Church Fathers Dialectica a systematic treatise on

							                   Notes on Peter Abelard

                               Life
Dates: 1079-1142

Eldest son of noble family in Palais, near Nantes

Chose a life of philosophy over that of a knight which would have
been his conventional prospect

Before age 20 attended the lectures of William of Champeaux in
"dialectic" at cathedral school of Paris and bested him in
disputation

Set up several schools and attended lectures of Anselm at Laon in
theology, also besting him in disputation

1115: appointed lecturer in dialectic at cathedral school in Paris

Acquired a vast popular following, being attended by crowds
numbering in the thousands

Became arrogant, according to his own account in History of My
Calamities, and thought himself "the only philosopher standing in
the world."

Fell in love with and "seduced" Heloise, the intellectually
accomplished niece of Fulbert, a canon of the cathedral

She became pregnant. She went to Brittany to have her child.

To appease her uncle Abelard offered to marry her, but secretly.

Heloise thought this was a bad idea but finally did it. The secret
got out, and she publicly denied it and fled, with Abelard's help,
to the convent of Argenteuil.

Fulbert thought Abelard was trying to free himself of Heloise and
arranged to have Abelard accosted in his cathedral rooms and
sexually mutilated.

Apparently this mutilation legally barred him from the priesthood
or ecclesiastical office.

Heloise took religious vows.
Abelard became a monk in the monastery of St. Denis.

After one year he resumed teaching at the Priory of Maisoncelle.

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1121: accused of Sabellianism and condemned at a synod at Soissons,
where he was forced to throw his book Introduction to Theology into
the flames. (However, this work survives.)

["Sabellianism":    ]

Confined at convent of St. Medard. Took pleasure in irritating the
monks by challenging the identity of Dionysius the Areopagite and
St. Denis.

Became a hermit in a desert near Nogent-sur-Seine, but students
flocked from Paris and set up tents and huts near him.

They built him an oratory called "Paraclete."

He became afraid of his enemies and took up residence at St.
Gildas-de-Rhuys in Brittany.

Remained there for ten years although it was "savage and
disorderly," and although the monks tried to poison him.

Heloise' convent was disbanded, and Abelard made her head of the
Paraclete.

He took on role as spiritual director of Paraclete, and was thus
able to visit her.

He wrote History of My Calamities and they wrote the famous letters
to each other.

Abelard became the target of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, who was an
opponent of rationalism in theology, and was arraigned on charges
of heresy at the Council of Sens in 1141.

He appealed to Rome, but Bernard had him condemned there also.

On his way to Rome to plead in person, he became ill and died at
the Abbey of Cluny (April 21, 1142).

                              Works
History of My Calamities

Introduction to Theology

Sic et Non (a collection of contrary opinions on theology from the
Church Fathers)

Dialectica (a systematic treatise on logic, missing in part)

Scito Te Ipsum (Know Thyself) (a treatise in ethics)

Glosses on Porphyry (a discussion of the problem of universals)

                  Notes on Glosses on Porphyry

Passage from Aristotle's On Interpretation in which he defines
"universal":

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"Now of actual things [onta, which seems always to mean extra-
mental realities], some are universal, others individual (I call
universal that which is by its nature predicated of a number of
things, and particular that which is not; man, for instance, is a
universal, Callias an individual)." 17b1.

"Genus" and "species" are relative terms, denoting respectively
more and less inclusive universals -- for example duck is a species
of bird, bird is the genus of duck. However, for Aristotle, there
are both ultimate genera (plural of "genus") and ultimate species.
The import of the Categories seems to be that the ultimate genera
are the ten categories and the ultimate species are things
predicated only of individuals -- the lowest level of universal.

Four level semantic theory stated very briefly at beginning of On
Interpretation:

There are two relations involved in this theory, the relation of
signifying or symbolizing, which is established by convention
(social agreement -- continual usage seems to be thought of here as
a tacit agreement), and the relation of resemblance or likeness.

1. Written language signifies spoken language.

2. Spoken language signifies thought (in the text, affections of
the soul).
3. Thought resembles extramental realities.

Thus written and spoken language are different in different
societies, but thought and extra-mental reality are the same for
all humans.

The three questions of Boethius on universals in his commentary on
Porphyry's commentary on Aristotle's Categories:

1. Do genera and species subsist, or are they posited in the
intellect alone?

2. If they subsist, are they corporeal or incorporeal essences?

3. If they are incorporeal, are they separated from sensible things
or in sensible things?

The meaning of these questions:

1. Are genera and species extramental realities, or do they have
only the reality of the objects of thought?

2. If they are extramental realities, are they corporeal or
incorporeal (sensible or non-sensible)?

3. If they are incorporeal, are they separate from sensibles
(independent realities) or in sensibles (attributes of sensibles)?

[Note that the second and third questions presuppose certain
answers to their immediately preceding questions.]

[Note also: these questions, although about an Aristotelian work,
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are posed in a Platonic framework. Porphyry was a Neo-platonist and
the biographer and editor of Plotinus.]

