1. The Orange County Public Defender’s Office, the attorney on the record for Mr. Lam Nguyen, the defendant, moves this court to suppress any and all statements made by him to the officials of the Westminster City Police Department in relation to the above-referenced case, and further to suppress evidence: 300 mg of cocaine, seized by law enforcement in relation to the above-referenced case. The defendant submits the following in support of this motion: The defendant, Lam nguyen, was stopping lawfully at the intersection of Bolsa and Bushard streed, Westminster CA at approximately 4:30 AM on February 12, 2010. On that morning, the defendant was approached by John Doe who is an officer employed by the Westminster Police Department. Officer Doe immediately asked Nguyen to step out from his car, and he conducted a search of the defendant’s car. The officer retrieved from the defendant’s passenger glove compartment a white bag that contained 300 mg of cocaine. The defendant was then arrested, placed into a patrol car, and transported to the Westminster Police Station. At the police station, the defendant was taken to an interrogation room and was interrogated by Officer Dan White without first being made aware of his rights. The defendant was not advised of his Miranda rights under the Fifth Amendment and, even if he has been advised, the defendant was in no state to knowingly or intelligently waive those rights. The officer did not give the defendant any means to contact a lawyer. The defendant was then booked into the Orange County Jail on the charge of the Possession of illegal drugs. The defendant now contends that his Fourth Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure was violated as well as his rights under the Fifth Amendment to counsel and due process. The defendant asks this court to suppress the cocaine and any statements made to law enforcement officials in relation to his arrest and his interrogations. (BN Tonnu, Motion to suppress, For educational purpose only) 2. Good morning ladies and gentleman, thank you for coming today. According to the motion filed by the attorney on behalf of his client, Mr. James Olmos, the defendant in case number FA019233 will move to suppress evidence seized by the police department under penal code section 1538.5. The search is described in the police report attached as exhibit 1. I had to continue this hearing until today’s date since I’ve been bogged down, for lack of a better word, to review the memorandum of points and authorities, the supporting declarations, affidavits, and the transcript of the preliminary hearing which are all necessary for me to make a decision in this case. I have determined that all the elements of the motion are in order so I am ready to proceed with this hearing. All physical evidence seized as a result of this search will be challenged based on alleged search and seizure violations that occurred when the officer opened the boxes during the alleged police invasion in this case. It is stated in the arguments in this motion that the police action was without warrant and lacked sufficient cause to justify the invasion of liberty complained by the defendant. Needless to say the motion invokes the 4th and 5th amendment rights and the defense contends that these rights were violated on the day of the alleged illegal police action. I have also received the prosecution’s declarations and points & authorities in opposition to the motion and it will be the order of the court today to obtain an affidavit from the police officer as soon as possible because I am inclined to rule against the defendant’s motion based on his testimony which indicates to me that there was probable cause for the search and subsequent seizure of the boxes containing rock cocaine. At this point counsel, the order of the court as in the case of the prosecutor’s declarations is to turn them in as soon as possible. Please notify the court and all the appropriate parties when you have the affidavits. I will enter the appropriate orders as soon as I receive the additional information requested today. I understand the defendants also wish to file a motion for severance of parties. Counsel, the motion is very well supported by the appropriate arguments and points and authorities. I will grant the motion for severance of parties. Thank you very much for coming today. (Motion to suppress, BN Tonnu, For educational purpose only) 3. By not being afforded a speedy trial on the charges in this case, the Defendant has been denied his constitutional rights under both the state and Federal constitutions as well as under California Criminal Procedure Rule 36. Under Rule 36, when the defendant is not brought to trial within the prescribed time period, he is automatically entitled to a dismissal when he (a) has not acquiesced to the delay, (b) is not responsible for the delay, and (c) and does not benefit from the delay. In such a case, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to justify the delay. That prejudice is addressed by California Criminal Rules 36(c)(1) and (2), which require that the defendant establish that the delay he has suffered is unreasonable, that it was caused by the prosecution, and that he has been prejudiced by the delay. In this case, the delay has been caused repeatedly by the unpreparedness and procrastination of the Prosecutor. Significantly, the key of the People’s witnesses have gained substantial training and education during the four years, so that they will appear to the jury to be considerably more knowledgeable than they actually were at the time the child was first interviewed