"Barry Bartmann conference paper"
DRAFT – do not cite From the Wings to Centre Stage: the International Relations of Europe’s Smallest States Barry Bartmann Department of Political Studies University of Prince Edward Island Canada firstname.lastname@example.org *Paper prepared for the international workshop, “Island Independence Movements in the 21st Century,” University of Edinburgh, Scotland, 8-10 September 2011 Introduction The year 2011 marks an unprecedented initiative in the international relations of very small states in the United Nations (UN). Now with 194 members, the UN may be seen to have fulfilled the expectations of those most ardently committed to a truly universal and inclusive world body to manage the increasingly multilateral diplomacy of the global system (1.) Very small or micro-states (countries with populations of approximately one million or less) now constitute a significant portion of the United Nations membership. (fn. Commonwealth uses figure of 2m, recently raised from 1.5m.) Now, one of those states, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, is mounting its candidacy for one of the non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council. This constitutes an immense challenge for a state of 506,000 people, albeit one of the wealthiest countries in the world (fn.). Moreover, this campaign is in the Western Europe and Other Group “where jockeying for seats is intense” (Malone, 2000, 3). Luxembourg’s competitors are formidable: Finland and Australia, a late entrant into the race (Mortimer, 2011). If successful, the challenge for the Grand Duchy is not only one of limited personnel in spite of the recent expansion of the Foreign Ministry. It also poses the problem of addressing unexpected and broad ranging issue-areas which are not necessarily within Luxembourg’s more familiar external outreach. Moreover, this represents a major precedent: this would be the first time that a very small state would assume the responsibilities of UN Security Council membership. It thus raises questions about the potential for a future expansion of the role of other very small states in the UN. The European Constellation of Micro-states The initial and most recurring theme which has characterised any discussion of very small states has been the problematic nature of their sovereignty, the discrepancies between legal status and the limitations of very small size. Typically, these states were described as 1 ‘ceremonial’ states, ‘statelets’, ‘quasi-states’ “accidents of history” and even recently as ‘confetti Page states‘ with formal credentials that bore little relationship to those powers normally associated DRAFT – do not cite with sovereign authority and responsibility (Barston, Sprout). Against traditional models of statehood they appeared as caricatures. More often than not, this was a perfunctory and intuitive response: it seemed self-evident that these tiny states could hardly be ‘genuinely’ sovereign. No support beyond an appeal to common sense was thought to be necessary (fn. Fenwick). In his frustration with this kind of condescension, in one of the earliest studies of micro-states, Roger Fisher (______) noted that: “there is inevitably an attempt on the part of lawyers and others who look at the micro- state problem to adopt the solution of Procrustes ... we tend to insist that a small entity fit the bed we have constructed. If it is not big enough to be a traditional state, ‘a viable international unit,’ then it should go back where it came from.” Such views were common enough in the early years of decolonisation before a great wave of very small states clamoured for their recognition, their equality and their flags in United Nations Plaza. At that time, full diplomatic recognition, let alone UN membership, seemed out of the question for the ‘Ruritanian’ micro-states of Europe. In 1945, Luxembourg was the only very small state at the table in the mainstream of international diplomacy. A year later, it was joined by Iceland, which had voted for independence from Denmark in 1944. This left two groups of microstates: those that were to achieve their sovereignty through decolonisation beginning in 1960: initially Cyprus, then Gabon and Mauritania in 1961, and Zanzibar from 1963 until its merger with Tanganyika in 1964. The second and much smaller group were those historical micro-states in Europe whose sovereignty and status were not so clear during the early period of decolonisation: Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco and Andorra. It was not until the end of the decolonisation period, the 1990’s, that these smallest European states emerged from the wings to finally join the United Nations as full members and to pursue a very active international diplomacy. Until that time, these states’ international profile was marked by very few embassies, a largely honorary consul network, virtually no diplomatic presence in their capitals (even from neighbouring mentor states), little participation in intergovernmental organisations and a very limited presence in just a few UN specialized agencies. Their foreign policy was directed almost obsessively to challenging this peripheral role and eventually to appealing to the extantism of the international system to assert and reassert their sovereignty and the doctrine of state equality which underscored their case for fuller recognition and participation. The international milieu for those very small states emerging from decolonisation could not have been more different. With a few notable exceptions (Cyprus, Guinea-Bissau), most of these territories won their independence without struggle and even then with the full connivance, and in many cases, relief, of the colonial power. With each decade, the support among the growing number of former colonial territories in the UN General Assembly expanded in number and stridency. Witness particularly the activities of the Committee of Twenty Four during this period. There could be absolutely no pretext for delaying, fudging or compromising the full sovereignty for all colonial peoples, including a paucity of resources, very small size of population or territory, and capacities for self-defence; the true marks of genuine sovereignty as understood in the nineteenth century (Treitschke). Still, not all very small colonial territories viewed separate statehood as inevitable. In the