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JIW10 cell 1 CAP Rapporteur Sheet Move 2

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					JOINT IRREGULAR WARFARE 2010 MOVE 2
RAPPORTEUR NOTES

DAY 1 - Monday

Introductions

Facilitator: Order of business

Senior Mentors to start:
HAWLEY:
1. Make sure everyone is on the same base plan, then we can move forward
2. Notebook of game scenario with more information is available
3. This is the plan that evolved from the 4 blue cells in Move 1.
4. In the overview, nothing new there. Talks generally about security coalition.
5. Section 1.1. – Confronting heavily transnational heavily armed forces.
        Approaches to national security
        Two pronged approach – CENTAM are interested in getting help, but there are
forces acting against us.
6. Section 1.3 outlines 4 policy objectives. These are given by the 7 friends.
7. Section 2.0 – major considerations that the blue cells identified should be taken into
account.
8. Guidance principles
9. Recurring themes in this wargame and overtime.
10. Section 3.2 – Issues expecting the 7 friends to deal with. These are strategic issues.
        Create an incentive based approach.
11. Page 6 – undertaking OSS engagement. Special representative is pushing that to
Washington. We are expecting Washington to get involved in that.
12. Security coalition strategy is penned by the special representative. Work on 2 levels,
regional and state.

IRC regional plan questions:
Harmon - Policy objectives 1 and 3, have 6 sub-bullets. Are they prioritized?
Hawley – no. focus is on the well armed powerful transnational organized criminals.
Harmon – in the worst case scenario list, there is no scenario that the gangs will over
throw the government. Is that a fair assumption that the government will not be over
thrown?
Hawley – Counter insurgency issue cannot be reduced. It’s a nasty environment. Focus is
on the bigger transnational problem.

Chuck: Defense vs. law enforcement.
Nugent: can we assume that someone else is cranking out national plans to support our
regional plan?
Hawley: I wouldn’t exclude them. The National security agenda needs to be laced with
the regional plan.


RAPPORTEUR NAME: FAISAL ANSARI

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Larry Regens: if we ask what are the things in the security reform.
Hawley: We need to focus on the theory of change. That’s the big question. How do you
do something at the regional AND national level that is congruent and gets things done?

CARDONA: If we talk about the long term strategy, last time we talked about free trade,
economic prosperity, and the effects this brings to elicit crime and trafficking, who are
the other major players that will have an impact or will be at the table for policy making?
HAWLEY: We cannot answer that right now.
HUME: I don’t see on the game book about what happens if one of the set of friends
pulls out?
HAWLEY: The special representative has taken that into consideration, and there is a
special team working on that separate issue.
MAXWELL: To what extent do we make up information that will come up from the
assessments?
HAWLEY: This is a marvelous treaty, and it is backed by a lot of talk. Now we have to
create a conversation so that they will appreciate our campaign design, and why that is
crucial.


MICHELLE HUGHES: Effort and body of work for security sector reform:
Not a lot of people have done security reform, while others have a solid foundation in it.
We need to step back and understand what it means.

   1. This game is not a U.S. construct. There is a practitioner’s guide for this type of
      situation.
   2. Security sector reform identifies that the security and justice department cannot be
      separated.
   3. We are changing the mindset for security reform.
   4. We need to strengthen the rule of law.
   5. all sections of operation must be planned for
   6. We need a comprehensive method.

Implementing the SSR:
   1. It is a process. Just as we are doing QDR’s, this is actually a security reform topic.
   2. Its real value is in taking these stove piped activities and it uncover where the
      cracks and seams are.
   3. Non-state actors are a big part of the SSR than anyone else.
   4. We need to remember that whether we are talking about OSS, they are providing
      the security to these answers, even if they are non-state security providers.
   5. role of civic society in creating over sign capable

We are dealing this problem as an anti trafficking problem, like in Albania. Strategies for
consultation. How do you bring in the civic society players than can bolster those values?


RAPPORTEUR NAME: FAISAL ANSARI

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Adapting frameworks:
Thinking in terms of how to create security partners rather than how to create defense
partners. It’s a mind set. Try not to just think in term of “how do we develop military.”
They are going to be different in every.

Will all due respect to my colleagues in the DOS INL, they are all looking at
development in the longer model. You have to link with the law enforcement there, and
identifying what those are, and doing it in partnership, and keeping it compatible as that
long worth development, that’s the goal.

The US GOVERNEMNT is not doing this right. We do not make partnerships. We as a
government have not agreed on a development model in a security capability. We don’t
have a JUSTICE model either. Every agency is working in a different vision with what
development looks like in their sector. I feel that the military can lead through with this
very strongly. In our short planning timelines that our commanders insist on, it really
changes the dynamic and allows us to get to some agreement on the development model
that we eventually want to model our resources into.

END MICHELLE HUGHS

FACILITATOR:
   IDENTIFY THE MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS THAT                                 GOES     INTO
     CRAFTING A MISSION STATEMENT:
   JUSTIFY AND EXPLAIN WHAT IT IS WE ARE ABOUT

Emphasis on steady state ops.

CELL LEADER CHUCK: we need to leave the mission statement open-ended, so that
the circumstances indicate a higher probability of success.

HUME: We should start with the problems, and then craft a mission statement out of it.

COGHILL: whose mission is this?
NUGENT: From the plan dated in April, it tells you what this regional plan (us govt plan)
is looking at, and our mission is the subset that we are after (4.6). \
HUME: We need to identify the problem, and then we can write the mission. We need to
see the major considerations.


1. a:
GREG: Then let’s look at and see what the major considerations are. Any thoughts?

BEMIS: This is going to be inter-departmental. DHS, DOD, DOS, etc. It will be a
comprehensive approach.
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CHUCK: baseline problems: transnational, regional activities. This may be too broad; we
might have to trim that down later. But that’s the root of the problem. We can probably
combine them eventually.

BEMIS: if you are going down along that line, social and political structures, and security
sector structures need to be taken into considerations.

JABRUN: mission is to find regional solutions. We have to look at the national elements
too.

REGENS: There is also a time constraint. We have to find solutions that are sustainable
by the host countries and the region. If it becomes self sustained, where is the revenue
stream going to come from? If you take the EU experience as an analog, it was a long
crafting union, form the Euro Coal and Steel community to a common political
community. You are asking for an act of magic to have these communities come together
in this very short period of time. We might have a 5 year plan, but we don’t do 5 year
budgets.

Greg: good point. If part of the problem is corruption in the judicial system, I am not
going to have a good security system until that is fixed.

REGENS: Lets start by saying “we have an objective in mind, is it feasible and how long
will it take to get there.”

HENDRICKS: what are the regional issues, and tensions? What are the major social
economic conditions that are the root of the problem?

MCCARTHY: that’s all in the game book.

HARMON: one of the considerations they mentioned that by bolstering the security, we
shouldn’t undermine the security.

COGHILL: access to land basing is limited. That is one of our considerations.

GREG: one of the things we have to wrestle with, in order to building capacity, it’s not
just us doing it. We are trying to build their capacity.

CHUCK: there a balance there, and there’s an attitude there that “if they could have done
it, they would have.” But I don’t believe in that view. We need to see what best practices
are for them, and we can do that with the power of the purse.

BEMIS: Extending on what Mr. Farah said, the central problem is corruption. Sometimes
you have a trade off between comprehensive approaches, but sometimes it doesn’t work
because the problem is endemic. You have to set new prosecutors, security forces that
can be counted upon. It might take the U.S. and EU by going in and politically beating up
RAPPORTEUR NAME: FAISAL ANSARI

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the govt and tell them that we are not going to help you until you get tough on corruption.
They need an anti corruption police, etc. Things are not going to move.

REGENS: Like the Columbian government had incentives for performing against the
FARC. It was in their own enlightened self interest to do certain things. If we are going to
craft a plan here, presumably, corruption exists for a reason. Those govts generate
resources. You are basically saying, you want to take 300 yrs of experience, and undo
major threads of that in 5 years. From an engineering perspective, that is very very
interesting.

GREG: Now we are going into why corruption is endemic. If you want to get rid of the
corruption, you have to go back to the issue of interests. How does it advance the interest
of the local populations?

CHUCK: an anti corruption unit that we provide some support to that has the tendency to
make the big splash media stories, and make the populace look at the direction of which
way to go, it might work. Other than that, no one cares about an anti corruption outfit that
goes after the coffee industry.

GREEN: I’m with you, chief. ANTI CORRUPTION UNIT AGAINST THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM.

HENDRICKS: The main problem in these countries is the issues with the indigenous
people against the white elites. A lot of the governments are not trying to make it better
for the people; they want to remain in power as the elites.

NUGENT: Then you have to make incentives where they have to look at the best
interests of the people. This is the whole issue of the SSR. How do I get into the business
of looking out for the little people?

GERG: two things of overwhelming importance:
1. MONEY,
2. The way they look at the United States.
How to do change the perception of what you are going to change, so that it is understood
by the key players in these countries.

GREEN: We have to elaborate that we are here to assist, not to take over. Perceptions are
important.

CHUCK: in strategic communications, we make our allegiance to CARB known well, so
it’s not US, it’s the friends of Central America that is going to El Salvador.

BEMIS: We have to remain as invisible as possible. (Room agrees)


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HENDRICKS: well it’s not exactly “invisible,” but we just have to look as friendly as
possible.

NUGENT: in the game design, quite deliberately so to take off the table the phony jazz
talks about the social system, and to answer the question of the military objective. If I
was going to build a program not withstanding the extra social stuff, what would that
program look like? IF I am a title 10 junkie, what type of tech would I need to do the
missions 5 or 10 years from now? That’s what we are trying to figure out.

HUGHES: before you go down that road, I’d hate to see you pass up the strategic
communications plan. What if you say “we have a problem in this region in strategic
communications and the perceptions?” just a thought there. I was hearing a number of
different views there on the important issue of communications, and I would hate for u to
leave that.

COGHILL: Isn’t that one of our deliverables?

GREG: Point well taken and we will get back to that. Let’s focus on the mission
statement too.

TAN: Shouldn’t you make a time frame of what you are looking at.

NUGENT: what are the rest of the slides? Let’s look at them so we know what context
we are working with and with what time frame for the purpose of this exercise.

HUME: well if you look at slide 7, and figure that out, then we are reverse engineering
what we need to be doing.

NUGENT: well I’m not saying we should do number 7, just that we should know what
context to be working with.

CHUCK: I think we are close enough to work on the mission statement.


1. b. MISSION STATEMENT (PURPOSE AND ENDSTATE).



HAWLEY: I’m going to throw out this idea: I think this is a very complex long term
challenge. If you were talking to your son or daughter, and they were facing 8 years of
college education and post graduate education, and you say “YOUR MISSION IS...” and
if you outline that whole thing to them, they will walk out the room saying “to hell with
this.” But if you say that “your mission is to get through this first semester” then that is
more realistic. What is the mission to get to phase 0? My view is, all the answer to get to

RAPPORTEUR NAME: FAISAL ANSARI

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phase 0 define what phase 1, 2, and 3 are. Conceptually, we are doing so much. We
should craft our mission statement for the next 6 months. We should confine the mission
statement for just getting through that ‘first semester.’

CHUCK: We have a pretty standardized missions statement, and this might be super
simple, but we can follow that. The alternative is, if we just run it for six months and end
it, then we loose some continuity.

HAWLEY: I wouldn’t call it an end state, but a “next state.” And the next state is to get
to the end of phase 0. That’s my 2 cents in here, to limit and define the problem.

CHUCK: we do have to have that fidelity. If we look at El Salvador, what we are going
to find is what sector we are looking at, some are here, some are there.

HUME: I think it’s important to have short term goals and the over arching goal. Iraq was
what we did 6 months at a time, but someone should have looked at the bigger picture
and said this is something that will take years to come, not just 6 months.

COGHILL: I agree. We need the overarching goal and objective.

BEMIS: This is very different from other missions the military is going to undertake.
There is an end state, but no clear vision of how to get there. Maybe the way to do the
mission statement is to find the role it will be playing in this inter-agency mission, and
the end state reform. Think of it as a coordinating function.

HUGHES: You are a good place, but technically there is no ENDSTATE unless
southcomm goes out of business. The world ENDSTATE is not compatible with the
steady state process.

GREG: Instead of saying ENDSTATE, we should program ourselves for “PROGRAM
FOR 2027.”

REGENS: That’s where we need some word-smithing.

CHUCK: IRC security assists the CARB and member nations to reduce illicit
transnational activity in CENTAM ….. (On slide).

HUME: Where is the “in order to?” why are we doing this?

TAN: Why don’t we stick to the 5 w’s? Who what when where why for the mission
statement? (Room agrees).

HUME: I’m a fan. Amen.

GREG: is the “illicit transnational activities” broad enough for what we are aiming for?
RAPPORTEUR NAME: FAISAL ANSARI

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NUGENT: you don’t want to link everything, so that if one thing fails, it doesn’t take two
other things with it.

CHUCK: we cannot say one or the other. We have to operate at a regional and a national
level.

NUGENT: Conceptually this may be a planning restraint. There are two issues. The
reform in the security sector, and then to figure out how to do business in this region.
Collaborative structure allows those who want to play to play, and those who need to
work on things to work on things.

REGENS: can we add “including regional collaboration to reduce illicit transnational
activity” to the mission statement? We want them to take care of their own security but
also collaborate with the region, because they don’t have the capacity. BUILD, that’s the
important word.

HUME: Is telling a nation with a security apparatus, is that okay? Develop? Enhance?
Build? Create? Refine? Which word do we use?

NUGENT: They don’t have a mechanism for collaboration. We are developing a regional
structure, and improve the national structure. We can only do this in a multi national
setting.

REGENS: you are enhancing the host nation capacity, and building something new in the
regional multinational capacity.

CHUCK: We have hit both regional and national. We haven’t hit the “when.”

NUGENT: your assistance is a 5 year campaign.

HAWLEY: Where do you get the 5 years from?

NUGENT: it’s in the book. By then we have to have self sustaining forces.

HAWLEY: that’s when their security self sustainment should start. We are not going to
be done in 5 years, maybe in 15.

GREG: your most specific language in the plan is phase 3. Vertical integration of the
security apparatus.

HAWLEY: Self Sustaining is a tough challenge. We will have to work at some systems
right now. This is a long term deal. I’m just disputing the 5 year construct. That would be
constraining to the whole project.

CHCUK: I say we don’t put time lines on it, and we go by phase.
RAPPORTEUR NAME: FAISAL ANSARI

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NUGENT: So you want “vague and long-term?”

