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                                                                                                CHAPTER             Formatted
                                                                                                   63



              <CT>PRESSURE EQUIPMENT REGULATIONS, CODES, AND STANDARDS IN SPAIN

                                                                                    Carlos Cueto-Felgueroso

<H1>63.1      INTRODUCTION
   This Chapter presents the regulation of pressure equipment in Spain, in the non-nuclear industry as well as
the activities in the codes and standards in the nuclear field. In both cases, emphasis is placed on periodic
inspections and testing.
   The basic Spanish regulation on pressurisedpressurized equipment in the non-nuclear industry may be found
in the Regulation on PressurisedPressurized Apparatus, published by the Ministry of Industry and Energy in
1979 [1]. The regulation consists of a set of general standards and leaves the specifics to a set of
Complementary Technical Instructions.
   Following Spain joining the European Community in 1986, a process of modification of this regulation
began, with a view to bring it in line with those of the other Member States to facilitate the trade of goods and
services within the European Union. An important milestone in the process of European
harmonisationharmonization was the Pressure Equipment Directive (PED) 97/23/EC issued by the European
Parliament and Council.
   The purpose of this Directive is to harmoniseharmonize the national laws of the European Union Member
States regarding the design, manufacture, testing, and conformity assessment of pressure equipment and
assemblies of pressure equipment. Since May 29th 29, 2002 the pressure equipment directive has been
obligatory throughout the European Union. The PED was applied to the Spanish Legislation through Royal
Decree R.D. 769/1999 [2]. This decree superseded the provisions of the Regulation on PressurisedPressurized
Apparatus relating to the design and manufacturing.
   In the nuclear field, and in the absence of a national regulation, the codes and standards of the countries of
origin of the design of each reactor are applied. The Spanish nuclear fleet is currently made up of 7 pressurized
water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) reactors of U.S. design and one German designed PWR
(Ssee Section 63.3). As a result, Section III of the ASME Code has been applied in the design and construction
of the Spanish nuclear power plants, except in the case of the German designed PWR, for which the KTA rules
were used. On the other hand, the rules of Section XI of the ASME Code are applied to all the plants for In-
Service Inspection (ISI).

<H1>63.2       SPANISH REGULATION IN THE NON-NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
<H2>63.2.1 Design and Construction
  As stated above, the design, fabrication, and conformity assessment of pressure equipment are currently
regulated in Spain according to Pressure Equipment Directive (PED).
  The main provisions of the PED are summarized, and are covered in detail in Chapter 47.
<H2>63.2.2 Inspections and testsTests
  The basic requirements regarding the inspection and testing of pressurisedpressurized equipment are to be
found in the Regulation on Pressurised Apparatus and its Complementary Technical Instructions. The following
are particularly significant:
2

   (a) ITC-MIE-AP1 [3]: referring to boilers, economiserseconomizers, water preheaters, superheaters , and
       steam reheaters
   (b) ITC-MIE-AP2 [4]: referring to piping for fluids relating to boilers
   (c) ITC-MIE-AP6 [5]: relating to oil refineries and petrochemical plants
   (d) ITC-MIE-AP10 [6]: referring to cryogenic tanks
   (e) ITC-MIE-AP16 [7]: relating to thermal power generation plants using solid, liquid or gaseous fossil fuels
       of any type and quality. Nuclear power plants are excluded.
   The following sections summarisesummarize the inspection and testing requirements for fossil fuel power
generation plants, and oil refineries and petrochemical plants respectively.
   <H3>63.2.2.1 Fossil fuel power Power plantsPlants. The requirements of ITC-MIE-AP16 [7] relating to
inspection and testing are summarisedsummarized below.
   (a) Classification for inspection and testing. Pressure systems and apparatus are classified through a
       combination of the concepts of hazard potential and fluid characteristics, as defined below.

        TABLE 63.1 HAZARD POTENTIAL GROUPS [7]
         Group          Hazard Potential (Pd V)                                                                    Formatted

           1                Pd Di  1000                                                                           Formatted

           2            300 ≤ Pd  Di < 1000                                                                        Formatted

           3             25 ≤ Pd  Di < 300                                                                         Formatted
                                                                                                                    Formatted
           4              10 ≤ Pd  Di < 25
                                                                                                                    Formatted
           5                 Pd  Di < 10
                                                                                                                    Formatted

     The hazard potential is defined as the product of design pressure Pd in kg/cm2 by volume V in m3. The          Formatted

     classification of pressurisedpressurized apparatus in accordance with this concept is shown in Table 63.1.     Formatted
     All boilers located in fossil power plants, both main and auxiliary, shall be classified in hazard potential   Formatted
     Group 1.                                                                                                       Formatted
     In the case of piping, hazard potential is defined as the product of maximum service pressure Pms in           Formatted
     kg/cm2 by the inner diameter of the pipe Di in centimetrescentimeters. The applicable groups are shown in      Formatted
     Table 63.2.                                                                                                    Formatted
                                                                                                                    Formatted
       TABLE 63.2 HAZARD POTENTIAL GROUPS FOR PIPING [7]
                                                                                                                    Formatted
         Group        Hazard Potential (Pms░ Di)                                                                   Formatted
           1              Pms  Di  3000                                                                           Formatted
           2          2000 ≤ Pms░ Di < 3000                                                                        Formatted
           3           1000 ≤ Pms Di < 2000                                                                        Formatted
           4           500 ≤ Pms░ Di < 1000                                                                        Formatted

           5               Pms░ Di < 500                                                                           Formatted
                                                                                                                    Formatted
     The classification of pressurisedpressurized apparatus in accordance with fluid characteristics is shown in    Formatted
     Table 63.3.                                                                                                    Formatted
                                                                                                                    Formatted
       TABLE 63.3 FLUID CHARACTERISTICS GROUPS (ITC-MIE-16) [7]                                                     Formatted

         Group            Fluid Characteristics                                                                     Formatted
3

                                   Fuel
                       Toxic, acid, or caustic liquid
             A
                                   gases
                                 Hydrogen
                               Steam water
             B          Innocuous or inert gases
                                    Air
                       Water at temperature  85 ºC
             C                      and
                          pressure  10 kg/cm2

