The Political Economy of Indian Wars

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The Political Economy of Indian Wars Powered By Docstoc
					The Political Economy of Indian
Wars
    TERRY L. ANDERSON and
    FRED S. MCCHESNEY
Introduction

   Most Americans today view the story of Indian-white
    relations through a late-19th-century lens.
   From this perspective, whites were intruders using
    military strength to take Indian lands and leaving the
    defeated Indians with nothing but useless tracts
    known today as reservations.
       An historian characterizes the conventional tale as
        one long episode of 'massacre,' 'extermination,' and
        'annihilation,' both 'utter' and 'complete,' recounted
        "with overtones of racism, genocide, and other
        shibboleths."


                                                                 2
Relative Peace Until 1850

    This version of Indian-white relations, however,
     misses the fact that the period from the first contact
     between the two groups until about 1850 was one of
     relative peace and harmony.
        The first Pilgrim Thanksgiving illustrates the peaceful and
         mutually beneficial relations between the two groups.
        Even on the western frontier, fur traders were hardly in a
         position to take from the Indians, and both sides partook of
         the gains from trade.
    Thus, the story of Indian-white relations is more
     accurately seen as a gradual deterioration from
     peaceful to bellicose.


                                                                        3
A Change in Attitude?

   This deterioration has been attributed to changes in
    whites' ideologies or attitudes toward Indian property
    rights.
   17th-century Europeans supposedly believed that their
    land claims were "unjustified and illegal if the prior right
    of the Indian were not recognized. Full title was in the
    Indian . . . from whom alone a valid title could be
    derived."
   But by the end of the 19th century the prevailing attitude had
    allegedly become that of Teddy Roosevelt: "The settler and
    pioneer have at bottom had justice on their side; this great
    continent could not have been kept as nothing but a game
    preserve for squalid savages" (1889, 90).


                                                                     4
Changes in Attitudes

   Economists do not like to resort to a change in
    ideologies or attitudes to explain economic
    phenomena, because changes in ideologies or
    attitudes cannot be observed in the same way that
    changes in income, relative prices, or technologies
    can.
   It is possible to use changes in ideologies or
    attitudes to explain anything, meaning that such an
    explanation can never be falsified.



                                                          5
An Alternative Explanation

   A&M offer a public choice explanation for the
    deterioration in Indian-white relations during the 19th
    century.
   Contrasting "the way of Coase with the way of
    Machiavelli."
   In the Coasian world, "people will never pass up an
    opportunity to cooperate by means of mutually
    advantageous exchange."
   But according to Machiavelli, "It is not gold, but good
    soldiers that ensure success . . . for it is impossible
    that good soldiers should not be able to procure
    gold."


                                                          6
Cooperate or Not?

 Hirshleifer offers two propositions:
(1) "Cooperation, with a few obvious
  exceptions, occurs only in the shadow of
  conflict," and
(2) "when people cooperate, it is generally a
  conspiracy for aggression against others (or
  at least, is a response to such aggression)"



                                                 7
Shadow of Conflict

   This shadow also falls over Indian-white relations.
   In resolving conflicts over land claims, both sides
    had a choice.
       They could follow the Coasian way and peacefully
        exchange, thereby enhancing total welfare, or they
        could follow the Machiavellian way and fight, imposing
        deadweight welfare losses overall.
       That they switched from the former to the latter
        suggests a deterioration in the gains from trade
        relative to the net gains from warfare.



                                                                 8
An Economic Model of Negotiation
Versus Taking
   John Umbeck's (1981) article on the choice
    between contract and violence provides a
    useful starting point.
   According to his theory, no distribution of
    rights is stable if anyone has less than he can
    obtain by forcefully taking from others.
   This did not mean violence, however, …



                                                  9
Umbeck’s Assumptions
   This conclusion is not surprising in light of
    Umbeck's assumptions.
       Identical production functions meant that no one
        had a differential incentive to put more effort into
        fighting.
       Equal abilities to use force meant that neither party
        had a greater likelihood of winning the fight.
       And finally, in a world of zero (or relatively low)
        negotiation costs, gains from trade could be
        captured without cost, thus avoiding the negative-
        sum game of war.


