Kim Kouwabunpat

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Lue/Kouwabunpat
EDGE
Fall 2003
5 December 2003

The North Korean Nuclear Missile Crisis
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, otherwise known as North Korea, is

a Communist state that has been creating headline news in recent years, regarding the

state of their notorious nuclear weapons program. In past years, the United States has

played a very critical role in trying to appease the escalating tensions developed within

the relations with North Korea. The speedy development of their nuclear missiles

program has surprised the world, and their proliferation of these nuclear weapons is

planting fear into people’s mind, the potential mass destruction that North Korea is

capable of. Paired along with a bad relationship with North Korea, careful steps must be

taken in order to prevent any possible acts of mass destruction or even an outbreak of

another potential cold war. Clearly, consequences of this nuclear missile crisis can be

enormous for the entire world. Considering the utter seriousness of the matter, the

negotiations conducted by the United States may determine the welfare of many people,

more specifically on the Korean Peninsula. In more recent years, the Bush administration

has been trying to continue the crucial negotiations that Former President Clinton had

began. But relations with North Korea have worsened since the change of the United

States presidency. The increased tensions between the United States and North Korea

regarding the nuclear missile crisis were in part, instigated by the United States--more

specifically, the Bush administration; because the United States is partly responsible for
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the escalation of the crisis, the U.S. should be accountable for its actions and should

devise a policy to establish better relations with North Korea.

Korea: A Divided Nation

Korea, a nation divided by political and economic differences and external

influences, has endured much political chaos throughout the years, resulting in the

creation of two independent nations, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and the

Republic of Korea. Combined, these two nations are merely the size of the state of Utah

in the United States. Once divided, North Korea was no larger than the state of

Mississippi and South Korea is comparatively the size of Indiana. (Compton’s

Encyclopedia) Compared to America, the size difference is amazing, also considering

the amount of culture, tradition, and history that exist within its limiting boundaries.

Although political differences separate Korea into two distinctive territories, the people

are still united in the sense that they continue to share the same cultural heritage and

language. Buddhism and Christianity are the most common forms of religion, although

religion in general is highly discouraged in North Korea. Korea’s geography consists of

mountainous terrain and is located on the Korean peninsula, which comes off in a

southern direction off the eastern coast of Asia next to China.
Lue/Kouwabunpat 3

(http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/images/north-korea-globe.jpg)

Although Korea is only a small part of the world in the northern hemisphere, there has

been significant interest from other surrounding nations to acquire its land. Some of

these countries include, China, Japan, and Russia. Consequently, the history of Korea

has been filled with overwhelming times of struggle and despair, which has had serious

implications for the welfare of the nation as a whole and the individual citizens of Korea.

The Historical Background of Korea’s Political Occupancy

Dating back to the late 19th century, China had marked its power in Korea, which

is part of the basis of some Chinese influence in Korea. But in 1894, the citizens grew

tired and angry of these external powers, and “antiforeign sentiment, coupled with

peasant demands for political and social reforms, culminated in the Tonghak Rebellion.”

(Compton’s Encyclopedia) Both China and Japan sent troops into Korea in order to help

settle the rebellion. Instead, these two rival countries lost sight of their initial intentions

for moving into Korea and started to fight against one another, resulting in the Sino-

Japanese War of 1894-1895. An eventual Japanese victory drove China out of Korea,

and this would be the beginning of a more permanent Japanese dominance found in

Korea. Apparently, Japan was not a favorite among its neighboring countries since there

was also a rivalry with Russia, in addition to China. This conflicting relationship

eventually led to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. With another Japanese victory,

they “declared Korea to be a protectorate of Japan [and] in 1910 they formally annexed

Korea as a Japanese colony.” (Compton’s Encyclopedia)
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Until the end of World War II, Japan had complete colonial control over Korea.

In 1945, Japan’s 35-year acquisition over Korea had ended and the people of Korea

celebrated this defeat. But instead of finding independence, Korea was divided by “the

two great antagonists of the cold war—the Soviet Union and the United States,”

(Compton’s Encyclopedia) at the 38th parallel. The Soviet troops then went on to occupy

the territory north of the 38th parallel, which would become North Korea. Likewise, the

United States went on to acquire the land south of the dividing border. For three years,

the two attempted to negotiate agreements for unifying the country but failed to do so. In

1948, the South had already established a Republic of Korea and had elected Syngman

Rhee as the president by the newly formed National Assembly.

(http://a1-bookmarks.com/images/korea_s-flag.gif, http://a1-

bookmarks.com/images/korea_n-flag.gif) During that same time, counterpart North

Korea had elected communist Kim Il Sung as their premier in the newly established

Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. (Compton’s Encyclopedia) Although all United

States and Soviet troops were withdrawn from Korea in 1950, it was not the end of major

conflict on the Korean peninsula. The Soviet Union soon sent their troops back to

support North Korea, beginning the Korean War. Later, Communist China would soon

join the Soviet troops. The United Nations responded by sending their own military
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support to South Korea, most of the troops comprising of American soldiers. After three

years of intense struggle, the Korean War was ended with the signing of a truce,

maintaining the border at the 38th parallel.

(http://www.thehistorychannel.co.uk/classroom/gcse/pics/korea_map.gif)

North Korea’s Economic Recovery—Post-Korean War

As a result of the devastating war, North Korea suffered severe economic,

industrial, and agricultural problems as they received substantial aid from their

communist allies, the Soviet Union and China. The Soviet Union’s aid included helping

North Korea set up an atomic energy research center in 1962.

(www.wisconsinproject.org) This would soon become the birth of a powerful nuclear

program, capable of a nuclear missile crisis that would have the world sitting in

discomfort. Developing a strong industry was an emphasis in recovering from the war,

especially since the winters in North Korea are very long and harsh. The weather
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conditions are far too severe to maintain agricultural means. They can only take

advantage of farmland support during the summer seasons, which is not enough to

support all the people of the North. Instead, manufacturing became the dominant,

instrumental factor in rebuilding North Korea’s economy. Some of their crucial products

include chemicals, cement, automobiles, iron and steel, nonferrous metals, machinery,

machine tools, tractors, railway rolling stock, and small ships; their consumer goods

include foodstuffs, medicines, textiles, and plastics. (Compton’s Encyclopedia)

Pyongyang would continue to develop as North Korea’s leading manufacturing center.

