India's Energy (in) Security by raahan123


Executive summary
This paper highlights the importance of India’s energy security and the possible repercussions of
Government’s policy paralysis, which is hurting the endeavors of energy firms.

India’s energy security is not attributed and confined to just oil & gas industry, whose role cannot be
denied in India’s overall growth story. The Government has indeed taken steps in the right direction
but now it has become critical for India to introduce policy reforms to secure India’s growing energy
needs. Starting from making the present Production Sharing Contract (PSC) structure more
remunerative for the investors, to rationalizing the taxation regime for the sector, changes are
indispensable. The biggest hurdle currently is the sector’s slow decision-making process. The dwindling
interest of foreign investors and their exodus are big concerns, especially at a time when India needs
them and the technology they possess. Not to forget, the reforms that India needs in the downstream
and midstream sectors and the coordination among various Ministries.

Indian economy is at a crucial juncture. Year 2012 marks the beginning of the 12th five year plan; the
economic scenario does not look very encouraging. Not just the European crisis but the fluctuating
crude price (on which India’s dependence is precariously high at ~80% currently) is increasing the
uncertainties. And though in recent times, crude prices are showing signs of relief, the depreciation of
Indian Rupee vis-à-vis US Dollar is not helping. But again, this also underlines the issue of India’s
growing dependence on energy. Analysts believe that situation will not change much, be it high crude
prices or lower valuation of Indian currency, neither of the problems augurs well for Indian economy.
So, then what are the possible options we have? How do we navigate through the crisis?

Option 1: Reduce imports and solve both the problems. With the population, substantially over one
billion, and growing energy demand this is not a policy solution. Table 1 highlights the precarious
Indian situation.

TABLE 1: Proved Reserve at the end of 2011
Country             Thousand MnTonnes    Thousand Million Barrels    Share of Total (%)

US                  3.7                  30.9                        1.9
Canada              28.2                 175.2                       10.6
Mexico              1.6                  11.4                        0.7
Venezuela           46.3                 296.5                       17.9
Kazakhstan          3.9                  30.0                        1.8

Russia            12.1                     88.2                       5.3
Iran              20.8                     151.2                      9.1
Iraq              19.3                     143.1                      8.7
Kuwait            14.0                     101.5                      6.1
Saudi Arabia      36.5                     265.4                      16.1
Qatar             3.2                      24.7                       1.5
UAE               13.0                     97.8                       5.9
Gabon             0.5                      3.7                        0.2
Libya             6.1                      47.1                       2.9
China             2.0                      14.7                       0.9
Malaysia          0.8                      5.9                        0.4
India             0.8                      5.7                        0.3

(Source: BP Statistical review 2012)

Option 2: Maximize self-sufficiency? This perhaps is one of the more sustainable options. Though India
has the fourth biggest reserves of coal and is the second biggest coal producer, petroleum sector still
continues to play a pre-eminent role in meeting the energy requirements of the country. In fact, 45% of
the total energy needs are met by oil and gas. Though India’s present levels of per capita energy
consumption is extremely low, with economy expected to grow between 7%-9%, energy consumption is
set to increase (see Table 3). Though, other sources of energy, especially coal will remain important
(see table 2), the Petroleum sector is crucial in determining India’s energy security.

TABLE 2: Energy Source Mix (%)
Year       Coal   Oil    Gas   Hydel   Nuclear

2010-11    53     30     14    2       1

2024-25    50     25     20    2       3

(Sources: Planning Commission 2012)
TABLE 3: Per capita Energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent)

World                   1.5

India                   0.4

China                 0.9

North America         6.3

Europe                3.3

Russian Federation    3.4

Rest of the World     0.8

(Source: BP Energy Statistics 2012)

During the second half of the last decade, India’s energy consumption has gone up from 382 million
tonnes of oil equivalent (MTOE) to 525 MTOE. And when we talk about maximizing self-sufficiency, it
includes increasing the exploration activity in the country; bring in more technology and liaison with
mature countries in the oil & gas sector, like Norway. Invite more foreign investments and make the
environment more investor friendly. Needless to mention, for all these India needs – bureaucracy,
polity, tax regime working in tandem to achieve nation’s energy security.