                                                                10
Machiavellian Outcomes

   Once these assumptions are relaxed, however,
    Machiavellian outcomes can occur, as in the
    case of litigation.
   Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) summarize the
    nature of the decision to litigate disputes by
    considering three stages of a legal dispute:
       harm,
       assertion of a legal claim, and then
       either bargaining (and maybe settlement) or
        litigation (when no settlement is reached).


                                                      11
Settle or Litigate; Negotiate or Fight

   Analytically, these phases apply to
    choices made between trade and war.
   Each phase has its analogue in the
    history of Indian-white relations.




                                          12
1. Harm

   To initiate the possibility of exchange, Indians would
    have to assert credible claims to what Europeans
    wanted.
   Assertion of Claims
   Once whites had trespassed upon Indian territory, two
    factors would determine whether Indians asserted claims
    to the disputed resources.
     First, asserting a claim depends on the expected loss
       from a continuing trespass relative to the cost of
       asserting the claim.
     Second, asserting a claim requires a credible ability to
       fight.


                                                             13
Rising Harm

   Given the vast amount of land held by Indians on
    first contact with Europeans and the relatively small
    amount initially desired by Europeans, it would be
    surprising for Indians to assert any claim against
    trespass at first.

   As the century progressed, however, and the
    relative mass of land held and demanded by the two
    sides shifted, it would be more likely for Indians to
    defend against trespass as a prelude to either treaty
    or war.

                                                            14
Negotiating or Fighting
   Once harm is imposed and a credible claim asserted,
    disputants must choose between bargaining or fighting.
   Obviously Indians and whites did not place equal values
    on the lands in dispute.
     On the Plains, where buffalo roamed over vast areas,
       Indians valued their hunting territories.
     In this setting the marginal value of an acre of land
       was quite low.
   On the other hand, whites generally were interested in
    more intensive agriculture, making their marginal value
    much higher.
     Implies more controversy over control of specific
       parcels of land and a differential willingness on both
       sides either to negotiate or fight over the land.
                                                                15
2. Fighting Endowments

   Umbeck assumed that each individual had equal
    fighting abilities and that each could only use his
    personal endowment of human capital.
   Both of these assumptions are unrealistic in the
    case of Indian-white relations.
   Military technologies differed: Indians relied
    extensively on bows and arrows, whereas whites
    primarily used guns.




                                                          16
Treaties are not Contracts

   Following Hirshleifer's second proposition, unlike
    disputes between individuals, warfare between groups of
    people requires collective action.
   Consequently the analogy between contracts to settle
    litigation and treaties to avoid warfare breaks down.
     Individuals make settlement contracts or litigate on
        their own behalf; war is waged on behalf of entire
        groups in a public choice setting, and treaties are
        made by subsets of representatives from each group.
     A settlement contract must make all individuals better
        off, whereas litigation leaves them worse off; the same
        is not necessarily true of treaties and warfare.

                                                              17
Prisoner’s Dilemma
   One difference between individual contracting and
    collective treaty making is that treaties often create a
    prisoner's dilemma; that is, even if the total benefits from
    a treaty exceed its total costs for both sides, any
    particular individual may find it in his interest to violate
    the treaty terms.
     The individuals within the collectivities [to be bound by
       a treaty] may or may not have given their consent to
       arrangements entered into by their governments and
       may or may not benefit from the treaty provisions....
       (Roback, 1992, 7)
   This prisoner's dilemma problem associated with treaty
    enforcement reduces the likelihood of negotiated
    outcomes and increases the likelihood of war.

                                                               18
Coalition Costs

   Similarly, coalition costs can affect the decision to
    negotiate or fight in a collective setting.

   Coalition costs are typically unimportant in the
    individual contractual setting.

   But because war ordinarily is not undertaken by
    individuals or small groups, the calculus must
    include the cost of amassing military forces.


                                                            19
Low Coalition Costs on the Margin

   Whites used two principal arrangements to
    fight Indians:
       part-time militia made up of local citizens and
       the standing national army of full-time
        professionals.
   Use of a full-time, professional army raises
    the fixed costs but lowers the marginal costs
    of warfare and so increases its likelihood.


