 are described in Section II), and distance from a 1 kt surface burst at which the various categories of damage have been observed is the horizontal coordinate.· Increasing distance implies decreasing values of blast parameters, so the curve indicates that damage decreases with an increase in distance from the burst point. There are infrequent exceptions to this rule, which generally occur in the regular reflection region for large heights of burst. Figure 14-4 shows a comparison of the • da ge- 1 kt
14-6
Small Arms
Water Storage Equipment Lyster bag. 36 pi Tank. cylindrical, open top
~
Ap
Shielded EqUipment
Ap
14-7 14-5
14-6
"
Ap
Ap
II
1/4-ton Trucks Crawler Tractors
Road Graders Lightweight Radios
14-6
"
"
"
.. ..
,
14-22
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1.0
10
100
1000
PEAK OVERPRESSURE (psi.
Figure 14-12.
II
Peak Dynamic Pressure at a Function of Peak Overpressure
II
14-26
Problem 14-1.
Calculation of Damage to Wheeled Vahi_
• Tables 14-5 through 14-7 show values of equivalent overpressure (4fJe ) and dynamic pressure (qcq) necessary to produce a so percerit probability of at least the damage category indicated to items of equipment listed in Table 14-4. Ground distances must be obtained from Figures 2-18 or 2-19 for 4fJeq , and from Figure 2-25 for qeq' In those cases where qeq is lower than shown in Figure 2-25, the corresponding overpressure may be obtained from Figure 14-12. The ground distance corresponding to this overpressure may then be obtained from Fure 2-19 or Figure 2-20. .' Scaling. The height of burst curves of Chapter 2 must be entered with the height of burst. or ground distance for a 1 kt explosion. For yields other than I kt, the height of burst and ground distance scale as follows: For equipment listed in Table ]4-5,
h = WIll
Find.: The ground distances for each damage category for randomly oriented 2-1/2 ton trucks for both near-ideal and nonideal (light dust) surface conditions. . Solution: From Table 14-4, the equipment is sensitive to total impulse and Table 14-5 is the appropriate table from which to obtain the damage category blast parameters. From Table 14-5. the equivalent overpressures and dynamic pressures for a 1 kt explosion over near-ideal and nonideal surfaces are:
ii;
·
For equipment listed in Tables 14-6 and 14-7,
•
where d 1 and hI are the distance from ground zero and height of burst, respectively. for I kt, and d and h are the corresponding distance and hl:iof b~t forMield of W kt. t
Example .
iven: A 10 burst of 200 feet.
explosion at a heIght of
14-27
_ Reliability: Two factors affect the reliability of damage predictions: the accuracy with which the air blast environment can be predicted; and the accuracy of the damage values or comparable data. The accuracy of the predictions of the overpressure and dynamic pressure environments is discussed in Chapter 2. The values shown in Tables 14-5 through 14-7 are for 50 percent probability with an accuracy of ±25 percent, i.e., the value for a change in damage level is for a 50 percent probability that the greater damage will occur, and the value shown in the table is accurate to within ±2S percent. These reliability and accuracy values are estimates because there are rarely sufficient data to justify a statistical analysis. The damage values with asterisks, Signifying limited data, are estimated to be accurate to within ±50 percent. Theloss in accuracy resulting from ~odi~cati.~f~~. random orientation and shielding are belieyed tc:r:be small and would have nttle efiect o~~the·over.: -'-all reliability of.the d~age p.reqiction .. _.-. . • Related M:;~;W;- :~ p~~p~- 14-7 and 14-8, Tables 144 through 14-7, and Figure 14-12. See also paragraphs 2·20 through 2-22. Figures 2·18 through 2-20, and Figure 2-25.
~.,
.
"
'.
.,
.:}
14-28
Problem 14-2.
Calculation of Damage to Shielded Wheeled Vehicles
Find: The ground distances for each damage category for 1/4-ton trucks within revetments) i.e., shielded on two sides. Solution: From Table 144, shielded vehicles are overpressure sensitive and Table 14-6 is the appropriate ta~le .from which to obtain the damage category ~13st parameters. Since no partic.uJar orientation was ~pecifIed, random orientation is assumed,. ,From Table 14-6, overpressures for a 1 kt burst pyer a near-ideal surface . ... -.. are:
.:.~.
• Tables 14-5 through 14-7 show values of equivalent overpressure (~e ) and dynamic pressure (qeq) necessary to pro~uce a 50 percent probability of at least the damage category indicated to items of equipment listed in Table 144. Ground distances must be obtained from Figures 2-18 or 2-19 for ~eq' and from Figure 2-25 for qeq' In those cases where qeq is lower than shown in. Figure 2-25, the corresponding overpressure may be obtained from Figure 14-12. The ground distance corresponding to this overpressure may then be obtained from Figure 2-19 o~re 2-20. _ Scaling. The height of burst curves of Chapter 2 must be entered with the height of burst or ground distance for a 1 kt explosion. For yields other than 1 kt. the height of burst and ground distance scale as' follows: For eqUipment listed in Table 14-5, .
"
'
- = WO·4 ,
For equipment listed in Tables 14-6 and 14-7,
d
..
where d 1 and hi are the", distance from ground zero and height of burst. respectively, for 1 kt, and d and h are the corresponding distance and heltof burst fOJiaield of W kt. Example • iven: A 2 explosion at a height of burst of 500 feet.