and at the time the child's memory and perception of events was first distorted or contaminated. The child herself has gone through different stages of development. As a result of the unjustifiable delay by the People in bringing the charge forward first in District Court and then, when it appeared that John Doe was going to get custody of the child in Probate Court, in indicting and arraigning him in Superior Court, John Doe has been caused considerable concern and anxiety. Thus the defendant has been significantly prejudiced by the delay of trial thus far and will be further prejudiced by even further delay of trial. Therefore, the Defendant asserts his right to a speedy trial pursuant to Rule 36 and thereby is entitled to dismissal with prejudice. For the above reasons, a dismissal with prejudice of the charge against the defendant is the only appropriate remedy by the Court. (BN Tonnu, Motion to Dismiss, for Educational purpose only) 4. COMES NOW, the Defendant, pro se undersigned and hereby states the following: 1. This action was commenced on Jan 15, 2010 by Plaintiff filing a Summons and Complaint in County, Small Claims Court. 2. Defendant pro se appeared in person at the Pre trial conference and asserted various defenses among which the alleged debt was outside the Statue of Limitations. Discovery was granted at the Pre-trial since no evidence was attached to claim to support their case. On February 5, 2010 the Defendant sent the Plaintiff, First Set of Interrogatories, Production of Documents and Admissions On February 20, 2010 Defendant telephone the Plaintiff’s office and spoke with John Nguyen (handling this case), and was informed that he objected to all interrogatory’s, production of documents or admissions. The Plaintiff has failed to provide the Defendant with requested documents. The Plaintiffs refused to answer any discovery question requiring the Defendant to file a motion to compel. Now therefore, as a result of Plaintiff’s failure and refusal to comply and to provide the required documents, Defendant has been irrevocably harmed in his ability to narrow the issues for the Court to consider. Thus the Defendant moves to ask that the Court grant an Order to Strike Plaintiff from producing any evidence, testimony, documents or other written, electronic or verbal matter at Trial. (BN Tonnu, Motion to Strike, for Educational purpose only) 5. First, pursuant to California Rules of Civil Procedure Small Claims Rule 7.020 (b): “Any party represented by an attorney is subject to discovery pursuant to California Rules of Civil Procedure 1.28-1.380 directed at said party, without order of court. If a party proceeding without an attorney directs discovery to a party represented by an attorney, the represented party may also use discovery pursuant to the above-mentioned rules without leave of court. When a party is unrepresented and had not initiated discovery pursuant to California Rules of Civil Procedure 1.280-1.380, the opposing party shall not be entitled to initiate such discovery without leave of court.” Second, at Pre-trial Conference the Court granted Discovery. Third, California Rules for Civil Procedures permits discovery as a method of narrowing the issues for the Court to decide. All questions submitted where written to lead to admissible evidence. Fourth, Plaintiff was served with Discovery, Interrogatory, and Admissions on March 21, 2009. (Copy of return receipt enclosed) Fifth, California Rules for Civil Procedures Rule 1.340 prescribes the required time period under which Discovery must be responded to 30 days after service. The court may allow a shorter or longer time. Sixth, the Defendant has not received notification from the Plaintiff, they object to Discovery. Seventh, the Defendant certifies on April 25,2009 the Defendant telephoned the Law Office for Plaintiff and spoke with Linda Tran (attorney now handling the case since original attorney no longer is employed with firm) informed myself that they did not need to answer them and were not going to answer them. Eighth, to date the Plaintiff has not provided the court with any answers to these requests. The Defendant now, respectfully, requests the Court, enter an Order requiring the Plaintiff to provide full and complete responses to the above request within five days of the order granting Discovery. (BN Tonnu, Motion to compel, for Educational purpose Only) 6. Defendant files this Motion to Suppress pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article 1, §§ 10, 13, 19; and Rules 102, 403, 702, 705 Rules of Evidence as follows: Defendant was arrested without a warrant and without probable cause to arrest. The results of all tests taken after his arrest were fruits of an illegal arrest which were obtained in violation of the United States Constitution, Amendment IV and in violation of Art. I of the California Constitution. The results of the tests should be suppressed. California Pennal Code which defines the offense of driving while intoxicated requires the State to prove the defendant's physiological condition while he was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle. Additionally, the breath test results themselves have very little probity because of the defective procedures utilized in obtaining the breath test result. Neither the subject test nor the reference sample device was kept at a known temperature as required by California Breath Alcohol Testing Regulations. Thus, the substantial prejudicial effect of the results was out-weighted the probative value of the results on the issue of whether Defendant committed the offense