The Hunt For Adequate Protection Ground-Based Air Defense In the

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					The Hunt For Adequate Protection: Ground-Based Air

Defense In the USMC

CSC 1995

SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting

                    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



AUTHOR:           Major Mark A. King, USMC

PROBLEM:           Based on the current threat and what USMC GBAD has been and

currently is--what should it be in the near term? How can the USMC provide adequate

protection to its forces as part of Joint and Combined operations?

DISCUSSION:         This study reviews the neglected history of USMC ground-based

air defense, discusses the current threat, examines current USMC doctrine and that of its

sister services, outlines the options for the future, and ends with recommendations for the

future. Appendixes are used to describe the current US AD systems and their general
capabilities against the current threat. The focus is on doctrine and fighting Joint within

the realities of both the current threat and the current economic realities.

THESIS:     The USMC should give GBAD the appropriate focus in its doctrine by

organizing it under the operational function of PROTECTION. The USMC should keep

its Ground-Based Air Defense firepower, and integrate that firepower better into a truly

Joint air defense system by reducing and streamlining its redundant command and control



SECTION                                                                        PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION                                                                1

II. HISTORICAL REVIEW                                                          4

III. THE THREAT-- 1995-2005                                                    11

IV. CURRENT USMC DOCTRINE                                                      17

V. CURRENT SISTER SERVICE DOCTRINE                                             19

VI. OPTIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMEDATIONS                                    27


B.   MAA 32 DEFICIENCIES                         40




E.   US AD SYSTEMS VS THE THREAT                 46

NOTES                                            47

BIBLIOGRAPHY                                     53



                I. INTRODUCTION
  "The use of aircraft in warfare will become of increasing importance as time goes on.

New developments and improvements will modify their tactical employment. Similarly,

the necessity for providing adequate protection against them becomes more and more

pressing."1 An officer wrote these words in 1933 as he was trying to ensure Marine

forces would have what they needed to defend advanced naval bases. How prophetic

those words proved to be eight years later at Pearl Harbor. The words are no less true

today than they were 62 years ago - let us make certain that we provide "adequate

protection against them."

  Today the hunt for adequate protection against air attack continues. USMC fighter

aircraft and ground-based air defenders are both under review in the current examination

of the roles, missions and functions of the armed forces of the United States of America.

The 1993 report on roles and missions by the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff

General Colin Powell, stated that in the post Cold War world the US no longer needs the

redundancy of air defense capability which was necessary when the US faced the large and
sophisticated aircraft threat of the Soviet Union.2 The report went on to recommend that

a Joint commission analyze the entire spectrum of the current and near term Theater Air

Defense (TAD) requirements and develop a proposal.3

  It has been almost fifty years since an enemy air force attacked Marines.4 During my

entire career in the Marine Corps, the debate has raged over how much and what type of

air defense capability the Corps needs. A particular system often singled out for

elimination by Marine forces are the Homing All the Way Killer (HAWK) missile units.

Within the past three years the scrutiny increased to the point that USMC HAWK was

only one decision away from elimination in its entirety.5 The USMC finally decided to

save one HAWK Light Antiaircraft Missile (LAAM) battalion for the active duty

structure. The only other USMC ground-based air defense asset, the Low Altitude Air

Defense (LAAD) units, have fared better in this debate because of their comparatively low

cost, great utility, and constant visibility with the Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU's).

  How did the USMC get to this point and does the USMC need its own organic air
defense capability? The purpose of this study is to examine this question without the bias

of any preconceived agenda either to save or to get rid of anything. The goal is to develop

a course of action that will provide the "adequate protection" that Marines will need in the


  In this study I will use the following process to arrive at that goal: historical

background, threat description, current doctrinal solutions, and options for the future with

conclusions and recommendations. I will first review the historical setting of

Ground-Based Air Defense (GBAD) in the USMC. I will then provide an overview of the

threat facing the USMC forces. I will go on to describe the current USMC doctrinal

solution to this threat and then outline the doctrinal solutions of our sister services. I

will provide a brief description of the weapon systems and command and control

mechanisms which each service is currently using to provide their solution. Lastly, I will

define and analyze the options for the future, and then provide a conclusion and

recommendations for the future of ground-based air defense in the Marine Corps.
  Before starting the historical review, it is essential to understand the basic parameters

of this quest. First, I will focus the study on the next ten years--1995-2005. This is

important because the task becomes increasingly difficult and speculative beyond that

point. Beyond ten years it is very hard to clearly define how the threat will evolve and to

accurately predict how technological solutions will grow. Second, I will concentrate on a

study of concepts and missions rather than technology. Technology is certainly very

important, and the study will discuss its impact; but the process by which the USMC

chooses to solve the problem is my focus. Third, the USMC has limited resources to

provide the solution. The USMC does not have the resources of the Cold War era

available under the Reagan mandate; therefore, it must base the solutions on cost

effectiveness and hard nosed practicality. Consequently, USMC must eliminate

nice-to-have redundancy and potentially low risk capabilities. Finally, the study will

consciously try to focus on ground-based air defense, but we must realize that aircraft and

command and control are a large part of both the problem and the solution.
                  II. HISTORICAL REVIEW

  There is no official history of ground-based air defense in the United States Marine

Corps. Written histories exist on other ground units, air units and most every type of unit,

but not on the overall history of ground-based air defense units. Specific ground-based air

defense unit histories and command chronologies exist, but there is no comprehensive

written work dealing with the entire topic. The most famous USMC ground-based air

defense units, the Defense Battalions of World War II, will soon have a history published.6

Probably the most famous historical book about ground-based air defense is Ack, Ack by

Sir Frederick Pile about the British antiaircraft efforts during the Battle of Britain.7 Most

surprising is the fact that there appears to be only one comprehensive work which deals

with the history of US ground-based air defense at all - a small book (183 pages)

published by a former Air Force officer, Dr. Werrell, in 1988; Archie, Flak, AAA and

SAM a Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air Defense.8
  Why the USMC has never written a ground-based air defense history is an

interesting question - Dr. Werrell devotes a paragraph to why there is so little written

about US ground-based air defense in his preface.9 Dr. Werrell maintains this neglect is

for the following reasons: research is difficult and source material is fragmented; the topic

does not have "sea appeal" which aircraft or offensive weapons have. Offensive use of air

has been the focus of US experience, and the air offensive community has had the ear of

both Congress and industry. Many agree strongly with Dr. Werrell's observation that

because the US has had air superiority so much of the time that the US leadership takes air

superiority for granted.10 Whatever the reasons, the lack of a written history is still a poor

reflection on the community as a whole.

  The Marine Corps' history of defending its forces against aircraft began during World

War I when the new technology called airplanes first attacked Marines. Like everyone

else, the Marines' first antiaircraft weapons were the same weapons they used against the

enemy on the ground - small arms and machine guns. Initially the gunners would simply
aim the weapons skyward. As the war continued, increased air attacks fostered early

forms of specific antiaircraft weapons: machine-guns on antiaircraft mounts, and artillery

set up specifically for antiaircraft defense.11

  During the interwar period, as the technology of aircraft developed, so did the early

techniques of how to defend Marine Expeditionary Forces against such air attacks.12 The

services designed and developed antiaircraft machine-guns further and, most importantly,

antiaircraft artillery.13 The USMC also develop specific antiaircraft units during this

period known as Defense Battalions.14 Their mission was twofold: to defend the

advanced naval bases against ships and against air attack. The weapons used by the

defense battalion were twelve --90mm AA Guns, eight--4Omm Cannons, 20mm Guns, and

50 Cal antiaircraft machine guns. They had searchlights and the SCR 270 radar.15

  During World War II these defense battalions saw extensive combat in the Pacific

theater. Wake Island, Guam and Guadalcanal were three of their most famous actions.

