Federalism Disadvantage by W3uXqSq

VIEWS: 26 PAGES: 26

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                                         Federalism Disadvantage

               Table of Contents
Topic                                        page
Negative Case                                2-14
Overview                                     2
Uniqueness Options                           2
Link Options                                 3
Internal Link Options                        5
Impact Options                               7
AT: No Threshold                             11
AT: Federalism Leads to Secession            11
AT: Emigration Solves Ethnic Conflicts       11
AT: No Spillover – Single Decision Key       12
AT: Democracy/Federalism bad                 13

Affirmative Answers                          15-26
Uniqueness Attacks                           15
Link Attacks                                 16
Federalism – No Slippery Slope               17
Federalism Not Modeled                       18
Strong Government is Critical                20
Federalism Bad – Economy                     21
Federalism Bad – Environment                 21
Federalism Bad – Ethnic Conflict             22
Federalism Bad – Localism/Secession          23
Federalism Bad: Russian example              25




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Overview:
The affirmative plan has the federal government act in an area where the states traditionally act. This signals that our
system of federalism – where the states are granted broad authority – is not working. Other nations, who are
considering whether or not to establish or lock in a federalist system, look at the United States to see how it is working
here. When they see us backing off of it then they will be less committed to it. Federalist structures are good because
they defuse ethnic conflicts and calls for secession around the world that could lead to horrible wars and conflicts.


I. Uniqueness Options

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New York Times January 2009
[http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30federal.html?_r=1] (accessed 6/26/12)

The Obama administration seems to be open to a movement known as “progressive federalism,” in which governors
and activist state attorneys general have been trying to lead the way on environmental initiatives, consumer protection
and other issues, several constitutional experts say. A recent decision by President Obama that could open the way for
California and other states to set their own limits on greenhouse gases from cars and trucks represents a shift in the
delicate and often acrimonious relationship between the federal government and the states, legal experts say, possibly
signaling a new view of federalism. “I think it’s quite significant,” said Samuel Issacharoff, a professor of
constitutional law at New York University law school. “It shows the Obama administration’s more benign view of
government intervention,” Professor Issacharoff said, and “may indicate a spirit of cooperative federalism” in which
Washington will look to the states for new ideas and even a measure of guidance.
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Bruce Katz, Vice President Metropolitan Program, Brookings, 2012, “Remaking Federalism to Remake the American
Economy,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/02/16-federalism-katz (accessed 6/26/12)

On the programmatic front, President Obama has worked to enable states and localities to tackle structural challenges
in integrated ways. The administration’s Sustainable Communities Initiative—a partnership among the Department of
Transportation, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA)— has, for example, given cities and metropolitan areas resources, information and tools to make sharper
connections between housing, transportation and environmental resources. On regulatory matters, President Obama
has used federal actions to set a “floor rather than a ceiling” on a range of consumer protection, clean energy and
environmental matters. This has left room for the states to innovate on auto emission standards in California, for
example, and to seek redress for mortgage abuses through the States Attorney Generals. To date, President Obama’s
approach to economic restructuring has tended toward the more permissive, enabling end of the federalist spectrum.




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Dinan, Wake Forest University, July 2009
[John, The State of American Federalism, PUBLIUS, Vol 39 Issue 3, July 2009, p. 369-407] (accessed 6/26/12)

As for the continuing consequences for federalism of the 2008 election, this will depend to a great degree on how
President Obama handles situations where his policy preferences are in tension with state prerogatives. On a number of
issues, there will be little conflict between Obama’s policy preferences and state interests, as was the case with his
support for state experimentation with auto emission standards and CHIP coverage in excess of federal standards. As
long as these sorts of issues remain atop the policy agenda, a Democratic president and congress can be counted on to
permit state discretion, just as a Republican president and congress were willing to permit states to exercise discretion
in ways consistent with their policy interests (such as limiting or providing alternative delivery of Medicaid services).
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Forbes Magazine June 29, 2009
[http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/29/supreme-court-roberts-business-washington-discrimination.html] (accessed
6/26/12)

Ricci and Cuomo fall within the federalist doctrine of the Roberts court, which accords great respect to the powers of
the states, and state courts, to enforce laws to protect their citizens. They also represent the collapse of hopes of many
in the business community that the court would expand the concept of federal pre-emption of state laws.

II. Link Options

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Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy ‘2K
         (Spring, p. 565-6)
The new term actually gives us a new perspective on the enumerated powers. No power granted to Congress - think of
the Commerce Clause - may be so construed as to preempt entirely the states' power over the people. I employ the
phrase "power over the people" for two reasons. First, this phrase emphasizes that the reserved powers of the states
must somehow reflect general sovereign powers, which are powers over people. The "States qua States" cases preserve
the states' power over some people - those who are state employees. A state that may resist commandeering so as to
retain only the power to exist in name possesses no meaningful powers. Second, I refer to the states' power over
"people" because the Court has overlooked "the people" in its arguments over the Tenth Amendment, and "the
people's" rights are also reserved. The Tenth Amendment expresses a triangular relationship among the federal
government, state governments, and the people. Although the context for Tenth Amendment litigation has involved
disputes between states and the federal government, residual state authority also inures to the benefit of "the people."
In any contest between Congress and the states, a decision that favors expanded federal powers necessarily disfavors
the states and the people. When Justice Souter wrote in Alden that "the commerce power is no longer thought to be
circumscribed," he meant, implicitly, that the people have reserved no powers over commerce or anything affecting it




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Scheppach, Executive Director, National Governors Association 06 [Raymond C. Ph.D. Executive Director, National
Governors Association. Will the 2008 election improve state-federal relations?; The next president faces a crucial
choice in how he'll get along - not just with foreign governments - but with leaders at home in the 50 states.
Stateline.org. July 9 Lexis AD 07/05/09] (accessed 6/26/12)

Federalism scholars often point to two recent periods in which federalism was defined very differently. Between 1980
and 1996, there was "cooperative" federalism, an era ushered in by the Reagan administration and marked by a
genuine partnership between states and the federal government. President Reagan engaged in discussions and
negotiations with the nation's governors over a huge swap proposed for domestic programs in which the federal
government would take responsibility for all Medicaid and states would take responsibility for transportation and other
domestic issues. Although this dialogue did not lead to any major legislative changes, both sides embraced a real
federal-state partnership. Cooperative federalism continued through the early years of the Clinton administration,
which saw passage of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act in 1995, and welfare reform in 1996. Both the Republicans
in Congress and the Democratic president worked cooperatively with governors to enact these two bills. Welfare
reform not only turned an individual entitlement program into a block grant, but it also gave states substantial authority
to tailor the program to the needs of their citizens. From the mid-1990s through the present, we have been in a period
of "coercive federalism," where the federal government more often just tells the states what to do. It does not ask for
advice or enter into serious negotiation with the states.
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Bruce Katz, Vice President Metropolitan Program, Brookings, 2012, “Remaking Federalism to Remake the American
Economy,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/02/16-federalism-katz (accessed 6/26/12)

Our federal republic diffuses power among different layers of government and across disparate sectors of society.
States are the key constitutional partners, because they have broad powers over such market-shaping policy areas as
infrastructure, innovation, energy, education and skills training.
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Darien Shanske, Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Winter 2012, Virginia Tax Review HOW LESS
CAN BE MORE: USING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX TO STABILIZE STATE AND LOCAL FINANCE, p. 423

Yet there are still deeper issues to be considered. First, the federal financing subsidy undermines truly competitive
federalism because the central government is putting its thumb on the scale in favor of certain activities - specifically,
borrowing. Furthermore, this subsidy allows sub-national governments to avoid internalizing the full cost of their
borrowing because the borrowing is subsidized by the national government, and so this subsidy is particularly suspect.