-
II Reliability: Two factors affect the reliability of damage predictions: the accuracy with
which the air blast environment can be predicted; and the accuracy of the damage values or
comparable data. The accuracy of the predictions of the overpressure and dynamic pressure environments is discussed in Chapter 2. The values shown in Table 14-5 through 14-7 are for SO percent probability with an accuracy of ±25 percent. i.e., the value for a change in damage level is for a SO percent probability that the greater damage will occur, and the value shown in the table is accurate to within ±2S percent. These reliability and accuracy values are estimates because there are rarely sufficient data to justify a statistical analysis. The damage values with asterisks, signifying limited data, are esti· mated to be accurate to within ±50 percent. The loss in accuracy resulting from modifications for random orientation and shielding are believed to be small and would have little effect on the ovel'ability of the damage prediction. Related Material: See paragraphs 14-7 an 4-8, Tables 144 through 14-.7. and Figure 14-12. See also paragraphs 2·20 through 2-22, Figures 2·18 through 2-20, and Figure 2·2S.
aiM
-
Problem 14-3. Calculation of Damage to Wire Entanglement
Tables 14-5 through 14-7 show values of e=ent overpressure (~e ) and dynamic pressure (qeq) necessary to produce a 50 percent probability of at least the damage category indicated to items of equipment listed in Table 14-4. Ground distances must be obtained from Figures 2-18 or 2-19 for ~eq , and from Figure 2-25 for qe . In those cases where qeq is lower than sh6wn in Figure 2-25, the corresponding overpressure may be obtained from Figure 14-12. The ground distance corresponding to this overpressure may then be obt~ f~ Figure 2-19 ~2-20. -.. _ Scaling. The height· of burst curves of Chapter 2 must be entered with the height of burst or ground distance for a 1 kt explosion. For yields other than I kt, the height of burst and ground distance scale as follows: For equipment listed in Table 14-5, .
Find: The damage-distance relations for a concertina wire entanglement. Solution: Table 14-4 indicates that wire entanglements are sensitive to dynamic pressure for yields greater than 1 kt, and that Table 14-7 is the appropriate table from which to obtain blast
400
WO··,
For equipment listed in Tables 14-6 and 14-7,
(15)1/3
= 162 ft.
..!!. =!!.. = Wl/3 ' hI d
l
I
where d 1 and hI are the ,distance from ground zero and height of burst, respectively, for I kt, and d and h are the corresponding distance and hili of burst fo~ield of W kt. t Example _ Given: A 15 kt explosion at a height of burst of 400 feet.
Reliability: Two factors affect the reliof damage predictions: the accuracy with which the air blast environment can be predicted; and the accuracy of the damage values or comparable data. The accuracy of the predic14-31
-----------~-------
------------
II of the overpressure and dynamic pressure tions
environments is discussed in Chapter 2. The values shown in Tables 14-5 through 14-7 are for 50 percent probability with an accuracy of ±25 percent, Le., the value for a change in damage level is for a 50 percent probability. that the greater damage will occur, and the value shown in tl;le table is accurate to within ±25 percent. These reliability and accuracy va1ues are estimates because there are rarely sufficient data to justify a statistical analysis. The damage values
with asterisks, signifying limited data, are estimated to be accurate to within ±50 percent. The loss in accuracy resulting from modifications for random orientation and shielding are believed to be small and would have little effect on the overall reliability of the damage prediction.
._ Related Material: See paragraphs 14-7 and 14-8, Tables 14-4 through 14-7, and Figure 14-12. See also paragraphs 2-20 through 2-22, Figures 2-18 through 2-20, and Figure 2-25 .
.
14-32
Problem 14-4.
_
Calculation of Damage to Artillery
corresponding height and distance for a yield of W kt. For convenience, the proper ~caling is indicated on each figure. .@-
Ii~ curves that define the damage categories
as functions of height of burst and ground distance from a I kt explosion for the several classes of equipment listed in paragraph 14-8. Separate curves are shown for near-ideal and 0 • eal surface conditions. Scaling. For yields other than ] kt the hel t of burst and ground distance scale as follows: For Figures 14-13 through 14-21,
Figures 14-13 through 14-27 show fami-
~ Example.: ~iven: A 2SO'kt explosion at a height of
11
burst of 1,250 feet. Find: The distance to which severe damage occurs to artillery located on a nonideal surface. - Solution: The corresponding height of burst for 1 kt is
-=
h
h
W l/3 ,
1
=~ =
Wl/3
1,250
(250)1/3
=
198 ft.
WO·· ,
For Figures 14-22 through 14-25, and 14-27,
The listing given in paragraph 14-8 shows that Figure 14-14 is the appropriate fIgUre to for
For Figure 14-26.
h
Wl /3 ,
• Reliability: The ground distances for the various damage categories shown in Figures 14-13 through 14-18 and 14-22 through 14-27 are estimated to be accurate generally within ±25 percent. although wide variations might occur for individual items within a class (see paragraph 14-3). These reliability values are estimates because the~ are rarely sufficient data to justify a statistical analysis. The ground distances obtained from Figure 14-19 through 14-21 are estimated to be accurate within ±50
14-33
-=
d
WO:4 • except Radomes,
for
which distance sca1es as,
•
.!!. = WIll
d1
'
where hI and d 1 are the height of burst and ground distance for 1 kt, and h and d are the
"
,
II because of the even more limited data percent
and because of the difficulty in aggregating all supply dumps into one class. As described in paragraph 14-8, curves that reflect the yield dependence of the scaling might be expected to provide somewhat more reliable predictions;
however, such curves are not available at present.
II Related Material: See paragraphs 14-3,
14-7, and 14-8. See also paragraphs 2-20 through 2-22.
.... ,~
,"'
.....
..,~;.?:;;;
,.
'-'
'~-
...£;..
-:'III'""
14-34
•
Shiekli~g,;;:.
Problem 14-5.
Calculation of 1M AdvanUgl 'in Engineer Heavy Equipment
Figures 14-13 through 14-27 show fami· I~ curves that define the damage categories as functions of height of burst and gro~d dis· tanee from a I kt explosion for the several classes of equipment listed in paragraph 14-8. Separate curves are shown for near-ideal and nnf'III1.·,U surface conditions. .. ' Scaling. For yields other than 1 kt the of burst _and ground distance scale as follows: For Figures 14-13 through 14-21,
_
corresponding height and -distance for a yield of
W kt. For convenience. the proper scaling is indin each _
t exp109io,\ at a height of burst of 1,000 feet'over a nonideal surface. Find:. The advantage in shielding engineer heavy equipment at a distance of one mile from the expected ground zero. Solution: The Corresponding height 'of burst for 1 kt is
Example iven:·A 2S
fJlqll,
.