   Bureaucratic and political hurdles : Domestic production stagnated
   Lower indigenous production and exploration: Fizzling NELP
   Energy security vs. national security : Defence hurdles
   International force: Fear of supply disruption
   Gas imports and international negotiation
   Overseas merger & acquisitions: Chinese aggression
   Non-remunerative taxation regime
   New technology for new source of energy – CBM, Shale Gas, Oil Sand, etc.
   Interrelated policy framework for upstream, midstream and downstream

India’s energy demand is growing by about 7% and based on the growth rate, International Energy
Agency (IEA) estimates India may need to invest $800 billion by 2030 for meeting its demand. What
makes this imperative is the fact that India’s annual production is 2.3% of world energy production, but
India’s consumption is 3.3% of the world energy supply. The deficit is estimated to surpass Japan and
Russia by 2030 placing India in the third position in terms of annual energy consumption.

    1. Growing imports with growing economy: Domestic production stagnates

Fact: India’s domestic production has stagnated to around 33-35 MMT and imports have gone up from
120 MMT to 142 MMT between 2007 - 2011. Clearly, domestic production remained flat, probably
because of slow pace of decision-making, bureaucratic hurdles, limited prospectivity, delays in
commissioning of new projects and declining production from existing fields (See Table 4).

TABLE 4: India’s import vs. domestic oil production

           MMT     Domestic    Imports   %imports dependence      (BCM)    Domestic   % Growth
           O I L   34          121       72.0                     G A S    31.7       -1.4

                   34.1        128       73.4                              32.4       2.1
                   33.5        133.6     75.0                              32.8       1.3
                   33.7        137.8     75.6                              47.4       44.6#
                   38          142       73.0                              52.2       9.95

   Cairn-ONGC Rajasthan production started
#KGD-6 gas production starts
(Source: Petroleum Planning & Analysis Cell)
   Delay in approvals to the already discovered fields. Best example is Cairn-ONGC JV in Rajasthan
    Indirectly, the bureaucracy and politics held back the decision on allowing ramp up from Barmer oil
    block, by almost an year. Timely approval for ramp-up in Rajasthan would have reduced oil imports
    and save forex reserves.
   Though the issue has now been resolved but crucial time and money was lost
   Still many of the oil blocks await approvals from DGH/Petroleum Ministry/Other Ministries
   Exploration in many of the pre-NELP and NELP blocks stopped because of hurdles Annexure 1

   PMO principal secretary has formed a group to resolve inter-ministerial issues. Annexure 2
   The inter-ministerial group is focused on petroleum sector. Steps in such direction would surely

   PMO should make sure that the petroleum ministry will expedite the clearance process

    2. Lower indigenous production and exploration: Fizzling NELP
   No significant increase in exploration expenditure in NELP blocks (See Table 5)
   No significant increase in investments seen, despite few big discoveries in some of the NELP blocks
   Under NELP-IX committed investment in the awarded blocks is about US$582.29 million
   So naturally, there is a significant dip between NELP 8 and 9

Table 5: No significant growth in exploration capex
$ Mn              2006-07   2007-08    2008-09   2009-10    2010-11   Total
NELP- I -VIII     1168.53   1625.60    1857.89   1942.05    2293.93   8888.00