charged. Defendant seeks that the Court will set this matter down for a hearing, and upon hearing order that: A. any and all evidence obtained as fruits of an illegal arrest be suppressed; B. the results and any opinion concerning those results as they related to Mr. Huỳnh’s earlier physiological condition be suppressed; and C. the breath test results be suppressed. (Motion to Suppress, BN Tonnu, For Educational purpose only) 7. John Nam through counsel, respectfully moves the Commission to quash the Subpoena issued to him in the above-referenced investigation (the “Subpoena”) Mr. Nam is not a party to the above-referenced litigation, and presumably would be a non-party witness. A copy of the Subpoena is attached. The Subpoena was issued on April 26, 2004, sent to Mr. Nam in an overnight mail for delivery on April 27, and it demanded Mr. Nam’ presence in Washington, D.C. for trial testimony on May 4, 2004 or some other unnamed date up to May 17. Commission staff, however, informed counsel for Mr. Nam on April 29 that staff would not be able to ascertain whether Mr. Nam’s testimony would be needed until a status conference on Friday, April 30. Commission staff stated that they hoped that an evidentiary stipulation could be reached that would eliminate any alleged need for Mr. Nam’s testimony. Subsequently, Commission staff informed counsel for Mr. Nam via voicemail late Friday evening, April 30,that Mr. Nam would be called to testify on Tuesday, May 4. On May 1, May 2, and May 3, in subsequent conversations or voice mail messages, staff equivocated and informed counsel for Mr. Nam that they were uncertain whether Mr. Nam would be needed to testify at all. As grounds in support of his motion, Mr. Nam states as follows. Counsel for Mr. Nam has conferred with Commission staff as required by the Commission’s Rule of Practice on May 2 regarding the burden imposed by the staff’s last-minute Subpoena and the uncertainty of whether compliance was necessary. Mr. Nam counsel told counsel staff that Mr. Nam resides in California where his business is located. Forcing Mr. Nam to travel approximately 2500 miles to and from Washington, D.C. with less than three days’ concrete notice would be unduly burdensome. Mr. Nam’ appearance at a later date in May would also be unduly burdensome because of previously scheduled international travel. Mr. Nam’s counsel invited Commission staff to consider less burdensome means of proving their case, including relying upon business records and a declaration submitted in connection with another Commission staff investigation of a product similar to that of the product in the Tran administrative litigation. Staff declined. 8. Moreover, The Commission staff Subpoena was issued with inadequate notice. The Subpoena apparently seeks Mr. Nam’s appearance on May 4, 2004, or some other unnamed time, one week after the Subpoena was sent to Mr. Nam . Mr. Nam, who resides in California, cannot reasonably be expected on less than a week’s notice to interrupt his business and make arrangements for travel across the country to appear in Washington, D.C. Further compounding the lack of adequate notice to Mr. Nam is the uncertainty that Commission staff cast on the necessity or timing of Mr. Nam’s appearance and the uncertainly as to the specific date reflected in the subpoena itself. Even on the day before Mr. Nam’s appearance might be required by the Subpoena, Commission staff was still uncertain whether his appearance was necessary. The Subpoena imposes an undue burden on Mr. Nam personally, and threatens to unduly disrupt and seriously hinder the normal operations of his business. Mr. Nam’s wife is out of town this week due to a family medical emergency, and Mr. Nam thus has child care obligations precluding him from traveling overnight. Further, Mr. Nam is actively engaged in the operation of a business in California and has ongoing commitments during the time period identified in the Subpoena. Compliance with the Subpoena would unduly interrupt Mr. Nam’s business activities, substantially hinder the normal operations of his business, and require Mr. Nam to cancel his existing engagements and arrange to travel across the country on virtually no notice and without any meaningful opportunity to arrange for the conduct of his business and personal affairs during his absence. This undue burden is not outweighed by the need for his testimony, which does not appear to be greatly or at all relevant to the staff’s case. The foregoing shortness of notice, combined with the purported exercise of personal jurisdiction based national service of process by the Commission’s Subpoena as applied in this matter violates the due process requirement of the U.S. Constitution. Due process requires some measure of basic fairness be met to satisfy constitutional requirements even in national service of process cases. As a result of the unreasonably short notice and Mr. Nam’s lack of any individual contacts with the District, the Subpoena imposes an undue burden on Mr. Nam and deprives Mr. Nam of his right to due process of law under the United States Constitution by requiring that he travel across the country on a few days notice in order to comply with the Subpoena. For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Nam respectfully requests that the Commission quash the Subpoena. 