Attempts at Reunification and Peace

Since the formalized division of the Korean peninsula into North Korea and South

Korea, there have been multiple attempts to help improve relations between the two

Koreas in order to hopefully bring about a reunification in the future. Meetings were

gathered for this reason, starting in 1972. There have been efforts to create various

policies with North Korea that put an emphasis on containment. It was not until 1998

that a formal policy was formulated to move away from the focus of containment, in

order to achieve better relations between North and South Korea. Kim Dae Jung, the

South Korean President, introduced the Sunshine Policy “in order to underline the

peaceful management of the division of the Korean Peninsula.” (Wikipedia) Many feel

that the Sunshine Policy will be much more effective than previous ones since it is

fundamentally different in significant ways. In a speech to the United States the Korean

Ambassador, Yang Sung Chul explained:
Lue/Kouwabunpat 7

First, the Sunshine Policy responds to North Korea’s economic and humanitarian

needs, rather than its strengths on military and ideological fronts…Second, the

central premise of this policy is that North Korea will not collapse any time

soon…Third, the Sunshine Policy focuses first on the tasks and problems that

both sides can easily resolve and overcome, while setting aside intractable issues

for future consideration and resolution…Fourth, it encourages our allies and

friends to actively engage North Korea. (Chul)

As a result so far, there has been a slightly improved integration between North Koreans

and South Koreans. More specifically, “the two countries have forged closer ties: the rail

lines between the North and South have been reconnected, economic relations have

strengthened, and some families separated some 50 years by the Cold War have

reunited.” (Chepesiuk) In June 2000, North Korea and South Korea had made a big step

in inter-Korean relations since they “sign[ed] a joint declaration stating they have ‘agreed

to resolve’ the question of reunification of the Korean Peninsula. The agreement includes

promises to reunite families divided by the Korean War and to pursue other economic

and cultural exchanges.” (Kerr) The Sunshine Policy stands out because of its purpose to

“improve inter-Korean relations, and establish a foundation for peaceful unification.”

(Chul) instead of rushing the process and aggressively imposing South Korean policy

onto North Korea. Balbina Hwang, a policy analyst, explained, “The Sunshine Policy

has as its goal the reduction of tensions between the two Koreas, and the creation of

reconciliation and peace on the Korean peninsula, but the policy don’t aim for

reunification of two Koreas, per se, although that’s the explicit, long-term objective.”
Lue/Kouwabunpat 8

(Chepesiuk) It is a very gradual, yet effective, method of peace-making between the two

Koreas. In 2000, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Kim Dae Jung for the

formulation of such a significant policy that has helped improve relations between the

two Koreas.

The Development of a Nuclear Program and the Progression of a Nuclear Missile

Crisis

(http://www.openhere.com/images/newsimgs/wnet_north_korea_missile_150.jpg)
Although relations have, in fact, improved to some degree on the Korean

peninsula, North Korea’s pursuit of producing powerful nuclear weaponry in the past

decades surely have been impeding the process. Some may give partial responsibility to

the Soviet Union due to its initial aid in helping North Korea set up an atomic energy

research center as well as starting up small reactors in the 1960s. The Soviet Union also

supplied North Korea with FROG-5 and FROG-7A missiles.

(www.wisconsinproject.org) These are true foundations to developing nuclear weapons

and later becoming a potential threat to other nations. With these resources, in addition

to the military aid received from other countries, North Korea already had the capability

to produce enough plutonium to build one bomb each year, by 1979 and build its first

successful reverse-engineered Scud-B missile by 1984. All these events are evident signs
Lue/Kouwabunpat 9

that the progression of North Korea’s military weapon prowess is very much underway at

that moment.

There are other countries, such as Iran, that have also contributed to North

Korea’s nuclear power development. In 1985, negotiations were settled between the two,

agreeing for Iran to financially aid North Korea’s development of Scud missiles. In

return, North Korea agreed to provide Iran with Scud-B technology and would later sell

Iran the missiles when they were ready. This purchase occurred in 1987 when North

Korea sold about 100 Scud-B missiles for $500 million. As a result, in 1988 the United

States refers to North Korea as a nation supporting terrorism. Further relations with Iran,

emphasizing on nuclear weapons trade, includes selling nuclear-capable Scud-C missiles

to Iran in 1991 and another arms deal, selling four Scud-TELs in 1995.

(www.wisconsinproject.org) With continual exchanges of nuclear weaponry between

North Korea and the Middle East, it has driven President Bush to warn that “they would

be ‘held accountable’ if they developed weapons of mass destruction ‘that will be used to

terrorize nations…and by seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a

grave and growing danger.’” (www.cnn.com)

In 1985, North Korea finally signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),

which eased the tensions just slightly with other countries. The treaty basically states a

promise to not produce any bombs and to open all nuclear sites to international

inspection. But North Korea only agreed to sign the treaty under the condition that the

Soviet Union promises to give them several large power reactors. In the meantime,

though, North Korea continued to build nuclear reactors and large plants in order to
Lue/Kouwabunpat 10

produce mass amount of plutonium then process all of it into weapon-ready form.

Despite their signing of the NPT, North Korea had continuously missed numerous

international inspections from 1987 through 1990. (www.wisconsinproject.org) Other

nations even have tried to negotiate inspections out of them. Japan attempted to

exchange their aid and recognition for North Korea to proceed with international

inspections. They refused. Additionally, they also restricted inspectors from entering

certain undeclared sites.

Clearly, there has been a lot of suspicious activity occurring in regards to North

Korea’s nuclear program, which is why this nuclear missile crisis is in an escalating

progression. South Korea attempted to ease the situation on the Korean Peninsula and on

December, 31, 1991:

the two Koreas sign[ed] the South-North Joint Declaration on the

Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Under the declaration, both countries

agree not to ‘test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use

nuclear weapons’ or to ‘possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment

facilities. They also agree[d] to mutual inspections for verification. (Kerr)

Although this agreement between North Korea and South Korea seemed noble at the

time, North Korea clearly did not hold themselves to these promises for very long at all.

Later, the United States tried to impose “missile sanctions” on North Korea in June 1992.

Interestingly enough, that year the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors found

out that North Korea was in the midst of violating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by

diverting plutonium for their nuclear weapons program. In 1993, North Korea went
Lue/Kouwabunpat 11

ahead and gave everyone warning of their plans to withdraw with the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty; this withdrawal from the treaty would be delayed for many

years until their withdrawal would be later finalized. Then United States began to initiate

negotiations themselves with North Korea in 1994 in order to halt their nuclear program.

