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					Filed 11/28/01
                            CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION


                 COURT OF APPEAL - FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION ONE

                                  STATE OF CALIFORNIA



CHARLES ANDREW WILLIAMS,                         D038141

        Petitioner,                              (San Diego County
                                                 Super. Ct. No. CE211823)
        v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN
DIEGO COUNTY,

        Respondent;


THE PEOPLE,

        Real Party in Interest.


        Petition for writ of prohibition from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego

County, Herbert J. Exarhos, Judge. Petition denied.



        Steven J. Carroll, Public Defender, Gary R. Nichols, Jo Pastore, Robert Rexrode,

Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner.

        John T. Philipsborn for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, upon the request

of the Court of Appeal, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.



                                             1
         No appearance by Respondent.

         Paul J. Pfingst, District Attorney, Thomas F. McArdle and Anthony Lovett,

Deputy District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.

         Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Laura Whitcomb Halgren and

Patti W. Ranger, Deputy Attorneys General, upon the request of the Court of Appeal, as

Amicus Curiae.

         Gary T. Yancey, District Attorney (Contra Costa) and L. Douglas Pipes, Deputy

District Attorney for the California District Attorneys Association, upon the request of

the Court of Appeal, as Amicus Curiae.



         This petition challenges the constitutionality of Welfare and Institutions Code

(W&I) section 602, subdivision (b)(1), enacted by section 18 of Proposition 21, the

"Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention" initiative (hereafter Proposition 21).1

Under W&I section 602, subdivision (b)(1), a minor age 14 or older who is alleged to

have committed enumerated offenses must be prosecuted in adult rather than juvenile

court.




1      Voters approved Proposition 21 at the General Election on March 7, 2000.
Section 602, subdivision (b)(1), is the codification of section 18 of that initiative and took
effect March 8, 2000. (§ 602, subd. (b)(1), added by initiative, Gen. Elec. (March 7,
2000) [Proposition 21].)


                                               2
        Petitioner Charles Andrew Williams (petitioner) was charged in adult court

pursuant to W&I section 602, subdivision (b)(1). He argues that Proposition 21 is invalid

because it violates the single-subject rule contained in the California Constitution, article

II, section 8, subdivision (d), that W&I section 602, subdivision (b)(1) is therefore

invalid, and that the adult court does not have jurisdiction over this proceeding.

        We recognize the issue presented by this petition is currently pending before the

California Supreme Court. We also recognize that Court will write the final decision on

the validity of Proposition 21. Our duty in the interim is to resolve the issue in the case

before us to the best of our ability based upon the available precedent. Based upon our

analysis of existing law, we will reject the challenge based upon the single-subject rule

finding that although Proposition 21 is a complex criminal justice reform measure with

multiple subparts, each part is reasonably germane to the general purposes of the

initiative.

                                              I

                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

        The San Diego County District Attorney filed a complaint in respondent court

charging petitioner with two counts of murder (Pen. Code,2 § 187, subd. (a)), and alleged

as to each murder the special circumstances of multiple murders and lying in wait.3



2       All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.

3       The complaint also alleged 13 counts of attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)),
or alternatively, 13 counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)).


                                              3
(§ 190.2, subds. (a)(3), (15).) The complaint also alleged in connection with the murder

counts that petitioner was a minor age 14 years or older at the time of the murders and

had personally killed the victims, and the murders involved special circumstances within

the meaning of W&I section 602, subdivision (b).

       Petitioner demurred to the complaint, contending the court had jurisdiction over

these proceedings solely by virtue of Proposition 21, and that Proposition 21 was invalid

because it violated the single-subject rule.4 The court overruled the demurrer. Petitioner

then filed the writ petition now before us. We ordered a stay of the proceedings below,

and issued an order to show cause and heard oral argument. He reasserts in his writ

petition that Proposition 21, including W&I section 602, subdivision (b), is invalid

because it violates the single-subject rule.

                                               II

                                         ANALYSIS

       The initiative process is a power reserved to the people rather than one granted to

them (National Paint & Coatings Assn. v. State of California (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 753,

760), and occupies a "cherished and favored role . . . in our constitutional scheme."

(Senate of State of Cal. v. Jones (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1142, 1158 (Jones).) However, the

initiative power is subject to an important limitation under article II, section 8,




4      Petitioner also alleged Proposition 21 violates the constitutional separation of
powers principles by improperly assigning judicial power to the executive branch, and
violates the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Petitioner does not
reassert those contentions in this writ proceeding.

                                               4
subdivision (d) of the California Constitution, which provides that initiative measures

may not "embrac[e] more than one subject."

       Petitioner contends Proposition 21 violates the single-subject rule because it

embraces numerous subjects that are not reasonably germane to each other or to the

stated purpose of the initiative. The People counter that under case law an initiative may

have a broad scope without violating article II, section 8, subdivision (d), and argue

Proposition 21 does not offend the single-subject rule because its provisions are

reasonably germane to each other and to its stated purpose.

       A. The Standards for Evaluating a Single-Subject Challenge

       The courts have recognized the single-subject rule is consistent with the

"cherished and favored role" occupied by the initiative process because the single-subject

rule is an integral safeguard designed to maintain the integrity of the initiative process by

preventing deceptive manipulation or abuse of that process. (Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th at

pp. 1157-1158.) The single-subject rule promotes related policies: to protect the

electorate from confusing or misleading measures (ibid.), and to prevent proponents of

initiatives from engaging in "logrolling."5 (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist.

v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 231-232 (Amador Valley).)




5      "Logrolling" is a method of exploiting the initiative process by taking disparate
and unrelated provisions, none of which standing alone would have garnered a majority
vote, and combining them into a single measure to cobble together a majority vote. (See
generally McFadden v. Jordan (1948) 32 Cal.2d 330, 345-346.)