                                                          20
Problems of Collective Decisions
   Finally, attempts to predict peace or war must recognize
    that these decisions are made by government officials (in
    the case of whites) and tribal leaders (for Indians).
   Just as dispute resolution by judicial trial is a "negative-
    sum game for the disputants, grafted onto collective
    choice by an impartial court," war is a negative-sum
    game.
   Rational avoidance of negative-sum situations presumes
    that the persons deciding between negotiation
    (settlement) and violence (litigation) bear the relevant
    costs.
     Where political decisions are made, however,
      individuals or coalitions can benefit themselves by
      shifting the costs of war to others, meaning that the
      relevant political actors may undervalue the cost of
      fighting.
                                                              21
Perverse Decisions

   Although warfare is negative sum overall, it may be
    value enhancing for influential persons or groups.
   If so, raiding will become more common relative to
    trading--for political reasons.
   If a small group can call on a standing army
    composed mostly of outsiders and compensated
    from general tax receipts, then the congruence
    between gains and costs is lost.
   The incentive increases for "political" wars, whereby
    wealth is created for one group at the expense of
    another.

                                                        22
Standing Army

   A standing army creates a class of professional soldiers
    whose personal welfare increases with warfare, even if
    fighting is a negative-sum act for the population as a
    whole.
   For military bureaucrats (typically the highest-ranking
    soldiers), warfare increases budgets.
   War means potential distinction for soldiers in the field,
    more promotions, and simply relief from boredom.
   Particularly when the army has political influence, a full-
    time fighting force will increase the number of disputes
    resolved violently.


                                                                  23
3. Information Costs

   Information costs are crucial in the warfare
    calculus but are ignored by Umbeck because he
    assumes that everyone has an equal ability to
    use force and that each knows how much force
    the other will use.
   In this world, outcomes are known so there is no
    reason to expend resources in wasteful warfare.
   Uncertainty, however, is a major factor in
    warfare, especially if it produces differential
    expectations about outcomes.

                                                   24
Uncertainty

   Because, ceteris paribus, the potential for
    differential expectations decreases with repeat
    dealings, we would expect warfare to
    predominate over negotiation when parties are
    unfamiliar with one another.
   This explains high rates of settlement versus
    litigation (where there is generally good
    information about precedent) where "ten
    disputes settle out of court for every one that is
    tried."
   At least among judiciable disputes, negotiation is
    the rule; fighting is the exception.

                                                     25
4. Negotiation Costs
    Even with differential information and therefore
     different probabilities assigned to winning and
     losing a war, the likelihood of fighting is a positive
     function of negotiation costs.
      These include the cost of defining and
        enforcing property rights.
    As property rights become less clear and other
     transaction costs rise, the costs of negotiation will
     grow relative to the cost of fighting, and violence
     will become a more attractive alternative.
      In Indian-white negotiations, several
        transaction costs are potentially important.
                                                              26
High Transaction Costs

1. The most obvious obstacles to negotiation over
   resources are differences in language and customs
   between Indians and whites.
     Chiefs who signed treaties did not always understand what
      they had agreed to.
2. Also important would be the nature of property
   rights held by Indians relative to those desired by
   whites.
     Whites might earnestly seek to negotiate for peaceful
      acquisition of resources. But purchasing rights requires that
      someone be able to sell them.



                                                                  27
High Transaction Costs (cont’d)

   These problems would be further complicated
    by restrictions on alienability.
       Even Indian tribes with well-specified property
        rights among themselves often had restrictions on
        transferability.




                                                        28
Political Economy Model of Warfare:
Implications
1.   Zone of Controversy
2.   Informational Asymmetry
3.   Military Technology
4.   Property Rights
5.   Standing Army Versus Militia




                                      29
Zone of Controversy

   Disputes over resources predictably will not occur at
    the first point of contact between whites and Indians.
   Nor will disputes continue to the point where all
    resources are owned by one group or the other.
   Decisions to rely on negative-sum solutions to
    disputes can be traced to some "contract failure" in
    the negotiation process.




                                                         30
31
Zone of Controversy (cont’d)

   Indians at first were prepared to accede to whites'
    assertion of land claims.
   As Robert Utley describes conditions on the Great
    Plains until about the time of the Mexican War, it
    was not worthwhile for the Indians to stop white
    intrusions, although whites' behavior was
    "sometimes reprehensible. . . . Neither race posed
    much of a threat to the other, and on the whole they
    got along fairly well" (1967, 59).



