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  Update on Aegis Ballistic Missile

      Defense and the Navy Air

    And Missile Defense Center


         Rear Admiral Alan B. Hicks
Program Director, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
                        The George C. Marshall Institute
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 Update on Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
and the Navy Air and Missile Defense Center

                Rear Admiral Alan B. Hicks
       Program Director, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

                The George Marshall Institute
                     Washington, D.C.
Rear Admiral Alan B. Hicks is the Program Director, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD), the sea-based element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) under
development by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and Commander, Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense, a Naval Sea Systems Command Field Activity. His decorations and
awards include the Legion of Merit (4), Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious
Service Medal (4), Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (3) and the Navy and
Marine Corps Achievement Medal.
                Update on Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
              and the Navy Air and Missile Defense Center
                                 Rear Admiral Alan B. Hicks
                      Program Director, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

                                          August 3, 2009

Jeff Kueter: Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for being here. I am Jeff Kueter, the
President of the George C. Marshall Institute, a non-profit public policy research institu-
tion here in Washington, D.C. that explores science and technology issues and brings
together groups like this and hosts forums to talk about issues where science and tech-
nology impact public policy, of which missile defense has been a priority over our
twenty-five years. Public opinion polls and surveys of public attitude show over the
years a consistent and persistent theme: the public wants, and thinks that it has, ballis-
tic missile defense. They want that because they understand, I believe, and are growing
to appreciate that the threats to their security, the direct safety of the American home-
land and that of our forces deployed abroad, from a threat which is both real and grow-
ing in both size and sophistication. The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system is
one of our principal responses to that threat and it is a successful response. In nine-
teen of the past twenty-three flights and intercepts tests, it has successfully destroyed or
met its target and those tests are of increasing sophistication and complexity to match
the growing sophistication of the threats that they face. In addition, it operated suc-
cessfully in a real-world context as in early 2008 when it destroyed a dying U.S. intelli-
gence satellite. So the question before us today is where is the Aegis program headed?
What are the new roles that it may be assigned? What are its new capabilities? What
has it accomplished and where is it going? It is my pleasure to have here today Rear
Admiral Alan B. Hicks, the program director of the Aegis ballistic missile defense sys-
tem, the sea-based element of the United States’ ballistic missile defense system under
development by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). He is the Commander of the Ae-
gis Ballistic Missile Defense, a Naval Sea Systems Command Field Activity. This will be
the third time that Adm. Hicks has been with the Marshall Institute, in two-year incre-
ments. In 2005 in the fall he was here, in 2007 in the fall he was here, and now in the
summer of 2009 we are very glad that he is able to join us to provide an update on
where the program is and where it is going.

       Rear Admiral Hicks commanded the U.S. Cape St. George from March 1999
to September 2001. He has also served as the director for network systems and inte-
gration for the office of the chief of naval operations. He was selected to flag rank by
the Fiscal Year 2002 Flag Selection Board. He served as the Deputy Commander of

 The views expressed by the author are solely those of the author and may not represent those of any
institution with which he is affiliated.

                                         Update on Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense and
                                             The Navy Air and Missile Defense Center

 Warfare Systems Engineering at the Naval Sea Systems Command. He was Com-
mander of the Naval Surface Force Warfare Center. He has also held responsibilities in
the Pentagon as Deputy Director for Combat Systems and Weapons in the Service
Warfare Directorate of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Hicks,
thank you for being here today.

Admiral Alan B. Hicks: Good afternoon. It is great to be with you back at the
Marshall Institute. I have always appreciated the opportunity to speak here. I am not
sure if the fact that I am back on my third go-around is a good news story or not; I
think it is. It also shows my longevity. I did assume the job fairly lacking in hair so
there is no change there, but I am grayer. I have adopted the strategy of cutting it
shorter with the high-speed low-drag mentality, as some do. I did acquire a tan this
summer. I would like to say it was due to off time, but I have just returned from Hawaii
where we successfully wrapped up another test campaign. If you have to work, it is
always good to do it at Kauai and Barking Sands in the sunshine of Hawaii.

        It was late November 2007 when I spoke to you last and back in December
2005 when I spoke to you before, I had just relieved Rear Admiral Kate Paige late that
year of 2005 as the Director of Aegis BMD. Part of my discussion with you today is to
try to capture where we have been and where we are going and let you judge for your-
self where you think our successes are and where we are headed. As has been stated,
we feel we are pretty successful. I will tell you that I am always the toughest critic of
my own program. I think that only by necessity, because the stakes are very high in
this mission area. Whether I am dealing with my own team in Dahlgren, Virginia or I
am dealing with my contractors or I am dealing with the fleet and the ships, I constantly
press the system because I do worry about making sure we deliver what we promise
and that the ships operate to the utmost. As some of you are aware, this recent April,
the Chief of Naval Operations stood up a command called Navy Air and Missile De-
fense Command which has ballistic missile defense as a subset of part of the core mis-
sion, that is, to bridge that interface between the acquisition community, whether it is
the Navy or the Missile Defense Agency, and the warfighter, the fleet, and also that
joint interface to make sure the correct equities are sustained and we get the right doc-
trine at ConOps and so forth to get the job done. I will be speaking to you about that

         Figure 1 has not changed since I showed it to you in November 2005; it is very
similar. This was a stated supposition of what we did back then. What I can tell you
for today is real. When I talked to you in 2005, we had no engagement ships and
when I talked to you in 2007, we were up to a handful of engagement ships with very
little inventory. Today we have eighteen engagement ships with a nineteenth in avail-
ability as we speak (it will be available here in a couple of months) and we have inter-
ceptors in the inventory. In fact, based on combatant commander requirements, we
have ships deployed today 24/7, 365 days a year, meeting combatant commander re-
quirements. Additionally we have proven ourselves in tracking and real-world events

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such as with North Korea and with the Iranian event, tracking ballistic missiles with our
ships on station with the capability we have fielded. We are very proud of that. I am
also feeling the squeeze of combatant commanders for this; the more they see it, the
more they like it, the more they want of it.