Seychelles, Premier James Mancham attempted to resist the blandishments and warnings of the 2 Page Organisation of African Unity and the Committee of 24. Eventually, however, he too was fated to accept independence for the Seychelles. In the Cook Islands fierce resistance to United DRAFT – do not cite Nations pressure led to the reluctant UN acceptance of association with New Zealand with the Cook Islanders retaining New Zealand citizenship and the right to opt for sovereignty at any time of their choosing. It may be that the conditions for independence on the ground in South Sudan best illustrate just how totally irrelevant criteria for self-determination have become. It is true that, in 1965, with the independence of the Maldives, then with a population of less than 100,000, hitherto a tacit and unspoken barrier in discussions of the micro-state issue and UN membership, both the United Kingdom and the United States called for a review of the membership question with the growing realisation of ever diminishing size of newly independent microstates, as even smaller, last fragments of colonial rule queued up in increasingly emboldened campaigns for independence. The UN Secretary-General called upon the Legal Counsel to the Secretariat to examine all alternative options, including recognition of sovereignty but not membership, or membership but not full participation, or participation for some purposes but not others (fn.). All alternatives were doomed to fail. It was impossible to avoid the wholly arbitrary selection of criteria that would inevitably reflect on the quality of sovereignty, much less undermine the cherished principle of state equality (Gunter). That states could be sovereign but not members of the United Nations was deeply offensive and humiliating though, it must be remembered, this was exactly the formula adopted by the League of Nations in 1920 when it rejected Liechtenstein’s application for membership (fn League Report) and, by implication, the membership aspirations of the other European very small states. Moreover, when these very small states applied for membership in certain specialized agencies in the early post-1945 years, similar reservations and qualifications were made. They were not to be precedents for other similarly sized diminutive states. The European microstates today consist of two distinct groups: five larger members (including three island territories) and four smaller continental states (see Table 1). GNP per capita, State Population GDP (US$bn, 2009) 2009) Montenegro 678,000 4,086 6,690 (2010) Cyprus (less 671,000 23,450 TRNC) 30,460 Luxembourg 506,000 52,850 79,510 (2010) Malta 403,000 7,910 18,350 Iceland 304,370 12,140 33,870 (2010)* Andorra 84,000 3,740 41,130 (2005) 3 Liechtenstein 36,000 4,830 (2008) 136,540 Page DRAFT – do not cite Monaco 35,000 6,110 197,460 San Marino 31,810 1,700 50,670 (2008) *Iceland’s GDP dropped from US$28,428bn in 2007 and US$16,804bn in 2008. Per capita income fell from US$58,430 in 2007: the savage effects of the banking collapse. For the purposes of this paper, we will focus on Luxembourg and the four smallest European micro-states. This will not include the Vatican City which is a sovereign territorial state but with an international role entirely different than the states in this discussion (fn.). Clearly, with the exception of Luxembourg, these states are very small indeed, most about one tenth the size of the larger European micro-states. Our principal objective is to trace the unexpected development of micro-state diplomacy that led to their UN membership in the early 1990’s. We also intend to examine the expansion of their international relations since then, including the development of their foreign ministries, the establishment of their network of embassies and missions to inter-governmental organisations. Just as important is their broadening participation in a wide range of global issues and their confidence in addressing those issues, and even in assuming positions of leadership in international conference diplomacy focusing on these concerns. In spite of the difference in size, the historical origins and the development of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg’s international relations hold greater resonance and serve as a template for the four smallest states than do any of the other larger European micro-states. Cyprus, Malta and even Iceland achieved statehood through decolonisation. Once the colonial flag was lowered, there was never any question about their credentials, their diplomatic status or the conduct of their relations with other states. And Montenegro’s restored sovereignty in 2006 was similarly without question. Montenegro achieved its independence in 1878 and participated in the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1908. The kingdom lost its independence in World War I and was occupied by Austrian-German forces. Their eventual defeat led to annexation by Serbia and incorporation into the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes which became Yugoslavia in 1929. The following sections of the paper will examine the passage of Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco and Andorra to their present status in the contemporary international system. This will be followed in an annex by an examination of those twelve micro- states with current populations of under 100,000; the same class as the smallest European states. These states achieved independence through decolonisation and all are island states. The central theme in this annex will be a comparative analysis of their international relations and diplomatic status with the smallest European states. The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg When we consider the very gradual development of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg it is within the same early post-Westphalian milieu that attended the political development of the four smallest European states. All these states passed through a myriad of associations with major states that involved complex and overlapping degrees of autonomy, suzerainty and formal protection. Luxembourg in the late 13th century was a county that stretched from the Meuse to 4 the Moselle, occupying a much larger area than today’s 2,590km2. In 1353, Emperor Charles IV Page promoted the county to a duchy, a status which it retained until 1443 when