1 CHAPTER Formatted 63 <CT>PRESSURE EQUIPMENT REGULATIONS, CODES, AND STANDARDS IN SPAIN Carlos Cueto-Felgueroso <H1>63.1 INTRODUCTION This Chapter presents the regulation of pressure equipment in Spain, in the non-nuclear industry as well as the activities in the codes and standards in the nuclear field. In both cases, emphasis is placed on periodic inspections and testing. The basic Spanish regulation on pressurisedpressurized equipment in the non-nuclear industry may be found in the Regulation on PressurisedPressurized Apparatus, published by the Ministry of Industry and Energy in 1979 . The regulation consists of a set of general standards and leaves the specifics to a set of Complementary Technical Instructions. Following Spain joining the European Community in 1986, a process of modification of this regulation began, with a view to bring it in line with those of the other Member States to facilitate the trade of goods and services within the European Union. An important milestone in the process of European harmonisationharmonization was the Pressure Equipment Directive (PED) 97/23/EC issued by the European Parliament and Council. The purpose of this Directive is to harmoniseharmonize the national laws of the European Union Member States regarding the design, manufacture, testing, and conformity assessment of pressure equipment and assemblies of pressure equipment. Since May 29th 29, 2002 the pressure equipment directive has been obligatory throughout the European Union. The PED was applied to the Spanish Legislation through Royal Decree R.D. 769/1999 . This decree superseded the provisions of the Regulation on PressurisedPressurized Apparatus relating to the design and manufacturing. In the nuclear field, and in the absence of a national regulation, the codes and standards of the countries of origin of the design of each reactor are applied. The Spanish nuclear fleet is currently made up of 7 pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) reactors of U.S. design and one German designed PWR (Ssee Section 63.3). As a result, Section III of the ASME Code has been applied in the design and construction of the Spanish nuclear power plants, except in the case of the German designed PWR, for which the KTA rules were used. On the other hand, the rules of Section XI of the ASME Code are applied to all the plants for In- Service Inspection (ISI). <H1>63.2 SPANISH REGULATION IN THE NON-NUCLEAR INDUSTRY <H2>63.2.1 Design and Construction As stated above, the design, fabrication, and conformity assessment of pressure equipment are currently regulated in Spain according to Pressure Equipment Directive (PED). The main provisions of the PED are summarized, and are covered in detail in Chapter 47. <H2>63.2.2 Inspections and testsTests The basic requirements regarding the inspection and testing of pressurisedpressurized equipment are to be found in the Regulation on Pressurised Apparatus and its Complementary Technical Instructions. The following are particularly significant: 2 (a) ITC-MIE-AP1 : referring to boilers, economiserseconomizers, water preheaters, superheaters , and steam reheaters (b) ITC-MIE-AP2 : referring to piping for fluids relating to boilers (c) ITC-MIE-AP6 : relating to oil refineries and petrochemical plants (d) ITC-MIE-AP10 : referring to cryogenic tanks (e) ITC-MIE-AP16 : relating to thermal power generation plants using solid, liquid or gaseous fossil fuels of any type and quality. Nuclear power plants are excluded. The following sections summarisesummarize the inspection and testing requirements for fossil fuel power generation plants, and oil refineries and petrochemical plants respectively. <H3>188.8.131.52 Fossil fuel power Power plantsPlants. The requirements of ITC-MIE-AP16  relating to inspection and testing are summarisedsummarized below. (a) Classification for inspection and testing. Pressure systems and apparatus are classified through a combination of the concepts of hazard potential and fluid characteristics, as defined below. TABLE 63.1 HAZARD POTENTIAL GROUPS  Group Hazard Potential (Pd V) Formatted 1 Pd Di 1000 Formatted 2 300 ≤ Pd Di < 1000 Formatted 3 25 ≤ Pd Di < 300 Formatted Formatted 4 10 ≤ Pd Di < 25 Formatted 5 Pd Di < 10 Formatted The hazard potential is defined as the product of design pressure Pd in kg/cm2 by volume V in m3. The Formatted classification of pressurisedpressurized apparatus in accordance with this concept is shown in Table 63.1. Formatted All boilers located in fossil power plants, both main and auxiliary, shall be classified in hazard potential Formatted Group 1. Formatted In the case of piping, hazard potential is defined as the product of maximum service pressure Pms in Formatted kg/cm2 by the inner diameter of the pipe Di in centimetrescentimeters. The applicable groups are shown in Formatted Table 63.2. Formatted Formatted TABLE 63.2 HAZARD POTENTIAL GROUPS FOR PIPING  Formatted Group Hazard Potential (Pms░ Di) Formatted 1 Pms Di 3000 Formatted 2 2000 ≤ Pms░ Di < 3000 Formatted 3 1000 ≤ Pms Di < 2000 Formatted 4 500 ≤ Pms░ Di < 1000 Formatted 5 Pms░ Di < 500 Formatted Formatted The classification of pressurisedpressurized apparatus in accordance with fluid characteristics is shown in Formatted Table 63.3. Formatted Formatted TABLE 63.3 FLUID CHARACTERISTICS GROUPS (ITC-MIE-16)  Formatted Group Fluid Characteristics Formatted 3 Fuel Toxic, acid, or caustic liquid A gases Hydrogen Steam water B Innocuous or inert gases Air Water at temperature 85 ºC C and pressure 10 kg/cm2 Table 63.4 summarisessummarizes the different categories of pressurisedpressurized apparatus. (b) Inspection and testing prior to entry into service: (1) At the manufacturer’s workshop. These consist of visual inspection and dimensional control of the apparatus, including the connections required for safety and control elements, along with hydrostatic testing. The latter may be carried out on site when this is technically justified and is contemplated in the design manual. (2) On site. This consists of a dimensional control, if not already performed in the workshop or if there has been any anomaly in transport making it advisable. A hydrostatic test should also be performed if not already carried out in the workshop. (c) Periodic inspection and testing. The inspections are aimed at gaining insight into damage caused in service with respect to corrosion, cracking and the state of welds. They consist basically of visual inspections, checks by the sampling of thicknesses and whatever non-destructive tests are considered necessary. The pressure or alternative tests consist of a hydraulic test or any special alternative test that has been previously authorisedauthorized. In the specific case of piping, examinations should be carried out by means of non-destructive testing. The frequency of and competence for the different periodic inspections and tests for the different categories of apparatus are indicated in Table 63.5. (d) Testing conditions: (1) Pressure values for the initial test. Except in the case of boilers, the pressure should be such that 90% of the yield strength of the material is not exceeded at the test temperature, and furthermore the provisions of the Design Code shall be applicable. By default the hydraulic test pressure shall be as follows: Pp 1.5 Pd where Pd is the design pressure. d is the allowable stress in design conditions. p is the allowable stress in test conditions. In the case of boilers, the hydraulic test pressure shall be as follows: p Pp 1.25 Pd d For straight-through forced circulation boilers with a variable point of vaporization and pressurisedpressurized parts designed for different levels of pressure along the water-steam flow path, the test