        Table 63.4 summarisessummarizes the different categories of pressurisedpressurized apparatus.
    (b) Inspection and testing prior to entry into service:
       (1) At the manufacturer’s workshop. These consist of visual inspection and dimensional control of the
           apparatus, including the connections required for safety and control elements, along with hydrostatic
           testing. The latter may be carried out on site when this is technically justified and is contemplated in
           the design manual.
       (2) On site. This consists of a dimensional control, if not already performed in the workshop or if there has
           been any anomaly in transport making it advisable. A hydrostatic test should also be performed if not
           already carried out in the workshop.
    (c) Periodic inspection and testing. The inspections are aimed at gaining insight into damage caused in
        service with respect to corrosion, cracking and the state of welds. They consist basically of visual
        inspections, checks by the sampling of thicknesses and whatever non-destructive tests are considered
        necessary.
        The pressure or alternative tests consist of a hydraulic test or any special alternative test that has been
        previously authorisedauthorized. In the specific case of piping, examinations should be carried out by
        means of non-destructive testing.
        The frequency of and competence for the different periodic inspections and tests for the different
        categories of apparatus are indicated in Table 63.5.
    (d) Testing conditions:
       (1) Pressure values for the initial test. Except in the case of boilers, the pressure should be such that 90%
           of the yield strength of the material is not exceeded at the test temperature, and furthermore the
           provisions of the Design Code shall be applicable. By default the hydraulic test pressure shall be as
           follows:
                                                           Pp  1.5  Pd

          where
           Pd is the design pressure.
           d is the allowable stress in design conditions.
           p is the allowable stress in test conditions.
          In the case of boilers, the hydraulic test pressure shall be as follows:
                                                                            p
                                                         Pp  1.25  Pd 
                                                                            d
          For straight-through forced circulation boilers with a variable point of vaporization and
          pressurisedpressurized parts designed for different levels of pressure along the water-steam flow path,
          the test pressure shall be the highest of the following values:
                                                          Pp  1.5  Pms s
4

                                                            or
                                                     Pp  1.25  Pms e

         Where Pms s is the maximum service pressure permitted at the outlet of the superheater and   Pms  e   is the
         maximum service pressure permitted at the economisereconomizer feedwater inlet.


    TABLE 63.4 CATEGORIES OF PRESSURE EQUIPMENT (EXCERPT FROM ITC-MIE-AP16) [7]
                                                             Fluid Characteristics
                Hazard Potential
                                             A                        B                  C
                        1                 Category I               Category I         Category II
                        2                 Category II              Category II        Category III
                        3                 Category III             Category III       Category IV
                        4                 Category IV              Category IV        Category V
                        5                 Category V               Category V         Category V
5

    TABLE 63.5 FREQUENCY OF PERIODIC INSPECTIONS AND TESTS (EXCERPT FROM ITC-
                                  MIE-AP16) [7]
                 Category of the                           Periodic Inspections and Tests
                   Equipment                         Inspection                      Pressure Test
                                                 6 years (by External             9 years (by External
                         I
                                                       Inspector)                      Inspector)
                                                 8 years (by External            12 years (by External
                        II
                                                       Inspector)                      Inspector)
                                                 10 years (by External           15 years (by External
                        III
                                                       Inspector)                      Inspector)
                                                  12 years (by Own
                        IV                                                   18 years (by Own Inspector)
                                                       Inspector)
                        V                          Not required              18 years (by Own Inspector)


      (2) Subsequent test pressure values. Following major repairs, as defined in paragraph (e) below, or the
          required periodic tests, the provisions of the Design Code will be fulfilled. If not specified, the test
          pressure for pressure apparatus or systems, other than boilers, shall be:
                                                                            p
                                                           Pp  1.1 Pd 
                                                                            d
          For boilers, the test pressure value shall be:
                                                             Pp  1.25  Pd

          For straight-through forced circulation boilers with a variable point of vaporization and
          pressurisedpressurized parts designed for different levels of pressure along the water-steam flow path,
          the test pressure shall be as follows:
                                                             Pp  1.1 Pms e

       Following any repairs not having a scope defined as constituting a major repair, the only requirement will
       be a leak test of a value equal to the maximum service pressure, Pms .
    (e) Major repairs. These are defined as those affecting to apparatus belonging to Categories I, II, III, and IV,
        in accordance with the extent established below:
       (1) In boilers, when a surface area of the shroud of more than 2% has been replaced.
           Also, when drums or headers are affected by the repair whatever the number of welds affected or a heat
           treatment has been required during the repair.
           The cutting of tubes or removal of header plugs to inspect the conditions of the interior of the boiler are
           not considered to constitute major repairs. One hundred percent of the welds performed for these
           reasons shall be inspected by non-destructive testing techniques.
           Repairs affecting the reheater are not considered to constitute a major repair for the purposes of
           hydraulic testing, although in their place the radiographic inspection of 100% of the welds is required.
       (2) In the case of heat exchangers, except condensers, when the length of the affected weld whatever the
           chamber in question exceeds 10% of the total.
           Also, when heat treatments have been performed or more than 10% of the tubes have been replaced,
           this shall also be considered as constituting a major repair.
           Repairs affecting the condenser are not considered to constitute a major repair for the purposes of
           hydraulic testing.
       (3) In piping systems, when the number of welds performed is greater than 2% of those in the system for
           Categories I and II, and greater than 10% for Categories III and IV.
6

   <H3>63.2.2.2 Oil refineries Refineries and petrochemical Petrochemical plantsPlants. The requirements
of ITC-MIE-AP6 [5] relating to inspection and testing are summarisedsummarized below.
   (a) Classification for the purposes of inspection and testing. PressurisedPressurized systems and apparatus
       are classified through a combination of the concepts of hazard potential and fluid characteristics, as
       defined below.
       Hazard potential is defined as the product of the design pressure Pd in kg/cm2 by volume V in m3, as            Formatted
       indicated in Table 63.1.                                                                                        Formatted
       As regards fluid characteristics, the classification of pressure apparatus is shown in Table 63.6.

        TABLE 63.6 FLUID CHARACTERISTICS GROUPS (ITC-MIE-6) [5]
           Group                                          Fluid Characteristics
                        Flammable fluids in vapourvapor, gas, or liquid phase and their mixtures at temperature
                                                   equal to or higher than 200 ºC;
             A
                                                gases and liquids of elevated toxicity;
                                                    hydrogen at any temperature.

                        Flammable fluids in vapourvapor, gas ,or liquid phase and their mixtures at temperature
             B
                             lower than 200 ºC; and toxic liquids, acidic or caustic at any temperature.


             C                         Water steam (gas phase), inert or innocuous gases and air.


             D                                        Water at temperature  85 ºC



        Table 63.7 summarisessummarizes the different categories of pressurisedpressurized apparatus.
    (b) Inspections and testing prior to entry into service. The requirements are similar to those indicated in
        Section 63.2.2.1 paragraph (b).
    (c) Periodic inspections and testing. With the exception of piping, the scope of the periodic inspections and
        tests is as follows:
       (1) Exterior inspection. This will consists at least of a visual inspection of the areas subjected to the
           highest stresses and corrosion, of the checking of thicknesses by means of ultrasonic techniques and of
           any non-destructive test considered necessary, as long as the conditions of the process allow. In order
           to perform this inspection it will not be necessary to remove the apparatus or system to be inspected
           from service.
       (2) Interior inspection. This will consist at least of a complete visual inspection of all parts subjected to
           pressure, along with whatever non-destructive tests are considered necessary. Whenever an interior
           inspection cannot be performed for reasons of physical impossibility, it shall be replaced with a
           pressure test.
       (3) Pressure test. This will consist of a hydrostatic test or any special alternative test previously
           authorisedauthorized, and will be combined to the extent possible with interior inspection.
       The frequency of and the competence for the different periodic inspections and tests for the different
       categories of apparatus are indicated in Table 63.8.
       In the case of piping, non-destructive testing inspections shall be carried out every ten 10 years by an own
       inspector.
7