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___________________________________________________________________________
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Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy ‘2K (Spring, p. 565-6)

The new term actually gives us a new perspective on the enumerated powers. No power granted to Congress - think of
the Commerce Clause - may be so construed as to preempt entirely the states' power over the people. I employ the
phrase "power over the people" for two reasons. First, this phrase emphasizes that the reserved powers of the states
must somehow reflect general sovereign powers, which are powers over people. The "States qua States" cases preserve
the states' power over some people - those who are state employees. A state that may resist commandeering so as to
retain only the power to exist in name possesses no meaningful powers. Second, I refer to the states' power over
"people" because the Court has overlooked "the people" in its arguments over the Tenth Amendment, and "the
people's" rights are also reserved. The Tenth Amendment expresses a triangular relationship among the federal
government, state governments, and the people. Although the context for Tenth Amendment litigation has involved
disputes between states and the federal government, residual state authority also inures to the benefit of "the people."
In any contest between Congress and the states, a decision that favors expanded federal powers necessarily disfavors
the states and the people. When Justice Souter wrote in Alden that "the commerce power is no longer thought to be
circumscribed," he meant, implicitly, that the people have reserved no powers over commerce or anything affecting it.

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Darien Shanske, Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Winter 2012, Virginia Tax Review HOW LESS
CAN BE MORE: USING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX TO STABILIZE STATE AND LOCAL FINANCE, p. 423

Yet there are still deeper issues to be considered. First, the federal financing subsidy undermines truly competitive
federalism because the central government is putting its thumb on the scale in favor of certain activities - specifically,
borrowing. Furthermore, this subsidy allows sub-national governments to avoid internalizing the full cost of their
borrowing because the borrowing is subsidized by the national government, and so this subsidy is particularly suspect.

III. Internal Link Options

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John Yoo, law professor, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, 1997, p. 1352.

It is important to note that Justice Kennedy did not differentiate between laws that regulated states qua states and those
that regulated private parties in areas that might be thought to lie within state power. Following Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion, Justice Kennedy's concurrence treated the exercise of any federal power as a diminution
of the power of the states and hence a reduction of state sovereignty




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Calebresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law ‘95
[Stephen, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1983, Yale, “Reflections on
United States v. Lopez: "A GOVERNMENT OF LIMITED AND ENUMERATED POWERS": IN DEFENSE OF
UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ,” 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, Michigan Law Review, December, 1995, p. 759-60]

At the same time, U.S.-style constitutional federalism has become the order of the day in an extraordinarily large
number of very important countries, some of which once might have been thought of as pure nation-states. Thus, the
Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Austria, the Russian Federation, Spain, India, and Nigeria all have
decentralized power by adopting constitutions that are significantly more federalist than the ones they replaced. Many
other nations that had been influenced long ago by American federalism have chosen to retain and formalize their
federal structures. Thus, the federalist constitutions of Australia, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, for example,
all are basically alive and well today. As one surveys the world in 1995, American-style federalism of some kind or
another is everywhere triumphant, while the forces of nationalism, although still dangerous, seem to be contained or in
retreat. The few remaining highly centralized democratic nation-states like Great Britain, France, and Italy all face
serious secessionist or devolutionary crises. Other highly centralized nation-states, like China, also seem ripe for a
federalist, as well as a democratic, change. Even many existing federal and confederal entities seem to face serious
pressure to devolve power further than they have done so far: thus, Russia, Spain, Canada, and Belgium all have very
serious devolutionary or secessionist movements of some kind. Indeed, secessionist pressure has been so great that
some federal structures recently have collapsed under its weight, as has happened in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and
the former Soviet Union. All of this still could be threatened, of course, by a resurgence of nationalism in Russia or
elsewhere, but the long-term antinationalist trend seems fairly secure. There is no serious intellectual support for
nationalism anywhere in the world today, whereas everywhere people seem interested in exploring new transnational
and devolutionary federal forms.

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Mallat PhD Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law ‘03
        (Chilibi, PhD – U London, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Winter, p. 21

Laurence Tribe, in Constitutional Choices, summarized what he calls the underlying political ideas of the American
system into a list of six categories: representative republicanism, federalism, separation of powers, equality before the
law, individual autonomy and procedural fairness. America has shared many of these traits with other democracies for
a long time, but two constitutional features stand out on a world level as typically American -- federalism and the
Supreme Court. The American people deserve credit for both inventions which brought new dimensions to democracy
and the rule of law for the rest of the planet. Perhaps America does not know it, but the world has been a consistently
better place wherever her two home-grown intellectual products have found anchor.




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Simeon, professor, University of Toronto, 2009
[Richard, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, March 2009, vol 39 p.245]

The potential constitutional agenda for designing or reforming federations is a long one—the number, size, and
composition of the constituent units; the division of powers; symmetry or asymmetry between the constituent units;
fiscal arrangements; regional representation at the centre, the mechanisms of intergovernmental relations; and the like
The agenda will vary between reform of existing federations and the design of new ones. In the former, it is likely to
focus on only a few central questions; in new federations all are on the table (though some issues may be left aside for
future attention). In the former, existing states and provinces are likely to play a central role through intergovernmental
mechanisms; in the latter the range of players is likely to be broader. In the following sections, I outline the issues that
may come on the agenda of constitutional politics in federal systems. All of these issues cause serious political
conflicts. This is especially the case in situations in which federalism is being considered as an option in developing
and transitional systems that have experienced deep-seated conflict (Hart 2001). The underlying, and very difficult
question is whether relatively successful federal models in established democratic federations such as Germany,
Australia, Canada, the United States or Switzerland are feasible or workable in other circumstances.