pressure shall be the highest of the following values: Pp 1.5 Pms s 4 or Pp 1.25 Pms e Where Pms s is the maximum service pressure permitted at the outlet of the superheater and Pms e is the maximum service pressure permitted at the economisereconomizer feedwater inlet. TABLE 63.4 CATEGORIES OF PRESSURE EQUIPMENT (EXCERPT FROM ITC-MIE-AP16)  Fluid Characteristics Hazard Potential A B C 1 Category I Category I Category II 2 Category II Category II Category III 3 Category III Category III Category IV 4 Category IV Category IV Category V 5 Category V Category V Category V 5 TABLE 63.5 FREQUENCY OF PERIODIC INSPECTIONS AND TESTS (EXCERPT FROM ITC- MIE-AP16)  Category of the Periodic Inspections and Tests Equipment Inspection Pressure Test 6 years (by External 9 years (by External I Inspector) Inspector) 8 years (by External 12 years (by External II Inspector) Inspector) 10 years (by External 15 years (by External III Inspector) Inspector) 12 years (by Own IV 18 years (by Own Inspector) Inspector) V Not required 18 years (by Own Inspector) (2) Subsequent test pressure values. Following major repairs, as defined in paragraph (e) below, or the required periodic tests, the provisions of the Design Code will be fulfilled. If not specified, the test pressure for pressure apparatus or systems, other than boilers, shall be: p Pp 1.1 Pd d For boilers, the test pressure value shall be: Pp 1.25 Pd For straight-through forced circulation boilers with a variable point of vaporization and pressurisedpressurized parts designed for different levels of pressure along the water-steam flow path, the test pressure shall be as follows: Pp 1.1 Pms e Following any repairs not having a scope defined as constituting a major repair, the only requirement will be a leak test of a value equal to the maximum service pressure, Pms . (e) Major repairs. These are defined as those affecting to apparatus belonging to Categories I, II, III, and IV, in accordance with the extent established below: (1) In boilers, when a surface area of the shroud of more than 2% has been replaced. Also, when drums or headers are affected by the repair whatever the number of welds affected or a heat treatment has been required during the repair. The cutting of tubes or removal of header plugs to inspect the conditions of the interior of the boiler are not considered to constitute major repairs. One hundred percent of the welds performed for these reasons shall be inspected by non-destructive testing techniques. Repairs affecting the reheater are not considered to constitute a major repair for the purposes of hydraulic testing, although in their place the radiographic inspection of 100% of the welds is required. (2) In the case of heat exchangers, except condensers, when the length of the affected weld whatever the chamber in question exceeds 10% of the total. Also, when heat treatments have been performed or more than 10% of the tubes have been replaced, this shall also be considered as constituting a major repair. Repairs affecting the condenser are not considered to constitute a major repair for the purposes of hydraulic testing. (3) In piping systems, when the number of welds performed is greater than 2% of those in the system for Categories I and II, and greater than 10% for Categories III and IV. 6 <H3>184.108.40.206 Oil refineries Refineries and petrochemical Petrochemical plantsPlants. The requirements of ITC-MIE-AP6  relating to inspection and testing are summarisedsummarized below. (a) Classification for the purposes of inspection and testing. PressurisedPressurized systems and apparatus are classified through a combination of the concepts of hazard potential and fluid characteristics, as defined below. Hazard potential is defined as the product of the design pressure Pd in kg/cm2 by volume V in m3, as Formatted indicated in Table 63.1. Formatted As regards fluid characteristics, the classification of pressure apparatus is shown in Table 63.6. TABLE 63.6 FLUID CHARACTERISTICS GROUPS (ITC-MIE-6)  Group Fluid Characteristics Flammable fluids in vapourvapor, gas, or liquid phase and their mixtures at temperature equal to or higher than 200 ºC; A gases and liquids of elevated toxicity; hydrogen at any temperature. Flammable fluids in vapourvapor, gas ,or liquid phase and their mixtures at temperature B lower than 200 ºC; and toxic liquids, acidic or caustic at any temperature. C Water steam (gas phase), inert or innocuous gases and air. D Water at temperature 85 ºC Table 63.7 summarisessummarizes the different categories of pressurisedpressurized apparatus. (b) Inspections and testing prior to entry into service. The requirements are similar to those indicated in Section 220.127.116.11 paragraph (b). (c) Periodic inspections and testing. With the exception of piping, the scope of the periodic inspections and tests is as follows: (1) Exterior inspection. This will consists at least of a visual inspection of the areas subjected to the highest stresses and corrosion, of the checking of thicknesses by means of ultrasonic techniques and of any non-destructive test considered necessary, as long as the conditions of the process allow. In order to perform this inspection it will not be necessary to remove the apparatus or system to be inspected from service. (2) Interior inspection. This will consist at least of a complete visual inspection of all parts subjected to pressure, along with whatever non-destructive tests are considered necessary. Whenever an interior inspection cannot be performed for reasons of physical impossibility, it shall be replaced with a pressure test. (3) Pressure test. This will consist of a hydrostatic test or any special alternative test previously authorisedauthorized, and will be combined to the extent possible with interior inspection. The frequency of and the competence for the different periodic inspections and tests for the different categories of apparatus are indicated in Table 63.8. In the case of piping, non-destructive testing inspections shall be carried out every ten 10 years by an own inspector. 7 (d) Testing conditions. For the first pressure test the following minimum requirements shall in all cases be met, in addition to those established in the design manual and referring to these values: (1) PressurisedPressurized apparatus or systems. The hydrostatic test pressure shall be as follows: p Pp 1.25 Pd d During pressure testing, and other than in exceptional cases duly justified in the design manual, the value of 90% of the yield strength of the material at the test temperature shall not be exceeded for the primary membrane stresses. For subsequent pressure tests, the test pressure value shall be at least that indicated for the initial test. (2) Apparatus or systems subjected to vacuum. The test pressure value shall be that defined in the design manual. (e) Inspection and testing following repairs. After a major repair (as defined below), a visual inspection of the repaired area and a pressure test shall be carried out. The test pressure will be equal to that of the first pressure test. Major repairs are defined as those affecting repaired apparatus belonging to Categories I, II, III, and IV, with the scope indicated below: (1) Columns, tanks, and reactors: - When the length of the affected weld calculated in percentage of the total length of the equipment is equal to or greater than the values indicated in Table 63.9. TABLE 63.9 MAJOR REPAIRS IN COLUMNS, TANKS, AND REACTORS WELDS  Type of Weld Category Longitudinal Circumferential I Any Any II Any Any III 15% 30% IV 20% 40% - In apparatus or systems subjected to vacuum, except for those containing incombustible fluids or fluids not forming explosive mixtures. (2) Heat exchangers. The