    (d) Testing conditions. For the first pressure test the following minimum requirements shall in all cases be
        met, in addition to those established in the design manual and referring to these values:
       (1) PressurisedPressurized apparatus or systems. The hydrostatic test pressure shall be as follows:
                                                                            p
                                                         Pp  1.25  Pd 
                                                                            d
           During pressure testing, and other than in exceptional cases duly justified in the design manual, the
           value of 90% of the yield strength of the material at the test temperature shall not be exceeded for the
           primary membrane stresses.
           For subsequent pressure tests, the test pressure value shall be at least that indicated for the initial test.
       (2) Apparatus or systems subjected to vacuum. The test pressure value shall be that defined in the design
           manual.
    (e) Inspection and testing following repairs. After a major repair (as defined below), a visual inspection of
        the repaired area and a pressure test shall be carried out. The test pressure will be equal to that of the first
        pressure test.
        Major repairs are defined as those affecting repaired apparatus belonging to Categories I, II, III, and IV,
        with the scope indicated below:
       (1) Columns, tanks, and reactors:
           - When the length of the affected weld calculated in percentage of the total length of the equipment is
              equal to or greater than the values indicated in Table 63.9.

              TABLE 63.9 MAJOR REPAIRS IN COLUMNS, TANKS, AND REACTORS WELDS [5]
                                   Type of Weld
               Category
                           Longitudinal Circumferential
                    I         Any             Any
                   II         Any             Any
                  III         15%            30%
                  IV          20%            40%

           - In apparatus or systems subjected to vacuum, except for those containing incombustible fluids or
              fluids not forming explosive mixtures.
       (2) Heat exchangers. The conditions indicated in paragraph (1) above apply for the shell side and
           distributor.
       (3) Air-coolers. Any replacement of tubes or weld repairs to headers.
       (4) Furnaces. When the length of tubes replaced exceeds of 10% of the full length of the complete drum
           circuit.
       (5) Boilers and steam producing equipment. When the length of tubes replaced exceeds of 10% of the full
           length of the tube circuit.



    TABLE 63.7 CATEGORIES OF PRESSURE EQUIPMENT (EXCERPT FROM ITC-MIE-AP6) [5]
                                                            Fluid Characteristics
      Hazard Potential
                                    A                      B                    C                       D
              1                  Category I             Category I          Category I               Category II
              2                  Category I             Category II         Category II              Category III
              3                  Category II            Category III        Category III             Category IV
8

            4            Category III          Category IV        Category IV          Category V
            5            Category IV           Category V         Category V           Category V



    TABLE 63.8 FREQUENCY OF PERIODIC INSPECTIONS AND TESTS (EXCERPT FROM ITC-
                                   MIE-AP6) [5]
       Category of the                         Periodic Inspections and Tests
         Equipment       External Inspection         Internal Inspection          Pressure Test
                          3 years (by Own           6 years (by External      12 years (by External
              I
                             Inspector)                   Inspector)               Inspector)
                          4 years (by Own           8 years (by External      16 years (by External
             II
                             Inspector)                   Inspector)               Inspector)
                          5 years (by Own           10 years (by External
             III                                                                  Not required
                             Inspector)                   Inspector)
                          6 years (by Own             12 years (by Own
             IV                                                                   Not required
                             Inspector)                   Inspector)
                          7 years (by Own
             V                                         Not required               Not required
                             Inspector)
9

     (6) Piping. In this case, major repairs are defined as all those fulfilling the following conditions
         simultaneously:
         - The number of pipe joining welds performed exceeds those indicated in Table 63.10.
         - The welding procedure includes heat treatment or the thickness of both pipes to be joined exceeds
             12 millimetresmillimeters.

                 TABLE 63.10 MAJOR REPAIRS IN PIPING WELDS [5]
                Category    Number of Welds
                     I           Any
                    II            4
                   III            8
                   IV            16
                                                                                                                    Formatted: Bullets and Numbering

63.3<H3>63.3 CODES AND STANDARDS IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
   In the nuclear field, and in the absence of a national regulation, the codes and standards of the countries of
origin of the design of each reactor are applied. The Spanish nuclear fleet is currently made up of 7 PWR and
BWR reactors of U.S. design and one German designed PWR. The main characteristics of these plants are
summarisedsummarized in Table 63.11, which also includes the José Cabrera Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) (also
known as Zorita after the village near which it is located), which was disconnected from the grid in April 2006
after 38 years of operation and is currently in the dismantling process. Section III of the ASME Code was
applied to the design and construction of this plant for the first time in Spain, and subsequently Section XI was
applied for in-service inspection, following its publication in 1971.
   Before the start of the NPP construction programme in Spain, nuclear power was considered in the 1961
Rules on Uncomfortable, Unhealthy, and Dangerous Activities (now overruled by Law 34/2007 on Air Quality
and Atmosphere Protection) [8] as an industrial activity which that required the enforcement of the specific
measures laid down by the competent Technical Bodies, and which that urged the Ministerial Departments with
competence in the above areas to issue the required provisions.
   Fundamentally, the legal bases were established in 1964 Law on Nuclear Energy [9] adopting the Nuclear
Act and Decree dated July 21, 1972 on the Order of Nuclear and Radioactive Installations [10]. The scope of
the 1964 law cover the application of nuclear power for peaceful purposes and its safety objectives are the
protection of life, health, and property. This law sets out the framework for the definition of international
agreements, designates the Ministry of Industry as the body responsible for the nuclear permits and designates
the Junta de Energía Nuclear (JEN) as the body responsible for the assessment of matters dealing with safety,
inspections, and surveillance of nuclear and radioactive installations. In 1980 the Law [11] creating the Consejo
de Seguridad Nuclear (CSN) was passed and this body was assigned the tasks previously carried out by the
JEN, the development of regulations in this field, the definition of nuclear safety-related research plans and
international coordination. The CSN is independent of government administration and is directly responsible to
Parliament.
   Apart from these basic laws there is additional applicable legislation such as the Regulations on Protection
from Ionising Radiations, Seismic Resistance, and Protection of the Environment among others.
   The legislation is completed by specific requirements in the licensing process, which is similar to the one
used in the United States and consists of three main stages [12]:
      (1) Prior authorization of the site and of the objectives of the installation.
      (2) Authorization for construction including the Preliminary Safety Study.
      (3) Authorization for startup of commercial operation.
10

   Before the authorization of the construction, the CSN evaluates the Safety Study and forwards its evaluation
to the Ministry of Industry and Energy along with a conditional permit which that defines the safety limits and
conditions to be incorporated in the project or justifying studies to be provided by the applicant.
   The conditional permit issued by the CSN establishes the Licensing Bases and rarely establishes requirements
in addition to those stipulated in the nuclear safety Laws and Regulations or in the codes and standards
applicable in the country of origin. Some differences do, however, exist in the applicability of Code Cases in
respect to the validity dates or specific regulatory requirements that aim to harmoniseharmonize the
requirements of different countries of origin of the nuclear reactor for the power plants of different designs
existing in Spain. For instance, the authorities required the German designed PWR plant to comply with the ISI
requirements of the ASME Code Section XI. This represents a differential treatment with respect to the In-
Service Inspection Manual applicable to similar German NPPs.
   Certain differences may be underlined, for example, the in-service hydrostatic testing of the primary circuit at
a German designed PWR plant, where the regulator established in the licensing basis that this should be
performed in accordance with the KTA rules with respect to test pressure (1.3 times the design pressure) and
temperature (not less than RTNDT + 33 ºC, nor higher than RTNDT + 55 ºC), but with a frequency of ten 10 years,
as in the case of ASME Code Section XI, instead of the eight years established in the KTA rules.