They eventually issued an “’Agreed Statement,’ under which North Korea will rejoin the

Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty in exchange for light-water reactors, interim energy

supplies and normalization of political and economic relations.”

(www.winsconsinproject.org) Additionally, they also agreed to “work together for peace

and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula [and] work together to strengthen the

international nuclear non-proliferation regime.”

(http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/koreaaf.htm) This would later be

known as the 1994 Agreed Framework.

After the successful signing of this Agreed Framework, the United States

conducted negotiations with North Korea in order to hold up their end of the agreement

and work towards normalizing political and economic relations with them. The

negotiations continued in a second round of talks in New York in June 1997, “with U.S.

negotiators pressing North Korea not to deploy the Nodong missile and to end sales of

Scud missiles and their components.” (Kerr) Unfortunately, effective agreements were

not reached during the meetings in New York but future meetings were being planned. In

August 1998, North Korea surprised the United States with their impressive showing of a

quick jump in technology. They proved their powerful capabilities when they

“launch[ed] a three-stage Taepo Dong-1 rocket with a range of 1,500-2,000 kilometers
Lue/Kouwabunpat 12

that [flew] over Japan. Pyongyang announce[d] that the rocket successfully placed a

small satellite into orbit, a claim contested by U.S. Space Command.” (Kerr)

(above: a Taepo Dong missile, http://www.orbireport.com/NewsPix/TaepoDong.jpg) The

United States intelligence admitted to being shocked at the speed of North Korea’s

missile advancement technology. The thought of their great advancement potentially can

become a fearful thought in realizing the possible outcomes regarding the nuclear missile

crisis. A third round of missile talks between the United States and North Korea were

held once again in New York in October 1998. The United States again, pushed for

North Korea to freeze their nuclear program, and again very little was accomplished. The

fourth round of missile talks in March 1999 in Pyongyang saw very similar results to the

previous few talks in that very little progress was made. (Kerr)

As part of numerous efforts to prevent such monstrous consequences, in May

1999, Former Defense Secretary William Perry visited North Korea to send them a US

disarmament proposal. Then in September that same year, North Korea promised to stop

their testing of long-range missiles for the length of the negotiations with the United

States to normalize relations. At the time, President Clinton focused on improving the

economic tensions with North Korea by easing the “economic sanctions against North

Korea since the Korean Way ended in 1953.”

(http://www.wfn.org/2003/02/msg00214.html) Immediately after in December 1999,
Lue/Kouwabunpat 13

they signed the contract for North Korea to finally begin the construction of their two

Western-developed light-water nuclear reactors. But in July 2000, North Korea was

unhappy and impatient at the fact that they were losing electricity due to the delays of

constructing the nuclear power plants and they threatened to again start up their nuclear

program. In addition, they later warned the United States that they would possibly test

their missiles if the Bush administration did not continue the negotiations regarding the

normalization of economic and political relations. Shortly afterwards, an official

reported that North Korea had went ahead to test their Taepodong-1 missile.

(http://www.wfn.org/2003/02/msg00214.html) The fifth round of these negotiation talks

then occurred in Kuala Lumpur, and again ended without any effective solutions. The

United States continued to ask North Korea to halt their missile program, and North

Korea also repeated their demands for $1 billion every year for freezing their nuclear

program. The United States also rejected this offer, and said that they will instead just

continue to normalize economic relations between the two countries.

The sixth round of missile talks in September 2000 again were brought back to

New York and involved more heavy issues on the nuclear crisis along with terrorism.

The United States and North Korea “issue[d] a joint statement on terrorism, a move that

indicate[d] progress toward removing North Korea from the State Department’s terrorism

list.” (Kerr) For the first time, we can see that progress is being made within these

frequent negotiation talks, even if the progressions are small. The seventh round of

missile talks took place in November 2000 in Kuala Lumpur once again, and further

progress was not achieved. But the lack of progression experienced during this missile
Lue/Kouwabunpat 14

talk in particular was of a little greater significance since it was the last that could occur

before the end of Clinton’s term as president. In December 2000, President Clinton

formally announced that he would no longer be able to personally continue the missile

talks in North Korea since he felt that it was not enough time in order to finish what he

had started. (Kerr)

Negotiations seemed to be well underway under the Clinton administration at that

point, but once the Bush administration was elected in the United States, events again

began to turn sour in the nuclear missile crisis. In March 2001, the media had published

that “a deal with North Korea to eliminate its medium—and long-range missiles and end

its missile exports has been ‘tantalizingly close’ at the end of the Clinton administration.”

(Kerr) Evidently, the seven tedious missile talks that seemed to have accomplish very

little, actually was well in the works for the ultimate goal of the United States and its

allies—to end the North Korean nuclear missile crisis and possibly normalize relations

once again. After Clinton’s term had ended and Bush had taken over his presidency,

Bush expressed his excitement to continue the negotiations with North Korea to try and

settle the nuclear crisis. In June 2001, President Bush publicly announced:

the completion of his administration’s North Korea policy review and its

determination that “serious discussions” on a “broad agenda” should be resumed

with Pyongyang. Bush states his desire to conduct “comprehensive” negotiations,

including “improved implementation of the Agreed Framework,” “verifiable

constraints” on North Korea’s missile programs, a ban on North Korea’s missile

exports, and a “less threatening conventional military posture.” (Kerr)
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Clearly, President Bush had good intentions regarding the North Korean missile crisis,

but instead, the road to settling the crisis took a wrong turn.

In January 2002, President Bush verbally attacked North Korea for being armed

with weapons of mass destruction as well as being inhumane towards its citizens. Also,

by labeling North Korea as part of the “axis of evil” along with Iran and Iraq, it seems as

though Bush had further impeded the process of normalizing relations with North Korea

and heightened the existing tensions. In October 2002, they actually proceeded to act on

their threat in 2000 and “North Korean officials revealed that the country had a second

covert nuclear weapons program in violation of the 1994 agreement—a program using

enriched uranium.” (www.cnn.com) North Korea’s admission to having such an existing

threatening program, surely does not help normalize the relations with the United States.

