Hays Earthly Security Challenges by GjnL49L

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									            Spacepower’s Role in
            National Security Space
            Addressing Earthly Security
            Overview and Issues
            Challenges
                           Pete Hays, SAIC

            IAFF 290: of Space Exploration:
            The Future Space and National
            Security
            Solutions to Earthly Problems?
            George Washington University
            Boston University


            12-14 April 20072006
             12 September
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                   National Defense University
                   Spacepower Theory Study
    • Originated during 2005 QDR
    • Feb 06 OSD Letter with TOR to NDU
    • Study Design
            – Yearlong effort: due Summer 07
            – Seminars, Workshops, Conferences
            – Product: Two Books
              • Volume I: Concise Spacepower Theory
              • Volume II: Comprehensive Spacepower Theory
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            Edited Volume: Comprehensive Spacepower Theory
       VOLUME II CHAPTERS AND AUTHORS
       Foreword: Implications of Spacepower for Geopolitics and Grand Strategy
       Section I: Introduction to Spacepower Theory
            Chapter 1: On the Nature of Theory: Harold R. Winton
            Chapter 2: International Relations Theory and Spacepower: Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
            Chapter 3: Landpower, Seapower, and Spacepower: Jon T. Sumida
            Chapter 4: Airpower, Cyberpower, and Spacepower: Benjamin S. Lambeth
       Section II: Spacepower and Geopolitics
            Chapter 5: Orbital Terrain and Space Physics: Martin E.B. France & Jerry Jon Sellers
            Chapter 6: Space Law and Governance Structures: Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz
            Chapter 7: Building on Previous Spacepower Theory: Colin S. Gray & John B. Sheldon
       Section III: Commercial Space Perspectives
            Chapter 8: History of Commercial Space Activity and Spacepower: Henry R. Hertzfeld
            Chapter 9: Commercial Space Industry and Markets: Joseph Fuller, Jr.
            Chapter 10: Merchants and Guardians: Scott Pace
            Chapter 11: Innovative Approaches to Commercial Space: Ivan Bekey
       Section IV: Civil Space Perspectives
            Chapter 12: History of Civil Space Activity and Spacepower: Roger D. Launius
            Chapter 13: Affordable and Responsive Space Systems: Sir Martin Sweeting
            Chapter 14: Space and Environmental Issues: Eligar Sadeh
            Chapter 15: Competing Visions for Exploration: Klaus P. Heiss & Dennis R. Wingo; Robert Zubrin

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                                        Edited Volume (cont.)
            Section V: Security Space Perspectives
                 Chapter 16: History of Security Space Activity and Spacepower: James Lewis
                 Chapter 17: Increasing the Military Uses of Space: Henry F. Cooper, Jr. & Everett C. Dolman
                 Chapter 18: Preserving Freedom of Action in Space: Michael Krepon, Theresa Hitchens &
                         Michael Katz-Hyman
                 Chapter 19: Balancing Security Interests: Michael E. O’Hanlon
            Section VI: International Perspectives
                 Chapter 20: Russia: James E. Oberg
                 Chapter 21: China: Dean Cheng
                 Chapter 22: Europe: Xavier Pasco
                 Chapter 23: Emerging Actors: Randall R. Correll
            Section VII: Evolving Futures for Spacepower
                 Chapter 24: Evolving U.S. Structures: John M. Logsdon
                 Chapter 25: Organizational Drivers for Spacepower: John M. Collins
                 Chapter 26: Technological Drivers for Spacepower: Taylor Dinerman
                 Chapter 27: Building Human Capital for Spacepower: S. Peter Worden
            Afterword: The Future of Spacepower:
            Appendixes
                 Space Law: Outer Space Treaty, Registration Convention, Rescue and Return Agreement,
                        Liability Convention, Moon Treaty, PAROS Proposals, IADC
                 Orbits and Orbital Mechanics
                 Basics of Space System Design
                 Possibly Bibliographic Essay, Annotated Bibliography (assembled from COP), and
                         Comprehensive Bibliography
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            Requirements for Concise Spacepower Theory

        Account for the structure of the field:
                  • the divergent world views of each sector and
                  • the dynamics of their interactions
        Define the boundary conditions of the theory:
                  • Cis-Lunar space as opposed to all of space
                  • International perceptions of spacepower and their effect on US policy
        Ask the key, fundamental questions regarding the uses and purposes
          of space to extract underlying principles.
                  • Question hypotheses and present conditions.
                  • Test counterfactuals
        Construct a framework that integrates divergent points of view and
          takes into account potential future scenarios.