conditions indicated in paragraph (1) above apply for the shell side and distributor. (3) Air-coolers. Any replacement of tubes or weld repairs to headers. (4) Furnaces. When the length of tubes replaced exceeds of 10% of the full length of the complete drum circuit. (5) Boilers and steam producing equipment. When the length of tubes replaced exceeds of 10% of the full length of the tube circuit. TABLE 63.7 CATEGORIES OF PRESSURE EQUIPMENT (EXCERPT FROM ITC-MIE-AP6)  Fluid Characteristics Hazard Potential A B C D 1 Category I Category I Category I Category II 2 Category I Category II Category II Category III 3 Category II Category III Category III Category IV 8 4 Category III Category IV Category IV Category V 5 Category IV Category V Category V Category V TABLE 63.8 FREQUENCY OF PERIODIC INSPECTIONS AND TESTS (EXCERPT FROM ITC- MIE-AP6)  Category of the Periodic Inspections and Tests Equipment External Inspection Internal Inspection Pressure Test 3 years (by Own 6 years (by External 12 years (by External I Inspector) Inspector) Inspector) 4 years (by Own 8 years (by External 16 years (by External II Inspector) Inspector) Inspector) 5 years (by Own 10 years (by External III Not required Inspector) Inspector) 6 years (by Own 12 years (by Own IV Not required Inspector) Inspector) 7 years (by Own V Not required Not required Inspector) 9 (6) Piping. In this case, major repairs are defined as all those fulfilling the following conditions simultaneously: - The number of pipe joining welds performed exceeds those indicated in Table 63.10. - The welding procedure includes heat treatment or the thickness of both pipes to be joined exceeds 12 millimetresmillimeters. TABLE 63.10 MAJOR REPAIRS IN PIPING WELDS  Category Number of Welds I Any II 4 III 8 IV 16 Formatted: Bullets and Numbering 63.3<H3>63.3 CODES AND STANDARDS IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY In the nuclear field, and in the absence of a national regulation, the codes and standards of the countries of origin of the design of each reactor are applied. The Spanish nuclear fleet is currently made up of 7 PWR and BWR reactors of U.S. design and one German designed PWR. The main characteristics of these plants are summarisedsummarized in Table 63.11, which also includes the José Cabrera Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) (also known as Zorita after the village near which it is located), which was disconnected from the grid in April 2006 after 38 years of operation and is currently in the dismantling process. Section III of the ASME Code was applied to the design and construction of this plant for the first time in Spain, and subsequently Section XI was applied for in-service inspection, following its publication in 1971. Before the start of the NPP construction programme in Spain, nuclear power was considered in the 1961 Rules on Uncomfortable, Unhealthy, and Dangerous Activities (now overruled by Law 34/2007 on Air Quality and Atmosphere Protection)  as an industrial activity which that required the enforcement of the specific measures laid down by the competent Technical Bodies, and which that urged the Ministerial Departments with competence in the above areas to issue the required provisions. Fundamentally, the legal bases were established in 1964 Law on Nuclear Energy  adopting the Nuclear Act and Decree dated July 21, 1972 on the Order of Nuclear and Radioactive Installations . The scope of the 1964 law cover the application of nuclear power for peaceful purposes and its safety objectives are the protection of life, health, and property. This law sets out the framework for the definition of international agreements, designates the Ministry of Industry as the body responsible for the nuclear permits and designates the Junta de Energía Nuclear (JEN) as the body responsible for the assessment of matters dealing with safety, inspections, and surveillance of nuclear and radioactive installations. In 1980 the Law  creating the Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (CSN) was passed and this body was assigned the tasks previously carried out by the JEN, the development of regulations in this field, the definition of nuclear safety-related research plans and international coordination. The CSN is independent of government administration and is directly responsible to Parliament. Apart from these basic laws there is additional applicable legislation such as the Regulations on Protection from Ionising Radiations, Seismic Resistance, and Protection of the Environment among others. The legislation is completed by specific requirements in the licensing process, which is similar to the one used in the United States and consists of three main stages : (1) Prior authorization of the site and of the objectives of the installation. (2) Authorization for construction including the Preliminary Safety Study. (3) Authorization for startup of commercial operation. 10 Before the authorization of the construction, the CSN evaluates the Safety Study and forwards its evaluation to the Ministry of Industry and Energy along with a conditional permit which that defines the safety limits and conditions to be incorporated in the project or justifying studies to be provided by the applicant. The conditional permit issued by the CSN establishes the Licensing Bases and rarely establishes requirements in addition to those stipulated in the nuclear safety Laws and Regulations or in the codes and standards applicable in the country of origin. Some differences do, however, exist in the applicability of Code Cases in respect to the validity dates or specific regulatory requirements that aim to harmoniseharmonize the requirements of different countries of origin of the nuclear reactor for the power plants of different designs existing in Spain. For instance, the authorities required the German designed PWR plant to comply with the ISI requirements of the ASME Code Section XI. This represents a differential treatment with respect to the In- Service Inspection Manual applicable to similar German NPPs. Certain differences may be underlined, for example, the in-service hydrostatic testing of the primary circuit at a German designed PWR plant, where the regulator established in the licensing basis that this should be performed in accordance with the KTA rules with respect to test pressure (1.3 times the design pressure) and temperature (not less than RTNDT + 33 ºC, nor higher than RTNDT + 55 ºC), but with a frequency of ten 10 years, as in the case of ASME Code Section XI, instead of the eight years established in the KTA rules. TABLE 63.11 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN SPAIN [Source: Spanish Nuclear Industry Forum (www.foronuclear.org)] Capacity Commercial Current Plant Type NSSS Supplier (MWe) Operation Operation Permit Almaraz I PWR Westinghouse 977 05/1981 06/2000 Almaraz II PWR Westinghouse 980 10/1983 06/2000 Ascó I PWR Westinghouse 1033 12/1984 10/2001 Ascó II PWR Westinghouse 1027 03/1986 10/2001 Cofrentes BWR/6 General Electric 1092 03/1985 03/2001 José Cabrera PWR Westinghouse 150 07/1968 Decommissioned (Zorita) Santa María de BWR/3 General Electric 466 05/1971 07/1999 Garoña Trillo PWR Siemens/KWU 1066 08/1988 11/2004 Vandellós II PWR Westinghouse 1087 03/1988 07/2000 [Source: Spanish Nuclear Industry Forum (www.foronuclear.org)] Formatted 11 Furthermore, the CSN monitors the safety of the plants during their operating life by means of Periodic Safety Reviews (PSR) carried out every ten 10 years. Basically, the scope of the PSR covers : (1) Applicability of new regulations. (2) Operating experience. (3) Safety of design modifications. The following sections summarisesummarize the national projects on ISI. Formatted: