QuO Naming: Sept 29, 1997 Dr. John Zinky JZinky@BBN.COM

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QuO Naming: Sept 29, 1997 Dr. John Zinky JZinky@BBN.COM Powered By Docstoc
					   Applications That Participate In Their Own Defense
                        (APOD):

     Adaptive Use of Network-Centric Mechanisms in
                     Cyber-Defense
                                   Michael Atighetchi

                    Partha Pal, Franklin Webber, Christopher Jones
                            {matighet,ppal,fwebber,ccjones}@bbn.com




1 APOD 05/09/2003                         ISORC 2003
                                     Outline

   • Motivation
         – Defense Enabling
   • APOD Technology
         – Toolkit to defense-enable applications
   • Network-Centric Adaptive Defenses
         – Strategies, Tactics and Mechanisms
   • Validation
         – Red-Team Experiments
   • Concluding Remarks




2 APOD 05/09/2003                   ISORC 2003
               Evolution of Cyber Security Paradigms
   • 1st generation: Prevent attacks
         – build an impenetrable static fortress through policy enforcement
         – Lesson: Impossible to build, Result is non-interoperable, brittle and
           expensive systems, New attacks continue to evolve

   • 2nd generation: Detect attacks
         – augment policies by intrusion detection systems
         – Lesson: Novel attacks, false positives and false negatives, many are post-
           facto

   • 3rd generation: Survive attacks
         – Prevent as best as possible, but assume some attacks will succeed, at least
           partially, and deal with the attack effects
         – Defense enabling: adaptive application-level responses to engage the
           attacker, and to tolerate and recover from (partially) successful attacks




3 APOD 05/09/2003                       ISORC 2003
           Defense Enabling a Distributed Application

    •Survivability Aspects
          –Dynamic defenses and adaptive
          responses increase application               Attacks
          resiliency to attacks
          => operate through attacks
          –Wide range of network and
          host-based adaptive defenses
    •Survivability Toolkit
          –Strategies                            Application
                                                   Host 1
          –Tactics                                                           Application
                                                                               Host 3
          –Mechanisms
    •Adaptive Late-Binding
    Middleware
                                                               Application
          –QuO encapsulates defenses                             Host 2
          into reusable configurable
          components


4 APOD 05/09/2003                   ISORC 2003
                    Foundation of Adaptive Behavior
   • QuO is a middleware framework that supports the development and
     execution of adaptation and adding it to an application. QuO is used for
     coordination and integration of network defenses in APOD.
   • Adaptation can be driven by changes in an application’s operating
     environment.
         –   Host resources (CPU and memory usage)
         –   Network resources (bandwidth, connectivity)
         –   Host and Network Intrusion status
         –   Replication Management
   • Adaptive code is encapsulated in a middleware component called
     “qosket”.
         – A qosket is a set of specifications and implementations that defines a
           reusable module of specific adaptive behavior.
   • Qoskets can be added to a distributed object application with minimum
     impact on the application.




5 APOD 05/09/2003                       ISORC 2003
                                 Quality Objects(QuO) Architecture
                                                                         in args
CORBA DOC MODEL




                       CLIENT        OBJ                               operation()                                OBJECT            Application
                                     REF                                                                           (SERVANT)
                                                                 out args + return value
                                                                                                                                    Developer
                                                                                                                 IDL
                       IDL                                                                                     SKELETON   OBJECT
                       STUBS                                                                                              ADAPTER

                                                                                                                                    Mechanism
                               ORB         IIOP                   Network                               IIOP       ORB
                                                                                                                                    Developer
                                                                         in args
                                                                                                                  OBJECT            Application
QUO/CORBA DOC MODEL