the Duke of DRAFT – do not cite Burgundy conquered the town sealing its fate as a province of the Netherlands for the next four centuries, until captured by French Revolutionary forces and annexed to France. After the defeat of Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna – seeking to thwart any revival of French power - created a much larger Kingdom of the Netherlands which included the now Grand Duchy of Luxembourg as an autonomous entity, but still circumscribed by royal personal ties to the Dutch king, William I of Orange-Nassau. It was not until the Treaty of London in 1867 that Luxembourg’s international status was clearly determined. At that conference, the signatory powers agreed to guarantee that Luxembourg would be a perpetually neutral and unarmed state. Separate sovereignty was finally established with the death in 1890 of William III, the last male descendant of the house of Orange Nassau. The ducal crown then passed to the Nassau-Weilburg branch of the dynasty and to Grand Duke Adolf. Luxembourg participated in the Hague conferences, but issues of small size and the ambiguities of her international status persisted in the discussions on the Grand Duchy’s membership in the League of Nations. Initially, the League was widely seen as a confirmation of the values of national self-determination and small state security. The aspirations of small states at the Hague Conferences were now established in the provisions of the Covenant. The League represented the notion that the world could be made safe for the smallest and the weakest. And to a great extent, membership in the new organisation was itself a measure of international personality (fn.). Yet, this did not mean that the League should accept the universal suffrage of states. After all, most of the delegates in Paris grew up in the culture of the Concert system. The very small states of Europe were accorded some of the courtesies of sovereignty but they were still regarded as anomalies of a well-ordered international system. This is not surprising since such very small states had all but disappeared by the end of the war. Only six very small states retained any measure of international legal personality: Luxembourg, Iceland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco, and Andorra (fn.). Luxembourg was finally admitted to the League, though the question of smallness did arise in the Committee (fn.). Luxembourg’s original application on February 23, 1920 requested that she be granted the privilege of maintaining her neutrality. By November 28, nine months later, Luxembourg had withdrawn this request and agreed to alter her status of neutrality to the extent that Covenant obligations required (fn.) Luxembourg strengthened her case by applying directly and by abandoning her neutrality. With a standing army Luxembourg could justify her capacity to fulfil the obligations of the Covenant. Moreover, the Grand Duchy was, as the rapporteur noted in the plenary, “... an ancient state ... recognised by all civilised states [which] has always scrupulously carried out her international obligations’ (fn.). Luxembourg’s foundations in the international system were far more certain than those of some of the smaller micro-states. Long establishment and an active diplomatic tradition can counter the adverse effects of very small size (fn.). And these efforts to counter the marginal status of the past remain as the principal objectives of the smallest European states today. Luxembourg as a Foundational State in the post-1945 International System In terms of the post-1945 international system, Luxembourg has been truly a foundational state, a founding member of the UN, Council of Europe (CoE), Benelux, European Economic Community (later the European Union), NATO, OECD, OSCE, IMF, the World Bank and the 5 Page World Trade Organisation, all bodies which have shaped the architecture of the modern world. In recent years, Luxembourg has dramatically extended its diplomatic reach both in terms of DRAFT – do not cite missions established abroad in foreign capitals and to intergovernmental organisations. At one time, Luxembourg’s 20 embassies were almost exclusively European, with only two Asian missions: in China and Japan (fn.). In contrast, the most recent data gives Luxembourg 27 missions accredited to a further 65 states. (Multiple accreditation is a viable response to relationships which are neither consistent nor significant enough to warrant the courtesy, attention and expense of a permanent mission: an option that allows small states to raise their diplomatic reach to levels comparable to other, larger states, and achieving an international presence in line with their own aspirations and ambitions.) In addition, Luxembourg maintains seven permanent representatives to various international organisations, plus three professional consul-generals (New York, Shanghai and San Francisco). Such a (growing) network of professional diplomats is supplemented by a corps of 140 honorary consuls, 59 of which are located beyond Europe. In short, Luxembourg offers a diplomatic template which is encouraging for very small states with aspirations to play a growing role in the international system. For small states, some form of diplomatic co-operation with another state appears to be a reasonable arrangement to ensure a more extensive representation of interests. This may involve a treaty with a larger state whereby the latter undertakes representation of the smaller state’s interests, either wholly or supplementary to the smaller state’s own diplomatic service. It can also mean arrangements for establishing joint missions with neighbouring states of similar circumstances. Luxembourg has had considerable experience in diplomatic cooperation since the 1921 BLEU agreement setting up an economic union with Belgium, followed by the Benelux Union in 1955, itself a precursor to the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Union (EU). As a result of her ties through Benelux, Luxembourg’s economic and commercial interests are tended to by Belgium, while her political and diplomatic interests are handled by the Netherlands, in those states where there is no direct Luxembourg accreditation and upon the initiative of the Luxembourg government. However this cooperation, as we have seen, has in no way diminished the expansion of Luxembourg’s own diplomatic