Their defense of Henderson Field on Guadalcanal played an important role in winning that
crucial battle.16 As the war went on, radar and sophisticated flak were to play increasingly

important roles, and by the end of the war antiaircraft artillery had become very effective

because of further development of these two technologies. A little known fact is that

during World War II ground-based air defense killed more aircraft than fighter aircraft.17

Although fratricide was a problem for all air defenders during World War II, the USMC

only lost three aircraft to friendly AA fire.18

  In the Korean war USMC ground-based air defense units, including 1st Antiaircraft

Artillery Battalion from Camp Pendleton, California, served in support of the First Marine

Division and the First Marine Air Wing. The North Korean air force never challenged the

United Nations' air superiority in the south and the antiaircraft (AA) units used their

secondary role as effective direct fire weapons against enemy ground forces.19 These

antiaircraft artillery units consisted of 90 mm Anti Aircraft Artillery (AAA) gun

battalions, 75 mm AAA gun battalions, AAA Automatic Weapons (AW) self-propelled

battalions, and AAA Automatic Weapons (AW) battalions.20
  Between Korea and Vietnam the development of surface-to-air missiles brought a

tremendous change in both the technology and organization of ground-based air defense in

the USMC. The USMC's first surface-to-air missile was the Terrier (operational in the

Navy in 1956), and the unit to which it belonged became known as the Medium

Antiaircraft Missile battalion.21 In 1958, this unit replaced the light antiaircraft artillery

battalion which consisted of quad 50 cal machine-guns mounted on half-tracks, and twin

40mm AA guns mounted on tank chassis.22

  Before the Terrier was even three years old, the USMC replaced it with the HAWK

missile system which the Raytheon company develop in the late 1950's. The USMC

renamed the newly equipped units the Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalions.23 Since 1960

this HAWK weapon system has been the centerpiece of USMC integrated air defense.

  Around 1960 air defense battalions began the transition from ground combat units to

Marine Aviation units.24 The USMC integrated them into the developing Marine Air

Command and Control System (MACCS) consisting of units tasked with the aviation
command and control mission: the Marine Aircraft Control Groups. The purpose of

moving ground-based air defense units under Marine aviation was to integrate the entire

air defense effort under the wing - fighters and surface-to-air missiles with the MACCS as

the agency in charge of the overall air defense effort. Prophetically, in 1957 an officer at

the Junior School had written a research paper which recommended this move of the

heavy antiaircraft artillery units to force aviation. 25 Another reason that this transfer took

place was the fact that USMC leadership saw defense of air bases as the primary mission

for these air defense units.

  In 1962 the USMC deployed LAAM Battalion units to South Florida during the

Cuban missile crisis. After the crisis passed, 3d Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion did not

return to Marine Corps Base at Twenty-nine Palms, California. Instead, it went to Cherry

Point, North Carolina, where it was to spend the next 34 years serving the USMC as part

of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing. 26

  In 1965 Battery A, 1st LAAM Battalion deployed to South Vietnam to protect the
Da Nang air field.27 ft was the first USMC ground unit to deploy to South Vietnam.

North Vietnam never challenged US air superiority in the south and the LAAM units

re-deployed home in 1969-70. Although USMC ground-based air defense units never

fired in anger during their time in Vietnam, HAWK units did have a deterrent effect on the

North Vietnamese decision not to attack the US forces in South Vietnam with their

aircraft. Surface-to-air missiles did kill three North Vietnamese MIG's -- all credited to

ships of the US Navy. 28

  During the Vietnam period a new weapon became operational. It was the heat

seeking, shoulder-fired, man portable Redeye missile.29 With the addition of this new

short range air defense weapon for forward areas and low altitude, the USMC had

established the basic pieces for integrated air defense: Fighters, HAWK, and shoulder-

fired missiles. This triad has remained the foundation of USMC ground-based air defense

to the present. From 1966 to 1995 this basic air defense system has remained: Light

Antiaircraft Missile Battalions with HAWK; Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) units
w/Redeye missile systems and later Low Altitude Air Defense Battalions with Stinger; and

fighter squadrons with F-4's and now F/A-18's.

  Since the Redeye Antiaircraft units moved from the Marine Division to the Marine

Aircraft Wing in 1969, the Marine Divisions have had no organic air defense weapons.30

Because of this and the fact that Marine Divisions have not come under air attack --

generations of Marines have not even thought about air attack. Air superiority has

become an assumption - one that I called a dangerous assumption in a 1989 article in the

U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings.31

  The HAWK system has gone through four phases of improvement since its

fielding in 1960. During the late 1960's Raytheon fielded Improved HAWK (called

I-HAWK) with the primary improvement being the missile as a certified ammunition round

and a computer capability called the Automatic Data Processor (ADP). Raytheon then

went on to upgrade HAWK with the first of three Product Improvement Phases (PIP's).

The first (PIP I) came in 1979 and included improvements to the acquisition radars and,
for the first time, a data link capability called the Army Tactical Data Link (ATDL). In

1983 Raytheon fielded the PIP II which included major improvements to the illumination

radars, ADP capability and a new system which allowed for visual tracking of targets

called the Tracking Adjunct System (TAS). PIP III started its fielding immediately prior

to the Gulf War. It brought a complete digitalization of the system, significant

improvements in maintenance reliability and better tactical mobility.32

  The USMC fielded the Redeye missile system in 1966 and later replaced it with

Stinger in 1982. The USMC adopted the Stinger RMP (Reprogrammable

Microprocessor) in 1989.33 In 1994 the USMC began fielding the AVENGER weapon

system which has eight ready to fire Stinger rounds, a .50 caliber machine gun, and a

Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR).

  Since 1982 a Low Altitude Air Defense platoon (minus) has supported all Marine

Expeditionary Units (MEUs), earlier called Marine Amphibious Units. These are the most

forward deployed and visible of all the USMC ground-based air defense units and have
served in every MEU (SOC) operation from Beirut in 1983 to Somalia in 1994.

  During the Gulf War the USMC deployed all active duty LAAM and LAAD

battalions as well as elements of both reserve battalions. They served in general and direct

support of I MEF units from Bahrain to Kuwait City and all amphibious forces from the

Mediterranean to the Arabian Gulf. As with the Korean and Vietnam wars, no enemy

aircraft attacked US ground forces, but unlike the Korean and Vietnam wars, the enemy

utilized a new threat to attack US ground forces: tactical ballistic missiles.

  Since the Gulf War the USMC GBAD units have been the subject of continuing

deactivation and reductions. At present there is only one active duty LAAM Battalion,

located at Yuma, Arizona; two active duty LAAD Battalions, located at Camp Pendleton

and Cherry Point, and one Stinger Battery located in Okinawa, Japan. The reserves have

one LAAM Battalion and one LAAD Battalion located throughout the United States.

  All the USMC ground-based air defense aircraft kills came in the forty-five years

(1915-1960) while it was antiaircraft artillery organized with the ground combat units.

During the past thirty-five years (1960-1995) the USMC surface-to-air missile units have

killed no hostile aircraft while organized within Marine Corps aviation command and

control. This does not mean that the GBAD units of the past 35 years have been less

effective or professional than their predecessors; they have just had no enemy targets to

shoot. As stated earlier, the last enemy air attack, not including Ballistic Missiles (BMs),

was during the battle for Okinawa in 1945.

  The experiences of the past 35 years, however, do help to explain why the current

generation of USMC GBAD units have had to constantly justify their necessity in the

USMC. The long period of history with no engagements explains why the current

generation of senior commanders does not put much emphasis on the role of

ground-based air defense, because during their entire experience the Marine Corps has not

had to use ground-based air defense.
                 III. THE THREAT--1995-2005

  Now that we know what USMC ground-based air defense has been, what is the

current and near term threat to Marine forces and the vital areas that they defend? It is

necessary to define the problem properly before crafting a solution. Too often leaders

have tried to design a solution and then shape the problem to fit it in order to satisfy a

particular agenda. In today's environment of limited resources, the USMC can not afford

to do so even though the current world makes threat definitions much more difficult than

in the past.

  The following is this author's assessment of the threat which the USMC is facing for

the next ten-years. It comes as a result of discussions with threat experts and reading

published sources currently written about this important subject. Chapter two of the new
FM 44-100, US Army Air Defence Operation Manual, contains a very good overview of

the current air threat. It maintains that with the demise of the Warsaw Pact forces, fixed

wing aircraft are no longer the principal threat to allied forces as they were during the days

of the Cold War.34


  Few potential adversaries do not have a credible attack helicopter capability-there

are over 10,000 MI-8 Hips in the world.35 Hips are a good example of a capable, low cost

aircraft which a military force can use for many military functions: carrying combat

troops, providing rapid resupply, serving as anti-tank escort gunships, conducting

electronic warfare, conducting reconnaissance, or serving as medivac platforms. With

improving technology an enemy can easily modify most helicopters to fire sophisticated

air-to-air or air-to-surface weapons. Helicopters used by a dedicated, well-trained enemy

can clearly present a very serious threat to our forces. These helicopters can fly so low

and slow as to evade much of our current technology's capability to detect them soon
enough to engage them with our aircraft.

