FERC�s Initiatives on Gas Infrastructure

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FERC�s Initiatives on Gas Infrastructure Powered By Docstoc
					FERC’s Initiatives
on Energy
Infrastructure
Alison Silverstein
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n
EEI-AGA Board Member Seminar
September 25, 2003

                               1
Overview
   Short-term initiatives
     Cost  recovery policy and cases
     Critical energy infrastructure information
     Dam safety
     Natural gas deliverability
     Cyber-security
     Supporting industry and other efforts
   Long-term concerns

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Security cost recovery
 Policy – spend what you need to protect
  assets and we’ll review and approve
  prudent expenses
 Issued September 14, 2001
 3 requests approved, more filings coming




                                             3
Critical energy infrastructure
information
   Goal to protect information asset-owners must
    submit from widespread public dissemination,
    without harming public’s right to learn
    information to participate in siting proceedings
   Keeps locational information and key
    engineering detail off the web and out of public
    reading rooms; review of each requester and
    purpose of request
   Rule adopted February, 2003
   http://www.ferc.gov/home/RM02-4-02-21-03.pdf
                                                       4
Dam safety program
   Formed FERC hydro security team
   Security program for hydropower projects -
    guidance for licensees
   Initial assessments and security enhancement
    guidance for specific dams; ongoing inspections
   Integration of security concerns with emergency
    action plans and procedures
   Rapid alert notification method for information
    dissemination
   Consultation (w/ industry and government
    agencies) and training (FERC staff and industry)
                                                       5
Natural gas supplies
   Working with industry to determine ability
    to assure gas delivery in the event of
    pipeline disruptions
     Emergency  reconstruction
     Assessing deliverability relative to needs
     Emergency gas reallocation
     Regional table-top disaster exercises coming
      up
   Using non-public technical conferences to
    resolve security issues in specific cases
                                                     6
Cyber-security
   FERC asked industry, through NERC, to
    develop cyber-security standards to address
    bulk power grid cyber inter-dependencies
   These are generic and least common
    denominator, not “best practices”
   Since cyber systems and challenges are
    consistent across industries, same standards
    could be used for natural gas, oil pipelines,
    water and wastewater utilities

                                                    7
Supporting industry and other
security efforts
   Electric -- NERC CIPAG
   Natural gas -- AGA, INGAA initiatives
   Other federal agencies -- cooperating with
    Department of Energy, Office of Pipeline Safety,
    Department of Homeland Security, Rural Utility
    Service, …
   Talking to state regulators
   Thinking about what a secure energy system of
    the future would look like….
                                                       8
Longer-term security initiatives

   Facilitating expansion of physical energy
    infrastructure
   Using locational pricing of energy to encourage
    better siting, balancing between energy users
    and transmission, generation and fuel sources
   Facilitating use of distributed energy resources –
    energy efficiency, demand response, distributed
    generation
   Rethinking energy system architecture, materials
    and assumptions
                                                     9
Security considerations
   It’s not just terrorism we have to protect against
   What if the energy system is used as the
    weapon instead of the target?
   The energy system should include not just the
    energy producing and delivery components, but
    also the energy users
   Beware the inter-dependencies….
   Measures that improve security and reliability
    often have multiple benefits

                                                         10
We can’t protect the whole energy
system, so we need:
   Better detection of attack or system failure
   More graceful, less disastrous system failure
   Easier, faster system repair (e.g., more
    interchangeability between key parts)
   Lower consequences to energy system failure
     More efficiency, renewables, distributed generation
     More robust, redundant, dispersed energy sources
     Smarter grid controls, more islanding
     Make the digital economy more fault-tolerant
                                                            11
Energy security challenges
 Paying for new infrastructure and security
  investments
 Paying for new research and development
 Cyber-security and SCADA
 Protecting information
 Voluntary versus mandatory or regulated
  security measures
 Lack of leadership
 Difficult to prioritize challenges, needs
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