Automation Policy Recommendations by HC1209122075

VIEWS: 6 PAGES: 17

									                          Commercial Aviation
                          Safety Team




      SAFETY ENHANCEMENT 30
              Revision 3
Mode Awareness and Energy State Management
      Aspects of Flight Deck Automation




            DRAFT Final Report
             February 5, 2008
                                                       DRAFT

                                             TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acronym List ........................................................................................................ iii
1.0 Introduction .................................................................................................... 1
   1.1 Background .......................................................................................................... 1
   1.2 Methodology Overview ......................................................................................... 1
   1.3 Summary of Results and Recommendations ........................................................ 2
   1.4 Report Organization ............................................................................................. 3
2.0 SE–30 Automation Policy .............................................................................. 5
   2.1 Philosophy............................................................................................................ 5
   2.2 Levels of Automation ............................................................................................ 7
   2.3 Situational Awareness ........................................................................................ 10
   2.4 Communications ................................................................................................. 10
   2.5 Verification ......................................................................................................... 11
   2.6 Monitoring Automation ........................................................................................ 11
   2.7 Command and Control ....................................................................................... 13
   2.8 Recommendation Summary ............................................................................... 14




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                                      ACRONYM LIST
A/T               Auto Throttles (Boeing)
A/THR             Auto Thrust (Airbus Fly-by-wire)
AFS               automatic flight system
AIDS              Accident and Incident Data System
AP                autopilot
ASIAS             Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing
ASRS              Aviation Safety Reporting System
CAMI              Confirm, Activate, Monitor, Intervene
CAST              Commercial Aviation Safety Team
CDU               control and display unit
ECAM              electronic centralized aircraft monitoring (Airbus)
EICAS             engine indication and crew alerting system (Boeing)
FAA               Federal Aviation Administration
FCU               flight control unit (Airbus)
FD                flight director
FMA               flight modes annunciator
FMC               flight management computer (Boeing)
FMGS              flight management guidance system (Airbus)
FMS               flight management system
FPV               flight path vector (Airbus)
GPS               global positioning system
INS               inertial navigation system
JIMDAT            Joint Implementation Data Analysis Team
LNAV              lateral navigation
MCP               mode control panel (Boeing)
navaids           navigational aids
ND                navigation display
PARC              Performance-Based Aviation Rulemaking Committee
PF                pilot flying
PFD               primary flight display
PM                pilot monitoring
PNF               pilot not flying
SE                Safety Enhancement
VNAV              vertical navigation
VOR–DME           very high frequency omnirange station–distance measuring equipment
VVM               Verbalize, Verify, Monitor




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                                      1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
Automation has contributed substantially to the sustained improvement in air carrier
safety around the world. Automation increases the timeliness and precision of routine
procedures, and greatly reduces the opportunity to introduce risks and threatening flight
regimes. In short, automation has been very positive. Nevertheless, in complex and
highly automated aircraft, automation has its limits. Equally or perhaps more critically,
flightcrews can lose situational awareness of the automation mode under which the
aircraft is operating or may not understand the interaction between a mode of automation
and a particular phase of flight or pilot input. These and other examples of mode
confusion often lead to a flightcrew’s mismanagement of the energy state of the aircraft
or to the aircraft’s deviation from the intended flight path for other reasons.

The Loss of Control Joint Safety Analysis Team, chartered by the Commercial Aviation
Safety Team (CAST), identified this issue as a factor or problem in several major
accidents in the United States and around the world. The subsequent CAST Joint Safety
Implementation Team recommended in Safety Enhancement (SE) 30 that CAST charter a
Joint Implementation Data Analysis Team (JIMDAT) subteam to address mode
confusion in cooperation with a working group chartered by the Performance-Based
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (PARC), which was in the midst of a more broadly
based study of issues related to automation.