                                              5
       The oft stated test is that an initiative, even though containing numerous and

complex provisions, comports with California's single-subject rule if "'despite its varied

collateral effects, all of its parts are "reasonably germane" to each other,' and to the

general purpose or object of the initiative." (Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236,

245 (Brosnahan), emphasis in original.) The single-subject rule "obviously forbids

joining disparate provisions which appear germane only to topics of excessive generality

such as 'government' or 'public welfare,'" but the courts have indulged in a "liberal

interpretative tradition . . . of sustaining statutes and initiatives which fairly disclose a

reasonable and common sense relationship among their various components in

furtherance of a common purpose." (Id. at p. 253.) The single-subject rule does not

require that each of the provisions of an initiative measure effectively interlock in a

functional relationship (id. at pp. 248-249); however, the various provisions must be

reasonably related to a common theme or purpose. (Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52

Cal.3d 336, 347-348.) If the provisions of an initiative possess a reasonable and common

sense relationship among its various components to further the common underlying

purpose, then "[w]hether or not these various provisions are wise or sensible, and will

combine effectively to achieve their stated purpose, is not our concern in evaluating [a]

single-subject challenge." (Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 514, emphasis in

original.)

       The diversity of an initiative's purposes and subjects, rather than the number of its

provisions, invalidates an initiative under the single-subject rule. For example, in

Brosnahan the California Supreme Court considered a challenge to Proposition 8, the


                                                6
"Victims' Bill of Rights," an initiative with wide ranging and numerous provisions

including victim restitution, school safety, bail, sentence enhancements, the use of prior

convictions to impeach, the defense of diminished capacity, and evidentiary rule changes.

The Brosnahan court held it did not violate the single-subject rule because the parts,

although numerous, were reasonably germane to a central defined purpose.6 (Brosnahan,

supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 246.)

       In contrast, in Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1142, the California Supreme Court

evaluated a proposed initiative that contained relatively few substantive provisions but

held it invalid because its provisions addressed two distinct subjects. Several provisions

were concerned with compensation of state officers, and a separate provision addressed

the distinct subject of reapportionment of voting districts. (Id. at p. 1161.) The court

concluded these provisions did not have a common subject beyond a commonality at a

level of abstraction so general it would "'essentially obliterat[e] the constitutional

requirement'" of a single subject. (Id. at p. 1162.) Additionally, the Jones court's

analysis described how joinder of the disparate subjects within the proposed initiative

threatened to undermine the policies promoted by the single-subject rule, thus confirming



6       Other cases have also rejected single-subject challenges to multi-faceted initiatives
because the provisions were reasonably germane to a unifying central purpose. (See
Raven v. Deukmejian, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 347 [upholding the "Crime Victims Justice
Reform Act" and concluding that its various provisions formed "a comprehensive
criminal justice reform package"]; Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 231 [upholding
tax initiative on the ground that its varied provisions were "reasonably . . . germane to the
general subject of property tax relief"]; Fair Political Practices Comm. v. Superior Court
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 33, 37 [upholding Political Reform Act of 1974 despite its multiple
complex features].)

                                               7
that one component of a single-subject analysis is whether the joined provisions might

confuse or deceive voters or permit logrolling. (See Uelmen, Handling Hot Potatoes:

Judicial Review of California Initiatives After Senate v. Jones (2001) 41 Santa Clara

L.Rev. 999, 1024-1025.)

       B. The Matters Encompassed Within Proposition 21

       Proposition 21's title, as well as its findings and declarations, state that its purpose

is to reduce juvenile and gang-related crime. (Prop. 21, §§ 1-2.) Because one indicia of

compliance with the single-subject rule is the extent to which the substantive provisions

of an initiative are consonant with the purposes expressed in the initiative's title and

preamble (California Trial Lawyers Assn. v. Eu (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 351, 358;

Brosnahan, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 246-247), we detail the substantive provisions of

Proposition 21 and examine those provisions for consonance with its stated purpose.

       The 32 substantive sections of Proposition 21 can be subdivided into four subsets.

The first subset, which we denominate the "gang provisions," are those sections that

amend or enact statutes specifically targeted at the problems presented by street gangs.

Sections 3 through 10 of Proposition 21 amend portions of the Street Terrorism

Enforcement and Prevention Act (§ 186.21 et seq., the STEP Act), an act designed to

combat violent street gangs. (§ 186.21.) Section 11 of Proposition 21 adds gang-related

murder as a special circumstance. Portions of section 15 of Proposition 21 add two gang-

related crimes to the provisions of section 667.5, and a portion of section 13 of

Proposition 21 amends the wiretap statute (§ 629.52) to add violation of the STEP Act to

the crimes for which wiretaps may be authorized.


                                               8
       The second subset, which we denominate the "juvenile provisions," is composed

of sections that address juvenile crime and the juvenile justice system and apply to all

juvenile offenders regardless of whether the offender is a participant in a street gang.7

Sections 18 through 34 of Proposition 21 amend various portions of the W&I to alter

various aspects of the juvenile justice system, including: expanding the list of offenders

who must (Prop. 21, § 18), or in the prosecutor's discretion may (Prop. 21, § 26), be

prosecuted in adult court; changing the procedures and standards for revoking a juvenile's

probation (Prop. 21, § 27); reducing in various ways the confidentiality previously

afforded to juvenile offenders (Prop. 21, §§ 19, 25 & 30); and making other changes

pertaining to juvenile offenders.

       The third subset, which we denominate the "repeat offender provisions," is

composed of four sections that apply to all offenders regardless of their age or gang

affiliation. Sections 15 and 17 of Proposition 21 amend sections 667.5 and 1192.7,

respectively, to expand the list of violent and serious felonies that qualify for treatment

under those sections and under the "Three Strikes" law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). Sections

14 and 16 of Proposition 21 change the reference dates for sections 667.5 and 1192.7,

respectively, from June 30, 1993, to March 8, 2000, which has the effect of expanding the

lists of violent and serious felonies that qualify all offenders for treatment under the

Three Strikes law.



7      Sections 12 and 12.5 of Proposition 21 address the problem of graffiti, a crime that
could reasonably be perceived as a problem common to both gangs and juveniles.


                                              9
       The fourth subset, which we denominate the "wiretap provisions" is composed of a

portion of section 13 of Proposition 21 that amends the wiretap statute (§ 629.52) to add a

violation of section 186.22 and a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6

(possession of funds in excess of $100,000 related to illegal drugs) to the crimes for

which a wiretap may be authorized.

       C. Proposition 21 and the Single-Subject Rule

       Our review of the substantive provisions of Proposition 21 convinces us that all of

its components are reasonably germane to other of its components or to its stated

purpose. Therefore, we conclude that Proposition 21 is not subject to challenge under

article II, section 8, subdivision (d), of the California Constitution.

