Message to the Senate Transmitting Conventional Weapons Convention

							                                                     Administration of William J. Clinton, 1997 / Jan. 8


Message to the Senate Transmitting Conventional Weapons Convention
Protocols on Mines, Incendiary Weapons, and Blinding Lasers With
Documentation
January 7, 1997

To the Senate of the United States:                    tive means for dealing with compliance prob-
   I transmit herewith, for the advice and con-        lems to ensure that these restrictions are actually
sent of the Senate to ratification, the following      observed. These objectives were all endorsed by
Protocols to the 1980 Convention on Prohibi-           the Senate in its Resolution of Ratification of
tions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Con-       the Convention in March 1995.
ventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to                  The amended Mines Protocol was not as
Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscrimi-        strong as we would have preferred. In particular,
nate Effects: the amended Protocol on Prohibi-         its provisions on verification and compliance are
tions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines,             not as rigorous as we had proposed, and the
Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II or          transition periods allowed for the conversion or
the amended Mines Protocol); the Protocol on           elimination of certain noncompliant mines are
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incen-      longer than we thought necessary. We shall pur-
diary Weapons (Protocol III or the Incendiary          sue these issues in the regular meetings that
Weapons Protocol); and the Protocol on Blind-          the amended Protocol provides for review of
ing Laser Weapons (Protocol IV). Also transmit-        its operation.
ted for the information of the Senate is the
                                                          Nonetheless, I am convinced that this amend-
report of the Department of State with respect
                                                       ed Protocol will, if generally adhered to, save
to these Protocols, together with article-by-arti-
                                                       many lives and prevent many tragic injuries. It
cle analyses.
   The most important of these Protocols is the        will, as well, help to prepare the ground for
amended Mines Protocol. It is an essential step        the total prohibition of anti-personnel landmines
forward in dealing with the problem of anti-           to which the United States is committed. In
personnel landmines (APL) and in minimizing            this regard, I cannot overemphasize how seri-
the very severe casualties to civilians that have      ously the United States takes the goal of elimi-
resulted from their use. It is an important pre-       nating APL entirely. The carnage and devasta-
cursor to the total prohibition of these weapons       tion caused by anti-personnel landmines—the
that the United States seeks.                          hidden killers that murder and maim more than
   Among other things, the amended Mines Pro-          25,000 people every year—must end.
tocol will do the following: (1) expand the scope         On May 16, 1996, I launched an international
of the original Protocol to include internal           effort to this end. This initiative sets out a con-
armed conflicts, where most civilian mine cas-         crete path to a global ban on anti-personnel
ualties have occurred; (2) require that all re-        landmines and is one of my top arms control
motely delivered anti-personnel mines be               priorities. At the same time, the policy recog-
equipped with self-destruct devices and backup         nizes that the United States has international
self-deactivation features to ensure that they do      commitments and responsibilities that must be
not pose a long-term threat to civilians; (3) re-      taken into account in any negotiations on a total
quire that all nonremotely delivered anti-person-      ban. As our work on this initiative progresses,
nel mines that are not equipped with such de-          we will continue to consult with the Congress.
vices be used only within controlled, marked,             The second of these Protocols—the Protocol
and monitored minefields to protect the civilian       on Incendiary Weapons—is a part of the original
population in the area; (4) require that all anti-     Convention but was not sent to the Senate for
personnel mines be detectable using commonly           advice and consent with the other 1980 Proto-
available technology to make the task of mine          cols in 1994 because of concerns about the ac-
clearance easier and safer; (5) require that the       ceptability of the Protocol from a military point
party laying mines assume responsibility for           of view. Incendiary weapons have significant po-
them to ensure against their irresponsible and         tential military value, particularly with respect
indiscriminate use; and (6) provide more effec-        to flammable military targets that cannot so


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