10. On or about November 29, 2007, Respondent served the Bank of America subpoena on Petitioner while he was yet self represented. Because of his lack of training, Mr. Do did not know the procedure to stop or limit production of his bank records. On December 21, 2007 Respondent was also served with a Chase CitiCorp subpoena, just prior to his retaining Jones Law and Mediation Offices to represent him in this case. Ms. Jones office contacted Petitioner, Ilene Do’s attorney Mr. Nguyen alerting him to the fact that both this Bank of America subpoena and a subsequent Chase CitiCorp subpoena were overly broad as following: The Discovery Act imposes a thirty day (30) discovery "cut-off" before the date initiallyset for trial unless otherwise ordered, as set forth in California Practice Guide Civil Procedure Before Trial at Chapter 8E-2,5(b), which in this case means a December 14, 2007 deadline to issue their subpoena. The deadline is necessary because a party would need time to timely file a motion to quash and all hearings on motions have a fifteen (15) day deadline before trial. So where the document in CitiCorp may be timely produced if the subpoena were not defective, still time would need to be needed to file a motion to quash or a motion seeking a protective order. Thus, when Petitioner serves a December 21, 2007 subpoena with a production date a mere 5 days before trial, there would scarcely be time to prepare one’s case to consider the production. Moreover in accordance to California Rule of Court 14.15, the parties are obligated to exchange exhibits (given the current trial date of January 29, 2008) on January 22, 2008. The date of production on the CitiCorp subpoena of January 24, 2008, even if it were proper, will not even provide admissible evidence. A motion to quash or limit Petitioner’s request for the Bank of America and CitiCorp document request is warranted in this case, both subpoenas being in violation of Respondent’s right to privacy to bank and consumer records prior to his marriage to Petitioner. Not withstanding the foregoing, the CityCorp subpoena must be quashed completely, because it was issued in an untimely manner. (Motion to quash, BN Tonnu, For Educational purpose only) 11. The Defendant, John Nguyen, in the above-referenced-and-numbered cause, respectfully moves this Honorable Court to suppress the following evidence: 1. All tangible evidence seized from her person or any vehicle, on March 1, 2010, by law enforcement officers. 2. Defendant would show the Court that said evidence was seized without a search warrant, and such seizure was in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; Article 1, Section 9, of the California Constitution; Article 1.06 of the California Code of Criminal Procedure, and Article 38.23 of the California Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. Defendant would further show that the search by police officers was without probable cause or exigent circumstances and that, in the absence of a search warrant or an exception to the search warrant requirement, any evidence seized is inadmissible. Therefore, the Defendant respectfully asks that the Court grant this Motion in all things. 12. A suppression motion in a California DUI case typically challenges the results of the chemical tests administered to determine blood alcohol content (BAC), questions whether police officer had probable cause to make a traffic stop and arrest, or both. Motion to suppress based on whether or not police had probable cause to make a traffic stop usually focus on whether or not the officer had a reasonable belief that a crime was being committed. If the motion is successful, statements obtained as the result of an unlawful arrest or search will be suppressed. Any California Vehicle Code violation can establish probable cause for a traffic stop; however, in most cases, the violation must occur in the officer's presence. Police cannot stop a car just to determine whether the driver has a valid driver's license and registration. It is also unlawful to stop a vehicle in anticipation of discovering a vehicle code violation or other contraband, such as drugs, when no actual probable cause has presented itself to the officer before the stop. Motions to suppress chemical test results generally center on whether the test was conducted properly. If any of the strict guidelines surrounding chemical test administration were not followed, the evidence probably will be suppressed. If the motion is successful, evidence gained as a result of the test also would be suppressed, such as observations of signs and symptoms of intoxication. A motion to suppress can be brought on several different grounds. California drivers accused of DUI fear that chemical test results and other evidence means an automatic conviction, but that's not the case. Prosecution evidence is not automatically admissible - it must meet strict legal requirements to be used at trial. A California criminal defense attorney who concentrates on DUI defense will challenge the admissibility of evidence to improve a driver's prospects at trial. 