            Roles of Theory: Define – Construct – Explain – Connect – Anticipate

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                      Upcoming Conference
            Capstone Symposium: 25-26 April 07,
             National Defense University,
             Washington, D.C.
              Initial presentation of Concise Spacepower Theory

            For more info or to sign up:
             www.ndu.edu; haysp@ndu.edu
            Community of Practice Website:
              http://groups-
                beta.google.com/group/spacepower-theory

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                Soviet Space Systems and Co-Orbital ASAT



            RORSAT




                                              Co-Orbital ASAT
              EORSAT




  Energia carrying Skif DM (Polus)
     prototype “battle station”
                                     DS-P1-M Target Satellite
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                     Soviet Space Systems and Co-Orbital ASAT

   •        Many details about this system remain classified or are lost to history. The system
            used two types of satellites: co-orbital active killers (Istrebitel or killer) and passive
            targets
   •        The first tests, Polyot-1 and Polyot-2, were conducted in 1963 and 1964. There were
            subsequently 19 target satellite tests and 22 killer satellite tests. The system reached
            full operational capability in 1972. The last test was on 18 Jun 1982
   •        Killer satellites tested in the 1970s were ready for launch within 90 minutes (using a
            Tsiklon booster) and could close within less than one kilometer of target satellites
            within 40-50 minutes
   •        On 23 Mar 1983 Yuri Andropov announced a moratorium on design, construction, and
            testing of the system; the moratorium ended in Sep 1986
   •        In May 1987 Michael Gorbachev visited Baikonur and saw the co-orbital killer satellite
            and the prototype of the anti-satellite and anti-missile platform called Narvad (Guard).
            General Zavalishin, who escorted Gorbachev, used the opportunity to advocate
            resumption of testing. Zavalishin pointed at similar developments in the US and
            promised to cover up ASAT launches so no one would suspect tests were taking
            place. As Zavalishin recalls, “...Gorbachev issued incoherent and wordy
            explanations, which concluded with a polite, but resolute refusal.”
   •        Ironically, only few days after this conversation, on 15 May 1987, the first heavy-lift
            Energia rocket blasted off from Baikonur, carrying Skif DM (Polus) spacecraft, which
            was later described as a prototype “battle station” in space. Due to a software glitch,
            the 90-ton-class spacecraft never made it into orbit


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            US ASAT Systems and Residual Capabilities




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               US ASAT Testing and Systems

    • Bold Orion air-launched, nuclear-tipped ASAT tested in
      late 1950s; world’s first known test 19 Oct 1959
    • Programs 505 and 437 ground-launched, nuclear-tipped
      ASATs operationally deployed 1963-70
    • NSDM 345 in Jan 77 called for development of air-
      launched KEW ASAT
    • MHV ASAT successfully tested on 13 Sep 1985;
      Congressional restrictions led to cancellation in 1989;
      KEASAT was follow-on system
    • MIRACL tests in Oct 1997; highlighted satellite
      vulnerability to DEW
    • ASAT potential of BMD systems: BP and ABL


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                ASAT Arms Control Efforts

        • Development and testing of ASAT capabilities not
          covered by OST or other space agreements
        • Two-Track Diplomacy with three rounds of US-USSR
          ASAT negotiations 1978-79
        • USSR testing moratorium 1982-86; Congressional
          restrictions on MHV ASAT testing
        • DST was only “bucket” of AC that did not lead to
          agreements during 1980s-90s
        • PAROS efforts at CD and UNGA Resolutions




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A Space Enabled Reconnaissance-Strike
Complex: The New American Way of War
    KTO, 1991                 Unguided          245,000   92%
    (Desert Storm): 37 Days   Laser/EO-guided    20,450    8%
    1 Mbps/5K Forces

    Serbia, 1999              Unguided           16,000   66%
    (Allied Force)            Laser/EO-guided     7,000   31%
    78 Days; 24.5 Mbps/5K     GPS-guided            700    3%

    Afghanistan, 2001-02      Unguided            9,000   41%
    (Enduring Freedom)        Laser/EO-guided     6,000   27%
    90 Days; 68.2 Mbps/5K     GPS-guided          7,000   32%