The effectiveness of the 1994 Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United

States has every reason to be questioned due to these setbacks and violations. Evidently,

negotiations were not continuing very effectively, so during that same month, Bush met

in Mexico with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and South Korean President

Kim Dae Jung in order to formulate a better agreement to settle the nuclear missile crisis

with North Korea. Japan and South Korea are both two of United State’s important allies

in Asia. The next month in November 2002, the three nations were able figure out a

possible plan that would help impede North Korea’s nuclear program. They decided to

stop supplying oil to North Korea. This would mean that they would be in violation of

the 1994 Agreed Framework, just as North Korea had also violated the same agreement

only one month before. (http://www.wfn.org/2003/02/msg00214.html)
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In December of 2002, North Korea had already begun to remove surveillance

cameras and monitoring seals from its nuclear facilities. As a result, the United Nations

International Atomic Energy Agency discouraged North Korea from reactivating their

nuclear facilities and to follow the NPT. Instead, just within the past year in January

2003, North Korea officially withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Later

within the same month, South Korea attempted to persuade their counterpart North Korea

to reverse its decision to withdraw from the treaty but failed to successfully convince

them. In February 2003, the United States prepared to send military forces to the Pacific

region, and North Korea responded by immediately reactivating its nuclear power

facilities. (www.cnn.com) As the United States continues to send military forces to the

Pacific, North Korea resorted to threatening to abandon the 1953 Korean War armistice.

North Korea’s nuclear program seemed to be well underway as they then “test fired a

land-to-ship missile into the sea between the Korean Peninsula and Japan…[then]

reactivated its five-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.” (www.cnn.com)
Lue/Kouwabunpat 17

(http://www.cartoonweb.com/images/korea/korea14.gif) After another missile testing out

to the Sea of Japan, a Group of Eight world leaders met in France in June 2003 to further

discuss North Korea’s outward undermining of non-proliferation agreements.

(www.cnn.com) North Korea also continued to adamantly resist all demands for

international inspection of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. Interestingly, even if they

were able to proceed with inspections, it would require an overwhelming amount of

effort, more than if they were able to conduct inspections a few years earlier. One United

States official explained that, “we can’t expect that we’re just going to go in there and in

a matter of months check all the suspect sites…given the ability of the North to hide

facilities—it’s estimated there are hundreds, maybe thousands of tunnels.” (Arnoldy)
Lue/Kouwabunpat 18

Even if international inspections were to happen, doing so at this intense time may not be

as productive a task as it would have been in the late 1990s.

In June 2003, North Korea began to target the United States in saying that they

were experiencing hostile threats from the United States and that they are now in need of

their nuclear weapons in order to protect themselves from them. As the tensions in the

nuclear crisis escalate even higher, North Korea finally agrees in early August that they

will join in on a six-nation talk in order to hopefully appease the problems. Then later

that month in August 2003, North Korea demanded that the United States sign a non-

aggression pact with them. They claimed that they would not disarm themselves unless

the United States would stop posing as a hostile threat towards them. Clearly, the Bush

administration has not done much in the past few years in order to reach any concrete

solutions regarding the nuclear crisis with North Korea. The six-way talk was recently

gathered in Beijing on August 27, 2003, focused on putting an end to this tedious nuclear

missile crisis. (www.cnn.com) A successful meeting among North Korea, South Korea,

the United States, Japan, Russia, and China is imperative in hopes of ensuring the entire

world’s safety from weapons of mass destruction.

Is the United States Really Under Serious North Korean Threat?

The North Korean nuclear missile crisis has been a worrisome issue for quite

some years now, yet nothing drastic has actually happened. Could North Korea be

bluffing to some extent? It seems as though that some people are questioning how

serious a threat they are to the United States. As observers, we can think further about
Lue/Kouwabunpat 19

certain aspects of the situation. First, it is helpful to decide whether or not North Korea

really has active bombs now. According to experts:

the regime expelled inspectors last December [2002], giving free rein to begin

reprocessing the fuel rods. The North claims to be reprocessing now, but the US

has not said publicly whether its surveillance confirms that. The rods could yield

enough plutonium for six more bombs. There are also doubts about whether they

have the expertise to detonate a nuke…Plutonium bombs require precision-timed

explosives. (Arnoldy)

It seems as though that American experts are undermining North Korea’s nuclear

program. But is this necessarily the right mindset to have on a country that can

potentially be holding weapons of mass destruction? Furthermore, the relations between

the United States and North Korea are not on very positive terms. Just by the possibility

that they are close to producing many bombs or even already possess these weapons is in

and of itself a crisis. With an underdeveloped economy and a deficiency in certain

necessary supplies, officials believe that North Korea is using their powerful military to

either “to trade to food and fuel, or, as it says, to deter the US and its allies from invading

[them].” (Arnoldy) In either case, the fact is that North Korea is continuing to strengthen

its nuclear weaponry program.

Secondly, it is also important to consider the perspectives of the people in North

Korea. By better understanding the common sentiments out of North Korea, more

effective solutions can be formed to help the crisis and possibly reduce the potential

threat that may be on the United States. First of all, it is crucial to realize the conditions
Lue/Kouwabunpat 20

that the North Koreans are living in. Geographically, they have no choice but to endure

harsh, long winters and continuous extreme weather. This essentially puts them in

vulnerable positions, especially when they lack certain supplies and resources necessary

for survival in such climates. Kim Jae-rok, a director of the government’s energy

ministry, explained:

sometimes the weather is as cold as minus 20C and many of our homes have no

heat at all. Not only that, but most live in high-rise buildings and we lack the

power to pump water up to those on above floors…So many elderly people have

no heating or water and sometimes have to walk to 40 or more floors because

there’s no power for the elevators either. Just imagine the suffering this causes.

(Thompson)

Clearly, the living conditions can become so extreme to the point that the government

must resort to certain measures to provide for their people. This may mean for them to

use their strengths to their advantage, strengths such as their military defense of

weaponry. Also, there have been reports that the North Koreans are putting the blame on

the United States for pressuring them to freeze their nuclear program in the 1994 Agreed

Framework; they say that this has lead to a big loss of the atomic power needed to supply

their heat. (Thompson) It seems as though the North Koreans are feeling a sense of

animosity from the United States, which certainly does not improve relations between the

two countries. Efforts at changing the North Korean sentiment may be more important

than any other at this moment; it may help ease the tensions of the nuclear crisis.
Lue/Kouwabunpat 21

Going back to the issue of how serious a threat that North Korea truly poses, there

should be some concern when taking their perspectives into account. Kim Jae-rok

continues to explain that, “our people don’t want war, but if the United States provokes

another Korean War here, we’ll give them a big blow in a very unexpected way.”

(Thompson) A statement like this paired with escalating tensions with the United States

certainly does not lead to more peaceful relations. If North Korea feels threatened by the

United States, the United States itself should feel threatened as well. When asked if the

United States should be worried, one expert stated, “ Yes. Arms proliferation matters,

especially when weapons of mass destruction fall into the hands of secretive,

unpredictable regimes which may well be heading for catastrophic failure.”