"
-=
d - = d1
h
wl/3 ,
WO·4
h
i
=~ =
W1l3
1,000 (250)1/3
= 159 ft.
'
For Figures 14-22 through 14-25, and
14-27,
7i;
h
d 1l3 = dt = W ,
The listing given in paragraph 14-8 shows that Figure 14-15 is the appropriate figure to determine damage relationships for unshielded engineer heavy equipment, and Figure 14-25 is appropriate for shielded engineer heavy equip· ment. The corresponding ground distance from a 1 kt explosion for use with Figure 14-15 is (see Scaling above)
For Figure 14-26,
~" h -.'. _ : : wlJ7"--
WO''',
h
1-
rr;,
•
dl
=
5,280 = 580 ft. (250)°·4
ex~- Riidomes. for
'
:..,.
-
,
-.
which distancescaJes aJf' -
--~~~._ '~~'.~3~
-
.,."~-'
The corresponding ground distance from a 1 kt explosion for use with Figure 14-25 is (see Scaling above) d
dt --Wl/3
where hi and-d1 ' are' the height of burst and ground distance for 1 kt, and h and d are the
dt
=
5,280
(250)1/3
= 838
ft.
14-35
are estimated to be accurate generally within ±'2S percent, although wide variations might occur for individual items within a class (see paragraph 14-3). These reliability values are estimates because there are rarely sufficient data to justify a statistical analysis. The ground distances obtained from Figure 14-19 through 14-21 are estimated to be accurate within ±50 percent because of the even more limited data and because of the difficulty in aggregating all supply dumps into one class. As described in paragraph 14-8, curves that reflect the yield dependence of the scaling might be expected to provide somewhat more reliable predictions; however, such curves are not available at The ground distances for the damage categories shown in Figures 14-13 through 14-18 and 14-22 through 14-27
.n.t'IIU(lImry:
W
t. Related ,Materllll: See paragraphs 14-3 •
1 ,and 14-8. See also paragraphs 2-20 through 2-22 .
.
1i9;~J JI./-P.;J ~~), 1¥-27 a~
ft,tfll!~ 1~-~7 ~~}, I~-s-J .t?/~ C/.Il / t!.+
JI ~ .Q.J..J~A-, )
'-t-.
{f)(1
uration and the large, flat-topped surface, a large Untested Equipment • lifting force is quite possible. In addition, the Although a wide variety of equipment is large weight force on each of four wheels is likei~ed in Tables f4-5 through 14-7. many ly to cause a buildup of resistive force during items are not listed. principally because they sliding. It therefore appears reasonable to aswere never subjected to the air blast environsume that overturning occurs shortly after slidment of nuclear or large HE tests. In some cases ing begins. it is possible to deduce an approximate set of _ In the end-on configuration, the sloping damage criteria, either because the untested ~ of the vehicle will cause a significant equipment is comparable in some degree to vertical force. However. the extremely large some item that was tested, or because subsysmoment of inertia in this orientation should protems of the new equipment are similar to subsysvide resistance to overturning. The construction tems on tested equipment. The principles and of the item, in addition to the flotation gear, the damage agents described in paragraphs 14-1 may make it vulnerable to low overpressures. A through 14-6 should aid in predicting damage to rupture of the hull or Ootation gear would make untested equipment, although familiarity with the item useless until repairs are made. In this subsystem response (a subject beyond the scope instance, whether the item was made of steel or thiS chapter) would be more satisfactory.'" aluminum, the thickness of hull, and whethe~ of • Table 14-8 Usts a number of items of riveted or welded construction, would' be-sigequipment for which approximate levels of damnificant. Thermal effects!W, t1o~at!on ·ge~., ....., age were deduced from the principles outlined not expected to cause rupture or burninl~ex1ip1 previously. The response infonnation shown in Table 14-8 is generally considered to be accurate . at high yields, although the flotatiOrigeu'may loose in the end-on conrlgUratiO~- to within ±50 percent. unless otherwise stated. • Additional informatiorr coricefuing this This is caused by the inherent inaccuracies assoltem would increase the reliability of damage ciated with the use of the comparability principredictions. Until such time as more infonnation ple, which is primarily useful for obtaining estibecomes available. the following values are recmates. The remainder of this section describes ommended. how the damage levels were detennined. _ Bridges, Mobile ASSQult; A specific example of this equipment is the "Bridle. Floating: Mobile Assault, 36-ft." This item should be examined for its response when on the road, and when in the water. Unfortunately no information about its response in the water exists. _ When on the road and side-on, the crit~g1e t for overturning is about 4S degrees, which is comparable with a 2-1/2-ton truck. The P. l. MorriJ, Study 01 Mill'., Fwld EquipIMnr Rerponle area of the side-on vehicle is at least twice that Blat lIItd P1et:lktlDft of ~ (U) detcribes predictions of a 2-1/2-ton truck, and the weight is about blUed on subsystem respon. .4 scaliq for poUlld ruae· 14-9 _
)
tI.AnaIe
+1
14-52
t;1J1e!....
)JI-~-3
1# -?