                                                       32
Zone of Controversy (cont’d)

   The hypothesis that negotiations would have
    predominated over warfare in the early years of
    Indian-white relations can be tested with the data on
    the number of battles and treaties between Indians
    and whites shown in Table 8.1.
   Until 1830 fighting was comparatively rare and
    treaties frequent, but the use of violence to settle
    disputes was increasing throughout the 19th
    century.
       Ultimately warfare became the principal way of
        resolving controversy, and in fact Congress voted in
        1871 not to ratify any more Indian treaties.

                                                               33
34
Informational Asymmetry

   This shift from negotiation to warfare can be
    explained, in part, by informational
    asymmetries that arose increasingly as
    interaction moved onto the Great Plains.
   Since western Indians were more nomadic, it
    was more difficult for whites to communicate
    with the disparate bands, let alone the entire
    tribe.


                                                 35
Unfamiliar with Tactics

   In fact, one side's faulty information seems to have
    been an important factor in just about all the bloody
    fighting in the West.
   The Plains Indians "greatly favored the decoy tactic"
    (Utley 1984, 105), sending forth a small party to
    encounter a white detachment (seemingly by
    mistake) and then running from it to lure pursuing
    whites into a trap where many more Indian warriors
    lay hidden.
       Thus in the notorious Fetterman Massacre in 1866,
        eighty-one bluecoats were enticed into combat with
        some 2,000 Sioux and wiped out.

                                                             36
Information Asymmetries

   More disputes will degenerate into violence,
    ceteris paribus, if the two sides have
    differential expectations about likely
    outcomes of fighting.
   Different expectations may be due to
    differences in information.




                                                   37
Military Technology

   A likely source of information asymmetry is
    the development of new weapons by one
    side.
   New weapons may cause hostilities if the
    other side is not well-informed about their
    impact.




                                                  38
Superior Weapons?

   Superior military technology is often alleged to be a
    major factor in white domination of Indians.
   However, although Indian and white war
    technologies were often different, it is not obvious
    that one side or the other had systematically better
    technology.
   In the early years, Indians' bows and arrows were a
    match for whites' muskets.




                                                            39
New Weapons?

   Indians usually were able to obtain new weapons
    (from both private traders and even the reservation
    agents of the Bureau of Indian Affairs) almost as
    soon as they were available to whites.
   Moreover, as Custer's troops discovered, white
    technology was not always superior and certainly
    was not enough to guarantee success against large
    numbers.
       General William Tecumseh Sherman stated that "fifty
        Indians could checkmate three thousand troops" (quoted in
        Debo 1989, 221).



                                                                40
Information
   The real issue, however, was not whether whites
    had superior technology but whether Indians
    might sometimes have been unduly optimistic
    about winning when information about new
    weapons was unavailable.
       For example, in the case of the Wagon Box Fight in
        1867, Sioux losses were extraordinarily heavy.
           "One chief placed them at 1,137, and called the
            battle a 'medicine fight'—meaning that the
            soldiers had had supernatural help.
           What the soldiers had were new Springfield
            breech-loading rifles and plenty of ammunition,
            while the Indians were using the old muzzle-
            loaders" (Chapel 1961,259).
                                                              41
Property Rights

   For trade to occur, property rights must be well-
    specified and divestible, and agreements must be
    enforceable.
   Agricultural tribes had property rights specified in
    ways that made negotiation less costly.
   Conversely, nomadic tribes relied more on the rule
    of capture, with land rights specified over large
    hunting territories.




                                                           42
East vs. West

   East of the Mississippi, where agriculture was the
    principal commercial activity, private property was well
    established.
     The costs of negotiated exchange decline when one
       party has well-defined, divestible property rights in the
       resources demanded by another.
   For the nomadic tribes in the West, land and the
    resources on it were a vast commons, with only
    usufructuary rights by possession recognized.
     When whites discovered that Indians did not have
       exclusive control and could not transfer land, they had
       little alternative but to raid.