(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2340405.stm

Tensions with North Korea have been a long standing issue. The history of the

country leads itself to constant conflict and turmoil. Beginning with the conflicts with

Japan, Russia and China, North Korea has been marked with conflict ever since the late

nineteen century. Even today, North Korea struggles with the nuclear missile crisis, a

totalitarian regime and an unstable economy. These issues have lent themselves to

creating a serious missile crisis. Negotiations between the United States and North Korea

must take place so that positive foreign relations are re-established. This in turn will

create a safer environment for all countries involved.
Lue/Kouwabunpat 22

Why the Nuclear Crisis is a critical issue

North Korea already has at least one nuclear bomb and is striving to make many

more, while the Communist state's scientists have made rapid progress on missile

development. Most of the country’s 1.1 million armed forces are less sophisticated than

the soldiers who went into battle in WWII. "This is a threat to South Korea, to Japan, but

also a real threat to the world," US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said earlier this

year, calling North Korea one of "the world's leading proliferators in missiles"

(HotNews.com). The real problem is posed by the country's non-conventional abilities,

especially in the nuclear field. North Korea currently has one or two nuclear weapons,

according to Central Intelligence Agency estimates from earlier this year. This is

matched by independent analysts reckoning that North Korea possesses sufficient

weapons-grade plutonium to produce at least a couple of nuclear devices. Meanwhile,

the country's ballistic missile research is making rapid strides, possibly posing the first

credible threat to the US mainland since the end of the Cold War. The missile has a

current range estimated at between 3,500 and 6,000 kilometers (2,190 and 3,750 miles),

putting Hawaii and Alaska within reach. Even before the ongoing nuclear crisis, North

Korea's missile capability which is already feared by South Korea and Japan, was used as

a prime justification for the US missile defense shield planned by the administration. If

the United States is not careful in how it negotiates with North Korea, they may

potentially use their nuclear weapons against us (Hot News.com).
Lue/Kouwabunpat 23

Changes in U.S. Administration

The U.S. North Korea relations have worsened since the Bush administration took

office. The Bush administration’s policy towards North Korea has drastically changed

since the Clinton administration. The Bush administration is marked by neglect rather

than engagement, miscommunication, and isolationism towards North Korea. These

elements have caused the tension marked U.S.-North Korea relations

(CommonDreams.org). Clinton used different methods of rewarding North Korea for

complying with its terms. He provided humanitarian aid as a diplomatic tool to secure

North Korean agreements to meet with the United States (Heritage.org). Clinton

employed bilateral diplomacy many times, sending officials and dignitaries to North

Korea for negotiations. The Bush and Clinton administrations appear to have significant

differences in their outlook towards North Korea. The Clinton administration exerted

effort towards easing North Korean relations. Clinton sent Madeline Albright and

William J Perry to North Korea to establish a comprehensive agreement with North

Korea that would eliminate both its nuclear and long-range missile threats. Both of these

visits were carried out carefully- taking caution not to offend North Korea and exacerbate

the uneasy relations. Albright led the way for future negotiations between North Korea

and the United States on many controversial issues. Her visits and negotiations raised

hopes in Pyongyang that the United States would accept the regime on its own terms

(Terrorism Eclipses, 10). It was also tentatively planned that President Clinton would

pay a visit to Pyongyang and clinch an agreement between North Korea and the United

States. However, despite Secretary Albright’s efforts, the United States did not secure an
Lue/Kouwabunpat 24

agreement with North Korea regarding its economic, political, and diplomatic and

security policies. It was during this time that Clinton’s presidency was marked by

controversy in the United States over presidential pardons granted and fits taken. Many

advised Clinton to avoid a visit to Pyongyang because no satisfactory agreement was

ready to be signed. Moreover, Chairman Kim of North Korea refused to sign any

agreement that took away his bargaining chip of missiles without major concessions from

the United States that included economic, political, and diplomatic and security

guarantees (CNN.com). Also, many felt that it was not politically proper for President

Clinton to adopt a policy in his last few days of office that his successor would not find

acceptable (Terrorism Eclipses, 7). U.S. relations with North Korea were finally slowly

improving. Towards the end of Clinton’s term, North Korea had pledged to freeze long

range missile tests, and Clinton had eased economic sanctions against North Korea.

Also, in December of 1999, the U.S. signed a 4.6 billion contract for 2 safer, Western

developed light water nuclear reactors in North Korea. By then, North Korea had agreed

to extend a moratorium on new ballistic missile tests, had begun rapprochement with

South Korea, and had expressed a willingness to further restrict or eliminate its nuclear

and ballistic missile programs as part of the 1994 framework agreement with the U.S.

However, with the beginning of the Bush administration, North Korea warned the U.S.

that it would reconsider its moratorium on missile tests if the Bush administration did not

resume contacts aimed at normalizing relations (CNN.com).
Lue/Kouwabunpat 25

Problems between Bush and North Korea

Uneasy relations with North Korea came along with the Bush administration. One of the

main factors responsible for the stalemate includes the hardening of the U.S. position

after the Bush administration took office.

Figure 2.
Cutting communication
between North Korea and
the United States

http://www.cotf.edu/ete/ima
ges/modules/korea/north_br
idge.gif

Bush will not send negotiators over to North Korea until they have complied with his

demands. The administration’s new policy includes intrusive inspections that would be

required for tough verification and are unlikely to be accepted by Pyongyang. The U.S.

demand for the North Korea to make a pull-back while U.S. troops till occupy South

Korea also appears unreasonable due to the current state of relations. In addition to these

complications, the relationship between the United States and the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea (DPRK) cannot be simply resolved by signing a treaty. Continuous

negotiation and compromise between leaders of both countries is necessary. However,

when Bush took office in 2000, his cabinet had very different agendas toward North

Korea. While previous presidents had professed their support for the Sunshine policy,

Bush appears rather apathetic towards the Sunshine Policy, and would not shed a single
Lue/Kouwabunpat 26

tear should Kim’s peace—policy fail—or be abandoned (Future of the Sunshine Policy,

2).. Instead of continuing Clinton’s policies and ideas, the Bush plan included two harsh

agendas. He included: the negotiations the inclusion of conventional weapons reductions

as well as the call for a pull back of North Korea’s conventional weapons; and the

demand for tough verification of any agreements-just the kind of verification that was set

aside when the Clinton administration negotiated a nuclear agreement with North Korea

in 1994 (Terrorism Eclipses, 9). The North Koreans did not provide an optimistic

response towards the Bush administration’s policy reviews and plans to resume serious

negotiations. North Korea perceived that there was increased hostility towards them, and

therefore concluded that it was impossible to deal with the United States.

