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					Lexington High School 2005-2006                                                                                                  Guantanamo Bay Affirmative
                                                                                                                                            Pre-camp Work

Contention One: Inherency

The perpetual War on Terror has created an ever-lasting state of emergency, to fight the others. This is the
ultimate deployment of biopolitical control that acts through such concentration camps as Guantanamo bay.
These camps stripe the occupants of their rights and dehumanize them.

Jess, White, 7/04 Project Officer of World Refugee Day (“The Human is a Battleground”)

                                                                                                                 biotechnologies have
What is the human today? And what is life? While once the answers perhaps seemed self - evident, today this is far from the case. Emerging
moved both life and death from the natural realm into the realm of decisionism and hence the realm of sovereign power . Schools of bioethics
are devoted to such questions as, when is an embryo life? When is a foetus too old too abort? What counts as death - the end of the heartbeat? Brain-death? Yet while
technologies have forced debate on such matters, another more sinister redefinition of the border between the human and the animal is taking place in the sphere of a politics
that is rapidly being subsumed into biopolitics.
Life, politics, and the politicisation of life:
From Aristotle to Arendt, classical political thinkers have sought to delimit politics, setting it apart from mere life, which, they argued, was an essentially private affair. In
Ancient Greece, this distinction is evident in the lack of a single word for human life, signified by the split between zoe: natural life, and bios: the politically qualified life.
The purpose of politics was therefore not simply life but the good life, a life that is not naturally given but is an achievement. Hence only through political action could one
create a good and truly human life.

Yet while these thinkers conceived of natural life as that which must be excluded from the polis, the realm of politics, zoe is nonetheless presupposed as that which must
simultaneously be excluded and politicised through its transformation into bios. For Agamben, the relationship between what he terms bare life and the polis is one of
inclusive exclusion: bare life is immediately included as that which is held in a ban, or maintained in a relation of abandonment, in order to enable the existence of politics.
Agamben gives the name “bare life” to that threshold between bios and zoe which separates the political sphere from the sphere of natural life, and the polis from the private
realm. And yet today this threshold has succumbed to instability. As the management of biological life becomes the supreme political task, the border between bios and zoe
crumbles, and Arendt’s assertion that “life and death are non-worldly and anti-political” can no longer be sustained. As life and death are politicised, we see, in
concerns with “racial purity” and “biological heredity” - which became the fundamental tasks of the Nazi state - and in the movement
of death from a zone of pure biological fact into one of politics by virtue of new medical technologies, the necessity for biopolitics to
pass over into thanatopolitics (a politics of death). Death is always lurking behind the state’s “care for life ”, a realisation that has existed since
Socrates described an “art of medicine” in which the doctor would “let die the ones whose bodies are [corrupt] and the ones whose souls have bad natures and are incurable,
they themselves will kill.”2
In his 1976 lecture series at the College de France, Society Must be Defended, Foucault pointed to racism as that which reinscribes the right to kill in the sphere of a state
supposedly committed to the fostering of, and care for, life. Foucault argues that in the “biopower system”
…killing or the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries but in the elimination of
the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race . 3
As Foucault points out, war today has two functions: it exists not only to destroy a political adversary but also to destroy the “biological
threat”, to destroy the sort of threat “that those people over there represent to our race .” It is in this context that we should view the recent warnings by a senior
                                                                        In the context of Iraq, we see how this mobilisation of a biological
British military officer that the US occupying forces in Iraq view the Iraqi population as untermenschen (subhuman).
discourse, which as Foucault points out is simply reinscribed onto the notion of the political enemy, is utilised to deadly effect, justifying
the indiscrimate targeting of a civilian population conceived as both enemy and subhuman threat, and undoubtedly contributing to the
torture, degradation and humiliation of Iraqi prisoners.
Human Rights?
How then do we respond to this new biopolitical control? The primary response to the inscription of biological life into the realm of state power and of politics, has been the
assertion that inalienable rights are attached to the human in and of itself. Yet to invoke human rights is not only to legitimise the power of the state that must enforce them,
but to be implicated in the very development of a biopolitics that has turned human life into a site for political control. Far from being neutral in relation to this power,
human rights declarations are mechanisms by which sovereignty, which was previously legitimated through recourse to the divine, now finds its basis in a national or
sovereign people. To locate rights in the biological life of the human, is to bring this life further into the realm of sovereign power. As Agamben puts it:
It is almost as if starting from a certain point, every decisive political event were double sided: the spaces, the liberties and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts
with certain powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of individuals’ lives within the state order, thus offering a new and more dreadful
foundation for the very sovereign power from which they wanted to liberate themselves.4
The truth of this is perhaps best revealed in the 1679 writ of habeas corpus – “show us the body.” Habeas corpus was a writ aimed at the undermining of arbitrary
imprisonment, and provided that an individual who was detained must, if a writ was lodged, be brought before a magistrate within a certain period of time. Interestingly
however, the writ operated without reference to the standard mechanisms of political legitimation: it referred not to the subject of feudal relations, or the citizen imbued with
political rights, but simply to the body, the human in and of itself. While, as Hansen and Stepputat argue, habeas corpus “curtailed the exercise of arbitrary state violence by
defining the body of the citizen as an integral part of the sovereign body of the people and thus entitled to due process”, it did so only at the cost of entangling the body, or
something akin to Agamben’s bare life, in the sphere of sovereign power.

This analysis of Agamben’s goes beyond the more familiar critique of human rights, which suggests that in their application, human rights are in fact the rights of citizens.
Certainly this recognition provides an initial insight into the mobilisation of the category of the human, and the concomitant dehumanisation that has always accompanied it.
Yet to point to the nationally demarcated sphere of application of human rights is not enough to explain the changing nature of the human that has accompanied the
progression from a sovereignty legitimated through the life of a people, to a biopolitics of national populations, to the emerging biopolitics of humanity. While today the
possession of citizenship is an essential precondition for access to human rights, it is by no means enough to guarantee such access.