                                         Figure 1

        So while I am very proud of that, I am always under pressure to get more out
here. The capacity in and of itself is a capability. That is a lesson learned for me: it is
one thing to declare you have a capability, but if you don’t have adequate capacity,
then it is a hollow capability. We are proud of the fact that very quickly, in two years,
we have come from just a couple of engagement ships to the full eighteen BMD ships
that we promised a couple years ago. In fact, because of the urgency, we have added
three more ships to the inventory and we are looking to do more, and I will talk to that.
We have additionally conducted many tests with either THAAD or with the GMD sys-
tem where we are integrating those systems. We are very confident of our interopera-
bility with THAAD. That is a good-news story. We have also made great progress
with GMD as part of the sensor the GMD system.

       Figure 2 generally hasn’t changed. The elements that we told you about back in
2005 that we were expecting in the weapons system and the upgrades that we had
planned are on track or ahead of schedule. We have the 1A missile, which has gone
from testing to being in production today and being delivered to the fleet. The 1B mis-
sile we will fly late next year, which has allowed us to deal with the future threats. The
2A missile, which is a cooperative development with Japan that I will talk to you about

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later, is on-track. I will tell you that the next program is probably the one that keeps
me up at night the most.

                                        Figure 2

        When we signed up for this program with the government of Japan, because of
the operational urgency, we signed up to an aggressive schedule. We signed up to a
very ambitious program, but we feel there was a need for it. I am extremely pleased by
not just the government-to-government interaction between Japan and the United
States, but I am very pleased with the progress we made with the industry-to-industry
relationship between the U.S. and Japanese industry teams. That is a good-news story
for us. But it remains an aggressive schedule. When I talked in 2005, the change to
the chart, the sea-based terminal in the lower right corner, was a program that did not
exist. We did a demo in 2006 called Pacific Phoenix where the Navy came forward
and flew an SM-2 Block IV modified with a minimal weapons system change and suc-
cessfully intercepted a target in the Pacific. We then went forward and got the funding
that was necessary to modify the SM-2 Block IV inventory to move forward the capabil-
ity. I will show more about that. This also led us to something beyond that capability,
which we call near-term sea-based terminal. You also see here, we went to sea re-
cently on the U.S.S. Lake Erie for this most recent test. It came out of the shipyard
and we have done the most extensive weapons system modification we have ever done
with the BMD signal processors. This is the single most complex change to the Aegis
weapons system that we have ever attempted. I am pleased to report she went to sea
and successfully tracked the targets in the most recent test in Hawaii. Why is this im-
portant? That system is made up of the 1B missile that allows us to hedge for the fu-
ture to deal with advanced threats.

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                                         Update on Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense and
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        Another significant change is that we made with the Navy was a line to deliver
open architecture to go on board the U.S.S. John Paul Jones in the 2012 when she
goes through Aegis modernization. We will take her to sea in late 2012 and then go
through a period of testing over eighteen months to certify Aegis open architecture
combined with BMD functionality so there is only one computer program on the ship.
Today we have a BMD program and we have the standard fleet AEW program. That
is not to mean that the ship in a BMD configuration can’t do AEW, but it is a limited
AEW self-defense; it is not area AEW. When we go to this configuration in the future,
it will be one program; the ship will have total control. They will have balanced re-
sources along with the radar upgrade to give the capability it needs for the fleet.

       The other area I want to highlight here is back when I spoke in 2005, I couldn’t
speak to the number of ships (eighteen) and I couldn’t speak to inventory. It was “to be
determined.” Today in 2009, as you can see, that was the goal, by the end of the cal-
endar year 2015. If you look at 2010, we are now up to twenty-one ships from the
eighteen we talked about in 2007 and 28 BMD ships by 2013. Additionally, there will
be 218 SM-3 IA and 1Bs in inventory by 2015. Now I will also tell you that is inade-
quate for combatant commander needs and we still have a tremendous demand signal
for more missiles in the inventory. We are working with the budgetary process. You
also see here we are still on track to do the test firing of the SM-3 Block IIA through
this program.

                                        Figure 3

      Fast forward to November 2007, where we had a handful of engagement ships
and missiles not even in the inventory. Today Aegis BMD ships on patrol can fire SM-

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3 Block IA missiles, which you see here are accounted for in the inventory. We have
also successfully modified, through today, forty-seven of the SM-2 Block IV missiles
with the Navy, where the Navy picked up that cost share and contributed those mis-
siles. They have been modified to do BMD in the terminal mode, endo-atmospheric.
You see the ships that are in the inventory today in Figure 3. They are deployable as-
sets; they are managed in the global force management process along with the missiles
they carry and we have an unceasing demand. So much so that in late 2007, the Navy
and the Missile Defense Agency got together and determined that we could come for-
ward with three additional ships that would allow us to get more capability, particularly
on the East Coast. Because we thought the threat primarily was from North Korea at
the time, we made a decision that sixteen of the eighteen ships would be in the Pacific.
Two ships, the Ramage and the Stout, were on the East Coast. With the rise of the
threat from Iran, obviously that wasn’t meeting the demand signal, so right now the
U.S.S. Sullivan out of Mayport, Florida is being modified as we speak. The U.S.S.
Vella Gulf, a cruiser in Norfolk, will start modification shortly and they will both be
online and certified for performance this fiscal year. Early in 2010, the U.S.S. Mon-
terey, another cruiser in Norfolk, will be modified with BMD capability. That was a
joint cost share between the Navy and the Missile Defense Agency to meet combatant
commander requirements. Additionally we are looking at adding six more ships to the
fleet, per the Secretary of Defense’s announcement on the budget to our PD ten. We
have not identified those specific hulls yet, but we are in the process of working with
the Navy to identify specific hulls and their homeports and the dates to get those six
ships modified as soon as we can. Our goal is to have those ships on line and available
to the fleet sometime in 2012 – no later than.

                                        Figure 4

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         I like Figure 4. Why do I like it? Because it has hardly changed a bit from when
I first started in this job. The difference is that we used to talk about this notionally, as
notional capability, and they are notional charts just because of classification. But do
you know what? We exercise this kind of training and stationing today for ships. I
don’t have that many BMD ships to actually sustain what is pictured, but the capability
exists today with the Block IA missiles and the Aegis BMD 3.6 to do what you see here
in the mission set. Whether we are cueing GMD for the defense of the United States
or we are defending Hawaii with a ship off the Hawaiian Islands or whether we have a
ship in the Sea of Japan or off Guam or off Israel, we are there to meet the nation’s
requirements. That is a fact that is real, that is in place today.