Terrorism and Reckless Rhetoric

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 simply exacerbated the uneasy

relations between North Korea and the United States. As terrorism became a new threat,

Washington included its North Korea Policy under the anti-terrorism policy. By virtue of

its production and sale of missiles to the Middle East, the Bush administration accused

North Korea as one of the suspects of the terrorist attacks. Before long, Bush had labeled

North Korea as a member of the new “axis of evil in his State of the Union Address”

(CNN.com). This new label paralleled President Reagan’s designation of the Soviet

Union as the “Evil Empire” (Terrorism Eclipses, 11). The severity of such a designation
Lue/Kouwabunpat 27

wounded the North Korean’s pride and turned them against talks with the Bush

administration.

There is no question that the demands by the Bush administration would make

North Korea less of a nuclear threat to the rest of the world. Plans of removing weapons

of mass destruction out of the hands of governments that are actively hostile towards the

United States are included in the axis of evil concept. However, the outward hostility and

verbal aggression that the Bush administration has towards North Korea has not helped

solve any issues (CarterCenter.org). If anything, the Bush administration has regressed in

terms of relations with North Korea. Had he continued with Clinton’s plans of

negotiating with North Korea, U.S.-North Korea relations would be in much better

condition. The Bush administration, when it took over, did not appear to understand the

delicacy of North Korean relations. Instead, it made irrational demands as well as

outward verbal attacks. Bush’s reckless rhetoric destroyed the first signs of confidence

that could be found in the ranks of North Korea’s distrustful rulers. These demands of

North Korea to stop missile production and tests were too aggressive and ambitious for

the fragile U.S. – North Korea relations at the time. The Bush administration’s

increasing list of demands for North Korea leaves Pyongyang less space to negotiate

(CommonDreams.org). Recently, on November 5, 2003, North Korea’s deputy

ambassador Kim Chang Guk calls the nuclear standoff between North Korea and the

United States a product of a “U.S. hostile policy” towards his country. Since the

beginning of Bush’s Administration, the United States and North Korea have

continuously disagreed on Pyonyang’s nuclear program. While the United States
Lue/Kouwabunpat 28

continues to demand that the Pyongyang’s nuclear program be dismantled immediately,

North Korea continues to refuse to agree to Bush’s demands. North Korea states that it

would agree to dismantle its nuclear program if and only if Washington agreed not to

attack the North and provided humanitarian aid necessary for North Korea’s starving

population (CNN.com). The Bush Administration has only one interest—completely

disarming and killing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. North Korea’s vice

foreign minister says, “Since it has proven the United States is only interested in turning

the six-party talks into a ground for completely disarming and killing the DPRK

(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) by all means instead of co-existing peacefully

with the DPRK, we have been driven not to maintain any interest in or expectation on

such talks” (CNN.com).

The Bush administration has also considered using nuclear weapons in an attempt

to reach its foreign policy goals. “Policymakers in the Bush administration are clear and

forceful about what they want in terms of counterterrorism, counter proliferation, and

nonproliferation” (Terrorism Eclipses, 16). Unsure of how to proceed with obtaining

these goals, the Bush administration has turned to military action. North Korea is the

second target of U.S. military and political power. Bush’s administration has prepared to

fight terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction sooner than later

causing the “crisis of 2003”. Bush has made it clear that if North Korea threatens to

begin testing long-range missiles or to restart its old nuclear reactors, his administration

will follow with harsh action. South Koreas have many believes and ideas about the

Bush administration and North Korea. They believe that “the attitudes and behavior of
Lue/Kouwabunpat 29

the Bush administration closely resemble those that the United States attributes to China:

hegemonic desires, closed policy-making, and disregard for the stability of East Asia”

(Terrorism Eclipses, 13).

The United States takes Responsibility and Accountability

Because the United States contributed to the exacerbation the state of the crisis,

the Bush administration should take a more active role in compromising and negotiating

with North Korea in regards to its nuclear weapons as well as other relations. The United

States must take responsibility and accountability for its actions. The Bush

administration and administrations to follow must reestablish amicable terms with North

Korea. They must take extra steps to nullify the bitter sentiment between both countries.

Although the Bush administration is convinced that North Korea has no business selling

missiles, it must find a way to compromise with North Korea in this request because

selling missiles is in fact one of North Korea’s best businesses. The United States will

have to rectify an extremely attractive deal to achieve its nonproliferation goals. The

Bush administration must realize that they contributed to the increased tensions between

North Korea and United States negotiations. Bush must then take responsibility for his

words and actions.

Learning from the Sunshine Policy

Like the Sunshine Policy that South Korea devised towards North Korea, the

United States should also devise a foreign policy towards North Korea. Before
Lue/Kouwabunpat 30

establishing such a policy, the United States must not see North Korea as an enemy. The

United States must also find a method to continue supporting South Korea’s Sunshine

Policy while devising a new one. The apathetic sentiment of the Bush administration

towards the Sunshine Policy must also be altered. Instead of continuously making

irrational demands, the Bush administration must find incentives for North Korea to

adhere to the demands. It will also behoove the Bush administration to review the

Sunshine Policy and determine the strong and weak points of the agreement. Perceived

flaws in the Sunshine Policy include:

1. Bearing the risk of a people’s revolution

2. It does not seek to destabilize or change the South Korean regime,

3. and the atmosphere of trust that the policy seeks to create has been destroyed.

Reviewing the flaws in the Sunshine Policy will enable the United States to create a

better foreign policy with North Korea. According to some North Koreans, the Sunshine

policy carries numerous risks in regards to reunification. They make the comparison to

the history of German unification. Some North Korean’s fear that they would engage in a

people’s revolution aspiring for freedom first and then seeks unification (Sunshine

Policy: Groundwork, 2). Critics of the Sunshine Policy also argue that North Korea’s

Kim Jong-il only accepted South Korea’s advances in order to stabilize his own regime,

however; it has never been the goal of the Sunshine Policy to unseat the North Korean

regime (Future of Sunshine Policy). Unless the North Korean regime can be stabilized,

future foreign relations with North Korea will prove to be extremely difficult because of
Lue/Kouwabunpat 31

the lack of stability within the country. The policy was also included creating an

atmosphere of trust between the two Korean states. This atmosphere of trust proves to be

an essential precondition for normalizing relations on the Korean Peninsula. However,

this trust has been destroyed due partly because an absence of diplomatic and other

changes as well as an “inexcusable slow review process” in the United States (Future of

the Sunshine Policy, 2).