HAWLEY: it’s not just a 3 yr effort. We are talking about the very long commitment in
the steady state universe.

MCCARTHY: How about an enduring campaign?

HAWLEY: we agree that a 2027 is a good enough marker. Once you are in, you’re in. If
you go to ambiguity, it confuses our objective. I think it’s an important aspect of steady
state engagement. If you say enduring, well what the hell does that mean? 2027 is a good
marker.

DISCUSSION ON MISSION STATEMENT JARGON (to vs. through, through vs.
through out, etc.).

HAWLEY: Greg, how are we doing on time? (1612hrs)

GREG: We are behind. We have to report to the meeting and deliver these by 1645 hrs.
We have just fewer than 30 mins to get the purpose and end state done.

HUME: is the end state then, the reduction of transnational activity? Or until it stops
threatening state stability?

NUGENT: We have an enemy that reacts. When we chased drugs when I was a boy, they
had sail boats and planes. Now they use submarines. We have to constantly evolve.

HAWLEY: CARB needs to be an adaptive institution through out this process. It’s not
just “getting more cops out there,” its more than that. If that’s the issue we are looking at,
that’s the end state we need. Add political stability, or prospects for economic
opportunities.

CHUCK: there will be a lot of illicit benefits…

HAWLEY: I agree with Michelle that the world ENDSTATE is a bad word. How about
“desired outcome?” The DOS uses the word “GOAL.”

HUME: Well that hurts the DOD outcome. We should pick a word that doesn’t hurt
either of us. “DESIRED OUTCOME” is good.

COGHILL: what I have is “illicit activity no longer threatens CARB and member
nations’ sovereignty, political stability and economic prosperity, and security.
Illicit activity is effectively managed by host nations and regional security structures.

GREG: can you say “simply manage security threats?” and leave it broad?
RAPPORTEUR NAME: FAISAL ANSARI

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COGHILL: By saying “ALL” you are over extending yourself. Maybe we can replace
“all” with “transnational” and leave it open to interpretation.

HUGHES: Id hate to word smith on you while you are typing, but I have some words to
use. Should we add “host nation and regional security structures?

GREG: We have 25 mins here before we have to ENDEX here and go to the
presentation. Let’s look at the next slide (2.a) and see what we have to say.



2. a.

NUGENT: we have to frame it in the sense that they are doing it; it is their idea... not
what we are doing to/for them.

HAWLEY: I am trying to get to the issue of some historical narrative that I want to avoid
in our effort. This is a very straight forward comment, and I’m afraid drug cartels have
radio stations. They are going to drive us crazy. We are walking into a mine field, and are
going to get killed if we don’t know what we are doing.

HENDRICKS: That’s the issue. There’s a big issue if we are talking about Costa Rica.
They only have an indigenous population of just 1%, and the integration of Costa Rica is
of a friendly status. As far as the other countries are concerned, that’s what I am trying to
wrap my thoughts around, just by dealing with security, are we dealing with all these
issues? Why are we having these issues of drug trafficking, etc? It all comes down to the
under lying issue of the politics between the indigenous and the upper class.

HAWLEY: it’s a fairly straight forward comment that we are here to help.

BEMIS: I think we should put it in terms of murder, mayhem, evils of trafficking, and the
activity of gangs and narco-traffickers. This is a horrible situation for your people, and
your government wants us to help with the problem.

HUGHES: you are forgetting the level of distrust. They are two things that have to be
blended here. The rule of law for the common person, and accountability for those who
are restoring the rule of law.

GREG: There is a psycho-social factor that is creating an environment of fear. Your life
is in peril every day you life. This initiative is intended to address the primary right of
your life, to remove fear. The right words to craft that are something you can play with,
but that’s what we need to get at.


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CHUCK: How about the rule of law is applicable to all citizens.

HARMON: I think we are setting expectations to fail. The narrative will sound good, but
if we don’t deliver, then it will back fire.

BEMIS: Unless you are talking to a group of sociologists, it doesn’t have too much
impact. STOP MUGGINGS sounds a lot more agreeable than “enforce the rule of law.”

REGENS: Some of these narratives you cannot lift. The question is, ‘what benefits are
they going to reap?’ Or you are coming down here really because you don’t want to do
anything with your drug problem locally, so you are coming down here to combat it.
There is a fundamental mistrust of the whole thing.

HENDRICKS: yes, there is mistrust because the government doesn’t deliver.

NUGENT: if I don’t trust my government locally, but I embed them in an international
system from which they cannot hide, if you don’t trust the government, let us help so they
have to be transparent.

COGHILL: What if they distrust the neighbors even more?

NUGENT: eventually we run into things that will go wrong. This is about how the weight
of your narrative leans over theirs, not over throw theirs.

HUGHES: These are things that resonate, and if u see the other strategic narratives of
what the other organizations are saying, they have got to support the actions you are
going to take to counter those particular elements.

CHUCK: Remember the mission statement and who we are targeting in this rule of law.

NUGENT: so we should have 2 messages: 1. it’s going to get better for you. 2. its going
to get worse for the bad guys.

HAWLEY: I think if we don’t get this right, its going to haunt us. The second narrative
that we have to counter is that we are perpetuating a very bad system. We have to at least
have a narrative that says that things have to be on a different trajectory. There’s another
population that is the official population, and a narrative for them will be tricky, as they
are the ones who will have to sign up and give up some power. We need to provide some
incentives for them to provide this jump, so it will be better for them over all. This is a
very complex problem. So the three pieces of that narrative is evidence enough of the
illicit problem.

GREG: we are out of time.
End of working on slides for tonight.

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CHUCK: For tomorrow, looking at the next slide ahead, we have campaign design, bi-
phase, operation priorities, etc. what I like to do there is take every body sitting on that
side of Michelle to work on phase 2 and 3, thinking that 0 and 1 have been completed.
Just put down some considerations of priority and effort. I would so, to follow through,
this side will do 0 and 1. This way we will have a lively discussion.

Just a few considerations: The tasks are straight forward. Take a look at it to develop a
model in your mind that you want to do these things in this prioritized order.


GREG: we need volunteers for sub tasks.

END OF DAY.




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DAY 2 - Tuesday

GREG: We got into a good discussion about the narrative yesterday; we should pick that
up today. We also have the people selected for the sub-groups.

Tomorrow morning we will discuss gang issues, and Cardona can lead that discussion.

We should continue our discussion from the plenary about the SSR tonight.

HAWLEY: This is going to be the hardest day that we have, and it will bleed over into
tomorrow. They are all linked: the campaign design for 4.6 and observational priorities
are a discussion that we should have, to know where our operational priorities are, and
that will indicate the stake holders that are involved in the national and the regional level.
        The disaggregation here enables us to think of this in a step by step process. There
are complex questions, but we can go by it in order. This is an all inclusive effort and we
are a part of this. The WNN blip we say today opens the door into more conversation.
Costa Rica doesn’t have a military. They have a civilian security. The constitution forbids
a military.

HUGHES: Id like to throw out some SSR rules to get everyone started, and you can get
to work. There are 10 basic guidelines:
    1. Let’s look at this 4.69 military defense reform. The question for you guys from
       the military side is that how are you going to engage non military in your design?
       You want to bring in the relevant inter-agency so you can get their perspective.
       The foremost question is how do you bring non military partners into your
       design?
    2. Capacity building, not train and equip, is about the process as much as it is about
       the product. Think of the campaign design not as an end product, but about
       designing a security sector management process within the host nation that they
       can sustain and they can support. Are they capable of handling national budgets?
       Making policy? Sustain their forces?
    3. Strategic narrative is not a pitch for military action for SSR. Take the campaign
       design to execute the strategic narrative, and not the other way around. Don’t
       leave perception management and IO and STRATCOMM out. Turn that around.
    4. Find out where the centers of gravity are for other lines of effort. It’s not just who
       is leading them, it’s about how they are leading them and other LOE’s. How is
       that taking place? This way you can ensure 4.6 is running in constant with the
       other 4. - points. What can defense do in these other lines of effort and they make
       their progress? Think of the military as a platform (logistical capabilities,
       transportation, management, ATC) for civilian efforts. STRATCOMM probably
       has real organic intelligence assets on the ground that can find intel and
       information that can be provided about what’s going on, which can be released to
       other LOE’s.
    5. Throw out your assumptions about these host nations. We are trying to build
       security partners. That may not mean that we are building defense partners. In
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     development speak, we may not have the same development models. Designing
     security partners and capabilities rather than stovepipe, that’s what we want to
     move towards.
  6. How do you engage upon agreed set upon expectations? This is the main driver
     for your consultative strategy. If you can reach agreed upon measure of successes,
     then that gives you the measures of success for transition. Everyone will be
     operating on the same page then. We generally get in there, and then we try to
     figure out measures of success.

CHUCK: So you are saying that the military measures of success might not be the right
measure for civilian efforts.

HUGHES: Yes. Correct.

SWEBERG: The question we need to address is the why, not just what and the how. I
know that 20 years ago, SOUTHCOMM asked that same question looking at its AOR,
and recognized that in their countries, there was a problem because the civilian wants a
military, but how do you get the military to stay busy while they are stuck in the barracks
rather than trying to figure out how to overthrow the government. What are they building
a force to do, and that’s when you involve them in development and peace keeping
efforts.

  7. Each country has their own SSR challenge, as they have different internal security
      issues and different policies. This internal campaign must try to figure out what
      their internal strategies are to synchronize these bilateral efforts. This is a bilateral
      effort as everything is so political. We are trying to get a regional structure here.
      You don’t just accept on face value, the issue is that if you look at it very closely,
      those police forces are becoming increasingly militarized because of the threats
      they face. Our lines of authority don’t allow us to cross train as neatly as these
      other countries do, where, like in Columbia, the military forensics trains the
      police academy.
  8. In SSR, what we often find is that there are INTL accept standards that countries
      are very amenable to try to achieve. ISPS standards for port operations, for
      example. For a port to be used for international commerce, it must be ISPS
      certified. There are emergency response strategies, etc. Air domain and ATC is
      another example, to help capacity building on a short term basis.
  9. How are you going to set your communications with your partners with this SSR?
      SOUTHCOMM had some great lessons learned form the Haiti response. They
      used the Web to log on to relief domains, and set themselves as a communications
      hub, without the need for complex passwords for non military and Non DOD
      players to play. Find out if there is already a web based forum in these 7
      countries.
  10. Look at the restrictions on presence in these countries as an opportunity. This is
      an opportunity to connect to host countries. Accountability, over sight, accounting
      of equipment, money, human rights standards. We did this very effectively in
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       Georgia vs. Russia. Judicial reform and accountability of the forces that were
       going to be in training, etc. Look at the way you can bench mark some of these
       things, and an opportunity of force to identify host nation leadership you can work
       with.
Mike, can you talk about the DHS perspective as a security force within this country?

NASON: From the DHS perspective, with our experience on the south west border and
its strategy, and the northern border strategy, there are a lot of different players, not just
DHS and DOS. It also depends on the host nations, like dealing with Canada is different
than dealing with Mexico. Although they both have the same issues, like crime, drugs,
weapons. CVP did 330 missions in 81 countries. The DHS has experience in these
countries and offices in these countries.

CARDONA: You saw the framing of the issue of Costa Rica and the military. Every
jurisdiction is going to take what they need and run with it. We have to realize that how
we measure our success is different from how they are going to measure their success,
and how they are going to take this.

HAWLEY: As part of the strategy, we should develop something that can make sure they
continue with the progress. We have to realize what kind of incentives or issues can be
involved, and reframe it if that’s the case.

CARDONA: yes we need benchmarks for them to keep measuring, and keep in mind
how they are going to respond to that.

HUGHES: This is key to SSR, and the assessment process. We are not talking about
program reviews, but assessment with partner nations. A collaborative assessment
process that becomes part of the SSR, so that way you can constantly adjust to what they
can absorb, what they are willing to absorb, and the advice they are willing to take. So
when you build the engagement strategy, you must take this into consideration.

HAWLEY: Let’s take Michelle’s points and other comments, and make a slide.
 I was asked to share notes taken during the above discussion for cell use. I made a small copy
 on a separate document for their use in the CELL 1 folder named “Hughes 10 points.”


CHUCK: In our community we regular work with police forces, and they always have
some kind of high end SWAT equipment. And that can be used to counter the problems
they have with the Law. Michelle mentioned a couple of options that can use the military
in non traditional roles. She said “PLATFORM,” but that is a huge word. For example
the situation in Haiti and how they needed civic action, like road building,
SOUTHCOMM does all kinds of civil action, like road building. If the intent is to surge
gang activity within an area, then that’s one indicator that we should aim to have
presence in that area. I say “WE” a lot and I’m very deliberate about that. Every LOE
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might have their own individual problems, but they are all underfunded and lack
capacity. That is a significant leverage point that we can apply to reinforce positive
change. This is to drive in Michelle’s point, that we don’t have to give things blindly to
people, and we can have strings attached to them. If they are underfunded, it opens doors
quite well. We should start of as our primary assessment tool to all the host notions, and
in that we incorporate that assessment.
        If Panama is making a police whose primary function is to build roads, clear
jungles, then their primary assessment for this mission should be a CARB function. We
incorporate all the CARB reps from the military side to prioritize the resources. That
guarantees the regional security.

SWEBERG: Are we playing in 2020 that we can train the forces?

CHUCK: We do that all the time today!

SWEBERG: I know there are limits, and have been limits, and there are exceptions, but
we are talking steady state where those exceptions are harder to take. Should we discuss,
since we are looking at a broader approach, that we get involved with INL and DOS
department of Law enforcement, which has a mandate to help police capabilities, and
work in support of them while we support them and let them handle it as a civilian
component.

BEMIS (DOS): That’s a good plan, we should go that way.

HAWLEY: What I suggest we do is we think through the campaign design, and if there
are any questions that has question marks still, then that’s a potential place to start off
from. These are all the things to start from, and the analysts can help us get through that.
How do you help these transnational problems, and get into conversations the rest of the
day that don’t matter. If we can get waivers for whatever legal problems, those are the
issues we need to work on.

MCCARTHY: I think the authorities are critical to see where we focus our assets and
efforts. There are Law enforcement authorities, military Intel assets, etc, that we need to
define and asses before we can determine where we are going to focus our assets. We
cannot do anything unless we can make our case, and it is going to put them in jail.

HAWLEY: We should think about what the golden nugget is, and what priorities we
should think on. I am willing to go to bat for any issue or authority on the Hill, but I need
to know why.

HUME: There may be authorities required after we do the intellectual rigor, like the civic
courts. So let’s start on that. Is there a threat finance problem?