network. Finally, the representation which a very small state receives is as important to their participation in international relations as that which they are able to send. The diplomatic attention accorded to very small states is significant not only as a reflection of international status but as a further dimension of their capacity to function in the international system. For Luxembourg, the resident diplomatic community is a reflection of Luxembourg as an important centre of European policy and institutions. There are 23 embassies based in Luxembourg (fn.). Moreover, and not surprisingly, given Luxembourg’s proximity to Brussels, there are ambassadors from 140 states accredited to Luxembourg but resident in Belgium. Another five are resident in London or The Hague. And there is the significant presence of honorary consuls: there are 68 honorary consuls in Luxembourg, including those from countries which have ambassadors resident in Luxembourg or accredited from Brussels. Luxembourg and the Security Council In the current campaign for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for 2013- 2014, Luxembourg first stresses its long term and deep-rooted commitment to multilateralism and regional and international cooperation (fn.). Luxembourg City, along with Brussels and Strasbourg, is one of the three capitals of Europe (fn.). Luxembourg was the first headquarters of 6 the European Coal and Steel Community. It is home to many of the EU’s institutions, including Page the seat of the European Commission, European Parliament, Translation Services Centre, and DRAFT – do not cite School for European Civil Servants, (fn.) As the 2011 Annual Report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs put it: “The perception of Luxembourg as a European actor is primarily due to its political engagement in favour of European integration, but also because of the presence on its territory of numerous institutions and organisations. The locations of the head offices of these bodies contribute significantly in enhancing the country’s visibility, in Europe and internationally” (fn.). And, as the campaign emphasises, the Grand Duchy’s role in the European Union has given the country a wealth of experience in multilateral diplomacy. Luxembourg assumed the Presidency of the Council of the European Union for the 11th time in 2005 and it was during that Presidency that the EU member states pledged to achieve the goal of allocating 0.7% of their Gross National Income as Overseas Development Assistance by 2015 (fn.). Luxembourg is deeply involved in the General Affairs Council of the EU which monitors the progress of candidate and applicant states for EU membership. Of particular relevance at the time of writing is the role of Luxembourg’s foreign minister as Chair of the Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Committee. This Committee oversees the fiscal crisis hitting member states, with Luxembourg serving as the location of the European Financial Stabilisation Fund which offered loans to Ireland in December 2010 (fn.). Luxembourg’s central role in the EU has also extended its reach both regionally and internationally which is equally reflected in Luxembourg’s extended activity beyond Europe in the work of the UN. Together with her Benelux partners, Luxembourg has initiated dialogue with both the Visegrad group of states and the Nordic Council (fn). Luxembourg has extended its involvement in the Balkans both by vigorously supporting the membership of Balkan states and technical assistance programmes in the region which include “study visits, technical support in the development of public health, stock exchange management, journalism and public administration expertise” (fn.). In addition to non-resident accreditation to Macedonia and Montenegro, Luxembourg has opened a Bureau of Cooperation in Pristina in Kosovo. One further note might be made before leaving Luxembourg’s role in Europe; a point which its Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes repeatedly. Luxembourg is a multicultural and multilingual country. Indeed, nearly half of its resident population consists of non-Luxembourg citizens. This includes a large number of Portuguese and Italian immigrants attracted by employment opportunities in the steel and construction industries in the 1970s. Today there are over 160 nationalities present in Luxembourg with some 86% of foreign residents coming from the other 26 EU member states. Thus, what might be seen as a weakness in the pursuit of a growing international role is offered as a model and a strength. In the words of a Ministry document: “Luxembourg is seen as a model for openness and a microcosm of Europe, with foreign residents comprising 49.2% of its population. The country’s small size has enabled it to maintain an image of harmony ‘on a small scale’” (fn.). In presenting its case for a seat on the UN Security Council, Luxembourg emphasizes 7 commitment, contribution and responsibility (fn.). All three are reflected in Luxembourg’s role Page in the UN since its establishment, and particularly its role as a founding state of all the major DRAFT – do not cite European and international institutions of the post-war era. Moreover Luxembourg has had a very strong record “in making voluntary contributions to the Funds and the Programmes of the UN, as well as by taking part in peacekeeping missions and pursuing an active policy of development cooperation.” In spite of its very small size, Luxembourg ranks 54th in terms of absolute contributions to the regular UN budget as well as the UN’s budget for peace keeping forces. Luxembourg is third among member states which exceed the UN target of 0.7% of Gross National Income in Official Development Assistance (ODA); in 2009, Luxembourg’s ODA reached 1.04% of GNI (fn.). Luxembourg’s role in the UN has also included a high profile in peacekeeping operations and in security and military crisis management: UNPROFOR, IFOR, SFOR and KFOR in the former Yugoslavia; UNIFIL in Lebanon and ISAF in Afghanistan. Luxembourg has also participated in missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and the Gaza Strip. Luxembourg also participates in the EU’s mission to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia (fn.). Luxembourg’s central role in the UN may be best illustrated in the Grand Duchy’s assumption of the Presidency of ECOSOC in 