If today biopolitics increasingly operates on a global scale, taking all the people of the globe as a population to be monitored, ordered, hierarchized and intervened into with
Lexington High School 2005-2006                                                                                                  Guantanamo Bay Affirmative
                                                                                                                                            Pre-camp Work
food parcels or with missiles, then citizenship can no longer play the role, or at least cannot play it alone, of policing the binary opposition between those who are, and those
who are not granted human rights. Increasingly this role is being taken up by the very notion of the human: a notion that must not be conceived as either natural or neutral.
In an era devoid of middle grounds, as epitomised by Bush’s threat “you are with us or you are with the terrorists”, the role of “humanity” in the simplistic dualism between
good and evil, freedom and terror, is not to mark out the universal or the common, but to offer decisive proof of the authority of the US imperial project. Humanity is not a
value-free term but one imbued with a particular political coloration. Just as tolerant liberal multiculturalists can tolerate anyone as long as they are liberal, multicultural and
tolerant, the Bush regime, despite its brutality, justifies its actions through reference to notions of humanity and freedom, thus imbuing such notions with a specific
geopolitical content and function. Hence anyone who threatens this geopolitical project, or even challenges the benevolence or desirability of a US empire, is quickly written
out of the sphere of humanity.

This has become most evident in the context of the war on terror, and internment by the United States of thousands of people termed “unlawful
combatants”, including British and Australian citizens, IN GUANTANAMO BAY. GUANTANAMO BAy, along with spaces like Australia’s detention centres, is, in
Agamben’s terminology, a “camp”, defined as a localization of a state of exception. While the state of emergency, or exception, is often conceived as a temporal
suspension of law aimed at the restoration of “order”, in the camp this regime of exceptionality finds a permanent spatial arrangement . And
if, within the state of exception, sovereign power confronts bare life without the mediation of law or rights, then the camp is the ultimate
biopolitical space, in which the state directly takes over the management of the biological life of the human.

                                                                              Guantanamo demonstrates is the complicity between the direct
As Agamben has warned of the proximity between biopolitics and thanatopolitics, what
management of
human life, and dehumanisation. As previous wars and colonial projects have demonstrated, the divide between the “human in and of
itself”, and the inhuman is a slippery one. Jamal Al Harith, a Briton recently released without charge from Guantanamo after two years tells:
After a while we stopped asking for human rights - we wanted animal rights. In Camp X-Ray my cage was right next to a kennel housing an
Alsatian dog. He had a wooden house with air conditioning and green grass to exercise on. I said to the guards, “I want his rights”, and they
replied, “That dog is a member of the US army.”
Once humans are stripped of the mediation of law and citizenship and placed outside the discourse of human rights, it is not long before
they find that it is with these mechanisms that the political construction of the human begins and ends. As those detained in Camp X-ray
and Camp Delta are accused of complicity in a “crime against humanity” (September 11) or of fighting for the “inhuman” Taliban regime,
they are written out of the very status of humanity. Yet it should not be conceived that the humanity from which they are expelled is
self-evident, or pre-existing. Just as it is the exception which creates the norm, it is through the figure of the inhuman, as the negative but
constitutive term, that humanity itself is constructed.

The system of tribunals fails to use any due process, provide Habrus Corpus, and ignores international law

William Fisher, Staff Writer for IPS, 4/13/05, (RIGHTS: U.S. JOINT CHIEFS WANT TOUGHER RULES ON 'TERROR' DETAINEES) lexis

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff want Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to approve new guidelines that would formalise the Bush administration's
policy of imprisoning so-called enemy combatants without the protections of the Geneva Conventions, Human Rights Watch (HRW) says. The
guidelines would also enable the Pentagon to legally hold "ghost detainees" who are denied access to the International Committee of
the Red Cross, according to the HRW. In a letter to Rumsfeld, the rights advocacy group said, "Denying the protections of the Geneva Conventions to
persons apprehended in the global war on terror is unsupported as a matter of law, represents a radical deviation from the standards that have traditionally guided U.S.
military operations, and places U.S. service members and civilians detained by enemy forces at greater risk of mistreatment." The new memorandum, now in final draft, is
known as the "Joint Doctrine for Detainee Operations: Joint Publication 3-63", and is dated Mar. 23, 2005. "If the draft memorandum is approved, it will formalise
'enemy combatant' as a class of prisoner that the Bush administration says has no protections under the Geneva Conventions," HRW attorney
John Sifton told IPS. "There are no categories of prisoners unprotected by one or another of the Geneva Convention." An additional concern, he said, is that the draft
memorandum would give the military authority to classify as an enemy combatant anyone whose name appears on a government watchlist. "The proposed watchlist
includes a wide variety of groups from Sikhs to followers of Peru's Shining Path, and potentially hundreds of thousands of people
named Ahmed or Mohamed. This is a huge and radical departure that could further erode the rule of law." The letter to Rumsfeld, signed by HRW Executive
Director Kenneth Roth, says if the Defence Department acts on the new guidelines, "U.S. military personnel may be committing grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions
and placing themselves at risk of prosecution for war crimes." The organisation argues that the U.S. government's decision in January 2002 to "disavow the applicability of
the Geneva Conventions in the global war on terror" has been at the root of alleged detainee abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay. HRW says the new rules "will
send a message to the world that the Geneva Conventions are not law, but mere policies that can be changed according to tastes of a particular government." This in turn
would have "a profound impact on future armed conflicts between states and the soldiers and civilians affected by them, including Americans." They also contain overly
broad criteria for designating as an enemy combatant anyone who appears on a government list that contains common names and aliases shared by tens of thousands
of persons worldwide. The Pentagon document has not yet been publicly released, and is to be submitted to Rumsfeld for approval on Apr. 16. The Defence Department
declined to comment on the reported draft memorandum or the HRW letter to Rumsfeld. Last June, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down two decisions related to the
detention of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In the first case, the justices ruled that detainees had the right to due process and must be allowed to contest their
imprisonment before a "neutral decision-maker". The second case confirmed that U.S. courts have jurisdiction to hear such challenges. The Defence Department then
created special military tribunals to determine which Guantanamo prisoners posed threats to the U.S. These bodies have been criticised
for denying detainees the most basic due process, including attorney-client confidentiality. Little information about those held at Guantanamo has
been released through official government channels. But stories of 60 or more of the prisoners are spelled out in detail in thousands of pages of transcripts filed in U.S.
District Court in Washington, where detainees have filed lawsuits challenging their detentions. Court documents publicised last week are giving dozens of Guantanamo
Lexington High School 2005-2006                                                                                       Guantanamo Bay Affirmative
                                                                                                                                 Pre-camp Work