  Our adversaries will not use helicopters as air superiority fighters. But many of our

enemies do have the capability to use their rotary winged assets as platforms for the new

sophisticated air-to-surface missiles, such as the Exocet, which have proven deadly even

to US warships. In addition to their important role in logistical support, helicopters have

proven effective platforms for surveillance, command and control, and troop transport.36


  The consensus is that the fixed wing aircraft threat has lessened because no enemy

air force in the world today can even consider challenging US fixed wing air superiority.37

This ability to provide US ground forces air superiority over any potential enemy's fixed

wing aircraft seems assured for the foreseeable future. One important aspect of the fixed

wing threat is that pilot training is so critical to employing this capability and all our

adversaries currently possess a very limited ability to train their pilots well.38 The trend
seems to be away from emphasis on this capability because of its high cost and significant

training requirement.39 A great air force is so very costly that few of our adversaries have

the time or resources to develop and maintain one.

  This should not mean that our potential adversaries can not hurt our forces with their

fixed wing aircraft for limited periods of time. The fact that no possible adversary has a

capability to challenge our air assets directly does not mean that they do not have the

capability to use their fixed wing aircraft at a specific time and place to support their

ground maneuver, conduct reconnaissance, or operational level air interdiction missions.

As with helicopters, fixed wing aircraft will increasingly serve as the platform of choice for

the growing number of sophisticated air-to-surface weapons.


  The ballistic missile threat is the threat that is currently most troubling to the US

intelligence community.40 This threat is real and available to a growing number of threat
countries. And quite honestly, the US currently has very limited abilities to defend against

it (Appendixes A and B). The growing accuracy of these weapons and their potential for

delivering chemical and nuclear warheads has made this threat the one with a clear

mandate for the US to solve. It will require a solution which is primarily ground-based, at

least for the near term.

  There is debate within the intelligence community as to how great this threat really is

- some threat experts at the DIA say that this threat is more political than tactical.41 They

state that although this threat is growing and serious, it is not very capable on the tactical

level where it would most affect USMC forces. They maintain that Tactical Ballistic

Missiles (TBMs) are more of a weapon of terror and political blackmail than weapons

which deserve such a priority of effort and resources. They support their view by using as

an example the now famous "scud hunts" of the Gulf War which wasted so much time and

resources without much success in trying to find and destroy weapons which had virtually

no tactical significance. This view also maintains that our potential adversaries do not
have the ability to target well at the tactical level. Only by using chemical or nuclear

warheads could the systems prohibitively interfere with Marine tactical functions.

  In 1992 LtCol Robert C. Dodt, Jr., wrote what many in the USMC consider the

fundamental study of this problem from the USMC perspective, "Tactical Ballistic Missile

Defense for the United States Marine Corps."42 His description of the serious and

growing threat to USMC expeditionary forces is very persuasive. If TBMs are the critical

threat which many maintain, then how realistic is it to provide total protection of our force

from them? What is an acceptable level of risk for our forces? What is adequate

protection? The Marine Corps must answer these questions.


  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), also called Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV's),

are another growing threat. Currently the UAV threat is primarily that of reconnaissance

and Electronic Warfare (EW) and not of a lethal nature. Even the Iraqi's were able to use

UAVs during the Gulf War with some measure of success. The UAV's relatively low cost
and the difficulty of defending against them has made it one of the most popular weapons

on the current arms market.

  This UAV capability is so vital to potential adversaries being able to target friendly

forces effectively that it is critical that the US develop its ability to counter this threat.

Another important reason to develop an effective defense against these systems is that

UAVs are developing the capability to be involved directly in lethal fire delivery.43


  Cruise missiles are actually a type of ballistic missile but one which will have to be

countered differently because of the nature of its flight profile. According to DIA, Cruise

Missile (CM) technology is growing but is still a few years away from being a reality in

most potential adversaries.44 The Joint Chiefs of Staff; however, maintain that there is

already a viable cruise missile threat and that these weapons are available at increasingly

low prices which make their proliferation almost inevitable.45 Although the US may have
some time before having to worry much about this threat, it is important that the research

and acquisition agencies ensure that the US can defeat this threat in the very near future.

Once the threat nations develop this capability it could prove to be one of the most

difficult to defeat.


  Joint Publication 3-01.2 provides a very good summary of the threat:

    Air Threat. Enemy fixed-wing aircraft and cruise missiles pose a primary threat to

  friendly forces and must be countered to gain control of the air and to protect US

  forces. Additionally, enemy SOF, airborne forces, and attack helicopters pose a

  threat both in their capability to attack friendly forces independently and in

  conjunction with hostile ground forces. Tactical ballistic missiles employing

  conventional, chemical, or nuclear warheads also pose a significant threat to the

  joint force. Additionally, lethal unmanned, nonballistic systems, such as glide

  bombs or remotely piloted vehicles, and nonlethal air vehicles with electronic or

  psychological warfare capabilities also threaten the joint force. Satellite surveillance

  systems could provide the enemy with warning, reconnaissance, and other

  capabilities to increase friendly force vulnerability.46

  USMC forces should expect air superiority against fixed wing aircraft in its area of
operations anywhere in the world. There is, however, a significant capability for potential

adversaries to hurt USMC forces with ballistic missiles, with UAVs, and the emerging

Global Positioning System (GPS) capabilities providing them much needed targeting

information. The most serious threat is that these ballistic missiles can deliver chemical or

nuclear warheads. Helicopters at the tactical level will remain a significant threat to

USMC forces. Adversaries win increasingly use both fixed wing aircraft and helicopters

as platforms for sophisticated air-to-surface weapons which pose serious threats to USMC

expeditionary forces.

                 IV. CURRENT USMC DOCTRINE

  According to the USMC doctrinal publication on air defense, FMFM 5-50, Antiair

Warfare, antiair warfare (AAW) is one of the six functions of USMC aviation whose

mission is to, "gain and maintain the degree of air superiority required for the Marine Air

Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to conduct operations."47 This important document goes
on to describe the AAW assets to "include aircraft, air-launched weapons, Surface-to-Air

Weapons (SAWs), and the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS). The

MAGTF commander uses these assets as tools to gain and maintain the air superiority

needed for the successful prosecution of amphibious or expeditionary operations." 48 In

the USMC the term "air defense" is a subset of this AAW function and ground-based air

defense is a subset of the air defense function. Air defense is not given the status in the

USMC that it is in other services. In the Joint world, air defense is a major part of the

operational function: PROTECTION.49 USMC doctrine does not even mention this

important point.

  As discussed in the historical section, the USMC Integrated Air Defense system

consists of a triad of weapon systems: FA-l8s, HAWK, and Stinger, integrated by USMC

MACCS.50o This triad has been consistent for the past 30 years -- in 1966 it was F-4's,

HAWK, and Redeye integrated by the USMC MACCS. The USMC has technically

improved the three weapons and the MACCS system many times, but the basic theory has
remained the same: Fighter Engagement Zone (FEZ), buffer or crossover zone, and

Missile Engagement Zone (MEZ)51 all coordinated through the Tactical Air Operations

Center (TAOC). Current USMC doctrine recognizes the TAOC as the agency which is

responsible for coordinating and allocating resources into the Joint and combined world. 52

  The 1994 Mission Area Analysis 32, Mission Area Analysis for Antiair Warfare

(MAA 32), is a fundamental document in the current USMC system of asset acquisition

based on concept requirements. Its purpose is to accomplish a comprehensive analysis of

the Marine Corps' mission requirements for antiair warfare for the period FY 1993 to FY

2003. 53 MAA 32 lists thirty-three validated deficiencies (Appendix B). Number 12

states, "The MAGTF has an insufficient number and mix of AAW assets to provide

continuous air defense coverage to all desired MAGTF areas."54 This document defines

the current solution as trying to correct all the weapons and command and control

deficiencies which we currently have. MAA 32 emphasizes interoperability but appears to

give no real emphasis to eliminating redundancy or fighting Joint.
  The USMC Master Plan (MCMP) 1994-2004 is the latest USMC vision for the

future.55 This document lays out the current USMC vision for the future of Antiair

Warfare -- Mission Area 32. It lists 20 tasks organized into three functional areas:

doctrine, training and education, and equipment (Appendix C). This document comes as

close to any the USMC has in defining what the current official solution is for the future of

ground-based air defense in the USMC. It, like MAA 32 which forms the basis of its

reasoning, appears to be a strategy of fixing what is wrong with a stand alone air defense

system in the USMC. It gives great emphasis to Joint interoperability but only in addition

to a complete stand alone system. It does not give enough emphasis to a Joint system

which would do away with unrequired redundancy in this period of very limited resources.

