The Ties that Bind min
Christopher Koliba, 2010
University of Vermont
Koliba, Meek and Zia, 2010, p.97)
Figure 2.1 Nodes and
Exchanges of Resources,
Execution of Administrative
“Rules” of governance
• Interdependence between organizations.
Governance is broader than government,
covering non-state actors…
• Continuing interactions between network
members, caused by the need to exchange
resources and negotiate shared purposes.
• Game-like interactions, rooted in trust and
regulated by rules of the game negotiated and
agreed by network participants (Rhodes,1997).
Ostrom’s differentiation of rule types:
(a) operational rules that govern day-to-day
activities of appropriators,
(b) collective choice rules concerning overall
policies for governing common pool resources
and how those policies are made, and
(c) constitutional choice rules that establish who
is eligible to determine collective choice rules.
(as described in Stone and Ostrower, 2007,
Levels of rules:
• Meta – Rules governing the creation of rules…
Social Exchange Theory
• Any organization is dependent upon other organizations for resources.
• In order to achieve their goals, the organizations have to exchange
• Although decision-making within the organization is constrained by other
organizations, the dominant coalition retains some discretion. The
appreciative system of the dominant coalition influences which
relationships are seen as a problem and which resources will be sought.
• The dominant coalition employs strategies within known rules of the game
to regulate the process of exchange.
• Variations in the degree of discretion are a product of the goals and the
relative power potential of interacting organizations. This relative power
potential is a product of the resources of each organization, of the rules of
the game and of the process of exchange between organizations. (Rhodes
1981; 98-99; 199; 78-79).” Rhodes, 2007, P.1245
Koliba, Meek and Zia, 2010, p.100)
Table 4.1: Range of Combinations of Resource Exchanges
Resources Provided by Actor B
Financial Natural Physical Human Social Political Cultural Knowledge
Provided by Social
Actor A Political
• Figure 4.2 Koliba, Meek and Zia, 2010,
Formality of ties
A formal social structure is defined as: “one in
which the social positions and the relationships
among [social actors] have been explicitly
specified and are defined independently of the
personal characteristics of the participants
occupying these positions” (Scott, 1987, p.17).
Strength of ties
Administrative Authority and Power
Table 4.2 Koliba, Meek and Zia,
Vector of Tie Social Power Direction of Dynamic of Compliance Organizational
Power Authority Structure
No ties Competition Authority Normative Market
Vertical ties Command & Authority Coercive Hierarchy
Horizontal ties Collaboration & Authority Normative Collaborative
Diagonal ties Concession & Authority Remuneration Mixed
• Competition has been observed ecologically as,
“the struggle among organisms, both of the same
and of different species for food, space, and
other requirements for existence” (Webster,
1989, p. 300).
• Competition between social actors is defined as
the: “rivalry between two or more persons or
groups for an object desired in common, usually
resulting in a victor and a loser or losers, not
necessary involving the destruction of the other”
• Have you found evidence of competition in
the case studies analyzed thus far?
Command & Control
Principal – Agent Theory
Principal A Preference P Agent X?
or or or
Can Principal B Secure Preference Q From Agent Y?
or or or
Principal C Preference R Agent Z?
Nature of the Principal-Agent
• A principal commissions an agent to act on the
principal’s behalf. In general, the agent’s interests do
not entirely coincide with those of the principal; the
principal does not have complete control over the
agent; the principal only has partial information about
the agent’s behavior. The agency relationship consists
in the reliance of a principal upon the agent with an
agenda of his own. The agency problem is the
difficulty, in all but the simplest such relationships, of
ensuring that the principals is faithfully served and that
the agent is fairly compensated (Donahue, 1989, p.38).
• Transaction Cost
The Rules of Cooperative Behavior
• What are they?
