A promise
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IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD AT CAPE TOWN
Case no:
C168/2007
In the matter between:
FREDERIC JOHAN DU PLESSIS Applicant
and
KAAP AGRI BEDRYF LTD Respondent
JUDGMENT
MOLAHLEHI J
Introduction
[1] This is an application in terms of which the applicant sought to
challenge the termination of his employment on the basis that it was
an unfair dismissal based on operational reasons by the respondent.
The respondent contended that the employment relationship was
terminated by mutual agreement between the parties.
[2] The applicant abandoned issue of procedural fairness at the beginning
of the hearing.
[3] The issues to be determined in terms of the agreement between the
parties are whether:
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“5.1 The settlement agreement entered into between
the parties deprived the Honourable Court of
jurisdiction to entertain the dispute;
5.2 The settlement agreement entered between the parties :
5.2.1 Was induced by misrepresentation; or
5.2.2 constitutes the valid settlement of an unfair
dismissal dispute;
[4] If it was to be found that the agreement was induced by a
misrepresentation and that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the
dispute, then the remaining issue would be whether or not the
dismissal was substantive fair.
Background facts
[5] It is common cause that the respondent experienced difficult trading
conditions during the first months of its financial year 2005/2006.
[6] The applicant who was employed as General Manager: Packaging was
concerned about the performance of his division and as a result
motivated for the reduction of staff as a cost saving measure. At that
stage there were three managers reporting to the applicant and he
reported to the Operations Manager.
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[7] As a result of these trading difficulties that respondent embarked on
cost cutting measures during January 2006 and when this did not yield
any positive results, a meeting was convened with all staff members
on 20 February 2006. At this meeting the respondent informed the
staff that it intended to commence with consultation regarding the
proposed restructuring and that would done in terms of s189(3) of
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 ( the Act).
[8] Thereafter, and on the 22 February 2006, Mr Liebenberg, the General
Manager and Mr J du Toit, the Senior Manager, met with the applicant
and advised him that his position would be made redundant. The
applicant did not contest the issue of making his position redundant.
What then followed after this announcement was consultation between
the parties regarding the severance pay for the applicant.
[9] The consultation resulted in an agreement between the parties on
amount of severance to be paid to the applicant. Although the
applicant left the employment of the respondent on 28 February 2006,
the employment terminated on 31 March 2006.
[10] It is common cause that the applicant appointed Mr Andre Du Toit
was appointed to the position of General Manager: Packaging
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Material, a fact the applicant claims he became aware of on 13
November 2006. The applicant further testified that this is the same
position he occupied before termination of his employment with the
respondent. It was also arising from this that the applicant referred a
dispute to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration
(the CCMA).
[11] The conciliation process having failed to settle the dispute and
Commissioner Warwick having ruled that the CCMA did not have
jurisdiction to hear the dispute, the applicant instituted these
proceedings.
The case of the applicant
[12] The thrust of the applicant’s case is that he signed the agreement
terminating his employment due to the misrepresentation by the
respondent. The misrepresentation according to him arose from the
presentation by the respondent during the consultation that his
previous position, that of the General Manager: Packaging would be
done away with.
[13] He conceded during cross examination that he had made the
proposal for rationalisation which would result in the reduction of
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staff complement as a cost saving measure. He further conceded that
despite the fact that the rationalisation process was to render certain
positions redundant, it was not intended to do away with the functions
of those positions. The functions were according to him to be
absorbed into other positions which were unaffected.
[14] When asked whether he would have accepted the position regard
being had to the fact that it paid R10 000.00 less than what he earned
at the time the applicant indicated that he would seriously consider it.
The case of the respondent
[15] The respondent closed its case without leading any evidence and
applied for the dismissal of the applicant’s case with costs. The
respondent contended that the case should be dismissed because the
applicant had failed to prove that he was dismissed. The applicant
contended that in the alternative, the case should be dismissed because
the matter was res judicata, the dispute having been settled by
agreement.
Evaluation
[16] It is clear that the applicant sought to have the agreement
concluded between him and the respondent set aside on the basis of
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misrepresentation.
[17] The legal principles to apply when dealing with a plea of
misrepresentation are summarised in Novick And Another v Comair
Holdings and Others 1979 (2) SA 116 (WLD) as follows:
“(a) That the representation relied upon was made.
(b) That it was a representation as to a fact. A promise, prediction,
opinion or estimate or exercise of discretion is not a representation
as to the truth or accuracy of its content; it can, however, often be
construed as a representation that the person making it is of a
particular state of mind.
(c) The representation was false. In relation to an ordinary
representation of fact, what must be shown is not merely that it
was, or turned out to be, erroneous, but that it did not represent the
bona fide view, at the time when it was expressed, of the person
who expressed it.
(d) That bit was material, in the sense that it was such as would have
influenced a reasonable man to enter into the contract in issue.