        Aegis BMD has been proven operationally effective and cost effective. I con-
tend that Aegis BMD is a good buy for the nation for capability. Why? The nation has
invested in an Aegis cruiser a 35-year life cycle for about what we used to build them
for back then, about $1 billion apiece. Even with the Base-Line 4.0.1 configuration,
we are about $35-40 million plus the cost of the missile, less than $10 million, and we
have a BMD capability on a multi-mission platform that can sail the world’s oceans for
the nation forward, available, with a multi-mission capability and the ability to defend
themselves while operating forward. I think that is a pretty flexible, viable option for
the United States for the defense of ourselves and our allies. We have gone through a
very rigorous test program that started well before I came on board, where we worked
hard with the operational testing to make sure that we had the requirements dictated by
the warfighters reflected in our test program. And we have flown a lot. Getting to fly
is the fun part of the job; although I admit there is a lot of pressure, some days when
you are in the drudgery of the Pentagon, this is what keeps you going.

                                          Figure 5

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        We are very proud of this program (Figure 5). We are proud of the fact that we
got terminal defense capability fielded. Although it is not what we want for an end
state, we have a capability out there. The SM-3 has gone through a very rigorous
process through which the OTE determined that Aegis BMD is operationally suitable
and operationally effective; that is about as good a grade as you can get from those
guys. We are very proud of that and that was reported last October to the leadership
in the Pentagon. We have tracked; we have done two firings off Japanese ships. We
have a very robust research program with a foundation for the Block 2A program with
the Japanese and we are very proud of it. You see FTX-06; we conducted that first
shot off that campaign which concluded in November. It was the first series of tracking
exercises with that computer program that set the stage for us to come back to sea in
2010 and do our first engagement test with the IB missile. We build on the whole phi-
losophy of “build a little, test a little, learn a lot” that Admiral Wayne E. Meyers bred in
to all of us; he made this a rule about how to deliver capability to the fleet.

        Again, we are very proud of this. We are hoping next year to do FTM-15,
which is where we will fire against a launch on a remote track, a link track, from a
down-range ship against an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) threat. We are
looking forward to the opportunity to do that test. It is not a stated capability of the
block of the current capability or something we are required to do, but we have a mar-
gin in the design to do this capability and we want to do it as a stretch goal. Late next
year we will do that again; we will be flying the IB missile with that 401 configuration.

                                   Video Narration

       Now everybody has to bring a movie. Last time I told you I would give you a
  good one, but this one I think is a little bit better. It gives you a sense of what we
  do to build a missile and get it to sea and go through flight-testing. Here you can
  see at Lualualei Weapons Station in Hawaii the SM-3’s vertical launch canister
  being loaded on board Lake Erie. The ship is heading to sea from Pearl Harbor.
  From the get-go we have used sailors at operating the system, no contractors. In
  fact, the CNO said to me that the thing he was most proud of about the Burnt
  Frost operation was that a sailor pushed the button, not an engineer, to take the
  satellite down. You can see the launch of the target out of the Barking Sands Pa-
  cific Missile Test Range in Kauai. That is the target going through the second
  phase burn; the ship will go through a detection. You see here in the weapons
  system, it has passed through the search fence; the ship is set up by itself in plan-
  ning for the defended area. The Captain ordering the engagement. The launch
  of the SM-3 in slow motion. The missile accelerates to over three kilometers a
  second when it hits the space. You see the initial burn and then off it goes. That
  is the second and third stage shifts and burns. The third stage takes it into space.
  You will see a nosecone ejection where the seeker will now start looking. You
  will see the attitude control system firing; you see the KV, and that is the third

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  stage and the nosecone following it. It is now in endgame, you will see the target
  coming into the field of view, with an intercept.

       We do talk about an intercept of this type; an intercept in centimeters is what
  we are aiming for. Five to seven centimeters is a good day, and that is not much.
  It’s about the size of a quarter. That’s what we’re aiming for in a particular spot
  on a target; we measure distances of pennies, nickels, dimes and on a bad day, a
  quarter. We are very proud of that fact. We have engaged multiple threats simul-
  taneously. I would say that one of the highlight days of my naval career was the
  shooting down of two ballistic missiles simultaneously. High on that list also was
  shooting down a ballistic missile when we shot down a cruise missile simultane-
  ously. You see here the series of tests with the intercept versus unitary and sepa-
  rating targets that we have conducted over the years. There is a lot of legacy
  here of good engineering rigor between the government and industry teams.
  That kind of brainpower just cannot be replaced. The Japanese flight test and
  endo-atmospheric test. You actually see the second SM-2 Block IV hitting on de-
  bris because we destroyed the target with the first salvo. Another endo-
  atmospheric test; this one actually occurred off Kauai also where we literally
  pulled two ships off the fleet line, went to sea and did a short-notice test. Again,
  we are very proud of our record here and what we have accomplished and the
  fact that we have such ships deployed today with capability.

                                        Figure 6

        Figure 6 shows operationally realistic testing. Again, we have done the transi-
tion to the Navy with the initial capabilities.

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                                         Figure 7

        Figure 7 shows Burnt Frost. In December 2007 we just finished the first Japa-
nese flight-test successfully. During the buildup to that test I was called by my boss,
Trey Obering, who said, “Brad, is it possible for Aegis BMD to shoot down a satellite?”
At first I had a response that I won’t say in public. Then I said, “Sir, I don’t know, but I
will get back to you.” I grabbed a small group and part of the government team is the
Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab who operates as the technical design agents for a
lot of the Navy weapons systems development programs. One of these scientists, a
guy named Dr. Gary Sullins, had done a study a few years before on a what-if drill. We
called Gary back in Laurel, Maryland and said, “Gary, can you pull that study out?” He
said, “Yes, but I can tell you the answer now: it is possible, but it depends.” That
wasn’t exactly the appealing answer I was looking for. It depends on the altitude of the
target, its speed, what kind of orbit it’s in. I called my boss back and asked if he could
give me any details; he said no. I told him that it is possible, but my answer is “it is
possible but it depends.” He said, “I was looking something a little bit more specific.”
We both laughed and I figured that was the end of it.