BEMIS: The role of the gangs in the Northern triangle is as much as a social problem as
it is a security problem. How are people going to address that particular set of problems?
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Then there’s the problem of the corruption. And until you figure out the role of the
military, you have to find out what their roles are, until then you don’t know what you are
doing except boosting their capabilities.

CHUCK: Yes, the military is well set for intel, sigint, analysts, platforms that Michelle
was talking about.

BEMIS: Yes, then the question is takes us back to is that how do you sync up these
efforts to agree on the security line of efforts... These are still stove piped because there is
no interaction.

HUGHES: Make an assumption that there is a larger on going SSR process that led to the
identification of these SSR efforts. Ideally, there has been an SSR OPT, and that would
have determined where the priorities were. Yes, they appear stove piped in the given
scenario, but we will get to that.

CARDONA: I also want to throw in about one of the challenges, at this point now, Chuck
and Jon, we were in the same group together, but did we feel comfortable that we knew
there were corruption issues, and based on our recommendations, that would get to the
reform needed to get to these points? I didn’t. Jon said its key, and a parallel track, what
is the military’s role in corruption? In trafficking? I don’t think we answered those yet. I
don’t have that clarity, and I’m stuck here, and I’m going to make these
recommendations to these players, but what’s in their best interest to buy into this, and
what has been done on behalf on their nations, to get to these discussions.

HENDRICKS: I don’t think the military is pretty welcome in South America, and that
one of the reasons is corruption.

HUGHES: Thank you for bringing out the topic of corruption. There has to be some kind
of transparency program, and as we are designing some kind of SSReform, have we build
in transparency and over sight, or a system where by defense dollars and resources and
people and equipment are being used for the purpose intended, and not being pocketed or
going to illicit activities. The host nation has a concept that the transnational crime that
we are talking about is a bad thing. So what are you doing in the defense sector, to create
that presence of that element? Ill give you a chart later than gives you the things needed
in defense reform.

NASON: Some of the problems we are talking about right now are not 2020 issues, they
are 2010 issues. One of the great conversations we had in move one was embedding
units, and what is important about that is who you can trust and who you cannot. We will
never get law enforcement in south and Central America to look like how it looks like in
the US. We have to look at the quick fixes, to see what is beneficial. Shooting people for
the back of the pick up truck is not beneficial. We have to see what we can fix and what
we cannot. If it’s not broken, let’s not fix it.

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HUGHES: A lot of the points in 4.6 are to see what you can do. It’s a two way street
here.

HENDRICKS: I think it’s important and essential to address racial issues with
government, to see how that is the problem.

REGENS: One way, like the Mexico case, is to see rather than to build some from the
ground up, we should see existing forces. Mexican navy has bedded units that counter the
drug domain, that the Mexican government has allowed their Navy to operate (before
only in coastal areas) to work in the land to solve these issues. These quick wins are what
we need.

HENDRICKS: I still don’t think we are addressing the racial issue.

BEMIS: Guatemala is one of the countries where indigenous population is over 50%.

HARMON: I think we should tackle the narrative after we figure out the problem.

CHUCK: We have been at this for an hour fifteen, and these are great points. I think we
can list the issues, and make some sort of a tool set and priorities our issues based on
those tool sets.

HAWLEY: I think process wise; we need something on the board. We are getting issues
on the table, but we need answers or beginnings of an answer so we can get rolling in
discussion. We should try to answer the start of a point, and then we can debate it.



CHUCK:

2. b. Campaign design slide (DoD capabilities).

A few things I threw up there that would give us links to the other lines of operation, like
judicial reform, operations, etc. That same organization can be used to prioritize the 7
friends the Central America’s efforts. It’s not enough to just train and equip. They should
want it. We need their input from the beginning. The only way to do that is get the 7
friends in the same room.

That’s a good way of assessing the results. Assessment is important. So is vetting. In the
US system, we should do some vetting, and have them vetted through the DoS.

What can a military do on the ground? I’m talking in general. Domain awareness:
sharing.


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(Explanation of slide).


HUME: Discussion of “center of gravity.” On how to come up with a strategy.

HARMON: I don’t think we should get into this necessarily. We are handing them a
solution rather than letting them figure out the reform

HUME: I disagree. If I may be throwing money around, it might not solve the issue. This
gives us understanding on how we must arrange and organize our description.

BEMIS: STATE and DHS have leads in almost all these areas. How would you relate to
the fact that what the military can do?

HUME: we have platforms that we can sell them, train them. And I will use the INS as an
example. We are attacking the network that gives them the safe haven. How many DHS
complain about the catch and release program? We can support their forces this way
(pointing to chart).

BEMIS: what I’m saying is that these are capabilities. What is the area in the defense
military reform that this can be applied to?

HUME: I’m looking at LEAP. Los Angeles county detectives

BEMIS: I thought we were looking at military defense reform. At the broader image. You
are going into this too narrowly. What does this explain? How does this help SSR?

HUME: I don’t see how all this DOESN’T help SSR!

CHUCK: Maybe I can throw an example on how this can crystallize this for you. In
Guatemala, the gangs are too big of a target to handle by the law enforcement on their
own. We can train Guatemala military to work in conjunction with the police to tackle
these gangs.

BEMIS: We are drawing up a list of things we could propose they can get other agencies
to help us out.

CHUCK: Having a bunch of guys sitting polishing their boots in the military doesn’t help
anything. When we say reform, in my head, is using the military when they are not
defending.

SWEBERG: These are problems that the military needs to address. Right now they can’t
for a plethora of reasons. I would ask, what are we going to do so that the US military
and our multinational partners are going out and addressing these issues, but giving the
host nation the capacity to, so we don’t have to? You bring out outstanding points that
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need to be addressed, but we need to identify missions that we need to reform. We have a
military that has a whole buck of DELTAS for why they cannot perform.

HUME: There is a critical requirement for them like the unprofessionalism of the military
and policing forces, and those are their vulnerabilities. We need to find the bigger process
where it’s in concert with officer training and rule of law and warfare.

CHUCK: The training must go on in conjuncture with the other 7 nations.

SWEBERG: We have 7 countries, with each having their strengths and resources. We
need to take the 7 countries, capitalizing on their strengths, and minimizing the weakness.
It’s like the way the Nordic countries go with peace keeping. Each country takes on a
different type of training, and all the countries send their police to that one academy.
Collectively, they can finance it because they are sharing the cost. We have the
opportunity here to look at the same type of analogy.

CHUCK: Ill defer to HAWLEY, but ill throw another analogy back. The border between
Honduras and Guatemala: we are sending two men for what can be done by 1. As long as
they by into it, the more effecting it will be.

HUME: The country needs to identify that a drug dealer here is a drug dealer there. There
needs to be a message that they aren’t safe in any area, rather than to push them around.

CARDONA: Maybe we can facilitate a program where we give seed money let them do
their own assessment, and we can send help, and then we can move forward to see how
we develop our design and go from there.

HAWLEY: let me talk a point of procedure: Let’s focus on this program of illicit
trafficking and the role of the military. I don’t mind taking the point of view that they are
certain goose eggs that are important. Border security is an issue whoever you want to
talk about it. The military has essentially 3 capabilities. 1, one capability, Military
support to border security, civil agency border security people. 2, the second capability,
the military would need to have is to conduct operations and to secure unsecure borders.
Maybe they are infested with bad guys. Then there is a 3rd capability that the 3rd military
needs to talk about, so you need to capability to support normal border support and
reassert control over completely unsecure borders. And the capability to talk to someone
else higher. That goes on our list, border security is a problem, a theme, and those are the
3 capabilities we need to hook up. Now we can go later and see how Costa Rica stack up
in this, and kind of do the later work we need to do, and do the assessment of , well, our
own look of who did the work. This will give us the understanding of the WHAT that is
important.
         We can then add anti corruption in our things to do to gain the confidence that we
are good security partners. Is that a reasonable way to go?


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SWEBERG: It does help, and it supports the idea of developing the militaries of all the
countries in the same professional level, so that there is connectivity between them. We
need a 4th capability that is about their not being any safe havens anywhere. If an illicit
drug dealer is fleeing the border and if the military is interacting, then it’s not a safe
haven for him to cross the border. Maybe then we can portion some of the impact down
the road.

BEMIS: the 3rd point about communication for border security, you will need
coordination with the military. One thing, with border security, is that keeping in mind
that this is the problem with border security; the military role is a small piece of the pie…
while there are other agencies that are involved with that part of the security effort. This
is the part of the pie we need to focus on.

HUGHES: I don’t want you to get too far off the track. What you are doing on that
butcher paper chart is the immediate. It represents the immediate part of the commander’s
intent, and we have to deal with that right now. By cherry picking the priority goose eggs,
make sure you are dealing with the immediate issue you have to deal with now. The
development process of the long term engagement that becomes your long term piece,
element of your campaign plans. We don’t control the operational environment like we
do in AFPAK (Afghanistan and/or Pakistan). You have to make sure that what you do in
the short term doesn’t affect your legitimacy for the long term goals. Long term
legitimacy.

JABRUN: To my simple mind, please clarify; I thought we were trying to get to the LOE.

HAWLEY: If we can look at some major other areas that are in the SSR 4.6 domain that
provide the basis of this kind of work, then we will make progress. There are 2 pieces of
this. Military reform in the long run, and illicit trafficking that must be solved asap. The
question is, how can we proceed? We have 30 mins left before lunch. Can we split this
within groups and identify 3 or 4 goose eggs, and define what capabilities might have,
and have the other groups talk about military reform that Michelle can head.

Lunch
Plenary briefings
Group session
Working on 2.b:
HAWLEY: I am looking for a quick and dirty briefing of what we got done today so far.

MCCARTHY: Certain weapons, depending on the nation, are legal. And we have to
support those legal frameworks. Other than that, we have to develop a cell to combat and
share information for the problem. Everything we talked about is what the ATF guy said
in the briefings.



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HAWLEY: The kind of capabilities he asked for we think are kind of good. Do you have
anything to add to it?

MCCARTHY: No, I think he had it listed.

CHUCK: If we go through all our slides, we will see some commonalities. Everyone
talks about an informational center. Everyone talks about Intel Sharing. So that’s what we
should focus about. It comes up over and over again.

HAWLEY: So we need to drill into those, as those themes are recurring. Regional
military entities should work this. Let’s go through the next one. Law enforcement?

COGHILL: as the briefer recommended. We concur with what he had. We mentioned
transportation, and he mentioned helicopters and air support. I know task force BRAVO
(in Honduras) has like 18 helicopters.

HAWLEY: The real issue here is to see central American capabilities, and how we can
improve that. He gave the example of Columbia, and I like that. First, they had 9, now
they have over a 100. That’s the story of the endgame. The sub story is that we are no
longer providing military helicopters like black hawks to Columbia, but we can train
them.

COGHILL: We should help jumpstart their aviation program. Luis was saying that they
have some heli capabilities, but maybe it’s not what they need to be. Of course, we talk
about Intel collection and sharing as well. We can give them some US intel, but maybe
letting they collect intel from US assets, and sharing, for the regional aspect, and helping
them kick start their intel acquisition program, and helping them with their own systems
would be helpful. Training of law enforcement and the 660 rules, NATO and EU can
possibly step in there to help in the training of law enforcement. EU has the Gendarmerie.
Those are the things you can get into in phase 1, and in phase 2 they can start taking the
lead and move on.

LUIS: so in the law enforcement, did you include issues like corruption and
accountability?

HAWLEY: Well there’s a vetting process. Who did the vetting for other programs?

CHUCK: The military did.

HUGHES: The vetting process for law enforcement is really different form the vetting
process of military. The vetting process is a complex process that requires back ground
investigation, public input, etc. it requires a degree of commitment…

SWEBERG: and I think it’s like a 3 year commitment, and it has to be managed by the
host nation.
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MCCARTHY: Yes there was a 3 yr commitment, and they were sent to areas in which
they had no connection to, like to get out of their family, and make them work in a
neighborhood where they can start fresh and no issue of corruption or carrot dangling.


HAWLEY: There are much more benefits to be gained from a holistic approach from the
region rather than concentrating on just a country. We will need to reset our priorities.

CARDONA: We need to take into account what we are investing. What’s to ensure that
these are not going to become tools to oppress their people? The people are already being
oppressed by the criminals. It may not completely change the paradigm of the Law
Enforcement; let’s take into considering what you said in the beginning, that we have to
see where it goes. Columbia is a great example of improvement.

BORDER SECURITY (4.4)
NASON: We are going to use the analogy of the exoskeleton as they used in the briefing,
and imbed military personnel wherever there are gaps. Core security is important for not
only trade, but to impede the transfer of illicit goods.
        IT support and Intel sharing must be emphasized. This can be done with hardware
and sofware.
        We may be dealing with countries in Central America that don’t have air or land
or maritime security. We should be ready to provide these. There are two sides to every
border.
        The security of ungoverned spaces, we must take those into account as well.
There are 43 unofficial border crossing spots, those must be checked. That’s what we
came up with.

HAWLEY: I want to keep separate what we did this morning, and what we are doing this
afternoon. We need help in developing their militaries. They become part of the ministry
of defense capabilities. Let’s separate that regarding required support and regarding
capabilities. I want this to be a MIL to MIL issue.

CHUCK: There’s one other piece I want to mention. How do we look Congress in the
eye and tell them that our aid is not being abused. This gives us an opportunity to have an
on-going assessment system.

REGENS: Okay so we are creating a regional diffusion center, some of which maybe
transferred in hardware and skills, and once u transfer, you still want to be around to
advise them and share.

HUGHES: When you talk about defense reform, and discuss over sight controls, you are
also doing direct military contribution, like border security. And when you create vetted
unites, the collaborative vetted components in border security becomes part of military

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support to this line of operation. Go ahead and make those links explicit for defense
reform.

HAWLEY: It’s got to be recognized how we want to manage this, because they are all
interlaced. It’s got to be managed well. I don’t want to have Stove pipes. Everyone is in
the business.

NUGENT: I think if you are looking at making the military as a solution and not the
problem, you are going to have the same discussion with the maritime guys. We need to
be providing a service that goes from nation to nation. If you have 6 [countries] that work
and 5 that do, then you have a system to make it work.

HAWLEY: I don’t want to make a scene on border security by building stuff that creates
holes.

NUGENT: Id flip the question around. Once you make a structure, then you go learn and
see where those seams are. You don’t go in there knowing where the holes are going to
be. It’s a learning process.

