Suez-Crisis-July-26-december-31-1956-XVI - 0062

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					                       Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company   25

 believe confiscation of company was in itself sufficient reason-for
 military invasion. Some other overt aCt would be necessary before
 we would be justified in adopting such measures. Otherwise our
 entire posture would be compromised. President agreed. (President's
reply to Eden rpt Lima Tedul 17, July 27) 4
      2. In view forthcoming Eden-Pineau meeting on Sunday, we
decided to have Murphy go London arriving there Sunday noon. We
are much concerned at reports from London and Paris re inclination
toward military measures, and fear that unless we can introduce an
element of restraint Eden and Pineau will tend to move much too
rapidly and without really adequate cause for armed intervention.
      3. Our preliminary thinking is along following lines: (a) Egyp-
tian order that foreign technical personnel (such as pilots) must
remain on job under duress of imprisonment may provoke incidents,
including possible stoppage of transit, which would provide better
basis of intervention; (b) action in name of NATO might be more
effective than operation in UN and also more suitable than tripartite
measures; (c) firm and positive position by US, UK, France and other
interested countries is necessary to prevent loss of other Western
assets such as air bases, oil concessions and pipelines.
      4. French and Canadians both now appear eager to support
Israelis with considerable armament. We believe this could be most
dangerous and therefore making every effort have them hold off
deals for Mysteres and F-86's. We are also postponing announce-
ment Operation Stockpile.
      5. President has followed events with keen interest and is
looking forward to your return early Sunday morning. He fully
concurs in our view that we must adopt a firm policy but at same
time not jeopardize our long-term posture by precipitate action.
       See footnote 4, Document 6.

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