(Source: Petroleum Ministry Data, 2012)
   NELP was meant to attract global energy giants but India’s low prospectivity is a deterrent (see
    table 1)
   Experience of global giants in Indian E&P sector: some example
        o       Bureaucratic hurdles in BP’s $7.2 billion investment to pick up stake in RIL’s assets
        o       Vedanta faced 16 months delay for acquiring majority stake in Cairn India
        o       Delays in approvals finally forced ENI to minimize its operation
        o       BHP Billiton NELP blocks have issues with Defence Ministry clearances
   Investors don’t get a smooth exit route: Cairn Energy’s exit was made very difficult
   Production sharing contract is regressive and confusing in nature: no clarity, freedom on gas
   Long process for allowing investors and technology experts, if they want to invest: again many
    examples but BP’s entry was not smooth.
   Arbitrary rules for clearances: It is expected that blocks offered under NELP have all clearances in
    place. However, in middle of exploration phase, various wings of government create hurdles;
    especially defense ministry. Best example is BHP Billiton, who is likely to lose its entire portfolio if
    policy action is further delayed. Annexure 3

   PMO* principal secretary has formed a group to resolve inter-ministerial issues. Annexure 2
   Petroleum Ministry/DGH# should make sure that before the block is offered for NELP** rounds, all
    the negotiations and clearances are in place

   Move towards the Open acreage system
   DGH should complete the national data repository soon to make the open acreage bidding possible
   Change in the PSC. Annexure 4
   Exploring various contract models with a view to minimize monitoring of expenditure of the
    contractor without compromising, firstly, on the hydrocarbons output across time, and secondly, on
    the Government’s take Annexure 4

*PMO: Prime Minister’s Office **NELP: New Exploration Licensing Policy (international bidding rounds of
oil & gas blocks in India) #DGH: Directorate General of Hydrocarbons (Technical advisory wing of
Petroleum Ministry)

India’s endeavor to minimize dependence on imported hydrocarbon is facing hurdles from Defence
Ministry – in the name of NATIONAL SECURITY. There is a growing concern amongst the oil & gas
companies as their operations are getting stalled because of clearances not granted by Defence

Examples: NELP-IX BLOCKS: MoD* in action
   For the two blocks - MB-DWN-2010/1 and MB-OSN-2010/2 – that were offered in NELP-IX, MoD is yet
    to give clearance
   Empowered Committee of Secretaries (ECS) too was helpless as MoD clearance for the blocks has
    not come as yet
   Offshore Defence Advisory Group (ODAG), under the MoD, is restricting any seismic surveys
*MoD: Ministry of Defence

Other case specific example BLOCK: PR-OSN-2004/1 (Cairn India bagged the block under NELP-VI)
   Cairn asked for invoking force majeure
   After a sunk cost of $30 million, now 40% of the block falls in a prohibited zone (as per MoD)
   The block falls near the missile testing range in Sriharikota

   Defence ministry withheld clearances for all 10 blocks operated by BHP
   As per Defence Ministry all 10 blocks are inside Naval Exercise Area
   GVK Group of India is partner of BHP in these blocks

The Blocks in question:
   NELP VII Blocks: KK-DWN-2005/1, MB-DWN-2005/2, MB-DWN-2005/2, MB-DWN-2005/3, MB-DWN-

    2005/4, MB-DWN-2005/5, MB-DWN-2005/7, MB-DWN-2005/9
   NELP VIII Blocks: MB-OSN- 2009/3, MB-OSN- 2009/6 and MB-OSN- 2009/7

   Clearances from MoD were held up for four blocks meant to be offered under NELP-IX
   DRDO says they are in the rocket flight path from the missile test range in Machalipatnam
   RESULT: So much so all the blocks were NOT OFFERED in the NELP-IX round

   In 16 exploration blocks of Eastern offshore, 60 oil and gas discoveries made so far (eight in the
    NEC basin, three in the Mahanadi basin, 47 in the Krishna-Godavari basin and two in the Cauvery
   Twenty-five major E&P companies are operating in the Eastern offshore with an exploration
    commitment of Rs 31,500 crore

   100 major missions of national importance and this work cannot be compromised
   For missiles launch, Andaman is an ideal location
   Machlipatnam (AP) is of strategic importance for setting up a state of the art, long range missile
    launching facility
   DRDO says it has made it clear that it’s not possible to give long notice period on a missile launch
    due to technical complexities and secrecy involved