In late 2005, CAST chartered the SE–30 Data Review Team to undertake this task (see
appendix A to this report for the team charter). The team was directed to restrict its work
to the issue of mode confusion and to work closely with the PARC, which continued to
address a more comprehensive range of automation issues. The SE–30 Data Review
Team was charged with producing a prototype automation policy, or an exemplar, for
air carriers. The exemplar would combine a set of best practices in the industry with
suggested additions to fill any identified voids. The ultimate objective of any policy
exemplar would be to help minimize the frequency with which flightcrews induce
automation errors and to help flightcrews recognize and correct automation errors in a
timely fashion, regardless of the source of the error.

1.2 Methodology Overview
To identify any such voids, the team began by reviewing hundreds of reports from the
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and from other public data sources, including
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)’s Accident and Incident Data System (AIDS)
and the National Transportation Safety Board’s Accident and Incident Database, all of
which were compiled by the FAA’s Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing
(ASIAS) center. The final dataset included 480 incident and accident reports during
14 CFR Part 121 operations by U.S. air carriers.




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The team then reviewed in detail 50 de-identified ASRS reports from pilots over the
preceding 5 years (2000 through 2006). The reports dealt solely with automation
incidents involving energy state management and mode awareness, and allowed the team
to conduct a gap analysis between guidance in air carrier automation policies and pilot
actions described in the reports.

The SE–30 Data Review Team also requested and received current automation policy
statements from 16 air carriers from which the team sought to identify common concepts
and operational best practices that could contribute to a prototype automation policy for
the entire industry. Such a policy would be designed to minimize the frequency with
which flightcrews inadvertently induce automation errors, or fail to recognize and correct
any errors in a timely fashion.

Ultimately, the team derived a set of recommended automation policy components that, if
incorporated in policy and reinforced in training, would allow pilots to trap or avert many
acute automation errors.

See appendix B to this report for a detailed discussion of data gathering, data extraction
parameters, data set discrimination, gap analysis, and subject matter expert review.

1.3 Summary of Results and Recommendations
Among the 16 air carrier automation policies, the most common concept was, as stated by
one air carrier, to “use the level of automation that will best support the desired operation
of the aircraft.” This concept is fine if the flightcrew understands what the automation is
doing at the time of the problem onset, and is then able to determine if the current or
another automation level will better suit the operation. However, nearly all incident
reports shared one common factor: regardless of whether an error was pilot-induced or
was a function of the automation system, pilots did not understand what the automation
was doing, or did not know how to use it to eliminate an error. In all 50 cases, pilots
were unable return the aircraft to the desired flight path in a timely manner. This was
because of two root causes: (1) inadequate training and system knowledge, and (2) the
unexpected incompatibility of the automation system with the flight regime confronting
pilots in their normal duties. Consequently, the team’s recommendations emphasize
specific elements that air carriers should incorporate into their automation policies and
which should be systematically reinforced.

The most generic recommendation addresses an automation philosophy that should
permeate any air carrier’s policy. While recognizing that automation has brought major
improvements to safety, the team recommends that air carriers promulgate and
systematically reinforce the philosophy of “fly the airplane.” If pilots recognize that they
do not understand the nature of an anomaly and precisely understand the solution, pilots
should not choose to continue in an unstable or unpredictable flight path or energy state
while attempting to correct an automation anomaly. Instead, flightcrews should revert to
a more direct level of automation until the aircraft resumes the desired flight path and/or
airspeed. This may ultimately require that the flightcrew turn off all automation systems
and fly the aircraft manually. When the aircraft once again is flying the desired flight


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path and/or airspeed, the flightcrew can begin to reengage the automation, one system at
a time. Below is a recommended statement to be included in air carrier automation
policies and systematically reinforced.

     At any time, if the aircraft does not follow the desired vertical flight path/
     lateral flight path and/or airspeed, do not hesitate to revert to a more direct
     level of automation without delay:
     ■ Revert from FMS guidance to non-FMS guidance: AP/FD modes
       engaged—pitch attitude and bank angle, altitude, vertical speed, heading,
       track, or selected speed as required, or

     ■ Switch from non-FMS guidance to manual hand- flying:
          → AP/FD modes disengaged.
          → A/THR or A/T (as required) disengaged and thrust set manually.