MAA 32 and the current Master Plan outline a current and future USMC doctrine which

is inconsistent with the resource realities which demand the elimination of stand alone

service redundancies.

  In current USMC doctrine, ground-based air defense is lost somewhere between
aviation and survivability. The doctrine does not even include air defense in the current

list of tactical battlefield activities!.56 The current USMC battlefield activities are:

Maneuver, Fires, Intelligence, Aviation, Combat Service Support,

Mobility-Countermobility- Survivability, and Command and Control. No other service,

either US or allied, views air defense with such an obvious lack of emphasis.


  Since the USMC charter is to be JOINT, the Marine Corps must have a basic

knowledge of its sister services' capabilities and limitations in order to best craft the proper

Marine Corps slice of the Joint air defense system. As discussed earlier, General Powell

stated that the US military no longer needs nor can it afford all the redundancies among

the services.

FM 100-5, Operations, states the US Army mission and position very well:

 Air defense operations are key when generating combat power. They provide

the force with protection from enemy air attack, preventing the enemy from

separating friendly forces while freeing the commander to fully synchronize

maneuver and firepower. Air defense operations are performed by all members

of the combined arms team; however, ground-based air defense artillery (ADA)

units execute the bulk of the force-protection mission. These units protect

deployed forces and critical assets within a theater area of responsibility (AOR)

by preventing enemy aircraft, missiles, and remotely piloted and unmanned

aerial vehicles (RPV/UAV) from locating, striking, and destroying them. The

threat to friendly forces and combat functions is significantly greater than in

the past due to weapons of mass destruction and the proliferation of missile

technology. The potential for catastrophic loss of soldiers, time, or initiative,

forcing a change to operational objectives, requires a greater role for theater

missile defense when generating combat power at the operational level. Air

defense operations represent the Army contribution to counterair operations.

The theater air commander is normally the area air defense commander (AADC).

He integrates the capabilities of different services and establishes counterair

ROE and procedures for the theater. A control and reporting center (CRC)

usually exercises control of theater counterair operations.57
  The Army has been the lead service in ground-based air defense for many years.

FM 44-100, US Army Air Defense Operations, discusses the current Army doctrine on air

defense in detail and states that "The mission of US Army ADA is to protect the force

and selected geopolitical assets from aerial attack, missile attack, and surveillance. This

mission statement has been expanded over the previous versions to include all elements

which require protection and to include all types of aerial threats."58 The Army has based

its new doctrine on the new Joint doctrine and, of all the four services, is the most "Joint"

in its nature.

  The key Army term is AIR DEFENSE (AD). The current system's foundation is the

Patriot missile system, augmented by HAWK from the National Guard, and the Short

Range Air Defense (SHORAD) weapon -- Stinger, both MANPAD (Man Portable Air

Defense) and Avenger.59 The Army ties into the Joint command and control system

through the US Air Force Combat Reporting Center (CRC) or the USMC Tactical Air

Operations Center (TAOC). The Army views its Air Defense Artillery as an important
supporting arm. Its historical background is from the artillery arm, specifically the coastal


  Unlike the USMC, the US Army stresses the importance of air defense at all levels of

warfighting. At the strategic level part 1, national military, it provides protection for

strategic forces and means; at the strategic level part 2, theater force requirement and

readiness, it provides theater strategic air defense. At the operational level it provides

operational air defense. At the tactical level the Army gives air defense equal status with

the other Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS): Maneuver, Fire Support, Air Defense,

Command and Control, Intelligence, Mobility and Survivability, and Combat Service


  The US Army is moving forward with a growing emphasis on Theater Missile

Defense (TMD) capability and has delayed fielding its next generation of Short Range Air

Defense (SHORAD) weapons in favor of the TMD focus. Army documents clearly

illustrate this theater missile defense focus. The Army's acquisition emphasis is presently
on a Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which is many years away,

and the new Patriot capability called the PAC 3 system.61

  The Army has developed an exemplary concept of solving its short range air defense

of its armored units with the Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle. This concept provides a

very capable and economical solution by using a combination of presently available

systems: the Bradley armored fighting vehicle and the Stinger missile system. This

solution gives the important armor units the protection they need while saving a great

amount of money which the Army can use to focus on ballistic missile defense.

  Some in the USMC have stated the USA can provide the USMC with AD capabilities

that eliminate the need for the USMC to have HAWK. I have never heard or read of any

Army air defender who has made such a claim. The Army leadership maintains that they

do not even have enough air defense assets to accomplish the Army's mission, much less

take on defending USMC forces.

  US Navy doctrine stresses antiair warfare as an important part of battlespace

dominance which the Navy ensures by achieving and maintaining both maritime and air

superiority. United States Navy Doctrinal Publication 1, Naval Warfare (NDP 1), states

that "after achieving maritime and air superiority, naval forces can continue to operate as

an integrated part of a larger Joint organization or disengage to respond to another need

for their presence."63 Naval Warfare Publication 32, Antiair Warfare (NWP 32),64 and

Naval Warfare Publication 10-1-21, Commanders Guide to Antiair Warfare (NWP

10-1-21), detail the current Naval approach.65

  The US Navy does give a priority to air defense. After all, unlike the USMC, the US

Navy has suffered from damaging air attacks since World War Two. The most recent

being the Iraqi Exocet missile attack on the USS Stark in 1987. The Navy lists Antiair

Warfare (AW) as one of its composite warfare functions.

  The key word in Navy terminology is ANTIAIR WARFARE which the Navy

executes through its traditional base of guided missile frigates, AEGIS, and the emphasis
on carrier-based aircraft -- F-14's and F-18's. Their E2C Hawkeye carrier-based aircraft

and the designated composite warfare commander assigned the role as Antiair Warfare

Coordinator (AAWC), usually an AEGIS class ship, provide the Navy's air defense

command and control.66

  Current Navy doctrine does not give much emphasis to Joint warfighting. The latest

NWP 32 is only a slight change from the past doctrine and still focuses on protecting the

fleet out in the deep blue water. The only section of NWP 32 which even mentions

integration with land based forces is the section on amphibious operations.

  Some in the Navy would have them take over the AAW roles which HAWK has

provided for the USMC for many years. It is interesting that certain Navy leaders in

Washington have stated that the AEGIS can do this mission, but the AEGIS operators

with whom I have worked and discussed this issue claim that the AEGIS can NOT replace

HAWK capabilities for the USMC ashore. These operators maintain that AEGIS does

provide a tremendous capability which can and does extend over the littoral area, but it
should not be thought of as a stand alone answer for the USMC assault forces ashore.67


  Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force,

describes the current US Air Force doctrine.68 The US Air Force uses the term

AEROSPACE CONTROL, which consists of counterair and counterspace missions. 69

The US Air Force sees aerospace control as its fundamental role. The Air Force believes

it must establish and maintain aerospace control first and then, and only then, can they

perform their other functions (they call them "roles"): Force Application, Force

Enhancement, and Force Support.70 Although the US Air Force places great importance

on aerospace control, it gives little emphasis to defensive counterair and hardly mentions

ground-based air defense.

  The Air Force bases its doctrine upon a reliance of massive numbers of fighter

aircraft coordinated by airborne AWACS and ground control units called Combat
Reporting Centers (CRC's).71 The Air Force places almost total reliance on offensive

counterair operations -- in other words, the conduct of deep air strikes. It is odd that the

USAF now wants to get into the ground-based air defense business (in their Deep Battle

concept) since it has never performed ground-based air defense except on the blackboards

of antiballistic missile defense and star wars.72 I can only surmise that it is because the

greatest current threat to US forces (TBMs) is one which the Air Force's airplanes will not

have any real capability against for a long time.


  Joint Publication 3-01.2, Theater Counterair Operations, details the Joint position on

air defense.73 This doctrine is sound and all four services should incorporate it. Currently

they do not! Only the Army has written its new draft FM44-100 in clear support of this

important document.74 My experience in air defense can be informative on this issue.

Despite fourteen years of intense experience in USMC ground-based air defense, until I
began the research for this paper, I had never heard of this Joint document on air defense.