     TABLE 63.11 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN SPAIN [Source: Spanish Nuclear Industry Forum
                                (www.foronuclear.org)]
                                                             Capacity      Commercial         Current
             Plant           Type       NSSS Supplier
                                                             (MWe)          Operation     Operation Permit
          Almaraz I           PWR        Westinghouse          977           05/1981         06/2000
          Almaraz II          PWR        Westinghouse          980           10/1983         06/2000
            Ascó I            PWR        Westinghouse         1033           12/1984         10/2001
            Ascó II           PWR        Westinghouse         1027           03/1986         10/2001
          Cofrentes          BWR/6      General Electric      1092           03/1985         03/2001
         José Cabrera
                             PWR         Westinghouse           150          07/1968      Decommissioned
           (Zorita)
       Santa María de
                             BWR/3      General Electric        466          05/1971           07/1999
            Garoña
            Trillo           PWR        Siemens/KWU         1066            08/1988          11/2004
         Vandellós II        PWR        Westinghouse        1087            03/1988          07/2000
[Source:           Spanish           Nuclear        Industry             Forum            (www.foronuclear.org)]      Formatted
11

  Furthermore, the CSN monitors the safety of the plants during their operating life by means of Periodic
Safety Reviews (PSR) carried out every ten 10 years. Basically, the scope of the PSR covers [13]:
     (1) Applicability of new regulations.
     (2) Operating experience.
     (3) Safety of design modifications.
  The following sections summarisesummarize the national projects on ISI.
                                                                                                                     Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
63.3.1<H2>63.3.1 Qualification of NDT for ISI
   <H3>63.3.1.1 Background. As a consequence of the international Programme for the Inspection of Steel
Components (PISC) funded by the OECD-NEA and completed in 1992, the European organizations related to
In-Service Inspection (ISI) and the nuclear utilities constituted the European Network for Inspection
Qualification (ENIQ) to develop an harmonisedharmonized qualification methodology as a recommendation to
be implemented at national level in the different European countries. The methodology was published in 1995
and revised later in 1997 [14]. Several technical documents, named Recommended Practices that support this
methodology have been alsoalso been elaborated.
   On the other handcontrary, the European Nuclear Regulators was constituted in 1995 the "“Nuclear
Regulators Working Group" ” (NRWG-TF-NDTQ) to analyseanalyze their position in relation to nondestructive
examination (NDE) qualification and to evaluate the proposed methodology elaborated by ENIQ. In 1996 they
issued the document "“Common Position of European Regulators on Qualification of NDT systems for Pre- and
In-Service Inspection of Light Water Reactors Components", ,” revised later in 1997 [15]. In general terms,
their position is coincident with the ENIQ methodology.
   Both the Spanish Utilities and the Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (CSN), the Spanish Nuclear Regulator,
agreed that in Spain, the European NDE qualification methodology should be implemented, but in the
framework of ISI scope of ASME Section XI.
   As a consequence, UNESA, as the Spanish Nuclear Association of Utilities, started in 1996 started a project
to develop the Spanish NDE methodology based on ENIQ qualification principles within the ISI scope of
ASME Section XI. This methodology was completed in 1999
and it was presented to the CSN for evaluation to regulate in the near future the NDE qualification approach
proposed.
   The regulator and the utilities agreed to perform a pilot project to verify the qualification process and the
technical requirements defined in the methodology [16]. The pilot project, named VENDE, started in 2000 and
it was completed by the middle of 2002. It was jointly funded by the nuclear utilities throughout UNESA and
the CSN.
   The inspection components in the pilot project were the output nozzles of a PWR reactor pressure vessel and
the feedwater nozzles of a BWR reactor pressure vessel. The inspection areas were in both cases the nozzle to
shell weld, the inner radius, and the adjacent nozzle body. For both components ultrasonic
mechanisedmechanized inspection were used, but the PWR nozzle was inspected from the inside surface and
the BWR nozzle from the outside surface.
   (a) Organisation of the pilot project. All parties involved in the qualification process were created, by
       constituting working groups. The Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) group, responsible of the ISI, had two co-
       ordinators from the two pilot plants and representatives of all other plants. The Independent Qualification
       Body (IQB) group, responsible of the evaluation and certification of the qualification, had also two co-
       ordinators from the two pilot plants and representatives of all other plants. Observers from the CSN
       participated in each working group. A Quality group was also created with the same structure as the other
       two groups. In the other handOn the contrary, Tecnatom acted as the ISI vendor to be qualified in this
       exercise.
   (b) Qualification input data. According to the methodology, the qualification input data was defined for each
       inspection area including:
      (1) Inspection area description
12

     (2) Definition of type of qualification defects: postulated and specific, which were the cases applicable to
         these areas
     (3) Definition of qualification defects sizes
     (4) Defect detection rate in practical demonstrations (accordingly probability of detection and confidence
         level)
     (5) False call detection rate in practical demonstrations (accordingly probability of false call and
         confidence level)
     (6) Definition of measurements uncertainties
      Tecnatom prepared detailed 8 eight inspection procedures for detection and defect sizing according to the
      input data definition and the requirement of the methodology
  (c) Qualification documentation. The following documents were elaborated within the project:
     (1) Qualification ISI Objectives report for each area.
     (2) Essential Variables report for each area, to define the essential variables of component, defects,
         equipment, procedures, techniques, etcand so on.
     (3) Technical Justifications for each area for the postulated defect cases, including analysis of worst-case
         defects in each area by simulation modellingmodeling.
     (4) Specification for defect manufacturing in PWR and BWR test specimen for open and blind
         qualifications. A total of 38 fatigue crack defects were manufactured.
  (d) Qualification performance demonstrations. Open demonstrations for inside surface inspection procedures
      qualification were performed for PWR nozzle to shell weld, inner radius, and adjacent nozzle body. The
      inner radius area had a specific defect case and the other two had component design postulated defect
      cases. In the first case the practical demonstration was a requisite, but after analysis of technical
      justification the NPP group and the IQB group concluded that additional performance demonstration had
      also to be performed in the postulated defect cases.
      Open demonstrations for outside inspection procedures qualification were performed for BWR nozzle to
      shell weld, inner radius, and adjacent nozzle body. All areas had component design postulated defect
      cases, but after analysis of technical justification the NPP group and the IQB group concluded that
      additional performance demonstration had also to be performed in the postulated defect cases.
      Blind practical demonstrations were performed for data qualification of analysts in the case of specific
      defect.
  (e) Final qualification reports. A Final Qualification report was prepared for all the inspection areas with the
      conclusions on the qualification exercises and also the lessons learned on the application of the
      methodology and the technical guidelines during the performance of the pilot project.
  (f) Revision of the Spanish ISI qualification methodology. After completion of the pilot project, a revision of
      the methodology took place, with the aim of including the practical experiences of the qualification
      exercise. The main document and the seven technical guidelines were revised and this activity was
      completed by the middle of 2003. The revision was made by the UNESA qualification-working group that
      held periodic meetings with the Nuclear Regulator for consensus in the modifications. The revised
      methodology was sent to the CSN for final approval and ruling, which was completed in March 2004. As
      general criteria for the evaluation of the methodology, the CSN used also the document “Report on
      Regulator’s Experience on NDT Qualification for In-Service Inspection of LWR Components” [17].
      Immediately after that, UNESA started a joint effort to perform the required NDE qualification of the
      inspection systems in a Qualification Programme that will last until the end of 2008.
   <H3>63.3.1.2 Description of the Spanish NDE qualification Qualification methodologyMethodology.
The methodology [18] is described in a main document where the objectives, scope, principles of qualification,
functions, and responsibilities of the parties are defined. Additionally, seven technical documents develop all
technical aspects of a qualification process:
13