IV. Impact Options

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James Gardner, Professor of Law, State University of New York, GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL, June 2003, p.
1007-8

"The accumulation of all powers . . . in the same hands," wrote Madison "may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny." To protect liberty, then, power must be divided. Federalism serves this guiding principle of American
constitutional design by parceling out government powers among different levels of government. Federalism, it must
be borne in mind, is a creation of the national Constitution, not state constitutions. It is not the result of a fortuitous
series of agreements reached one by one by the separate peoples of the original thirteen states; on the contrary,
federalism represents the deliberate decision of a single national polity to divide governmental power for the purpose
of protecting the liberty of all. Federalism protects liberty by giving the state and national levels of government
substantial powers sufficient to allow each to monitor and check the abuses of the other. n14 As with the horizontal
separation of powers that divides governmental power into legislative, executive, and judicial branches, each level of
government in this vertically fragmented system is given the power and incentive to struggle against the other:
"Ambition," as Madison put it, "must be made to counteract ambition." nThe result is a compound federal republic in
which power is deeply fragmented, reducing as far as possible by structural means the likelihood that a tyrannical
measure of power can be accumulated in a single set of hands: In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the
people, is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division
of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered
by the people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each, subdivided
among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different
governments will control each other; at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.


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Calabresi, Assistant Prof – Northwestern U., Michigan Law Review ‘95
       (Steven G., Assistant Prof – Northwestern U., Michigan Law Review, p. 762)

Small state federalism is a big part of what keeps the peace in countries like the United States and Switzerland. It is a
big part of the reason why we do not have a Bosnia or a Northern Ireland or a Basque country or a Chechnya or a
Corsica or a Quebec problem. American federalism in the end is not a trivial matter or a quaint historical anachronism.
American-style federalism is a thriving and vital institutional arrangement - partly planned by the Framers, partly the
accident of history - and it prevents violence and war. It prevents religious warfare, it prevents secessionist warfare,
and it prevents racial warfare. It is part of the reason why democratic majoritarianism in the United States has not
produced violence or secession for 130 years, unlike the situation for example, in England, France, Germany, Russia,
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, or Spain. There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that is more important or that
has done more to promote peace, prosperity, and freedom than the federal structure of that great document. There is
nothing in the U.S. Constitution that should absorb more completely the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Carment, Carleton University, 2009
[David, The Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict, International Studies Review, Jan 2009, p. 64]

Ethnic conflicts have caused enormous human suffering and produced devastating impacts on political order and
economic growth around the globe, so a shift in interest to processes of internationalization is understandable. This
type of strife affects neighboring states, poses a threat to both regional and global security and stability, and emerges as
a key concern for policymakers. Indeed, ethnic conflict has been elevated to the domain of high politics, a realm
previously occupied by international crisis, ideological conflict, and interstate war.

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Emory International Law Review 2007
[Emory International Law Review Spring 2007 21:321]

A theory of federalism's potential to prevent ethnic conflict has also developed in recent years. Ethnic-or identity-based
federalism, as an idea, holds a certain appeal in the post-colonial context. As a system of government, it attempts to
resolve one of the problems that imperialist, colonial history created by granting autonomy to groups whose culture
and identity have long been suppressed in the "unity" of modern nation-states. A nation-state adopting an ethnic-based
federal system gives the "nations" within its borders some degree of self-governance as regions or states in a federal
system. Ethnic federalism is one method by which a country may attempt to manage the interests of multiple ethnic
groups within its borders and prevent violent ethnic conflict or attempts at secession.




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Calebresi Assistant Prof – Northwestern U., Michigan Law Review ‘95
[Stephen, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1983, Yale, “Reflections on
United States v. Lopez: "A GOVERNMENT OF LIMITED AND ENUMERATED POWERS": IN DEFENSE OF
UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ,” 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, Michigan Law Review, December, 1995, p. 771-2

A third related advantage is that international federations can undertake a host of governmental activities in which
there are significant economies of scale. This is one reason why federations can provide better for the common defense
than can their constituent parts. Intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines,
and B-2 stealth bombers tend to be expensive. Economies of scale make it cheaper for fifty states to produce one set of
these items than it would be for fifty states to try to produce fifty sets. This is true even without factoring in the North
American regional tensions that would be created if this continent had to endure the presence of fifty nuclear mini-
powers, assuming that each small state could afford to own at least one Hiroshima-sized nuclear bomb. Important
governmental economies of scale obtain in other areas, as well, however, going well beyond national defense. For
example, there are important economies of scale to the governmental provision of space programs, scientific and
biomedical research programs, the creation of transportation infrastructure, and even the running of some kinds of
income and wealth redistribution programs
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Ernest Young, Law Professor, University of Texas, TEXAS LAW REVIEW, November 2004, pp. 59-60

More fundamentally, our federalism has always been justified as a bulwark against tyranny. Madison extolled
federalism as part of the "double security" that the new Constitution would provide for the people; just as the three
branches of the central government were to check one another, the state governments would check the center. As Lynn
Baker and I have discussed elsewhere, Madison's discussion in Federalist 46 emphasized worst case scenarios, in
which the states would have to oppose the national government militarily, and this emphasis has sometimes distracted
critics of federalism from more prosaic - but also more relevant - mechanisms by which federalism protects liberty.
Even in the Founding period, however, state autonomy buttressed individual liberty in other, less dramatic ways.
States may oppose national policies not only militarily but politically, and in so doing they may serve as critical
rallying points for more widespread popular opposition. Madison and Jefferson, out of national power during the
Federalist administration of John Adams, worked through the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures to oppose the Alien
and Sedition Acts. The states thus, as Professor Friedman puts it, "serve as an independent means of calling forth the
voice of the people." More recently, "Some state and local governments have proven themselves formidable lobbyists
and indefatigable litigants" on issues such as affirmative action, benefits for the disabled, and environmental policy

.




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Dalton Cross, Law Professor, Texas, HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW 2000 (HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW &
PUBLIC POLICY, Fall, p. 165)

Government can be made more responsive to the popular will by keeping the policy-making unit closer to the people.
As a matter of simple arithmetic, the smaller the policy-making unit, the fewer the number of people who will be
discontented by any policy choice. Individual freedom means leaving policy choices with the individual; if a choice
must be removed from the individual by government, individual freedom is served to the extent that it is removed no
farther than necessary.

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Micklavzina, Canes International, 2009
[Matthew, Using Federalism to Defuse Conflict, Canes International, University of Miami International Studies
Journal, 2.26.2009 http://www.canesinternational.org/?p=491] (accessed 6/26/12)

Much of the literature on alleviating ethnic tension and avoiding ethnic conflict suggests that federal states are best
able to handle the competing demands of ethnic autonomy with the advantages that come from larger territory.
Federalism is a broad term with many variations on the theme of constitutionally divided competencies in government.
As such, this type of government is very flexible and matches the diversity of ethnic conflicts and tensions that exist;
political opportunities are very broad.The strength of federalism lies in two major areas: it divides power and it is
culturally realistic. Unlike power sharing, federalism essentially constitutes a “divided-power” form of rule;where
power sharing brings ethnic groups to the same table and forces them to associate with quotas and other political tools,
power dividing through federalism attempts to create political subunits within a state that more closely match the
cultural units inside. Federalism “occupies a middle ground on a continuum running from separation or independence
for each group at one pole, and complete assimilation or the submergence of difference at the other.” Federalism
becomes the ultimate compromise between secessionist extremists and extremists on the other end who want a unitary
state with no recognition of cultural or ethnic diversity within a state.