       We had gone through a very aggressive test schedule in 2007, so we were
frankly a little bit tired. We rolled back for the holiday all smiling; we sent the Kongo
back home to Japan and we were all feeling really good. Then on the afternoon of
January 3, my world was turned upside down when I got a phone call and he said,
“You know, you’re on the short list.” I said, “What the heck does that mean?” He
said, “You are on the really short list for options to deal with this decaying satellite.
The beauty of this is it is going to be really close to home and you are going to have to
pull together a small team.” I said, “Okay.” On the night of January 4, we got the

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team together and then we went on what I call “six weeks from hell.” We literally in
the first three weeks had to find out what we needed. The system is built not to engage
a space object; in fact we built it to prevent the crew from engaging space objects. In
optimizing for a satellite intercept versus a ballistic missile intercept, there are some
things that you want to tell the missile to do differently. It is a weapons system, and I
mean system, missile to ship to radar to the crew, with a rebalancing of that dynamic
from training to modification. So in the first three weeks, we had to understand what
we were going to go after, dealing with a lot of agencies we weren’t used to dealing
with. The great news is when we got back to some sociological cultural barriers about
sharing information, everybody was on board. But I will tell you, we didn’t have a day
off and we had some really long days. This is the untold story: the engineering team
that goes back with the Standard Missile and Aegis pulled together, the government-
industry team with the sailors to do something pretty incredible in the first few weeks.

        Once we determined what we wanted to modify in the system and in the missile,
then we had to validate that. We had ships at sea tracking the satellite. We also used
the ship in the cornfield up in New Jersey to track the satellite as it passed over to
gather data. This was not a stable satellite; it was spinning and tumbling and we were
going to hit a target within a target, as we used to describe it. We are going for a one-
yard diameter tank inside something the size of a large Suburban SUV. Closing veloci-
ties were calculated at a little over nine kilometers per second, which was faster than
anything we had ever intercepted before. Also it was going to be a higher intercept
than we had ever accomplished before. We made the modifications and started bring-
ing the missiles off the line to modify the software in the missiles and we started doing
the weapons system, validating that to ourselves and retraining the crew how to do this,
all the while protecting information. I remember telling some senior Navy leaders that
we are going to keep this a secret until we go to sea to do the event and they said we
would never pull it off. Another highlight to me was that the ships were actually pulling
out of Pearl Harbor and under way when they made the announcement at the Penta-
gon. We were very proud that we protected that information to give the government
and the nation’s leadership that option of how they wanted to do it and allowed us also
to deal with our allies to get their information out and the other embassies around the
world to honor that obligation about what we were going to do.

        We went to sea and successfully did this event. It was a consummate team
event. We used lots of other agencies; we used lots of sensors from other agencies to
help us characterize the target. One of my guys came up with an analogy: you are in
the batter’s box and you are picking the pitch. You are going for that pitch that is in
the strike zone that you want to take to hit out of the park. We did and we were suc-
cessful. The intercept was about 153 nautical miles above the earth and it was about
22,500 miles an hour closing velocity. It was a significant event for us and we are very
proud of what the team did.

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                                        Figure 8

        Figure 8 hasn’t changed much since I started in 2005. We are incrementally
delivering capability to the nation. The image on the left is out there today; we are ac-
tually in the process of putting this in place. We are almost done with BMD 3.6.1 and
are down to our last couple of ships, giving them both exo-atmospheric and endo-
atmospheric capability. Lake Erie at sea was 4.01. If all goes well, in early 2012 we
will certify the computer program and the 1B missiles will be in production. In far-
term, 5.0 is where we merge with Navy’s open architecture, which I mentioned earlier.
They will deal with 5.1 which allows us to fire the Block IIA and that substantiation and
then 5.2 will be our far-term sea-based terminal program. In essence, we are spiraling
capability. I hate that term, which is overused in Pentagon-speak, but we are spiraling
additional capabilities as we prove to ourselves that it works. We have also worked
with the warfighters to make sure it is the right thing they want in that situation.

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                                         Figure 9

        As many of you may know, in late 2001 the Navy Area program was canceled
and we went into a limbo phase. The requirement for the warfighter was still out there
for an endo-atmospheric terminal defense capability for ships. It was a dead program.
We literally took a demo, which I mentioned, Pacific Phoenix back in the summer of
2006 and then once we were successful there proving it could work, programmed and
got the money programmed and now have a capability today. So again, we didn’t
waste time; we got it out there and we are pleased with how that is going. That is a
joint MDA-Navy-funded operation. More robust capability is in high demand by the
warfighters and combatant commanders. We are on a process to get out there. If I
leave here and capabilities being delivered by 2018, I would be the first to tell you, it is
not exactly the date that the warfighter wants it; they want it yesterday. So we are
working on a plan as we go through the options for a sea-based terminal of what we
can do to accelerate that capability. Once we get that first look done later this year, we
will report out and offer the options of what we can do to accelerate the process.

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                                         Figure 10

        Figure 10 shows the SM-3 evolution for exo-atmospheric. This slide has not
changed. 1A is in production, a full length booster, 13.5 inch second, third and fourth
stage; for IB, the big difference in this missile is the brand-new kill vehicle, two color
seeker, all-reflective optics, advanced signal processor and a new divert management
control system. This is the missile that will become, we believe, the workhorse of the
fleet in the SM-3 inventory of the future against the advanced threats that we are going
to have to deal with. The Block II missile, which is the 21-inch missile which we call
the full-caliber round, will max out the vertical launch system that we know today. In
fact, we are going to a new lightweight canister to help reduce weight. This is a coop-
erative development program with Japan. That is why I tell people if you want to look
at how you can work with an ally and establish a gold standard of cooperation, this is it.
The nation of Japan is so committed that they could put over a billion of their research
dollars to help us develop this. We have worked out in the latest negotiation work
share for the missile, who works on what. We have gotten through a system design
review so that in about a year and a half we will go to a preliminary design review and
we are getting more and more refined cost estimates.

       The bottom line is it is a very aggressive program, but it gives us a lot of capabil-
ity and we have to do it. Because instead of three ships defending Japan, you can do it
with one ship. That is the kinematic reach of this missile. This missile gives the nation
options for lots of things, including a land-based option for SM-3, if required by the na-
tion. The IIA will then come in with a totally new kill vehicle in later testing. We will
build a couple of these rounds before we transition to this round and flight test it.
Again, this round covers a lot of defended area, which is what you want.