• Group exercise: Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Person X Person Y Outcome
0 1 Y wins (1 pt)
0 0 X and Y tie (.5
1 1 Neither X nor Y
wins (0 pts @)
Gray’s 3 phase collaborative process:
• Problem setting
• Direction setting
What are the rules governing effective
• Setting ground rules– see pages 75-76 of Gray
• Enforcing ground rules…
• Structures matter…
Figure 4.4: Degrees of Collaboration (Source: Frey et al., 2006)
•Cooperation Integration and Formalization
Good management is the art of making
problems so interesting and their solutions so
constructive that everyone wants to get to
work and deal with them.
Table 8.1: The Convergence of PA Paradigms into Governance Network Administration
Dominant Administrative Structure Central Administrative Dynamics
Public bureaucracies Command & control
New Public Management Public bureaucracies or private firms
Concession & compromise
Collaborative Public Partnerships with private firms, non- Collaboration & cooperation;
Management profits and citizens Concession & compromise
Command & control;
Mixed-form governance networks Concession & compromise;
Collaboration & cooperation;
Classical PA contributions
• Vertical authority may persist within the
organizational culture of individual network
• Vertical authority may persist at the network-
New Public Management
• A strong focus on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of
• A strong focus on ideas and techniques that have proven their value in the
• A strong focus on the use of privatization and contracting out of
governmental services, or (parts of) governmental bodies to improve
effectiveness and efficiency.
• A strong focus on the creation or use of markets or semi-markets
mechanisms, or at least on increasing competition in service provision and
realizing public policy.
• A strong interest in the use of performance indicators or other
mechanisms to specify
• the desired output of the privatized or automised part of the government
or service that has been contracted out (Klijn & Snellen, 2009, 33).
New PM contributions to Network
• The role of market forces and competition
within governance networks needs to be
• Interest in monitoring network performance
is a critical feature of sound network
Collaborative Public Management
• “A concept that describes the process of
facilitating and operating in
multiorganizational arrangements to solve
problems that cannot be solved, or solved
easily, by single organizations. Collaboration is
a purposive relationship designed to solve a
problem by creating or discovering a solution
within a given set of constraints…” (Agranoff
and McGurie, 2003, p.4).
Vertical Collaboration Activities Horizontal Collaborative Activities
Information seeking Policymaking and strategy making
• General funding of programs and projects • Gain policymaking assistance
• New funding of programs and projects • Engage in formal partnerships
• Engage in joint policymaking
Interpretation of standards and rules • Consolidate policy effort
General program guidance Resource exchange
• Seek financial resources
Technical assistance • Employ joint financial incentives
• Contracted planning and implementation
• Regulatory relief, flexibility or waiver Project-based work
• Statutory relief or flexibility • Partnership for a particular project
• Change in policy • Seek technical resources
• Funding innovation for program
• Model program involvement
• Performance-based discretion
Source: Agranoff and McGuire, 2003, p.70-71
Governance Network Administration
• From the interdependence perspective, network
administration is aimed at, “coordinating strategies of
actors with different goals and preferences with regard
to a certain problem or policy measure within an
existing network of inter-organizational relations”
• Network administration may also be seen as promoting
the mutual adjustment of the behaviour of actors with
diverse objectives and ambitions with regard to
tackling problems within a given framework of
interorganizational relationships” (Kickert and
Koopenjan, 1997, p.10, 44).
The complex nature of network
conflict (O’Leary and Bingham, 2007):
• There are multiple members
• Members bring both different and common
• Network organizations have different cultures
• Network organizations have different methods of
• Members have different stakeholder groups and
• Members of different degrees of power
• There are often multiple issues
• There are multiple forums for decision-making
• Networks are both interorganizational and
• There are a variety of governance structures
available to networks
• Networks may encounter conflict with the
Table 8.4 Network Administration Coordinating Strategies
Governance Network PA Paradigm
Administration Class- NPM CPM GNM
Strategy Characteristics ical PA
Oversight; Use of command and control authorities to gain compliance.
Mandating Employed in most classical hierarchical arrangements and X X
Providing Resources Provision of one or more forms of capital resources as inputs
into the network. X X X X
Negotiation and Engaging in processes of mutual adjustment and agreements
Bargaining ultimately leading to common acceptance of parameters for
X X X
resource exchange and pooling and other forms of coordinated
Facilitation Use of coordinating strategies to bring actors together, ensure
the flow of information and joint actions between actors.