HAWLEY: It’s just the way we handle it. Once it happens, we will try to figure how the
army and navy cant talk to each other. I want to be thoughtful and fix issues form the
early stages. Let’s go to the next one.

HARMON: They key thing coast guard didn’t discuss is a seat back where everyone can
discuss these major issues. The second piece, they asked for technical advice in Intel
sharing and collection. There needs to be a common info sharing system. Like a
“carbaya.”

BEMIS: Basically what they have up there, it seems to us that training security forces to
protect key tourism centers would be important economically. Under integration, the
securing borders and key ports will all come down to training and infrastructure.
        One area that they didn’t touch on is the importance to the economy to have a
sense of security among the population. Economic activity is going to take place if people
feel secure. The feeling of insecurity is going to slow down the economy.
        Train the military for a disaster, like earthquake, volcano, etc. We don’t have an
LOE for that. There’s a humanitarian aspect, and the logistical aspect. We are going to
have a small military footprint in CENTAM, but the fact that we have one, we have to
find support for that. And we should find support locally, instead of bringing our own
supplies, we should use local supplies.

HAWLEY: All good points. I was discussing the economic structure.

SWEBERG: We talked about that and the necessity to instill in the military a
professionalism that is radiated into the community, so the people can feel that. This way,
the rural farmer will be encouraged to work his crops by donkey cart on the road to sell it
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in the market. There is such a lack of trust in the military police that they don’t move
their crops, because they are worried about corrupt officials or bandits. Because of the
size of the country, a sense of security is going to self generate economic activity.

HUGHES: Another case is Columbia, where they are explicitly trained to protect national
assets. None of you mentioned up there, is that the military conducting exercises with
interaction for border security and interagency effort. This is where the military’s
comparative advantage comes in. This works great in the Balkans.

HAWLEY: Maybe we can start a regional exercise programs that start explicitly, or field
exercise, or even table top exercise. This way we can fuse it back together. Maybe I can
take that on as the special representative. Like a CARB exercise.

CARDONA: I need to reiterate how huge the Gang problem is and how dependent they
are on this type of economy, like extortion, and bus drivers paying huge sums of their
salary just to get home safely, etc. How do we create the parallel that these guys are sold
on? They are victimizing the people and generating money out of it. We need to create a
system which is not oppressive, and help small business thrive. We need to look at those
security measures to provide security to everyone.

HAWLEY: I think the law enforcement team should really look into. I am not
comfortable with the law enforcement solution so far. The extortion game is very
complex.


Review for plenary:

HAWLEY: Let’s look at Michelle’s top 10 SSR issues and see what is important.
Number 7 is important because every section is important, and every country has its own
challenges.

Number 2 in something we took away that is important
Number 3 is about don’t talk the talk if you can’t walk the walk.
Lets take 2, 3, and 7 and use them as take away’s.

2b, campaign design (op priorities for defense reform).
JABRUN: Some of these are listed in bullets, but this is a top down and bottom up.
SWEBERG: There are linkages in all of them, so they cannot be prioritized. They are all
important.

HUGHES: But in your discussion you set some priorities, like how legitimacy has to be
developed and addressed front and center.



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CARDONA: Those are the end results of successfully executing legitimacy, so they can
be prioritized.

HAWLEY: Then we will have to satisfy that need and prioritize that.
        Also, we need to talk about training. We have to get an agenda and start thinking
about stakeholders and donors, because they are putting money into it too.

GOETCHIUS: one comment, where do you get your soldiers from? Most soldiers have
mandatory service, but not all talk about it. Where do you get your soldiers?

HUGHES: Yes, Just of the ease of slide-ology, this is a critical issue, and we should
include that in there. It is important for the sustainability of the program.

GARY: Yes, and they need legitimacy.

HUGHES: Then we should have a system of vetting. Include Vetting.

CARDONA: We should include some program for the youth, like youth police academy,
because one day they are going to grow up and be part of the man power. We need this
kind of manpower. Its pulling these gang members off and they need to rehabilitate.
Reintegrate.

HUGHES: So do you want to include that in the sustainability issue or as a
professionalization issue? Based on the El Salvador case, that is seen as a
professionalization issue, and not as a sustainability issue. So I think you have a
sustainability issue form the lessons learned from El Salvador. And I wouldn’t lose that
idea.

HAWLEY: This is a big problem from this region, so we should include that, the
reintegration issue, DDR” in SUSTAINABILITY. Let’s go on to the next one. The
military folks walk away from this question, and they make it the central theme…

Combat illicit traffic

HUGHES: Demobilization should be taken out of there.

HARMON: This goes back to Intel collection and sharing. Helicopters, training, and
upgrading of technology.

[[Double checking slides for presentation]].




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DAY 3 - Wednesday

GREG: Order of business. Campaign design: From the work done yesterday, where are
we at today in terms of the design.

HAWLEY: We need to take a look at that. We did a good job of getting a rough idea
regarding where we are going to be. We have a good portrayal of what’s going on.
Having this guidance for SSR upfront, and our 3 lines of effort within the LOE for 4.6,
we have consistent ideas for that. That sets the stage. We need to focus on what we are
focusing on, and what we are incentivizing for these goals?
       The second piece of the campaign design is to support the other lines of effort.
What is your idea to accomplish this?

GREG: Yes, id like to revisit every slide and see where we are at.

NUGENT: Yes, lets look at the whole sequence again, every step, so we know in the
earlier steps whether they match the intent of the whole flow.

GREG: I was thinking of just reviewing the 4.6 thing.

HUGHES: We need to link the near term actions that have to take place to fix the
immediate problem, border security, humanitarian, those need to be put together in a
more coherent whole. So I would say, we need to focus on how to link those 4 disparate
pieces together. That way we can ensure what the commander told us to do. Ensure they
are solid, incentivized, and in order.

CHUCK: That all together will give us the building blocks of concept of support.

HUGHES: Yes, once you do that, you will know your gaps in the capabilities. When you
are thinking of our capabilities, its not just troops, equipment and structure, it’s the
echelon and consultation as well. All of that will come once you have a coherent strategy
that fits together.

GRET: As per your suggestion we will start from phase 1. This is what we left as major
considerations. If you see any errors, let’s bring that up.

HAWLEY: All id like to do is group the things together so there is a logic for major
considerations flow. I.e., the last one should be up front, etc. lets merge what needs to be
merged. We can do a final review tomorrow. Did we include HENDRICK’s idea of
social trouble?

HENDRICKS: Yes

CARDONA: I don’t see anything in there in major considerations about unintended
consequences. Also, how far are the military and police going to go with this?
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HENDRICKS: Another thing that has caused a lot of issue is the land issue. It is a key
issue in all of Latin America.

GREG: Let’s review the Commander’s intent and mission statement, and see what we
need to do.

HUGHES: No where in the mission statement does it say that we need to combat illicit
activity.

TAN: Or a time frame.

GREG: That’s by design. This is a steady state operation, so we cannot express that.

HUGHES: I think what you need to do to the statement is that a real critical issue and a
gap to a comprehensive approach to the SSR. You approached SSR with the joint force
need for immediate imperative. So make it match the general’s mission statement. How
do you get quick wins in the underlying security problem. You might have to scale it
back a little.

MCCARTHY: The line that kills me in the mission statement is that “we will lead the
effort to assist and enable the CARB….” There is no direct order.

HUGHES: You do not have presence on the ground, and you don’t have that mission,
and you need to assume that your physical presence on the ground is going to be
minimal. This is not Afghanistan with a direct mission. Assume this is going to be like
Columbia, that had 80% alternatively governed, and we had the order to have no more
than 600 guys on the ground. Right now you don’t have that authority. Your guys cannot
go on patrol and activities in Columbia and you are probably going to work with the same
rules here.

REGENS: To the degree DOD both leads and supports in capacity building, who within
DOD is cast to do this? Supporting functions? Mix? It’s at a macro level, but are you
really talking about sof focus activity? And if so, in what regard? Is it a general purpose
force? This stuff will magically not happen.

HAWLEY: Our game organizers are planning, there are issues here. The goal of the
whole efforts are to find the gaps in the capabilities.

REGENS: Objective 1 want to achieve out of the game. Well, what is it that you would
really want to get out of the game from the planning exercise?

HUGHES: The capabilities you might need, maybe DOD civilians like Mr. Hawley, or I,
had to think different.

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GREG: This is important. Language. The world “LEAD” has different meanings for
almost all of you, in the mission statement.

OBSERVER: term lead and intent means SOUTHCOMM will lead the effort and
coalition. They should not be inferred for tactical purposes. Leadership is leadership of a
coalition effort. This is written kind of “hippy” for a reason.

HAWLEY: All I think in this issue of LEAD is that all Settler has done is that he is going
to Lead 4.6, and support the 8 other security lines of effort. It’s a rubber stamp of what
he’s already been told.

GREG: To get the big flavor of the intent, let’s go through the other slides.

CHUCK: Emotional involvement is not the way to go. There’s a 100 ways to skin all of
these cats, and they all have their benefits, but lets see what works for now, and what
works for others.

GREG: REVIEW OF SLIDES. FIND WAYS TO SAY YES.

HAWLEY: We need to keep the momentum going with what we are going to offer for
Centralia. We have to keep the donors happy. And this is the political dimension we need
to think of as well. This risk management issue is CARB cohesion and 7 Friends is
something I will have to manage very carefully as the special representatives.
         This topic has wicked problems, and it is not easy. Getting to the issues Michelle
is talking about is not simple. One of the more difficult issues I ever took.

HUME: We don’t have the narrative done. *Presentation on Center of Gravities Slide*.




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GREG: I found this an interest construct, is that what you described to me makes more
sense. Maybe you should include a key so anyone looking at it can get it. So now, is his
sufficient?

NASON: Instead of using DDR security, use these 4 points to address the particular area
of concern, like 4.4, 4.5 or so, so we know which line of effort is going to what arrow.

GOETCHIUS: This is pretty valuable since a picture is like a 1000 words.

GREG: We might want to break out in groups to come up with a solution, then we can
discuss as a group what we have, and go from there.

HAWLEY: What this slide does is present the problem of the illicit trafficking rather than
the solution of “kill the gang members.” This will give us the idea that we need a holistic
approach to combat this situation. This will give us the complete solution, and is a
communication effort interagency. If we use this single graphic and explain so much, we
can get a lot accomplish. We have to think of financing, resources, and these discussions
can be brought out with this image. This is a great communication tool to frame the
environment in a very complex situation. The bigger point of what this is about. We don’t
have one for defense reform, but we should make it. This is one piece of the challenge.

HUGHES: There’s one aspect that is missing in this, which is the gang member
reintegration and rehab issues that CARDONA talked about yesterday. You have to talk
about what you do when you demobilize the bad guys.

HUME: This slide is the narrative for the bad guys, so this one will not have
reintegration, demobilizing, or rehab for the bad guys.

GREG: We need to incorporate extortion, and its way to punish or reward the
populations.

CARDONA: We must also know that when we start the program to crack down on them,
this might spike the violence in the beginning.

HAWLEY: Well the ability to coerce the government and the people is something that
will need to be tackled. That needs to be addressed. That is a form of political violence.
*Next slide review*




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                                  UNCLASSIFIED// FOR WARGAMING PURPOSES ONLY

 2b. Campaign Design - Operational Priorities
 for Defense Reform
                     1.       LEGITIMACY (PH 1,2,3)
                          •      Transparency
                          •      Public Engagement (Social Development LOE)
                          •      Accountability
                          •      Human Rights (Human Rights Coalition LOE)
                          •      Vetted Force Generation - Conscripts v Recruits
                     2.       PROFESSIONALIZATION (PH 1,2,3)
                          •      Defense Strategy and Force Structure
    Simultaneously

    And Top-Down




                          •      Standardization
      Bottom-up




                          •      PME
                          •      Equipment (LOE 4.8)
                          •      Training
                          •      Pay and Promotion Structure
                          •      Internal Oversight and Control
                          •      Mission Orientation
                     3.       SUSTAINABILITY (PH 1,2,3)
                          •      Infrastructure (LOE 4.7)
                          •      Programming, Policy and Budget
                          •      External Oversight and Control
                          •      Coordination with other parts of the Security System
                          •      Strategic Narrative / Perception Management
                          •      Civil Society Development
                          •      Disarmament / Reintegration
                                  UNCLASSIFIED// FOR WARGAMING PURPOSES ONLY




NUGENT: If you look at the recent one, its 2 layers, and they have to be fused. Our job is
to figure out that relationship.

HUGHES: What you have on this slide is the framework for the bilateral strategy, and
since it will consistent, then you take this and see what the regional activities can be to
support this. When you are trying to do these things, they cannot start with the ministerial
level, you have to work all levels, tactical and strategic.

NUGENT: This is the regional planning staff. The focus on the regional plan, as an
overarching plan, is the framework. The national framework that you have to do one on
one on a bilateral basis is different. If you have to go first in here, and take these
problems at a regional level, that will be more effective.

CARDONA: All these problems are interconnected. You can do all the training,
infrastructure changes, etc, but if you are worried about the insurgents, then this will not
help. I know politics will need to be kicked in, but you have invited everyone one on the
table.

HUGHES: Well you cannot reach 3 without going thru 1 on this slide. There is no
precedent for a regional collaboration which we are talking about. The regional piece of
this should be seen in baby steps to see where we can get quick wins. And these wins
may be in standardization, regional dialogue, things needed for cooperation.

CHUCK: I think a big win would be if the US doesn’t have to come from the north.

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HUGHES: How do you agree upon international standards as a basis of regional support
to SSR. Think about the coalition guys said about yesterday. There are models out there
that are understood, and there is a consensus about agreement to help, at different paces
at different nations. Including the political will that was behind the formation of the
CARB in the first place. Some of our partners, the civilian LOE’s spoke about how they
can help.

HAWLEY: Let’s talk about the national level SSR agenda. Our emphasis in the
beginning should be the LME.

CHUCK: I think this is the time to get back to what Luis was saying, such as unintended
consequences. Going along with the strategy of consultation, the decision makers have to
be CARB nations and friends. The U.S. cannot be the one to say “WE ARE GOING TO
STANDARDIZE THE METRIC.” There are 2 parts to this, as each thing goes on, we
have to see how it is going and validate the organization’s selection. The things we
haven’t regionalized, and maybe we do this deliberately, is to figure out which direction
to skin the cat goes best. The last thing we want to do is give the knife and cat to 7
different people.

HUGHES: What we have on this list here is not what we are providing. This is just the
agenda in the strategy of consultation. There are part of our conversation.

CARDONA: I think all this requires a certain level of investment from our part. You
don’t want to do this half way.