,'1
JJAt ~
dc/e..f.d. t/jAAJC~ ~)())
_ Camouflage-Nets. These items are rarely considered in damage predictions. They are included in Table 14-8 primarily as a possible source of fIfes. Very low dynamic pressures, on the order of 2 psi, are sufficient to destroy their
effectiveness for concealment. Cloth netting generally is destroyed by a thennal exposure of 15 cal! cm2 .. Cloth nets can be a considerable fire hazard if this amount of thennal energy is received prior to the arrival of a low overpressure blast of about S psi, which may be insufficient
to extinguish pre-blast flames. Plastic netting is not as susceptible to burning, but it will melt and char at a thermal exposure of approximately OCalcm2. Carriers. Full Tracked.. Some data are avSl a Ie on equipment that predates present equipment, e.g., the Annored Infantry Vehicle t MS9. So few data are available on similar current equipment, however, that any attempt to apply MS9 information to current equipment could be misleading. Present vehicles are significantly dif.... ferent from the M59 since they are constructed of aluminum. whereas the M59 was constructed of steel. The response of carriers is believed to. be ,similar to that of wheeled vehicles in that a boxlike construction and large areas make it susceptible to overturning. It appears that the damage values for l/4-ton trucks may be appropriate until actual response information becomes
ii
lI
ai
Ie. Engineer Construction Equipment. Tab-
u a e values for road grader and tracked tractors are probably appropriate for the present equipment; however, theSe response tables are based on very few data points., which undoubtedly affects their reliability. The characteristics of the equipment exposed in nuclear tests are not known, and comparisons with present items cannot be made. It is believed, however, that nees will be relatively small. No test information is available for • ee ed scoop loader type equipment. Since it is w
Howitzers, ,Self-Propelled. MI09 ISS-mm, and MilO 8-in. selfpropelled howitzers are examples of this equipment type~ The MIOS and MI09 howitzers are more similar in mass distribution and geometry to tanks than to the howitzers exposed during nuclear tests. Their somewhat higher prof11e and more "bulky" construction of the turret indicate they would be more susceptible to overturning than tanks. Nevertheless, the damage values for tanks shOUld provide a good estimate until a closer examination of these items is made. The 8-in. howitzer on the other hand has a configuration similar to howitzers that were exposed at tests; thus, the damage values for the T97 self..propelled howitzer shouJd provide a ad estimate. _ Damage values for self-propelled howitz.. e e based on very little data, and care should be exercised in using the tank damage values for the MI08 and MI09. One major consideration not previously mentioned with regard to these items is the lack of data or analysis for howitzers exposed with their gun tubes in a fIring position. Such a configuration could change the response of these items materially as a result of a change in the dispositions of blast forces and resisting ts. Howitzer. Towed. Three examples of • this category of equipment are the M lOlA 1 IOS . . mm light howitzer, Ml14Al ISS-mm medium howitzer t and M} 1S S-in. heavy howitzer. Damage values are available for the 57-mm antitank gun and the U.K. 2S pounder. The damage values for the 57-mm AT gun probably can be used for the MIOIAI lOS-mm light how..
~.J-..I.1I.lI"_
-.
I!.,
but insufficient infonnation is available for the M1l4AI ISS-mm medium howitzer, and MIlS 8-in. heavy howitzer. _ Radm Sets. The ANIMPQ4A radar set is ::r'primarily to locate hostile mortars and to adjust low-velocity artillery nre. When this equipment is in transit, the antenna group and power supply are each mounted on two-wheeled trailers. The antenna trailer has outriggers for stability. The control unit for the radar and power supply can be removed for remote operation from the power supply trailer, which contains a gasoline generator. When in remote operation the control unit is -mounted on a tripod-type stand and weighs about 575 pounds. The only response tables which deal with items that resemble any of this equipment are the ones for skid- and trailer-mounted generating sets. The vulnerability of the power supply trailer might be correlated with a trailer-mounted genera tor, and the antenna group with a skidmounted generator. The antenna group is difficult to analyze because of its uniqueness, plus the fact that the trailer outriggers should significantly reduce its vulnerability to overturning. The antenna reflector should be the most vulnerable subsystem of this group, and damage to it would probably detennine the overall damage category of the radar system. Thus the damage values for generators may be used as an estimate if the antenna reflector is added as another subsystem, which results in the following approximate damage values for both near-ideal and nonideal blast conditions.
_ Another radar set that may be used as an example is the AN/TPS-2S. This is a combat surveillance, night vision, target acquisition radar. There are three major groupings of components in the system. The antenna, antenna mast, radar modulator, and receiver-transmitter are grouped together and connected by cable to the shelter that contains the radar controls and plot board, and houses operating personnel. The system is powered by a remotely located gasoline generator. The shelter may be located either on the ground or on its transporting vehicle, a 2·1/2-ton cargo truck or 3/4-ton or }-1/2-ton two-wheeled trailer. AU components are packed in the shelter during transit or when not in use. The antenna mast comes in three 6-1/2 foot tubular sections, one, two, or three of which may be used. The antenna mounted on the mast weighs about t 50 pounds. The on the DT'r'''Tlln to the antenna mast.
•
Telegraph. The ra sets AN/GRC-26D, AN/GRC·SO, AN/MRC-BO, and tenninal telegraph-telephone
r:rrn 10 keY. fission)
!3<
til ~ quartz nlOutor cryltill aD4 YOS f1eJd~ffect tran&; am wry IIIlIitM to pmma ndiadoa..
14-63
. s e silicon control rectifiers to malfunction, and. normally. prompt doses over 100 rads (Si) will perturb most component parts sufficiently to cause all unhardened circuits to malfunction. 14-18 _ Subsystem
_
Possibly the most critical part of a system 1S its power source. Power supplied from a motor-generator, dynamotor or battery to fail in a
115;tJ
Vul~bility _
for power transistors. Circuits that must retain information are ,to transient damage. That is, transient photocurrents can introduce erroneous information mto the memory system or even han e~the information in the memory system. Integrated circuits can be triggered into • aj" ' fUnction caU~ "latchup" by the, prompt ioniiing dose at levels from 10 to 100 rads (Si). Latchup can be important thiSparticular condition may bum out the circuit or just simply not allow recovery~ t9 prope.:, o9!!llyPn for periods long compared'to the noimal circuitoverlt~., ... Section VII; Chapter 9 provides more e ed infonnation concerning circuit response to radiation.
Generally it is those subsystems that' use ~re vulnerable semiconductor component parts that will limit the hardness of a system to radiation. The relative sensitivity of semiconductor devices to radiation w.as outlined in paragraph 14-3. Some of the more common circuits that are likely to use these component parts, and the attendant approximate hardness levels will now be described.· Unijunction transistors commonly are _ employed in time-delay circuits, pulse generators, clocks, pul[se-:Sha.pm device rtri"";.,, ...