Abelard quotes Boethius as saying that Aristotle held that
universals subsist only in sensibles, but are understood outside
sensibles, while Plato held that both exist and are understood
outside sensibles.

[Note: if Abelard is interpreting Boethius correctly here, I would
disagree with Boethius' attribution to Aristotle of the opinion
that universals subsist only in sensibles, but are understood
outside sensibles. For this supposes that universals, in the sense
of the contents or significata of universal names, exist outside
the mind, which I do not believe Aristotle held. He did hold that
"forms" exist outside the mind, in sensibles, but forms are
essences or formulas, not universals. The distinction is that, for
example, between "man" and "to be man" (the latter being a form).]

First question of Abelard: does being a universal belong to
linguistic items only, or also to extra-linguistic entities?

Abelard points out the wording in On Interpretation seeming to
imply that universals are things in the sense of being extra-mental
(and extra-linguistic). [However, the whole context of Aristotle's
treatment here would favor Abelard's ultimate interpretation --
that universals are linguistic only -- since universals are defined
in a context which is entirely grammatical and logical, not
metaphysical.]

Abelard points out other passages which show that Aristotle calls
linguistic items, in addition to onta, universals.

Second question of Abelard: how do those who maintain that extra-
linguistic, extra-mental things can be universals give an account
of how such a thing can be predicated of many? (These philosophers
were, either in their own time or later, called "realists," the
chief of whom, in Abelard's day, was William of Champeaux.)

First realist account:

Individuals the same in species share the same "material essence"
but differ in "forms" [Note: the philosophers of Abelard's day did
not have access to most of the works of Plato, Aristotle, or the
Neo-platonists. John Scotus Erigena, the disciple and translator of
Pseudo-Dionysius had been declared a heretic, and so his great
work, On the Division of Nature, though it survives now, and was
written in France about two centuries before Abelard, probably was
not widely available. Thus the realists were in the dark about both
Aristotle's and the Neo-platonists' actual usage of key terms. The
account Abelard gives of their views does not seem to reflect the
terminology either of Aristotle or of the Neo-platonists.]

For example, in single humans who are numerically different, there
is a single substance man which becomes Plato here through these
accidents and Socrates here through these accidents.

[Note: Aristotle's uses of the terms "substance," "essence," and
"accident":
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English "substance" usually translates Latin "substantia," which
translates Greek ousia. In Aristotle this means underlying or
fundamental reality.

English "essence" usually translates Latin "essentia," which
tranlsates Greek to ti en einai, literally, "the what was to be."
This concept seems to relfect Aristotle's notion of "entelechy," an
immanent form or soul that guides a living thing to its mature
perfection. It is possible that "essentia" was also used in some
Latin texts to translate ousia. Aristotle also thinks of this as
the formula or recipe of a thing -- the account which describes how
it is constructed.

English "essentially" translates Latin "per se," which translates
Greek kath' hauto, "through or of self" (as opposed to through
another).

English "accident" translates Latin "accidentia," which translates
Greek symbebekos, the principle meanings of which are three, each
opposed to a corresponding meaning of "per se":

1. Per se/accidentally means what belongs to a thing either as part
of its formula or as that which contains the thing of which it is
predicated as part of its formula; versus that which belongs to a
thing in neither of these ways. Example: "to be a plane figure"
belongs to "triangle" per se in the first way; "scalene" belongs to
"triangle" per se in second way; "green" belongs to "triangle" accidentally.

2. Per se/accident means substance versus attribute -- i. e., an
item which is not a fundamental reality, but an aspect of something
else.

3. Per se/accidentally means that which belongs in a more extended
way intrinsically, as to be feverish belongs to being ill, as
opposed to that which does not, as to be feverish belongs to being
intelligent.]

(Continuing Abelard's account:) The realists of this first type
also say that animal is one substance which differs in horse, dog,
etc., through its accidents.

Abelard's argument against the first realist account:

First round: on this account contraries will exist in the same
substance, since, for example, rationality and irrationality will
exist in the same man in the same respect, which is impossible.

Reply of realists: a contrary is only that which can not exist in
two individual substances at the same time in the same respect.

Second round: But on these realists' views, contrary attributes
will exist in the same individual at the same time, in the same
respect. For rationality will exist in Socrates and irrationality
in Browny (an ass). But on their view Socrates and Browny will be
the same in essence; i. e., the same substance. So Socrates will be
Browny and will be both rational and irrational.

Anticipation of further replies:

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You cannot say that the "forms" (accidents) of Browny are Browny,
since then substance will be accident.

You cannot say that the substance and accidents together of Browny
are Browny, because then body and non-body together will make up
body. [Here Spade, the translator, says that the text is corrupt.]

You cannot say that rational and irrational are not true of Browny
at the same time in the same respect because they are true in
virtue of different accidents, because by that argument man cannot
be at the same time and in the same respect both animal and
substance, and thus the very concept of genus is destroyed.

Further objection to the first realists' position: on their view
there will be only ten things, the ten highest universals or
categories.