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                                        Figure 11

         Internationally, I have talked about Japan as the gold standard. We have lots of
relationships with countries on exchanging data and analysis of what they could do with
ballistic missile defense (Figure 11). We are very proud of the relationships we have
had and I will talk about who has participated. Also I will highlight here who have pur-
chased the Aegis system: Australia, South Korea, Japan, Spain, to name a few. We
feel that there are other nations with sensors like the U.K., the Netherlands, the Ger-
mans, that have a system capable of tracking, and I will talk a little bit more about that
in a second, they just have to have the desire to want to commit to this. In other
words, they have the price of admission, which is a sensor that is adequate to be able
to track and then allow you to engage a ballistic missile, if you so choose.

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                                         Figure 12

        So looking at cooperative development (Figure 12), I don’t want to beat a dead
horse, but the cost of the program I used to talk to you all about has gone up. The
more that we have refined what we want to put in this missile for capability and also
what we want to control in work share in order to keep the risk manageable, the more
the cost has gone up. For those of us who have been in the acquisition business for a
while, early-on cost estimating is more of an art based on folklore than it is data. I am
late to acquisition, frankly; I came from an operational background and came to acqui-
sition late, but what I found is that if your requirements are tight up front, the likelihood
that you will be successful is much greater. But also as you go through that require-
ments definition with the engineering and industrial team, controlling that definition,
those requirements, is very critical and you are going to find a big uncertainty factor,
particularly where there is more high-risk technology. And certainly in this business, it
is high-risk technology. What we found is that before we get to the preliminary design
review in eighteen months, we will probably be at the 80-85 percent confidence factor
on a cost estimate, which for acquisition is pretty darn good.

        Right now my responsibility and the program officer’s responsibility is, with the
government of Japan, to contain the requirements with the engineering community so
we down-risk and control costs and deliver on schedule. I would say, and I have seen
this in the IB development, if you can control costs and growth up to critical design re-
view (CDR), you have done a great job. Generally in the Aegis SM-3 world, once we
get to CDR, we are up to a 95 percent confidence level. We do a hell of a job control-
ling the costs of CDR. Getting to CDR is always a challenge, controlling that variable
of uncertainty in technology in space to get that design type, to understand the re-
quirements, to understand the technology, to get those technical risk levels down where

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you can really understand what you’re building. The Japanese program is more com-
plex and we are dealing with not just two nations, but different cultures of how you ac-
quire tech stuff. A lot of our work with Japan is based on trust in the relationships, real
trust. I think that has been the thing that gives me the greatest confidence as this pro-
gram goes forward. We have been in research and development with Japan for eleven
years now in ballistic missile defense. That confidence of working together and the re-
lationships we have, even though we may have different government approaches of
how we do contracts and bring industry in, that understanding of how we each do busi-
ness and understanding of how we get where we need to go, is what gives me hope
that this program will be successful.

                                        Figure 13

        We have had international participation: we have had a Dutch ship sail from the
Netherlands to participate in tests, we have had a Spanish ship sail to participate in the
tests, and obviously we have had the Japanese participate (Figure 13). We will have
another Japanese test in the not-too-distant future. We had shown that sensors other
than the Aegis system are adequate to test and track a ballistic missile.

       I told you about Navy initiatives in missile defense. The Navy Air and Missile
Defense Command was stood up at the end of April. That command is about thirty-six
and will eventually get to seventy-five; we are over half way there in the manning.
There is strong support by the Navy to get it manned up correctly with some of the
best talent in the Navy: we have a former BMD cruiser CO, a former destroyer DDG
CO, a former combat systems officer on Lake Erie, probably some of the strongest
LDO talent in the Navy and engineering duty officer expertise in the Navy in the pro-
gram. As I mentioned, we got a “pop-quiz” test called Pac Blitz last year where we

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took some missiles that were old initial deployment rounds that were going to go out of
inventory. We literally pulled two ships off the line and said they are going to be able
to shoot at target at short notice, and they did a great job. We have moved forward
with sea-based terminal tests with the Navy helping foot the bill to get that terminal test
off. Again, that went very well off Point Mugu, California.

        The other big story in Navy initiatives is the Navy has skin in the game. The
Navy has over $1 billion in Aegis modernization invested. The closure of the Missile
Defense Agency with the Navy in Aegis modernization to get to combined BMD func-
tionality with the Navy systems is a powerful story. Why? One, the Navy is putting
money, real big money, not just missiles like the SM-2 Block IV and the modifications
they paid for; they are investing real money that allows us to put BMD on ships and
they are, in fact, paying the procurement costs starting in 2012 for those BMD efforts.
We are paying the developmental costs and they are paying for the procurement costs
in a true cost-share initiative to get BMD capability. What else does it do for you? As
the Navy goes through modernization of the Aegis fleet, eighty-some-odd ships, the
ability to put a BMD capability you can extend through the entire Aegis fleet, should
the nation desire to do so. Frankly, for operational flexibility, we need more ships.

        I did not talk about this when I was last here, but I am asked a lot: “What makes
you guys successful?” Culturally those of us who have grown up in the Aegis Standard
Missile community grew up in a rigor where the government had a strong team in the
program office and in the government labs, combined with Johns Hopkins Applied
Physics Lab as a TDA that is a peer of our industry partners. So together we have in-
sight into what industry is doing and vice versa. Industry wants to know the exact re-
quirements and understand that and create space in the design. So the industry got to
walk in the program office, find out, this is what you have in writing, let’s understand,
let’s camp out on the exact meaning of what you are trying to achieve, whether it is in
the missile or weapons system. That is truly priceless. Had we not had that strong re-
lationship, Burnt Frost would not have been possible because there was stuff we found
on models on the government side and we found differences. That ability to resolve
those differences gave us insight into that design, trade space for something that wasn’t
in the core design, i.e., how to shoot down a satellite, which we would not have found

        Details, details, details, I was taught by Admiral Meyer and Admiral George
Meinig, two old stars of the program and advisors to me. “There are a million damn
things that can go wrong with missiles, Brad. They are so complex and you had better
look at every detail.” A weapons system this complex is truly a work of art. Test as
you intend to fight and fight as you test. Absolutely, and having been an operator by
training, I live and breath it. We stress the operational aspects, ship, no-notice
launches. We had one test where we kept the ship on station for three days and didn’t
tell them where we were going to shoot for three days. They had to go through watch
team rotations, like they had been on deployment and they did just fine. Never accept

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being hardware poor. If you are going into a multi-billion development program and
your infrastructure is hardware poor, in other words, not enough test infrastructure to
test stuff, not enough ground testing, control vehicle testing, test vehicles, if you are
hardware poor, you are going to fly at high risk. I would rather stretch a program
schedule than be hardware poor, because inevitably you will pay for it later. Anticipate
change and embrace it; things are going to happen, technically, programmatically,
maybe in guidance from the administration or within the department. You figure it out,
change it and embrace it. Do not compromise your rigor, but be ready embrace
change when you get it. We have another expression: assess all the data all the time.
The most recent test will include two targets and we will be going through that data for
months. We will write it into our next test event this fall and we will still be going
through the data, always looking for what we need to work on.