detainees what the Bush administration had sought to keep from public view: identities and voices. The government is holding about 550 terrorist suspects at
its naval base in Cuba. An additional 214 have been released since the facility opened in January 2002 -- some into the custody of their native governments, others
freed outright. The detainees appeared last year before the three-officer military tribunals which, after quick reviews, confirmed their status
as "enemy combatants" who could be held indefinitely. In the transcripts, one terror suspect asked his U.S. military judge: "Is it
possible to see the evidence in order to refute it?" In another case, Guantanamo prisoner Feroz Ali Abbasi was ejected from his hearing
for repeatedly challenging the legality of his detention. "I have the right to speak," Abbasi insisted in transcripts reviewed by the
Associated Press. "No, you don't," the tribunal president replied. "I don't care about international law ," the tribunal president told Abbasi
just before he was taken from the room. "I don't want to hear the words 'international law' again. We are not concerned with international

finally, The process of detainment will spread, destroying multilateralism and soft power

Judith, Butler, 04, Professor of Rhetoric at Berkeley (“Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence)

My fear is that the indefinite  detainment of prisoners on Guantanamo will become a model for the branding and management of so-called terrorists
in various global sites where no rights of appeal to international rights and to international courts will be presumed. If this extension of
lawless and illegitimate power takes place, we will see the resurgence of a violent and self aggrandizing state sovereignty at the expense of any
commitment to global cooperation that might support and redistribute rights of recognition governing who may be treated according to standards that ought to
govern the treatment of humans. This is a form of sovereignty that seeks to absorb an international coalition, rather than submit to a self limiting practice by
virtue of its international obligations
Lexington High School 2005-2006                                                                                             Guantanamo Bay Affirmative
                                                                                                                                       Pre-camp Work

Contention Two: Advantages

Sub point A – Bio power

This bio political control over the other justifies wholesale slaughter of entire populations and nuclear
Foucault in 78 (Michel Foucault, philosopher, former director at the Francais Institute at Hamberg, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, pg 136-137, Nov. 1978)

                       West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. “Deduction” has tended to be no longer
Since the classical age, the
the major form of power but merely one element among others , working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a
power bent on generating forces making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or
destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-administering
power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the social body to ensure, maintain or develop its life . Yet
wars were never as bloody as the have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such
holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death-and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which is
has so greatly expanded its limits-now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and
multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended;
they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the
name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as mangers of life and survival-of bodies and the race, that so many regimes
have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed . And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has
caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in
fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival . The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to
expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence . The principle
underlying the tactics of battle-that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living-has become the principle that defines the
strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is
indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and
exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, ad the large -scale phenomena of population.

also, It is a moral obligation to protect humyn rights

Sané 93 (Secretary General of Amnesty International)

                                                                      is a struggle between the people and their governments. What is at
The issue is not an argument between human rights organizations and governments; it
stake today is a vision of the world in which all human beings can live in the knowledge that certain basic rights are inviable. It is the
duty of each of us individuals and collectively to see that these rights are always protected .

finally, The people must rise up to defend against all breaches of freedom or be thrown into a world of
Petro, 74 (Law Professor at Wake Forest, Wake Forest Law Review.)

However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway - "I believe in only one thing: liberty." And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume's observation:
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." Thus it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of
no import because there have been of so many other aspects . The road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human
aspiration." Ask Solzhenisyn. Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to
maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.
Lexington High School 2005-2006                                                                                               Guantanamo Bay Affirmative
                                                                                                                                         Pre-camp Work

Sub point B – Soft Power

Lack of soft power creates a perception of hostile hegemony thereby stroking an isolationist public –
legitimacy is the only way to sustain unipolarity
Kori Schake, Director for Defense Strategy, National Security Council, and Klaus Becher, Senior Fellow for European Security, International Institute for
Strategic Studies, August 02 (“How America Should Lead” – Policy Review) lexis
IF THE AMERICAN-LED Century is to become the American-led Centuries, the U.S. needs to foster and promote the sources of
American power: the legitimacy and quality of leadership ensured by America's democratic institutions and rule of law, the dynamism of the global economy,
the innovative juggernaut of the American military, international respect for U.S. analysis and diplomacy, the sparkling generosity of individual Americans and their
charities, the magnetic attraction for immigration that enriches diversity and expands the talent pool, the good sense of the American people, the belief in progress and
harnessing technology, the prospect of more capable webbing together of the instruments of power. All the things that have made the U.S. strong show every likelihood of
making it stronger -- and while America certainly doesn't have all the answers, as a society it is open to finding right answers and correcting its course. The U.S. could
very likely sustain the current American-dominated international order unilaterally, shedding the constraining and frequently aggravating
alliances and institutions. However, that would be a costly way to dominate, and one with which the American public is likely to be
uncomfortable. An international order in which other states did not want U.S. dominion and regulation would be a much more
burdensome and hostile international order -- one much more likely to make American taxpayers feel isolationist, with all the damaging
consequences for American well-being.