2009 (fn.). This very small country has been a member of the Commission on Human Rights, the Organisational Committee of the Peace- building Commission, and a second one year mandate in the Coordination Council of the UN AIDS Programme. Luxembourg has served on the Executive Boards of UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and UNESCO. In short, if peace and security, international development and human rights are the three pillars of the UN, then Luxembourg’s experience and record are exemplary. True, it must be remembered that Luxembourg is a very wealthy country indeed. But it is still very small, particularly considering the small national proportion of its own citizenry, which makes its broad and active participation in the UN across all three areas particularly impressive. Consider too. its role in the European Union and its bilateral diplomacy and Luxembourg my very well be the template for small states in the international system. The Luxembourg Model for Other European Very Small States The other very small states of Europe seem disproportionately small in comparison to Luxembourg. Yet all of them have been sensitive to Luxembourg’s exemplary and pioneering role for small states (fn.) just as the Luxembourg delegation has been committed to the ongoing process of inclusion and recognition for these smaller European states. This does not mean a concerted policy collaboration, though there is a natural diplomatic community of interest, especially in the area of state equality and human rights, among all of these smaller states. It does mean that all these very small states give significant priority to each other’s quest for recognition and inclusion. In the wake of Luxembourg: the Smallest States after 1945 Unqualified universality was no more accepted at San Francisco in 1945 than it had been for the League of Nations in 1920. The League’s rejection of Liechtenstein constituted a judgement ‘by inference’ for the other very small states. San Marino failed to respond to the Secretary-General’s request for further information in support of its application (fn); and Monaco 8 (fn), though endorsed by France, withdrew on further consideration (fn.). Andorra, meanwhile,, Page had not escaped from the jurisdictional ambiguities of its continuing medieval character. Unlike DRAFT – do not cite Iceland and Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, San Marino and Monaco were not invited to accede to the Treaty for the Renunciation of War (August 27, 1928) (the Kellogg-Briand Pact), though all five states were listed as ‘entitled to appear before the Permanent Court of International Justice” (fn.). And so, the League’s 1920 decision still hung as a pall over the early post-war years for Europe’s smallest states and cast doubts on the future of their international relations. None of them sought to risk the rejection which Liechtenstein incurred in 1920. Their inhibitions left no doubt that smallness was a factor affecting eligibility for full participation (fn.). The risks of testing these assumptions too soon or too far were very dangerous because adverse reaction from the organized international community could be a clear judgement on their sovereignty and their statehood at the very time a new international system was taking shape. And, of course, for the very small states, it is the very pressing questions of sovereignty, their legal international personality in the fullest sense, and the corollary argument of state equality which lie at the very core of their foreign policy interests and objectives. It is somewhat ironic then that the first move to fuller participation in the international system came from Liechtenstein, which since 1921 had been content to be ensconced in the Treaty with Switzerland whereby the Swiss would administer Liechtenstein’s relations with other states, albeit only with the initiative and agreement of the government in Vaduz. In 1949, Liechtenstein applied to become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under conditions that were applied to Switzerland, the year before, including an undertaking to contribute to the expenses of the Court. The Soviet delegate argued that Liechtenstein “was not a free and independent state” which resulted in its application being referred to the Committee of Experts (fn.). There the Soviet and Ukrainian delegates argued that only sovereign and independent states could be parties to the Statute (fn.). Since Liechtenstein “had yielded important parts of its sovereignty to another state” (fn.), it was ineligible to be a party to the Statute. But this was not quite the same milieu as 1920. The majority argued that Liechtenstein possessed all the qualifications of a state, that the Court’s jurisdiction should extend as far as possible, and that small states particularly needed the protection of the law. The Sixth Committee (Legal Affairs) recommended acceptance and the UN Security Council voted in favour with opposition only from the Soviet Union (which did not use its veto), the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Czechoslovakia (fn.). As David Beattie put it: “To Liechtenstein, this was an important vindication of its sovereignty after the war.”(fn.). On December 1, 1950, Liechtenstein became a party to the Statute of the ICJ. On November 6, 1953, it was San Marino’s turn to apply to become a party to the Statute of the ICJ. This time, there was no discussion of statehood or sovereignty in the Committee of Experts, the Security Council or the General Assembly; the Republic became a party to the Statue in 1953 (fn.). Monaco’s case was slightly different in that it had ratified the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1937 and even accepted compulsory jurisdiction, There was no need to apply separately to the Statute of the ICJ, though Monaco was prepared to cite Liechtenstein as a precedent (fn.). These cases were followed by separate applications to the specialised agencies. These were without controversy except for Monaco’s admission to the World Health Organisation 9 which was qualified by the reservation the Monaco’s membership would not constitute a Page precedent for other micro-states (fn.).The next opportunity for an expanded diplomatic role for DRAFT – do not cite the smallest states in Europe came with the first Conference on European Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) convened