Bullets and Numbering 63.3.1<H2>63.3.1 Qualification of NDT for ISI <H3>18.104.22.168 Background. As a consequence of the international Programme for the Inspection of Steel Components (PISC) funded by the OECD-NEA and completed in 1992, the European organizations related to In-Service Inspection (ISI) and the nuclear utilities constituted the European Network for Inspection Qualification (ENIQ) to develop an harmonisedharmonized qualification methodology as a recommendation to be implemented at national level in the different European countries. The methodology was published in 1995 and revised later in 1997 . Several technical documents, named Recommended Practices that support this methodology have been alsoalso been elaborated. On the other handcontrary, the European Nuclear Regulators was constituted in 1995 the "“Nuclear Regulators Working Group" ” (NRWG-TF-NDTQ) to analyseanalyze their position in relation to nondestructive examination (NDE) qualification and to evaluate the proposed methodology elaborated by ENIQ. In 1996 they issued the document "“Common Position of European Regulators on Qualification of NDT systems for Pre- and In-Service Inspection of Light Water Reactors Components", ,” revised later in 1997 . In general terms, their position is coincident with the ENIQ methodology. Both the Spanish Utilities and the Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (CSN), the Spanish Nuclear Regulator, agreed that in Spain, the European NDE qualification methodology should be implemented, but in the framework of ISI scope of ASME Section XI. As a consequence, UNESA, as the Spanish Nuclear Association of Utilities, started in 1996 started a project to develop the Spanish NDE methodology based on ENIQ qualification principles within the ISI scope of ASME Section XI. This methodology was completed in 1999 and it was presented to the CSN for evaluation to regulate in the near future the NDE qualification approach proposed. The regulator and the utilities agreed to perform a pilot project to verify the qualification process and the technical requirements defined in the methodology . The pilot project, named VENDE, started in 2000 and it was completed by the middle of 2002. It was jointly funded by the nuclear utilities throughout UNESA and the CSN. The inspection components in the pilot project were the output nozzles of a PWR reactor pressure vessel and the feedwater nozzles of a BWR reactor pressure vessel. The inspection areas were in both cases the nozzle to shell weld, the inner radius, and the adjacent nozzle body. For both components ultrasonic mechanisedmechanized inspection were used, but the PWR nozzle was inspected from the inside surface and the BWR nozzle from the outside surface. (a) Organisation of the pilot project. All parties involved in the qualification process were created, by constituting working groups. The Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) group, responsible of the ISI, had two co- ordinators from the two pilot plants and representatives of all other plants. The Independent Qualification Body (IQB) group, responsible of the evaluation and certification of the qualification, had also two co- ordinators from the two pilot plants and representatives of all other plants. Observers from the CSN participated in each working group. A Quality group was also created with the same structure as the other two groups. In the other handOn the contrary, Tecnatom acted as the ISI vendor to be qualified in this exercise. (b) Qualification input data. According to the methodology, the qualification input data was defined for each inspection area including: (1) Inspection area description 12 (2) Definition of type of qualification defects: postulated and specific, which were the cases applicable to these areas (3) Definition of qualification defects sizes (4) Defect detection rate in practical demonstrations (accordingly probability of detection and confidence level) (5) False call detection rate in practical demonstrations (accordingly probability of false call and confidence level) (6) Definition of measurements uncertainties Tecnatom prepared detailed 8 eight inspection procedures for detection and defect sizing according to the input data definition and the requirement of the methodology (c) Qualification documentation. The following documents were elaborated within the project: (1) Qualification ISI Objectives report for each area. (2) Essential Variables report for each area, to define the essential variables of component, defects, equipment, procedures, techniques, etcand so on. (3) Technical Justifications for each area for the postulated defect cases, including analysis of worst-case defects in each area by simulation modellingmodeling. (4) Specification for defect manufacturing in PWR and BWR test specimen for open and blind qualifications. A total of 38 fatigue crack defects were manufactured. (d) Qualification performance demonstrations. Open demonstrations for inside surface inspection procedures qualification were performed for PWR nozzle to shell weld, inner radius, and adjacent nozzle body. The inner radius area had a specific defect case and the other two had component design postulated defect cases. In the first case the practical demonstration was a requisite, but after analysis of technical justification the NPP group and the IQB group concluded that additional performance demonstration had also to be performed in the postulated defect cases. Open demonstrations for outside inspection procedures qualification were performed for BWR nozzle to shell weld, inner radius, and adjacent nozzle body. All areas had component design postulated defect cases, but after analysis of technical justification the NPP group and the IQB group concluded that additional performance demonstration had also to be performed in the postulated defect cases. Blind practical demonstrations were performed for data qualification of analysts in the case of specific defect. (e) Final qualification reports. A Final Qualification report was prepared for all the inspection areas with the conclusions on the qualification exercises and also the lessons learned on the application of the methodology and the technical guidelines during the performance of the pilot project. (f) Revision of the Spanish ISI qualification methodology. After completion of the pilot project, a revision of the methodology took place, with the aim of including the practical experiences of the qualification exercise. The main document and the seven technical guidelines were revised and this activity was completed by the middle of 2003. The revision was made by the UNESA qualification-working group that held periodic meetings with the Nuclear Regulator for consensus in the modifications. The revised methodology was sent to the CSN for final approval and ruling, which was completed in March 2004. As general criteria for the evaluation of the methodology, the CSN used also the document “Report on Regulator’s Experience on NDT Qualification for In-Service Inspection of LWR Components” . Immediately after that, UNESA started a joint effort to perform the required NDE qualification of the inspection systems in a Qualification Programme that will last until the end of 2008. <H3>22.214.171.124 Description of the Spanish NDE qualification Qualification methodologyMethodology. The methodology  is described in a main document where the objectives, scope, principles of qualification, functions, and responsibilities of the parties are defined. Additionally, seven technical documents develop all technical aspects of a qualification process: 13 (a) Guideline for the definition of ISI qualification objectives (b) Guideline for the definition