In addition to this recommended philosophical foundation, the team developed a broad
set of elements that should be incorporated in all air carrier automation policies. The
policy recommendations are organized into seven topics:
     ■ Philosophy
     ■ Levels of automation
     ■ Situational awareness
     ■ Communication
     ■ Verification
     ■ Monitoring
     ■ Command-and-Control

The team further recommends that air carriers assess their policies against these
seven topics, fill any identified gaps, and ensure each element is regularly reinforced in
operating procedures and training programs.

1.4 Report Organization
Section 2.0 of this report presents the team’s recommendations in order of priority within
each of the seven topics of automation policy. These recommendations constitute the
exemplar, or SE–30 Automation Policy.

The following appendixes are available under separate cover. Appendix A contains the
team’s charter. Appendix B discusses the methodology in more detail. Appendix C
summarizes each of the 50 incidents the team examined in detail. Appendix D is an
analysis matrix that scores each of the 50 detailed cases against key characteristics.
Appendix E summarizes the automation policies that 16 air carriers voluntarily submitted
to the team, without identifying the individual carriers. Appendix F presents the results
of a gap analysis that compares automation policies for each of the 16 air carriers against


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the exemplar. Appendix G contains a list of the subject matter experts. Finally,
appendix H lists regulatory and guidance support references for use of automation.




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                              2.0 SE–30 AUTOMATION POLICY

2.1 Philosophy
The optimum use of automation requires the integrated and coordinated use of the
following systems:
     ■ Autopilot/flight director (AP/FD);
     ■ Auto Thrust (A/THR) or Auto Throttles (A/T)1; and
     ■ Flight management systems (FMS)

Three generations of flight guidance systems are currently in airline service, providing
different levels of integration and automation:
     ■ Non-glass-cockpit models, that feature—
          → Partial integration (pairing) of the AP/FD and A/THR or A/T modes;
          → Vertical and lateral AP/FD modes; and
          → Lateral navigation only (that is, inertial navigation system (INS) or
            FMS/global positioning system (GPS)).
     ■ First glass-cockpit/FMS aircraft generation, that features—
          → Full integration of AP/FD and A/THR or A/T modes;
          → Vertical and lateral AP/FD modes; and
          → FMS vertical and lateral navigation.
     ■ Fully integrated, automated aircraft, that feature—
          → Full integration of flight guidance and management (AP/FD, A/THR–A/T,
            and FMS modes);
          → Vertical and lateral AP/FD modes; and
          → FMS vertical and lateral navigation in all flight phases.

Higher levels of automation provide flightcrews with an increasing number of options
and strategies to choose for the task to be accomplished (for example, to comply with
air traffic control requirements).

The applicable air carrier’s Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM)/Aircraft Operating
Manual (AOM) provides specific information and operational recommendations for each
aircraft type.




1
 The terms Auto Thrust (A/THR) and Auto Throttles (A/T) are specific to Airbus Fly-by-wire and
Boeing aircraft, respectively. Airbus A300/A310 are conventional aircraft and therefore use the term
Auto Throttle (A/T).


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2.1.1 AP–A/THR and AP–A/T Integration
Integrated AP–A/THR or AP–A/T systems feature an association (pairing) of AP pitch
modes (elevator control) and A/THR or A/T modes (thrust levers/throttle levers 2).
Integrated AP–A/THR or AP–A/T systems operate in the same way as a pilot who
hand-flies with manual thrust:
        ■ Elevator is used to control pitch attitude, airspeed, vertical speed, altitude,
          flight-path-angle, and vertical navigation profile or to capture and track a
          glideslope beam.
        ■ Thrust levers or throttle levers are used to maintain a given thrust or a given
          airspeed.
        ■ Throughout the flight, the pilot’s objective is to fly either—
            → Performance segments at constant thrust or at idle (for example, takeoff,
              climb, or descent), or
            → Trajectory segments at constant speed (for example, cruise or approach).

Depending on the task to be accomplished, maintaining the airspeed is assigned either to
the AP (elevators) or to the A/THR (thrust levers) or A/T (throttles levers), as shown in
table 1 below.