    Exhibit: 1

   Estimates: Out of 6.40 lakh sq km in Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off eastern coast, 3.75 lakh sq km is
    where DRDO is putting hurdles
   Andaman offshore: Out of 6 lakh sq km (High prospects) DRDO’s restrictions reduced exploration by as much
    as 1.42 lakh sq km
   Due to high prospectivity petroleum companies are more keen for East coast
HISTORY - In 2005, DRDO asked to set up exploitation and extraction equipment at the seabed (remember there
is no technology in the world that would ensure that all exploration facilities could be seated at the seabed)
   DRDO’s "danger corridor" covers virtually the entire East Coast, leaving little scope for carrying out
    exploration activities
   Major international E&P companies such as ENI, NIKO, BHP Billiton, Cairn Energy, British Gas, British
    Petroleum have entered India through liberal Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in NELP (New Exploration
    Licensing Policy), but are now finding it difficult
FINANCES - Estimates show that earnings of about Rs.8.55 lakh crore (at $80/barrel) in next 15-20 years is at
stake. Plus nine new oil & gas fields are being developed in this area with an expenditure of $16,275 million and
likely to generate revenue of Rs.9.69 lakh crores in the next 20 years
   Existing field: Ravva, PY-1, PY-3 and KG-D6 is being continuously bullied from Defence Ministry
   These fields currently produce60.68 MMSCM of gas per day out of India’s present production of 140
    MMSCMD of gas
   These fields have estimated hydrocarbon reserve of 693.12 MMT (recoverable reserves of 337.023 MMT
                                                                                 Exhibit 2

                                                                            INDIA’S TOP CRUDE OIL SUPPLIERS
                                                                                Saudi Arabia: 27 MT
         International force: Fear of supply disruption                        Iran: 19 MT
         Gas imports and diplomatic hurdles                                    Iraq: 15 MT
         Overseas merger & acquisitions                                        Nigeria: 13 MT
                                                                                Kuwait: 12 MT
      CRUDE REALITY India is highly dependent on crude supplies                 UAE: 11.5 MT

      from Middle East and North Africa, which accounts for 60% of              Angola: 9 MT

      supplies to India. And the kind of geopolitical volatility                Venezuela: 7 MT
                                                                                Oman: 5 MT
      witnessed in Middle East and North Africa is a cause for concern
                                                                                Qatar: 5 MT
      for India. Not just constraints from supply but similar upheaval
                                                                                Egypt: 3 MT
      and uncertainty will automatically trigger a drop in crude
                                                                                Malaysia: 2.5 MT
      production resulting in increased crude oil imports and higher
                                                                                Brazil: 2.5 MT
      prices in turn driving inflation in India.
                                                                                Ajarbaizan: 2.2 MT
                                                                                Mexico: 2 MT
                                                                                Russia: 1.6 MT                  8
                                                                                Ecuador: 1.2 MT
                                                                                Libya: 0.9 MT
   Expedite domestic exploration and production
   Lower dependence on Middle East and North Africa
   Look at other supply sources
   Increase the percentage of gas in India’s energy mix

More than 30% of India’s gas demand is still not fulfilled. And situation is getting grimmer as domestic
production has not delivered as per expectations.
   Other problems include delayed/failed negotiations for international pipelines (IPI: Iran-Pakistan-
    India pipeline)
   Problems in sourcing long term LNG (except Qatar and little bit from Australia, there is limited
    contract for India)
   Competition from China, Japan and South Korea is weighing heavy on India’s aspirations.
   China, Japan and South Korea have smoother decision making process compared to India.
   Diplomatic and bureaucratic failures in Qatar and even IPI have defeated India’s energy needs
   Even price issues delayed TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) pipeline
   Limited LNG import infrastructure in the country and concentrated only in western India

Goldman Sachs study shows increase of $10/barrel can lower the GDP growth by 0.4%. Also higher
oil prices result in outgo of forex reserves impacting India’s trade deficit.