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V. Answers to affirmative responses
AT: No Threshold
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Lebow, Associate Dir Tennessee Law Review ’97 (Cynthia C., Associate Dir – RAND, U. Tennessee Law Review,
Spring, n162

If Congress may do this, presumably it has the power to pre-empt state-court rules of civil procedure and judicial
review in classes of cases found to affect commerce. This would be the type of gradual encroachment hypothesized by
Professor Tribe: "Of course, no one expects Congress to obliterate the states, at least in one fell swoop. If there is any
danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions in the prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit
by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell."

AT: Federalism Leads to Secession
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Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University
of Maryland, PEACE AND CONFLICT, 2006 p.25

Expectations that autonomy agreements will set the stage for all-out wars for independence are often expressed, but
rarely realized. More commonly, most parties to conflict accept and work within the framework for autonomy while a
few spoilers may continue to fight in the hope of forcing greater concessions. The greatest risk in autonomy
agreements is not the eventual breakup of the state, rather it is that spoilers may block full implementation, thereby
dragging out the conflict and wasting resources that might otherwise be used to strengthen autonomous institutions.
The pendulum can swing the other way as well – when the state employs stall tactics or otherwise causes delays during
the implementation phase, more militant factions of the communal group may continue or resume violence, arguing
that the state has not made good on its promises.

AT: Emigration Solves Ethnic Conflicts
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Muller, professor history, Catholic University, 2008 [Jerry, Muller Replies, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2008
http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/is_ethnic_conflict_inevitable_parting_ways_over_nationalism_and_separatism/]
(accessed 6/26/12)

Second, the authors' emigration-as-safety-valve strategy ignores the fact that in contrast to the earlier era of
globalization (from the late nineteenth century through World War I), the current era of globalization is characterized
by governments better able and more inclined to police their borders and, hence, by the comparatively limited mobility
of people across national borders. Moreover, discontent in the relatively wealthy states of the West with some recent
streams of immigration has already led to pressures for governments to exercise greater control over the movement of
people from particular regions. It is far from clear that emigration from the Maghreb to France, for example, will be
allowed to continue indefinitely.



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___________________________________________________________________________
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Muller, professor history, Catholic University, 2008
[Jerry, Muller Replies, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2008
http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/is_ethnic_conflict_inevitable_parting_ways_over_nationalism_and_separatism/]
(accessed 6/26/12)

For a historian, the authors' assertion that "international economics increasingly dwarfs politics" -- like so much of
their response to my essay -- is eerily resonant of a British bestseller of a century ago. In 1910, Norman Angell
published The Great Illusion, which explained on economic grounds why an extended war between great powers was
impossible under the contemporary economic conditions. His argument was logically compelling but wrong. In 1933,
Angell published a new edition of his book, in which he suggested that nations could not enrich themselves by
conquering their neighbors and that war was therefore futile. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, but his message
seems not to have reached all the relevant parties. I fear that the predictions of Rosecrance and Stein about the future of
ethnic nationalism will meet the same fate.

AT: No Spillover – Single Decision Key
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Stephen G. Calabresi, professor of law @ Northwestern, Mar. 2001, The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 574 Annals 24

When the Supreme Court decides a big federalism case like Lopez, it does a lot more than simply resolve the
immediate case and issue at hand. In some fundamental sense, it sets up a symbol for the American people of the
importance that is attached to a constitutional value or norm. Symbolism is terribly important in constitutions and in
constitutional case law. Symbols help citizens organize their beliefs, reinforce core values, and provide a rallying point
for those who believe in them, thus reducing the costs of organization. When powerful symbols issue from the
Supreme Court of the United States, those symbols help to set the national agenda, and they affect the flow of our
politics. Lopez, for example, caused devolution and federalism concerns to become more prominent in Congress than
they otherwise might have been. This may well have played into the last Congress’s decision to devolve part of the
federal welfare entitlement to the states.
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Michael S. Greve, John G. Searle Scholar, American Enterprise Institute 2001. “Federalism Values and Foreign
Relations,”Chicago Journal of International Law Fall, 2001

Domestic federalism may set precedents or provide competitive models that can be scaled internationally. For
example, successful and highly efficient state competition for corporate chartering 6 demonstrates why international
agreements on corporate chartering should probably take the form of reciprocal recognition of domestic charters rather
than harmonizing standards. For another example, successful federalist regulation of internet privacy and consumer
marketing information here in the United States might well show that appropriate choice-of-law and contractual rules
are preferable to an international regulatory "privacy" cartel.



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AT: Democracy/Federalism bad

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
David Broder, Washington Post, June 24, 2001, “Lessons On Freedom.”

Even more persistent were the questions about the role the United States would play, under this new administration, in
supporting democratic movements around the world. It is sobering to be reminded how often, during the long decades
of the Cold War, this country backed (and in some cases, created) undemocratic regimes, simply because we thought
military rulers and other autocrats were more reliable allies against communism. The week of the Salzburg Seminar
coincided with President Bush's first tour of Europe. He was a target of jokes and ridicule for many of the fellows as
the week began. But the coverage of his meetings and, especially, his major address in Poland on his vision of Europe's
future and America's role in it, earned him grudging respect, even though it remains uncertain how high a priority
human rights and promotion of democracy will have in the Bush foreign policy. Another great lesson for an American
reporter is that the struggle to maintain the legitimacy of representative government in the eyes of the public is a
worldwide battle. Election turnouts are dropping in almost all the established democracies, so much so that seminar
participants seriously discussed the advisability of compulsory voting, before most of them rejected it as smacking too
much of authoritarian regimes. Political parties -- which most of us have regarded as essential agents of democracy --
are in decline everywhere. They are viewed by more and more of the national publics as being tied to special interests
or locked in increasingly irrelevant or petty rivalries -- anything but effective instruments for tackling current
challenges. One large but unresolved question throughout the week: Can you organize and sustain representative
government without strong parties? The single most impressive visitor to the seminar was Vaira Vike-Freiberga, the
president of Latvia, a woman of Thatcherite determination when it comes to pressing for her country's admission to
NATO, but a democrat who has gone through exile four times in her quest for freedom. She is a member of no party,
chosen unanimously by a parliament of eight parties, and bolstered by her popular support. But how many such leaders
are there? Meantime, even as democracy is tested everywhere from Venezuela to Romania to the Philippines, a new
and perhaps tougher accountability examination awaits in the supranational organizations. The European Union has
operated so far with a strong council, where each nation has a veto, and a weak parliament, with majority rule. But
with its membership seemingly certain to expand, the age-old dilemma of democracy -- majority rule vs. minority and
individual rights -- is bound to come to the fore. The principle of federalism will be vital to its success. And, once
again, the United States has important lessons to teach. But only if we can keep democracy strong and vital in our own
country.