and, The end of unipolarity results in multiple nuclear wars, systemic global conflict, and magnification of
all impacts
Niall Ferguson, Professor, History,School of Business, New York University and Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, October 04 [“A world
Without Power” - Foreign Policy] infotrac.
So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age
experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an
altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous—roughly 20 times more—so friction between the world's
disparate “tribes” is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on
supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it.
For more than two decades, globalization—the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital—has raised living standards throughout the world, except
where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war . The reversal of globalization—which a new Dark Age would produce—
would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11
devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business.
Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-
Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis,
unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western
investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the
edges of the waning great powers.   The wealthiest ports of the global economy—from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai—would become the targets
of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while
Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions,
beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens
would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa ,   the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their
deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe
havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne .   If the
United States retreats from global hegemony—its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier—its critics at home and abroad must
not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what
you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity—a global vacuum of power.
Lexington High School 2005-2006                                                                                                                                                                             Guantanamo Bay Affirmative
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       Pre-camp Work

also, Hard Power exercised without soft power obliterates US leadership in numerous ways – domestic
public backlash, overextension of resources, counterbalancing, loss of international coop and acceleration of
nuclear proliferation.

G. John Ikenberry, Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice @ Georgetown University and Transatlantic Fellow @ the German
Marshall Fund of the United States, October 02 (“America’s Imperial Ambition”) lexis
Pitfalls accompany this neoimperial grand strategy, however  . Unchecked U.S. power, shorn of legitimacy and disentangled from the postwar norms and institutions of the international order , will usher in
a more hostile international system, making it far harder to achieve American interests. The secret of the United States' long brilliant run as the
world's leading state was its ability and willingness to exercise power within alliance and multinational frameworks, which made its power and agenda more acceptable

to allies and other key states around the world. This achievement has now been put at risk by the administration's new thinking. The most immediate problem is that the neoimperialist
approach is unsustainable. Going it alone might well succeed in removing Saddam Hussein from power, but it is far less certain that a strategy of counterproliferation, based on American willingness to use
unilateral force to confront dangerous dictators, can work over the long term. An American policy that leaves the U nited States alone to decide which states are threats and how best to deny
them weapons of mass destruction will lead to a diminishment of multilateral mechanisms -- most important of which is the nonproliferation
regime. The Bush administration has elevated the threat of WMD to the top of its security agenda without investing its power or prestige in fostering, monitoring, and enforcing nonproliferation commitments. The tragedy of
September 11 has given the Bush administration the authority and willingness to confront the Iraqs of the world. But that will not be enough when even more complicated cases come

along -- when it is not the use of force that is needed but concerted multilateral action to provide sanctions and inspections. Nor is it certain that a preemptive or preventive
military intervention will go well; it might trigger a domestic political backlash to American-led and military-focused interventionism. America's well-meaning imperial strategy
could undermine the principled multilateral agreements, institutional infrastructure, and cooperative spirit needed for the long-term success of
nonproliferation goals. The specific doctrine of preemptive action poses a related problem: once the United States feels it can take such a course, nothing will stop other countries from doing the same. Does the United
States want this doctrine in the hands of Pakistan, or even China or Russia? After all, it would not require the intervening state to first provide evidence for its actions. The United States argues that to wait until all the evidence is in,
or until authoritative international bodies support action, is to wait too long. Yet that approach is the only basis that the United States can use if it needs to appeal for restraint in the actions of others. Moreover, and
paradoxically, overwhelming American conventional military might, combined with a policy of preemptive strikes, could lead hostile states to accelerate
programs to acquire their only possible deterrent to the United States: WMD. This is another version of the security dilemma, but one made worse by a neoimperial grand
strategy. Another problem follows. The use of force to eliminate WMD capabilities or overturn dangerous regimes is never simple, whether it is pursued unilaterally or by a concert of major states. After the
military intervention is over, the target country has to be put back together. Peacekeeping and state building are inevitably required, as are long-term strategies that
bring the un, the World Bank, and the major powers together to orchestrate aid and other forms of assistance. This is not heroic work, but it is utterly necessary. Peacekeeping troops may be required for many years, even after a new regime is built. Regional conflicts inflamed

                                           . This is the "long tail" of burdens and commitments that comes with every major military action. When these costs and
by outside military intervention must also be calmed

obligations     are added to America's imperial military role, it becomes even more doubtful that the neoimperial strategy can be sustained at home over
the long haul -- the classic problem of imperial overstretch. The United States could keep its military predominance for decades if it is supported by a
growing and increasingly productive economy. But the indirect burdens of cleaning up the political mess in terrorist-prone failed states levy a hidden cost.
Peacekeeping and state building will require coalitions of states and multilateral agencies that can be brought into the process only if the initial decisions about military
intervention are hammered out in consultation with other major states. America's older realist and liberal grand strategies suddenly become relevant again. A third problem with an imperial grand strategy is
that it cannot generate the cooperation needed to solve practical problems at the heart of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. In the fight on terrorism, the
United States needs cooperation from European and Asian countries in intelligence, law enforcement, and logistics. Outside the security sphere, realizing U.S. objectives depends even more on a continuous stream of amicable working relations with major states around the

                                                                                                                                                                             But it is impossible to expect
world. It needs partners for trade liberalization, global financial stabilization, environmental protection, deterring transnational organized crime, managing the rise of China, and a host of other thorny challenges.