~)';~
because'
Power transistors generally are of two low-frequency types, -such as those used in power supply dc;:ic convertors or series regu-
li
_
)
TREE-DAMAGE ESTIMATES
II
circuits (amplifiers, etc. are more susceptible to permanent damage than digital types, but the
Estimates of system damage from ~-burst radiation are based on two factors. First is the likelihood that a given system type contains a susceptible circuit or subsystem as described in paragraph 14-18. Second is the probable environment in which the equipment will be used. Differences in shielding afforded by aircraft, missile, ship, or jeep installations could be significant for some components of nuclear burst radiations. _ The estimates that are given in succeeding paragraphs are not all inclusive in the types
~ ....... wbh aIIltIdaft'...... as a puameter.
they lie WIhardeDed.
*,_E EaltimaUlI lie bated 00
_
*:be auwnpdoo that the equipment
i ....
14-84
IIsystems or installations covered. The cross of
section of systems should provide some basis for estimating the radiation damage threshold of other similar equipment. _ Radiation levels given in the followmg paragraphs are considered to be external ambient levels. The gamma environment assumes monoenergetic photons having an energy of approximately J to 1.S MeV. A slightly degraded fission spectrum is assumed for neutrons. The X-ray sources . . are blackbody
under unusual circumstances, X-rays probably do not pose a significant threat for ground equipment. 14-20 An Example of Ground ~pment SUrvivability Estimation _ The Lance support system provides an
~tion of the use of Table 14-9. The missile
•
itself is ",ound under the heading "Ground and Sea Support Equipment"; however. the levels listed for the Lance are associated only with the missile and not with the launch support equipment or the communications equipment necessary to direct the launch. The associated critical electronic equipment for launch be listed as 14-19 Ground Equipment • follows: _ Estimates of radiation levels suffi1. Radio receiver and transmitter, or transcIent to cause failures as previously discussed are shown in Table 1~9 for typical ground installaceiver tions or ground support equipment under the 2, Batteries to frre the missile and to operate the launch vehicle heading "sure kill:' A lower threshold for fail3., Fire control system for the missile. ure, below which the equipment in question may be c~~sidered ~p~rable is referred to as...".o: _ .T1}e..survivability levels for most of these "sure safe. All radIatIon levels. are external subsystems"'can also be found in Table 14-9 and ambient values that have meamng only for are listed on page 14-67. The firing system, not unhardened systems. For hardened systems, the being listed in the table, must be estimated. A hardening specifications should be. consulted. It basic description of this system impJies that it is should be bome in mind that the fact that a a box of electrical toggle switches and lights; system has been hardened does not mean that it· which apply power and indicate operation. These will survive all radiation environments. It should, component parts are not particularly susceptible however, survive at"{east those to which it was to radiation. Therefore, they should be at least . most as hard as the systems with semiconductor dehardened. It is further assumed that vices. Therefore, they will be considered as part of the communication electronics without affect'n the analysis. caul',""".n exposures are for With this summarized information any of ). since these depend strongly on the t possible situations can be visualized for X-ray spectrum., which·iA tum. is extremely dependent on the weapon type and the degradation the the'
cit
W
fi,'1'" Ji./·-bi"
jJ-/u ';
YwtJ<"h
,..,;+t.. '4;,/-e-.
l.1$AA)(!A
14-65
case gamma rate would critical, since the missile is not in operation and the other
neutrons or gamma rays or the sureakill level could cause significant problems, and both should be considerecf.. .
14-21 Aircraft Systems _ Estimates of sure safe and sure kill radia~evels in aircraft systems are shown in Table 14-10. These levels are considered to represent external ambient conditions. As was the case for ground equipment, the total dose is not considered to be a problem, and thennomechanical shock from X-rays is not considered important. However. the ionization rate includes both the ~nd gamma-ray rates. _ The functional breakdown for aircraft systems is more complex than that for ground systems, since many mission functions require severa] generic functions within the subsystems. As an example, penetration aids, such as terrain clearance radars, include power sources, radars, - computers, flight control links and crew station data display consoles. A brief listing of subsystems that are considered to be part of a mission function are shown in the table. Depending on the type and mission of the aircraft of interest, some of these functions may not be critical or may not even be present in the system. For specific equipment it may be necessary to refer to the levels presented in the previous Table 14-9. 14-22 An Example of Aircraft
II
•
The sureaSafe and sure-kill levels for this appear t9 be the same as the previous case. However. the gamma dose rate could cause problems and should be COnsidered in the suresafe level. For the· third case the missile is depen-=-wlely on itself for control and the levels of survivability are the same as those shown for the missile alone.
Survivability. Estimation _
• To· c1arify the process of analysis, two cases are considered. The flfSt case is a singleengine spotter plane and the second is a jet similar to the F-l11 A. • Considering fmt, the spotter aircraft, the generic functions are:
ItJ-t.? ~J /.4/.-~7' / ~hl f!. / J.,I._1 c,. ~ I..n-te'd.