                           Table 1. AP–A/THR and AP–A/T Integration

                                                   A/THR or A/T                       A/P
                                                   Thrust levers/
                                                                                  Elevators
                                                   throttle levers
              Performance Segment                  Thrust or idle                   Speed
                                                                            V/S vertical profile
              Trajectory Segment                        Speed
                                                                            altitude glideslope


2.1.2 Automation Design Objectives
The automatic flight system (AFS) is an integral part of the automatic and manual control
system of the aircraft; its design objective is to assist the flightcrew throughout the flight
by—
        ■ Relieving the pilot flying (PF) from routine tasks and thus allowing time and
          resources to enhance his/her situational awareness and/or for problem solving
          tasks, or
        ■ Providing the PF with adequate attitude and flight path guidance through the
          flight director (FD) for hand-flying.



2
    The terms thrust levers and throttle levers are specific to Airbus and Boeing aircraft respectively.


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The AFS provides guidance to capture and maintain the selected targets and the defined
flight path, in accordance with the modes engaged and the targets set by the flightcrew on
either the flight control unit (FCU)/mode control panel (MCP)3 or on the FMS control
and display unit (CDU):
        ■ The FCU/MCP constitutes the main interface between the pilot and the autoflight
          system for short-term guidance (that is, for immediate guidance such as radar
          vectors).
        ■ The FMS CDU constitutes the main interface between the pilot and the autoflight
          system for long-term guidance (that is, for the current and subsequent flight
          phases).

On aircraft equipped with either a flight management guidance system (FMGS) or
flight management computer (FMC)4, featuring both lateral and vertical navigation,
two types of guidance (modes and associated targets) are available:
        ■ Selected guidance: The aircraft is guided to acquire and maintain the targets set
          by the flightcrew, using the modes engaged or armed by the flightcrew (that is,
          using either the FCU or the MCP target setting knobs and mode
          arming/engagement pushbuttons).
        ■ FMS guidance: The aircraft is guided along a pilot-defined FMS lateral
          navigation (LNAV) and a vertical navigation (VNAV) flight plan, speed profile,
          and/or altitude targets/constraints.

2.2 Levels of Automation
Understanding and interfacing with any automated system, but particularly the AFS,
ideally requires answering the following fundamental questions:
        ■ How is the system designed?
        ■ Why is the system designed that way?
        ■ How does the system interface and communicate with the pilot?
        ■ How does the pilot operate the system in normal and abnormal situations?

Air carriers should ensure the following aspects are fully understood by flightcrews for
the optimum use of automation:
        ■ Integration of AP/FD and A/THR or A/T modes (that is, pairing of modes);
        ■ Mode transition and reversion sequences; and




3
    The terms FCU and MCP are specific to Airbus and Boeing aircraft, respectively.
4
    The terms FMGS and FMC are specific to Airbus and Boeing aircraft, respectively.


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     ■ Pilot-system interface for—
          → Pilot-to-system communication (that is, for target selections and modes
            engagement); and
          → System-to-pilot feedback (that is, for cross-checking the status of modes
            and accuracy of guidance targets).

When flightcrews perform an action on the FCU/MCP or FMS CDU to give a command
to the AFS, the pilot has an expectation of an aircraft reaction and, therefore, must have
in mind the following questions:
     ■ What do I want the aircraft to fly now?
     ■ What do I want the aircraft to fly next?                                                   Comment [RJM1]: In terms of what?


This implies also answering the following questions:
     ■ Which mode did I engage and which target did I set for the aircraft to fly now?
     ■ Is the aircraft following the intended vertical and lateral flight path and targets?
     ■ Which mode did I arm and which target did I preset for the aircraft to fly next?

To answer these questions, pilots must understand the role of the following controls and
displays:
     ■ FCU/MCP mode selection keys, target-setting knobs, and display windows;
     ■ FMS CDU keyboard, line-select keys, display pages, and messages;
     ■ Flight modes annunciator (FMA) on the PFD; and
     ■ PFD and navigational display (ND) displays and scales (that is, for
       cross-checking guidance targets).