would-be     partners to acquiesce to America's self-appointed global security protectorate and then pursue business as usual in all other domains.
The key policy tool for states confronting a unipolar and unilateral America is to withhold cooperation in day-to-day relations with the
United States. One obvious means is trade policy; the European response to the recent American decision to impose tariffs on imported steel is explicable in these terms. This particular struggle concerns specific
trade issues, but it is also a struggle over how Washington exercises power. The United States may be a unipolar military power, but economic and
political power is more evenly distributed across the globe. The major states may not have much leverage in directly restraining American military policy, but they can make the
United States pay a price in other areas. Finally, the neoimperial grand strategy poses a wider problem for the maintenance of American
unipolar power. It steps into the oldest trap of powerful imperial states: self-encirclement. When the most powerful state in the world throws its weight around,
unconstrained by rules or norms of legitimacy, it risks a backlash. Other countries will bridle at an international order in which the United States plays only by its own rules. The proponents of the new
grand strategy have assumed that the United States can single-handedly deploy military power abroad and not suffer untoward consequences; relations will be coarser with friends and allies, they believe, but such are the costs of
leadership.   But history shows that powerful states tend to trigger self-encirclement by their own overestimation of their power.                                                                                                                           Charles V, Louis
XIV, Napoleon, and the leaders of post-Bismarck Germany sought to expand their imperial domains and impose a coercive order on others. Their imperial orders were all brought down when other countries decided they were not prepared to live in a world dominated by an

overweening coercive state. America's imperial goals and modus operandi are much more limited and benign than were those of age-old emperors. But a hard-line imperial grand strategy runs the risk that          history will repeat itself.
Lexington High School 2005-2006                                                                                                 Guantanamo Bay Affirmative
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and, The acceleration of WMD proliferation causes nuclear wars and global escalation

Victor   Utgoff, Deputy fo Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division, Institute for Defense Analysis, 02 (Survival)

Widespread proliferation      is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons and that such shoot-outs will have a
substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped we
are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800’s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear “six-shooters” on
their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even
whole nations.

moreover, the legitimatization of torture destroys our European relations as well as our soft power

James Kitfield, 1/15/05, Staff Writer for the The National Journal, (“Give 'Em Hell, George?”) lexis

"But in an extraordinary series of decisions in 1949,Truman put forward ideas and molded a successful strategy that was neither American nor European in
nature, but rather Western.' That solidarity between America and Europe remains the best recipe for global security today," said Serfaty. "My concern
now is that the United States is no longer in control of events, but rather, events are controlling us. And if the present outreach by the Bush administration to allies in Europe
is spurned, or is unsuccessful, then the issues we face together will worsen, the bad feelings across the Atlantic will grow, and the Western alliance that is already splintering
may never recover."


The question now is whether those moves are mostly stylistic flourishes designed to temporarily mask the hard edges of U.S. foreign policy -- or whether
they are signs of a substantive effort to adjust the Bush Doctrine in the face of demands by allies for more consultations and consensus-building. The answer
could well shape the history of the early 21st century and determine whether the United States reclaims leadership of the industrialized democracies. Either
America will lead the West in a collective effort to confront crises in Iraq, Iran, and elsewhere in the Middle East, and in North Korea -- not to mention
the long-term challenges of terrorism and the proliferation of doomsday weapons; or, a United States determined to address disparate crises with ad hoc
coalitions of the moment will continue to go its own way, unfettered by traditional alliances and suspicious of international legal structures. "If you look at the Bush
administration's actions after the election, I think they've clearly realized that their often- brusque style has been counterproductive, and that by reducing our
attractiveness overseas, it has diminished American soft power," said Joseph Nye, a former dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of
Government and the author of Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. "Given that President Bush has declined invitations to admit any mistakes, however, it's
difficult to know whether his administration is pursuing a more multilateral course at the moment simply because the U.S. military is overextended in
Iraq and they have run out of good options, or whether they are aware of the damage done to America's image and are quietly trying to change course.
That's the million-dollar question." Danielle Pletka is vice president of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, the intellectual home of
influential neoconservatives in the Bush administration, most of whom will remain in the second term. Speculation that Bush's outreach campaign amounts to a substantive
change in foreign-policy direction, she says, is a gross miscalculation of the nature and core beliefs of Bush and his senior advisers. "There has been a change in
atmospherics: The substance of Bush's foreign policy has been expressed more politely, the outreach to other leaders has been enthusiastic, and that's all to the good,"
Pletka said in an interview. "But I have seen zero evidence of a change in the underlying policy . The basic idea that the United States is going
to use its muscle to promote democracy as a long-term solution to Islamic extremism in the Middle East has become so mainstream as to be conventional wisdom
today, and I would call that a resounding victory for neoconservatives." A Controversial Doctrine Certainly, the Bush administration has failed to
win wide acceptance, even among its traditional allies, for the Bush Doctrine. From the very beginning, the post-9/11 Bush Doctrine for fighting the global war
on terror and countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction was based on a bold premise: that American power, unconstrained by traditional
bonds and honed to a domineering edge by a transformed high-tech military, could not merely check or contain, but decisively defeat those threats. In announcing this
doctrine, Bush took aim not just at Al Qaeda, but also at any terrorist organization with global reach. His doctrine also included those nations that sponsored terrorism,
exhibited "rogue" behavior, and pursued weapons of mass destruction. In his 2002 State of the Union address, Bush named three of the worst offenders as part of an "axis of
evil" -- Iraq, Iran, and North Korea -- and then in his 2002 National Security Strategy document, he implied that the United States would be prepared to attack them pre-
emptively, if need be. The Pentagon, meanwhile, continually insisted that any such campaigns would result not from close consultations with traditional alliances such as
NATO, but rather with an ad hoc" coalition of the willing." When all of those controversial premises seemed to coalesce around the Iraq war, the Western
alliance essentially split. In a second term, the Bush administration confronts a choice between trying to recast the doctrine in a way that mends the rift and
wins wider international support, or continuing to fashion a more "go-it-alone" approach that emphasizes American "exceptionalism." Ironically, the Iraq
difficulties may provide Washington and its allies with the chance to undertake a sobering period of reflection, and the opportunity to seek a
middle ground where their interests still intersect. "Despite a lot of happy talk from the Bush administration, I'm pessimistic that they are willing to take concrete steps
to improve our alliances. But even if their mind-set has not changed at all, it's difficult to imagine the next international crisis they would be willing to provoke," said Philip
Gordon, director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution. "The reality of the situation is that the United States military is badly
overstretched, we're facing huge deficits and running out of money, and we have few allies in Iraq," Gordon said. Those difficulties have provided a certain breathing space,
he said, for all sides to contemplate where the Western alliance goes from here. "At some point, our allies are likely to stop fearing our power, and start worrying more about
the weakness of a United States that remains bogged down in Iraq. That would be a sea change in international affairs." To reclaim a middle ground on which a
Lexington High School 2005-2006                                                                                                Guantanamo Bay Affirmative
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united Western alliance can once again stand firmly, some analysts say, the Bush administration needs to consult more closely with traditional allies, and to
show greater deference to international law. That seemed to be the message behind the Bush administration's planned trip to the European Union and to
NATO in February, as well as behind recent declarations in support of the Geneva Conventions against torture . Follow-on initiatives designed
to win international support might include greater U.S. participation in efforts to reform the United Nations, and a long-promised Bush plan for reducing emissions
that contribute to global warming. Re-engagement in the Middle East peace process, meanwhile, could once again cast the United States in the role of
"peacemaker," a position from which it derived significant global legitimacy in the past. "I think the Bush administration underestimated the degree to which the
legitimacy of American power is linked to a fundamental respect for international law," said David Hendrickson, a professor at Colorado College and the co-author of "Iraq
and U.S. Legitimacy" in the November/December 2004 edition of Foreign Affairs magazine. "There were times in the past when we departed from
international law, but they were generally viewed as the exception and not the rule. For the Bush administration to treat international law disdainfully with doctrines like
'pre-emption' and memos seeming to authorize torture not only alarmed our traditional allies , but it diminished us in world opinion." For
their part, allies will need to meet the Bush administration halfway, at least in part by taking seriously U.S. concerns about the volatile mix of rogue states, terrorists, and
weapons of mass destruction. Already, Britain, France, and Germany have taken the lead in negotiations designed to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program,
while Japan and South Korea are closely involved in similar negotiations with North Korea. The next step is for the United States and its allies to fashion coherent
approaches, and agreed-upon packages of carrots and sticks, that can lead to successful conclusions to those negotiations.