       As a preliminary matter, we agree with the People that Proposition 21's

amalgamation of juvenile provisions with gang provisions does not offend the single-

subject rule. The declared purpose and goal of Proposition 21 was to address the broad

problem of juvenile crime, and to target gang violence as a specific and more dangerous

subset of the broader problem. (Prop. 21, § 2.) Although petitioner correctly asserts that

not all juvenile offenders belong to gangs, and all gang members are not juveniles, there

is an undeniable and significant overlap between these two groups.8 Accordingly, we are

satisfied the portions of Proposition 21 enacting a comprehensive, two-pronged approach



8      The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention reported that,
according to a "1998 National Youth Gang Survey," the gang population is aging but
despite this trend there were still 40 percent of gang members under the age of 18.
(<http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/jjsum_11_00/survey5.html/survey6.html>.)


                                              10
-- one seeking to reform a juvenile justice system that deals with nearly all juvenile

offenders who are a significant percentage of the gang offenders, and a second prong

targeting gang offenders -- encompass provisions reasonably germane to the single-

subject of crimes by youths acting individually or in concert with their gangs. The

commonality of juvenile crime and gangs is not at a level of abstraction so general it

obliterates the constitutional requirement of a single subject. (Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th at

p. 1162.)

       The principal challenge in the petition focuses on the recidivist provisions of

sections 15 through 17 of the measure. We will discuss the several challenges to those

provisions separately.

       D. Recidivist Provisions

       Section 15 of Proposition 21 is a repeat offender provision that expands the list of

violent felonies that qualify for enhanced punishment of habitual criminals under section

667.5 (Prop. 21, § 15).

       Sections 16 and 17 of Proposition 21 are also repeat offender provisions that

expand the list of serious felonies that will qualify as strikes under the Three Strikes law.

Proposition 21 accomplishes this by first explicitly adding offenses to the list of serious

felonies contained in section 1192.7, subdivision (c) and then enacting section 1170.125.

(Prop. 21, §§ 16, 17.) Proposition 21 then adds section 1170.125, which modifies the

Three Strikes law to include as qualifying felonies all post-June 30, 1993, additions to the




                                             11
serious felonies list.9 The post-June 30, 1993, legislative additions to the serious felonies

thus converted into qualifying serious felonies by sections 1170.125 and 667.1

encompass a number of offenses added by the Legislature in 1998, including:

(1) throwing acid or flammable substances in violation of section 244; (2) continuous

sexual abuse of a child in violation of section 288.5; (3) rape in concert in violation of

section 264.1; and (4) any violation of section 12022.53. (See Stats. 1998, ch. 936,

§ 13.5.) It also converts carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)), an offense added by the

Legislature to section 1192.7, subdivision (c) in October 1993 (see People v. Nava (1996)

47 Cal.App.4th 1732, 1736-1737), into a qualifying serious felony.

       Petitioner contends these provisions violate the single-subject rule in that they

principally revise the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and are not reasonably

germane to the purposes of the initiative which deals with juvenile and gang-related

crime. Petitioner argues the addition of such nonjuvenile related matters would mislead

the voters and introduce unrelated changes to the recidivist statutes which are primarily

directed to adult crimes.

       We believe careful analysis of the recidivist provisions of Proposition 21

demonstrate the changes in those statutes are reasonably germane to addressing juvenile



9        The courts had construed the provisions of sections 1192.7 and 667 as freezing the
list of felonies that would qualify as strikes to the lists within those statutes as they
existed on June 30, 1993. (See, e.g., People v. O'Roark (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 872, 878-
879, fn. 3.) Under section 1170.125, which changes the reference date from June 30,
1993, to March 8, 2000, all legislative additions to the lists that occurred between
June 30, 1993 and March 8, 2000, as well as the additions made by Proposition 21, are
converted into qualifying serious felonies.

                                             12
and street gang crime. The modification of the "freeze date" for the definition of

serious/violent felonies under the Three Strikes law is a necessary step to accomplish the

purposes of Proposition 21. The resulting inclusion of serious felonies defined by the

Legislature since 1993 but before the enactment of Proposition 21 is a reasonable

collateral consequence of the initiative as recognized as appropriate in Jones, supra, 21

Cal.4th 1142.

       Proposition 21 added nine new felonies to the serious felony list. These felonies

are: (1) exploding a destructive device with bodily injury (§ 12309), (2) any felony

which would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22, (3) all violations of

section 245, (4) all violations of sections 245.2, 245.3 and 245.5, (5) discharging a

firearm at an inhabited dwelling, vehicle or aircraft (§ 246), (6) shooting a firearm from a

vehicle (§ 12034, subds. (c) & (d)), (7) intimidating victims and witnesses (§ 136.1),

(8) criminal threats (§ 422); and (9) conspiracy to commit any serious felony (§ 182,

subd. (a)(1)).

       In addition, Proposition 21 added nine new felonies to the violent felony list.

These nine new violent felonies are (1) all robberies (§ 211), (2) arson of an inhabited

structure or inhabited property (§ 451, subd. (b)), (3) exploding destructive device with

bodily injury and great bodily injury (§§ 12309 & 12310), (4) all kidnappings, (5) all

violations of section 220, (6) all carjackings, (7) extortion for gang purposes (§§ 518 &

186.22), (8) threatening witnesses and victims for gang purposes (§§ 136.1 & 186.22),

and (9) any first degree burglary in which a nonaccomplice of the defendant was present

in the residence at the time of the burglary.


                                                13
       Petitioner claims these felonies have nothing to do with gang or juvenile activities

and argues they relate solely to adult offenders. We disagree. It is apparent that the nine

new serious felonies will clearly impact juveniles. Five of the nine serious felonies,

section 186.22, section 245, subdivision (a), (assault with force likely to produce great

bodily injury), section 246, section 136.1 and section 12034, subdivision (c), were

already listed in subdivision (b) of W&I section 707 prior to the enactment of Proposition

21. However, before this Proposition the five felonies listed above could not constitute

serious or violent felonies within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i),

based upon a juvenile adjudication because they were not serious felonies when

committed by an adult. (People v. Leng (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1, 10-11.) Including

these five new felonies in both lists, that is, the W&I section 707, subdivision (b) list, and

Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c), makes juvenile adjudications of these five

felonies strikes within the meaning of the Three Strikes law.