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                                                                                                                Federalism DA

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, October 1995, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990’s,”
http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/dia95_01.html, (accessed 6/27/12)

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the
former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs
intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes
and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to
proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and
unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions
for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY - The experience of
this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one
another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do
not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not
sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another.
Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable
climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize
to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal
obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret.
Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law,
democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s,
http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm (accessed 6/27/12)

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and
decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The
flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common
cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem,
appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or
aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular
sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers
important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another.
They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments
do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency.
Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or
to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long
run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they
must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments.




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                                               Affirmative Answers
Uniqueness Attacks
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Robert Jay Dilgerm, Senior Specialist in American National Government at the Congressional Research Service,
January 10, 2011, “Federalism Issues in Surface Transportation Policy: Past and Present,”
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40431.pdf

American federalism, which shapes the roles, responsibilities, and interactions among and between the federal
government, the states, and local governments, is continuously evolving, adapting to changes in American society and
American political institutions. The nature of federalism relationships in surface transportation policy has also evolved
over time, with the federal government’s role becoming increasingly influential, especially since the Federal-Aid to
Highway Act of 1956 which authorized the interstate highway system. In recent years, state and local government
officials, through their public interest groups (especially the National Governors Association, National Conference of
State Legislatures, National Association of Counties, National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, and
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials) have lobbied for increased federal assistance for
surface transportation grants and increased flexibility in the use of those funds.
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Peter Harkness, founder and publisher emeritus of GOVERNING, now serves as a co-writer of the Potomac Chronicle
column, Governing, January 2012, “What Brand of Federalism is Next?”,
http://www.governing.com/columns/potomac-chronicle/gov-col-what-brand-of-federalism-is-next.html (accessed
6/27/12)

In this atmosphere, the Obama administration has pursued a very unique mixture of collaborative and coercive
strategies in dealing with states and localities, making it hard to define just what kind of federalism we’re seeing. The
health-care, education and financial regulation reform bills, the climate change proposal and the massive financial
stimulus bill all represented an aggressive use of federal power, some of it unprecedented and some pre-empting state
regulations.




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Link Attacks

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Erwin Chemerinsky, law professor, DUKE, BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW, Summer 2004, pp. 1316-7

Article VI of the Constitution contains the Supremacy Clause, which provides that the Constitution, and laws and
treaties made pursuant to it, are the supreme law of the land. When a state law conflicts with federal law, the federal
law controls and the state law bows under the principle of federal supremacy. As the Supreme Court declared: "Under
the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, any state law, however clearly within a State's
acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield." In Gade v. National Solid Waste
Management Association, the Court summarized the tests for preemption: Pre-emption may be either expressed or
implied, and is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly
contained in its structure and purpose. Absent explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at least two types of
implied pre-emption: field pre-emption, where the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it, and conflict pre-emption, where compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Bradley Bobertz, Environmental Law Professor, PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW, 2003, pp. 88-9

Let us begin by demystifying the word "federalism." Federalism, itself, simply refers to any system of power-sharing
in which authority is distributed between what is typically a larger political unit, such as the United States, and what
are typically smaller political subdivisions, such as the states, which are a part of, but at least partially independent
from, the larger body. The European Union and its constituent nations are an example of federalism, as were the
Articles of Confederation that the Constitution supplanted. Federalism, in other words, is a structural notion that has no
meaning independent of its particularizing details. Under any given system of federalism, the larger political body can
have a great deal more power than its political subunits, as is the case in some European nations, or the subunits can
wield comparatively more power than the larger political unit, as was the case under the Confederate Constitution
during the American Civil War. In normal usage, then, the term "federalism" is agnostic as to how power is distributed.
"Federalists" of the founding generation favored a strong national government in relation to the states, while the
modern Federalist Society appears to favor the diminishment of national power vis-a-vis the states




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                                                                                                         Federalism DA
Federalism – No Slippery Slope

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Robert F. Nagel, Law Professor, University of Colorado, March 2001, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, p. 53

In what appears to be an ambitious campaign to enhance the role of the states in the federal system, the Supreme Court
has recently issued a series of rulings that limit the power of the national government. Some of these decisions, which
set boundaries to Congress's power to regulate commerce and to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
establish areas that are subject (at least in theory) only to state regulation. Others protect the autonomy of state
governments by restricting congressional authority to expose state governments to suit in either state or federal courts
and to "commandeer" state institutions for national regulatory purposes. Taken together, these decisions seem to reflect
a judgment held by a slight majority of the justices that the dramatic expansion of the national government during the
twentieth century has put in jeopardy fundamental principles of constitutional structure.

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Justice Breyer, 5-15-2000, “United States v. Morrison et al.,” Dissenting Opinion,
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=000&invol=99-5
(accessed 6/27/12)

Since judges cannot change the world, the "defect" means that, within the bounds of the rational, Congress, not the
courts, must remain primarily responsible for striking the appropriate state/federal balance. Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 552 (1985); ante, at 19-24 (Souter, J., dissenting);
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. , (2000) (slip op., at 2) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Framers designed
important structural safeguards to ensure that, when Congress legislates, "the normal operation of the legislative
process itself would adequately defend state interests from undue infringement"); see also Kramer, Putting the Politics
Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215 (2000) (focusing on role of political process
and political parties in protecting state interests). Congress is institutionally motivated to do so. Its Members represent
state and local district interests. They consider the views of state and local officials when they legislate, and they have
even developed formal procedures to ensure that such consideration takes place. See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U. S. C.). Moreover, Congress often can
better reflect state concerns for autonomy in the details of sophisticated statutory schemes than can the judiciary, which
cannot easily gather the relevant facts and which must apply more general legal rules and categories. See, e.g., 42 U. S.
C. §7543(b) (Clean Air Act); 33 U. S. C. §1251 et seq. (Clean Water Act); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.
S. 144, 167-168 (1992) (collecting other examples of "cooperative federalism"). Not surprisingly, the bulk of
American law is still state law, and overwhelmingly so.




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___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Ilya Somin, Law Clerk for Judge Jerry E. Smith, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; Ph.D. Candidate,
Department of Government, Harvard University; J.D., Yale Law School, 2001; M.A., Harvard University, 2002
(GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL, January, p. 485)

The problem of transparency that Justice O'Connor detected in the case of federal commandeering is much more
serious in the case of federal subsidies to state governments. State officials faced with commandeering statutes and
other unfunded mandates from the federal government have an obvious incentive to publicize their complaints and use
their lobbying power to mobilize opposition. Indeed, such opposition has resulted in numerous state government
initiated lawsuits to curtail such mandates and even in the passage of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, a
federal statute intended to curb them. Although this activity is unlikely to completely negate deeply rooted voter
ignorance, it may at the very least diminish it to some degree.
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Ernest Young, Law Prof @ Texas, May 2003, Texas Law Review,

One of the privileges of being a junior faculty member is that senior colleagues often feel obligated to read one's rough
drafts. On many occasions when I have written about federalism - from a stance considerably more sympathetic to the
States than Judge Noonan's - my colleagues have responded with the following comment: "Relax. The States retain
vast reserves of autonomy and authority over any number of important areas. It will be a long time, if ever, before the
national government can expand its authority far enough to really endanger the federal balance. Don't make it sound
like you think the sky is falling."