 (a) Guideline for the definition of ISI qualification objectives
 (b) Guideline for the definition and analysis of essential variables
 (c) Guideline for the definition of objectives and content description of technical justifications
 (d) Guideline for the specification of test specimens for practical demonstrations
 (e) Guideline for the definition of rules for the performance of practical demonstrations
 (f) Guideline for the definition of the final qualification report contents
 (g) Guideline for the definition of management and quality system for the qualification process
 This These guidelines constitutes an alternative to the qualification requirements for ultrasonic examinations
 in ASME Section XI Appendices VII and VIII. The main features of the guideline are described below:
 (a) Scope. The basic scope is Section XI of ASME Code, but also other areas requiring NDE examinations by
     the regulator, on basis to operating experience, etc.
     The methodology is applicable to the ultrasonic inspections as well as to other NDE methods with
     capabilities for defect detection and through wall depth sizing, such as eddy current techniques applied to
     the inspection of steam generator tubes.
 (b) Definition of qualification defects. Consistent with the ENIQ methodology, for each inspection area a
     qualification defect shall be defined. The qualification requirements are based on the type of the
     qualification defect.
    (1) Specific defect case. It is applicable when a defect has been observed in a given area/component in the
        plant. The defect to be detected, characterisedcharacterized and sized is known in location and
        morphology and a “fit-for-purpose” inspection procedure can be elaborated.
    (2) Postulated defect case. Applicable when there is a postulated defect due to component design
        requirements. Degradation experiences in other similar NPP can be considered as postulated defects, if
        the situation is extendable to the component or area. The exact characteristics of the postulated defect
        are not known and they must be alsoalso be postulated.
        For piping segments classified as High Safety Significance in the framework of a Risk-Informed
        Inspection (RI-ISI) program according to the Spanish RI-ISI methodology (See see Section 63.3.2), the
        applicable qualification requirement are those corresponding to the postulated defect case.
    (3) Undefined defect case. Applicable when none of the above cases exist in the component or inspection
        area.
 (c) Qualification principles. As per ENIQ methodology, inspecttioninspection qualification can be achieved
     by combination of the following elements:
          - Practical Demonstration (non-blind and blind).
          - Technical Justification.
 (d) Requisites for qualification of inspection equipment and procedures. These are a function of the
     qualification defect case:
    (1) Specific defect case. An open practical demonstration is required on test specimen containing the
        specific defects. Also, a technical justification must be prepared to generalisegeneralize and complete
        the results of the practical demonstrations.
    (2) Component or area with postulated defect case. A technical justification must be prepared to
        analyseanalyze in depth the inspection techniques, the procedure and the equipment performance and
        all the essential variables must be evaluated by physical reasoning, theoretical and practical
        experiences, validated mathematical and simulation modellingmodeling, etcand so on.
        In case that the technical justification presents all the needed evidences, a practical demonstration will
        not be carried out. On the contraryOn the contrary, for the essential variables that cannot be properly
        justified, a practical demonstration will be performed on test specimens that reproduce the essential
        variables under analysis.
14

      (3) Component or area with undefined defect case. A simplified technical justification must be prepared to
          demonstrate that the inspection is performed according to written instructions, standards, or codes. The
          technical justification will include a demonstration of the sensitivity of the inspection techniques
          according to the applicable codes and standards.
   (e) Requisites for qualification of inspection personnel. All inspection personnel must be in possession of
       their valid Nondestructive Testing (NDT) Certification according to the inspection procedure
       requirements, and as a minimum requisite, must be certified as Level II or III through Spanish Standard
       UNE EN 473 [19] or equivalent. Additionally, the inspection personnel must accomplish with the
       following qualification requisites defined as a function of the qualification defect case.
      (1) Specific defect case. All inspection personnel performing equipment calibration and data acquisition
          must perform the open practical demonstration for equipment and procedures qualification.
          All data analysts must perform a blind practical demonstration on test specimen containing the specific
          defects. Previously acquired data can be used for data analyst qualification. In all cases, selection of
          data to be analysed analyzed shall be selected by the Independent Qualification Organisation.
      (2) Component or area with postulated defect case. All inspection personnel performing equipment
          calibration and data acquisition must perform the open practical demonstration for equipment and
          procedures qualification, when it was necessary to be performed.
          All data analysts must perform a blind practical demonstration on test specimen containing the
          essential variables, when it was necessary to be performed.
      (3) Component or area with undefined defect case. No additional requisites are needed in this defect case.
   (f) Parties involved in the qualification process:
      (1) Nuclear Power Plant. It has the responsibility of preparing the specification of input data and NDT
          qualification objectives. It has also the responsibility of revising and the approval of all documents
          required for qualification (inspection procedures, technical justifications, test specimen specification,
          practical demonstration results, etc.).
      (2) Independent Qualification Body. An Independent Qualification Body (IQB), as per Standard UNE EN
          45004 type B Body [20], will be set within the organisational organizational structure of the nuclear
          power plant. A quality system will guarantee its full independence. It has the responsibility of
          evaluating all qualification documents and that all qualification activities are performed according to
          the Spanish NDT Qualification Methodology, and of the certification of the qualification.
      (3) ISI Vendor. It has the responsibility of preparing the inspection procedures, technical justifications, and
          of performing all required practical demonstrations.
      (4) Nuclear Regulator (CSN). In relation to qualification, the CSN approve the methodology and will rule
          its application in Spain. Then, the Nuclear Regulator function will include NDT qualification follow-
          up as part of their general evaluation of safety requirement of the nuclear power plant installations.
   <H3>63.3.1.3 Implementation of the methodology. The Spanish nuclear power plants decided to work
together in a joint project to perform the initial NDT qualifications. The objective is to optimiseoptimize the
resources to be dedicated to qualification from the viewpoint of technical experts, test specimens, ISI vendors,
etc.and so on, given the important synergy existing among the components in operating nuclear power plants in
Spain.
   A working group was set up in 2002 with the participation of all the ISI managers in the plants, which was
named GRUVAL. The function of this group is to co-ordinate and to supervise the qualification activities
defined in the methodology. In parallel, another working group named GROIV was set up in 2003 with the
participation of the IQB managers of each plant to co-ordinate and evaluate the qualification activities. The
organisation organization flow chart of the joint qualification project is shown in Fig. 63.1.
15