       Any crime that is contained in the list of serious or violent felonies can constitute a

strike when the crime is committed by a 16 or 17-year-old juvenile, and the crime results

in an adjudication of wardship in the juvenile court for the offense listed in W&I section

707, subdivision (b). The addition of the five new felonies to the list of serious felonies

which were not previously contained in section 1192.7, subdivision (c), makes it possible

for a juvenile to accumulate a strike as a result of a juvenile adjudication of the newly

added serious felonies.

       The remaining new serious felonies, sections 182, 245.2, 245.3 and 245.4, as well

as sections 422 and 12309, were not listed in W&I section 707, subdivision (b) prior to


                                             14
the enactment of Proposition 21 nor were they added by that initiative. Under previous

law juvenile adjudications for those four felonies could never be strikes because they

were not serious felonies when committed by an adult. (People v. Leng, supra, 71

Cal.App.4th at pp. 10-11.) Since these four felonies have been included in the serious

felony list and because the freeze date for strikes has been changed, a juvenile

adjudication for these four felonies could constitute a strike if the qualifying juvenile is

adjudged a ward of the juvenile court in the same proceeding for at least one offense

listed in W&I section 707, subdivision (b). (People v. Garcia (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1, 6.)

       Thus it seems clear that the addition of the nine new felonies listed above to the

list of serious felonies under section 1192.7, subdivision (c), does not relate solely to

adult nongang offenders as petitioner contends. Nor does it "relate[] only to sentencing

enhancements for adult criminal offenders."

       Similarly the addition of nine felonies to the violent felony list of section 667.5,

subdivision (c) does not relate simply to the prosecution of adults. When a crime is

added to the list of violent felonies if that crime is not also a serious felony its addition to

section 667.5, subdivision (c) makes it a strike. Further, denominating a crime a violent

felony limits conduct credits, including work time and good time credits which a prisoner

can earn to only 15 percent of the sentence. (People v. Palacio (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th

252; § 2933.1.) Finally, an enhancement may be added to the subordinate term for a

violent felony. (People v. Ramos) (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 810; People v. Palacio, supra,

56 Cal.App.4th 252.)




                                               15
          While limitation upon conduct credits and the enhancement for violent subordinate

terms do not apply to juvenile court proceedings, they would apply to juveniles who are

prosecuted as adults in the criminal courts. Both Proposition 21 and the law in existence

at the time of its passage recognize some juveniles can lawfully be prosecuted in the

criminal courts.

          One of the principal defects in petitioner's challenge to the recidivist provisions of

Proposition 21 is the assumption its purpose is to address offenses under the jurisdiction

of the juvenile court. The initiative is not so limited. The measure certainly deals with

such prosecutions, however, it also purports to significantly expand the circumstances

under which juveniles can be prosecuted in adult court. Thus increasing the availability

of recidivist treatment for certain types of criminal conduct potentially effects juveniles

who are prosecuted in adult court or those who have suffered prior juvenile adjudications

which can be alleged as strikes when such juveniles reoffend and are sent to the criminal

courts.

          Petitioner also makes the erroneous assumption that Proposition 21 effects only

juveniles. It does not. The reach of initiative's stated purposes is to address crime by

street gangs as well as juveniles. While it is true street gangs include juveniles such

persons are not the exclusive membership of those gangs. As we have previously noted a

1998 National Youth Gang Survey conducted by the Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention indicated only 40 percent of gang members were 17 years of age

or under. Thus, the statutory amendments to add recidivist provisions relevant to such

gang activity will, of necessity, include adult offenders within its scope.


                                                16
       E. Changing the "Freeze Date"

       Sections 14 and 16 of Proposition 21 update the freeze date of the Three Strikes

law. The proposition enacted sections 667.1 and 1170.125 which provide that all

references to existing statutes in "three strikes" "are to those statutes as they existed on

the effective date of this act including amendments made to those statutes by this act."

Since a felony strike is any conviction or juvenile adjudication of violent or serious

felonies listed or defined in sections 667.5, subdivision (c) and 1192.7, subdivision (c),

the effect of these newly enacted sections is to update the strike list to mirror the serious

and violent felony lists as those lists read on March 8, 2000 as amended by Proposition

21.

       The enactment of sections 667.1 and 1170.125 was appropriate in order to qualify

as strikes the nine new felonies that the proposition added to the list of serious felonies

under section 1192.7, subdivision (c). Without the enactment of these sections the nine

new serious felonies would not qualify as strikes. We are persuaded that sections 667.1

and 1170.125 are reasonably related to the basic purpose of Proposition 21 which is to

increase the protection of California's citizens against violent crime committed by

juveniles and street gangs. Expansion of the crimes which can serve as strikes will

increase the likelihood of greater sentences for juveniles and gang members who commit

or have committed in the past violent crimes.

       Petitioner argues the section modifying the "freeze date" is misleading to the voter

because it relates solely to adult nongang offenders. Petitioner contends the crimes added

to the strike list which include assault with intent to commit rape, throwing acid, and


                                              17
continuous sexual abuse of a child are not gang related. The principal weakness of this

argument however is that those crimes were declared serious felonies by the Legislature

(as well as the crimes of carjacking, assault with a deadly weapon on a firefighter, and

violation of section 12022.53) prior to the enactment of this initiative. The fact these

legislatively declared serious felonies were swept into the Three Strikes law by the

enactment of Proposition 21 is a collateral consequence of the measure. Alteration of the

freeze date was essential to accomplish the purpose of the initiative. That it had a

collateral effect outside the purpose of the initiative is not fatal to its validity. (Jones,

supra, 21 Cal. 4th at p. 1157; Legislature v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 512; Brosnahan,

supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 245.)

       In sum, we are satisfied that the recidivist provisions of Proposition 21 are

reasonably germane to its purposes and that such relationship is not destroyed by the

collateral effects of the amendment to the freeze date of the Three Strikes law. We reject

the challenge on those grounds.

       F. Wiretap Provisions

       Section 13 of Proposition 21 amended section 629.52 to add section 186.22 to the

list of felony offenses for which wiretapping may be authorized. Petitioner does not

contend that section 186.22 is unrelated to juvenile and street gang activity. There is no

serious challenge in this petition to this particular amendment to section 629.52.