in Helsinki in 1972. Liechtenstein participated in that conference and it was seen as “an unprecedented breakthrough” (fn.) in its effort to establish its foreign policy independently from Switzerland (fn. Hans-Adam). San Marino joined the Conference at the same time, “with its main interest (being) . . . the international acceptance of its sovereign equality by the other participating states” (fn.). Although San Marino’s actions in the CSCE are given more political weight through the joint actions of the group of neutral and non-aligned states, they also emphasize its individual strength” (fn.). For example, San Marino’s attacks on human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia were more severe and robust than those of other states (fn.). Monaco did not participate in these early conferences, in spite of the French request that the Principality be invited. Once again, the Soviet Union raised doubts about Monaco’s independence. However, by June 1973, Monaco was accepted as full member of the CSCE, gaining the same advantages of enhanced diplomatic profile as San Marino and Liechtenstein. Andorra was excluded from the outset due the persistent French claim that it was responsible for Andorra’s external relations (fn). The Principality had to wait until 1996 before joining, three years after the new 1993 constitution clarified its status and established Andorra as a sovereign modern territorial state (fn). The most important platform for full recognition and international participation for the European micro-states has been the CoE. Liechtenstein was advised by the then Secretary- General of the CoE to take admission into the Council step by step (fn). From 1962, Liechtenstein ministers had attended meetings and participated in sessions of the Parliament from 1971. In 1974, Liechtenstein was accorded Observer status which led to it signing Council conventions and assuming an active role in Council committees. Liechtenstein’s application for full membership in 1977 was most staunchly supported by Germany remembering Liechtenstein’s constructive contributions in all-German debates in the CSCE (fn.). France took the line “that it was not fitting for mini-states to be members of the Council (fn.). Italy raised the issue of precedent again, fearing that San Marino would be next to apply. Indeed, the progression of these states to various levels of international recognition has precisely followed this pattern of precedent with Liechtenstein serving s the pathfinder state! Liechtenstein’s application would prevail with strong British support, a pledge not to use its vote to be decisive in budgetary allocations, and finally by the commitment to establish a permanent mission in Strasbourg. David Beattie summarized the impact of Liechtenstein’s accession particularly well: “[Liechtenstein’s admission to the CoE in 1978] was welcomed in Liechtenstein as an important landmark in its history. It was not merely a fresh acknowledgement of its independence and sovereignty, important though that was, but it also gave an opportunity to show what a small country could contribute to a major international organisation. Liechtenstein has remained an active member. It has run an efficient presidency when its turn has come around. Membership has given a much need East-West vantage and contact point in a new and increasingly complex Europe” (fn.). San Marino won Observer status in the CoE in 1982 and used this period to become familiar with the working of the Council until 1988 when it applied for full membership. The application 10 was finally passed on to the Political Affairs Committee and the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries. These Committees appointed one rapporteur each and asked Page the following three questions: (1) is San Marino a sovereign state?; (2) does San Marino have a DRAFT – do not cite democratic constitution and does it respect human rights?; and (3) does San Marino have the ability to face up to the obligations which membership of the CoE entails? The responses to all three questions were decidedly affirmative, and San Marino’s membership was unanimously confirmed in November, 1988. The Liechtenstein delegate aptly summarized the changing mood: “Liechtenstein’s membership of the CoE over the past ten years has shown that small countries had a role to play and could benefit from regular communication with other larger States, with which they could not have relations otherwise” (fn.). The mood had certainly changed and it is not surprising that Monaco would follow the other very small states in Europe in applying for CoE membership: it applied on October 15, 1998, a decade after San Marino’s admission. In that decade, opposition to the principle of equal participation had waned; what once may have seemed preposterous was now a matter of course. It was even more difficult to raise objections when a dozen small island states, including those smaller than any of their European counterparts, were now full members of the UN, as well as of such regional bodies as CARICOM and the Pacific Islands Forum. For that matter, all four of the European microstates were UN members by 1998, including Andorra. Moreover, these very small states had performed well in all the international institutions to which they belonged, sitting as members of critical committees, initiating resolutions, particularly in the area of human rights and humanitarian affairs, assuming the presidency of central organs, even the General Assembly itself. By the turn of the 21st century, it was clear that micro-states were a fact of international life and were here to stay. But Monaco’s application did raise serious questions for the CoE that were inherent in the questions posed by the rapporteurs at the time of San Marino’s application. Perhaps the most vexing problems related to Monaco’s relations with France as a result of the 1918 and 1930 treaties between the two countries. In the view of the CoE: “Monaco has long had particularly close ties with France, its big neighbour. The two countries have been linked since 1918 by a treaty governing their relations which substantially restricts Monaco’s exercise of its sovereignty with regard to external relations and the succession to the crown” (fn.). The 1918 treaty was rooted in the French concern that Monaco would not “become subject to Germany or