                      NPP 1                               NPP 2                                NPP n




               ISI1           IQB1                 ISI2           IQB2                  ISIn           IQBn




                                      GRUVAL                                 GROIV
                               (NPP ISI Working Group)                   (IQB W. Group)




                              Methodology   Engineering                     Technical
                               Support      Companies                        support



     FIG. 63.1 ORGANIZATION FLOW CHART OF THE JOINT QUALIFICATION PROJECT [16].
                         (Note: dotted line means administrative link only).


   Several activities were performed by GRUVAL and GROIV<!--<query>Please provide the full definition of
the terms "GRUVAL and GROIV',in the text.</query>--> since 2003. In relation to the definition of the
organisation organization and responsibilities of GRUVAL and GROIV, a Management Manual was elaborated.
There, the final responsibilities of qualification of each plant and its individual IQB, GRUVAL, and GROIV are
stated; the mission is to co-ordinate, manage, and evaluate the joint qualification exercises. Each nuclear plant
and his its IQB must later approve all documents and activities produced by GRUVAL and GROIV to officially
assume the qualifications in each plant.
   In relation to the technical activities, GRUVAL decided to create Qualification Groups for all the inspection
areas of the nuclear plants that required qualification of the ISI performed, based on the synergy existing among
them. Four technical documents were elaborated for this purpose:
      (1) Definition of the grouping criteria
      (2) Definition of all Qualification Groups
      (3) Identification of inspection areas of all NPP in each Qualification Groups
      (4) Calendar for all qualification activities
   For the definition of grouping criteria several different types of information were needed: component
geometries and dimensions, base material and weld materials, basic NDE methods, qualification defect cases,
access to the areas, inspection requirements, etcand so on. A total of 53 Qualification Groups were defined
encompassing ferritic, austenitic and dissimilar metal welds in piping, reactor pressure vessel areas, including
control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) penetrations in PWR vessel heads and control rod drive housing (CRDH)
penetrations in BWR bottom heads, steam generator tubes, etcand so on. More than 10,000 inspection areas
were assigned to the Qualification Groups.
   For those welds in the ferritic, austenitic and dissimilar metal Qualification Groups inspected using manual
ultrasonic procedures, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Performance Demonstration Initiative (PDI)
qualified generic procedures have been selected for application to Spanish plants. Practical demonstrations have
been carried out at the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) facilities in Charlotte, NC using the existing
PDI mock-ups. Further, the EPRI PDI personnel also developed the technical justifications to analyze those
essential variables of the inspection procedures that could not be properly reproduced during the practical
demonstrations.
16

<H2>63.3.2 RI-ISI applications for piping
   <H2>63.3.2.1 Background. Taking into account the U.S. developments regarding Risk- Informed ISI, the
Spanish utilities and the Nuclear Regulator (CSN) have shown an increasing interest in any possible
optimisationoptimization of the ISI programs. Within this framework, a pilot study on risk-informed ISI was
arranged in a cooperative R&D project between the CSN and UNESA (Spanish Utilities Group).
   The objectives of the project were as follows:
   (a) To define the main characteristics of a suitable methodology to define a risk-informed ISI program for
       piping, using as reference, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) regulation.
   (b) To apply the developed methodology to a Spanish NPP, defining the scope of systems to be included in
       the program and analyzsing the different cases that might occur, to define the necessary steps to be
       followed and to identify and solve the potential problems that might arise during the definition of a full
       scope RI-ISI program for piping.
   (c) To define the minimal requirements for the documentation to be submitted and the basic steps of the CSN
       staff evaluation process, to allow for an agile implementation process for future applications.
   The project consisted of three main activities:
   (a) Revision and analysis of all the applicable and available documentation, to define the framework for the
       project for the Spanish approach. This activity was completed in December 1998.
   (b) Definition of a generic guideline applicable to Spanish NPPs, for the establishment of an RI-ISI program
       for piping. This guideline was issued in its first consensus draft in May 1999 and later revised to include
       the lessons learned from the pilot studies.
   (c) Application of the guideline defined to one or two pilot plants. The objective of this activity was to check
       the technical consistency of the guideline. The pilot plants were Ascó I (PWR) and Santa María de
       Garoña (BWR). In both cases, only the quantitative approach was used. The scope of the Ascó I study was
       all the Class 1 piping and selected portions of Class 2, 3, and Non-class piping systems. In the case of
       Santa María de Garoña, the scope covered selected portions of Class 1, 2, and Non-class piping systems.
   The Ascó I Class 1 piping application [21] was later submitted to and approved by the CSN with slight
modifications in September 2001, becoming the first RI-ISI application licensed in Europe.
   <H3>63.3.2.2 Description of Spanish RI-ISI Guideline for pipingPiping. The Guideline RI-ISI-02, rev. 0
[22] was issued in May 2000. The guideline develops general criteria for a risk-informed application in nuclear
class piping and particular criteria related to the quantitative and the qualitative methods. The guideline, is
mainly based on USNRC Reg. Guides 1.174 and 1.178, NUREG-0800 Chapters 19 and 3.9.8; this guideline
also considers methods from WCAP-14572, rev. 1-NP-A (for quantitative approach) and EPRI-TR-112657, rev.
B (for qualitative approach) as well as ASME Section XI Code Cases N-560, N-577, and N-578; it is also based
on the conclusions and recommendations of the report EUR 19153 EN [23].
   The guideline has the following structure:
   (a) A methodological part defining the general approach to be applied, taking into account both quantitative
       and qualitative approaches.