  A little more than a year ago, 21 March-- 1 April 1994, the Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD) conducted a very important Joint Air Defense Test in Southern

Mississippi and the northern Gulf of Mexico called the Joint Air Defense Operations/Joint

Engagement Zone (JADO/JEZ) Nearland Test. It was the third and most comprehensive

of three tests/evaluations conducted by the OSD. It involved all four services and their

primary air defense weapons and command and control.

  I was the senior Marine at the Camp Shelby, Mississippi, JADO/JEZ test site and

had under my supervision a USMC HAWK Battery, a USMC LAAD Platoon, and a

USMC Early Warning and Control Site (EW/C). The Army co-located a Patriot firing

platoon with us. The Camp Shelby air defense units were linked to the USMC Tactical

Air Operations Center (TAOC) at Gulfport, Mississippi, which served as the command

and control fusion center for all the AD players including: USAF fighters and

E3/AWACS, Navy fighters and E2C/HAWKEYE, Navy AEGIS missile cruiser, US
Army Patriot Battalion (-), plus the USMC ground-based air defenders -- HAWK and

Stinger. Aircraft and helicopters--F-16s, A-6s and a real MI-24 Hind and KA-25

Hormone--provided the threat force.

  Joint Air Defense Operations/Joint Engagement Zone (JADO/JEZ) Joint Test

Force Nearland Test (NLT) Report documented the results of this important Joint

evaluation.75 I observed that all four services have much work to do to truly operate in a

Joint manner -- the four command and control systems are not easily interoperable. The

results of the test proved that the four services certainly can function well together, but

even after all these years it was clear that each of the four services had developed its own

air defense system in virtual isolation. Most systems' operators had very little experience

in operating in a truly Joint environment. As the report says, "tracking of aircraft by Joint

service organizations did not support maintaining correct IDs and positions on aircraft

throughout the IADS (Integrated Air Defense System)."75 The USMC Tactical Air

Operations Center (TAOC) proved to be the one agency which enabled the teat to be as
successful as it was.


  The services' doctrines discussed are currently in a serious state of flux. In truth it is

difficult to define just what current "doctrine" is. Many times I would hear different

"words" from day to day and office to office, even in the same service, and even these

words would differ from the actual service's published directives. However, there are

some consistent concepts.

  The Army has its view of defending its ground forces, the Air Force has its view of

aerospace control, the Navy has its composite warfare (AW) concept, and the Marine

Corps has its view of antiair warfare as a function of Marine aviation. All give lip service

to jointness, but few seem to really be "getting it." Only the US Army's doctrinal

publications stress the important operational term PROTECTION. All the services

currently have stand alone systems which give "eye wash" to interoperability and jointness.
The services must eliminate this "stovepipe" approach to this important doctrine, starting

with all four services agreeing to one set of Joint terms instead of the four sets we have


  The USMC, in particular, is not consistent in regard to antiair warfare/air defense

doctrine. How can the USMC reconcile all the current focus on "jointness," "primacy of

the MEF," "single battle," and "battlespace" to its two dimensional view of warfighting?

Only the USMC does not give air defense/AAW equal status with the other battlespace



  Now that we have laid a foundation describing where the USMC ground-based air

defense has been, what the current threat is, and what the current solutions are -- what

are the USMC options for the future? There appear to be only three: 1) continue the
current USMC policy, 2) eliminate all USMC air defense capabilities and let the Joint

world take care of it, or 3) reduce the USMC air defense redundancies and integrate better

into the Joint world.

  COA # 1

  Course of action #1 is to continue the current USMC policy. As already discussed it

is not easy to describe what the current policy/doctrine is, but for the purposes of this

study, we will use the definition provided by the current USMC policy in the USMC

Master Plan and FMFM 5-50. They would have the USMC fix all its current systems as if

it plans to go to war alone with its own completely Integrated Air Defense System


  Some would have the USMC continue this policy of a total IADS but reduce

everyone across the board - save the structure to everything, just reduce assets and

manning. This is what the USMC has traditionally done in the past. This is a bad
approach. The USMC's recent experience in truly trying to integrate into a Joint air

defense structure has clearly demonstrated that the current system is broken. The results

of the JADO/JEZ series of tests/evaluations demonstrated dramatically that the current

systems and concepts are not Joint.77 Each service's air defense assets and mind sets

proved to be far less interoperable than originally anticipated. Each service had developed

its doctrine and systems with that service's particular slant on air defense as the

foundation. The USMC can not afford to have a capability which does not integrate into

the Joint system.

  COA # 2

  Course of action #2 would simply eliminate all USMC air defense units and assets

and give the mission to the Joint system. This seems to be what many leaders in the

USMC want to do. It is odd that they would agree with an Air Force general on

something as fundamental as this.78 Some in the US Air Force maintain that they are
responsible for aerospace control, so they should be in charge of all the air defense assets;

therefore, if a threat gets through it is the Air Force's fault. This sounds good to the

average layman most concerned with cost savings, but if one examines how this would

actually take place, it starts to breakdown. The USAF has never been in the ground-

based air defense business, so how the USMC could just hand over its weapons and

manpower to them is difficult to understand. That would be like the USMC taking over

the submarine business.

  Others would have the USMC just do away with all air defense without any transfer

of responsibility to another service. Appendix E clearly shows that to eliminate all the

USMC air defense tools would leave quite a hole in our overall capability.

  COA # 3

  Course of action #3 is for the USMC to keep its shooters, reduce its air defense

system, particularly the redundant command and control structure, and integrate better
into the Joint system. The USMC must participate in the development of a truly Joint air

defense command, control and communications system. The USMC can begin to do this

with the assets it already has and will have by 1996. Software modifications can fix many

of the interoperability problems for the short term.


  Course of action three (COA #3) is the course of action that I believe will be the best

solution for the Marines on the ground. Since the USMC will never go to war except in a

Joint environment, it does not need a stand alone AAW system -- nor does any other

service need such a system. What the USMC needs are Marine-like-weapons (agile,

mobile, hostile) and an appropriate slice of command and control to connect these

weapons into any potential Joint command and control system.

  I have developed this final recommendation over a period of months. The more I

researched the topic the more I realized that some of my earlier judgments about the
subject were in error. Many ground-based air defense officers in the USMC have fought

so long to educate the senior leadership about GBAD that they are usually far from

objective and too emotional. I have put aside these emotions and make the following four

recommendations which will provide the adequate protection which we have been hunting.


  The USMC must revise its current doctrine. It must take the Joint approach that it

professes to have and rewrite its doctrine after the fashion which the US Army has in its

new FM 44-100. The USMC doctrine must reflect the Joint principle of protection. The

USMC can NOT continue to use the old "AAW is one of the functions of Marine

Aviation" answer. Protection of the MAGTF is the function, aviation assets are tools to

help us provide that function. This mission of air defense is a very important part of

protecting our forces and the reality of the modern battlefield is that ground-based air

defense must play an important part in that mission. Aircraft have never nor can they now
do it all.

   Protection of the force is the operational commander's most important function. The

CINC and the MAGTF commanders have no more important function than to provide

their tactical forces protection from air and naval attacks --both lethal and nonlethal. The

USMC can no longer assume that the air forces' supremacy can prevent enemies from

hurting USMC forces from the air. Air defense is, in a real sense, a function which only

forces at the operational/theater level can accomplish. Therefore, it is inherently a JOINT

function which the services must integrate and coordinate at the operational/theater level.

Only a flexible and Joint interoperable command and control system can provide this

function to the CINC and MAGTF commanders.

   In fact, all four services should revise their doctrine and training so that they really

have the JOINT system which they need to provide effective protection to the Joint

forces. Even with current emphasis on jointness, I found in my research and experience

that much of that emphasis is lip service. It is time that all four services grow up and quit
acting like it is a defeat to make a capability purple (Joint). Especially in the short term,

the services must put aside their parochial interests and do what is right for the United

States. Each of the services has its traditional strengths which it should maximize while

working to eliminate the cut throat attitude of the past.