X X X
Usually relies on incentives and inherent agreements on
common norms and standards.
Participatory Use of administrative authority to ensure the participation of
Governance / Civic selected interests or citizens-at-large. Relies on models of X X
Engagement deliberative and consensus seeking processes.
Brokering; Boundary The development and use of social capital to bridge boundaries,
Spanning establish new ties.
Systems Thinking The development of situational awareness of the complex
systems dynamics that are unfolding within governance X
Characteristics of Negotiations
• Sensitivity to early interactions: the beginning of
negotiations set the tone for future interactions.
• Irreversibility: Sometimes negotiators “walk
through doors that lock behind them.”
• Threshold effects: small incremental moves
resulting in large changes in the situation.
• Feedback loops: Established patterns of
interactions among actors readily become self-
reinforcing (Watkins, 1999, p.255).
• emphasize the possibility of leadership as
facilitation rather than the giving of orders, and
authority as accountable expertise rather than as
chain of command. Ultimately, working within
such a perspective, we should be able to ground
administrative legitimacy in accountability that
not only is exercised in the privacy of the
individual conscience or in the internal process of
a particular agency, but also tangibly enacted in
substantive collaboration with affected others,
including members of the general public (Stivers,
• Participatory governance includes a number of strategies
within quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial administrative
tools employed by public administrators to leverage greater
citizen control and involvement.
– Quasi-legislative processes… include deliberative democracy, e-
democracy, public conversations, participatory budgeting,
citizen juries, study circles, collaborative policy making, and
other forms of deliberation and dialogue among groups of
stakeholders or citizens.
– Quasi-judicial processes include alternative dispute resolution
such as mediation, facilitation, early neutral assessment, and
arbitration [and include] … minitrials, summary jury trials, fact
finding...” (Bingham, Nabatchi and O'Leary, 2005, p.547, 552)
“Brokers are able to make new connections across
[organizations] and communities of practice,
enable coordination.” He goes on to add that, “if
they are good brokers [their efforts lead to]
opening new possibilities for meaning (Wenger,
Table 8.7 Multi Social Scale Approaches to Decision-Making
(adapted from Koopenjan and Klijn, 2004, p.44)
Level Nature of Decision-Making Central Insights Useful Theories
The individual (central) decision Rationality, incrementalism,
Limitation of information
maker assesses alternatives on the and mixed scanning (Simon,
Individual processing capacity: ‘bounded
basis of his own objectives and with 1957; Lindblom, 1959;
as complete information as possible. Etzioni, 1967)
Social psychology of groups
Decisions are made in groups, where Group processes influence
(Janis, 1982); Community of
Group the group process influences course information provisions, value
practice theory (Wenger,
and outcome. judgments and interpretations.
Organizational filters, intra-
Organizations make decisions in model (Allison, 1970);
and attention structures
Organization relative autonomy. The structure and Garbage can model (Cohen
influence information processes
function of the organization matters. et al., 1972); Community of
and the decisions based upon
practice theory (Wenger,
Policy stream model
Decisions between mutually Subjective perceptions, power
(Kingdon, 1984); Complexity
dependent organizations are taken in relations, dynamics and
theory (Koppenjan and Klijn,
Inter-Organizational different configurations of vertical and coincidence influence
2004); Policy implementation
horizontal settings in a highly information and decision
(Pressman and Wildavsky,
‘disjointed’ nature. making.
Table 8.8 Group Decision-Making Process
Group Processes Consultative Roles Deliberative Roles
Consensus Non All deliberative.
None All deliberative: with majority opinion
Voting holding sway.
Those outside the sub-set may provide Sub-set of the group makes the decision.
Decisions made by a sub-set of
input into the decision.
Group members may provide input into Single member (or non-member)
a decision to be made by the individual possesses authority to make decision.
Single decision-maker in the decider.
All consultative. Authority to make the decision falls to some
Group provides input into an other person or CoP.
Issue or decision