                                               18
       During our review of section 13 of the initiative we noted it also added Health and

Safety Code section 11370.610 to the list of offenses for which wiretapping can be

authorized. The parties had not addressed that particular portion of section 13 of the

initiative. We requested supplemental briefing from the parties in order to address the

question of whether the addition of a drug money laundering offense to the wiretap

statute was reasonably germane to the purposes of Proposition 21.




10      Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 provides: "(a) Every person who
possesses any moneys or negotiable instruments in excess of one hundred thousand
dollars ($100,000) which have been obtained as the result of the unlawful sale,
possession for sale, transportation, manufacture, offer for sale, or offer to manufacture
any controlled substance listed in Section 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057, or 11058, with
knowledge that the moneys or negotiable instruments have been so obtained, and any
person who possesses any moneys or negotiable instruments in excess of one hundred
thousand dollars ($100,000) which are intended by that person for the unlawful purchase
of any controlled substance listed in Section 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057, or 11058 and
who commits an act in substantial furtherance of the unlawful purchase, shall be punished
by imprisonment in the county jail for a term not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment
in the state prison for two, three, or four years. [¶] (b) In consideration of the
constitutional right to counsel afforded by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Section 15 of Article 1 of the California Constitution, when a case
charged under subdivision (a) involves an attorney who accepts a fee for representing a
client in a criminal investigation or proceeding, the prosecution shall additionally be
required to prove that the moneys or negotiable instruments were accepted by the
attorney with the intent to participate in the unlawful conduct described in subdivision (a)
or to disguise or aid in disguising the source of the funds or the nature of the criminal
activity. [¶] (c) In determining the guilt or innocence of a person charged under
subdivision (a), the trier of fact may consider the following in addition to any other
relevant evidence: (1) The lack of gainful employment by the person charged. [¶] (2) The
expert opinion of a qualified controlled substances expert as to the source of the assets.
[¶] (3) The existence of documents or ledgers that indicate sales of controlled
substances."

                                            19
        Petitioner filed a terse response simply asserting that the addition of Health and

Safety Code section 11370.6 to the wiretap statute was not reasonably germane to the

purposes of Proposition 21. Petitioner offered no analysis to support such assertion.

        The real party in interest (People) and their amicus California District Attorneys

Association (CDAA) filed substantial supplemental briefs persuasively arguing that drug

money laundering is an activity relevant to street gangs. Thus they contend the addition

of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 to the wiretap statute is reasonably germane

to the purpose of addressing juvenile violence and street gang activity. We agree with

real party in interest and amicus CDAA.

        First, it is virtually without dispute in this record that juveniles are significantly

involved in street gang activity (see 1998 National Youth Gang Survey published by the

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention of the U.S. Dept. of Justice, supra;

see also § 13826, subds. (a) & (b)).11 Street gangs in turn are clearly involved in drug

dealing in order to provide income. (1997 National Youth Gang Survey, Office of

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Summary and

Conclusions (<http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/97_ygs/summary.html>); § 13826, subd.

(f).)




11      A number of the articles available relevant to address the issue of juvenile activity
in street gangs include Dowie, "When Kids Commit Adult Crimes, Some Say They
Should Do Adult Time" (Oct. 1993) 13 Cal.L. 55, 58; Hagedorn, Gang Violence in the
Postindustrial Era (1998) 24 Crime & Just. 365, 393; Elsea, The Juvenile Crime Debate:
Rehabilitation, Punishment, or Prevention (Fall 1995) Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 135, 136;
Princenthal, Crimes and Offenses (1998) 15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 80-84.

                                               20
       The Legislature has clearly recognized the need to address drug activities by street

gangs including money laundering. It included money laundering within the street gang

statute. (§ 186.10; see also People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 797.)

       Given the undisputed facts that juveniles represent a significant portion of street

gangs and that those gangs regularly engage in drug transactions which also include the

legislatively recognized possibility of money laundering, the addition of Health and

Safety Code section 11370.6 to the list of felonies in the wiretap statute was reasonably

germane to the purposes of Proposition 21.

       G. Conclusion

       As we noted at the outset, Proposition 21 is a complex criminal justice reform

related to juvenile crime and the activities of street gangs which include heavy

representation by juveniles. Although the initiative is complex and includes multiple

subparts we find that it is indistinguishable from the propositions encompassing broad

criminal justice reforms approved by the Supreme Court in Raven, supra, 52 Cal.3d 336

and Brosnahan, supra, 32 Cal.3d 236. We believe this initiative is plainly

distinguishable from the circumstance presented to the Supreme Court in Jones, supra, 21

Cal.4th 1142 and therefore find it does not violate the single-subject rule.

                                      DISPOSITION

       The petition for writ of prohibition is denied.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                   HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

I CONCUR:
NARES, J.


                                             21
McDONALD, J., dissenting.

       I agree with the majority's cogent synopsis of the principles guiding our evaluation

of whether Proposition 21 offends the single-subject rule. I also agree that some

provisions of Proposition 21 are reasonably germane to other provisions and to its stated

general purpose. However, the single-subject rule requires that all of an initiative's

provisions be reasonably germane to each other and to its stated purpose. The bulk of the

repeat offender provisions and one aspect of the wiretapping provisions in Proposition 21

facially and primarily target all offenders and are not limited to juveniles or gang

members. In my view, the fact that these provisions can on occasion be applied to some

juveniles or gang members is so incidental or collateral to their primary focus and impact

that their inclusion in Proposition 21 violates the single-subject rule; they are reasonably

germane neither to other provisions of Proposition 21 nor to its stated purpose.

       To distill why I cannot subscribe to the majority's conclusion, I begin with those

aspects of the majority opinion with which I agree. I view the 32 substantive sections of

Proposition 21 as divisible into three broad subsets.1 The first subset, the gang

provisions, consists of sections of Proposition 21 that amend or enact statutes specifically



1      The majority divides Proposition 21 into four subsets by characterizing the wiretap
provisions as a discrete subset. However, the majority then allocates one of the two
wiretap provisions--the addition of a violation of the California Street Terrorism
Enforcement and Prevention Act (Pen. Code, § 186.20 et seq., referred to as the STEP
Act) to the list of wiretap-authorized offenses--to two different subsets: the gang subset
and the wiretap subset. I agree that the STEP Act violation aspect of the wiretap law
belongs properly to the gang provision category. However, the remaining wiretap
provision is then a subset of one, which highlights my concern that it is indeed a rogue
provision unrelated to the purposes and provisions concerning gang and juvenile crime.