                       CLIENT        OBJ                               operation()
                                     REF
                                                                 out args + return value
                                                                                                                   (SERVANT)        Developer
                                                  Contract                                   Contract
                      Delegate                                              Qosket
                                                                                                                    Delegate        QoS
                                                             SysCond               SysCond
                                                                                                                                    Developer
                                                                                                 SysCond
                                       SysCond
                                                             MECHANISM/PROPERTY
                                                                                                                 IDL
                       IDL                                       MANAGER                                       SKELETON   OBJECT
                       STUBS                                                                                              ADAPTER

                                                                                                                                    Mechanism
                               ORB         IIOP                   Network                               IIOP       ORB              Developer


  6 APOD 05/09/2003                                                      ISORC 2003
                              Adaptive Strategies

   • Coordinate the defense among the set of distributed
     application parts to form a coherent defense posture
         – Overall Goal: Use protection and slow down attacker through
           adaptive responses
   • Strategy Examples:
         – “outrun”: move application components off corrupted hosts and on to
           good ones at a rate faster than the hosts go bad.
         – “contain”: quarantine bad hosts and bad LANs by limiting or blocking
           network traffic from them and, within limits, shutting them down.
              » Respond quickly with locally gathered information.
              » Can only quarantine so many hosts or LANs before application
                performance becomes affected.
              » In follow on projects we are looking at having backup hosts to replenish
                application capabilities depleted by quarantining bad application hosts.
         – “keep changing unpredictably”: quickly outdate information gathered
           by the attacker.


7 APOD 05/09/2003                       ISORC 2003
                        APOD Tactics Overview

   • APOD tactics integrate sensors and actuator mechanisms to
     mount a local defensive response.
   • 4 tactics have been developed so far linking sensors to
     actuators:
         –   Blocking Suspicious Traffic
         –   Choking TCP Connection Floods
         –   Containing ARP Cache Poisoning
         –   Squelching Insider Floods
                                    Detect           React
                                    Snort alert      block IP source
                                    #con > thresh    block IP source
                                    ARP corruption   block MAC source
                                    outbound flood   rate limit




8 APOD 05/09/2003                  ISORC 2003
           Example Tactic: Squelching Insider Floods

   • Uses network traffic accounting to keep track of
     packets/second and bits/second, and comparing means
     between observed and expected to determine a spike in
     outgoing traffic.
   • If spike occurs, rate limiting is applied to outgoing traffic of a
     LAN.

                    Inside Attacker
                                  Flood




                                                   Router              Router
                                      Boundary                                  Server
                                      Controller
                         Client
                                                            Other Client
9 APOD 05/09/2003                            ISORC 2003
                     Other Tactics Used in Validation

     • Block Suspicious Traffic
           – Combines network intrusion detection system and firewall
             mechanisms to catch attacker reconnaissance traffic and block
             further malicious traffic from the attacker host.
     • Choking TCP Connection Floods
           – Joins TCP Connection counting with a firewall to block hosts that
             request large numbers of connections to a single port.
     • Containing ARP Cache Poisoning
           – Incorporates an ARP cache poisoning sensor and firewall to
             monitor mapping of MAC to IP addresses and resets any mapping
             if they change as well as blocking traffic from offending MAC
             address.




10 APOD 05/09/2003                  ISORC 2003
                     APOD Mechanisms - Sensors
  • Sensors provide information to higher level defenses such
    as tactics
  • Sensors are integrated into APOD by wrapping existing
    COTS sensors via QuO System Condition Object.
  • List of sensors deployed in validation experiment:
        – Network Intrusion Detection: Snort
        – TCP Connection Flood: Netstat
        – ARP cache poisoning: ping, arp




11 APOD 05/09/2003                    ISORC 2003
                     APOD Mechanisms - Actuators
  • Actuators allow higher-level defenses to control resources in
    their environment in response to attacks
  • Actuators are incorporated by wrapping existing COTS
    actuators via QuO System Condition Object.
  • List of actuators used in validation experiment:
        – Network Traffic Filters: Linux iptables firewall
        – Bandwidth Management
              » IntServ : RSVP, SecureRSVP
              » DiffServ: Bandwidth Broker
        – VPNs: FreeS/WAN IPsec




