Stephen Bosworth on the Korean Conflict by YH95e8

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									                           Stephen Bosworth on the Korean Conflict

President Obama’s new envoy to North Korea Stephen Bosworth spoke in February 2009 of the
importance of direct talks between Washington and Pyongyang. He served as ambassador to
South Korea between 1997 and 2000, an important period of expanded “sunshine” policy
between the North and South. He worked as executive Director on the Light Water reactor
consortium Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) (1995-1997), but has
commented, “The Agreed Framework was a political orphan within two weeks after its signature."

Bosworth is responsible for coordinating the overall U.S. policy for North Korea and will keep his
position as dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University; the State
Department says another special envoy for North Korea, Sung Kim, will handle “day-to-day”
negotiations with North Korea. The following are some of his early comments that reflect a
healthy attitude of engagement. The language is invaluable toward understanding the need for
engagement and a peace treaty.


               Bosworth, “After the Summit: American Policy towards Korea”
                          Korea Press Foundation June 28, 2000

On the Summit between President Kim Dae-Jung and Chairman Kim Jong Il in 2000:
“The summit was an historic step that will hopefully begin to end the tragic legacy of that war.
How appropriate that as we commemorate the pain and sacrifice of the war, we also celebrate
the beginning of a process that could lead to lasting reconciliation and permanent peace.”

“Years of hostility can only be overcome by realistic diplomacy.”

“Yet, the ROK and the US have also recognized that true peace is more than just the absence of
military conflict. With powerful armies faced off along the DMZ and intense suspicion and
mistrust dividing the two sides, it has been all too apparent that the Korean Peninsula is a very
dangerous place where miscalculations or misapprehension could have terrible consequences.”

“Both the ROK and the US have recognized, therefore, that deterrence by itself is no longer an
adequate strategy. Lasting peace and true stability will only come through the reduction of
mistrust and underlying tensions - through engagement with the North. …. On the other hand,
South-North relations cannot be improved if the North is isolated in a state of near-war with the
rest of the world.”

“Ultimately, the key to resolving the problems of the Korean Peninsula is reconciliation between
South and North. The United States will be steadfast in support for our ally and for engagement
with North Korea. We share South Korea's goals of reconciliation, and eventually, of
reunification, for we believe that a strong, united Korea serves the cause of stability in Northeast
Asia.”

“Flexibility and creative diplomacy play a constructive role.”

“What do we expect of the future? Setbacks in the course of reconciliation are, of course,
possible, perhaps inevitable. But we must not reject the prospect of positive change just because
it is difficult or unprecedented.”

                          FAREWELL SPEECH AS AMBASSADOR
                Speech to the Korean American Association, February 7, 2001

We need to look at things for what they are, to place issues into the context of a relationship. Our
investigation of the tragic events at Nogun-ri, for example, provided an undeniable reminder of
the horrors of war. Though only time can ultimately ease the pain, we have sought to help the
process of healing through frankness, contrition and reconciliation, seeking to determine, as best
we can after half a century, what really happened.

The challenge of managing progress with the DPRK is formidable. But it is one for which our
"real" relationship is clearly fit. In fact, the progress we have already made, thanks to President
Kim Dae-jung's engagement policy and the Perry Process, is a perfect example of how quiet
consultation and coordination should work between cooperating partners. Our governments have
pursued the policy of engagement with the DPRK in parallel. We have consulted with
unprecedented closeness, and have each played the role of direct interlocutor with Pyongyang.
Progress in one of our bilateral dialogues has benefited the other. There has never been any
doubt in Washington or Seoul, or in Pyongyang, that we were pursuing a common strategy and
working in close coordination.

Reaching Out To Pyongyang: Despite its achievements, Washington is divided on how to
                         deal with North Korea long term.
  By Morton Abramowitz and Stephen Bosworth, NEWSWEEK Magazine, May 12, 2008

“What North Korea wants more than anything is "political compensation," a relationship with
Washington, in which the United States would stop making threats, drop all sanctions and start
treating North Korea as a friendly country. As Pyongyang sees it, such moves would finally allow
it to join the global economic community—key to its survival. Until then, North Korea will hold on
to its nuclear weapons as an insurance policy against a U.S. attack and, more important, the
threat that Washington will simply ignore North Korea and allow it to starve in the dark. What this
means in practical terms is that Pyongyang won't give up its nukes until it's sure Washington has
permanently abandoned its "hostile policies," and "mutual trust" has been established. This will
require, among other things, establishing diplomatic relations and striking a peace
agreement that formally ends the Korean War.”

“The next U.S. president will have to decide how to deal with North Korea in a larger sense, not
just on the nuclear question. We think the best approach would be to forge ahead with the
denuclearization process while also working with the other members of the Six-Party Process to
begin to build a web of connections tying North Korea to the regional and global economies. This
would likely involve some economic subsidies for North Korea, including more humanitarian aid,
energy assistance and investment in the rebuilding of the economy.”

Feb 26 2009 – Appointment announcement with Secretary of State Clinton

“AMBASSADOR BOSWORTH: Well, obviously, we plan to engage with North Korea. … I was
there earlier this month as a member of a private delegation. I found the North Koreans, I thought,
quite inclined toward continued dialogue with the United States and a continued commitment with
the people of the region and the Six-Party process. But in my judgment, they see the benefits to
them of engagement with the outside world and are prepared to move ahead.”

March 6, 2009 in Japan: Stephen Bosworth, US Envoy to DPRK said "We are in the final stages
of our policy review in Washington and the Obama administration and I think we are confident
that the five parties see this situation very much the same and we are going to move ahead as
soon as we can.”

March 9, 2009 upon arrival in Seoul “U.S. special envoy on the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea (DPRK) Stephen Bosworth said Saturday that Washington wants dialogue with
Pyongyang." We are reaching out now. We want dialogue," Bosworth said upon his arrival to
South Korea.”