  The USMC must retain its firepower, its "shooters." There is not enough ground-

based air defense in the Joint US structure now (Appendixes D and E). Initially I believed

that the USMC had cut back its LAAM battalions and its HAWK missile system to the

point of no return; that it was trying to get global sourcing of ground-based air defense

capability from one small battalion - more and more with less and less. I believed that it

was time that someone stood up and said "NO." If the USMC wants an integrated air

defense system then have one. If not, then let us move on with just the Stinger system in

the LAAD battalion and pray that none of our enemies notice. I also thought that claiming
that the HAWK system can provide the USMC a TBM defense capability was just another

attempt to save HAWK by tying it to a good source of funding. I tried hard to be

objective and the research and months of thought have changed my mind about these


  The real debate continues over the USMC HAWK capability. HAWK is currently

the most capable medium range/altitude mobile air defense weapon in the world. HAWK

is the only 24-hour-a-day, all weather, air defense system which the USMC has. In its

current form it is much more mobile than in the past and its mobility is constantly

improving. It recently demonstrated a TBM capability with upgrades in the TAOC's TPS

59 radar.79 What most people fail to understand is that the new HAWK's phase III

system is more modern than even the current Patriot system. It is expensive - one of the

most expensive ground units in the USMC. The Marine Corps without HAWK will have

no viable medium range/altitude air defense capability for at least the next ten years -- nor

will it have a system upon which to develop any future capability. Without HAWK the
USMC will have absolutely no ballistic missile or cruise missile defense capability and little

capability against UAV's.

  An examination of Appendixes D and E clearly shows that the Joint commander is

long on fixed wing aircraft and short on ground-based air defense. It is very striking to

see that only the HAWK has capability against all the current threat systems; the chart

depicted in Appendix E really shows the issue well. The USMC should not give up its

HAWK capability!

  All agree that the USMC should keep and continue development of its low altitude

air defense capability which the Stinger weapon system currently provides. It is agile,

mobile, and hostile. Even the Air Force does not argue with the USMC keeping air

defense weapons like Stinger/Avenger. These LAAD units have had the political

advantage of always being on the cutting edge - being assigned to all the Marine

Expeditionary Units. This has given them the visibility with the ground units which their

larger cousin has not had. LAAD gets all the direct support missions in support of the
ground combat units; they get the "sexy" adventure training and are generally the most

"grunt like" unit in the air wing.

  The problem with all this love of LAAD is that too many are too quick to oversell

its capabilities. The Stinger missile is not magic -- it is currently limited to the gunner's

eyeball and without early warning has very limited ability against high performance attack

aircraft. Gunners currently must expose themselves to the environment to fire -- even in

the Avenger they have no protection against even small arms. The USMC must not

overstretch these very capable units with requirements for which they were never

intended. LAAD units are in many ways like reconnaissance units; everybody wants some

but few know how to use them properly.

  The only weapon which I would recommend adding for the short term solution is a

simple antiaircraft machine-gun capability. All of the pilots with which I have ever

discussed this issue have stressed their fear of this capability, and yet, the USMC has not

had it for over thirty years. I recommend simple antiaircraft machine-guns in the structure
of all USMC ground forces as a part of their normal crew-served weapons. These

weapons have proven their great utility over the years. If the unit is deploying to a

situation which does not require the weapons, then do not take them. We should at least

have antiaircraft mounts for the crew served weapons which the units already have -

amazingly these mounts existed but the USMC eliminated them from the inventory some

years ago. It is interesting to note that fighter aircraft did away with all their guns when

they originally converted to missiles too, thinking that with missiles, guns were obsolete.

Fighter pilots put the guns back on their aircraft many years ago; it is long overdue that

the ground forces get their AA guns back!


  The USMC must reduce and streamline its command and control (C2) system. The

C2 system must be truly Joint (not just interoperable) with the one Joint overall command

and control-system within which the USMC will always operate in the real world. The
USMC cannot afford to give up any weapons, because the Joint world does not have

enough shooters now, but what the Joint world does have too much of is command and

control systems, Figure 1.

Click here to view image

The United States needs one Joint air defense command and control system which is

flexible and capable of incorporating any potential mix of the shooters against any

potential adversary, Figure 2.

  The critical question is who will be in charge of this Command and Control (C2)

system? Why does the USMC need six Marine Air Control Squadrons (MACS) when it

only has one HAWK battalion? If we can "globally source" HAWK, why not MACS

capability, especially when you consider that in the Joint world chances are slim that the

USMC will provide the senior command and control agency to the overall air defense

effort. The Joint world wants firepower not more command and control systems to burn

up what few radio frequencies we have.
  The main argument for keeping all the MACS units is that without them the USMC

will lose its ability to provide command and control to our fixed wing aviation and will,

thereby, weaken the USMC argument to keep its fixed wing aviation-- especially the

F/A-18s. The other argument is that the USMC needs all the MACS units so it can train

all the various fighter groups. This is totally against the Joint concept which the USMC

professes!. If the USMC truly plans on going to war in a Joint environment then it must

train to do so. Even USMC doctrine states that our warfighting MEF only rates two

TAOCs, and since everyone should know that the USMC can only fight one MEF at a

time, I recommend that the USMC have one TAOC on each coast and one in the reserves.

That would give the USMC half what it has now--quite a savings in money, manpower

and lift.


  Finally, after making USMC doctrine more Joint-keeping the USMC shooters, and
streamlining its C2--the Marine Corps must ensure that its preparations are always

consistent with fighting Joint. The USMC must practice the way it is going to "play" and

conduct all exercises and evaluations in a manner consistent with the USMC fighting Joint

doctrine. My personal experience at JADO/JEZ underlines this recommendation. Training

Joint should not be something Marine forces can do - training Joint must be the standard

that Marine forces adhere to!


  As the USMC continues the hunt for adequate protection from air attack, the USMC

must make decisions that are conscious, well-informed, and JOINT. Who is responsible

for what specific part of the air defense mission is a Joint decision -- because it is a Joint

commitment. No matter what the decision, the only viable answer can be one that is Joint

in nature, because it is the resource reality of the modern world. No one US service is

going to do anything in isolation that will require air defense.
  Finally, in the debate over what kind of ground-based air defense it will have, the

USMC must at all costs stay faithful to our traditional Marine Corps values. No matter

whose Military Occupational Specialty or weapon system gets saved or eliminated. The

Marine Corps really has only one weapon which is critical to its survival - the individual

MARINE! Whatever the USMC does, the ultimate litmus test is whether that action

enhances the Marine rifleman and his warfighting capabilities. He is the ultimate capability

and asset. The words of the officer who wrote the 1933 report are still true today -- in

the face of new threats from the air let the USMC ensure it maintains "adequate

protection." I believe that the four recommendations which I have submitted will not only

do that but they will do it at a considerable cost savings to the USMC.

Click here to view image

                     APPENDIX D83


   1. F-15 EAGLE. USAF all weather air superiority fighter, one man crew, two

engine, 2.5 mach, 250-600 mile, armament: one 20mm cannon, four Aim-9 and four

Aim-7's. Probably the US's best all round air superiority radar capable fighter. 894 F-15's

and 209 F-15E's total in USAF.

   2. F-14 TOMCAT. USN all weather air superiority fighter, carrier based, two

crew, two engine, 2.34 mach, 250-700 mile, armament: one 20mm cannon, four Aim-9,

and four Aim-7's. 385 total.

   3. F-16 FIGHTING FALCON. USAF multipurpose fighter/attack aircraft, one

man crew, one engine, 2.0 mach, 250-600 mile, armament: one 20mm cannon, six

Aim-9's. A very agile fighter which is very popular for its multipurpose capabilities.

2,203 total sold to USAF of which about 1000 are left in the active forces.

   4. F/A-18 HORNET. USN/USMC multipurpose fighter/attack aircraft, carrier
based, one man, two engine, 1.8 mach, 200-600 mile, armament: one 20mm cannon, two

Aim-7, and two Aim-9's. 153 total USMC and 718 USN.

   5. AV8-B HARRIER. USMC multipurpose vistol attack aircraft. one man crew,

one engine, .9 mach, 200-600 mile, armament: one 25mm cannon, four Aim-9's. 290

total USMC.

   6. AH-1W SUPERCOBRA. USMC helicopter which can be used in a

secondary role of air-to-air.84 Armament: one 20mm cannon, two Aim-9's. 100 total

presently in USMC with plans to purchase 100 more.

   7. OTHERS. Obviously there are many aircraft which can be adapted for a

limited air defense role - the aircraft above have been selected because they are the

principle counter air weapons in the US inventory.


   1. PATRIOT (MIM-104). US Army's primary surface-to-air missile system.

There are nine (9) active duty Patriot battalions of the PAC 2, QRP 2 version of Patriot.
The new PAC 3 system will be fielded in 1996.