another foreign interest” (fn.). It insisted, therefore, that the Prince would exercise his sovereign rights in perfect conformity with the French political, military, naval and economic interests, under which practically any French wish could be classified” (fn.).Then, in 1930, the two countries concluded a Convention with respect to a number of government, civil service and judicial posts in Monaco to be reserved for French civil servants and judges (fn.). The fact that the 1930 treaty included French appointments of the Minister of State and other senior officials raised doubts about Monaco’s internal sovereignty in the conduct of the affairs of state and the administration of justice; by reserving senior Monegasque government and civil servant posts for seconded French officials, the 1930 treaty makes the citizens of Monaco ineligible for them (fn.). Both the 1918 and 1930 treaties were however overturned by a new Convention, revised in 2002 and ratified by France and Monaco in 2005. This clearly established 11 the relationship between the two states as one based on sovereign equality, in conformity with international law and the principles of the CoE. Page DRAFT – do not cite Further concerns related to the partial democratic process in Monaco and called for greater democratic reform: greater assembly supervision of the government programme, the right of legislative initiative budgetary control and greater transparency in all matters as well as a proper balance between the major institutions of the Monegasque government. Both the Prince and the National Council have agreed to these and other recommendations in the fields of human rights, such as spousal equality in the naturalisation process. Monaco became a member of the CoE in 2004; a Council Report in 2009 expressed gratification with the first five years of Monaco’s membership and its continuing progress on CoE conventions (fn.). Some mention should be made of the European micro-states relations to the EU. San Marino and Monaco are both considered to be parts of the EU’s customs territory by virtue of their own customs unions with Italy and France. Moreover, derogations were granted in that both states did not have to apply EU legislation concerning the free movement of workers, the freedom of establishment and the free movement of services (fn.), a clear sensitivity to the very small indigenous populations of these states, particularly the case in Monaco. Andorra was always treated as a third country by the EU; but negotiations towards the 1993 Treaty of Vicinage between France, Spain and Andorra, which recognized the sovereignty of all three states, set the stage for new arrangements. As Jorri Duursma (_______) put it: “Andorra has gained several advantages from its agreement with the European Community. In the first place, it now receives the import duties on industrial products from third countries collected on its behalf by the Community, whereas agricultural products imported into Andorra are exempt from Community customs duties. In the second place, the European Community has treated Andorra like a State. Relations between the Community and Andorra are maintained directly with Andorran institutions (Government and Co-Princes), without the need for the legal interventions of either France or Spain” (fn.). In 1988, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA then comprising Austria,, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) agreed to a Special Protocol to the EFTA Convention which provided that the Convention would apply to Liechtenstein’s territory. On May 22, 1991, Liechtenstein joined EFTA as the seventh full member. This set the stage for Liechtenstein’s participation in negotiations for the EEA (European Economic Area), “the most ambitious and complex negotiations in its history” (fn.). The European Community insisted from the outset that the EFTA states accept the four freedoms, indeed the entire acquis communautaire, or the equivalent of 12,000 pages of EC legislation and rules (fn.). However, it was not a customs union: EFTA states could negotiate their own trade policies with third countries; no monetary union; and no co-operation in foreign and security policy or home affairs. Nor did it entail common agricultural or fisheries policies (fn.). Due to its small territorial size and the huge size of its resident foreign and guest worker population, Liechtenstein was able to exploit the provision that permission was required to purchase real estate (fn). Liechtenstein, relative to its size, is one of the most industrialised countries in the world. Industrial exports rose from 15m Swiss francs in 1950 to 4,442bn Swiss francs in 2001 (fn). Its industries are clean, and deal in high tech and high value products, such 12 as precision machinery, dental appliances, pharmaceuticals and high grade building and fixing Page tools (fn.). Its diversity is remarkable, covering 15 of the 16 internationally classified sectors of economic activity (fn). Moreover, the economy is outgrowing Liechtenstein itself: the total DRAFT – do not cite number of people employed abroad now almost equals that of the whole economy in the Principality. These astonishing economic changes illustrate just how critical exports and foreign markets are to Liechtenstein and why there is an economic imperative for Liechtenstein to move beyond its borders diplomatically, especially in the European Economic Area. And so, though the Swiss declined membership in the EEA in December 1992, one week later a referendum in Liechtenstein resulted in a positive decision for membership. This resulted in the negotiation of a number of agreements with Switzerland which left the customs union between the two countries intact while allowing those changes which would allow Liechtenstein to enter the EEA which it did formally on May 1, 1995 (fn.). Conclusion The actions of Europe’s four smallest states reflect an emboldened confidence in moving beyond their long limited interaction with the outside world. And this confidence was clearly based in the dramatic changes in the economies of all these states. These are now among the wealthiest countries in the world which allows them to undertake impressive representation abroad and similar resident participation in the most important multilateral bodies. These organisations increasingly monitor and oversee change in an expanding