) 1'5/7 ;1./C;.7
-
14-67
(1..)(1)
-
.,
"
I. Flight cpntrol. 2. Crew station . 3. Propulsion system 4. Mission and traffic control. Of these, one function that might be critical to the mission is the Mission and Traffic Control. The· crew may not be able to communicate their observations at a critical time, even though they Ie to if
fighter aircraft, it would appear that all generic functions listed in Table 14-10 might be associated with the aircraft. Depending on the mission of the plane, various combinations of these generic· functions might be critical. For example, if the fighter was used for battlefield support, penetration aids would not be critical. The worst-case survivability levels would occur if both penetration aids and either the ilir-to-air or air-to-surface
14-23
Miai" Systems' _
_ The missile systems included in Table 14-11 are categorized acoording tp mission and guidance type. Thus, the damage criteria. in general, are not representative of a specific system, but reflect the mean susceptibility of systems within each category. Furthermore, unless otherwise specified, all systems are assumed to be
unhardened. The categories are not allencompassing. Where no information was available, estimates were made as noted. Sure-safe and sure-kill levels are given in terms of radiation levels external to the system. Although not a great problem for ground or aircraft systems, X-rays represent a much more formidable threat to missile systems operating at altitudes above 20 kilometers, hence, this information is included. The sources of X-rays postulated for these estimates are blackbody spectr~ -YAJ1,. ) _ No problems are antic~ (~)(3 ~ma dose effects unless the dose exceeds • 1 rads (Si). The prompt dose effects are taken into consideration in the dose rate terms. The dose rate estimates include both the X-ray and gamma ray rates. The dose-rate estimates are based on the damage caused by ionization effects, whereas the column head the "X-ray Exposure" includes estimates based on the damage caused by the thermomechanical effects. No. example is provided since it is only necessary to select the correct classification for the missile to establish its survivability levels. There are basicaJly three phases critical to the flight of missiles! 1. Storage 2. Powered flight 3. Reentry. A prime factor that would influence the survivability of a missile in storage is not necessarily the electronics vulnerability associated with the missile but. rather, the shielding effectiveness provided by the storage area (e.g., missile silo). The activation and ground-control electroniCs would be evaluated by using Table 14-9. The powered flight would be concerned with both the missile and the reentry vehicle. And. last, the reentry would be concerned only with the reentry vehicles.
as
14-70
fJat;e:. );;-7/ ~i~ "/.;J/c.. I 0/-1/ d~/e';'e~
t(S/1AJcA
(t.)(;J
•
BIBLIOGRAPHY •
Analysis of Atomic Weapons Effects Upon Anny Ground Operations Equipment Project Attack, TItird Phiiiise ORO-S-200, Armour Research Foundation, C 'cago, Re art, lllinois,l8June 1951 . Analysis of Atomic Weapons Effects Upon Army Ground Operations Equipment Project Attack, Fourth Phase Repo~ORO-S-208, Armour Research Foundation, Chicago, Illinois, 9 October 1 9 5 1 _ Analysis o[ Atomic Weapons Effects lJ,pon Army Ground Operations Equipment. Technical Memo ORO-T-223 Vol. Blast Effects, Annour Research Foundation~icago. Illinois, 16 March 1953
Beming, W. W., Predicted Effects of Atomic Weapons Upon Ordnance Equipment_. BRL 847, U.S. ~c Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, January 195~_ Beming, W. W. and N. W. Arnold, Combat Vehicle Exposure _ Operation Greenhouse, Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Annex 6.3, WT 90, U.S Maryland, August 1 Bowen, I. G., et al., A,,lJpdel Designed to. Predict the Motion of Objects Translated by Classical Blast Waves. Civil Effects Study CEX-58-9 Foundation for Medical Research, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 29 June 196 Brode, H. L., Point Source Explosion MOnica, California, 3 December 195 Bryant, E. J. and F. E. Grub1bs Statistical Estimation of Damage to Ordnance Equipment • BRL 657-RO, U.S. Ballistic Research tories, Exposed to Nuclear Blast Aberdeen Proving Ground, aryland, April 195 Bryant, E. J., N. H. Ethridge, and J. L. McCoy, Estimation of Damage to Ordnance Equipment Exposed to Nuclear Blasts Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE, Project 3.21, WT-733 , U.S. Army Ballistic Kelsea:rch Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Marylan~, February 1955 Bryant, E. J., and J. D. Da)\ Effects of Rough Te"ain on Drag-8ensitive Targets _ tion PLUMBBOB, Project 1.8b Final Report, WT-1408, U.S. Ballistic Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 9 November 195 Opera-
I
II,
Bryant, E. J., N. H. Ethridge, and~ R. Johnson, Response of Drag-Type Equipment Operation TEAPOT, Project 3.1 Final Report, Targets in the Precursor Zone • WT-1l23, U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 28 October 1
14-72
Burden, H. S. and J. D.
rurt:..
",,,t Drag Loading of Actual and Idealized Shapes from
High·Yield Detonations
Ball
Operation REDWING, Project 1.5, WT-1305, U.S. Army n"'1'np~'n Proving Ground, Maryland, 15 March 1960
Calvin, R. L. 'et aI., The Effects vf Atomic Blast on Military Field Equipment. Armour Research Foun~rt M041, Armour Research Foundation, Chicago~inois, 28 February 1 9 5 5 _ Deeds, F.E., et a1., Mine Field Oearance by Nuclear Weapons Operation PLUMBBOB, Project 6.1 Final Report, WT-1435, Midwest Research Institute, Kansas City, Missouri, and U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Laboratories, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 16 August 1 9 6 0 _ '
II
Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, J,
Damage Division, Vo1. I, II, III, June 1947
Bombing Survey, Physical
Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, ~ic Bombing Survey, Physical
Damage Division, Vol. I, II, 1II, May 1 9 4 7 _ Ethridge, N. H., Blast Effects on Simple Objects and Military Vehicle BEAM, Project 1.3, POR-226 1, U.S. Army Ballistic Research Proving Ground, Maryland, 18 September 1964 Gwyn, C. W., D. L. Scharfetter, and J. L. Wirth, The Analysis of Radiation Effects in Semiconductor Junction Devices, SC-R-67-1 158, Sandia Corporation, Albuquerque, New Mexico, July 196 Hearn. 'J. N. W.o Lt. Col., Operation BUFFALO: Interim Report of the Target Response Ordnance Group FWE-142, AWRE Report T25~, Research Establishment, Aldermaston, Berks, England, June 1 9 5 7 _
II
Henderson, J. E., Vulnerability of Radar to Nuclear ExploSiO~44, FWE· 136, Air Ministry, Ministry of Defence, U.K., August 1 9 5 7 _ Heyman, R. J. and H. G. Myer, Transient Drag and Its Effects on Structures AFSWC~erican Machine and Foundry, Chicago, Illinois, Nove~ber 1 9 5 6 _
II
J. 1,., A Management GUide to Transient-Radiation Effects on Electronics DN)\ 2051 Battelle Columbus Laboratories, Columbus, Ohio. February
Kaplan, K., and C. Wiehle,Air Blast Loading in the High Shock Str~llgth Region Analysis and Co"eiation. Part 1/ - Prediction Methods and Examples, 1 1965,
14-73
----------------------------------
•
Larin. F., York. I
Kal'll.Q'!!m
in Semiconductor Devices; J ohn- Wiley and Sons, Inc., New
Martin, A. R. F .• The Effects of Bklst on Dummies and Scout Operation ANTLER, Target Response Group. AWRE Report T6/S9, FWE 238. Atomic: Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston, Berks, England, August) McCoy, J. L., Damage Reports on Exposed Ordnance Equipment , KNOTHOLE, Supplement to Project 3.21, WT-821, U.S. Laboratories. Aberdeen Proving Ground; Maryland, December 1954 Morris, P. J.