and analysis of essential variables (c) Guideline for the definition of objectives and content description of technical justifications (d) Guideline for the specification of test specimens for practical demonstrations (e) Guideline for the definition of rules for the performance of practical demonstrations (f) Guideline for the definition of the final qualification report contents (g) Guideline for the definition of management and quality system for the qualification process This These guidelines constitutes an alternative to the qualification requirements for ultrasonic examinations in ASME Section XI Appendices VII and VIII. The main features of the guideline are described below: (a) Scope. The basic scope is Section XI of ASME Code, but also other areas requiring NDE examinations by the regulator, on basis to operating experience, etc. The methodology is applicable to the ultrasonic inspections as well as to other NDE methods with capabilities for defect detection and through wall depth sizing, such as eddy current techniques applied to the inspection of steam generator tubes. (b) Definition of qualification defects. Consistent with the ENIQ methodology, for each inspection area a qualification defect shall be defined. The qualification requirements are based on the type of the qualification defect. (1) Specific defect case. It is applicable when a defect has been observed in a given area/component in the plant. The defect to be detected, characterisedcharacterized and sized is known in location and morphology and a “fit-for-purpose” inspection procedure can be elaborated. (2) Postulated defect case. Applicable when there is a postulated defect due to component design requirements. Degradation experiences in other similar NPP can be considered as postulated defects, if the situation is extendable to the component or area. The exact characteristics of the postulated defect are not known and they must be alsoalso be postulated. For piping segments classified as High Safety Significance in the framework of a Risk-Informed Inspection (RI-ISI) program according to the Spanish RI-ISI methodology (See see Section 63.3.2), the applicable qualification requirement are those corresponding to the postulated defect case. (3) Undefined defect case. Applicable when none of the above cases exist in the component or inspection area. (c) Qualification principles. As per ENIQ methodology, inspecttioninspection qualification can be achieved by combination of the following elements: - Practical Demonstration (non-blind and blind). - Technical Justification. (d) Requisites for qualification of inspection equipment and procedures. These are a function of the qualification defect case: (1) Specific defect case. An open practical demonstration is required on test specimen containing the specific defects. Also, a technical justification must be prepared to generalisegeneralize and complete the results of the practical demonstrations. (2) Component or area with postulated defect case. A technical justification must be prepared to analyseanalyze in depth the inspection techniques, the procedure and the equipment performance and all the essential variables must be evaluated by physical reasoning, theoretical and practical experiences, validated mathematical and simulation modellingmodeling, etcand so on. In case that the technical justification presents all the needed evidences, a practical demonstration will not be carried out. On the contraryOn the contrary, for the essential variables that cannot be properly justified, a practical demonstration will be performed on test specimens that reproduce the essential variables under analysis. 14 (3) Component or area with undefined defect case. A simplified technical justification must be prepared to demonstrate that the inspection is performed according to written instructions, standards, or codes. The technical justification will include a demonstration of the sensitivity of the inspection techniques according to the applicable codes and standards. (e) Requisites for qualification of inspection personnel. All inspection personnel must be in possession of their valid Nondestructive Testing (NDT) Certification according to the inspection procedure requirements, and as a minimum requisite, must be certified as Level II or III through Spanish Standard UNE EN 473  or equivalent. Additionally, the inspection personnel must accomplish with the following qualification requisites defined as a function of the qualification defect case. (1) Specific defect case. All inspection personnel performing equipment calibration and data acquisition must perform the open practical demonstration for equipment and procedures qualification. All data analysts must perform a blind practical demonstration on test specimen containing the specific defects. Previously acquired data can be used for data analyst qualification. In all cases, selection of data to be analysed analyzed shall be selected by the Independent Qualification Organisation. (2) Component or area with postulated defect case. All inspection personnel performing equipment calibration and data acquisition must perform the open practical demonstration for equipment and procedures qualification, when it was necessary to be performed. All data analysts must perform a blind practical demonstration on test specimen containing the essential variables, when it was necessary to be performed. (3) Component or area with undefined defect case. No additional requisites are needed in this defect case. (f) Parties involved in the qualification process: (1) Nuclear Power Plant. It has the responsibility of preparing the specification of input data and NDT qualification objectives. It has also the responsibility of revising and the approval of all documents required for qualification (inspection procedures, technical justifications, test specimen specification, practical demonstration results, etc.). (2) Independent Qualification Body. An Independent Qualification Body (IQB), as per Standard UNE EN 45004 type B Body , will be set within the organisational organizational structure of the nuclear power plant. A quality system will guarantee its full independence. It has the responsibility of evaluating all qualification documents and that all qualification activities are performed according to the Spanish NDT Qualification Methodology, and of the certification of the qualification. (3) ISI Vendor. It has the responsibility of preparing the inspection procedures, technical justifications, and of performing all required practical demonstrations. (4) Nuclear Regulator (CSN). In relation to qualification, the CSN approve the methodology and will rule its application in Spain. Then, the Nuclear Regulator function will include NDT qualification follow- up as part of their general evaluation of safety requirement of the nuclear power plant installations. <H3>126.96.36.199 Implementation of the methodology. The Spanish nuclear power plants decided to work together in a joint project to perform the initial NDT qualifications. The objective is to optimiseoptimize the resources to be dedicated to qualification from the viewpoint of technical experts, test specimens, ISI vendors, etc.and so on, given the important synergy existing among the components in operating nuclear power plants in Spain. A working group was set up in 2002 with the participation of all the ISI managers in the plants, which was named GRUVAL. The function of this group is to co-ordinate and to supervise the qualification activities defined in the methodology. In parallel, another working group named GROIV was set up in 2003 with the participation of the IQB managers of each plant to co-ordinate and evaluate the qualification activities. The organisation organization flow chart of the joint qualification project is shown in Fig. 63.1. 