Federalism Not Modeled

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Alfred Stepan, Professor of Government at Oxford and Columbia, 1999, Journal of Democracy
10.4 “Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model” 1999. Project Muse, pp. 20-1

Third, as a result of the federal bargain that created the United States, each of the states was accorded the same
constitutional competences. U.S. federalism is thus considered to be constitutionally symmetrical. By contrast,
asymmetrical arrangements that grant different competencies and group-specific rights to some states, which are not
now part of the U.S. model of federalism, are seen as incompatible with the principled equality of the states and with
equality of citizens' rights in the post-segregation era. Yet although these three points are a reasonably accurate
depiction of the political structures and normative values associated with U.S. federalism, most democratic countries
that have adopted federal systems have chosen not to follow the U.S. model. Indeed, American-style federalism
embodies some values that would be very inappropriate for many democratizing countries, especially multinational
polities. To explain what I mean by this, let me review each of these three points in turn.




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___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Alfred Stepan, Professor of Government at Oxford and Columbia, 1999, Journal of Democracy 10.4, 19-34, “Federalism and
Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model,” muse

One of the most influential political scientists to write about federalism in the last half-century, the late William H. Riker, stresses
three factors present in the U.S. form of federalism that he claims to be true for federalism in general. 1 First, Riker assumes that
every longstanding federation, democratic or not, is the result of a bargain whereby previously sovereign polities agree to give up
part of their sovereignty in order to pool their resources to increase their collective security and to achieve other goals, including
economic ones. I call this type of federalism coming-together federalism. For Riker, it is the only type of federalism in the world.
Second, Riker and many other U.S. scholars assume that one of the goals of federalism is to protect individual rights against
encroachments on the part of the central government (or even against the "tyranny of the majority") by a number of institutional
devices, such as a bicameral legislature in which one house is elected on the basis of population, while in the other house the
subunits are represented equally. In addition, many competences are permanently granted to the subunits instead of to the center. If
we can call all of the citizens in the polity taken as a whole the demos, we may say that these devices, although democratic, are
"demosconstraining." Third, as a result of the federal bargain that created the United States, each of the states was accorded the
same constitutional competences. U.S. federalism is thus considered to be constitutionally symmetrical. By contrast, asymmetrical
arrangements that grant different competencies and group-specific rights to some states, which are not now part of the U.S. model
of federalism, are seen as incompatible with the principled equality of the states and with equality of citizens' rights in the post-
segregation era. Yet although these three points are a reasonably accurate depiction of the political structures and normative values
associated with U.S. federalism, most democratic countries that have adopted federal systems have chosen not to follow the U.S.
model. Indeed, American-style federalism embodies some values that would be very inappropriate for [End Page 21] many
democratizing countries, especially multinational polities.

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Andrew Moravcsik, Professor of Politics at Princeton University. Newsweek 2005, 1/31/05. “Dream On, America.”

Today. When nations write a new constitution, as dozens have in the past two decades, they seldom look to the American model.
When the soviets withdrew from Central Europe, U.S. constitutional experts rushed in. They got a polite hearing, and were sent
home. Jiri Pehe, adviser to former president Vaclav Havel, recalls the Czechs' firm decision to adopt a European-style
parliamentary system with strict limits on campaigning. "For Europeans, money talks too much in American democracy. It's very
prone to certain kinds of corruption, or at least influence from powerful lobbies," he says. "Europeans would not want to follow
that route." They also sought to limit the dominance of television, unlike in American campaigns where, Pehe says, "TV debates
and photogenic looks govern election victories." So it is elsewhere. After American planes and bombs freed the country, Kosovo
opted for a European constitution. Drafting a post-apartheid constitution, South Africa rejected American-style federalism in favor
of a German model, which leaders deemed appropriate for the social-welfare state they hoped to construct. Now fledgling African
democracies look to South Africa as their inspiration, says John Stremlau, a former U.S. State Department official who currently
heads the international relations department at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg: "We can't rely on the
Americans." The new democracies are looking for a constitution written in modern times and reflecting their progressive concerns
about racial and social equality, he explains. "To borrow Lincoln's phrase, South Africa is now Africa's 'last great hope'." Much in
American law and society troubles the world these days. Nearly all countries reject the United States' right to bear arms as a quirky
and dangerous anachronism. They abhor the death penalty and demand broader privacy protections. Above all, once most foreign
systems reach a reasonable level of affluence, they follow the Europeans in treating the provision of adequate social welfare is a
basic right. All this, says Bruce Ackerman at Yale University Law School, contributes to the growing sense that American law,
once the world standard, has become "provincial." The United States' refusal to apply the Geneva Conventions to certain terrorist
suspects, to ratify global human-rights treaties such as the innocuous Convention on the Rights of the Child or to endorse the
International Criminal Court (coupled with the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo) only reinforces the conviction that
America's Constitution and legal system are out of step with the rest of the world.



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Strong Government is Critical
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
James Gardner, Professor of Law, State University of New York, GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL, June 2003, p.
1010-11

Thus, although federalism contemplates the division of power to protect "liberty," I shall treat this conventional use of the word as
a kind of synecdoche that names only one part of the broader notion of achieving, or creating the conditions that enable citizens to
achieve, a substantively desirable way of life. Under this broad definition of liberty, the national government of the United States
contributes to and protects the liberty of American citizens in at least three distinct ways: (1) by using its affirmative powers in
pursuit of the good, (2) by practicing self-restraint, and (3) by restraining state governments from impairing the ability of citizens
to achieve the good. First and foremost, the national government protects liberty by using its affirmatively granted powers for the
good of the citizenry. This conception of governmental power is broad enough to embrace any conception of the state, from a
minimalist, night-watchman state to the contemporary European-style social welfare state. Whatever version of the state a society
chooses to adopt, a government must exist and must possess certain powers that enable the polity collectively to achieve the goals
that it sets for itself. Under the U.S. Constitution, the national government has many powers that fit this description. The
commerce power, spending power, and various military powers have all been used many times to achieve through direct action
by the national government objectives that the American polity has collectively decided will make it better off. The commerce
power alone, for example, has given us environmental regulation; social, health, and welfare programs; most of the administrative
state; and even much of our civil rights legislation, to name only a few of its principal uses.
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
James Gardner, Professor of Law, State University of New York, GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL, June 2003, p.
1008

The multiplicity of power centers in the American scheme can create the impression that the system is chaotic--a pure,
Hobbesian war of all against all without any purpose other than the accumulation of power. This is not the case--or at
least need not be the case. In the Framers' view, what unifies the dispersion of governmental power is the people, for
the entire system is designed to assure as far as possible that their wishes be done and their liberties left intact. “The
Federal and State Governments," Madison observes, "are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people,
instituted with different powers, and designated for different purposes." Federalism is thus more than a passive
institutionalization of social conflict; it is a dynamic system that is designed to be manipulated by the people to
produce results they desire. Hamilton put this point clearly: In a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be
said to be entirely the masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power; the General
Government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments; and these will have the
same disposition towards the General Government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will
infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other, as the instrument
of redress.