12 APOD 05/09/2003                      ISORC 2003
                     Developing Survivability Solutions



                     Strategies
                     Tactics          Runtime Cost / Complexity
                 Mechanisms

       Multi-Layered Defenses




                                               local   distributed   Coordinated
                                                                     distributed

13 APOD 05/09/2003                ISORC 2003
                                  Putting It All Together
       Abstraction Layer


Overall Strategy                                       Protect As Best As Possible
                                            Slow Down Attacker Through Adaptive Responses

                                                                                        Outrunning Component Failures
Sub-Strategy                                                                            Attack Containment
                                                                                        Continuous Unpredictable Changes

                     Blocking Suspicious Traffic        Squelching Insider Floods
Localized Tactic
                     Containing ARP Cache Poisoning     Port & Address Hopping
                     Choking TCP Connection Floods      Bandwidth Broker

Mechanism            Snort, Iptables, Netstat           SERSVP, IPsec, OO-DTE                            Defense
                     Iproute2, Shutdown                 Self-stabilizing Software Bus
                                                                                                         Complexity
                          local                                distributed              coordinated distributed
                               M1                                M1          M1                  M1          M1
                                                                                                 M2          M3

                                                                                                             Bus
                                                                       M1                               M1
                                                                                                        M2


14 APOD 05/09/2003                                ISORC 2003
                     APOD Red-Team Experiments

  • Reasons for experiments
        – Validate APOD idea that dynamic adaptation defenses can prolong
          an applications usefulness in a hostile environment
        – Also, analyzing the overhead of APOD
  • Sandia Labs Red-Team tasked with validating APOD
        – Outside, independent team
        – Given full knowledge of application, APOD defenses added, and test
          network
  • White-Team responsible for experiment executing and
    analysis
        – Outside, independent team
        – Measurement of metrics and post-experiment analysis
  • Red-teaming happened in two distinct experiments

15 APOD 05/09/2003                ISORC 2003
                        Red-teaming Attacks and Results

   • APOD defenses blocked or impeded the red-team’s
     progress.
         – APOD defenses overcame or blocked many of the single attack runs.
         – The red-team was forced to combine different attacks to cause a
           denial of service of the broker on the defense enabled application.
         – Of the attack runs that ended with the application in a denial of
           service, the average time-to-denial was approximately 45 minutes
           from start of attacks, with a minimum of roughly 10 minutes. Without
           APOD defenses, service was denied immediately.
                                    Time to Denial by Live Attack
                 (minutes)




                             100
                              90
                              80
                 Time




                              70
                              60
                              50
                              40
                              30
                              20
                              10
                                0




                                                 Runs

                                                                    client 2   client 3



16 APOD 05/09/2003                            ISORC 2003
                                  Results

   • The runtime overhead of adding the APOD defenses was
     approximately 5% to 20% to call latency depending which
     tactics and strategies were in place.
         – We concluded that most of the latency increase was caused by the
           containment strategy and accompanying mechanisms that ran on the
           boundary control routers.




17 APOD 05/09/2003                ISORC 2003
                            Concluding Remarks

   • Conclusion:
         – Dynamic adaptation has added value for an application by
           prolonging its ability to provide useful service in the presence of
           attacks
         – This is achieved at a reasonable runtime overhead
         – Red-Team experiments have been used for validating and “stress
           testing” our defenses.
   • APOD is being used in other survivability projects:
         – Using and expanding of APOD mechanisms, tactics, and strategies.
         – Other projects include ITUA, DPASA, and Dynamic Quarantine.
   • Websites:
         –   QuO: http://quo.bbn.com    for Base Adaptive Middleware
         –   APOD: http://apod.bbn.com for Defense Enabling Toolkit
         –   ITUA: http://itua.bbn.com for Byzantine Unpredictable Replication
         –   Questions: Michael Atighetchi - matighet@bbn.com

18 APOD 05/09/2003                   ISORC 2003

				
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