                            TABLE 63.12  CLASS 1 PIPING SEGMENTS
                            CLASSIFICATION FOR PWR PLANTS [24]
                                                               Number of Segments
                             Plant            Region
                                                             In Region      Total
                                          1    HSS/HFI           28
                            Ascó I        2    HSS/LFI           23          102
                                          3    LSS/HFI            9
17

                4    LSS/LFI         42
                1    HSS/HFI         20
     Almaraz    2    HSS/LFI          4
                                              86
     II         3    LSS/HFI         28
                4    LSS/LFI         36
                1    HSS/HFI         23
                2    HSS/LFI          5
     Almaraz I                                86
                3    LSS/HFI         30
                4    LSS/LFI         28
                1    HSS/HFI         19
                2    HSS/LFI         28
     Ascó II                                  102
                3    LSS/HFI         22
                4    LSS/LFI         33
               HSS: High Safety Significant
                LSS: Low Safety Significant
               HFI: High Failure Importance
                LFI: Low Failure Importance
18

                   TABLE 63.13 INSPECTION AREAS RESULTING FROM ASME
                   SECTION XI AND RI-ISI PROGRAMS FOR CLASS 1 PIPING IN
                   PWR PLANTS [24]
                                    Areas in ASME Section XI
                                             Program                   Areas in RI-    Reduction
                     Plant
                                    B-F         B-J                    ISI Program       (%)
                                                        Total
                                   welds       welds
                   Ascó I           42          178      220               103             53
                   Almaraz II       42          241      283               59              79
                   Almaraz I        42          233      275               76              72
                   Ascó II          42          178      220               82              62


   (b) A documentation requirement part defining the documentation that should be maintained at the plant and
       the documentation to be submitted to the Nuclear Regulator as the “Final Report.”.
   (c) An evaluation part which that includes the process that is to be adhered to by the CSN Staff to review and
       approve an RI-ISI program. All the activities that should be reviewed, and the acceptance criteria for each,
       are included in this part of the document.
   (d) Attachments: One with the details of the quantitative methodology, another with details of the qualitative
       methodology, and a third with the type of report that has to be submitted. Each of these attachments
       develops the details of the general body of the guideline.
   The approach for the Spanish guideline is not to limit the scope of the program only to Section XI but to
attempt to include all the ISI programs (e. g., IGSCC, FAC) in place at the NPP, on a voluntary basis.
   Another characteristic of the Spanish guideline is that it includes the technical approach and the evaluation
process in the same document, due to its having been developed through cooperative action.
   <H3>63.3.2.3 RI-ISI applications Applications at Spanish NPPs. Concerning the Spanish PWR plants,
following Ascó I application, Almaraz II, Almaraz I, and Ascó II NPPs submitted and get licensed their RI-ISI
programs for Class 1 piping [24].
   The degradation mechanisms applicable to the piping included in the scope are as follows [25]:
   (a) Thermal stratification in zones of possible mixing of water at different temperatures
   (b) Thermal fatigue due to normal heatup and cooldown
   (c) Vibrations in small piping close to the source of vibration
   (d) Water hammer in the pressurizer auxiliary spray line when not prevented by the operating procedure in
       place
   (e) Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) in areas containing susceptible material
   The results of failure probability due to these degradation mechanisms have been as expected. Logical
differences have been encountered between twin units, among other reasons, due to the age of the plant, the
results obtained from stress analysis (differences in piping supports, etc.) and the results of the inspections
performed to date.
   In addition to the results obtained from the application of the quantitative methodology, in accordance with
the requirements of the Spanish guideline, various locations have been selected for inspection to fulfilfulfill the
defencedefense in depth criterion. Other criteria that have been applied arehave been as follows:


            TABLE 63.14 CLASS 1 AND 2 PIPING SEGMENTS CLASSIFICATION AND
            NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS FOR THE COFRENTES BWR PLANT [26]
19

                                      Number of Segments    Number of Inspections
       Piping        Region
                                    In Region      Total   In Region      Total
                  1    HSS/HFI          39                    116
                  2    HSS/LFI           -                      -
       Class 1                                      182                    130
                  3    LSS/HFI          51                      7
                  4    LSS/LFI          92                      7
                  1    HSS/HFI          7                       7
                  2    HSS/LFI           -                      -
       Class 2                                      546                     21
                  3    LSS/HFI         124                      4
                  4    LSS/LFI         415                     10
                  1    HSS/HFI          46                    123
                  2    HSS/LFI           -                      -
     Class 1 & 2                                    728                    151
                  3    LSS/HFI         175                     11
                  4    LSS/LFI         507                     17
                 HSS: High Safety Significant
                 LSS: Low Safety Significant
                 HFI: High Failure Importance
                 LFI: Low Failure Importance
20

            TABLE 63.15 INSPECTION AREAS RESULTING FROM ASME SECTION XI
            AND RI-ISI PROGRAMS FOR CLASS 1 AND 2 PIPING FOR THE
            COFRENTES BWR PLANT [26]
                    Areas in ASME Section XI
                                                        Areas in RI-ISI Program        Reduction
                             Program
                                                                                         (%)
                     Existing       Selected           Existing          Selected
                      2840            365               6458               151             59


   (a) Relocation in Region 3 (LSS/HFI segments) of segments initially located in Region 4 (LSS/LFI), due to
       snubber failure potential or water-hammer potential.
   (b) NDT testing of a sample of piping segments greater than NPS 3 located in Region 4.
   (c) Improvements in the level of confidence required in the statistical analysis for determining the number of
       inspections required in a given segment, raising it from 95% to 99%.
   (d) Use of qualified NDT procedures capable of detecting and sizing cracking due to thermal stratification,
       thermal stripping, or SCC, in segments prone to these mechanisms.
   (e) Inclusion of all, or at least a representative sample of, welds showing a possibility of SCC degradation
       mechanisms, such as nozzle-to-pipe Alloy 82/182 welds in RCS components (RPV, steam generators, and
       pressurizer).
   The final classification of segments for each plant is shown in Table 63.12. In addition, Table 63.13 shows the
comparison between the number of inspections required by the ASME Section XI programs and the
corresponding RI-ISI programs.
   Despite the significant reduction achieved in the number of inspections, all RI-ISI programs resulted in slight
reductions of risk in comparison with the previous ISI programs, both in terms of the Core Damage Frequency
(CDF) and of the Large Early Release Frequency (LERF).
   On the other handOn the contrary, the RI-ISI application of Cofrentes BWR plant [26] shows differences in the
scope with respect to the above PWR applications, since the latter cover only Class 1 piping whereas the scope of
the former encompasses both Class 1 and 2 piping. Also, the Cofrentes NPP application does not cover dissimilar
metal welds between the RPV nozzles and safe-ends and between the safe-end and extensions (ASME Section XI
Category B-F welds).
   The total number of segments in the scope amounts to 728, from which only 182 belong to Class 1 piping. The
total number of welds in the scope amounts to 6458.
   Beside the fatigue, the Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) degradation mechanism was
postulated for austenitic stainless steel piping in contact with the reactor coolant. Consideration was given in the
evaluation of failure probabilities to the mitigation measures implemented in these welds. Also, the Flow
Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) mechanism was postulated for the carbon steel piping in the steam and feedwater
lines. The FAC mechanism was accounted for in the evaluation of the failure probabilities, although the plant’s
FAC program will continue to be governed basically by determinist criteria. This process identified High Safety
Significant (HSS) segments due to the FAC degradation all of which deserve special consideration in the future
implementation of the FAC program.
   By contrast with the FAC program, other augmented inspection programs such as those of IGSCC and High
Energy Line Breaks are included in the RI-ISI application.
   In addition to the large number of segments, it is worth noting the effort dedicated to the development of
criteria for the evaluation of failure probabilities for small bore piping which that lacked a formal stress analysis
since the design was based on guidelines. On the other handcontrary, special emphasis was placed on the
evaluation of indirect effects (flooding, jet effects, and pipe whipping) due to piping failures in the Break
Exclusion Zone.
21