15 NPP 1 NPP 2 NPP n ISI1 IQB1 ISI2 IQB2 ISIn IQBn GRUVAL GROIV (NPP ISI Working Group) (IQB W. Group) Methodology Engineering Technical Support Companies support FIG. 63.1 ORGANIZATION FLOW CHART OF THE JOINT QUALIFICATION PROJECT . (Note: dotted line means administrative link only). Several activities were performed by GRUVAL and GROIV<!--<query>Please provide the full definition of the terms "GRUVAL and GROIV',in the text.</query>--> since 2003. In relation to the definition of the organisation organization and responsibilities of GRUVAL and GROIV, a Management Manual was elaborated. There, the final responsibilities of qualification of each plant and its individual IQB, GRUVAL, and GROIV are stated; the mission is to co-ordinate, manage, and evaluate the joint qualification exercises. Each nuclear plant and his its IQB must later approve all documents and activities produced by GRUVAL and GROIV to officially assume the qualifications in each plant. In relation to the technical activities, GRUVAL decided to create Qualification Groups for all the inspection areas of the nuclear plants that required qualification of the ISI performed, based on the synergy existing among them. Four technical documents were elaborated for this purpose: (1) Definition of the grouping criteria (2) Definition of all Qualification Groups (3) Identification of inspection areas of all NPP in each Qualification Groups (4) Calendar for all qualification activities For the definition of grouping criteria several different types of information were needed: component geometries and dimensions, base material and weld materials, basic NDE methods, qualification defect cases, access to the areas, inspection requirements, etcand so on. A total of 53 Qualification Groups were defined encompassing ferritic, austenitic and dissimilar metal welds in piping, reactor pressure vessel areas, including control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) penetrations in PWR vessel heads and control rod drive housing (CRDH) penetrations in BWR bottom heads, steam generator tubes, etcand so on. More than 10,000 inspection areas were assigned to the Qualification Groups. For those welds in the ferritic, austenitic and dissimilar metal Qualification Groups inspected using manual ultrasonic procedures, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Performance Demonstration Initiative (PDI) qualified generic procedures have been selected for application to Spanish plants. Practical demonstrations have been carried out at the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) facilities in Charlotte, NC using the existing PDI mock-ups. Further, the EPRI PDI personnel also developed the technical justifications to analyze those essential variables of the inspection procedures that could not be properly reproduced during the practical demonstrations. 16 <H2>63.3.2 RI-ISI applications for piping <H2>188.8.131.52 Background. Taking into account the U.S. developments regarding Risk- Informed ISI, the Spanish utilities and the Nuclear Regulator (CSN) have shown an increasing interest in any possible optimisationoptimization of the ISI programs. Within this framework, a pilot study on risk-informed ISI was arranged in a cooperative R&D project between the CSN and UNESA (Spanish Utilities Group). The objectives of the project were as follows: (a) To define the main characteristics of a suitable methodology to define a risk-informed ISI program for piping, using as reference, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) regulation. (b) To apply the developed methodology to a Spanish NPP, defining the scope of systems to be included in the program and analyzsing the different cases that might occur, to define the necessary steps to be followed and to identify and solve the potential problems that might arise during the definition of a full scope RI-ISI program for piping. (c) To define the minimal requirements for the documentation to be submitted and the basic steps of the CSN staff evaluation process, to allow for an agile implementation process for future applications. The project consisted of three main activities: (a) Revision and analysis of all the applicable and available documentation, to define the framework for the project for the Spanish approach. This activity was completed in December 1998. (b) Definition of a generic guideline applicable to Spanish NPPs, for the establishment of an RI-ISI program for piping. This guideline was issued in its first consensus draft in May 1999 and later revised to include the lessons learned from the pilot studies. (c) Application of the guideline defined to one or two pilot plants. The objective of this activity was to check the technical consistency of the guideline. The pilot plants were Ascó I (PWR) and Santa María de Garoña (BWR). In both cases, only the quantitative approach was used. The scope of the Ascó I study was all the Class 1 piping and selected portions of Class 2, 3, and Non-class piping systems. In the case of Santa María de Garoña, the scope covered selected portions of Class 1, 2, and Non-class piping systems. The Ascó I Class 1 piping application  was later submitted to and approved by the CSN with slight modifications in September 2001, becoming the first RI-ISI application licensed in Europe. <H3>184.108.40.206 Description of Spanish RI-ISI Guideline for pipingPiping. The Guideline RI-ISI-02, rev. 0  was issued in May 2000. The guideline develops general criteria for a risk-informed application in nuclear class piping and particular criteria related to the quantitative and the qualitative methods. The guideline, is mainly based on USNRC Reg. Guides 1.174 and 1.178, NUREG-0800 Chapters 19 and 3.9.8; this guideline also considers methods from WCAP-14572, rev. 1-NP-A (for quantitative approach) and EPRI-TR-112657, rev. B (for qualitative approach) as well as ASME Section XI Code Cases N-560, N-577, and N-578; it is also based on the conclusions and recommendations of the report EUR 19153 EN . The guideline has the following structure: (a) A methodological part defining the general approach to be applied, taking into account both quantitative and qualitative approaches. TABLE 63.12 CLASS 1 PIPING SEGMENTS CLASSIFICATION FOR PWR PLANTS  Number of Segments Plant Region In Region Total 1 HSS/HFI 28 Ascó I 2 HSS/LFI 23 102 3 LSS/HFI 9 17 4 LSS/LFI 42 1 HSS/HFI 20 Almaraz 2 HSS/LFI 4 86 II 3 LSS/HFI 28 4 LSS/LFI 36 1 HSS/HFI 23 2 HSS/LFI 5 Almaraz I 86 3 LSS/HFI 30 4 LSS/LFI 28 1 HSS/HFI 19 2 HSS/LFI 28 Ascó II 102 3 LSS/HFI 22 4 LSS/LFI 33 HSS: High Safety Significant LSS: Low Safety Significant HFI: High Failure Importance LFI: Low Failure Importance 18 TABLE 63.13 INSPECTION AREAS RESULTING FROM ASME SECTION XI AND RI-ISI PROGRAMS FOR CLASS 1 PIPING IN PWR PLANTS  Areas in ASME Section XI Program Areas in RI- Reduction Plant B-F B-J ISI Program (%) Total welds welds Ascó I 42 178 220 103 53 Almaraz II 42 241 283 59 79 Almaraz I 42 233 275 76 72 Ascó II 42 178 220 82 62 (b) A documentation requirement part defining the documentation that should be maintained at the plant and the documentation to be submitted to the Nuclear Regulator as the “Final Report.”