The Delicacy of North Korea’s situation

Before starting to devise a policy to address the points stated about, the United

States must remember that “the communist dictatorship in North Korea has been one of

the most evil regimes in this world. In more than fifty years the rulers of Pyongyang

have terrorized, tortured, imprisoned, and murdered their own people, all of whom, and

all of which continues to this day” (U.S. Policy towards N.K., 6 ). The U.S. must be

careful not to confuse this with the axis of evil and continue to associate North Korea

with the terrorist empire. “In recent years, upwards of 10 percent of its population

perished from starvation and disease, but the North Korean regime is continuing to lavish

its funds on its huge and offensively posturing military while watching the distribution of

food by foreign humanitarian groups” (U.S. Policy To North Korea, 12.). The United

States must obtain a clear understanding of North Korea’s culture and regime. The

policy that it devises must be premised upon such an understanding in order to avoid

confusion and further trying the uneasy relations between the two countries.

The New Policy
Lue/Kouwabunpat 32

The United States, in its policy towards North Korea, should find ways to address

North Korea’s production of nuclear missiles, its struggling economic system, reducing

the risk of war on the Korean peninsula and promoting improved relations between North

and South Korea. Along with this agenda, the United States must also preserve its own

alliance with Japan and the Republic of Korea and protecting their security. Other points

worthy of discussing include the impoverished situation of North Korea’s citizens. With

this in mind, the United States can set forth to accomplishing the following agendas:

1. preserving the U.S.’ alliance with Japan and the Republic of Korea, and

protecting their security

2. preventing North Korea from acquiring more nuclear weapons and

nuclear weapon production capability

3. reducing the risk of war on the Korean peninsula,

4. And resuming negotiations where the Clinton administration left off.

5. Temporarily halt the research and development of tactical nuclear

missiles in the United States—to gain North Korea’s trust (Mixed

Messages).

Preserving the alliance with Japan and the Republic of Korea

The United States must continue to invest in the U.S.-Republic of Korea

partnership because this alliance has proven extremely successful at stabilizing Northeast

Asia and establishing a strong position for South Korea to reconcile with the North.

Seoul’s strategy of cooperation and reconciliation with North Korea has moved the
Lue/Kouwabunpat 33

political dynamics on the peninsula in a positive direction. South Korea has progressed

in tension reduction with the North and should continue to have U.S. support. The goals

of policy for dealing with North Korea should also include a reduction of military threat

and improvement in human rights in the North. It is believed that the reduction of the

North Korean military threat, the United States can also improve U.S.-ROK joint

readiness in areas such as continued reinforcement, deterrence, and protection against

weapons of mass destruction. More importantly, however, the United States should

begin to prepare the alliance relationship for a longer term role in regional security (U.S.

Policy to North Korea, 14).

Preventing North Korea from acquiring more nuclear weapons

In coordination with preventing North Korea from acquiring more nuclear

weapons as well as preventing further testing, production, deployment or export of

extended range ballistic missiles and ballistic missile technology, the United States must

continue to promote the Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework states that “both

sides (the U.S. and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) will cooperate to replace

the DPRK’s graphite moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor

power plants, the two sides will move toward full normalization of political and

economic relations, both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear free

Korean peninsula, and both sides will work together to strengthen the international

nuclear non proliferation regime”(Agreed Framework, 3.). In terms of moving towards

full normalization of political and economic relations, both sides will reduce barriers to
Lue/Kouwabunpat 34

trade and investment. These barriers include restrictions on telecommunications services

and financial transactions. With regards to working together for peace and security on a

nuclear-free Korean peninsula, the United States will provide official assurances to the

DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. (Agreed Framework, 3).

The DPRK will adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and

allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the treaty.

The Agreed Framework will prevent North Korea from producing fissile material

for nuclear weapons. The Agreed Framework gives the United States sufficient leverage

to gain access to inspect their nuclear facilities. Carefully dealt with, the Agreed

Framework exposes neither side to more harm than it would suffer without the

agreement; it also provides a basis for inspection to resolve concerns about North Korea

building missile facilities.

Figure 3.
North Korea’s nuclear
weapons.

news.bbc.co.uk/.../38366000/jp
g/
_38366729_missile_ap300.jpg

In addition to adhering to the Agreed

Framework, the United States can request North Korea to reduce its long-range missiles

in exchange for various inducements. These incentives should include humanitarian

assistance in categories such as food as well as economic assistance. Because missile

sales are one of North Korea’s best businesses, the United States must come up with a
Lue/Kouwabunpat 35

very appealing deal to achieve these nonproliferation goals. The U.S. must find a way to

help North Korea build an economy that does not rely in missile sales as its main source

of income. (Terrorism Eclipses).

Reducing Risk of War

Reducing the risk of war on the Korean peninsula also proves to be a critical

issue. The United States must work in coordination with our allies in the South as well as

surrounding countries. Eventually, the U.S. should move towards engaging the North in

discussions that would reduce the risk of a conventional conflict on the Korean peninsula.

This plan involves the kinds of confidence and security building measures proposed and

implemented elsewhere that reduce the risk of a surprise attack and increase levels of

transparency on both sides. In conjunction with reducing war, the United States should

engage the North in discussions of political, economic and security issues, with the long

term objective of reducing tensions on the peninsula and contributing to reunification. In

the process of discussion, the United States must also remain patient and understand that

changes of regime in the North will be a slow process because of its current totalitarian

state. Again, the United States should offer “rewards” in terms of political or economic

benefits in exchange for the outcomes we seek. (U.S. Policy Towards North Korea, 6).

There must be an incentive for North Korea to want to comply with the terms of the

policy.

Continuing where Clinton left off
Lue/Kouwabunpat 36

The Bush and Clinton administration have clear differences in their North Korea

foreign policies. However, in order to reestablish positive negotiations with North Korea,

the Bush administration needs to resume negotiations in accordance to the Clinton

engagement policies; Bush’s administration should continue to send diplomats like the

Clinton administration to negotiate with North Korea. When Clinton sent Secretary

Madeline Albright to North Korea, North Korea promised to a comprehensive agreement

between the two countries (Terrorism Eclipses, 8). Clearly, these negotiations proved to

North Korea that the United States was willing to discuss issues at hand. The most

promising way of luring North Korea out of its isolation is to join with our South Korean,

Japanese, and European allies. The Bush administration should test North Korea’s

commitment to peace by sending foreign officials to talk with the leader of North Korea.