The effective monitoring of these controls and displays promotes and increases the
flightcrew awareness of the status of the autoflight system (that is, modes being engaged
or armed) and the available guidance (that is, for flight path and speed control). The
active monitoring of controls and displays also enables the pilot to predict and anticipate
the entire sequence of flight modes annunciations throughout successive flight phases
(that is, throughout mode transitions or mode reversions).

Air carriers should emphasize the optimum use of automation by ensuring—
     ■ Disciplined adherence by flightcrews of standard operating procedures.
     ■ A clear understanding of pilot flying (PF) and pilot not flying (PNF)/pilot
       monitoring (PM) task sharing by flightcrews.
     ■ Standard call outs are well-defined.
     ■ Disciplined use of normal checklists by flightcrews.




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2.2.1 Engaging Automation
Before engaging the AP, ensure—
     ■ Modes engaged (check FMA annunciations) for FD guidance are the correct
       modes for the intended flight phase and task,
     ■ Appropriate mode(s) are selected, and
     ■ FD command bars do not display any large displacements. If large
       displacements are commanded, continue to hand-fly until FD bars are centered
       before engaging the AP.

Engaging the AP while large commands are required to achieve the intended flight path
may result in the AP overshooting the intended vertical target or lateral target, and/or
may surprise the pilot because of the resulting large pitch/roll changes and thrust
variations.

2.2.2 Use the Correct Level of Automation for the Task
On highly automated and integrated aircraft, several levels of automation are available to
perform a given task, either FMS modes and guidance or non-FMS modes and guidance.

The correct level of automation depends on the task to be performed: a short-term task
(that is, tactical choice, short and head-up action(s) on FCU/MCP, immediate aircraft
response required) or a long-term task (that is, strategic choice, longer and head-down
action(s) on FMS CDU, longer-term aircraft response). The phase of flight is important,
such as departure, en route climb/cruise/descent, terminal area, or approach and landing,
as well as time available to make either a normal selection/entry or a last-minute
change/entry.

The correct level of automation often is the one the pilot feels comfortable with for the
task or for the prevailing conditions, depending on his/her own knowledge and
experience operating the aircraft and systems. Reverting to hand-flying and manual
thrust control actually may be the correct level of automation, depending on the
prevailing conditions.

FMS or selected guidance can be used in succession or in combination (for example,
FMS lateral guidance together with selected vertical guidance) as best suited for the flight
phase and prevailing operational conditions.

The PF should retain the authority and capability to select the most appropriate level of
automation and guidance for the task. Making this selection includes adopting a more
direct level of automation by reverting from FMS guidance to selected guidance (that is,
selected modes and targets through the use of either the FCP or MCP); selecting a more
appropriate lateral or vertical mode; or reverting to hand-flying (with or without FD
guidance, with or without A/THR or A/T), for direct control of aircraft vertical trajectory,
lateral trajectory, and thrust.




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2.3 Situational Awareness
Situational awareness requires the pilot know the available guidance at all times. The
FCU/MCP and the FMS CDU are the primary interfaces for the flightcrew to
communicate with the aircraft systems (that is, to set targets and arm or engage modes).

The PFD and ND are the primary interfaces for the aircraft to communicate with the
flightcrew, to confirm that the aircraft systems have correctly accepted the mode
selections and target entries:
     ■ PFD (FMA, speed scale, and altitude scale): guidance modes, speed, and altitude
       targets; and
     ■ ND: lateral guidance (heading or track, or FMS flight plan).

Any action on the FCU/MCP or on the FMS keyboard and line-select keys should be
confirmed by crosschecking the corresponding annunciation or data on the PFD and/or
ND (and on the FMS CDU). At all times, the PF and PNF should be aware of the status
of the guidance modes being armed/engaged and of any mode changes throughout mode
transitions and reversions.