   2. HAWK (MIM-23B). USMC's primary surface-to-air missile system since

1960. A radar guided surface-to-air missile with a range of up to 25 nautical miles and up

to 50,000 feet in altitude. USMC has one active duty battalion of three batterys and one

reserve battalion of three batterys. The Army National Guard has three battalions.

   3. STINGER/AVENGER. Army and USMC's primary short range

surface-to-air missile system. 3 mile/6km range, 10,000 ft altitude, IR/UV shoulder fired

missile. Limited nighttime capability. Avenger is a pedestal mounted Stinger/50 cal

machine-gun weapon system which is transported in a HMMWV. Avenger also a FLIR

system which makes it much more capable at night. It has shoot on the move capability

and has eight ready to fire missiles in its pods.

   4. STANDARD MISSILE 1 (RIM-66A) and 2 (RIM-67A). US Navy's primary

surface-to-air missiles. Standard 1 has been in service since late 1960's and has a range of

18km and an altitude of 20,000 m. The latest USN surface-to-air missile is the Standard
2 which became operational in late 1970's and has a range of 55 km and an altitude of

20,000 m. Standard 2 is the primary weapon used by the AEGIS missile cruiser.

   5. SEA SPARROW (RIM-7E-5). US Navy's close in surface-to-air missile. A

radar guided missile with a range of 25 KM. Is currently being used in conjunction with

the Close in Weapon System/Phalanx for defense against anti-ship missiles and aircraft.


of defense against close in air attack. A 20 mm gattling gun (six barrels) of 2000 meters

range rate of fire of 3000 rounds per minute. This weapon system is found on almost

every US Navy warship.

   7. CHAPARRAL (MIM-72). US Army surface-to-air short range IR missile

system which is now only in the National Guard and will soon be totally retired. A four

missile launcher usually mounted on a self propelled track vehicle (M48 version).


   1. AADC. The Area Air Defense Commander will normally be assigned overall
responsibility for air defense by the Joint Force Commander. See Joint Publications 3-52

and 3-01 for more information.

   2. CRC/CRP. USAF Control and Reporting Center/Control and Reporting

Point. USAF primary control point of overall Air Defense effort in a given area. It is the

entry point of the Army's ADA into the Joint effort.

   3. E-3 SENTRY/AWACS. USAF 707 transport with a very large radome above

the fuselage and a complete air-defense operation center in the cabin. 17 man crew.

Primary coordinators of USAF fighters. 34 of these important aircraft still on active duty

since first being deployed in 1977.

   4. AEGIS. The Navy's principle antiair warfare ship which is usually designated

by the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) as the Antiair Warfare Coordinator

(AAWC) for a given area of responsibility. Operational since 1983 this state of the art

naval weapon system is built around the very capable multi-function phase array radar

   5. E-2 HAWKEYE. USN turboprop carrierborne early warning aircraft.

Primary coordinators of US Navy fighters.

   6. TAOC. USMC Tactical Air Operations Center used primarily for air defense

coordination and control. Similar to the USAF's CRC.

Click here to view image


  1 USMC Division of Operations & Training, Report on Equipment for an

Antiaircraft Regiment, Base Defense Force (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine

Corps, 20 Jan 1933), 1.

  2 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Report on the Roles, Missions and

Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: CJCS, February

1993), III-39.

  3 CJCS Report,III-41.

  4 Major Charles S.Nichols, Jr., USMC and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Okinawa: Victory in

the Pacific (Washington, DC: HQMC, 1965), 63.

  5 HQMC Memorandum for the record. Minutes of the ESG meeting held 24 Jan

  6 BGen. Simmons (ret), USMC Historical Department Director, telephone

interview by author on 27 Nov 1994.

  7 Sir Frederick Pile, Ack, Ack (London: Harrap, 1949).

  8 Kenneth P. Werrell, Archie, Flak, AAA, and SAM (Maxwell AFB: Air University

Press, 1988).

  9 Werrell, xv.

 10 Werrell, 177.

 11 John F. Kreis, Air Warfare and Air Base Defense 1914-1973 (Washington, DC:

GPO, 1988), 220.

 12 1933 HQMC Report.

 13 Werrell, 2-4.

 14 Kreis, 27.

 15 Kreis, 233.

 16 Kreis, 233.

 17 Werrell, 177.
 18 Werrell, 51.

 19 Mr. Dale Dewitt, MSgt USMC (ret), telephone interview by author on 10 Jan

1995. (Hereafter: Dewitt interview).

 20 Landing Force Manual (LFM) 23, Antiaircraft Artillery (Washington, DC:

HQMC, 1954), 1-2.

 21 Mr. Oscar Wallace, GySgt USMC (ret), telephone interview by author on 20 Dec

1994. (Hereafter: Wallace interview).

 22 Wallace interview.

 23 Wallace interview.

 24 Wallace and Dett interviews.

 25 Major G. D. McPherson, USMC, The Transfer of Certain Marine Corps

Antiaircraft Units from Force Troops to Force Aviation (Quantico, VA: the Junior

School, Marine Corps Educational Center, Marine Crops Schools, 19 March 1957).

 26 Dewitt interview.

 27 The Marines in Vietnam 1954-1973: an Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

(Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, HQ USMC, 1985), 39.

 28 Werrell, 136.
 29 Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-52, Employment of the Low Altitude Air

Defense Battalion (Washington, DC: HQ USMC, 1990), 1-1.

 30 FMFM 5-52, 1-1.

 31 Captain Mark A. King, USMC, "Our Dangerous Assumption" U. S. Naval

Institute Proceedings, November 1989, 44-47.

 32 Jane's Weapon Systems 1987-88 (London: Jane's Publishing Company), 181-184.

 33 FMFM 5-52,1-1.

 34 Field Manual (FM)44-100, US Army Air Defense Operations (Washington, DC:

Department of the Army, 1994), 2-7.

 35 Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1993-94 (London: Jane's Publishing Company),


 36 Mr. Al Catlett, helicopter analyst with Marine Corps Intelligence Agency (MCIA),

interviewed by author on 28 Feb 1995.

 37 DIA analysts Mr. Bob Shaefer, Mr. John Bullach, and LCMDR Dave Depman

interviewed by author at DIAC on 19 Dec 1994. (Hereafter: DIA interview).

 38 DIA interview.

 39 DIA interview.
 40 Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), Threats in Transition, Marine Corps

Mid-Range Threat Estimate - 1995-2005 (Quantico,VA: MCIA, 1994), 21.

 41 DIA interview.

 42 LtCol Robert C. Dodt, USMC, Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense for the United

States Marine Corps (Washington, DC: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1992).

 43 DIA interview.

 44 DIA interview.

 45 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Theater Missile Defense CONOPS

(Draft)(Washington, DC: JCS, 15 November 1994), 7.

 46 Joint Publication 3-01.2, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations

(Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff; 1986), III-1.

 47 Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-50, Antiair Warfare (Washington, DC:

HQMC, 1994), 1-1.

 48 FMFM 5-50, 2-1.

 49 Armed Forces Staff College Publication 2; Part II Joint Synchronization

(Quantico,VA: MCCDC, 1994), ll-5-F-1.

 50 FMFM 5-50, 2-1 to 2-6.
 51 FMFM 5-50, 3-12 to 3-13.

 52 Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-60, Control of Aircraft and Missiles

(Washington, DC: HQMC, 1993), 2-1.

 53 Mission Area Analysis for Antiair Warfare: 1993-2003 (MAA 32)

(Quantico,VA: MCCDC, 1994), 1 and 2.

 54 MAA 32,D-28.

 55 Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP) 1994 - 2004 (Washington, DC: HQMC,

1993), 11-25 to 11-27.

 56 USMC Command and Staff College, Commander and Staff Planning Guide

(Quantico, VA: MCCDC, 1994), 1-7.

 57 FM 100-5, 2-13.

 58 FM 44-100, 1-2.

 59 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and

Plans, Force Development Air & Missile Defense Division, Washington, DC. Captain Joe

Fischetti (Patriot), Major Hart (SHORAD), and Capt Maestas (Army National Guard)

telephone interviews by author on 13 Jan 1995. (Hereafter: Army Air Defense Officers


 60 US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 11-9, Blueprint

of the Battlefield (Fort Monroe, VA: US Army TRADOC, 1994).
 61 FM 44-100, 6-5.

62 Colonel A. P. Hasbrouck, Director of Combat Developments, Memorandum for

Assistant Commandant, US Army Air Defense Artillery School, Fort Bliss, Texas, 2O Sep


 63 Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1, Naval Warfare (Washington, DC: GPO,

1994), 28.