and finally, Transatlantic cooperation is essential to prevent bioterrorism attack that are highly probable,
quick timeframe, and as dangerous as nuclear war.

Daniel Hamilton, 6/11/03, Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations @ Johns Hopkins University, (FDCH Congressional Testimony) lexis

Third Priority: Transatlantic Homeland Security Third, we must develop "transatlantic" approaches to homeland security and societal protection. When the United States
was attacked, our allies immediately invoked the North Atlantic Treaty's mutual defense clause, in essence stating that the September 11 attack was an attack on a common
security space - a common "homeland." It is unlikely that a successful effort to strengthen homeland security can be conducted in isolation from
one's allies. The U.S. may be a primary target for Al-Qaeda, but we know it has also planned major operations in Europe.

A terrorist WMD attack on Europe would immediately affect American civilians, American forces, and American interests. If such an attack
involved contagious disease, it could threaten the American homeland itself in a matter of hours. The SARS epidemic, while deadly, is simply a
"mild" portent of what may be to come. Bioterrorism in particular is a first-order strategic threat to the Euro-Atlantic community. A bioterrorist
attack in Europe or North America is more likely and could be as consequential as a nuclear attack, but requires a different set of national and
international responses. Europeans and Americans alike are woefully ill-prepared for such challenges.

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, it has become very clear that controlling borders, operating ports, or managing airports and train stations in the age of
globalization involves a delicate balance of identifying and intercepting weapons and terrorists without excessively hindering trade, legal migration, travel and tourism upon
which European and American prosperity increasingly depends. Efforts to protect the U.S. homeland against cyberattack, for example, can hardly be
conducted in isolation from key allies whose economies and information networks are so intertwined with ours.

Unless there is systematic trans-European and trans-Atlantic coordination in the area of preparedness, each side of the Atlantic is at greater
risk of attack. Uneven "homeland security" coordination and preparedness within Europe renders North America more vulnerable, particularly since North America's
security is organically linked to Europe's vulnerability to terrorist infiltration. Similarly, if U.S. and Canadian efforts render the North American homeland less vulnerable to
terrorist attack, terrorists may target Europe. Just because the Cold War has faded does not mean that Europeans and North Americans are less dependent on one another.

Sub point C – Hard Power

Allied support is critical to global power projection – Unilateralism guts the ability of countries to provide
base and overflight rights

Joseph S. Nye Jr, 7/27/04, Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations at the Kennedy School of Government (Soft Power; The Means to Success in World
Politics) p. 26

Soft balancing was not limited to the UN arena. Outside the UN, diplomacy and peace movements helped transform the global debate from the
sins of Saddam to the threat of American Empire. That made it difficult for allied countries to provide bases and support and thus cut into American
hard power. As noted earlier, the Turkish parliament’s refusal to allow transport of ground troops and Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to allow American use
of air bases that had been available in 1991 are cases in point. Since the global projection of American military force in the future will require
access and overflight rights from other countries, such soft balancing can have real effects on hard power.
Lexington High School 2005-2006                                                                                      Guantanamo Bay Affirmative
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moreover, Base and overflight rights are a critical foundation of US hard power – preponderance cannot be
leveraged without it

Barry R Posen, Professor of Political Science @ MIT, 03 (“Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony” –International Security) Lexis