                                              1
targeting the problems presented by street gangs.2 The second subset, the juvenile

provisions, consists of sections of Proposition 21 that amend or enact statutes addressing

juvenile crime and the juvenile justice system. The juvenile provisions apply to all

juvenile offenders regardless of whether the juvenile is also a participant in a street

gang.3 Were Proposition 21 limited to these two sets of provisions, I agree it would not

offend the single-subject rule. The majority has noted the overlap between juveniles and

gang members. An initiative that enacts a comprehensive program both to reform the

juvenile justice system and to target a more pernicious subset of juvenile offenders (e.g.

gang offenders) encompasses provisions reasonably germane to the single subject of

crimes by youths acting individually or in concert with their gangs. Moreover, were

Proposition 21 limited to juvenile and gang provisions, the risks of voter confusion and



2      Sections 3 through 10 of Proposition 21 amend portions of the STEP Act, which is
designed to combat violent street gangs. Section 11 of Proposition 21 adds gang-related
murder as a special circumstance, and portions of Section 15 of Proposition 21 add two
gang-related crimes to the provisions of Penal Code section 667.5. A portion of section
13 of Proposition 21 amends the wiretap statute (Pen. Code, § 629.52) to add violation of
the STEP Act to the crimes for which wiretaps may be authorized; however, a separate
portion of section 13 also amends the wiretap statute to add violation of Health and
Safety Code section 11370.6 (possession of funds in excess of $100,000 related to illegal
drugs) to the crimes for which a wiretap may be authorized. The inclusion of this latter
provision within Proposition 21 is itself a violation of the single-subject rule.

3      Sections 18 through 34 amend various portions of the Welfare and Institutions
Code to alter various aspects of the juvenile justice system, including: expanding the list
of offenders who must (Prop. 21, § 18), or in the prosecutor's discretion may (Prop. 21,
§ 26), be prosecuted in adult court; changing the procedures and standards for revoking a
juvenile's probation (Prop. 21, § 27); reducing in various ways the confidentiality
previously afforded to juvenile offenders (Prop. 21, §§19, 25 & 30); and making other
changes pertaining to juvenile offenders.


                                              2
deception would have been minimized. Those provisions are consonant with its title, the

purposes set forth in its findings and declarations (California Trial Lawyers Assn. v. Eu

(1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 351, 358; Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236, 246-247),

and the arguments of its proponents contained in the ballot materials.

       The third subset, the repeat offenders provision and the wiretap provision targeting

non-gang offenders, consists of sections of Proposition 21 that amend or enact statutes

addressing enhanced punishment, recidivism and permissible wiretapping not directly

related to juvenile or gang crime. In my view, the inclusion of the third subset of

provisions offends the single-subject rule. The bulk of the repeat offender provisions and

the wiretap provision target all offenders regardless of their ages or gang affiliations, and

any relationship between the repeat offender provisions or the wiretap provision and

Proposition 21's other provisions and its stated purpose is largely fortuitous.

       Repeat Offender Provisions

       Proposition 21 expands the list of violent felonies that qualify for enhanced

punishments available under Penal Code section 667.5.4 (Prop. 21, § 15.) The newly

added violent felonies include (1) any robbery (§ 211); (2) any arson of an inhabited

structure or property (§ 451, subd. (b)); (3) exploding destructive devices causing any

bodily injury (§ 12309); (4) any kidnapping (§ 207); (5) assault in violation of section

220; (6) any carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)); (7) any first degree burglary (§ 460, subd. (a))

if a non-accomplice was present in the residence at the time of the burglary; and (8) any



4      All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.

                                              3
violation of section 12022.53.5 I recognize, and the majority sub silencio concedes, that

the only impact of adding these nine offenses to the violent felony list is to more harshly

punish adults or juveniles prosecuted as adults who commit those offenses; the only

consequences that Proposition 21 imposes on a person who commits one of these newly

listed offenses are a limitation on conduct credits available to, and an added enhancement

to prison term imposed on, persons prosecuted and punished in adult court.6 Thus, these

nine additions to the violent felonies list do not target problems created by juvenile

offenders generally or gang members specifically. Instead, these nine provisions identify

specified offenses rather than specified offenders and increase the punishment for all

adults who commit the specified offenses.




5      Section 15 of Proposition 21 also added two gang-related offenses to the violent
felony list: extortion for gang purposes in violation of the STEP Act (§§ 518/186.22) or
threats or intimidation of victims or witnesses for gang purposes in violation of the STEP
Act (§§ 136.1/186.22). I agree that adding those two provisions to the section 667.5 list
of violent felonies is reasonably germane to the other provisions and the purposes of
Proposition 21; my disagreement with the majority involves whether the other additions
made by section 15 of Proposition 21 are also reasonably germane to Proposition 21's
other provisions and central purpose.

6       The majority opinion, in a continuation of its refrain that harsher punishment of
juveniles under the "three strikes" law is reasonably germane to Proposition 21's central
purpose of reducing juvenile and gang crime, notes that another consequence of adding
an offense to the violent felony list is to qualify that offense as a strike "if that crime is
not also a serious felony." This observation, although true, is irrelevant because it
appears that all of the offenses added by Proposition 21 to the violent felony list were
already listed as serious felonies (see former § 1192.7, subds. (c)(10), (14), (15), (16),
(18), (19), (20), (27) & (28)), and most would have qualified as strikes, even had Section
15 of Proposition 21 not added them to the violent felony list.


                                              4
       Although the majority opinion correctly points out that gang members and

juveniles who are prosecuted as adults are also subject to the changes to the violent

felonies list, it is by fortuity rather than design that these provisions might impact the

problems targeted by, or have any relationship to, the other juvenile and gang provisions

contained in Proposition 21. If an initiative's articulated purpose is to target one problem

(juvenile and gang crime) and many of its provisions are tailored toward that purpose, but

a separate group of its provisions (here, the additions to section 667.5) facially targets a

different problem (adult crime) with only incidental or peripheral effects on the

ostensibly targeted problem, I do not believe all of the initiative's provisions are

reasonably germane to each other or to the general purpose of the initiative. (Brosnahan

v. Brown, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 245.) It is not fatal to an initiative's validity if its

provisions have collateral effects outside its core purposes (ibid.), but I do not believe an

initiative complies with the single-subject rule if its provisions only advance its core

purposes as an indirect or collateral consequence of being applicable to all members of

society.