HUGHES: Its helping them figure out how to take these positions forward within the
framework. Also, as a donor, it helps us decide when we step in. This is a topical
discussion of ways, and then we need to talk about the discussion of ways. That’s when
this is going to lead to really heave planning discussions.

GREG: Recognized but not addressed here is the prioritizing the efforts.

HAWLEY: Let’s work on section 4.6.2. *Slide review*. We are talking about military
response.

MCCARTHY: We need to discuss the training capabilities, especially if there is going to
be relief effort.

NUGNET: When I want to go find our vulnerabilities, I am looking for the seams. The
way you close seams is create a process to do that. Which seam to go after changes. If
you aim the mechanism as things evolve, the concept is to build a common
understanding.

HUGHES: The 4.6.x slides have to be rationalized. 4.6 is really your 4.6.1. That is your
macro SSR strategy. What you have done with 4.6.2 and 4.6.3 is focused on operational
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issues as your operating assumption as to what your strategy is capable of doing .You
might want to consider recasting emergency response, etc as subs of defense sector
reform. If you go back to slide 10, will provide you with the focus such as defense
strategy and force structure. Going back then 11 and 12, since your operating assumption
is the basis/focus of your defense strategy, is to conceptualize that as you are doing these
things to combat illicit traffic, you are building capacity for emergency reform.

HAWLEY: Okay we need to do national and regional priorities.

GREG: We need to discuss about getting a vetted intelligence process to know who to
collect and share information with.

BEMIS: I’m wondering, the lead US agency disaster response is AFTA in AID. 80% of
disaster relief is assistance, in which the military has the most assets. I’m just thinking
out loud, because the SEMAC isn’t accepted by all agencies that are participating, such
as NGO’s in emergency relief.

BERTZ: NATO has some relief assistance. Examples…



GREG: Okay

JABRUN: We should use the treaty of Leon, restricted for defense of all countries in the
area, in which they can talk about different issues, and we can plug into the 7 friends. We
can start at the ministry level.

HARMON: Since that says military leaders, does that mean its good to start at the
ministerial level?

HAWLEY: There are ministry of defense officials, who are retired generals, so they are
capable. The military is running. The military itself is also part of the conversation, and
each one of them is going to be different. It’s unfair how it’s categorized as military
officials are listed with ministry officials.

GREG: What is the strategy of consultation that is necessary to enable 4.6? That can be
done with defense and non defense

CHUCK: Another way to get at it is for regional, country by country view point, who do
we need to talk to? If we list those names up, that gives us the collective group to
coordinate to buy in, and we can look at structure of how that conversation goes.

GREG: Lets bounce back to the 4.6 slide with the 1, 2, 3. Identify areas as our subject
area.s

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NASON: I’m going to throw this out there too, if you go through the country briefs in the
course work, they all have police agencies, but might not have the capabilities to do what
we want them to do. All of these 7 specific spaces, we need to look at, DHS is not in the
business of training militaries. We would much rather train law enforcement. We will not
go in and train a military force, if there is a preexisting police force set up to do the same
thing. That needs to be defined by the host nation on how they want to solve that problem
.
SWEBERG: We need to look at a multitude of leadership. We need to identify the
ground truth of what’s going on, and who is doing what to whom. We have embassies
working in each of these countries, and you have military groups, economic groups, and a
pantheon of players who know the field for years and years. The first step, if you are
going to develop a strategy, it needs to understand who the players are on our side, who
the players are on the other side, and engaging them on capitalizing where the military is
and where we want to achieve our gains. It’s really a matter of who is doing what, and
people know what they are doing there.

GREG: What is our menu of folks and key players to make this happen? Especially if we
have a need to enhance legitimacy.

REGENS: For legitimacy, we need to know the right institutions, right people, and why
they should be engaged. What’s in it for them? Each one becomes a step. Is there a
Union? An overlap? That allows you to put together the pieces and how they assemble
those pieces into some sort of campaign that allows you to achieve early wins with phase
1 and phase 2. Are some things necessary conditions? Like the terrain? Keep in mind that
you can mix metaphors, you don’t want to lose the ball game. Maybe by doing that road
mapping, you can see what is capable.

CHUCK: We want each of these countries to begin by making a vetted force. Then how
do we get to a concept to a vetted force on the ground? Who do we have to talk to, and in
what order, and who has to say yes? As we are going through the road map, we can see
our progress. Simplify it to one topic, and it can get us to a focus point of where we are
going. Our first step should be staff members including from the military, and describe
the process. Run a selection of records check, human rights activity check, etc. and we
need from each of the countries that commitment.

HENDRICKS: What is the level of change that countries are looking for? I think they are
looking for some change, but they want to maintain the relationships that are in the
country, and they want to maintain the corruption. They may say something, but they
want another thing.

NUGENT: If I take a couple of givens, and there is a sufficient discontent in the status
quo, that they signed up for the CARB. There must be something common in the 7
nations that they are willing to go after.

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HENDRICKS: They want help to a certain degree, that’s it.

NUGENT: Then that should be part of our planning. If you have a regional thing that is
sufficiently irritating, which all the nations are willing to address, then you want to build
a catalytic event that sits down and says “what’s your problem with human smuggling?”
and get down to the root to it, and get them to turn their military to get after it.
        They will define the problem for you.

COGHILL: In July 2020, we are going to have a ministerial meeting, with the outcome
being they all sign a statement of principles that they all agree to abide by.

NUGENT: Don’t even be so ambitious. You are doing catalytic events. That was my job.
You force people to start collaborating, rub against each other and be forced to talk.
There is a lesser risk of failure with a statement of principle with 7 authors. Haul in the
worker level and start going after stuff. You have got them to take them to agree. And
you have to transition from big concepts to smaller things to build the rapport,
relationships.

HARMON: At some point, they will be happy to address the threat, but not everything on
the SSR.

NUGENT: You have to create the willingness to change. You are working in a group,
and this chunk in the military structure needs to be addressed. That’s how you facilitate
the national plan. You get imperfect integration then you work on the parts.

HAWLEY: The attitude at this meeting will matter. How you walk into the room
will matter. A mediation strategy, and a list of issues, the first thing you do is what
are the things I want to try to get done initially that will start the process. You are
thinking of incremental gains. Lord knows in mediation there is no momentum. It’s
like operating in the desert without water. We won’t have a lot of momentum, 2
steps forward, and 1 step backwards. You have to adapt to the risks. There is
something that will be given up, and that’s risking your family to the organization,
their livelihood, etc. There has to be an understanding, like a handshake, about how
do you start that process, and what are the basic people involved here, and how they
will be better off from walking down that path. Then you try to figure out how to
open the door. The mediation operating approach is important.
        We are likely to incite a lot of competition, and we need to be able to control
that competition. This makes it harder, it also makes it harder… there’s no road
map here. We have this campaign design, and at the end of the day, we will know as
it unfolds, where it’s going to end up. We need to know the agenda, and know what
we want to talk about. Then we talk about strategy so we have incentives. Not only
do they come to the meeting, but shake their heads in agreement.

JABRUN: You have to leverage their capabilities. There is cooperation with the US in
our programs in Africa, and that works. You should develop the same idea.
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HAWLEY: We have to adopt the role of the mediator. Through this process, we are
meeting to their interests. So however ugly this might be, they come out saying it is their
idea.

NUGENT: You get people to agree in the idea, then what their role is to go after that
idea. We didn’t tell them what they need to do. We said “if you want to go after it, what
do you think is the problem.” And they would then turn around and talk to the military
deputy’s and build their pieces. You can facilitate better than mediate.

CARDONA: When we started this process, I made a comment. One of the things I
said that it’s always good from the get go, to have as many people as possible. Part
of where we are at is because we might not have all the players on the table at this
point. It could be that have we had someone from the embassy of El Salvador, etc,
but it would help us to establish a certain comfort level, and get a good start on the
process. I don’t know if that’s the direction we are going to go into, but we should
have someone from the CENTAM govt. I know it is only an exercise, but you want
to get the people that are impacted to be in this exercise.

HAWLEY: Yes, that’s why we have the 7 friends, and the donors, and the French. The
initial consultation is not with the donor country, but with the partners.

SWEBERG: Yes, you have to find out who is doing what to whom. In the embassy and
in the field, a lot of countries are friends of ours, and a lot of our work will be done with
all of these efforts. If you take the time to do the research, they are not going to go
through steps that are unnecessary.

GREG: We need to identify what are interests for them. Not necessarily their objectives,
since they may be opposite of our goals. Alternate objectives can be created to get the
incentives they need. We need to entice their cooperation, and a sense of ownership. This
is a CARB consultation strategy.

HARMON: We need to have a chief mediator that can guide them through the “selling”
process of the idea. If we just give them the PowerPoint, they are going to expect the
worst.

SWEBERG: Good point.

GREG: That could be a double edged sword. If you make that completely transparent to
everybody, you can defeat the idea of anyone stepping out and doing other things.

HAWLEY: I’m not worried, I'm brave enough, and I understand that we can mange those
risks. I’m worried about the Colonels behind me who will shoot me in the back. I need
time to bring them along. I need a way where you can help me bring them along so that
they don’t shoot me in the back. It’s a complex dynamic.
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MCCARTHY: We have 7 different countries, and if 1 country sees that a country took a
deal, and if it’s a win, a success, then it will encourage other countries to flourish.

NUGENT: The first couple of moves need to be so benign that they are not a threat to the
level. Once you get the process going, you can crank it up.

HAWLEY: it’s a charismas party, or notes in a bottle. Some way! A lot more difficult
things will come later, right?

REGENS: One of the challenges is to the special representative is that the simple fact that
the element we see as the threat from the beginning, and how these governments have
normally bought it, we need embedded elements. We take the side of the lenders, and we
see ourselves as mediators etc, hen we need partners, since we are taking sides. What are
those initial incentives based on their needs? Can you tap into them and say “we want to
align our interest vs. theirs.

NUGENT: There are all kinds of dynamics you can play with.

HAWLEY: There are two very big issues. Who you talk with, and time. If this
consultation process takes 2 years, we can’t do that. We don’t have that kind of time. We
are under pressure to make this thing work. Capacity building in Afghan is going to
work. It’s the same kind of pressure that we won’t understand. Theresa a couple of
strategies associated with that. There are incentives, coercion, and the fact that the train is
leaving the station, and we have to get a move on.

CHCUK: One thing I’m not catching on is on day 1, SSR conference, well, we would
like to push the issue of vetted units, better for everyone, but you cannot do something’s
alone. You need to see who gets to go first, and who gets to go last.

NUGENT: Tactically if you are going to drive those agents on a bilateral basis, by us
working with an integral nation, we need to see if his customs guys are corrupt, but I
have it working and functions on either side, and my goal is to suppress whatever he lets
by. You don’t want to be in a position to say we screwed up. If we build the structure for
information structure, you see where the seams are.

GREG: We need an in-house discussion where we pick something that they are going to
win, no matter what.

CHUCK: Then you build the system for the difficult things, not the easy things. They
might not need any external stuff. That’s the end state we need to go to. Like changing
laws for hot pursuits. We can suggest that, but in the end it’s their thing.



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NUGENT: That’s why I push the central structure things. There’s a shared realization
that needs to occur, and a neutral ground to talk about it. That’s what the regional
structure gives you.


*Looking at the consultation roadmap slide*
HUGHES: “Assessment” is a loaded term in “assessment driven understanding.” That is
addressing a lot of strategies that in part of your capacity building capabilities.

GREG: Maybe the term you want is research driven consultation with donors.

HUGHES: Why don’t you delineate the process and call it collaborative assessment.
There’s a noun and a verb problem.

NASON: In law enforcement, it’s a metric, a measuring tool.

HUGHES: Eventually you want to get to the point that the host nation does the
assessment so they know which way is forward in the defense sector.

CARDONA: I have a question. Should we be taking into consideration the minister of
interior agrees at first, and then the new minister says that’s not even relevant.

HUGHES: my experience is that even when we are doing development practices, we do
the fully collaborative kumbaya assessment, that is the over activity, then there’s the US
only assessment that we don’t share, which assesses the impact of issues you described,
that give us concern, and let us know about administration changes.

HENDRICKS: Another issue is the issue with Honduras, with them trying to change the
constitution, etc. And if that happens again, that is possible and can throw our efforts off.

HUGHES: Another thing that is missing is whether you may or may not feel the public
engagement aspect. You are going to try to create a process with public engagement, how
are you going to support that on a regional level. Do you want to consider an NGO
advisory roundtables, like FOR A, or strategically important round tables that you can
collaborate with. Do you want to have as an express task this focus on setting the stage on
the public engagement piece? That is a very important part that will get over looked if
you assume it under the larger issues.

CARDONA: Don’t some of these countries have ministry of self participation?

HUGHES: you are right, they do. We will have to see the utility of those and see how
they                    can                      be                        leveraged.
     Also, your consultative process has to allow you to give you that role. The


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structure of office is important. What you are asking your civilian counterparts to do is to
do a SSR assessment, looking at your program.

Gang problem talk by Luis Cardona:
HIGHES: Strategy for getting people out of gangs, do you see successful strategies? Do
you focus on individuals? Or the organization itself? Also, you eluded to some faith bases
programs. How does that make it successful?

CARDONA: Most of these guys suffer from PTSD. Therapy helps, but the space you can
create for them to heal from this, like a personal redemption, and to move on from life,
plays a major role. That’s helped me out personally. Seems to work effectively with these
guys. The only problem is again that these guys get killed. This is what is interesting, and
that’s the deterrent. They either get killed by their own gang, the rivals, or law
enforcement. Even if everyone knows that they are no longer active gang members.
Intervention should include after care.
        It has to be the individuals. Even here locally, I work with a guy who was doing
some illicit activities, but was trying to get clean, and it’s impossible to do as a whole.
We are talking about the livelihood of individuals. And when you talk about prison
gangs, they live off of these taxes. If the guy outside the jail tries to rebel, he gets taken
out by orders of within jails. They have been able to walk through that fine line and etc,
we let them know that we don’t want to take away your soldiers, we are giving them
alternative lifestyles.
        I also believe that if we start with early intervention, they tend to be more
successful. Although there is no systematic formal structure, we have systems to relocate
individuals. This might be a great opportunity to talk to regional partners, and see if we
can relocate individuals.

Break for lunch – Updates: Cap for military presence by country

COGHILL: discussing slide which bolsters law Enforcement 4.1

HUGHES: If that’s going to be the presumption, we are taking Centralians out of
Centralia for training.