Damage
Carsll
of Military Field Equipment Response ·to Ai, Bwt and Prediction of
DASA 2005-1 and 2005-2, URS 660-9 URS R 2005-1, October 1971 2005-2, January 1972 h C.
Mateo
I··'
S
Morris, W. E., et ai., Air Bklst Measuremen 1.1a and 1.2, WT-710 land, August 195
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III
Moderate Damage to a Type IVeldl Forest
II
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SECTION 11
The effects of a nuclear explosion 011 a forcst may have a significant influence on military operations withil1 the region of the forest that is affected by the burst. __ Two H.E. tests have provided information concerning the character of the region that is damaged and the effect on vehicular and movement that the will ca
III
. . TROOP AND VEHICLE MOVEMENT
II
DNPi' 'Cb)ll')
An important difference between the ef-
~O kt by determining Ihe
*,.
The informatioa in the}" tabl", may be u.ed for yields gIOllnd ranges for equivalent dy-
namic pressure impulses.
Table 15-3
,
Effects of a 1 kt Weapon Burst at a Height of 270 Feet Oller a Rain Forest • •
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15-4~
broad leaf and coniferous forests is the
ber and diameter of stems in the path of the vehicles or troops. The variation in these parameters throughout various regions of damage are discussed in the following paragraphs. _ Data from the two TNT detonations that wrmentioned previously are presented jn Figures ! 5-35 and [5-36. Figure 15-35 shows the relation between stern-feet per acre* and grou!ld a rain forest and for a conif forest. The
/W',t
beDebris Characteristics • Th.: impact of the damage": region 0: a forest on movement is determined by the numTable 15-4 _
{b)( ;
tween the two forests results from the difference in average tree density and tree height of the
,see footnote to Table 15-1.
Effects of a 1 kt Surface Burst on a Coniferous Forest _
----------~-----------
~==~
____________________IIIIIt______________
15-42
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~
Stem-ft per Acre Compari50n Between a Rain Forest and a Coniferous Forest
e
tit The curve for the rain forest is based on forests.
data gathered by observation, while the curve for
the coniferous forest is based on calculations, using preshot and postshot tree surveys. Figure 15-36 shows the relation between ground and
'.:
16-43
Figure 15-36. • Average Diameter of Stems Down, CO'!ifison Between a Rain Forest and a Coniferous Forest, 1 kt •
from p reconnaissance, as are the zones described in Tables 15-3 and 15-4.
15-4 Vehicle Movement . . _ The movement rates of various wheeled anTt;;cked vehicles have been measured for both radial and circumferential traverses of various debris zones. Although quantitative data were obtained and can be used, correlations between vehicle movement and debris characteristics are incomplete and are not refined to the point of high reliability. Nevertheless, curves have been constructed that indicate in terms of the debris parameters (number of stem-feet per acre and diameter of debris) when a vehicle will not be able to move. These curves are presented in Fig15-44
ure \5-37 and 15-38 for radial movement from ground zero and circumferential movement. respectively. The general radial orientation of t.ree stems is significant in terms of movement, because selection of easier routes between stems is possible in some cases of radial movement, while all stems must be crossed in circumferential movement. The shaded areas on the graphs indicate debris characteristics where movement is difficult. The solid line indicates that movement is not possible. For example, from Figure 15-37, -for debris .characteristics of 10,000 stem-feet per acre with average diameters of 4, 6, and 8 inches, radial movement of wheeled vehicles would be possible, difficult, and not possible, respectively. Curves for wheeled vehicles are fairly well documented with data; however, the curves for the M 113 and tank are not, because
Figure 15-37. •
~vement
Debris Characteristics Preventing Radial of Vehicles
e
.~~
15-45
D (; i 0 i 12- (;]
Figure 15-38. •
Debris Characteristics Preventing Circumferential MO\lement of Vehicles •
"ehicles wt:re slowed but not stopped by the debris z.Ones in which they were tested. Tracked vehicles Citn climb onto the debris and mat it down after a number of passes, with the result that wheeled vehicles might pass, although this
movement. Branch debris in a broadleaf forest blowdown area adds difficulties, particularly in visibility, that are not as severe in coniferous forest debris. Troop trials were conducted on both TNT detonations previously described. The troop tests conducted in conjuncHan with the rain forest detonation involved comparisons between preshot and posts hot tests of day and night patrols, platoon exercises with a mortar squad, and tests with stretcher parties.
technique was not tested. 15-5 Troop Movement The effect of blowdown debris on the movement of troops is difficult to present quantitatively. Many factors other than the physical obstacle itself, such as visibility, leadership, size of force, mission, and what the troops are carrying are also influenced by the debris and indirectly affect movement. Movement of troops through a debris zone can be compared with moving through a thick jungle, although radial movement is generally easier than circumferential
III
It
III
D (l i C l (-J d
15-46
•
Delei£d
• The night and day patrols were conducted over a route that was about 700 yards long, with one 'leg from virgin forest to the vicinity of ground zero, then back to the virgin forest on a different bearing.