       Moreover, amalgamating the repeat offender provisions with the juvenile and gang

provisions invokes our Supreme Court's concern, expressed in Senate of the State of Cal.

v. Jones (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1142, about voter confusion and deception. The title and

findings, as well as the ballot arguments of the proponents and opponents, of Proposition

21 focused on the need to address juvenile and gang crime and contained no hint that its

provisions also targeted adult offenders. Although the Proposition 21 title and summary

prepared by the Attorney General, and its analysis by the Legislative Analyst, briefly


                                                5
adverted to the additions to the serious and violent felonies list, the risk of voter

confusion and deception is significant because the declared principal focus is to target

juveniles and gangs, and scant attention is devoted to the distinct and significant impact

of the initiative on persons who are neither juveniles nor gang members. The People,

noting that the ballot materials mention the violent offender provisions and include the

complete text of the amendments, argue there cannot be either voter confusion or

deception because "[w]e must assume the voters duly considered and comprehended

these materials." (Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 349.) Although courts

have previously indulged the fiction that voters read and understand complex ballot

initiatives (see Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization

(1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 243-244; Brosnahan v. Brown, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 251-252), I

question how that fiction can coexist with Jones' affirmation that the single-subject rule

safeguards against a combination of unrelated provisions that would confuse or mislead

voters. (Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1168.) If voters are presumed to read and fully

understand measures and hence are never confused or deceived, the single-subject rule

would never serve its underlying purposes and would become the toothless rule that

Jones specifically disavowed. (Id. at p. 1158.) I believe Jones effectively eschewed

employment of this fiction for single-subject challenges.

       I also believe Proposition 21's expansion of the list of serious felonies that qualify

as prior felony convictions under the three strikes law violates the single-subject rule.

Proposition 21 accomplishes this expansion by first explicitly adding offenses to the list

of serious felonies contained in section 1192.7, subdivision (c) and then enacting section


                                               6
1170.125. (Prop. 21, §§ 16, 17.) The explicit additions to the list of qualifying serious

felonies include: (1) exploding a device causing bodily injury (§ 12309); (2) any assault

on a peace officer or firefighter in violation of section 245; (3) all violations of sections

245.2, 245.3 or 245.5; (4) discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling, vehicle or

aircraft (§ 246); (5) shooting a firearm from a vehicle (§ 12034, subds. (c) and (d)); (6)

intimidating victims and witnesses (§ 136.1); (7) threats to commit a crime resulting in

death or great bodily injury (§ 422); (8) conspiracy to commit any serious felony (§ 182,

subd. (a)(1)); and (9) any felony that would also constitute a felony violation of section

186.22 of the STEP Act. Proposition 21 then adds section 1170.125, which retrofits the

three strikes law to include as qualifying felonies all post-June 30, 1993, additions to the

serious felonies list.7 The post-June 30, 1993, legislative additions to the serious felonies

thus converted into qualifying serious felonies by section 1170.125 include a number of

offenses added in 1998, including (1) throwing acid or flammable substances in violation

of section 244; (2) continuous sexual abuse of a child in violation of section 288.5; (3)

rape in concert in violation of section 264.1; and (4) any violation of section 12022.53.

(See Stats. 1998, ch. 936, § 13.5, p. 5436.) It also converted carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)),




7        The courts had construed the provisions of sections 1192.7 and 667 as freezing the
list of felonies that would qualify as strikes to the lists within those statutes as they
existed on June 30, 1993. (See, e.g., People v. O'Roark (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 872, 878-
879, fn. 3.) Under Section 1170.125, which changes the reference date from June 30,
1993, to March 8, 2000, all legislative additions to the lists that occurred between
June 30, 1993 and March 8, 2000, as well as the additions made by Proposition 21, are
converted into qualifying serious felonies under the three strikes law.

                                               7
an offense added to section 1192.7, subdivision (c) in October 1993 (see People v. Nava

(1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1732, 1736-1737), into a qualifying serious felony.

       I view sections 16 and 17 of Proposition 21 as transgressing the policies and

purposes of the single-subject rule in two distinct ways. First, as with Proposition 21's

additions to the violent felonies list, most of the newly-added serious felonies impact

every offender, regardless of their ages or gang affiliations, because the three strikes

consequences arise from the nature of the offense and not the characteristics of the

offender. I do not believe that increased punishment for all offenders can be considered

reasonably germane to the subject of reducing juvenile or gang crime merely because

juvenile and gang offenders are a subset of all offenders.8 Second, the danger that voters

were confused or misled by Proposition 21's disparate provisions appears particularly

applicable to the changes to the three strikes law made by sections 16 and 17 of

Proposition 21. The most conscientious voter could not determine from a review of the



8       The majority concludes that the additions to the serious felony list are reasonably
germane to combating juvenile crime because they expand the list of felonies that can be
the subject of a juvenile adjudication and count as strikes under section 667, subdivision
(d)(3) if the juvenile later reoffends. It is true that five of the felonies added to section
1192.7, subdivision (c) (e.g. violation of sections 186.22, 246, 136.1, 245, subd. (a) and
12034, subd. (c)) had previously been listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707,
subdivision (b) but not in section 1192.7, subdivision (c), and therefore would not qualify
as strikes if the juvenile subsequently reoffended. (See People v. Garcia (1999) 21
Cal.4th 1.) The majority reasons that closing this loophole is reasonably germane to
combating juvenile crime because juveniles will be deterred from committing these
crimes as a result of the collateral consequences attached to these offenses. Even if
adding these five offenses to section 1192.7, subdivision (c) is reasonably germane to
combating juvenile crime by closing this loophole, the remainder of the additions to the
serious felony list do not have any similar loophole-closing germaneness to combating
juvenile or gang crime.