    Iraq, 2003                Unguided            9,251   32%
    (Iraqi Freedom)           Guided             19,948   68%
    29 Days; 51.1 Mbps/5K
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            Growth in SATCOM Demand




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            Military Satellite Communications Grids




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               Four Defense Space
                 Mission Areas
            • Space Support
            • Force Enhancement
            • Space Control
            • Force Application

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            Force Enhancement Missions, Primary Orbits, Major Systems

Environmental             Communications                          Position,             Integrated           Intelligence,
Monitoring                                                        Navigation,           Tactical             Surveillance, and
                                                                  and Time              Warning and          Reconnaissance
                                                                                        Attack               (ISR)
                                                                                        Assessment
Polar LEO                 Geostationary Orbit (GSO)               Semi-                 GSO and LEO          Various
                                                                  synchronous
                                                                  Orbit
Defense                   Defense Satellite                       Global                Defense              Imaging (IMINT)
Meteorological            Communications System                   Positioning           Support              Satellites, Signals
                          (DSCS) II, DSCS III, Ultra-High
Support Program                                                   System (GPS)          Program              Intelligence (SIGINT)
                          Frequency Follow-on (UFO),
(DMSP)                    Milstar, Global Broadcast               GPS II                (DSP), GPS           Satellites,
-----------------------   System (GBS), Iridium,                                        ------------------   commercial systems
                                                                  GPS IIR
                          commercial systems                                                                 --------------------------
National Polar-                                                   GPS IIR-M             Space-Based
                          -------------------------------------
Orbiting                                                                                Infra-Red            Future Imagery
                          Advanced Extremely High                 -------------------
Operational                                                                             System               Architecture (FIA),
                          Frequency (AEHF), Wideband              GPS IIF
Environmental             Gapfiller System (WGS),
                                                                                        (SBIRS) High,        Integrated Overhead
Satellite System          Mobile User Objective System            GPS III               Space                SIGINT Architecture
(NPOESS)                  (MUOS), Polar Military Satellite                              Tracking and         (IOSA), Space Radar
                          Communications System,                                        Surveillance
                          Transformational
                          Communications System
                                                                                        System (STSS)
                          (TSAT)




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            Major Military Space Program Investments   (Millions of 2006 dollars)




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                                   Gain or Maintain
                                    Space Control


            Provide Freedom of                           Deny Freedom of
            Action in Space for                          Action in Space to
              Friendly Forces                             Enemy Forces


     PROTECTION           SURVEILLANCE            PREVENTION             NEGATION
  Employ active and       Detect, identify,    Employ measures to       Disrupt, deny,
   Passive defensive     assess, and track      prevent adversary    degrade, deceive, or
  measures to ensure     space objects and        use of data or      destroy adversary
 US and friendly space        events          services from US and    space capabilities
  systems operate as                              friendly space
       Planned                                systems for purposes
                                                 hostile to the US




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               Teets, Mar 05: Top National Security
                         Space Priorities
     •      Achieve Mission Success in Operations and Acquisition
     •      Develop and Maintain a Team of Space Professionals
     •      Integrate Space Capabilities for National Intelligence,
            Warfighting, and Homeland Security
     •      Produce Innovative Solutions for the Most Challenging
            National Security Problems
     •      Ensure Freedom of Action in Space

               Sega, Mar 06: Top National Security
                        Space Priorities
             Improve the integration of space capabilities across the
             national security space community
             Get “back-to-basics” in space acquisition
             Ensure the viability and proficiency of our space professional
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             and S&T workforce                                           20
            Intelligence Sector Drivers
      • Horizontal Integration
            –Role of DNI, NRO, NGA, USD(I)
      • Young Report: Future Imagery
        Architecture
            –Costs and Capabilities Issues
      • Space Radar, AESA
            –DTED, SAR, and SMTI


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               Defense Sector Drivers
      • Increasing Reliance on Commercial
        Satcom: 80% in OIF
            – Transformational Communications
              Architecture: AEHF, WGS, TSAT, COTM
      • Young Report: SBIRS High and EELV
      • Space Radar
      • Space Commission Implementation
            – Space Cadre