The use and operation of the AFS must be monitored at all times by—
     ■ Checking and announcing the status of AP/FD modes and A/THR or A/T mode
       on the FMA (that is, arming or engagement);
     ■ Observing and announcing the result of any target setting or change (on the
       FCU/MCP) on the related PFD and/or ND scales; and
     ■ Supervising the AP/FD guidance and A/THR or A/T operation on the PFD and
       ND (pitch attitude and bank angle, speed and speed trend, altitude, vertical
       speed, heading, or track).

2.4 Communications
Achieving effective pilot/controller communications requires the following:
     ■ Adherence to company standard operating procedures;
     ■ Understanding of pilots’ and controllers’ respective working environments and
       constraints;
     ■ Disciplined use of standard phraseology;
     ■ Strict adherence to the pilot-controller communication loop (that is, confirmation
       process);
     ■ Alertness to request clarification or confirmation, when in doubt;
     ■ Readiness to question an incorrect clearance or an inadequate instruction;
     ■ Prevention of simultaneous transmissions;
     ■ Adapting listening of party-line communications as a function of the
       flight phase;


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       ■ Adopting clear, concise communications in an emergency situation; and
        ■ Use of headsets below 10,000 feet.

2.5 Verification
Verification includes having one head up at all times whenever significant changes to the
FMS flight plan are to be performed by the PNF (PM), cross-checked by PF. The
flightcrew should be encouraged to transfer aircraft controls as required to maintain
one head up at all times for supervising the progress of the flight and for conducting
descent and approach flightcrew briefings and/or checking aircraft systems (on PFD, ND,
and Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM)/ Engine Indication and Crew
Alerting System (EICAS)5 display units).

When within navigational aids (navaids) coverage area, FMS navigation accuracy should
be crosschecked against navaids raw data (unless an aircraft is GPS-equipped and
GPS PRIMARY is available).

FMS navigation accuracy can be checked by entering a tuned very high frequency
omnirange station-distance measuring equipment (VOR-DME) in the bearing/distance
(BRG/DIST TO) field of the appropriate FMS page.

2.6 Monitoring Automation
Monitoring automation is simply carefully observing cockpit displays and indications to
ensure the aircraft response matches your mode selections and guidance target entries,
and the aircraft attitude, speed, and trajectory match your expectations, that is—
        ■ During the capture phase, observe the progressive centering of FD bars and the
          progressive centering of deviation symbols (during localizer and glideslope
          capture). This enhances supervision of automation during capture phases and
          cross-check with raw data, as applicable, to enable early detection of a false
          capture or capture of an incorrect beam.
        ■ No attempt should be made to analyze or rectify an anomaly by reprogramming
          the AFS or FMS until the desired flight path and/or airspeed are restored.
        ■ In case of AP uncommanded disconnection, engage the second AP immediately
          to reduce PF’s workload.
        ■ Any time the aircraft does not follow the desired flight path and/or airspeed, do
          not hesitate to revert to a more direct level of automation, as follows:
            → Revert from FMS-managed modes to selected modes; or
            → Disconnect AP and follow FD guidance (if correct); or




5
    The terms ECAM and EICAS are specific to Airbus and Boeing aircraft, respectively.


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            → Disengage FD, select flight path vector (FPV)6 (if available) and hand-fly the
              aircraft, using raw data or visually (if in visual meteorological conditions);
              and/or
            → Disengage the A/THR or A/T and control the thrusts/throttle levers manually.

Procedures/policies, such as the CAMI or the VVM procedure, have been developed by
various air carriers as effective means for pilots to validate the arming/engagement of the
AFS and to monitor functions/mode changes.
        ■ CAMI procedure for the pilot flying:
            → Confirm airborne inputs to the FMS with the other pilot.
            → Activate inputs.
            → Monitor mode annunciations to ensure the autoflight system performs as
              desired.
            → Intervene if necessary.
            or
        ■ VVM policy for both flightcrew members:
            → Verbalize.
            → Verify.
            → Monitor.
        ■ Comparing the resulting FMS DIST TO reading with the DME distance read on
          the radio magnetic indicator (or on ND, as applicable).
        ■ Checking the difference between FMS DIST TO and DME distance against the
          criteria applicable for the flight phase (as defined in standard operating
          procedures).