13. Plaintiff, by and through her attorney, Ronald Miller, requests that this Court preclude evidence of the photographs of the vehicles involved in the subject accident because expert testimony is required to correlate the property damage and Plaintiff's alleged injuries. In further support, Plaintiff states as follows: This is a personal injury case involving an auto accident. During the course of discovery, the Defendant has produced copies of photographs of the Defendant's vehicle and the Plaintiff's vehicle (Exhibit A). Plaintiff does not, however, deny that there was minimal damage to the rear of her vehicle or even that this was a relatively low impact collision. Defendant claims that there was no property damage at all to her vehicle. It is anticipated that Defendant will attempt to introduce into evidence the extent of property damage sustained by both vehicles in this accident as well as a description by the Defendant as to the level of the impact between the vehicles. The law states that: Expert testimony is required "when the subject of the inference is so particularly related to some science or profession" that it is beyond the knowledge of the average layman. And if the evidence on an issue is such that it would require the jurors to engage in nothing more than "sheer speculation," the issue may not be submitted to the jury. Furthermore, if photos and or testimony of damage are to be permissible, the Defendant must provide expert testimony to the link between the two because it creates a "complicated medical question" and without such testimony, it creates an invitation to speculation. A complicated medical question occurs when one or more of the following are present: (1) significant passage of time; (2) the impact of the initial injury on one part of the body and trauma in some remote part; (3) the absence of any medical testimony and (4) a cause and effect relationship that is not part of common lay experience. 14. In 2001, the Supreme Court of California held that: (1) as a general rule, a party in a personal injury case may not directly argue that the seriousness of personal injuries from a car accident correlates to the extent of the damage to the cars, unless the party can produce competent expert testimony of the issue; (2) counsel may not argue by implication what counsel could not argue indirectly," i.e., may not characterize the accident as a fender-bender or otherwise downplay the seriousness of the accident; and (3) the court erred in admitting the photographs of the Plaintiff's car without a specific instruction limiting the jury's use of the photographs. The issue of whether there exists a correlation between a small amount of property damage and the likelihood of the plaintiff's injury does not simply constitute a complicated scientific question. Rather, it constitutes a mixture of several complicated scientific questions: (1) How much force was necessary to produce the amount of damage to the plaintiff's car; (2) How is that force transmitted through the car, and how much force was thereby exerted on the plaintiff; and (3) What is the minimum, threshold force that is necessary to cause Plaintiff's herniated disc? This issue involves such matters as the strength of metal and rubber, the construction of a bumper, the materials that are used to construct a bumper (and, importantly, the interior of a bumper), how a bumper acts during a collision, and the construction and materials of the side walls of a car. It involves issues of engineering, physics, design, and chemistry. Moreover, the force that would produce a given amount of damage varies from vehicle to vehicle. 15. The issue of the amount of force is one issue and there is another issue as to how much force was inflicted on the Plaintiff in the accident. This question, in turn, involves how force and energy are transmitted though rubber, metal, and fabric, dissipated though the transmission, and applied to a human body at the opposite end of the car from the impact. The issue clearly involves issues of physics and engineering. A lay jury cannot look at an amount of property damage and conclude how much force was exerted on the plaintiff. Moreover, there is also the scientific issue of whether the lack of substantial damage to the bumper indicates that the plaintiff was subjected to a greater amount of force than that to which the plaintiff would have been subjected if there were substantial damage. The issue is whether the rear part of the car had been crushed or warped, force and energy would have been absorbed in the crushing or warping, or because the rear part of the car was not bent, all of the energy of the impact was transmitted through the car and onto the plaintiff's body. Finally, but most importantly, there is the question of what is the minimum, threshold force that is necessary to produce an injury to the human body -- or, more precisely, the specific injuries claimed to have been suffered by the plaintiff. The human body is one of the most complicated contraptions in the universe. Nobel Prizes have been won for explorations as what causes human injuries and maladies. The concept of the causation on an injury is quintessentially a matter of expert testimony. The mechanics of a body's movement in a collision, and the effects on the spine, ligaments, muscles, tendons, and blood vessels is also a matter of expert testimony. The issue involves questions of medicine and biomechanical engineering. This point particularly applies to the defense's anticipated argument, while holding up a photo of the damaged property, then ask the jury, "Does anyone here believe that any person could possibly have been injured in this accident?" 