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                                                                                                         Federalism DA
Federalism Bad Impact Turn – Economy

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Sudarshan Gooptu, Economist with the Debt and International Finance Division in the International Economics
Department of the World Bank. 2005. The World Bank Report: East Asia Decentralizes. “Making Local Government
Work.” http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPDECEN/Resources/dc-full-report.pdf (accessed 6/27/12)

International experience since the early 1980s, especially in Latin America, suggests that without appropriate
accountability and transparency mechanisms, decentralization can encourage dangerous opportunistic behavior by state
and local authorities. If left unchecked, such opportunism could undermine macroeconomic stability. The most vivid
manifestation of this phenomenon is the softening of subnational budget constraints (Rodden 2000a; World Bank
2002). Avoiding this risk depends on the ability of the central government to prevent subnational authorities from
passing their liabilities to higher-level governments.12 This, in turn, requires institutional mechanisms to discipline
borrowing by state and local governments.

Federalism Bad Impact Turn – Environment

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Tarlock, Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law, 95 [A. Dan, Md. L. Rev. 1315, Summer, p. Lexis]

Federalism doctrines may undermine biodiversity for both ethical and practical reasons because they unduly check
national authority. Biodiversity protection is more the province of national elites than local citizens and runs counter to
the often expressed preferences for lower-level rather than higher-level political control for the use of private property
claims to block environmental regulation. The fact that biodiversity is frustrated by lower-level resistance is, of course,
not in and of itself a basis for criticizing a constitutionally derived doctrine. However, biodiversity protection may
provide a new interest for courts to consider in federalism and constitutional adjudication when no other compelling
constitutional values are at stake.
The root of the problem is the preference for local decision-making that runs through much federalism jurisprudence.
This preference can frustrate biodiversity because it concentrates power at the level where opposition to biodiversity
protection may be the strongest. The preference for local decision-making rests on an alternative vision of the virtues
of America as a confederation of city-states, coexisting with the Marshallian vision of a strong central government
curbing parochial tendencies. Professor Carol Rose finds the persistence "of stubborn local particularism" a logical
"evolution of a kind of Anti-Federalist praxis, almost invisible in an intellectual environment of overwhelming
Federalist theory." 109 Biodiversity protection is especially vulnerable to this form of localism because it is both a
novel and thus difficult theoretical, legal, and political problem.




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                                                                                                       Federalism DA

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Kaufman, Chief Scientist at Edgerton Research Lab, 93 (Les, The Last Extinction, p. 4)

The fourth argument for preserving biological diversity is the simplest: Our lives depend on it. We are part of a
common fabric of life. Our survival is dependent on the integrity of this fabric, for the loss of a few critical threads
could lead to a quick unraveling of the whole. We know that there have been previous mass extinctions, through which
some life survived. As for our own chances of surviving this mass extinction, there can be no promises. If the Grim
Reaper plays any favorites at all, then it would seem to be a special fondness for striking down dominant organisms in
their prime. David Joblinski examines the fates of rudist dames, mammalike reptiles, dinosaurs, and a host of other
scintillating but doomed creatures in his essay. Humans are now the dominant creatures, at least in terms of their
influence. So, lest history bear false witness and barring some serious conservation efforts on our part, this mass
extinction could well be the last one that we will ever know about.

Federalism Bad Impact Turn – Ethnic Conflict
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Willy Mutunga, Executive Director of the Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2001The Nation, May 20, 2001.

Federalism promotes localism, ethnic and racial xenophobia and undermines the sense of nationhood. Unsurprising the
United States and Nigeria are living survivors of debilitating separatist wars between their regions; India, despite its
federal miracle still bleeds from secessionist movements. The introduction of ethnic-based 'quasi-regionalism' in post-
Mengistu Ethiopia has fuelled the conflict over the proposed Oromia state by members of the Oromo ethnic
population. Majimboism in the early 1960s had let off the lid of secessionist movements, particularly by Kenyan
Somalis in North Eastern Province and the clamour for an autonomous "Mwambao" on the Coast. There is no
guarantee that this time around, majimboism will not trigger ethnic recidivism and separatist movements, especially in
North Eastern, Coast and Eastern province where the Oromo population may lean towards the movement for an
Oromia state. Federalism's main weakness is that it is a very expensive system that duplicates services and office
holders at the regional and federal levels. It lacks uniform policies on such issues of national concern as laws
regulating marriages, divorce, abortions, liquor, voting rights and public education. Rather than ensuring economic
equity, as many proponents of majimboism assume, it sets those regions, states or cantons with a weak market-base,
capital, and resources down the spiral of economic decline. It subjects local governments to double subordination-by
the central and regional governments-and the citizens to triple taxation. At a time when the country's economy is on its
knees, the feasibility of a well-financed transition is highly doubtful.




                                                          22
                                                                                                                 HUDL 2012/13
                                                                                                                 Federalism DA
Federalism Bad Impact Turn – Localism/Secession
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Cross Professor of Law – U Texas Law, Cardozo Law Review’02 (Frank, Former NDT Champ and Prof Law – U
Texas Law, Cardozo Law Review, November, Lexis)

The evidence is overwhelming that federalism reduces localism. These robust findings survive the application of
different independent variables, different measures of local expenditure, and different national samples. Thus, the
interposition of sovereign state governments may reduce the central government's absolute role, but it will also
significantly reduce the role of local government, which is the key to decentralized decisionmaking. 270 This finding
is not an artifact of the particular time period chosen. Other OECD evidence "for four different time periods ...
indicates that unitary countries spent about 60 percent more money at the municipal level than did federal countries."
271 Stephen Calabresi has dismissed the decentralization of unitary systems as merely "a matter of temporary national
legislative grace." 272 Vicki Jackson notes that, without judicially-enforced federalism, the national government might
"simply reorganize the political boundaries" of the states. 273 While this is technically true, in a formalistic sense, it
has no pragmatic materiality. The virtues of decentralization are associated with actual decentralization, not
constitutional guarantees. Institutional pragmatic pressures may be far more important than paper guarantees in
ensuring decentralization. 274 Jackson concedes that it is unlikely that the national government would in fact abolish
the states but claims that "the belief that it cannot happen (under the present Constitution) in broad ways frames a host
of other understandings." 275 Surely this is overly formalistic; understandings are framed by real-world circumstances,
not by admittedly unrealistic hypotheticals. If the national government faces compelling democratic pressure to
delegate, such pressure may be far more significant than any formalistic legal paper guarantees. Moreover, true
decentralization, to local governments, in a federal system is merely a matter of temporary state legislative grace.
Neither unitary nor federal systems truly [*51] guarantee much real decentralization, but the circumstances of unitary
systems conduce to a greater overall level of decentralization. Indeed, the international evidence suggests that
federalism and decentralization function at cross purposes. 276