If the required FMS navigation accuracy criteria are not achieved, revert from NAV
mode to selected heading mode with reference to navaids raw data.




6
    The term flight path vector is specific to Airbus.


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2.7 Command and Control

2.7.1 General Guidelines
The following guidelines are applicable to any flight phase but are particularly important
in the high workload phases (below 10,000 ft) associated with takeoff, departure, climb,
and approach-and-landing.

The PF is responsible for controlling the vertical flight path and horizontal flight path and
for energy management, by either—
     ■ Supervising the AP vertical guidance and lateral guidance, and the A/THR or
       A/T operation (that is, awareness of modes being armed or engaged, of mode
       changes through mode transitions and reversions and of selected guidance
       targets), or
     ■ Hand-flying the aircraft with or without FD guidance and with or without
       A/THR or AT assistance.

The non-flying pilot has a dual role as PNF and PM. He/she is responsible for
systems-related and monitoring tasks and for performing the actions requested by the PF.
These responsibilities include the following:
     ■ Radio communications;
     ■ Systems selection/configuration;
     ■ AP/FD, A/THR, or A/TS and FMS mode selections and target entries, when PF
       is hand-flying;
     ■ Monitoring the status of the aircraft (for example, configuration, attitude, speed,
       and trajectory);
     ■ Performing the actions called by electronic and/or paper checklists, in abnormal
       and emergency conditions; and
     ■ Monitoring the PF to provide effective backup, as required (that is, standard calls
       and excessive deviation callouts).

2.7.2 Know Your Guidance at All Times
The AP control panel and FMS control display unit/keyboard are the prime interfaces for
the flightcrew to communicate with aircraft systems (that is, to arm modes or engage
modes, and to set targets).

As previously mentioned, the PFD, particularly the FMA section and target symbols on
the speed scale and altitude scale, and ND are the primary interfaces for the aircraft to
communicate with the flightcrew. These interfaces confirm the aircraft systems have
correctly accepted the flightcrew mode selections and target entries.




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Any action on the autopilot control panel or on FMS keyboard/line-select keys should be
confirmed by cross-checking the corresponding annunciation or data on the PFD and/or
the ND. At all times, the PF and PNF (PM) should be aware of the following:
     ■ Modes armed or engaged;
     ■ Guidance targets set;
     ■ Aircraft response in terms of attitude, speed, and trajectory; and
     ■ Mode transitions or reversions.

2.8 Recommendation Summary
For the optimum use of automation, carriers should promote the following:
     ■ Understanding the integration of AP/FD and A/THR-A/T modes (that is, pairing
       of modes).
     ■ Understanding all mode transition and reversion sequences.
     ■ Understanding pilot-system interfaces for the following:
          → Pilot-to-system communication (that is, for modes engagement and target
            selections), and
          → System-to-pilot feedback (that is, for modes and targets cross-check).
     ■ Awareness of available guidance (for example, AP/FD and A/THR or A/T status,
       modes armed or engaged, and active targets).
     ■ Alertness to adapt the level of automation to the task and/or circumstances, or to
       revert to hand-flying/manual thrust/throttle control, if required.
     ■ Adherence to the aircraft-specific design and operating philosophy and the
       air carrier’s standard operating procedures.
     ■ If doubt exists regarding the aircraft flight path or speed control, no attempt at
       reprogramming the automated systems should be made.
     ■ Selected guidance or hand-flying together with the use of navaids raw data
       should be used until time and conditions permit reprogramming the AP/FD
       or FMS.
     ■ If the aircraft does not follow the intended flight path, check the AP and A/THR
       or A/T engagement status. If engaged, disconnect the AP and/or A/THR or A/T
       using the associated disconnect push button(s), to revert to hand-flying (with
       FD guidance or with reference to raw data) and/or to manual thrust control.
     ■ In hand-flying, the FD commands should be followed; otherwise, the FD bars
       should be cleared from display, AP, and A/THR or A/T.




CAST SE–30, Revision 3 Final Report                                                         14

								
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