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                            Attributes of Military Space Doctrines
                Primary Value and          Space System                 Conflict Missions       Appropriate
                Functions of Military      Characteristics and          of Space Forces         Military
                Space Forces               Employment Strategies                                Organization for
                                                                                                Operations and
                                                                                                Advocacy
Sanctuary          Enhance Strategic         Limited Numbers             Limited             NRO
                    Stability                 Fragile Systems
                   Facilitate Arms           Vulnerable Orbits
                    Control                   Optimize for NTMV
Survivability   Above functions plus:         Terrestrial Backups         Force               Major Command or
                        Force                Distributed                  Enhancement         Unified Command
                        Enhancement            Architectures               Degrade
                                              Autonomous Control           Gracefully
                                              Hardening
Control            Control Space             Redundancy                  Control Space       Unified Command
                   Significant Force         On - Orbit Spares           Significant Force   or Space Force
                    Enhancement                                             Enhancement
                                              Crosslinks                  Surveillance,
                                              Maneuver                     Offensive, and
                                              Less Vulnerable Orbits       Defensive
                                                                            Counterspace
                                              Stealth
High Ground     Above functions plus:         Attack Warning Sensors   Above functions plus:   Space Force
                                                                          Decisive Space-
                    Decisive Impact on        5 Ds: Deception,
                    Terrestrial Conflict       Disruption, Denial,          to- Space and
                   BMD                        Degradation,                 Space- to- Earth
                                               Destruction                  Force
                                                                           Application
                                               Reconstitution
                                               Capability                  BMD
                                              Defense
                                              Convoy




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                            Space Doves
            • “Unlike the strategy for nuclear weapons,
              there exists no obvious strategy for
              employing space weapons that will
              enhance global stability. If the precedent
              of avoiding destabilizing situations is to
              continue—and that is compatible with a
              long history of US foreign policy—one
              ought to avoid space-based weapons.”
                – Lt Col Bruce M. Deblois, “Space Sanctuary,” APJ, 1998


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                   Militarization Realists
            • “fighting into space looks feasible and we
              should plan for the eventuality. Fighting
              in space shows little promise, while
              fighting from space looks impractical for
              the foreseeable future, with or without
              treaties.”
               – Maj William L. Spacy II, Does the United States
                             Need Space-Based Weapons, 1999



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                 Inevitable Weaponizers
            • “we know that every medium—air,
              land and sea—has seen conflict.
              Reality indicates that space will be
              no different. Given this virtual
              certainty, the United States must
              develop the means both to deter and
              to defend against hostile acts in and
              from space.”
                         – Space Commission Report, 2001

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                         Space Hawks
            • [concerted development of space
              weapons by the United States] “will
              buy generations of security that all
              the ships, tanks, and airplanes in the
              world will not provide. . . . Without it,
              we will become vulnerable beyond
              our worst fears.”
                  – Sen Bob Smith (R-NH) “Challenge of Space
                                           Power,” APJ, 1999


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             Five Potential Paths to Use of
                   Space Weapons
            High-Altitude
            Nuclear
            Detonation
            Slippery Slope
            Boost-Phase
            BMD
            Flag Follows
            Trade
            Astropolitiks
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                   High-Altitude Nuclear
                        Detonation
            • Potential to Disable all Nonhardened LEO
              Satellites
            • Prompt Kill for LOS; Effect falls with 1/R2
            • Gradual Fatal Dose in Weeks to Months
            • Potential for $50B+ in Damage
            • Starfish Test July 1962; 1.4 MT
            • Hardening Possible for 2-3% System
              Costs
                           – DTRA HALEOS Study, April 2001

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                        Slippery Slope
            • Range of “weapon-like” options:
              5Ds, EW, Laser “Dazzling,” Space
              Mines, Many Residual Capabilities
            • “If force application is construed
              broadly enough to include terrestrial-
              based applications of military force
              aimed at affecting orbital systems
              and their use, one can argue that
              space warfare has already arrived
              even though no space-based
              weapons are currently deployed.”
              – Barry D. Watts, The Military Use of Space, 2001