(e) That it was intended to induce the person to whom it was
made to enter into the transaction sought to be avoided.”
[18] In the pleadings and his evidence the applicant does not reveal the
nature or form of the representation made by the respondent. His
contention is that the redundancy of his position was not properly
thought through. In his testimony the furthest he could go in relation
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to this issue was that had the position mad available he would have
considered it.
[19] Unlike in the case of Baudach v United Tobacco (200) 21 ILJ
2241 (SCA), where the misrepresentation was found to be the cause
of the inducement for the employee to accept the settlement, in the
present instance there is no basis to arrived at that conclusion. Both
the pleadings and the evidence of the applicant do not reveal how the
applicant was misled into entering into the agreement. Mr Grobler
counsel for the applicant argued that the applicant would not have
signed the agreement but for the fact that he was told that if did not
sign at that stage he ran the risk of not receiving the same amount of
severance pay should the respondent not succeed in making savings in
that period. that, if there was no improvement in the performance of
the respondent he could receive a lesser severance pay. It was not
stated as a fact that if he did not sign at that stage he would receive a
lesser severance pay. There existed a possibility that he and other
affected employees would receive what they ultimately received even
if they did not sign at that stage depending on the improvement in the
financial performance of the respondent.
[20] It is also important to note in relation to the issue of representation
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that the applicant testified, when asked whether he would have
accepted the position despite the fact it was paying R10 000.00 less
then what he earned before termination of his employment, that he
might have considered the position. He did not say that he would have
accepted the position.
[21] Mr Grobeler further argued that the applicant would not have
signed the agreement but for the presentation that his post was
redundant. This argument does not assist the case of the applicant
because on his own version the proposal came from him that there was
a need for the respondent to embark on a cost saving exercise. It is
undisputed that this exercise resulted in significant savings for the
respondent.
[22] It is also not dispute that the person who the respondent
appointed was not an outsider but an employee who was transferred
horizontally and earned a salary far less than that of the applicant.
Whilst the title of the post occupied by the person who was transferred
from Trade Devision, was the same as that which was occupied by the
applicant, General Manager: Packaging, the content of the post is
different. This transfer which is recorded as part of the common cause
facts in the pre-trial minute occurred as a result of a further
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restructuring which occurred in 2007. It is however strange as the
applicant contended, that the appointment was made retrospective to
October 2006. However, this does not assist the case of the applicant
and as I pointed out to the applicant’s counsel the critical issue is that
the parties agreed that the appointment happened as a result of another
restructuring process.
[23] Another attack which was raised during argument against the
agreement was that it contained a common error such that it could not
be said that there was a meeting of the minds of the parties. The
argument relates to the fact that whilst this was a termination based on
operational reasons, it was in the signed agreement titled
“resignation.” This argument has no merit. The approach to name the
termination “resignation” arose from the concern by the applicant
about the implication of securing future employment if it was to be
stated that he was retrenched. He requested that the agreement should
record the termination of his employment with the respondent as being
due to resignation. This proposal was acceptable to the respondent
and accordingly the reason for termination was titled as such in the
agreement which was signed on the by both parties on 27 February
2007.
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[24] Prior to signing the agreement and on 22 February 2006, the
applicant confirmed the agreement that the termination will be treated
as a resignation rather than termination based on operational reasons.
The memorandum reads as follows:
“BEDANKENG
Beste Johan,
Hiermee gee ek formeeel kennis date ek my dienste as
Hoofbestuurder: Pakmateriaal sal be-eindig met effek 31
Maart 2006.
Ek maak graag van hierdie geleentheid gebreuk om my uit te spreek
teenoor die Direksie en Bestuur van Kaap Agri (Edms) Bpk vir die
voorreg om deel van ‘n wonderlike span te gewees het.
Voorspoed vir toekoms
Vriendelike groete.”
[25] As stated above the agreement was signed by both parties on 27
February 2006. In its introduction the agreement provides as follows:
“ANNGESIEN Kaap Agri met Du Plessis begin
konsulteer het oor sy moontlike diensbeeindiging weens
operassionele redes;
EN AANGESIEN Du Plessis op 22 February 2006 skriftelike kennis
gegee het dat hy met effek van 31 Maart 2008 uit die diens van
Kaap Agri bedank.”
Clause 7 of the provides that the agreement is in full and final
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settlement of any claim that the applicant may have against the
respondent.
[26] In the light of the above I do not agree that there was a confusion
as to what was agreed upon by the parties. In any event the use of the
word resignation is not significant in my view as what is significant is
that the facts indicate clearly that the employment relationship was
terminated by agreement.
_______________
MOLAHLEHI J
DATE OF HEARING : 24 JUNE 2006
DATE OF JUDGMENT : 12 JUNE 2008
APPEARANCE
For the Applicant :Adv Grobelar
Instructed by : J Gruss Attoneys
For the Respondent: Attorney H Nieuwoudt
Instructed by : Deneys Reitz Inc
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