CHUCK: Can we talk about military support to other LOE’s? We have military support
where we pull out key military folk and take them for training, like helicopter, etc. That’s
very cost efficient. Then the other types are technical training within the country, and
advisement training. Now that we have finite numbers for the training, we have to be
very careful as to the structure we put in.

HAWLEY: I don’t want to complicate the issue, but I’m not sure what we are saying
about who is providing the effort. Along with the SSR, it’s all about them and how they
work. What kind of support does the Guatemalan military give to Guatemalan law
enforcement? If they don’t, we need to find a way to do it as a training mechanism to
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provide training down the road. Aviation training for law enforcement training might be
initiated by us, but it’s designed to get their training to their law enforcement, assuming
that they have an aviation program.

GREG: Maybe we can make an introductory slide to get this started. i.e., Potential
support to civilian LOE’s. The 7 friends’ capacity is to develop the host nation to develop
itself.

HUGHES: We are mentoring host nations to develop forced structure, so it is compatible
with and interoperable with law enforcement LOE.

REGENS: What can their military provide to their police is important? Can their military
mingle with law enforcement in particular missions? Who is doing the support? The
whole purpose of this seminar is the DOD support.

GREG: It is to basically talk ourselves out of a job.

HAWLEY: At the beginning, it may be required that some Intl military force does it, but
the idea of doing it, it will start a process of them doing it, and teaching them to do
civilian law enforcement. You want them to be handling this thru their military when
their law enforcement capabilities get overwhelmed.

GREG: Like Michelle said, we need to do an assessment country by country.

HUGHES: None of these countries were developed in a vacuum. You are not developing
a general staff to do one thing, but you are precluding states towards the end state.

GREG: There’s an assumption that you consulted smartly, to do functions A, B, C. Even
if you did that through the stove pipe, it might not be effective to what you are doing in
another stove pipe.

HAWLEY: What we are doing between the LOE’s is the collaboration between 4.1 and
4.6. We are using this vehicle, using their law enforcement and military establishment,
and we are trying hard to make that mechanism wok. What are they willing go, or what
our mechanisms are, that’s kind of behind this philosophy.

Slide on border security. 4.4.
NASON: Increasing border security, control, intelligence sharing, collaboration
(transnational) and within the country. Create a border securing agency. Not every
country has 1 agency that does plan based and border based patrol. We have to see the
different components that do that.

CHUCK: It’s a CARB decision to see where we get military support for the borders?


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NASON: yes.

HAWLEY: The real issue here is the gaps being so big, and no one being able to fill them
except outside capabilities. This is a good list, that we can talk about military or other
kind of gap filler. Their military or so.

GOETCHIUS: This is including sea port security?

NASON: Under that security, you can also include maritime and airtime.

GREG: lets go back and identify only glaring issues. Let’s move on to maritime security.

Slide on 4.8. Weapons Control

HAWLEY: When we do the assessment, how is this done, if the seizure operation is
getting overwhelmed, what kind of activity do we undertook? In the maritime case, the
military provides the surveillance to a point, but the law enforcement action is done by
the coast guard. This is assuming the coast guard has the capability to do it. This is a very
sophisticated operation, if we are serious about weapons control.

NASON: If the goal is just eradication, then you don’t care, you just destroy it. If the goal
is prosecution, then you need the judicial system to assist. There’s a gap that needs to be
closed. We might be involved in training for that, and how these weapons are disposed
of.

HUGHES: One bullet that is missing here and Josh talked about it, is that you need
military support, and the most direct military support is the accountability of military
accountability of their ordinance. Put that as the first bullet. Maintain security and
accountability.

GREG: Is there a general agreement act for the arms trafficking?

HUGHES: What happens is that we provide it as part of our train and equip program, and
it flows right through to the gangs.

GREG: Many of these weapons, almost 90% come from the USA. Most of them come
legally. So we have an arms deal that brings a steady flow of arms into the country. So
we have a concern that must be addressed as a topic. Also, are you recommending that
we are the action agent for this weapons control? Like the 50 soldiers we have in Panama
will be in charge of this?

HUGHES: No, it will be the responsibility of the host nation.

Economic Prosperity:

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HARMON: The military should provide radars and other sensors that allow the host
countries to manage licit traffic. This way there’s a vital port management system.

BEMIS: This is a steady state environment, so there are civil aviation authorities and port
aviation in place. So there is no need to provide this capability.

HARMON: I’ve worked with them, and they do not have those capabilities. Now if you
don’t want to include that right now, that’s a different story.

HAWLEY: We can’t make the assumption that it is safe. We have to plan for it.

BEMIS: Do those really need to be protected in this environment?

HUGHES: Also Bemis, if we extend this, it comes into the assessment and control factor.

HAWLEY: Yeah we need to include it.

CHUCK: Why are we protecting tourist spots? Why do we need this, let’s remove this?

HENDRICKS: Tourism is a big economic opportunity, and they need that for prosperity.

CHUCK: My counter point would be that you are putting a military force in an awkward
position by making them protect tourist spots. I think courts, communication, financial
nodes, they seem a lot more important.

SWEBERG: You have to include tourist trade, as that brings hard currency. That is the
single most important way for these countries to do that. This creates an environment for
economic growth using internal economic resources. But the tourists bring in hard
currency that the country needs. You cannot put enough priority on tourism.

GREG: You might be better served as using the term “tourist trade.” They are a financial
aspect. Money laundering, etc.

CHUCK: What if the local business men start paying off the military to protect their
businesses?

HUME: That happens here, all the time. We can’t be that hollow.

Capabilities, needs, and gaps.

HUGHES: Before you start, you might want to think about, you also have a consultative
strategy here. When you think about strategy and approach the SSR, it affects your ability
to approach that strategy. Horizontal and vertical integration is required. You need to

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know if there is an office for communication this, or are we assuming by 2020 that it’s
going to be there, just make a note of that.

SWEBERG: State and AID have a strategy for communications.

HUGHES: If you feel that that’s what you are going to acquire to execute this strategy,
then I would suggest to you that you need to identify it as a technology that exists to let
you do your job, like a regional office you can engage with.

SWEBERG: And if it is not there, you need to identify that that is what you are going to
need. We spent 8 years to try to get them to identify and resource funding to fully do their
job, and now they can only do 70% of their job. There’s a clear mandate for the office to
do that job, these offices and agencies, only in the last couple of years, acknowledge that
they have a foreign assistance role to play.

HUGHES: If you press the I believe button, then you owe it to yourself to identify it as
an essential capability. One is, again, what do you need to be to reach in order to do this
kind of horizontal and vertical integration that is required. DO you have the expertise on
your staff to get this comprehensive approach to SSR? Is this something that needs to be
included in the PRE doctrine? Do you have the doctrine and training to support you? Do
you have the right civilian military mix in your force to tackle this? And ministerial and
tactical capabilities?

CHUCK: I think those are great points, but each of these people that spoke to us
yesterday, they spoke about a regional cell, and since we have the CARB organization,
and we know for a fact they have similar planning groups, like ones that are inter-agency
focused, I think in the end, we need the capabilities to exchange LNO’s with those
groups, and at least sync it up.

HUGHES: Chief, if you think you need this, put that on the board.

MIKE: You know, sometimes at DHS, DHS doesn’t know what we have. We have a
team to go to for support on current things that ICE and SService agents need for money,
fund transfers, etc. There’s an Army Lt. COL. Form UCOMM, form the flip side of the
coin, ICE has one ICE person (agent or analyst) in SOS or SOCOMM or etc. Some of
those assets are already there. It’s just a matter of knowing that they are there. I agree
with the chief that the country teams, ICE have a big footprint of offices in other
countries, especially in CENTAM and SOUTHAM. A lot of it is resource driven, and we
would like agents in every agency. We just can’t do it.

CHUCK: One final point: If we as the USDOD component sent and LNO out to your
office of CENTAM, and we know what you are doing and are synched with that, that
doesn’t meet the mail. The reason of them being there is to work with CARB countries.
Our Center of Gravity is to work with those lines of effort, and that’s where we should
exchange LNO’s and if there’s a clash, we can make a phone call and work those things.
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GREG: You need to make a standing interagency command and control agency, and now
we have 9 OPT’s out there, each for a different LOE. This isn’t part time business. This is
going to require agents, resources, over time to orchestrate all this. Is this what we want
to identify. That’s what the COCOMM? Commander would do at SOCOMM.

HUGHES: What SOCOMM has done in a myriad of civil agency has been highly
controversial with the LSD? The COCOMM doesn’t have that capabilities that you have
at SOCOMM. What most of the regional COCOMM have are principally LNO’s. Their
full time job is just information awareness. It is not sitting down on an OPT and planning.

Now, from the country’s perspective, is it in the posture to execute all this?

COGHILL: First we need to get the lexicon down. If SSR is the new SFA, then we need
to know that. There needs to be a resolution about what we are going to call this, and
even among NATO.

HAWLEY: We need a DOD instruction for SSR. Also we need a joint operational design
concept for implementing regional security integration. Right now we don’t have an idea
at all what regional security integration means. We are making it up.

GREG: So you are saying we need to institutionalize our ability to conduct and support
SSR. Bring it into the school of house.

HAWLEY: I want to tell the boys at J9 to start working on an operational design to crank
up the machine that cranks out doctrine. We don’t have an idea what security integration
is for a sub region.

HUGHES: Yes, even if you were in AFPAK, they would put together a sub regional
strategy. I just got done writing the SSR for Afghanistan, as there is no frame work to do
this on a sub regional level. We don’t even have, as a country, a plan to do this on a
national level. We had to split it into multiple regions.

MCCARTHY: It is interesting that we don’t have set up. That’s a gap in our system. Our
treasury rep is shared between SOCOMM and COCOMM. He works both regions, but
we pay for it. There’s a lack of man power and funding for interagency effort that we are
doing for them. This is one of the things that need to filter down.

HAWLEY: We need a train and equip capability for GENDAMERIE? Type forces.

NASON: This is something that we discuss during… there is really no capability in the
whole of US govt for a rapidly deployable sustaining force in the law enforcement nature.
That gets into the resources. There is no one that we can send. If we use coast guard, then
we are pulling them away from their mission. If we use CBP, then we are taking them

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away from their mission. Same with secret service and FBI. There are only so many
bodies to go around, and it’s all a matter of reprioritizing. There’s a huge gap.

HAWLEY: GENDARMERIE has law enforcement capabilities, but they are heavily
armed. I’m saying in 2020 if we are losing this and Mexico, then what kind of capability
can we get into the system that has GENDARMERIE type capability. I don’t think the
contracting system is going to be enough. Its not just military forces, or regime change,
we are interesting in capabilities that are stronger so they can deal with this heavily
armed                                                                         capabilities.

NUGENT: one is, you create specialized units that are a perversion from the normal stuff.
You have to enable general forces to train NON PEERS. Then the non peer thing is yet to
break out GENDARMERIE, teach them how to do stuff like whatever police does.

HAWLEY: I’m sure NATO is looking at this too. They are trying to do this in Africa.

NUGENT: We have a reserve unit out there that is hunting for harbor patrol cops.

SWEBERG: Right now, we kind of have what you are looking for in WESTHEM. We
decided a number of years ago, we could not pursue the establishment of a Gendarmerie
kind of force, like the French. We pay every year for that as part of the State Dept.
budget. One of the things we could consider is the budget. Now did you want them to
reside in the USA, or in a region?

GREG: We need an up-scaled police capability to deal with gangs. We are talking about
military capacity that is required in CENTAM, we just captured that there’s a need for
training and equip need.

COGHILL: The UN has something called police divisions, which are formed police
unites, have both police and military missions, and they have a whole SSR section as
well. That’s another option that the UN has intl units that are trained to do this.

GERMANY: This is because in Kosovo, no one trusts anyone, so we had to create that
force.

CHUCK: This is especially frustrating to me because I don’t know why we can’t say
BANG and make all this. They have been artificially precluded from this, but that’s okay.
We need to shape what we could use instead of them, like specific type units,
Gendarmerie, whatever you want to call it, has to be flexible enough to know subject
matter expertise and they will be good to go.

REGENS: If we are trying to craft a narrative with them, we can provide logistical
support, but the training of, since this is a security coalition, it would be well advised for
them to turn to, be it the Spanish, Italian, etc. With the limited number of friendly troops
on the ground, this is what we need to get troops to get going. Just as a cautionary thing,
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it makes good to clear that it is non US, and that I agree that there are other transnational
challenges besides narcotics, but the lines start getting too complicated. We have to
decide where the lines need to get drawn.

NUGENT: We are building force structure to do training. Unless you have that analytical
demand to plan this out, we don’t have it.

COGHILL: They are not going to say if you want to do something, we don’t have that
national plan.

HAWLEY: I’m just looking for DIA to come up with 3 or 4 guys to come with subject
matter expertise so we know what to do with whom. An initial Intel report or assessment
that can tell me what the situation is soon, not a year.

COGHILL: I disagree; I know there’s a guy in DIA right now that can crank out that
rep….

HARMON: And I disagree, they might have 1 guy for the region, or a country like
VENEZUELA, that only does “threats” for that region.

HUGHES: Yes, they don’t have anyone there because these things we need are not Intel
issues.

GREG: Ok, if we could solve that problem, how can we use that Intel to use it for our
next goal?

HUGHES: This is a combination of Intel and info issues, does the fusion capabilities
exist, and the analytical capabilities exist to take this plethora of info and fuse it together.
The DIA answer is “NO,” because they don’t think this is an INTEL issue.

HAWLEY: Well I need a capability to do this, because I am not going into this blind.
The INTEL and INFO capabilities to get assessment. We are walking into these issues
blind. You are talking about the analysis part of the Intel.

MCCARTHY: this is the problem that we have. We don’t do Intel collection. We do
analysis. We utilize Intel that is already produced, because the Intel is already there. We
don’t have enough analysts that we can contract or get, that are trained to utilize all this
Intel.

HAWLEY: Well if you have the audacity to wait for transnational assessments, then you
can...

NUGENT: Civil affairs guys do this, but we don’t have system to get that in analysis for
our purpose.

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CHUCK: They have this in El Salvador, Guatemala.

HAWLEY: Every capability that is out there that we don’t have, people are fighting the
issue to talk about it. I’m asking for small capabilities to solve this big problem. I don’t
want to wait a year for that kind of analysis. Let’s take this 2020, and it’s a real problem
we have to deal with now, and we need these capabilities. So that we have active work
going on at the end of this month. I’m not going to wait 6 months, not 5 months for the
reserve call up to get done. We are going to go down and do it.