16. The issue of whether there is a correlation between the amount of property damage and the likelihood of injury would be a good subject for a Ph.D. dissertation. The study would involve studies of a large number of actual cases, along with assistance from physicists and engineers who would analyze the construction of the vehicle and calculate the amount of force produced by the collision and transmitted on the plaintiff. But a lay juror does not have the tools to translate amount or degree of property damage to Plaintiff's injuries. A juror cannot look at a photograph, speculate as to how much force was caused by the collision, speculate as to how the force was transmitted through the car, speculate as to how a human body behaves during a collision of the type involved in the case, and speculate as to what causes an injury and what is the minimum force needed to cause that injury. Therefore, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court to instruct all parties, counsel and witnesses expected to testify that no person is to refer to, interrogate, or attempt to convey or suggest to the jury, directly or indirectly: (1) the amount of force between the two vehicles; (2) the speed of the striking vehicle; (3) the amount of damage or lack thereof to either vehicle; (4) any correlation between the force of the impact and the Plaintiff's injuries; (5) to precluded from introducing any photographs of either vehicle at the trial of this matter. 17. Plaintiff, Jane Doe, by and through her attorney, Amy Jones requests that this Court preclude testimony from Defendant's experts because they have not provided disclosure of their opinions as required by California Rule 2-504(b)(1). In further support, Plaintiff states as follows: During the course of discovery, the parties have actively engaged in discovery by way of depositions, interrogatories, request for production of documents, and requests for admissions. Plaintiff propounded the following request for the production of documents: 1. All written reports of each person whom you expect to call as an expert witness at trial. 2. All documents upon which any expert witness you intend to call at trial relied upon to form an opinion. 3. The most recent resume or curriculum vitae of each expert whom you expect to call as an expert witness at trial. 4. All notes, diagrams, photographs, x-rays or other documents prepared or reviewed by each person whom you expect to call as an expert witness at trial. Plaintiff has not received any of the documents requested in her requests for production of documents. On the day the Defendant's designation of experts deadline, defense counsel by correspondence designated Dr. Joe Smith, M.D., and Dr. Mary Smith, M.D. See Exhibit A. The proffered "opinions" of the Defendant's experts are stated as follows: "It is anticipated that both experts will testify that it cannot be said to a reasonable degree of medical probability that the Plaintiff's medical condition was proximately caused by the accident in question." Id . Defendant's experts never disclosed that their opinions would include anything beyond the extent of the above statement. No peer review report was provided or any basis of support for their conclusions. California Rule 2-504(b)(1)(B) requires a Scheduling Order to include one or more dates by which each party shall identify each person it intends to call as an expert witness at trial. By this very rule, the party's designation must contain the information required by California Rule 2-402(f)(1) including: the identity of the witness, the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, a summary of the grounds of the expert's opinion, as well as a copy of any report prepared by the expert concerning his or her opinions and findings. In this case, Defendant's deadline to comply with this California Rule was on July 23, 2004 Although the Defendant has identified the subject matter upon which its experts intend to testify, Defendant has not provided a summary of the grounds of their expert opinion, nor has it attached a copy of any report prepared by her experts concerning their opinions and findings. Even worse, Defendant's designation is lacking any mention of what the expert opinions actually are. As such, Defendant has failed to disclose its expert in compliance with the California Rules and the Scheduling Order issued in this case and their expert opinions should be precluded. Respectfully submitted, 18. On June 20, 2001, about midnight, Officer Smith of the Santa Ana Police stopped Defendant in his car for turning without signaling. Officer Smith pulled Defendant over, ordered Defendant out of the car, and patted him down. Finding nothing, Officer Smith placed Defendant in the back seat of the police cruiser. Officer Smith searched Defendant's car and discovered cocaine in the closed glove compartment. He also made a computer inquiry for Defendant's license status, but the search was aborted by a technical glitch. On a later computer attempt, Officer Smith learned Defendant's license was suspended pending a reinstatement fee. Officer Smith cited Defendant for not signaling and for driving under suspension. The stop occurred in a "high drug crime" area. Officer Smith also knew, from a separate previous incident, that Defendant had his license suspended for six months, starting in June 2000. Defendant never resisted or acted belligerent during the stop. ARGUMENT For an officer to detain a person for reasons unrelated to the original purpose of a traffic stop and make a search, an officer must have articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion that some illegal activity justifying the extended detention is occurring. This need for additional, articulable facts holds even where the traffic stop occurs late at night in a high crime area, or is in line with a drug enforcement policy. Without the additional articulable facts, a valid, but routine, traffic stop will not justify non-consensual search absent an immediate safety concern. For example, a police officer rightly stopped and arrested a lone motorist for driving while intoxicated. The officer saw no drug paraphernalia or other evidence of drug use in the vehicle, yet he immediately placed the suspect in the patrol car and searched the motorist's car. The officer found LSD in the glove compartment. 