Command of the commons is the military foundation of U.S. political preeminence. It is the key enabler of the hegemonic foreign
policy that the United States has pursued since the end of the Cold War. The military capabilities required to secure command of the commons are the
U.S. suit. They leverage science technology, and economic resources. They rely on highly trained, highly skilled, and increasingly highly paid military
personnel. On the whole, the U.S. military advantage at sea, in the air, and in space will be very difficult to challenge –let alone overcome. Command is further
secured by the worldwide U.S. base structure and the ability of U.S. diplomacy to leverage other sources of U.S. power to secure additional
bases and overflight rights as needed.

finally, Loss of hard power leads to nuclear war and global conflict

Zalmay Khalizad, Research Analyst at the RAND Institute, Spring 95 [“Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War” – Washington
Quartely) lexis
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to
multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as
an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global
environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second such a                     ,

world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of
regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile
global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a
global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of
power system.
Lexington High School 2005-2006                                             Guantanamo Bay Affirmative
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Thus the plan: We demand that the United States federal government substantially reduce its authority to
detain without charge by placing charges against the detainees of Guantanamo Bay. The detainees will
receive full due processes. We’ll clarify.

(Might need to change)
Lexington High School 2005-2006                                                                                        Guantanamo Bay Affirmative
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Contention Three: Solvency

We solve for our advantages in three separate ways

Productive and disruptive resistance can come from anywhere because we are all object of biopolitical
Slavoj Zizek, 02, Senior Researcher @ Institute for Social Studies @ Ljubljana (“Welcome to the Desert of theReal!”) p 91-

Lexington High School 2005-2006         Guantanamo Bay Affirmative
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Lexington High School 2005-2006                                                        Guantanamo Bay Affirmative
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moreover, By restoring humynity back to Guantanamo, we use democracy against the state, and give
infinite justice back to the other. We preclude political change

Simon, Critchley, 99, Philosophy @ Essex, (“Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity”) 281-283
Lexington High School 2005-2006         Guantanamo Bay Affirmative
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Lexington High School 2005-2006                                                                                             Guantanamo Bay Affirmative
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and, By sticking to its core beliefs, and protesting these atrocities, the U.S. can overcome the mistakes of
Guantanamo Bay and regain its soft power.

Joseph S. Nye Jr, 7/27/04, Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations at the Kennedy School of Government (“U.S. democratic alliances key to restoration of lost
'soft' power” - Reprinted from The Jakarta Post)

Admiration for American values does not mean, of course, that others want to imitate all the ways Americans implement them. While many Europeans       admire
America's devotion to freedom, they prefer policies at home that temper the liberal economic principles of individualism with a robust
welfare state. Despite all the rhetoric about "old" and "new" Europe, at the end of the Cold War opinion surveys showed that two-thirds of Czechs, Poles, Hungarians,
and Bulgarians perceived the U.S. as a good influence on their respective countries, but fewer than a quarter wanted to import American economic models.
Popular culture can often be an important source of "soft" power. Simple items like blue jeans, cola, or Hollywood movies helped produce
favorable outcomes in at least two of the most important American objectives after 1945. One was the democratic reconstruction of
Europe after World War II, and the other was victory in the Cold War. The Marshall Plan and NATO were crucial instruments of economic and military power,
but popular culture reinforced their effect. The dollars invested by the Marshall Plan helped achieve U.S. objectives in reconstructing Europe, but so did the
ideas transmitted by American popular culture.
Today, about two-thirds of the people polled in ten European countries say they admire America for its popular culture and progress in science and technology, but only
a third think the spread of American customs in their country is a good idea. The U.S. doesn't have to make others look like little
Americans, but it does have to live up to its core values in order to use its soft power effectively.
This is why the examples of the prisons at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay have been so costly. It is also why a free press that reports these problems,
congressional hearings that investigate them, and a recent set of Supreme Court decisions that give detainees legal recourse are also so important. America is not
perfect, but as long as it abides by its core values, it can overcome its mistakes and regain its soft power in democratic countries.
For example, America was extraordinarily unpopular at the time of the Vietnam War, yet it recovered its soft power within a decade, and it is
interesting to consider why. Part of the answer may be that when students were marching in the streets protesting, they did not sing the
"Internationale"; they sang "We Shall Overcome." America's democratic values will be the key to success in restoring its soft power.

finally, Now is a key time for the US to regain its soft power by picking up on its moral and judicial duties
through our prevalent democratic system

Joseph S. Nye Jr, Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations at the Kennedy School of Government, 7/29/04, (Can America Regain Its Soft Power After Abu