   Petroleum ministry’s “International Cooperation” wing should be strengthened
   At the time of Mani Shankar Aiyar’s tenure as minister, a special wing focused just on international
    opportunities was created. It should be revived (under an IFS officer)
   REGULATED domestic gas prices acts as a major deterrent.

India’s overall hydrocarbon (Oil & Gas) reserves are limited and it will not able to support future
needs. The only option, apart from diversifying import sourcing countries, is to look for assets in oil &
gas rich countries.

   Petroleum ministry’s “International Cooperation” wing should be strengthened
   At the time of Mani Shankar Aiyar’s tenure as minister, a special wing focused just on international

              opportunities was created. It should be revived (under an IFS officer)
             Create a sovereign fund or consolidated war chest for acquiring assets overseas
             Promote public private partnership for overseas M&A
          Exhibit 3

  SOVEREIGN FUND FOR ENERGY: Push For Energy Security
         Group of Ministers (GoM) already in place to discuss creation of sovereign wealth fund for energy security
         GoM looking for possibility of creation of a $10 billion sovereign wealth fund
         GoM may consider budget allocation of Rs 4,500 crore as a first tranche towards the fund
  Options Being Considered
  Option 1 - Create sovereign fund with budgetary allocation
  Option 2 - Use forex reserves to create sovereign fund
  Option 3 - Use part of surplus cash reserves lying with large PSUs
  The Global Benchmark
  -Norway: $ 550 bn
  -Saudi Arabia: $ 450 bn
  -Singapore: $ 400 bn
  -China: $ 400 bn -Qatar: $ 60 bn
  -Malaysia: $ 40 bn

          Exhibit 4

          2005: OVL lost out on acquiring 45% in the giant Akpo oilfield in Angola vs. China’s CNOOC (for $2.268
          2009: OVL lost out to Sinopec, that acquired Swiss oil exploration firm Addax Petroleum for $7.2 bn 2009:
           CNPC-CNOOC outbid ONGC for 75% stake in YPF, the Argentine unit of Repsol, Spain ($13-14 billion)
          2011:OVL lost bid to buy Exxon Mobil’s 25% stake at a deep-sea oil block in Angola (Bid $2.1-2.2 billion) vs.
           Chinese and Korean
          2010: ONGC lost out in Algerian oilfield to a consortium led by a Chinese oil firm
          2010: OVL lost bid for Halfaya oilfield in Iraq to CNPC and Petronas (remuneration five times higher) 2009:
           OVL lost the Zubair oil field in the first Iraqi round

          Any government can collect revenue from Petroleum sector by various instruments and in most of the
          cases government share of economic rent comes primarily through production-based or profit-based
          instruments. In India, it is a hybrid system. It is a system where the petroleum companies contribute to

government coffers through royalty payment and also through profit petroleum.

                    ONSHORE          SHALLOW WATERS                 DEEPWATER

Crude               12.5%            10%                            5-10%*
Natural Gas         10%              10%                            5-10%*

*Royalty on deepwater production is 5% for the first seven years and 10% thereafter

(Source: Petroleum Ministry, 2012) Income tax:
Domestic Companies                                Foreign Companies

30% +surcharge* 5% on tax + 3% education cess     40% + surcharge* 2% on tax + 3% education cess
*Surcharge is applicable when income is more than Rs.1 cr

(Source: Petroleum Ministry, 2012)

Taxing times
   Cess increased by Rs.2000/tonne to Rs 4,500
   Service related to oil and gas production brought under service tax net

Thankfully the proposal for windfall tax for the upstream companies, suggested by former petroleum
secretary and now planning commission member B.K.Chaturvedi, did not materialize. Otherwise, it
would have been untimely death for the upstream sector. Nonetheless government in Budget 2012 still
implemented the hike in cess for upstream companies from Rs 2,500 a tonne to Rs 4,500. Though India
was never seen as an investment destination for oil and gas sector but the discoveries in KG-D6 (for
gas) and Barmer block (for oil) revived the investment hopes. But then, the higher cess on crude
production, bringing upstream activities under service tax and taking away tax holiday on gas
production certainly are not going to negatively impact the investment sentiments. Exploration is a
high-risk activity and it needs sufficient incentive to attract investments.