. (c) An evaluation part which that includes the process that is to be adhered to by the CSN Staff to review and approve an RI-ISI program. All the activities that should be reviewed, and the acceptance criteria for each, are included in this part of the document. (d) Attachments: One with the details of the quantitative methodology, another with details of the qualitative methodology, and a third with the type of report that has to be submitted. Each of these attachments develops the details of the general body of the guideline. The approach for the Spanish guideline is not to limit the scope of the program only to Section XI but to attempt to include all the ISI programs (e. g., IGSCC, FAC) in place at the NPP, on a voluntary basis. Another characteristic of the Spanish guideline is that it includes the technical approach and the evaluation process in the same document, due to its having been developed through cooperative action. <H3>220.127.116.11 RI-ISI applications Applications at Spanish NPPs. Concerning the Spanish PWR plants, following Ascó I application, Almaraz II, Almaraz I, and Ascó II NPPs submitted and get licensed their RI-ISI programs for Class 1 piping . The degradation mechanisms applicable to the piping included in the scope are as follows : (a) Thermal stratification in zones of possible mixing of water at different temperatures (b) Thermal fatigue due to normal heatup and cooldown (c) Vibrations in small piping close to the source of vibration (d) Water hammer in the pressurizer auxiliary spray line when not prevented by the operating procedure in place (e) Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) in areas containing susceptible material The results of failure probability due to these degradation mechanisms have been as expected. Logical differences have been encountered between twin units, among other reasons, due to the age of the plant, the results obtained from stress analysis (differences in piping supports, etc.) and the results of the inspections performed to date. In addition to the results obtained from the application of the quantitative methodology, in accordance with the requirements of the Spanish guideline, various locations have been selected for inspection to fulfilfulfill the defencedefense in depth criterion. Other criteria that have been applied arehave been as follows: TABLE 63.14 CLASS 1 AND 2 PIPING SEGMENTS CLASSIFICATION AND NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS FOR THE COFRENTES BWR PLANT  19 Number of Segments Number of Inspections Piping Region In Region Total In Region Total 1 HSS/HFI 39 116 2 HSS/LFI - - Class 1 182 130 3 LSS/HFI 51 7 4 LSS/LFI 92 7 1 HSS/HFI 7 7 2 HSS/LFI - - Class 2 546 21 3 LSS/HFI 124 4 4 LSS/LFI 415 10 1 HSS/HFI 46 123 2 HSS/LFI - - Class 1 & 2 728 151 3 LSS/HFI 175 11 4 LSS/LFI 507 17 HSS: High Safety Significant LSS: Low Safety Significant HFI: High Failure Importance LFI: Low Failure Importance 20 TABLE 63.15 INSPECTION AREAS RESULTING FROM ASME SECTION XI AND RI-ISI PROGRAMS FOR CLASS 1 AND 2 PIPING FOR THE COFRENTES BWR PLANT  Areas in ASME Section XI Areas in RI-ISI Program Reduction Program (%) Existing Selected Existing Selected 2840 365 6458 151 59 (a) Relocation in Region 3 (LSS/HFI segments) of segments initially located in Region 4 (LSS/LFI), due to snubber failure potential or water-hammer potential. (b) NDT testing of a sample of piping segments greater than NPS 3 located in Region 4. (c) Improvements in the level of confidence required in the statistical analysis for determining the number of inspections required in a given segment, raising it from 95% to 99%. (d) Use of qualified NDT procedures capable of detecting and sizing cracking due to thermal stratification, thermal stripping, or SCC, in segments prone to these mechanisms. (e) Inclusion of all, or at least a representative sample of, welds showing a possibility of SCC degradation mechanisms, such as nozzle-to-pipe Alloy 82/182 welds in RCS components (RPV, steam generators, and pressurizer). The final classification of segments for each plant is shown in Table 63.12. In addition, Table 63.13 shows the comparison between the number of inspections required by the ASME Section XI programs and the corresponding RI-ISI programs. Despite the significant reduction achieved in the number of inspections, all RI-ISI programs resulted in slight reductions of risk in comparison with the previous ISI programs, both in terms of the Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and of the Large Early Release Frequency (LERF). On the other handOn the contrary, the RI-ISI application of Cofrentes BWR plant  shows differences in the scope with respect to the above PWR applications, since the latter cover only Class 1 piping whereas the scope of the former encompasses both Class 1 and 2 piping. Also, the Cofrentes NPP application does not cover dissimilar metal welds between the RPV nozzles and safe-ends and between the safe-end and extensions (ASME Section XI Category B-F welds). The total number of segments in the scope amounts to 728, from which only 182 belong to Class 1 piping. The total number of welds in the scope amounts to 6458. Beside the fatigue, the Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) degradation mechanism was postulated for austenitic stainless steel piping in contact with the reactor coolant. Consideration was given in the evaluation of failure probabilities to the mitigation measures implemented in these welds. Also, the Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) mechanism was postulated for the carbon steel piping in the steam and feedwater lines. The FAC mechanism was accounted for in the evaluation of the failure probabilities, although the plant’s FAC program will continue to be governed basically by determinist criteria. This process identified High Safety Significant (HSS) segments due to the FAC degradation all of which deserve special consideration in the future implementation of the FAC program. By contrast with the FAC program, other augmented inspection programs such as those of IGSCC and High Energy Line Breaks are included in the RI-ISI application. In addition to the large number of segments, it is worth noting the effort dedicated to the development of criteria for the evaluation of failure probabilities for small bore piping which that lacked a formal stress analysis since the design was based on guidelines. On the other handcontrary, special emphasis was placed on the evaluation of indirect effects (flooding, jet effects, and pipe whipping) due to piping failures in the Break Exclusion Zone. 21 The analyses showed a significant influence of the FAC and IGSCC degradation mechanisms in the failure probabilities. In general, segments affected with either mechanism resulted in the High Failure Importance regions. In terms of risk, the contribution of the FAC degradation to the CDF amounts to 51% of total CDF, whereas the contribution of the IGSCC degradation amounts to 23% of total CDF. To fulfilfulfill the defencedefense in depth criterion, the regulator required during the licensing process to include at least one location to monitor those systems that did not warrant inspection according to the RI-ISI program but had been required for inspection according to the Section XI program. The final segment classification and the number of elements selected for inspection in each region are shown in Table 63.14. It can be observed that 81% of HSS segments belong to Class 1 piping. These segments cover 93% of the total CDF. Table 63.15 shows a comparison between the number of inspections according to RI-ISI and Section XI programs. Despite the significant reduction on the number of inspections achieved (59%), the RI-ISI program resulted in being risk neutral in comparison with the previous deterministic ISI program, since the CDF reduction is 9.84░·░10-9 and the reduction of the LERF is 3.22░·░10-10. Formatted: Bullets and Numbering 63.4<H1>63.4 CONCLUSIONS In Spain the basic regulation of the non-nuclear industry is included in the Regulation on PressurisedPressurized Apparatus, published in 1979, and