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Gidon Gottlieb, Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and Diplomacy University of Chicago Law School, 1993, Nation Against
State, p. 26-27

Self-determination unleashed and unchecked by balancing principles constitutes a menace to the society of states. There is simply
no way in which all the hundreds of peoples who aspire to sovereign independence can be granted a state of their own without
loosening fearful anarchy and disorder on a planetary scale. The proliferation of territorial entities poses exponentially greater
problems for the control of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and multiplies situations in which external intervention could
threaten the peace. It increases problems for the management of all global issues, including terrorism, AIDS, the environment, and
population growth. It creates conditions in which domestic strife in remote territories can drag powerful neighbors into local
hostilities, creating ever widening circles of conflict. Events in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union drove this point
home. Like Russian dolls, ever smaller ethnic groups dwelling in larger units emerged to secede and to demand independence.
Georgia, for example, has to contend with the claims of South Ossetians and Abkhazians for independence, just as the Russian
Federation is confronted with the separatism of Tartaristan. An international system made up of several hundred independent
territorial states cannot be the basis for global security and prosperity.




                                                                23
                                                                                                                     HUDL 2012/13
                                                                                                                     Federalism DA

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Cross Professor of Law – U Texas Law, Cardozo Law Review’02 (Frank, Former NDT Champ and Prof Law – U Texas Law,
Cardozo Law Review, November, Lexis)

Federalism is a structural feature of the American political system. The federal system in this nation will not disappear in light of
evidence that it is inferior to a more unitary system. 317 If federalism is only a "historical artifact," 318 though, it hardly offers
grounds for its vigorous enforcement by the Supreme Court or other institutions. 319 The relevant issue regards what we shall
make of this historical artifact and how it might be adapted, within the bounds of the Constitution, for the benefit of the nation. The
benefits of decentralization not only fail to justify an expansive defense of states' rights, they affirmatively counsel against such an
interpretation of the constitution. As more power is transferred from the national government to the states, so will authority be
drawn from localities to the more centralized states and governmental quality and societal welfare will suffer. Fortunately, it
appears unlikely that the Supreme Court will substantially reinvigorate American federalism. 320 Historically, "the less politically
significant the issue, the greater the Court's insistence on the virtues of federalism."
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Michael Kelly, Director of Legal Research, Writing & Advocacy at Michigan State University's Detroit College of Law, 1999,
Drake Law Review

However, as political sovereign entities, federations are inherently susceptible to fragmentation. Indeed, the fault lines along which
a potential break can occur are usually already in place-fixed politically, historically, or both. This flows partially from the inherent
internal inequality of their collective constituent parts. In the international legal system, individual nation-states are formally
accorded equal legal status vis-à-vis each other. The reality, however, is that nation states are clearly unequal in both power and
ability. Likewise, federations generally accord equal legal status among their constituent parts, be they states, provinces, regions,
or oblasts. And just as in the international system, the reality is that those constituent parts are often unequal in terms of
development, population, and economic power. For example, just as France and Fiji share equal legal status on the international
plane but are vastly unequal in reality, California and Rhode Island enjoy equal legal status under the United States Constitution,
but are [*242] unequal in reality. The same comparisons can be made between many internal regions of almost any federation:
Nizhniy-Novgorod and Yakutia in Russia, Uttar Pradesh and Manipur in India, Amazonia and Rio in Brazil, or Ontario and Prince
Edward Island in Canada. Consequently, inequality is a fundamental feature in almost any federation, whether or not it breeds
secessionist ideas on its own. Just as devolution has been seized upon by nation-states, federal or otherwise, as a way to address
the self-deterministic aspirations of communities within their borders, so too has federalism been attempted by non-federal nation-
states as a self- preservationist move toward the middle ground between separatists and advocates of stronger centralized
government. The examples, however, of Mali, Uganda, Ethiopia, Zaire (now Congo), Nigeria, Kenya, and the Cameroons bear out
the conclusion that these efforts, at least in post-colonial Africa, have generally failed, except for the notable recent example of
South Africa under its new constitution. Consequently, while federated systems of government can work in multi-ethnic states,
with the appropriate degree of top-down devolution of administration and self-government, it seems that they cannot be universally
extrapolated to work in every instance. A. Recent Federated
Break-ups Nonetheless, when inherent inequality is added to other, seemingly dormant, fragmentary ingredients such as historical,
ethnic, religious, customary, or linguistic differences, a divisive stew can come to brew in which one of the potatoes may try to
jump out of the pot. Indeed, the recent federated crack-ups of the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia demonstrate that the
pot itself may burst, allowing all of the elements previously held together to spill forth and go their separate ways. While this
Article does not address the political, theoretical, economic, or social failures of the communist philosophy that was applied to the
countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, it does take note of the fact that these were all federal systems, at least on paper,
that spun apart into separate, smaller, more ethnically homogenous nation-states after the fall of communism in Europe.




                                                                  24
                                                                                                          HUDL 2012/13
                                                                                                          Federalism DA
Federalism Bad: Russian example

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Gregory Shvedov, director of media in Kavkaz, 6-19-2008, “Hearing,” FNS,

The first thing I want to touch base would be the lack of federal control. We saw this map on the screen, when we
observed the video which was made by Memorial, and it was good to recognize that the Northern Caucasus is a small
part of the south of Russia. But it was also good to recognize to what extent this is a part of Russia. Unfortunately,
during the last year is we do see that it is less and less a region which is under the control of federal authorities. What
do I mean by this? I don't mean that the separatist movement is really developed very much in the regions of the
Northern Caucasus. Not this is the main point. The main point is that the level of control, the level of federalism in
Russia in general is really very weak. And especially in the Northern Caucasus, we can hardly see that. These regions
are part of a bigger Russia.

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Evgueni Vladimirovich Pershin, second director of the Analytical Department of the Federation Council Apparatus.
Kazan Federalist, 2003. Number 4 (8). “Issues in the improvement of Russian federalism.”
http://www.kazanfed.ru/en/publications/kazanfederalist/n8/4/ (accessed 6/27/12)

The current state of federal relations in Russia requires practical steps aimed at its fundamental modernization.
However, we should not forget that Russian federalism is a national product. It will not and should not look like the
American or German models. Understanding of the foreign experience is important only to produce an essentially new
model of federal relations at the next stage of self-development, which the researchers will later call “the Russian
model of federalism.”

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Steven R. David, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, Foreign Affairs Jan 1999

Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually
certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more
independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its
will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel
less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already
have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by
shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt
against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these
rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely.




                                                             25
                                                                                                           HUDL 2012/13
                                                                                                           Federalism DA

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Steven R. David, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, Foreign Affairs Jan 1999

Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major
power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian
Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour
into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the
fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within
Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for
the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the
real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear
state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen.
Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites
scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much
material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and
supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents
the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more
than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war




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