CHUCK: The only way to get that done is to hold the carrot in your hand, and say “this
carrot is yours as soon as you get done with your training, promotion issues.” They work
with things themselves, they just need conditions for success. That’s how it’s done in the
theater. There is no existing expert on Salvadorian pay and promotion systems. You don’t
want this person to get into INTEL shock.

HUME: You don’t need an expert.

HUGHES: You are fighting us on this, and I don’t know why you are fighting us on this.
Think about this about IRAQ. We had to wait 11 months to wait for to get some IG
experts to find out their internal mechanisms. Their civilian and civilian system existed
no where and the inspector general system had to certify retired IG’s, get specific
legislative authority there are so many legal restrictions. It took another 4 years to get the
IG’s in Afghanistan. DON’T SIT HERE AND TELL ME THAT WE HAVE THE
STANDING FORCE AND CAPABILITIES TO GET THIS MINISTERIAL
DEVELOPMENT CIVILIAN TO CIVILIAN MENTORING, when we don’t.
With all due respect chief (Chuck), I’m not sending a CW-5 for this ministerial
mentoring project.



Break for 10 mins.

INSIGHTS ON STEADY STATE SSR.

NUGENT: There is an acceptable level of violence. This is not a crisis. It starts at a level
that is unacceptable, and is lowered to something we can live with.

HUME: So like Detroit?

NASON: Yes.

GREG: We chuckle at this, but this shows that it is a dynamic world. Trying to go in and
replicate normalcy in terms of what we define that as in our culture, in a different culture


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as a standard will be doomed for failure, and if you want to be successful, you have to
know what you are trying to fix.

NASON: In some ways, I’m looking at it as US law enforcement, we are steady state,
and we know we are not going to stop all the cases of homicide or sexual assault. When
do you have one rape vs. a serial rapist kind of situation? The higher level of murder is
the steady state for some of these countries. It’s just not acceptable in the USA. Law
enforcement in these other countries are trained to level it at their level, and they have
different levels.

HARMON: Well that is a matter of perception.

COGHILL: Well by steady state we mean routine.

GREG: Pre crisis, business as usual, etc.

NUGENT: The steady state you are talking about is the operating situation, the
implication of forced protection have to be tempered with the understanding that for them
it is normal.

BEMIS: Our goals are elusive. It is harder to describe in the steady state what our goals
are. It is easier to see violence stop, and we can say that our goal is reached, since the
conflict is stopping. But at a steady state, it is hard to see corruption go down. How does
the end state substantially differ in 2027 than what we did in 2020.

NUGENT: You don’t get to an acceptable level of violence, and in CENTAM, you know
start talking about back gaps and stopping drugs from coming through the boats and air
into submarines.

BEMIS: You will have to start where you train military people to start thinking like DOS.
Think in terms of setting up processes to manage situations. There are not many
expectations to bring to an end they are dealing with, they are setting up processes to
manage the situation.

HUME: Doesn’t the Dept. of State have goals?

BEMIS: Yes, we have goals to set up processes.

NUGENT: The implication of the military is that: I get the mission, I analyze the
mission, I go to the mission, I get the mission done, and I come home. This is not the case
anymore with these steady state systems. I have to now do 10% of the phase now, go
back do another 10%, then go back and do another 40%. It’s repetitive, common across
the theaters, and I don’t have to learn a new mechanism since I’m doing the same thing.
It’s the same planning process. I have to turn over the formal systems I accumulated, and

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pass it on to the next person in the door, since the operation carries on. Transient units
executing these things.

HUGHES: There’s a further implication to that. You have to incentivize concrete
accomplishments.

NUGENT: The person who grades me as a deployer is my immediate commander. If you
want to get a system that works, then the grade should be with the theater who grades me
on how well I pass the ball while I was there.

SWEBERG: We are phase 0 everywhere, and that you are talking about is stability ops,
not steady state. Without beating a dead horse and dwelling on it, I don’t disagree with
Hume, but there will be people who do. What exactly do we mean by phase 0. That
phase prior to conflict that we want to return to with the conclusion of conflict. The
moment we start talking about conflict and crisis, its not steady status.

NUGENT: Success in phase 0 means staying in phase 0. Irregular warfare is the low level
stuff that goes on all the time. There’s nothing irregular about it.

HENDRICKS: I think a focus of this process should tie along with the transitions, and
relationship building and gaining trust, since a lot of times, we don’t see that. I think it
goes a long way as it makes me think of living in Miami, FL, and I fit in them because I
understand their culture. You have to take that same approach if you are reaching out to
these same countries. They should want to work with us.

SWEBERG: I wrote what BEMIS said, in steady state, the focus is processes rather than
checklists.

HUGHES: What makes this so complex is that while you do steady state, at the same
time you still have to plan for and preserve the capacity to surge and manage risks, which
takes resources.

MCCARTHY: You always have to have the fire hose ready, incase the fire gets out of
hand.

REGENS: All things being equal, how do you know you are in phase 0.

HUME: Military says Phase 0 is to prepare and prevent, deploy LME’s, and put it in the
c2 structure so we know who to send and when to send it.

GREG: In steady state, do your thresholds become your goals?

NUGENT: Two things, you get what you measure. You are vulnerable to bad choices of
measure. Number 2, to some extent, the military, you, are not in charge of the thresholds.

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Politically, these thresholds are tied with wins, etc, and whatever is the acceptable level
of violence, isn’t anymore, and you are in a war.

GREEN: That was the same in IRAQ. Who set the metric to how many bodies to find is
okay. One senator speech can change the acceptable rate of violence.

HAWLEY: I think it’s a silly argument that the DOD is getting drained by 1400 men for
a steady state op.

NUGENT: Well it’s not an argument that holds water. If I need 1400 people that can hold
steady state ops, that means I need 4200 in reality to hold the rotations. This is what I was
talking about my fire fighting capacity.

REGENS: DOD can whistle up 1400 guys real quick.

CHUCK: Well DoD will be hard pressed if you asked for 20 helicopters with outfit.

GOETCHIUS: We can’t even do 9!

CHUCK: That’s right.

HUGHES: I think we need to go back to the 1400 troops, and see what you are dealing
with. You are talking about very low density for experience. This is almost a diplomatic
task, but not everyone can do that.

HAWLEY: SOCOMM and AFRICOMM are saying the same thing I’m saying. They
would want more people, more funds, and more resources.

NUGENT: Let’s take US as a country that needs SSR. The problem is that you don’t
have anything to put in the hopper than generates the men I need for 1400 continuous
troops.

HUGHES: I’m surprised no one has talked about planning and implementing guidelines.

HAWLEY: The ultimate resource question is: There no programmatic coherence in the
budget

CHUCK: . Maybe a caveat for this is to leverage the 7 embassies with the INL?

HAWLEY: But that is stove piped.

NETTLER: when you say you are title 10 buying something, you can justify it for the
war plan. Utilization of those on a daily basis to train and make sure the crew is ready
under war plans, I got that. I want to prevent war while I prepare for war. SOCOMM
owns no force, they will have to borrow it. This is steady state on steroids. Can you
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compete with what’s going on in the world? It’s not black or white, it’s out there, you
have to take a look to see if there’s a mechanism. We are missing the opportunity to reap
our global requirements to get global engagement. We can never prevent as long as we
are fat fight.

HAWLEY: The intelligence community is not ready for steady state.

NUGENT: with every event that I’ve done, Human Terrain Analysis is fundamentally not
an intel function. 1. Essentially none of the information is classified. And I am the
believer in operating the culture you are in as long as it is in harmony of it. Last thing I
want to do is put that info in the hands of the intel people where it will get hard to get at.
If you are going to do this level of human terrain analysis, then you need to invent a new
system that does that exactly.

CHUCK: The info we need is not about Centralia, it’s about the society of police and
why it allows corruption.

HUGHES: The information domain is not postured for steady state situations!

HUGHES: How SSR is such a political activity for 2 different dimensions. It’s political
in the host nation, but also political domestically among all the other agency actors. We
in this scenario, each national problem, if we were carrying out this strategy, we would be
struggling through steady state process.

HUME: If we can put people on the ground with a laptop, a phone, a table and a chair
and tell them that they will send information back whether the other can or cannot. At the
same time, we will bring more people to the camp fire.

BEMIS: Why would you want to duplicate something other people are already doing?

SWEBERG: When there is crisis, no body is not going to welcome this assistance. But
when you talk about steady state non crisis situation, then people get antsy about other
people in the background. It questions their capacity to control the environment. Its all
politics.

HUME: And now we have a special representative in the region from order of the
president, so




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DAY 4 - Thursday

WNN update.

GREG: Topic areas that need to be discussed today. Key points, highlights, glaring
mistakes.

SWEBERG: The challenges DOD faces when it comes to situations like this where the
requirement to be out of sight is a condition of the operation. It makes it challenging
when you are required to have such few boots on the ground. How do you work around
that? When we were trying to work with the African Union to develop plans for the
Sudan, the AU said “we don’t want Americans and European in our Headquarters.” How
do you help them with that requirement? What we had to do then was to find a work
around, by having our own building in another location, and had communications and an
out of sight command and control center and communicated through video and audio.
        There is nothing we could provide in terms of training and guidance since we
were not there. The challenge was for them to release key personnel so they could get
training in America. During non conflict times is the time to do the training and not
during ops.

CHUCK: Id like to make a cutline as to what steady state is. Within the 7 states, there is
some crisis or another. You might remember Haiti, Bosnia/Kosovo… basically where
there’s a surge of multi national presence, is because the existing government has been
somewhat debilitated, and the multi national forces help restore some sort of normalcy.
        Our purpose is not to surge military, it’s to surge developmental capability for
them.

GREG: Ok what we have here is a coalition that is growing, and let’s play with that for a
few minutes. Let’s take the Haiti example. If there’s sensitivity of troops on the ground,
like in African, let’s identify what we have to do. Do we see potential there?

SWEBERG: One of the things, if you take the Haiti example, is that we are talking with 7
countries who are talking together, and we are talking about what we have at this point.
One of these that we learned in Haiti is training leadership. Why not take this opportunity
to take the senior people to come to the USA and train and play together. So we took the
senior commander from Haiti to Fort Leavenworth, and we made them understand each
other and their roles, and most importantly, we made them friends. So that relationship
we built in Leavenworth spread to the staff, since everyone knew they were friends. That
was the smoothest transition. It was greatly attributed to Brohimi and the US commander.
You develop a kind of inter-personal relationship that could probably seriously benefit in
the long run.

BEMIS: This is great, and most places in the world that is a great idea. Except there’s a
great amount of historical baggage in CENTAM. They are all products of youth military
training. All the nasty people were coming out of the US training program. These guys
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are exposed to US, and misuse it for their ways. That political environment makes it hard
for America to look at them and find a solution.

GOETCHIUS: But that’s a characterization that’s not fair.

NUGENT: But it’s a characterization that can be useful. It allows you to throw a card that
blocks thing.

GREG: The US contribution could be going into Brazil, for example, and work with their
educational structure and training. That builds relations and understanding, and that’s
important.
       How about, let’s take the example of Haiti, that when there is a disaster, instead of
American forces, we could have CARB nation forces.

REGENS: Peace keeping, that kind of sloshes over, to policing operations. Those are two
capacity areas that the military across the coalition. You also have to look for classic civil
engineering. What can US military do? and other military units do? What can you
leverage?
       Steady state is not just natural disasters.

BEMIS: This kind of environment, the COCOMM needs to become more adept in
identifying resources outside of the command. Other military resources, other
government agencies. It happens in every country, they look into their own resources
first.

GREG: that’s a good mindset. There are some places where you will always be the
default machinery to provide what they need.

REGENS: For trauma neutral surgery, you want to go to the Israeli’s first.

SWEBERG: DOD is not accustomed to looking beyond their resources. “We don’t need
the interagency, we can do it all,” someone from SOCOMM said that last night, I heard
an 06 say that. But it’s nice to see the rest of you with open minds.

CHUCK: I think I said that….

SWEBERG: No, it wasn’t you, but thank you. It takes a good commander of staff to say
that “hey boss, we can’t do that, but so so and so can, so we can contact them.” We need
commanders that can ask the right questions. But normally you don’t have that.

NASON: We need to realize that in often times, in SSR, the USA might not be the
subject matter expert. DHS is recognizing in Shock trauma treatment. Some of the things
they do in medical treatment in Israel is totally 180 degrees from our paradigm of
medical emergency treatment. This will never happen in USA because we refuse to

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change. Our system is so different from theirs; we may need them to align themselves to
Columbia, or other countries that are more like them.

GREEN: We have a lot of interagency people going through our training. It’s funny to
see Egyptian, Iraqi and Israeli sit together and talk about what they are going to do when
they get home. We realize that we cannot handle it all. Afghanistan and Iraq taught us
that we can’t do everything by ourselves. That’s the reality.

GREG: Reality shows that while cultural change is hard, it can be done!

COGHILL: I think DOD is starting to get it, and one example is SOUTHCOMM. He
changed the staff structure around so he had the directorship and partnerships that was
divided to finding public private sectors.

HARMON: It is clear that the old system we had was not ready to deal with issues like
Haiti.

GREG: Well, we need to discuss that, and see what’s on the table and how we can get
things done.

CHUCK: Function becomes very important as a sub-division, and if you look at function,
you start looking away from rivalries, etc. This happened in Peru-Ecuador, etc. The U.S.
function was a logistical function. In Haiti, the military function was probably the key
enabling function for weeks, for AFSOC guys to open their air fields, and they bumped
from 20 landings a day to over 200. so I think, ….

NUGENT: In a joint planning day, the sea landings came late, because there wasn’t a
theater plan that had a maritime component, and the enablers got there late, and there was
no preplanning…

CHUCK: The final point on function is that, as part of SSR, we need to start looking at
that.

GREG: I mentioned we are going through a capabilities discussion yesterday, and right
now we have 9 OPT’s playing different aspects from the SOUTHCOMM commander. I
think we said we recognized that we need to have a standing man in control capability to
perform that form a continuing basis. We need to know how that is going to be
composed, like military, inter-agency, other 7 friend nations, and maybe even the host
nation. In addition to that, we are going to take the mission, what’s the best way to deal
with capacity, in a continuing capacity?

HARMON: I have one I have been thinking all morning… there is no model on how to
focus in on critical components on SSR. We need to proceed towards an SSR
instructions. Like a world bank that talks about economic construction, they realize that
working on everything at once doesn’t work. So they are now finding how to do it step by
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step. And they have metrics for each step, to find the biggest log jams. Then they can go
back and reassess what’s going on. This is something that DOD wouldn’t do. This is
reaching back to academic community, to allow you a framework.