        I heard this expression once, and as painful as it sounds, it is true: you learn
more from a failure than you do a success. It doesn’t sound good; it is like biting an
apple with a worm in it. Not a good day, but I have to tell you, it forces the engineer-
ing rigor of how you do failure review and it also prods you to be very reflective of what
your processes are, to make sure you are on track, which is what we did this summer
with the most recent test. Deliver as you promise and by God, make sure it works as
you promised in design. If it doesn’t, fix it. And when you deliver something, you are
going to keep coming back. The fleet inevitably, over time, will find things they will
want you to fix. Be prepared to fix it. It is never closed out. You will find things in the
weapons system, you will find things in the missile, you are going to make better.
Make sure you sustain stuff directly and that you fund it. There is a cost of doing that.
For us in the Navy, it is not hard to look at it this way. The sea is inherently unforgiv-
ing and a harsh environment so we prepare for it. By golly, when you go to sea, be
prepared to operate in a less than friendly environment. I guess the North Atlantic is
the hardest place you have to operate; it is the one of the hardest places, but until you
have been in a sandstorm for about three days and you see sand like talcum powder get
in everything imaginable on a ship, in heat that is indescribable – and yes, sand will
stick to vertical surfaces very well and it will creep into things that you cannot imagine –
you had better be prepared to operate in that environment, day in and day out. Don’t
forget that. Again, never test to discover. You go out and confirm what you believe,
and that means a lot of rigor and a lot of analysis beforehand.

       I have been doing this now for thirty-three years (Figure 14). I came in as an
ensign; that was my battle space, a 40-kilometer missile and a gun that could shoot to
the horizon. Then I went to a 993 with the U.S.S. Kidd and I thought that was about
as good as it got. I thought it was the slickest ship I had ever set foot on. That was
about an 80-kilometer missile and no Tomahawk, but I had Harpoon, so I could at least
launch a surface-to-surface missile. Then I took command of the U.S.S. Hayler and I
had Tomahawk. I didn’t have Standard Missiles, I had Sea Sparrow, so I had my battle
space. But look at the battle space, just in AAW. I went to Cape St. George with a
better missile – good. I had Tomahawk, that’s good and I had a great radar and spy

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radar. But my battle space is down here now, a little bit better. At this point I had
twenty-three years of service. I thought, man, my world has changed a lot. With the
U.S.S. Lake Erie, now you are not only talking about engagements in space, you are
talking about defending a carrier or some Marines going ashore or yourself defending a
city or a country. I would contend that the stakes are incredibly high. One of the COs
that was out on station for the recent North Korean event said, “Admiral, don’t screw
this mission. You can’t screw it up. Train, train, train.” I thought, “Okay, this young
commander on a BMD ship who literally is helping, with the other sister ships in Ja-
pan, to defend Tokyo, potentially, and millions of people. So what a difference a ca-
reer makes in the mission.

                                         Figure 14

         I will tell you, whether it is on the Japanese ships or the U.S. ships, you will be
in awe of these sailors and what they can do. It is truly incredible, the amount of effort,
the amount of diligence that they put into this mission area. They are excited about it.
Right now it is cool to be on a BMD ship and everybody wants to be on one, because it
is really neat stuff. It is truly a game-changing capability for the country. It changes the
dynamics of how ships deploy and how you operate them. So it has been a lot of fun
being part of this.

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                                        Figure 15

        In summary, we are getting more capable. Japan hit the gold standard on how
to do this. If you are committed to this mission area, go to Japan and see how you
commit to it. It is a growing interest area among our allies. Depending on what goes
on with the BMD review this summer in the QDR, I suspect we will see some move-
ment on the international front for sea-based missile defense. We need to keep them
informed, based on analysis so they see performance, so they can make decisions
based on their national needs. I have always committed that with the allies. I am not
selling it; I am just telling the data. Let’s talk about the data, what you can and can’t
do, and you will make your own informed decisions. Command and control (C2) is the
biggest thing I worry about every night. How do you command and control in this mis-
sion area? It is very complex command and control. Being a surface warfare officer
with a lot of strike group/battle group experience, it is tough enough for a strike group
to pull together a tight C2 and then make it joint. In this mission area, if you are talk-
ing about thousands of miles of command and control that you have to coordinate with
weapons release authority delegated down, for a critical mission area, down to that O-5
or O-6 on a ship for that THAAD battery or that Patriot battery or Arrow. Pick it. If
anybody thinks that something like this is going to go down in a vacuum and there are
not going to be other things flying in the air while you are doing this mission, you need
a dose of reality. For the April event off North Korea, the North Koreans were flying,
the South Koreans were flying, the U.S. Air Force was flying, and the Russians were
flying. That was one complex airspace. And by the way, there was a lot of ship traffic
out there. So it is a very dynamic command and control integrated air and missile de-

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fense environment, of which BMD is a subset. I worry about it. We have to get it
right. But that said, you have been very patient and I haven’t heard one bit of snoring.
I stand by for your questions.

Questions and answers.

Question: What was your reaction to the public announcement of your intention to
destroy a satellite this past December?

Adm. Hicks: My reflection on that is that several things came out of the guidance we
received from the Pentagon and the White House. One is that we would be transpar-
ent and there are no hidden agendas here. This was a one-time event because the na-
tion decided there was a threat – it was not just the U.S., but the world – from this
tank, and everybody we talked to, from NASA to anybody, said, “Okay, the likelihood
that this would land in a populated area is not high, but if it did, it would be very bad.”
Because there was frozen hydrazine in the tank, which was spherical, it was likely that
it would come through the atmosphere intact. Hydrazine is really nasty. I think what
impressed me the most about that was that what I had heard early on about how we
were going to handle it publicly and how we were going to advise the other embassies
around the world on what we were doing through the State Department held true all
the way through. That was very refreshing to me. You always hear Machiavellian
theories about stuff that is going on; I didn’t see that once, not one bit. We started
with a strategy which was driven by the White House about how we were going to deal
with this and once the President made the decision we were going to engage, I didn’t
see one deviation. However, we wanted to hold it close for a time, first to make the
decision and second, we timed the announcement to the embassies around the world
about what we were going to do to coincide with the ships getting to position. We
didn’t want the crews distracted. Does that answer your question?