19. The Court held that the search of the car was unconstitutional because nothing led the officer to believe the car might contain drugs. The drugs were not in plain view and the officer witnessed no suspicious behavior. Nor was the search justified for safety reasons because the detainee had complied with the officer and, being in the cruiser, lacked immediate control over the car's contents. Brown's scenario parallels ours. Defendant was the only person in his car. The officer immediately ordered Defendant out of the car, patted him down, and placed him in the cruiser. Officer Smith saw no drug paraphernalia or other evidence of drug use before searching the car, and the cocaine he found was not in plain view. The car's contents were never inventoried nor should they have been. Officer Smith's safety was not in immediate question because Defendant never resisted arrest and, being in the cruiser, he lacked immediate control over the car's contents. Unlike the detainee in Brown, Defendant was driving at night through a high drug crime area. But being in a high crime area does not, by itself, justify a warrantless search of a vehicle. An officer still needs to perceive some suspicious behavior or circumstance justifying the search. Officer Smith saw no suspicious behavior. There were no furtive gestures, suspect resistance, nervousness, vehicle alterations, volunteered information from Defendant, or anything else to foster an articulable belief in Officer Smith that drugs could be in the car or that a search was called for. With defendant secure in the cruiser, after a pat down search, Officer Smith did not need to search Defendant's car to ensure his own safety. Defendant never consented to the search. That the cocaine would inevitably have been found in an inventory search is no argument because, with a turn signal violation the only suspected offense, there would have been no reason to impound or inventory the car. 19. The California Supreme Court overruled Brown in 2002, holding that when a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the motorist, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that car. But the court reminded us that this rule applied only when there was already a lawful custodial arrest. A police officer who searches a vehicle incident to issuing a citation in lieu of an arrest in a routine traffic stop would violate the Fourth Amendment absent an immediate safety concern or need to preserve evidence. Here, unlike Brown, the detention was still a routine traffic stop at the time of the search, with only a citation issued for the traffic violation. Officer Smith had no immediate safety concern or need to preserve more evidence for not signaling. Thus, the search of Defendant's car was unreasonable, and the cocaine should be suppressed. The continued search for Defendant's license status was also unjustified. The scope and duration of an investigative stop must last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose for the initial stop. When an officer suspects a violation has occurred regarding the operation of a car yet the suspicion proves inconclusive upon investigation, the officer may not detain the motorist absent articulable suspicion for some other offense. Any steps taken then are efforts only to gain a basis for suspicion. In State, an officer stopped a motorist and his passenger who had been described as "suspicious" by an anonymous caller to the police. The caller alleged that the men had been lurking outside pharmacies supply stores. Both men had previous narcotics convictions and when the officer stopped them in their car and questioned them, the men gave contradictory statements about their previous activities. Later, still during the stop, the officer confirmed that one of the men had presented a prescription to a pharmacy for narcotics, but had been refused for being "kind of suspicious." The officer obtained the driver's consent to search the car. When the officer found a prescription receipt with neither man's name on it, he formally arrested both men. 20. Officer Smith may have had reason to ask Defendant for his driver's license because he believed Defendant violated a traffic law. But once the computer glitch occurred, Officer Smith, like the officer in Inabnitt, had no reason to detain Defendant further to find a license suspension he had no articulable reason to believe existed. Like the officer in Inabnitt, Officer Smith was trying to find a "basis" for suspicion, not actually acting on a suspicion. That Officer Smith knew of Defendant's previous six-month license suspension is no argument because Officer Smith knew the suspension occurred at least a year before the incident. Officer Smith had no reason to suspect that the license was still suspended. For these reasons, the continued search for defendant's license status and detention by Officer Smith was illegal. CONCLUSION No articulable facts existed to make Officer Smith reasonably suspect Defendant may have done anything illegal except fail to signal. Before the search, there were no signs of drug possession, and Officer Smith's safety was not immediately threatened. Officer Smith had no reason to believe Defendant's license was suspended. Once the computer search for Defendant's license status proved unfruitful, Officer Smith's search for the license status prolonged Defendant's detention beyond the scope of the original stop. Thus, the cocaine found in the glove compartment, and the suspended license, should be inadmissible as evidence against Defendant.
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