In April of 2001, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee traveled to Northeast

Asia in an effort to explore opportunities for peace and reconciliation on the Korean

peninsula. This was the first official representative sent by the Bush administration to

travel to North Korea (U.S. Policy towards North Korea, 10). In such a way, the Bush

administration should continue to send officials and representative to the Korean

peninsula to participate in negotiations on missile issues. Once North Korea realizes that

the Bush administration is making a clear effort to reopen lines of direct communication,

they may agree to the nonproliferation demands that Bush is currently making.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the U.S.
Lue/Kouwabunpat 37

It is ironic that while the United States holds fast to its hard-liner policies of

reducing North Korea’s hold on nuclear missiles and other weapons, they (the U.S.)

continues to acquire tactical nuclear missiles. The Senate recently voted to retain funding

for research on new types of nuclear weapons and speed up the nation’s ability to conduct

a nuclear test. This decision increased the U.S. nuclear weapons program and sent a

mixed message to nations around the world, more specifically, North Korea. Molly

Picket, the director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Center for Arms Control and

Non-Proliferation in Washington states, “It is hypocritical that, within days of pressuring

the international community to help curb nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea, the

U.S. government is continuing to push forward with new elements of its own

program…this policy is not reflective of a country committed to preventing reliance on

nuclear weapons” (Mixed Messages).

The push for U.S. nuclear weapon development for research sets the United States

on an unprecedented path since the Second World War. Proponents for the development

of tactical nuclear weapons argue that the research on new weapons is important to

keeping U.S. scientists updated with technology and aware of the weapons and

technology that hostile states and terrorist groups are capable of developing.

Unfortunately, these plans lead to the actual development of weapons; the development

of weapons in the United States proves to be a problem due to the new international

security environment where terrorist groups and hostile regimes pose as tremendous

threats. North Korea has become so suspicious of the Bush Administration’s nuclear

status that the development of nuclear programs, for security, has become their first and
Lue/Kouwabunpat 38

foremost priority. The development of nuclear programs in the United States has driven

North Korea to obtain more nuclear weapons because they feel that the United States is a

threat to their security. It is precisely for this reason that the United States should put its

nuclear program on hold until tensions lessen and North Korea becomes a more stable

country. The more weapons the United States develops the more weapons North Korea

develops and produces.

Unless the United States takes the initiative to stop its research and expansion of

its nuclear weapons program, tensions will continue to escalate with North Korea. If

communication and relationships worsen due to the fear of the other country, a potential

Cold War could break out again. Picket states, “Foes of the United States will not look at

this…funding for new nuclear weapons and accelerated test readiness as a research

exercise…they will see it as an aggressive move by an already dominant military power

to return to an age of nuclear advancement. The effects on world-wide nonproliferation

efforts could be disastrous” (Mixed Messages). Progress on the missile issue is critical

because by curtailing North Korea’s development and export of long range missiles, the

United States will gain time and flexibility in its own deliberations on national missile

defense.

Why North Korea should agree

The new proposed policy helps and benefits many more countries than just the

United States. The United States should make it very clear to North Korea that the terms

to the new policy are to benefit all parties involved, not just the United States. The
Lue/Kouwabunpat 39

United States must also reassure North Korea that it is in their interest to work with the

United States in making the Korean peninsula a more stable place, and that they can do

so without losing face. By agreeing to the points in the new policy, North Korea will find

a way to receive the much needed humanitarian and economic aid. Many Chinese

analysts have recognized that if North Korea is to survive, its economic system must

undergo fundamental reform (North Korea’s Decline, 1). The new policy will also aid

North Korea in terms of establishing a more stable regime. If tensions on the Korean

peninsula continue to improve, there is a possibility of Korean reunification.

Conclusion

The Korean peninsula has been an area of continuous unrest and turmoil. North

Korea and its nuclear weapons have proved to be a threat to the United States as well as

the rest of the world. Despite continued uneasy relations with the United States, North

Korea’s relations with the United States worsened when George Bush took office. His

foreign policy with North Korea greatly differed from Clinton’s foreign policy with

North Korea. These differences included two main points: Bush made demands of North

Korea to pull back conventional weapons as well as tough verification of any agreements.

It was precisely the hardening of the United States’ position after the Bush administration

took over that worsened U.S.-North Korea relations. North Korea finds it impossible to

deal with the United States because of Bush’s new agenda. To make things worse, Bush

openly labeled North Korea as part of the axis of evil in his State of the Union address.

Because of its role in exacerbating the North Korean nuclear weapon crisis, the Bush
Lue/Kouwabunpat 40

administration should take a more active role in re-establishing positive relations with

North Korea. The United States needs to take accountability and responsibility for its

careless actions. By reviewing current foreign policies, the United States and the Bush

administration can create a new policy that will address the following issues: preserving

the U.S.’ alliance with Japan and the Republic of Korea, and protecting their security,

preventing North Korea from acquiring more nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon

production capability, reducing the risk of war on the Korean peninsula, resuming

negotiations where the Clinton administration left off, and temporarily halt the research

and development of tactical nuclear missiles in the United States—to gain North Korea’s

trust. In order to convince North Korea go agree to these terms, the United States must

first find a way to approach North Korean officials as well as find incentives for North

Korea to work with the United States. These incentives will most likely include

humanitarian and economic aid. By following the new policy, North Korea and the

Korean peninsula will become a more stable area. By establishing positive relations with

North Korea, the United states will not only help North Korea’s economic state, it will

make North Korea a more stable country, thus, lessening the risk of a nuclear war or

attack. Ultimately, all countries involved will benefit from North Korea agreeing to the

United State’s foreign policy. Therefore, it is critical that all the countries in contact with

North Korea remain focused on reducing tensions until the threat of a nuclear war is no

longer an issue.
Lue/Kouwabunpat 41

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http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senate_hearings&docid=f:73070.pdf

Oh, Kongdan. Terrorism Eclipses the Sunshine Policy: Inter-Korean Relations and the
United States. New York: Asia Society. 2002.

The United States and North Korea: Few Kind Words, Lots of 'Guns'. 25, Nov. 203
http://www.commondreams.org/views02/1025-08.htm