Question: You didn’t know that you could do it, so you must have felt some personal

Adm. Hicks: I went to sea on Lake Erie and we tracked and did a simulated en-
gagement a couple times before I went to PACOM to execute with Admiral Keating. I
was very confident we were going to be successful, as long as we didn’t wait too long.
If you wait too long, you start picking up the drag in the atmosphere and it gets sporty.
As long as we didn’t wait too long, and Gen. Chilton was the critical player at Strat-
Com there, I felt confident we would be successful. Admiral Mullen arrived on-island
the night before the event on his way to Australia with the Secretary for talks and I
briefed him that night before we did the event. He said, “You don’t seem nervous.” I
said, “Sir, actually I am just tired and I am worried the crews of the three ships are go-
ing to get too peaked, beyond ready. We are ready to go.” I was very confident. I
was more confident about this than I have been about some of the flight tests. We
really stretched the envelope in some of the flight tests. I wondered, “Did I sign up for

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this?” We picked the pitch; just going into a 90-minute orbit, you can kind of pick the
pitch you want and we picked that, so I felt confident we could do that.

Question: You said that the SM-2 and the project with Japan has cost you some
sleep at night because of the aggressive schedule and the cost increases. Is it the cost
that is giving you problems or is it the schedule?

Adm. Hicks: When we initially scoped the program with Japan, we went by the in-
dependent cost estimates. The cost estimate I think right now is conservative at this
point in the design because of the relationship with Japan and their side of the cost
share that they bear on their own side, based on what their own government wants.
They are very confident where they are as far as risk and what they have. Because of
the complexity of what we want to put on the kill vehicle, we have notionally made the
decision of how robust we want that design to be to meet the threat. But we actually
made sure that requirement is very tight and robust for a future threat, and I will leave it
at that. Also we made a decision that the Block 2A program was going to be part of a
different program office for the kill vehicle, which used to be in a multiple kill vehicle
program office for kill vehicles. We were going to build a kill vehicle that had com-
monality and was applicable between the unitary on the 2A and the multiple. Frankly,
one of the big cost drivers for us has been the cancellation of that program and the fact
that we lost that element. That is our decision and the added cost is an unintended
consequence of that. Clearly, it is not a decision I would put on the Japanese govern-
ment to bear. It is our commitment to recover from that and go forward. We are very
aggressively working that with our industry partners. I would also tell you that when we
did the initial estimates for this program, even before I came aboard the program in
2005, the estimates were based on some pretty rough order of magnitude estimates,
which is not uncommon early in a program. The work is shared between the U.S. and
Japan and then you have to go back to each country and get their models of what they
think it is going to cost. Frankly, I don’t think it is a bad news story. The biggest risk
that we have had in the program is when we collapsed the multiple and unitary vehicle
within a multiple program office; we lost some schedule there, which is also a cost.

Question: How much is the cost increase, if you are at $3.1 billion right now? How
much bigger is that going to be?

Adm. Hicks: We were initially about $2.4 billion notionally. The reason I say that is
that is a notional fifty-fifty cost sharing between the United States and the government
of Japan. Whatever is inside their work share is their burden, in respect to controlling
their costs, per the agreement. So if they have costs inside their side, they bear the
burden; if it is on our side, we bear the burden. Since we have a lead for the kill vehi-
cle, we bear that big burden. It is also one of the higher risk areas of development in
the program. Ballistic missile defense for the Navy is a game changer. The 2A missile,
I believe, changes dynamics because then things like the ability to do earlier intercepts,
pre-apogee intercepts, gets much greater and so does the ability to deal with greater

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threats. I think it is very important to the nation to deliver this. It is important to Ja-
pan and it is important to me that we deliver that missile. Now I would say the same
thing about the 1B. The problem is, we kept the 1B missile intact and we added a new
kill vehicle. With the 2A, with the exception of the booster, that is a brand-new mis-
sile, from end to end. The complexity of bringing that home is a lot different.

Question: Are you at all concerned that you are not going to meet the goals?

Adm. Hicks: I intend to be flight-testing in 2014.

Question: From the test in November with the Japanese, which was a failure, what
has changed? Was this specific to a Japan configuration?

Adm. Hicks: There was a failure on the Chokai last year, but the ship did a magnifi-
cent job. I don’t say that just to be politically correct. That was one of the best per-
forming weapons performances we have seen to date by any ship, U.S. or Japanese.
The missile flew all the way to end game perfectly, nominally, all the way through. In
the last few seconds of flight, the divert and attitude control system had a failure and we
lost it in the very end state of flight, in the last few seconds. That wasn’t anything to do
with the ship. Now, in the process we went through in failure review for flight test fail-
ure, the Failure Review Board (FRB) process was exhaustive, between the government
and industry. We brought in outside experts and an independent review team to over-
see them. It was excruciatingly exhaustive. Out of that, we came up with what we
thought was the scenario that caused of failure. The flight this July was to verify that
our processes were in place, that we could fly with acceptable risk. We believed the
fact that we knew the missile would fly correctly, and in fact, we did it. Now as we roll
into the next test with the Japanese, we have restored confidence. I have called it a
vindication of how we do our engineering process and the rigor behind it. Nothing is
ever free in this kind of business. When you fly traditional missile programs, if you are
batting over 500, you are going into the hall of fame. We are doing a lot better than
that. I worry about it every day and it is something we have to keep on top of.

Question: You use the word process; does that imply that there is something on Ray-
theon’s end, in fabricating or somewhere else? You don’t have to inspect other mis-

Adm. Hicks: We feel that in the buildup of the round, there were imperfections in a
valve inside the divert and attitude control system on that particular buildup on that par-
ticular round, that led us down one path of substantiation that said, okay, it was a bad
day on the production line for that one missile. Because we do fly them right off the
production line; we don’t cherry pick the rounds.

Question: So you don’t have to inspect and investigate other missiles?

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Adm. Hicks: It causes us to go back and look at our production processes where we
can even put more eyes on as we do our quality assurance and mission assurance. We
took another round for how we do that. We are going to constantly over the next few
months keep looking to tweak that to make sure we have it right.