NUGENT: If you were using that model in this scenario, you might not go back to the
most broken part. If you are looking at the trafficking, then you will go after the part that
most effects the suppression. You will know how to solve that.

HARMON: That also depends on the commander’s intent/strategy.

HENDRICKS: how much change do we really want to effect in these countries? Yes we
want to stop the drugs and gangs because they affect the US.

GREG: Why would we not want to change the countries?

BEMIS: Is there anything to be said about over all structures for authority in US
government. Part of the reason this planning construct would work is because we have a
Special Representative that has a lot of authority. And you are bypassing a lot of detailed
planning that involved a military commander working in the OSD, who reaches his
counterparts in DOS and other agencies and mechanisms and others in Washington. Is
there anything to be said about this from Washington to local commanders, leaders,
special reps, and allowing them to work the problem?

CHUCK: Absolutely, for a troop to leave the US and go oversees, you need a joint staff
deployment approval. There is a lot of bureaucratic difficulty in the form of controls. The
reason you don’t see this everyday is that the DOS has their job, and the military has their
job.

GREG: What I hear is that we made a recommendation for the command and control
center for CARB. With the membership of that, is going to be a microcosm of
Washington DC picked up to perform this operation at SOUTHCOMM. We are going to
need to find out what authorities need to be identified to these authorities, like a
systematic walk through, to get this moving. What’s in your pit bag in terms of authority,
which justifies you being there in the first place?

BEMIS: Regional reps aren’t many of them, a they are in special cases, and they may or
may not have that much authority.

CHUCK: It doesn’t matter if they give you all the authority; you also have to have
resources. Who do I have to “mother may I?” to get things rolling? Senior Representative
Hawley are going to be extremely critical of that. What happens when we run down our
resources?



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GREG: Open the discussion back up to Sec. Gates and see if there is anything else he
needs to know?

TAN: Should we consider some form of exit?

GREG: I think the intent was to build post nation capacity and bolster military capacity.
The goal is talk your self into a job. Less is better.

CHUCK: That’s what we did for JTF in Haiti. We had a great exit strategy, as every one
of those assets was signed to somewhere else.

HENDRICKS: I was just thinking of not the most recent effort in Haiti, but the previous
one. How do we avoid that? Haiti was becoming more stable, and we pulled out, and now
everything is how it was. How do we avoid that happening in CENTAM?

CHUCK: When you talk to capacity building, that’s a nut you gamble on. 1994, 2004,
yes. US presence was replaced with Minusta. You have to be very careful in your
engagement with a sovereign nation, because if you have an artificially propped up
entity, why didn’t the Haitian national police push for the real entity? It depends on the
country too. Haiti is unique. Their history is nothing but bad. We limited our presence,
and when things got better, we left. When we look at end state, it’s not just about leaving,
its about leaving with a high potential that they can handle.

GREG: Better to send the UN than the US. The UN have a mission objective, of
transitioning and building capacity in the sovereign nation. The idea is not about a
substitute, the idea is to truly build organic sovereign capacity. It’s a focus effort. You
end of moving in, etc.

CHUCK: I’ve got a short story, and it was illuminating.
         Counter drug battalion in Columbia
         Took US template and put it on the ground for Columbians
         They said thanks, but it wont work (Few heli’s, logistical supply, etc)
         The expanded the battalion into a brigade
         In 2004 – 2007, Columbians took that stuff and slowly let it go down to
            fewer numbers.
         The brigade morphed into something they could use in their wars
         Lesson learned: you have to start from the beginning and get the SME, an
            honest broker, to get expertise to shape your assistance, otherwise it wont
            stick.

SWEGERG: DOD cannot change the resources in STATE and USAID. In USAID
employed 22,000 people, and now they have employed 1000 people. They still rely
heavily on contractors, host nation, outsourcing. Congress is saying “wow, why do we
have to double?” There are huge conceptual gaps with congress. How many times has
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Sec. Gates gone before congress, and said “you have got to fund State and AID better.”
Congress will not get the message. You are gong to get incremental advantages. In 10
years we are going to get a lot better.

BEMIS: I don’t think its exactly that bad. How many people do you have to have in HQ,
and how many do you need in the field. You can make it contracted out just as easily.

SWEBERG: There is one critical difference. The reason you have to have state dept.
employees, or AID employee oversees, as they are the only ones to represent USA
overseas, and provide funding. Contractors cannot do that. The sheer volume of
assistance programs that are going around the world, you cant do that.

BEMIS: How long can u maintain this high level commitment by congress to fund this?
History has shown that we had a lot of money going into CENTAM while the war was
going on. State was putting money in there, AID was putting money in there.

SWEBERG: we are making some assumption. It is important for the game to clearly
articulate that the assumptions that if we have the civilian agency representation to
respond to the challenges of this scenario, that needs to be caveat. If the DoD don’t have
resources, then the result is we are not going to achieve the following. That means, a
DELTA will have been created, from not having the funding to pay for BRAVO. We
need to make sure we clearly articulate that. This is the price we pay. Since we are
looking at this form a steady state perspective, this is to some degree as a surge. If this
was a real world situation, this is not going away in 3 or 4 years, this is going ot be there
for a while.

NASON: The JFCOM rep stopped me and said how do we get DHS reps more involved?
It has to come form the higher levels. How many times have we though to ourselves
“wish my boss could here this.” I told him, if this is important to Sec. Gates, they will
talk about it. If its important to the boss, it will be important to everyone else, as it shows
up on the report card.

COGHILL: Intel has already been driven by what the boss’ priorities are. If the
commander comes and says “I need to find a report on the finance sector on Guatemala,”
they are going to get it done. Its all about the commander’s priorities. Its not like the IC
cant do it, its all about priorities. You want to use your intel sources and think about
where they will be focused. You are going to spread out you intel community, and it cant
be all about CT or Non-proliferatoin.

NUGENT: Intel is secret squirrel stuff, how many tanks do they have, etc. this is
information, not Intel.

HARMON: Intel will do whatever you want it to do. Its not specific. Just because it used
to be something doesn’t mean its the same way today.

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GOETCHIUS: Theres one thing about Intel, is that we are saying a given country needs
Intel fuctions, the military doesn’t need to be doing that, like corrupt politicians in El
Salvador. We are setiting up a model on how to do intel and empower them.

GREG: I don’t think our intel discussion was about MI alone, it was about the general IC.

NUGENT: if you are going to do SSR, you need operational info. If you want to do
tactical stuff, like needing to know if Harry’s squad is corrupted, because I want to bust
Harry. The other piece of this, is that the best sources for the kind of transformation crew
comes from the IIR. Theres a different mind set as to what constitutes valid info.

GREEN: Don’t use him as a source. I use sources all the time. You can get sources, or an
informant. Informant info is a different mindset, but you can run with it.

GREG: Any pressing thoughts on issues we want to take forward? If not, we need to
more forward. We pushed the gang discussion to the right.


GREG: Gangs are an interesting topic and in this scenario, what are the real challenges in
the inter-agency approach that we are trying to talk about. What are the stresses that kind
of challenge creates?

NASON: Just a basic knowledge of how the gangs are involved in the social structure.
Their gangs are replacing social and economical structures that don’t exist in their
neighborhood. It’s a very involved issue.

GREG: It was kind of interesting that they blame us for the GANG issue.

BEMIS: Salvadorans, the problems go back to them. Going to Los Angeles and getting
involved in gang activity there, and then getting kicked out, they think they can replicate
that organization back home.

HENDRICKS: This goes back to the deportation policy. Do we find them and kick them
out of the country? Or do we fix that issue.

BEMIS: They get the idea now in CENTAM, they stood up these gangs. They are going
off in their own…

GREG: The gangs exist where there is a need for alternative social structures, as the
legitimate social structures are inadequate or non existent.

HENDRICKS: Its difficult because there is no real purpose behind it, because if you are
talking about a political movement, you have a motivation. If you have a gang, I think
that’s why its so complex.

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GREG: Why do gangs spread?

CHUCK: It seems to be an empowerment piece at the individual level. I don’t know if
this is happening, but think about whats happening in Arizona with the profiling going on
there. All the people that get stopped and bothered, they are de-empowered,
disenfranchised. A gang becomes very appealing, and they think it becomes a social
avenue. All you have to be is tough and be here, and good things will happen to you.
There’s a lot of draw to youth. It’s a vicious cycle. As gangs become endemic, quality of
life becomes to drop, and it becomes a police state. When the police overstep, all hells
breaks loose.
         You are not going to see the MS-13 rise up and overthrow the government. It’s a
local nucleus of power.

HENDRICKS: Also, how do you think about leaving the gang? They leave they gang and
they get killed. They don’t know how to get about that.

COGHILL: Some reason they join gangs is for personal security, like from someone or a
rival gang. Im just thinking to the movie, “City of God.” Everyone starts having guns,
and at some point you need a gun to be safe. It just spirals out of control.

GREG: They are drawn by a sense of belonging, economics, prosperity, power, etc.
Gangs are a phenomena that are a response to a society that are not meeting the needs of
humans. How do you change the character. They are dealth with individual basis, they
are somewhat manageable. They are dealt with in a local way. MS-13 came from the US
to El Salvador, etc. You see what is happening in Mexico, etc today. There is lots of
evidence that gangs grow.

CHUCK: Luis mentioned things that don’t work, like Manu Dora policy. Anyone on the
street with tattoos, they roll them up and throw them in the slang. It just transported the
guys into a very closed environment, where they had more control of the members. As
the lesser members were released, it built a network where the gangs were controlled
from the jails. That doesn’t work.

GREG: If gangs exist, they exist because of a lack of civil provision.

NASON: If we go in with a helping attitude, it will be better than going in with an armed
battalion. If we fill the void that fuels the creation of gangs, then we will see a change.
We can only try to counter act the gang. On educating people the reasons of why gangs
are back, helps, but you need to create an alternative. You need to counter the gang
options.

REGENS: Before you craft operational plans, what aspect of it are you trying to affect? Is
it that gangs have achieved a certain capability to act in a transnational way? What piece

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of that larger existence of gang problems is actionable, and why? That ideally guides the
framework. It’s a matter on knowing what the problem is that you can address.

NASON: LUIS bought this up in move 1, there maybe some added value in the
legitimizing of the gangs. Bringing the leaders of the bloods and the crips, to some sort of
forums. We will accept gang presence, but not gang violence. If you want to have that
sense of belonging, great. But don’t shoot each others at 2pm, when schools are out.

GREG: It is how do you deal with that component. That broadens it to military and law
enforcement. Mitigating actions are to change the social functions. There are probably
somethings, which encourages capturing and punishing those that are dong unacceptable
things, and also how you treat them.

TAN: Just a couple of suggestions. It seems that perhaps you need to distinguish between
immediate short term responses, and the other should be the long term , development,
root causes of gang problems. I think we need to separate the two when trying to address
this question. The other point is that when do we see this. After gang over is occurred, or
occurring? Or preventative? The gang, are they taking over?

GREG: The intent was to see how would we take preventative actions to include this
interaction.

GOETCHIUS: I agree with him. We need to stop the bleeding on this right away.

NUGENT: In a perverse way, if you think of this city as a gang, and you are thinking of
hitting up the root causes, that’s a gift you couldn’t pass up. Its not going to be liked, and
it gives you the chance to get rid of them before the justice system. In a crazy way, if
something like this happens and you are the theater commander…

CHUCK: I think the violence getting into the political scene, like the Haitian police was
not ready to deal with the issue. So that’s why you have to deal with the gang issue first.

TAN: Maybe we need another bubble chart to map the problem, from there we can
constitute how to attack the issues. Whether to use Shock Trauma emergency measures,
or long term issues.

CHUCK: The problem is that if the gang is still there and we try to fix the issues of the
city, they are going to try to take credit for it.

GREG: There should also plan for a contingency, that if things get out of control, we can
put out the fire. Its just like fighting a counter insurgency.

BEMIS: They cannot act with impunity. The government should always have a
monopoly of force. If anyone wants to take away that monopoly and make it a duopoly,

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then you should be prepared to counter that. I don’t think you can ever conceive those
two, its jus the way it is.

HOW DO YOU IMPACT FUTURE SOF CAPABILITIES?

BEMIS: You have 2 kinds of problems: first is the gangs, which involve small
populations, and are easy targets for sof power.

CHUCK: One of our topics was to train military to work with law enforcement. US SOF
is contrained by 1004, to the last secure forward operating location. We are not allowed
to replicate any law enforcement capabilities, or law enforcement capacity. We have
some of the most lethal killers on earth who have to sit back on the last secure base.
That’s an authorities issue. Also, we train police forces. The Carbeneros in Mexico are
sof trained, etc.

GREG: Well you can do that now, or do you need extra authority?

CHUCK: I think I can speak for all my counterparts for SOF, just take the hand cuffs off
and let us do it. Given the numbers you have, and the low footprint…

HARMON: What is the counterargument for the restrictions?

CHUCK: “US servicemen will not lose a drop of blood over drug wars.” Its
congressional language. It’s very suffocating.
       “We don’t want to start another Vietnam…and then a few years later, we don’t
want to start another El Salvador.” I don’t know why they use El Salvador for a negative
example.

GREG: is that an outgrow from the Iran –Contra affair?

CHUCK: Not at all.

REGENS: It’s a legacy from earlier practices.

GREG: So something worth noting is that to improve the forces in the host nations, we
have re-visit and review authority levels at the congressional levels. What else would you
like to see in the SOF world?

NUGENT: The capability gap is that you need a mechanism to use GPF to do tasks
presently done by SOF that can be done adequately by the force of the host nation. There
needs to be a better mechanism to proportion the work between SOF trainers vs. special
forces. I don’t need a SEAL to train someone to be a basic infantryman. How do I portion
that work out?


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REGENS: FID should not exclusively be a SOF core mission. SSR preceeds FID. Its just
a concept.

SWEBERG: SOF folks are the best possible for a lot of things, but they also aren’t for a
lot of things.

NUGENT: SOCOMM gets some of those commissions and a POCOMM, but there needs
to be parceled out better.

HUME: It does, it’s a title 10 responsibility. Marine core advisory group is also a new
tag. Every component has something to do that in.

GREG: So you don’t think we need significant changes to get this going?

CHUCK: Nothing permanent.


GREG: Lets use the remaining time to clean up some slides before we break.


FINAL COMMENTS:

HENDRICKS: I’d like to add that no one took into account the insurgency issue in
CENTAM. Like we commented before, are the gangs going to take over the govt? No.
But the insurgency can.




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