   Income tax should be levied on all E&P companies uniformly (not separate for foreign firms)
   Service tax on E&P services may continue (move towards GST) but the cess on crude should be

    India’s present form of PSC regime has attracted lot of criticism, especially from CAG in its audit of
     private PSCs. CAG suggested royalty based contracts
    Countries like Chile, Ecuador, Norway, Peru, Kazakhstan and Thailand have implemented royalty
     based regimes
    However, seeing India’s need for more investment in the sector the present form of profit sharing
     under PSC should not be tinkered
    Allow tax benefit uniformly on LNG imports (presently LNG meant for power sector is exempted)

    After the traditional form of oil and natural gas, the other form that has taken some shape in India
     is CBM
    DGH is working on data and policy framework for auctioning shale gas assets
    National program on gas hydrate is also being conducted with US companies
    Coal blocks for Coal to Liquid has been allocated to Tata and JSPL in Orissa

    Insufficient oilfield technology and services
    Problems with pipeline infrastructure

Non-commercialization of discovery: Inadequate E&P infrastructure
    Lower investment in the past has resulted in inadequate E&P infrastructure in India
    India’s gas pipeline density (per sq. km) is one of the lowest
    Lower pipeline density leading to lower share of natural gas in the overall energy mix (10% vs.
     global average of 24%)
    Production of oil and gas remained stagnant (Table 4)
    Limited participation from foreign players in NELP rounds
    Inadequate infrastructure leading to non-commercialization of discoveries
    Out of 60 discoveries in nine NELP rounds since 1999, only two have entered production phase
    Shortage of oil rigs too has played spoilsport

Foreign firms participation in NELP
NELP-VII          NELP-VIII         NELP-IX
21                10                08


   NELP has provision for charging market discovered price for gas
   However, operators have to follow the government determined price
   Even under regulation: No uniformity in pricing of domestic gas

   Let the market decide the gas prices
   Expedite the national gas grid program (as announced in the Budget) to enhance infrastructure
   The natural gas infrastructure in the country needs an overhaul
   Promote more CITY GAS DISTRIBUTION projects and allow market-driven pricing
   More LNG terminals, especially in the East Coast, need to be promoted

Though hydrocarbon will remain one of the key sources for India’s energy security, policy makers,
however, can’t ignore the other sources – viz coal, hydro power, nuclear, and solar. In fact, coal is
going to play a significant role in India’s energy security. Not just as a big source of fuel (50%), but also
because India has huge reserves of coal. Of course, within hydrocarbon sector prospect of shale gas
and natural gas needs to be identified as soon as possible. As far as the present form of allocation and
contracts of oil & gas blocks are concerned, India needs lot of changes. It should be appreciated that
Rangarajan committee is looking at overhauling the present format of PSC. One big move that India
needs to make is the shift from annual auctioning of oil & gas blocks under NELP to open acreage. For
open acreage, DGH needs to finalize the national data repository, so that companies can visit the
always open data rooms and can bid whenever they want. This will keep the competition alive and also
allow speedy exploration program in the country. DGH/Government also needs to finalise the terms for
shale gas block bidding, so that India can take advantage of the development in the rest of the world.
On regulation front, government needs to stop regulating gas prices and let the market decide the
prices. This will make the market more competitive and more remunerative for the investors. Also this
will give the much needed impetus to the gas retail sector in the country, which ultimately has the
potential to lower the dependence on imports of liquid fuel.      Focus also needs to be given to the PSU
oil companies, who for all these years have contributed to the growth of Energy security of the
country. Overall, India’s energy sector needs a concerted coordination between the departments, and
more public-private partnership will do the trick. We should also ensure that foreign companies, such
as ENI and mining major BHP Billiton, having deep pockets should get the right platform to drill deep
for ensuring India’s energy security.


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