                                              8
Title and Findings of the initiative or from the ballot arguments for or against the

initiative that any changes were being made to the three strikes law. Instead, a voter

would discover these proposed changes only by reading the text of sections 16 and 17,

and from the comments by the Attorney General and the Legislative Analyst that certain

undisclosed changes were proposed.9 However, a voter reading the proposed text would

be misled into believing that certain felonies--throwing acid or flammable substances in

violation of section 244, continuous sexual abuse of a child in violation of section 288.5,

rape in concert in violation of section 264.1, or violation of section 12022.53--were not

among those currently deemed to be serious felonies under section 1192.7, subdivision

(c), even though they had been added to the statute in 1998, because Proposition 21 lists

those offenses in italics, which signify matters being added to the statute.10 Although

section 16 of Proposition 21 might be necessary to convert the 1998 additions to section

1192.7, subdivision (c) into felonies qualifying for three strikes treatment, Proposition 21



9       The Attorney General's "Official Title and Summary" states only that Proposition
21 "[d]esignates additional crimes as violent and serious felonies, thereby making
offenders subject to longer sentences." The "Analysis by the Legislative Analyst" states
only that "[t]his measure revises the list of specific crimes defined as serious or violent
offenses, thus making most of them subject to the longer sentence provisions of existing
law related to serious or violent offenses. In addition, these crimes would count as
'strikes' under the Three Strikes law." (See Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec.
(March 7, 2000) pp. 44-47.) These unilluminating comments do not disclose or even
summarize the content of these proposed changes and require the voter to parse the text
of the ballot measure to determine the extent of the actual changes.

10      The text of Proposition 21 informs the voters that the initiative "amends, repeals,
and adds sections to the Penal Code . . . ; therefore, existing provisions proposed to be
deleted are printed in strikeout type and new provisions proposed to be added are printed
in italic type to indicate that they are new."

                                             9
is misleading insofar as it purports to add those offenses to section 1192.7, subdivision

(c)'s serious felony list. (Cf. Senate of the State of Cal. v. Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th at

pp. 1163-1166 [provision of proposed initiative requiring citizen approval of legislators'

salary adjustments held not reasonably germane to problem of legislators' self-interest

because it misleads by falsely implying that current law gave legislators control over own

salary].)

       Wiretap Provisions

       I believe one of the wiretap provisions of section 13 of Proposition 21 violates the

single-subject rule. This provision, which represents perhaps the starkest example of a

stealth provision hidden within the mountain of material provided to the voters, amends

the provisions of the wiretap statute to add two crimes to the list of violations for which a

wiretap may be authorized: violation of the STEP Act (new § 629.52, subd. (a)(3)); and

violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 (§ 629.52, subd. (a)(1), as

amended). The majority opinion points out, and I agree, that adding a felony violation of

the STEP Act to the crimes for which a wiretap may be authorized is reasonably germane

to combating juvenile and gang crime. However, I do not agree that permitting a wiretap

when there is a suspected violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 is

germane to combating juvenile and gang crime. Real Party in Interest and Amici Curiae

seek to draw a nexus between this wiretap statute and juvenile/gang crime purposes of

Proposition 21 by asserting that gangs and their juvenile members engage in narcotics

trafficking to generate income, and therefore wiretaps in cases of suspected money

laundering are germane to combating juvenile and gang crime. However, Health and


                                              10
Safety Code section 11370.6 is not a money laundering offense.11 More importantly,

Real Party in Interest's argument overlooks that this aspect of the wiretap law would

never have any independent purpose or operation except in non-gang related contexts. In

any case in which a prosecutor suspects a person is violating Health and Safety Code

section 11370.6 as part of his gang's narcotics business, that perpetrator would be

committing a "felony violation of [the STEP Act]" for which a wiretap is authorized

under new section 629.52, subdivision (a)(3). The same possession of the cash by

persons outside of the gang context would fall outside new section 629.52, subdivision

(a)(3), and instead fall within section 629.52, subdivision (a)(1) as amended by

Proposition 21. It is precisely this latter context that is not reasonably germane to

Proposition 21's purpose and other provisions. To the extent this aspect of the wiretap

provision is directed at gangs, it is redundant; to the extent it is not redundant, it is not

germane to the purposes of Proposition 21.

       In addition to offending the germaneness requirement, I believe this wiretapping

aspect of Proposition 21 violates the policy of the single-subject rule to protect voters

from confusion and deception. The ballot materials contain no hint of the presence of the




11     Contrary to the arguments posited by Real Party in Interest and Amici Curiae,
Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 does not criminalize the laundering of narcotics
proceeds. Instead, it seeks to stem large-scale drug operations by making it a felony to
possess cash in excess of $100,000 with certain culpable knowledge or intent. (People v.
Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 797.) Although money laundering is a felony, that
crime is defined and punished by sections 186.10 and 186.11.

                                               11
provision adding Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 to the wiretap law.12 Instead,

the only notice that this provision exists is the fact that, within a proposition containing

innumerable subsections and thousands of words, a single number (i.e., 11370.6) is

italicized in section 13 of the text of Proposition 21 included in the ballot. This buried

treasure, which appears to have no application in the sphere of gang- or juvenile-related

crime, expands the authority of law enforcement to invade the important privacy interests

of individual citizens.13 Although the electorate might be willing to sacrifice a portion

of their privacy in the interests of combating the drug trade, it should do so knowingly

and not on the basis of a rogue provision secreted into an unrelated measure.

       Neither the repeat offender provisions nor the provisions of section 13 of

Proposition 21, adding violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 to the

wiretap provisions of section 629.52, are reasonably germane to the other parts of

Proposition 21 or to its general purpose; and therefore Proposition 21 violates the single-

subject rule. Because severance of the non-germane portions is not an available remedy




12     The Attorney General's summary of Proposition 21 states only that the proposition
"authorizes wiretapping for gang activities." However, adding Health and Safety Code
section 11370.6 to section 629.52 provides authority for wiretapping in non-gang
contexts.

13    Our Legislature, by expressly recognizing that eavesdropping on private
communications "has created a serious threat to the free exercise of personal liberties and
cannot be tolerated in a free and civilized society" (§ 630), has at least indirectly
recognized that an individual citizen has an important privacy interest in being free from
eavesdropping.


                                              12
(Senate of the State of Cal. v. Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1168), Proposition 21 is

invalid under article II, section 8, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution.




                                                                             McDONALD, J.




                                              13

				
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