   The analyses showed a significant influence of the FAC and IGSCC degradation mechanisms in the failure
probabilities. In general, segments affected with either mechanism resulted in the High Failure Importance
regions. In terms of risk, the contribution of the FAC degradation to the CDF amounts to 51% of total CDF,
whereas the contribution of the IGSCC degradation amounts to 23% of total CDF.
   To fulfilfulfill the defencedefense in depth criterion, the regulator required during the licensing process to
include at least one location to monitor those systems that did not warrant inspection according to the RI-ISI
program but had been required for inspection according to the Section XI program.
   The final segment classification and the number of elements selected for inspection in each region are shown
in Table 63.14. It can be observed that 81% of HSS segments belong to Class 1 piping. These segments cover
93% of the total CDF.
   Table 63.15 shows a comparison between the number of inspections according to RI-ISI and Section XI
programs. Despite the significant reduction on the number of inspections achieved (59%), the RI-ISI program
resulted in being risk neutral in comparison with the previous deterministic ISI program, since the CDF reduction
is 9.84░·░10-9 and the reduction of the LERF is 3.22░·░10-10.
                                                                                                                      Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
63.4<H1>63.4 CONCLUSIONS
   In Spain the basic regulation of the non-nuclear industry is included in the Regulation on
PressurisedPressurized Apparatus, published in 1979, and in its Complementary Technical Instructions,
published in later years. Following Spain’s joining the European Community in 1986, the regulation underwent a
series of modifications with a view to bringing it into line with those of the other European Union countries. This
regulation remains in force for in-service testing and inspections, while aspects relating to the design,
manufacturing, and conformity assessment of pressure equipment are governed by the PED.
   In the nuclear field, and in the absence of a national regulation, the codes and standards of the countries of
origin of the design of each reactor are applied, with certain modifications aimed at harmonisingharmonizing
requirements among the country’s different facilities. This is the case, for example, as regards in-service
inspection, where Section XI of the ASME Code is applied in all cases.
   For the qualification of NDT tests applied for in-service inspection, the Spanish industry developed a
methodology based on the ENIQ principles, as in other European countries. It should be pointed out, however,
that in implementing this methodology for the manual ultrasonic inspection of piping, the generic EPRI PDI
procedures have been used, the practical demonstrations having been carried out at this institute’s facilities and
using its mock-ups.
   Furthermore, in Spain the nuclear industry and the regulator have jointly developed a guideline for the
application of the risk-informed methodology to the in-service inspection of piping, which is based mainly on the
U.S. regulations and on ASME Code Cases N-577 and N-578.
   On the European stage, the Spanish industry and regulator have contributed to the definition of a common
framework for the application of the RI-ISI methodology through their respective participations in the drawing
up of the ENIQ’s European Framework Document for Risk-Informed In-service Inspection [27] and the NRWG’s
Report on Regulatory Experience on Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection of Nuclear Power Plants Components
and Common Views [28].
                                                                                                                      Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
63.5<H1>REFERENCES
1. Rules on Pressure Apparatus, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Energy, decree Decree R.D. 1244 dated
   April 4, 1979 (BOE num. 128, May 29, 1979); R.D. 1504 dated November 23, 1990 (BOE 28-11-1990 and
   BOE 24-1-19909<!--<query>Please check the change in year for correctness.</query>-->. Modified by
   decree Decree R.D. 473 dated March 30, 1998 (BOE 20-5-1988) and R.D. 1495/1991 (BOE 15-10-1991).
2. Pressure Equipment Directive 97/23/CE, transposed by decree Decree R.D. 769/1999 dated May 7, 1999
   (BOE 31-5-1999).
22

3. ITC-MIE-AP1, Boilers, Economisers, Water Preheaters, Superheaters and Steam Reheaters, issued by the
   Ministry of Industry and Energy, orders Orders O. 17-3-1982 and O. 28-3-1985.
4. ITC-MIE-AP2, Piping for Fluids Relating to Boilers, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Energy, order
   Order O. 6-10-1980.
5. ITC-MIE-AP6, Oil Refineries and Petrochemical Plants, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Energy,
   order Order O. 30-8-1982 and O. 11-7-1983.
6. ITC-MIE-AP10, Cryogenic Tanks, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Energy, order Order O. 7-11-1983
   and O. 5-6-1987.
7. ITC-MIE-AP16, Fossil Power Generating Plants, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Energy, order Order
   O. 11-10-1987.
8. Rules on Uncomfortable, Unhealthy and Dangerous Activities, Decree dated November 30, 1961) (now
   superseded by Law 34/2007 on Air Quality and Atmosphere Protection, BOE 16-11-2007).
9. Law 25/1964 dated April 29 on Nuclear Energy (BOE 4-5-64), modified by Law 40/1994 dated December,
   30, 1994 for the Development of the National Electric System (BOE 31-12-94).
10. Decree law Law 2869/1972 dated July 21, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Energy<!--<query>Please
    check the insertion "and Energy" for correctness.</query>-->, approving the Bylaw on Nuclear and
    Radioactive Facilities (BOE 24-10-72).
11. Law 15/1980 dated April 22 on the Creation of the Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (BOE 25-5-80).
12. M. Colinet, M., H.-J. Frank, H.-J., A. Morel, A., F. Hevia Rupérez, F. and N.G. Smith, N.G., Survey of
    European Design Codes and Regulatory Requirements Relating to the Structural Integrity of ALWR Nuclear
    Power Plants – Final Report. , AEAT-1506 for the CEC DG-XI, September 1997.
13. CSN Safety Guide 1.10, Periodic Safety Reviews in Nuclear Power Plants, December 1995.
14. European Methodology for Qualification, EUR 17299 EN, revRev. 2, prepared by the European Network on
    Inspection Qualification (ENIQ), 1997.
15. Common Position of European Regulators on Qualification of NDT Systems for Pre-Service and In-Service
    Inspection of LWR Components, EUR 16802 EN, revRev. 1, prepared by the Task Force of Nuclear
    Regulators Working Group (NRWG), 1997.
16. L. Francia, L., G. Bollini, G., J.M. Figueras, J.M., and C. Castelao, C., Spanish Experience on NDT           Formatted
    Qualification.   Nuclear Industry and Regulator Views,. OECD/CSNI Symposium on International                  Formatted
    Developments and Cooperation on RI-ISI and NDT Qualification, Stockholm, 2004.
17. Report on Regulator’s Experience on NDT Qualification for In-Service Inspection of LWR Components, EUR
    20819 EN, revRev. 0<!--<query>Please check the Rev. No. for correctness.</query>-->, prepared by the
    Task Force of Nuclear Regulators Working Group (NRWG), 2003.
18. Qualification Methodology for Non- Destructive Examination Systems Applied in the In-Service Inspection of
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