Question: How effective would Aegis be to intercept a missile shot from a boat two
hundred miles off the coast of the United States, or against a missile armed with an
electro-magnetic pulse (EMP)-inducing warhead over the continental United States?

Adm. Hicks: I won’t speak to EMP because that exceeds the classification for this
discussion. Like anything, if a ship is on station and has search fences up against that
particular area for a defended area, then exo-atmospheric, endo-atmospheric, if it
meets the engagement criteria, it will kill it. But you have to have a ship on station to
defend an area, whether it is Los Angeles or New York City. Pick it and you can do it.
It is a capacity issue; how many ships do you want to put at sea to do this? And then
you want to hunker them down. Now a lot of the debate is on the asymmetric threat
or the shot out of the blue, and that gets into voodooism and it is up to combatant
commanders, with the national command, to figure out how to deal with that predictive
potential attack against the United States. So the system is what it is; you have seen
the design space. It doesn’t care whether it is firing off a barge or from land. If it
meets the engagement criteria against a defended area and passes through the search
fence, it will tell you there is a threat and you can engage it if you so desire.

                                   Video Narration
        I will walk you through a short video about the recently completed Stellar Aven-
ger. This was against a short-to-medium range target, right in that margin area. We
launched two targets: the first was the intercept target -- the U.S.S. Hopper engaged a
Short Range Ballistic Missile Target while the second one was a target where we did
TrackEx and all three ships participated, the O’Kane, the Lake Erie and the Hopper.
You are going to see the launch shortly, but the idea was that Lake Erie would do data
collection on a new BMD system; they did a simulated engagement. On the O’Kane
we had a prototype new kill assessment system, in other words, something that looks
at the target and makes the determination of a kill assessment. It is a new technology
we have been working on to help support the weapons system evaluation for kill on the
lethal object. You see the target flown out, the first stage. You won’t see it here, but
the second stage flight drops shortly over that over the target. Here is the U.S.S.
Hopper with CDR. Tim Kott in command. There is the launch there on a beautiful day
in Hawaii, about 5:40 in the afternoon. That was the booster you saw separate
through that puff there. That is the second stage burning. The second stage takes it
up to the edge of the atmosphere and the third stage takes it up into space. You will
start seeing a ship from visuals; we will see some other launches here. We will see it
from our airborne platforms. You will see the tracking. For those of you who have
been on ships and seen launches, this missile moves a lot faster than the normal mis-
siles you are used to seeing. You will see another one here that is really impressive.

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That is the venting of the exhaust here. The flame is about twenty-six feet long, com-
ing out of the back end of the missile, once it clears the deck. There is the intercept.
Again, we are looking for a kill on the payload part of the warhead and five centimeters
is what we aiming for. This is definitely a lethal intercept. In fact, the kill vehicle di-
ameter is about the same as the thickness of the target.

Question: Does SM-3 have land uses?

Adm. Hicks: As many of you know, one of the options that was talked about by Con-
gress and the Administration was an option to Arrow 3. We have done analysis of
what a land-based SM-3 configuration would look like, optimal. There is a program
laid into the PG10 budget that starts that effort next year, funded by Congress. Addi-
tionally there is part of the review, options for a land-based system, which could be
used for other potential uses such as defending Europe and so forth. Certainly it is a
configuration that has a lot of merit. As far as the technical aspect, we believe in Aegis
BMD and that it is something we can make work. If you can go to sea and make this
thing work, you can put it on dirt. I have it at Wallops, I have it at Moorestown, I just
need a launcher to go with it. We know how to do a land-based launcher; we have one
at White Sands Missile Range we use for non-tactical testing. This is not something
technically a bridge too far we believe to do. If it is what the nation wants, then that is
a decision for the leadership to make.

Jeff Kueter: Admiral, thank you so much for your leadership of this program and I
thank the audience for coming.

                                       * * *

The George C. Marshall Institute              26

Innovation in Aerospace – Chris Kemp, Tim Hughes, Doug Comstock, Scott Pace
and Uyen Dinh, June 16, 2009

Assessing the Economic Consequences of Cap-and-Trade Proposals to Regulate
GHG Emissions - William O'Keefe, Michael Canes, David Kreutzer and Sergey Mitya-
kov, June 4, 2009

Considering the Human Influence on Climate – Dr. Roger Pielke, Sr., May 14,

Assessing Low Carbon Fuel Standards: Implications of New Congressional and
State Efforts to Cap Carbon in Gasoline – Michael Canes and Edward Murphy, April
16, 2009

Boost-Phase Missile Defense: Present Challenges, Future Prospects – Robert
Pfaltzgraff, President, Daniel Gouré, Peter Huessy, Greg Hyslop, LTG Larry Dodgen
(Ret.), Michael Booen, Glenn Haskins, April 3, 2009

Global Warming as a Response to the Pacific Decadal Oscillation – Dr. Roy
Spencer, Dec. 15, 2008

Deterrence in Space: Responding to Challenges to the U.S. in Outer Space - Robert
Butterworth and John Sheldon, Nov. 13, 2008

"A Day Without Space" Economic and National Security Ramifications – Ed Morris,
Steven Anderson, Richard Hatch, Major General James Armor, John Sheldon and Pe-
ter Hays, October 16, 2008

Airborne Laser (ABL): Assessing Recent Developments and Plans for the Future –
Col. Robert McMurry & Lt. Gen. (ret) Michael Dunn, June 27, 2008

Examining the Risks of Nuclear Waste Disposal – Dr. Bernard Cohen, June 24,

Developing Clean, Innovative Commercial Energy: Will Proposed Federal Subsidies
Hurt or Help? – Lee Lane, Peter Bradford, and David Montgomery, June 13, 2008

         The Marshall Institute – Science for Better Public Policy
     Board of Directors

     Will Happer, Chairman
      Princeton University

     William O’Keefe, CEO
      Solutions Consulting

     Jeff Kueter, President

       Gregory Canavan
 Los Alamos National Laboratory

        John H. Moore
       President Emeritus,
       Grove City College

      Rodney W. Nichols
  President and CEO Emeritus,
 New York Academy of Sciences

        Mitch Nikolich
   Executive Associate of CACI

           Roy Spencer
   Principal Research Scientist,
University of Alabama in Huntsville

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