Deleted
• Tests with a loaded two-man stretcher indicated that passage through blowdown debris was very difficult. The stretcher bearers' attention was diverted from the patient as a result of the need to concentrate on locating suitable footing. Consequently, the simulated casualty had a very rough trip and was frequently struck by debris. The conclusion drawn from this trial was that the probahility for survival of a casualty with a severe wound would be significantly reduced by transit through blowdown debris. If the casualty survived the carriage, it is almost certain that he would experience a marked degree of secondary shock . • Troop trials conducted in the coniferous forest blowdow.n consisted of radial and citcuniferential platoon exercises, including a mortar squad, and a simulated casualty-moving test. Some movement rate data that were obtained are shown in Table 15-6.
~\'\.
t,,)L 0
(
Del(;icc.i
• In the platoon attack trials, controlproblerns were considerably eased in the blowdown area compared to the virgin forest. as a result of increased visibility.
Deleted
Deleted
15-47
\' 't'
. V\
..
, ....
..
Table 15-5 __
Comparison of Radial and Circumferential Movement Rates for Troops in a Rain Forest Blowdown A.-ea, Scaled to a 1 kt Nuclear Explosion
II
ployed as a skirmish line. The 2-to-l ratio in time was observed once again . • The moving of a simulated casualty by two- and [om-man stretcher bearer teams travTable 15-6 • Comparison of Circumferential Movement Rate~ for Troops in a Coniferous Forest Blowdown Area. Scaled to a 1 kt Nuclear Explosion •
ducted over a radial-circumferential-radial route. Tpe was in the area of
ntial trial described but in the opposite direction was performed. The piiitaon was organized as three attacking sqw.ld columns in line, except for the last 100 yards. where th.ey de15-48
•
eling circumferentially also was tested. Results were essentially the same as those from the rain forest trials.
15-6 Predicting Effects on Movement ~
• The results of the tests conducted after the two TNT detonations, together with the forest descriptions in Section I and Table 15-1, and the forest damage definitions in paragraph 15-2, have been combined in Table 15-7 for use
with Table 15-2 and Figures 15-1 through 15-34 to predict the ground distances at which movement will be affected to various degrees. The forest damage levels in Table 15-7 are restricted to Severe and Total, because Light and Moderate damage to forests have little influence on movement, except as a result of changes in visibility. Example problems will illustrate the use of Table 15-7 and will outline the limitations of the information presented.
Table 15-7 Illnfluence.oof Forest Damage on the Movement of Troops and Vehicles.
Dcreied
15--49
Problem 15-2
Calculation of the Distance at Which Movement Will Be Impaired
"'
Table 15-7 together with Table 15-2 and Figures 15-1 through 15-34 provide the information necessary to estimate the area within which movement will be affected to various degrees as a result of tree blowdown. The information contained in these tables and figures allows determination of the affected area for movement of troops or vehicles as a function of yield forest stand type.
II
wi"n
Exampl~ 'Given: A 2.!1t'burst at 1,640 feet above a
and
Type III forest stand. Find: Will wheeled vehicles be stopped by
15-50
Problem 15-3
Estimation of MOYement Difficulty
With these two parameters. the potential obs t . ,of a forest can be estimated .
•
Exampl.
Given: A C",oniferous forest with a density
of 200 trees per acre and average height of 50 feet. Girth at breast height averages 33 inches. Find: What obstacle could be fonned if possible to perform some of a forest using Figures 15-37 and 15-38 together with the forest characteristics. The forest charac~ristics required are tree denshy in trees per acre, average forest height in feet, average girth at breast height of the forest trees in either inches or centimeters, and tree type. The following parameters can then be determined: Maximum Debris = (Forest density) (average height) Average Debris Diameter in inches; girth, g,
given in cent'
f\~)l;'\ l\?
Average Debris girth, g, in in
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16-51
SECTION
•
m
THERMAL RADJATION •
Under certain conditions. a nuclear weap• on at is exploded over a forest or wildland area may cause fires. During the fire season, even when the burning potential (a measure of probable fire aggressiveness) is low, fires may spread. If fires are started in regions of sufficient fuel density when the burning potential is dangerously high, complete evacuation of personnel and equipment may be necessary. Organized control of the spread of the fire is virtually impossible until changes in weather or fuel availability reduce the burning potential.
tion pulses of larger-yield weapons. The increase caused by moisture being absorbed from the air at high relative humidities ordinarily will not be more than a factor of 2 to 3. Wet or green leaves, however, may be impossible to ignite and, if ignited, they will not participate in the development of a persistent fire. The live foliage of conifers and many ~hrubs jgnited by fire in associated dead fuel, however, burn vigorously and would add significantly to the intensity of spreading fire. This foliage is often the significant factor determining whether or not a crown fire develops.
15-8 Kindling FuelS.
_ The majority of thin wildland fuels that serve as kindling material are typed into four classes as shown in Table 15-8. These classes correspond to different minimum exposures required for ignition. Since ignitiOn generally occurs on surfaces that are most exposed to the atmosphere, ignition exposures are a function of relative humidity as shown in Figure 15-39. Fires n13Y be blown out by the blast wave, depending on the time inter.':1! between ignition and arrival of the shock. Blowout is not expected to occur
Table 15-8 Classes of Thin Wildland Kindling Fuels (Arranged in Order of Decreasing Flammability)
15-7 Ignitions
III
_ Wildland fuels are typically a mixture of thill and heavy fuel components. Often, the thinner fuels will establish the limiting radiant exposure that will be required to start fires in the ·.t reo • When fuels are dry, ignitions that have a reasonable chanCe of surviving (he subsequent blast effects and of initiating fires that can represent a hazard to military personnel in the forest can be expected at quite low levels of radiant exposure. For example. broadleaf and coniferous litter