Further objection to the first realists' position: they cannot
manintain that Socrates is constituted by his accidents. For the
fact that species are constituted by their differences makes
differences prior in definition to species; so Socrates' accidents
will be prior in definition to Socrates and in general accidents
will be prior in definition to individuals. But Aristotle shows
that whatever is posterior in definition to the species is also
posterior to the individual (whatever is "in" the species is "in"
individuals). Thus their view that the accident is posterior to the
species but prior to the individual is contradictory (given
Aristotle's argument just cited).

Abelard's statement of the view of a second group of realists:
These people say that individuals are not only diverse in their
accidents, but also in their essences, and "personally." But they
still want universality in things, so they say these things are the
same "indifferently."

Abelard's statement of differences in the views of the second group
of realists:

First group: the species is just the collection of all the
individuals falling under it -- e. g., the species man is just the
collection of all men.

Second group: they call the collection of all men the species man,
and also any individual man insofar as he is a man.

Abelard's refutation of the first group of the second group of
realists:

A universal is predicated of the individuals that fall under it.
But the collection of all men is not predicated of Socrates, for
then Socrates would be all men.

Further, Socrates, the collection of his parts, would be a
universal, and, for example, his heart would be his entire body,
etc.

Further, subsets of the class of all men would also be universals,
so that Socrates would be all the red-headed men in London.
 - 8 -

[I don't understand the next argument ]

Furthermore, the universal is prior to the individual, but the
class is posterior to the individual. [In what respect does he mean
here?]

Furthermore, according to Boethius, the whole is distinct from the
parts, whereas the individual is in some sense identical with the
genus. [Aristotle allows specific identity -- so Socrates is
specifically identical with man.]

Abelard's argument against the second group of the second group of
realists:

(These are they who say that the universal is the individual
insofar as it "agrees with" ("resembles") others.)
But then there will be no individuals, since individuals will then
be individuals insofar as they do not agree with others, but all
individuals agree with others in the respect in which they are said
by these realists to be species.

[As I interpret this objection Abelard is saying that on this view
there will be no true distinction between individuals and
universals because individuals and universals are not distinguished
from each other in any one respect. Everything will be an
individual in one respect and a species in another.]

Furthermore, for species and individuals to be distinct, individual
things will have to be distinct from themselves. But this is
impossible.

Furthermore, what does "agree in man" mean?

If it means agreeing in some thing which is man, then, since on
this view universals are individuals considered in a certain
respect, no individuals will agree in man, since they would have to
agree in Socrates, or Plato, etc, but they do not, since they are
all diverse.

If it means "not differing in man," then all men will likewise be
the species rock, since they do not differ in rock, none of them
being rocks.

[The following short elaboration of this point eludes me.]

Thus things cannot be called universals. It remains to be seen how
linguistic items ("utterances") can be so called.

First question: how can a universal have a signification if it does
not signify any one individual thing to the exclusion of others?

Answer: the name "man" (1) names individual men because they are
men, and thus is a universal because of this common cause for its
naming of all of the individual men, and it (2) constitutes a
certain common understanding which pertains to individual men.

Agreement in being man
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All men agree, not in man, but in being man, which is not a thing.
Agreeing in no thing is not the same as agreeing in nothing.

"Being a man" we call the status man.

The understanding constituted by the name "man"

The understanding that goes with a universal name conceives a
common and confused (or fused) image of many men, while the
understanding that goes with an individual name comprises a
singular form proper to one thing alone.

Only God can have a pure common concept of a plurality of things.

Nevertheless, in our understanding which corresponds to a universal
name, the confused image takes the place of such a pure concept.

Thus, the universal name signifies not only the individuals it
names, but also the confused image by which we understand all those
things in common.

Is the name called "universal" because it names many or because of
the confused image it signifies. Perhaps both.

We form the confused image or common conception by abstraction,
which is not false, but merely selective.

Answers to Porphyry's questions:
1. (Do genera and species subsist, or are they posited in the
intellect alone?)

Answer: they signify things which subsist, the same things which
individual names signify.

[He admits here that in answering the question he is reinterpreting
it.]

2. (If subsisting, are they corporeal or incorporeal?)

Answer: if we interpret the question to mean discrete versus non-
discrete [an outlandish interpretation], they signify discrete
things in a non-discrete way (since they involve the understanding
by means of a confused image).

3. (If incorporeal, are they in sensibles or separate from them?)

[I don't understand Abelard's answer here.]
(Another interpretation of questions 2 and 3:)

2. (If subsisting, are they corporeal or incorporeal?)
3. (If incorporeal, are they in sensibles or separate from them?)

Answer: they are both corporeal and incorporeal in signification,
since they signify both the things that fall under them and the
common conception or confused image. For the same reason, they are
(in their signification) both in sensibles and and separate from
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them.

If there are no roses, then "rose" has no nomination, but it still
has signification. Otherwise we could not say, "There are no
roses."

This is thus something like Frege's later distinction between sense
and reference.