 64 Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 32, Antiair Warfare (Washington, DC: Dept of

Navy, CNO, Jul 1992).

 65 Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 10-1-21, Commander's Guide to Antiair

Warfare (Washington, DC: Dept of Navy, CNO, Aug 1990).

 66 NWP 10-1-21, 5-3.

 67 A source, an AEGIS senior operator interviewed by author during JADO/JEZ

Near Land Test. This AEGIS officer is currently in command and did not give permission

to be quoted.

 68 Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force

(Washington, DC: Dept of the Air Force, 1992).

 69 AF Manual 1-1,7.

 70 AF Manual 1-1, 10.
 71 AF Manual 1-1, 11.

 72 General Merrill A. McPeak, "The Roles and Missions Opportunity," Armed Forces

Journal International (Washington, DC: AFJ, March 1995), 34.

 73 Joint Pub 3-01.2.

 74 FM 44-100.

 75 Joint Air Defense Operations/Joint Engagement Zone (JADO/JEZ) Joint Test

Force Nearland Test (NLT) Report (Eglin AFB, 1994).

 76 JADO/JEZ NLT final report, ii.

 77 JADO/JEZ NLT final report.

 78 General McPeak, 32-34.

 79 Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), Theater Missile Defense (TMD)

System Description Document (Washington, DC: DOD/BMDO, Dec 30 1994), 2-25.

 80 Joint Theater Missile Defense CONOPS, 8.

 81 MAA 32, D-28.

 82 MCMP, II-25 to II-27.
 83 Jane`s All the World's Aircraft, 1993-94.

 84 Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 55-3-AH1 Volume 1 (Rev. E), AH-1 Tactical

Manual, NAVAIR 01-1110HC-1T(Washington, DC: CNO, Dec 1993).

 85 Jane`s All the World's Weapon Systems, 1987-88; Jane's Fighting Ships 1993-94

and Army Air Defense Officers interview were used to construct this overview of these

air defense systems.

 86 Jane`s All the World's Aircraft, 1993-94,Jane's Fighting Ships 1993-94, Army

Air Defense Officers interviews and interviews with USMC Air Defense systems experts

were used during the construction of this capabilities overview. It must be noted here that

this chart is intended to provide an overview of the core capabilities of these systems

against the current threat systems. A "no" does not mean that there is not some

theoretical capability; what it means is that according to all the sources I have used, the

system is not practical to be used for such a mission.


Air Force Magazine. Vol. 75, no 5. Arlington, Va: Air Force Association. May 1992.

Air Force Manual 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force.

    Washington, DC: Headquarters US Air Force. March 1992.

Armed Forces Staff College Pub 2. Joint Synchronization. Quantico, VA: MCCDC,


Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). 1994 Report to the Congress on:
   Ballistic Missile Defense. Washington, DC: BMDO. July 1994.

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). Theater Missile Defense (TMD) System

   Description Document (SDD). Washington, DC: BMDO. Dec 1994.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of

    the Armed Forces of the United States. Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 1993.

Dodt, Robert C., LtCol USMC. Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense for the United States

    Marine Corps. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1992.

Field Manual (FM)1OO-5. Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. June


Field Manual (FM) 44-lOO. US Army Air Defense Operations. Washington, DC:

   Department of the Army. June 1994. Final Draft.

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-50. Antiair Warfare. Washington, DC:

   Headquarters United States Marine Corps. June 1994.

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-52. Employment of the Low Altitude Air Defense

    Battalion. Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps. October 1990.

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-60. Control of Aircraft and Missiles. Washington,

   DC: United States Marine Corps. 22 June 1993.

Hasbrouck, A. P., Colonel USA, Director of Combat Developments. Memorandum for

   Assistant Commandant, US Army Air Defense Artillery School. Subject:
   "Proposed Elimination of USMC SAM Battalions." Fort Bliss, Texas. 2O Sep


Headquarters Marine Corps. Report on Equipment for an Antiaircraft Regiment, Base

    Defense Force. Washington, DC: HQMC. 20 Jan 1933.

Headquarters Marine Corps approved memorandum for the record. The minutes of the

   Executive Steering Group (ESG) meeting held 24 January 1994.

Joint Air Defense Operations/Joint Engagement Zone (JADO/JEZ) Joint Test Force

    Nearland Test (NLT) Report. Eglin AFB: JADO/JEZ, 1994.

Jane's All the Worlds' Aircraft 1993-94. London: Jane's Publishing Company. 1993.

Jane's Fighting Ships 1993-94. London: Jane's Publishing Company. 1993.

Jane's Weapon Systems 1987-88. Eighteenth edition by Bernard Blake. London: Jane's

   Publishing Company. 1987.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Theater Missile Defense CONOPS (Draft). Washington, DC:

   Joint Chiefs of Staff November 1994.

Joint Publication 1. Joint Warfare of the United States Armed Forces. Washington, DC:

    National Defense University Press. November 1991.

Joint Publication 3-01.2 Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations. Washington,

   DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff. April 1986.
Joint Publication 3-01.5 Joint Doctrine for Theater Missile Defense. Washington, DC:

    Joint Chiefs of Staff. March 1994.

King, Mark A., Capt USMC. "Our Dangerous Assumption." U. S. Naval Institute

   Proceedings, November 1989, 44-47.

Kreis, John F. Air Warfare and Air Base Defense 1914 - 1973. Washington, DC: GPO,


Landing Force Manual (LM) 23. Antiaircraft Artillery. United States Marine Corps.

   Washington, DC: HQMC. 1954.

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. Threats in Transition, Marine Corps Mid-Range

    Threat Estimate - 1995-2005. Quantico, VA: MCIA. 1994.

Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP) 1994-2004. Washington, DC: Headquarters United

   States Marine Corps. July 1993.

McPeak, Merrill A., General USAF (Ret). "The Roles and Missions Opportunity."

   Armed Forces Journal International. Washington, DC: AFJ. March 1995.

Mission Area Analysis for Antiair Warfare (1993 - 2003) Study, final report. Quantico,

    Va: United States Marine Corps Combat Development Command. 1994.

Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1. Naval Warfare. Washington, DC: GPO, March


Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 10-1-21. Antiair Warfare Commanders Manual. (C).
   Washington, DC: Dept of the Navy, CNO. Aug 1990.

Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 32. Antiair Warfare (C). Washington, DC: Dept of

   the Navy, CNO. Jul 1992.

Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 55-3-AH1 Volume 1 (Rev. E). AH-1 Tactical Manual.

   NAVAIR 01-110HC-1T.

Nichols, Charles S., Major USMC and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. Okinawa: Victory in the

   Pacific. Washington, DC: HQMC. 1965.

Pile, Sir Frederick A. Ack-Ack. London: Harrap, 1949.

The Marines in Vietnam 1954-1973: am Anthology and Annotated Bibliography.

    Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine

    Corps, 1985.

Werrell, Kenneth P. Archie, Flak, AAA, and Sam: a Short Operational History of

    Ground-based Air Defense. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1988.


Catlett, Al. Marine Corps Intelligence Agency analyst. Interview by author on l March


Dewitt, Dale. A retired USMC MSgt who served in USMC ground-based air defense

   from 1952-1972. Telephone interview by author on 10 Jan 1995.
Fischetti, Joe, Cpt USA, Maj Hart and Cpt Maestas. US Army air defense officers who

   work at Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for

   Operations and Plans, Force Development Air & Missile Defense Division,

   Washington, DC. Telephone interviews by author on 13 Jan 1995.

Simmons, E. H. A retired BGen USMC who is now the Director of Marine Corps

   History and Museums. Telephone interview by author on 27 Nov 1994.

Shaefer, Bob, John Bullach, Dave Depman. DIA threat air analysts. Interview by author

   at Defense Intelligence Agency Center on 19 Dec 1994.

A source, an AEGIS senior operator interview by author during JADO/JEZ Nearland

   Test. This AEGIS officer is currently in command and did not give permission to

   be quoted.

Wallace, Oscar. A retired USMC GySgt who served in USMC ground-based air defense

   from 1955 - 1975. Telephone interview by author on 20 Dec 1994.

Wilkinson, Greg and Keith Wilkes. Both Majors in the USMC with extensive

   ground-based air defense experience in both operations and procurement.

   Interviewed by the author throughout the school year of 1994-95. Major

   Wilkinson is currently serving at MARCORSYSCOM and Major Wilkes is student

   at the USMC Command and Staff College

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