                                                               43
Prediction

   One would predict, therefore, that whites desiring
    resources used by western nomadic tribes would
    simply take them more often than they would take
    resources owned by eastern agricultural tribes.
   The model is also applicable to Indians' fighting
    among themselves.
   In the West, white migration did not intrude on a
    stable system of aboriginal rights recognized by
    Indians themselves "but rather broke over a
    congeries of scattered groups that had been fighting
    one another for generations and would continue to
    fight one another to the day of their final conquest
    by the whites."

                                                       44
Tribe vs. Tribe
   A principal source of the continuous warfare among
    Indian tribes was the fact that major hunting grounds
    overlapped.
   The belief that white migration generally dislodged
    Indians from centuries-old ancestral lands is inaccurate.
     The horse and the gun had arrived in the West well
      before major white incursions and had greatly altered
      the configuration of land use and possession among
      Indian tribes.
     As one Sioux chief declared to his white conquerors,
      "You have split my land and I don't like it. These lands
      once belonged to the Kiowas and the Crows, but we
      whipped these nations out of them, and in this we did
      what the white men do when they want the lands of
      Indians."
                                                             45
Agency Costs

   Finally, much Indian-white violence can be
    traced to agency costs that made negotiated
    outcomes unenforceable.
       On the Indians' side, chiefs almost never
        constrained individual warriors.
       On the white side, similar problems abounded.
        Treaties signed in good faith by white politicians
        proved to be unenforceable, as individual whites
        violated them with impunity.



                                                             46
Standing Army Versus Militia

   A standing army lowers the incremental costs
    of assembling fighting coalitions, decreasing
    the marginal costs of war and shrinking the
    surplus from negotiation.
   The rise of a standing army also creates
    political incentives that increase the likelihood
    of fighting to resolve disputes.



                                                    47
Low Marginal Costs

   Maintaining a standing army, as opposed to
    raising a militia, predictably would increase
    the number of battles, as noted above.
   Once the fixed costs of raising troops is
    incurred, the marginal cost of fighting is
    relatively low, increasing the incentive to fight
    rather than negotiate.



                                                    48
The “Indian Problem”
   A standing army also meant full-time officers and, behind
    them, military bureaucrats whose careers and budgets
    were advanced by fighting.
   This latter phenomenon was particularly important during
    the 19th century.
   Following both the Mexican and Civil Wars, the size of
    the peacetime army had to shrink.
     This was acceptable to most enlisted men, who were
      volunteers.
     But reduced troop strength was of considerable
      concern to career officers.
     The solution for postwar soldiers came principally from
      the "Indian problem."

                                                            49
Ennui

   Civil War officers retained their brevet ranks
    and pay as long as they were fighting
    Indians.
   For enlisted men as well as officers, an
    absence of war meant ennui and lost
    chances for advancement.
   The antidote was battle.



                                                     50
Evidence

   If having a standing army increases the
    incentive to fight, one would expect the
    number of Indian battles to have risen after
    both the Mexican and the Civil Wars.
   And that, in fact, happened.
       For the period 1790 to 1900, Figure 8.1 shows the
        size of the army and number of battles (in
        normalized form).



                                                        51
52
A Big Standing Army

   Because the standing army was so much smaller
    during the Mexican War, the number of Indian
    battles initially declined as troops were called to fight
    in the Mexican War.
   It was after the war, when troops were available in
    great numbers, that there was an upsurge in fighting
    with Indians.
   In the case of the Civil War, the army grew so large
    (in part as a result of the first military draft) that more
    men were stationed on the frontier than before.
   The increase in the number of battles is even more
    dramatic after the war, however, as the army's
    attention shifted westward.

                                                              53
Conclusion
   During the first half of the 19th century the two
    cultures struck a balance wherein negotiation
    predominated over warfare.
   But on the Plains, Indian nations were at war with
    one another.
       The arrival of the horse from the south gave the
        Apache and Comanche first access to the new
        form of transportation and superior military
        strength.
       Until the other tribes recognized the superiority that
        the horse afforded its owners or until they got their
        own horses, there was little peace.
       Because the horse also turned sedentary tribes
        into nomads pursuing buffalo, conflict between
        Indian nations not unlike that between Indians and
        whites (after 1850) was inevitable.
                                                                 54

				
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