Even before the Abu Ghraib photos were published, anti-Americanism had been rising around the world. Polls showed that the United States lost some thirty points of
attraction in Europe in 2003, and America’s standing had plummeted in the Islamic world from Morocco to Indonesia. In 2000, nearly three quarters of Indonesians had a
favorable view of the US. By May 2003, that had plummeted to 15 percent. In Jordan and Pakistan, a 2004 poll shows that more people are attracted to Osama bin Laden
than to George Bush. Yet both these countries are on the front line of the battle against Al Qaeda. Clearly, the Bush Administration has squandered America’s soft power.
Skeptics about soft power argue that anti-Americanism is inevitable because of our role as the world’s only military superpower. They regard popularity as ephemeral and
advise us to simply ignore the polls. We are the world’s leader and should do what we determine to be in our national interest. As the big kid on the block, we are bound to
engender envy and resentment as well as admiration. But the ratio of hate to love depends on whether we are seen as a bully or a friend . We were
even more preponderant in the 1940s, but the Marshall Plan helped our soft power. Similarly, the United States was the world’s only superpower in the
1990s, but anti-Americanism never reached the levels that it did after the “new unilateralism” of the second Bush administration.
Can the United States regain its soft power? We have done it before. Anti-Americanism soared during the Vietnam War in the early 1970s, but we
recovered within a decade. Not only did we change our policy in Vietnam, but the emphasis on human rights and freedom in Eastern Europe
by Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan helped to emphasize attractive American values.
More specifically, we will have to deal with the abuses that were exposed at Abu Ghraib. Fortunately, we have begun to do that. Whatever our flaws as an
occupying power, the symbolism of Abu Ghraib did not reduce the United States to the moral equivalent of the tyrant it replaced. Democracy matters. American
abuses were widely published and criticized in our free press for all to see. Congressional hearings have made officials testify in public. And the
American Supreme Court has asserted its independence from the executive branch by recently ruling that detainees at
Guantanamo Bay and in military brigs in the United States must have access to legal representation.
One of the greatest sources of American soft power is the openness of our democratic processes. Even when mistaken policies reduce our
attractiveness, our ability to openly criticize and correct our mistakes makes us attractive to others at a deeper level . Vietnam is a good
example. When protesters overseas were marching in the streets against the Vietnam War, they did not sing “The Internationale”, but rather Martin Luther
King’s “We Shall Overcome.” And that remains the best hope for those of us who believe that the United States can recover its soft power even after
Iraq and Abu Ghraib.
Lexington High School 2005-2006   Guantanamo Bay Affirmative
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Lexington High School 2005-2006                                                                                                Guantanamo Bay Affirmative
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The way to defeat terrorism is by upholding human rights
AFX News, 3/10/05, lexis

MADRID (AFX) - UN chief Kofi Annan    took a veiled swipe at the United States in a speech in which he said some countries were violating human
rights in their fight against terrorism.

International human rights experts 'are unanimous in finding that many measures which states are currently adopting to counter terrorism infringe on
human rights and fundamental freedoms,' he said in the address to a conference on terrorism in Madrid.

Although he did not name any country, many of the attendees took that to be shielded                criticism of US President George W. Bush's administration ,
which came in for frequent criticism from participants during the three-day conference.

The US-led war on Iraq, the curbing of civil liberties under its Patriot Act designed to boost data collection to detect terrorist suspects, and the extra-judicial
detention of hundreds of so-called 'enemy combatants' at the US facility at Guantanamo, Cuba, were all described as counterproductive in
the long term by several speakers.

'Human rights and the rule of law must always be respected.

'As I see it, terrorism is in itself a direct   attack on human rights and the rule of law. If we sacrifice them in our response, we are handing a
victory to the terrorists,' he said.
'Human rights law makes ample provision for strong counter-terrorist action, even in the most exceptional circumstances,' Annan told the audience, which included NATO
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, European Commission President Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, and the presidents of Afghanistan, Algeria, the Dominican
Republic, Pakistan and Portugal. Other top officials present included US Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier and German Foreign
Minister Joschka Fischer.

'Compromising human rights cannot serve the struggle against terrorism. On the contrary, it facilitates achievement of the terrorist's objective
-- by ceding to him the moral high ground, and provoking tension, hatred and mistrust of government among precisely those parts of
the population where he is most likely to find recruits,' Annan said.

'Upholding     human rights is not merely compatible with a successful counter-terrorism strategy. It is an essential element in it.'

and, It is a moral imperative that we must resist falling to the intolerance the government supplies us with.

. Sami A Al-Arian, 2/1/02. [P.H.D.., September. “We Must Resist.”]

Since Sept. 11th our nation has been at war, not just with the ugly face of terrorism, but also with the ugly face of intolerance and bigotry.
We should not sacrifice our freedoms and civil liberties to feel safe. Yet, this is what many politicians and powerful groups want us to submit
to. And we must say NO. We should not surrender to intimidation or fear so we may feel secure. Yet, this is what many politicians and powerful groups
want us to bow to. And we must say NO.

Albany Law Review, Winter 2003 v67 i2 p501(25), The Torture Victim's Protection Act, the Alien Tort Claims Act, and Foucault's archaeology of
knowledge.(Michel Foucault)(Torture: Paradigms, Practices, and Policies), Author: Eric Engle

Recently, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) tried to reduce the United States' obligations under the Convention against Torture. (126)
Though in this particular instance, the court intervened to overturn the BIA's decision, (127) a decision clearly in contravention to the Convention, it may be indicative of a
           the United States gradually begins to accept small or insignificant amounts of torture, it will likely generate
future trend. If
even more enemies. To justify this progression, the United States might try to draw on foreign case law. In looking at the European Court of Human Rights, one
finds cases that arguably support finding exceptions to international law's absolute prohibition of torture. (128)

and, The current system of tribunals is unfairly stacked against the others

Carol D. Leonnig, Staff writer for the Seattle Times, 3/28/05 (Military tribunal ignored evidence on detainee)

Court-ordered tribunals
About 540 foreign nationals are detained at Guantánamo Bay as suspected al-Qaida or Taliban fighters, or associates of terrorist groups. In
response to a landmark Supreme Court ruling in June that allowed the detainees to challenge their imprisonment, the military began holding
new review tribunals last fall.
Lexington High School 2005-2006                                                                                                Guantanamo Bay Affirmative
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During tribunal hearings, a panel of military officers considers public and secret evidence, and the detainee is offered an opportunity to state his case and answer questions.
The panel then decides whether a captive should be designated an enemy combatant and be detained further. A second panel later reviews how dangerous the detainee
would be if released.

According to the Defense Department, 558 tribunal reviews have been held. In the 539 decisions made so far, 506 detainees have been found to be enemy
combatants and have been kept in prison. Thirty-three have been found not to be enemy combatants. Of those, four have been released.

              District Judge Joyce Hens Green ruled that the tribunals are illegal, unfairly stacked against detainees and in violation of
In January, U.S.
the Constitution. The Bush administration has appealed her decision.

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