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                   Boost-Phase BMD
            • Space is Best Basing Mode for
              Global Boost-Phase Coverage; No
              Crisis Deployment or Contested
              Airspace/Littoral
            • Limited Engagement Window (70-300
              sec); Predelegation or Man-in-the-
              loop?
            • Even Limited BMD System can have
              Significant ASAT Capability
            • Crisis Stability; Expense;
              Technologies
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                       Flag Follows Trade
            • Neomercantilist Military Protection of New
              Economic and Strategic Center of Gravity
            • “Our investment in space is rapidly growing and
              soon will be of such magnitude that it will be
              considered a vital interest—on par with how we
              value oil today . . .” “it is not the future of military
              space that is critical to the United States—it is the
              continued commercial development of space that
              will provide continued strength for our great
              country in the decades ahead. Military space,
              while important, will follow.”
                                     – General Howell M. Estes, III, 1998


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                                Astropolitiks
            •   Withdraw from current OST-dominated space regime;
                establish benign free-market sovereignty in space
            •   Use current and near-term capabilities to seize military
                control of LEO
            •   Establish “a national space coordination authority” to
                “define, separate, and coordinate the efforts of commercial,
                civilian, and military space projects.”
                 – “The ultimate goal . . .is not the militarization of space.
                    Rather, the militarization of space is a means to an end,
                    part of a longer-term strategy. The goal is to reverse the
                    current international malaise in regard to space
                    exploration, and to do so in a way that is efficient and
                    that harnesses the positive motivations of individuals
                    and states striving to improve their conditions. It is a
                    neoclassical, market-driven approach intended to
                    maximize efficiency and wealth.”
                                       – Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik, 2001


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            Backup Slides




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            Missile Defense Share of Total DoD Budget and R&D Budget




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            Three Major Objectives of Current U.S. Missile Defense Program
   1) “Maintain and sustain an initial capability to defend the U.S., allies, and our deployed forces against
       rogue attacks.” MDA plans by 2013 to:
            Complete fielding of Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) in Alaska and California
            Enhance Early Warning Radars in Alaska, California, and United Kingdom
            Field Sea-Based X-Band Radar in the Pacific
            Field a forward-transportable radar in Japan
            Expand command and control, battle management, and communications capabilities
            Augment GBI midcourse defense capability by deploying Aegis BMD interceptors and
               engagement ships
   2) “close the gaps and improve this initial capability;” MDA plans by 2013 to:
            Add more Aegis BMD sea-based interceptors
            Field four transportable Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) units
            Introduce land and sea variants of the Multiple Kill Vehicle program
            Upgrade the early warning radar in Greenland
            Establish a GBI site and corresponding radar capability in Europe
   3) “develop options for the future;” MDA plans to:
            Continue development of the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS)
            Maintain two programs, the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) and the Airborne Laser (ABL), one of
               which is to be selected as the boost-phase missile defense element by 2010
            Develop a Space Test Bed to examine space-based options for expanding the coverage and
               effectiveness for future BMD systems


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                                U.S. Missile Defense
                         Programmatic Issues and Challenges
   European third site for GBI and associated radar
            $206M requested for FY08 but Congress cut funding last year; political issues in host nations;
               objections raised by Russians
   Airborne Laser
            Fully funded at $632M in FY07; FY08 request is $549M. Initial airborne attempt to intercept
               boosting missile pushed back to last quarter of FY09
   Kinetic Energy Interceptor
            Congress cut FY07 request of $406M by $48M; program restructured and scheduled for FY08
              flight test but may not offer a significant new capability such as boost phase intercept
              capability or a mobile launcher
   Multiple Kill Vehicle
            FY07 funding request of $165M was cut by $20M; $271M requested for FY08; program refocused
               on developing two separate payload configurations
   Testing
            $597M appropriated in FY07 and $586M requested for FY08 but concerns remain about breadth
               and scope of testing
   Space
            Request for Space Test Bed for FY08 is $10M and is projected to grow to $15M for FY09




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                Balancing Issues and Challenges
                 for Space and Missile Defense

   Desire for constantly deployed, global boost phase missile
     intercept capabilities via space basing of kinetic and/or
     directed energy weapons versus concerns over
     “weaponization of space”
   Desire for robust global capability to dissuade, deter, and
     defend against rogue actors versus concerns with
     undercutting strategic stability with Russia and China
   Desire to test base-based missile defense components
     versus concerns with “weaponization of space” and
     space debris
   Development of non-space based boost phase missile
     intercept capabilities (e.g. ground-based interceptors,
     ground-based lasers, and Airborne Laser) versus their
     significant anti-satellite capabilities

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