                             Private Trip to DPRK in January 2009

The experts’ mission, of which Ambassador Bosworth was a member, has provided a private
report on their observations in Pyongyang:
   ‘Viewed from Pyongyang, the arcane Beltway debates about the North Korea seem
increasingly wide of the mark. Our interlocutors made repeatedly clear that the nuclear test and
the claims of weaponization of the North’s plutonium inventory mark a fundamental divide in
Pyongyang’s thinking and actions.

  ‘Though the officials with whom we met insisted that ‘the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula’ remains Pyongyang’s long-term strategic objective, this goal seems premised on
expectations so fanciful as to vanish into the mists of time.

   ‘The essential message is that the North is now a state in possession of nuclear weapons, and
that it’s time for the U.S. to accept this reality; the weapons will not go away anytime soon. This
claim does not mean that negotiations are irrelevant.

   ‘For example, the full disabling of the Yongbyon reactor and associated facilities would be a
significant accomplishment, and the North Koreans gave every indication of wanting to proceed to
completion, though they do not see a verification protocol as part of the Phase 2 deal.

   ‘The essential message: you fulfill your objectives (that is, on the provision of energy), and we’ll
fulfill ours. The converse seems equally true, though the challenges of reconstituting the
Yongbyon complex are ever more daunting, if not insuperable.

   ‘Assuming completion, however, the challenges will then only increase. Expectations of the
provision of light water reactors (as a condition for dismantlement) are again in play, and in some
statements to this effect seemed virtually non-negotiable. This may well be little more than a
marker for future negotiations, but Pyongyang has few incentives to remove items from the
diplomatic agenda before determining what various items might be worth.

  ‘Pending the removal of the ‘U.S. nuclear threat,’ Pyongyang insists that it must continue to
enhance its defense and deterrence capabilities, though reports of an impending missile test
were left somewhat ambiguous.

   ‘The North Koreans recognized that the Obama Administration is reviewing its approach to
future negotiations, and they seem prepared to be patient, at least for now.

  ‘Their preferred outcome would give predominant weight to the bilateral relationship with the
United States, minimizing or even dispensing with the Six Party process.

  ‘The latter outcome would be clearly unacceptable to the United States and the other four
participants in the negotiations, a point that was made repeatedly clear by all delegation
members. But (unlike during the 1990s) the North Koreans seemed in no particular hurry to
proceed with full diplomatic relations with Washington, though this too may be a pose.

   ‘A more disquieting prospect is the utter trashing of relations with the Lee Myong Bak
administration (in South Korea). By comparison, the criticisms of Japan seemed far more
temperate. This was not characterized as a ‘hardline’ position, but an appropriate response to
actions by the South, including the repeated speculations about Kim Jong Il’s health, which were
viewed as disrespectful to the ‘Great General’.

   ‘As our delegation made clear, an outcome that leaves inter-Korean relations and Japan-North
Korea relations in a deep freeze is demonstrably unacceptable to the United States. It was
difficult to tell if the North Koreans internalized this argument, but it was conveyed
unambiguously.

   ‘In a longer run sense, the DPRK’s declared strategy presumes the end of the U.S. nuclear
umbrella, the invalidation of the U.S. alliance, and the development of a U.S.-North Korean
’strategic relationship’, for which Pyongyang would denuclearize in return.
  ‘Is this a serious negotiating stance, or does the North’s seeming bravado and assurance mask
deeper anxieties about the fate of their system?

  ‘There may be some modest evidence of change in North Korea, especially in the increasing
monetization of the economy for those able to secure even modest amounts of hard currency, but
the prospects for the DPRK’s citizenry remain deeply disquieting, with no obvious way out.

   ‘The fundamental questions for the United States and for North Korea’s neighbours persist:
how can outside powers credibly negotiate with Pyongyang without validating its claims to nuclear
weapons status? And are the self referential leaders of the DPRK truly prepared for normal
relations with the outside world, beginning most immediately with the ROK?’

                                   President Obama Comments

In the July/August 2007 issue of Foreign Affairs, Sen. Obama (D-OH) advocates for developing
an “international coalition” to handle nuclear North Korea, calls the Six-Party Talks “ad hoc,” and
                 says he supports “sustained, direct, and aggressive diplomacy.”

On Meet the Press October 2008: We have not explored any kind of dialogue with either Iran or
North Korea, and I think that has been a mistake. As a consequence, we have almost no
leverage over them. We end up having to use surrogates in order to try to communicate to them
to find out what their interests are, what their bottom lines are and to send clear messages to
them about what we think is acceptable or unacceptable. So I think military options always have
to remain on the table, but I think that when we leave all the other tools in the tool kit, then we are
doing a disservice to the American people.


                              Secretary of State Clinton Comments

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated on February 13 that the Obama administration
would be willing to normalize bilateral relations with North Korea if the North is genuinely
prepared to completely and verifiably eliminate its nuclear weapons program. She stated that the
U.S. would have a “great openness” to North Korea, and added, “It’s not only on the diplomatic
front,” but that Washington had a “willingness to help the people of North Korea, not just in narrow
ways with food and fuel but with energy assistance.” Two days later, North Korea’s head of state
Kim Yong Nam reaffirmed that North Korea would “develop relations with countries that are
friendly toward us.”

On February 17, Clinton reiterated the U.S. offer of a peace treaty officially ending the Korean
War, normalization of relations, and aid, but stated, “The decision as to whether North Korea will
cooperate in the six-party talks, end provocative language and actions, is up to them,” and , “If
North Korea abides by the obligations it has already entered into and verifiably and completely
eliminates its nuclear program, then there will be a reciprocal response,” indicating that North
Korea will have to make the next move.

								
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