in its Complementary Technical Instructions, published in later years. Following Spain’s joining the European Community in 1986, the regulation underwent a series of modifications with a view to bringing it into line with those of the other European Union countries. This regulation remains in force for in-service testing and inspections, while aspects relating to the design, manufacturing, and conformity assessment of pressure equipment are governed by the PED. In the nuclear field, and in the absence of a national regulation, the codes and standards of the countries of origin of the design of each reactor are applied, with certain modifications aimed at harmonisingharmonizing requirements among the country’s different facilities. This is the case, for example, as regards in-service inspection, where Section XI of the ASME Code is applied in all cases. For the qualification of NDT tests applied for in-service inspection, the Spanish industry developed a methodology based on the ENIQ principles, as in other European countries. It should be pointed out, however, that in implementing this methodology for the manual ultrasonic inspection of piping, the generic EPRI PDI procedures have been used, the practical demonstrations having been carried out at this institute’s facilities and using its mock-ups. Furthermore, in Spain the nuclear industry and the regulator have jointly developed a guideline for the application of the risk-informed methodology to the in-service inspection of piping, which is based mainly on the U.S. regulations and on ASME Code Cases N-577 and N-578. On the European stage, the Spanish industry and regulator have contributed to the definition of a common framework for the application of the RI-ISI methodology through their respective participations in the drawing up of the ENIQ’s European Framework Document for Risk-Informed In-service Inspection  and the NRWG’s Report on Regulatory Experience on Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection of Nuclear Power Plants Components and Common Views . Formatted: Bullets and Numbering 63.5<H1>REFERENCES 1. Rules on Pressure Apparatus, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Energy, decree Decree R.D. 1244 dated April 4, 1979 (BOE num. 128, May 29, 1979); R.D. 1504 dated November 23, 1990 (BOE 28-11-1990 and BOE 24-1-19909<!--<query>Please check the change in year for correctness.</query>-->. Modified by decree Decree R.D. 473 dated March 30, 1998 (BOE 20-5-1988) and R.D. 1495/1991 (BOE 15-10-1991). 2. Pressure Equipment Directive 97/23/CE, transposed by decree Decree R.D. 769/1999 dated May 7, 1999 (BOE 31-5-1999). 22 3. ITC-MIE-AP1, Boilers, Economisers, Water Preheaters, Superheaters and Steam Reheaters, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Energy, orders Orders O. 17-3-1982 and O. 28-3-1985. 4. ITC-MIE-AP2, Piping for Fluids Relating to Boilers, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Energy, order Order O. 6-10-1980. 5. ITC-MIE-AP6, Oil Refineries and Petrochemical Plants, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Energy, order Order O. 30-8-1982 and O. 11-7-1983. 6. ITC-MIE-AP10, Cryogenic Tanks, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Energy, order Order O. 7-11-1983 and O. 5-6-1987. 7. ITC-MIE-AP16, Fossil Power Generating Plants, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Energy, order Order O. 11-10-1987. 8. Rules on Uncomfortable, Unhealthy and Dangerous Activities, Decree dated November 30, 1961) (now superseded by Law 34/2007 on Air Quality and Atmosphere Protection, BOE 16-11-2007). 9. Law 25/1964 dated April 29 on Nuclear Energy (BOE 4-5-64), modified by Law 40/1994 dated December, 30, 1994 for the Development of the National Electric System (BOE 31-12-94). 10. Decree law Law 2869/1972 dated July 21, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Energy<!--<query>Please check the insertion "and Energy" for correctness.</query>-->, approving the Bylaw on Nuclear and Radioactive Facilities (BOE 24-10-72). 11. Law 15/1980 dated April 22 on the Creation of the Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (BOE 25-5-80). 12. M. Colinet, M., H.-J. Frank, H.-J., A. Morel, A., F. Hevia Rupérez, F. and N.G. Smith, N.G., Survey of European Design Codes and Regulatory Requirements Relating to the Structural Integrity of ALWR Nuclear Power Plants – Final Report. , AEAT-1506 for the CEC DG-XI, September 1997. 13. CSN Safety Guide 1.10, Periodic Safety Reviews in Nuclear Power Plants, December 1995. 14. European Methodology for Qualification, EUR 17299 EN, revRev. 2, prepared by the European Network on Inspection Qualification (ENIQ), 1997. 15. Common Position of European Regulators on Qualification of NDT Systems for Pre-Service and In-Service Inspection of LWR Components, EUR 16802 EN, revRev. 1, prepared by the Task Force of Nuclear Regulators Working Group (NRWG), 1997. 16. L. Francia, L., G. Bollini, G., J.M. Figueras, J.M., and C. Castelao, C., Spanish Experience on NDT Formatted Qualification. Nuclear Industry and Regulator Views,. OECD/CSNI Symposium on International Formatted Developments and Cooperation on RI-ISI and NDT Qualification, Stockholm, 2004. 17. Report on Regulator’s Experience on NDT Qualification for In-Service Inspection of LWR Components, EUR 20819 EN, revRev. 0<!--<query>Please check the Rev. No. for correctness.</query>-->, prepared by the Task Force of Nuclear Regulators Working Group (NRWG), 2003. 18. Qualification Methodology for Non- Destructive Examination Systems Applied in the In-Service Inspection of Spanish Nuclear Power Plants, UNESA CEX-120, Rev. 2, April 2003. 19. Qualification and Certification of Personnel That Perform Non- Destructive Examinations, UNE EN 473, AENOR, April 1993. 20. General Criteria for the Performance of the Several Types of Organizations That Carry Out Inspection, UNE EN 45004, AENOR, December 1995. 21. J. L. López Ansorena, J.L., L. Ulloa, L., and M. Canton, M., Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection of Piping. Application to Ascó Nuclear Power Plant, XXVI Annual Meeting of the Spanish Nuclear Society, León (Spain), October 2000. 23 22. Guide for the Development and Evaluation of Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection Programs, RI-ISI-02, Rev. 0, CSN-UNESA, May 2000. 23. Report on Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection and Testing, EUR 19153 EN,. European Commission. Nuclear Safety and Environment, June 1999. 24. J. Bros, J. and L. Francia, L., Experience of RI-ISI Applications in Spanish NPPs. Results and Impact on ISI Formatted Programs,. OECD/CSNI Symposium on International Developments and Cooperation on RI-ISI and NDT Formatted Qualification, Stockholm, 2004. 25. C. Castelao, C., C. Mendoza, C., and J.M. Figueras, J.M., Lessons Learned From from the Assessment and Formatted Review of Applications to Use RI-ISI in Spanish NPP,. OECD/CSNI Symposium on International Formatted Developments and Cooperation on RI-ISI and NDT Qualification, Stockholm, 2004. Formatted 26. E. Gutiérrez, E., P. Pérez Tejedor, P., J. García Sicilia, J., F. Gallego, F., C. Martín-Serrano, C., J. Godoy, J., and C. Cueto-Felgueroso, C., Risk-Informed ISI Program for Cofrentes NPP, XXXII Annual Meeting of the Spanish Nuclear Society, Tarragona, (Spain), October 2006. 27. European Framework Document for Risk-Informed In-service Inspection, ENIQ Report nrNr. 23, EUR 21581 EN, March 2005. 28. Report on Regulatory Experience on Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection of Nuclear Power Plants Components and Common Views, EUR 21320 EN,. European Commission. Nuclear Safety and Environment, August 2004.
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