global economy in which all these states are active and which shapes their futures as well as those of their larger neighbours. This confidence is also reflected in the leadership roles of micro-state governments, particularly the initiatives of Prince Hans-Adam of Liechtenstein and Grand Duke Henri of Luxembourg (fn.). This foresight, often with the active support of bodies such as the CoE, has led to major treaty changes in their relations with their larger immediate neighbours, changes which have both rooted and enhanced their sovereignty and statehood. What is striking about the overall process of change for these states in the European and international state systems is the prolonged and protracted nature of the process itself. It was a full 70 years between the humbling rejection of Liechtenstein’s membership of the League of Nations and her triumphant admission to the UN in 1990 (fn.). That date, important as it is in this overall story, led quickly to the admission of the other three very small states but it was not the end of the story. For example, in the ensuing decade, Liechtenstein joined the World Trade Organisation and the European Economic Area. All these states greatly elevated their diplomatic services from non-existent or basically consular relations to full scale embassies and ambassadorial relationships especially in the most important capitals, like Washington where there had not been a presence before (see below). It is a reflection on the slow acceptance of very small states that this process should have taken so long. After all, most of the states in the international system are new states, which have emerged since 1945 in the dismantling of European colonialism. Comparatively speaking, Europe’s smallest states have deep roots. San Marino claims to be the oldest republic in the world dating from its founding in 301 AD by a stonecutter, Marianus of Arbe, who founded a monastic community on Mount Titano. Even if we date the Republic from the time of its founding constitution, enacted in 1600, it is the world`s oldest constitution still in effect (fn.). Liechtenstein’s full sovereignty is dated from 1815 when it participated in the Congress of Vienna and joined the German Confederation (fn). As we have noted, Luxembourg’s sovereignty 13 has been dated from 1867 when the Great Powers guaranteed its borders, sovereignty and Page neutrality. That sovereignty would be further rooted in later years in piecemeal fashion with the DRAFT – do not cite removal of the Prussian garrison in Luxembourg City and the end of dynastic ties to the House of Orange Nassau in 1890. Monaco continued to press its sovereign claims with France passively accepting the changes, particularly after 1990 when Liechtenstein joined the UN. Most important, the discussions leading to eventual acceptance of Monaco as a sovereign state with equality in international law were pressed on both states in the discussions surrounding Monaco’s application to the CoE. Finally, in 2002, a new treaty between France and Monaco affirmed the full sovereignty and equality of Monaco and guaranteed full rights of succession beyond the direct male descendants of the ruling prince..It must be said that, for Monaco, that happy conclusion was largely the consequence of the efforts made by other very small states in Europe to secure their status. The ambiguities in Monaco’s case did not fatally detract from its ancient roots as a principality and the widespread recognition by other states of its sovereignty. This leaves only Andorra. This Principality too has ancient roots. In 1278, the Bishop of Urgell and the Comte de Foix signed a pariatage, defining their rights as co-princes of Andorra. The Comte de Foix became King Henry IV of France in 1590 and subsequently the title of co- prince of Andorra passed to the Head of the French State and in the modern period to the President of the Fifth Republic (fn). During this long period of contested status, Andorra was widely viewed as a separate jurisdiction, and even by some jurists as a state (fn.). It was seen to be part of neither Spain nor France. Yet, France consistently argued that it was responsible for Andorran external affairs and would represent Andorra in international conferences and in legations to other states. This did not change until involvement in the CoE led to the 1993 Treaty of Vicinage which establishes the two co-princess as constitutional rulers with full authority vested in the Council of the Valleys (the Parliament), and the recognition of full equality of Andorra as sovereign state with France and Spain. In one respect, then, Andorra shares ancient roots with the other smallest European sates. But, at the same time, Andorra as a sovereign state was a product in part of the international (and especially European) changes that accompanied the final, protracted integration of these states as sovereign and equal states in international diplomatic practice and law. One final note about the integration of Europe’s smallest states with the larger European and international system of sovereign states should be made. The change is evident not only at the multilateral level of the UN and other global and regional bodies, important though they are. It is also evident in the diplomatic choices which these states have made in their bilateral diplomacy. As late as 1978, Liechtenstein maintained only one embassy, in Berne. In 2002, it opened an embassy in Washington. In spite of long, friendly relations with the United States, especially with Princess Grace’s family ties, Monaco opened its first embassy in Washington only in 2006. Even San Marino, which has been held in high regard in the United States for many years (fn., Lincoln letter) has only recently elevated its relations to a full ambassadorial level: its consulate was elevated to an embassy in Washington in 2007. Of the four smallest European states, only Andorra still accredits its ambassador to the United States from its UN mission in New York. But even its diplomatic network is growing, with an Embassy in London, and beyond its Iberian neighbourhood. 14 The confidence so readily demonstrated in these states is, of course, best illustrated by the Page boldness of Luxembourg in offering itself for a seat on the UN Security Council. That marks a DRAFT – do not cite huge new precedent among these states. It has been an entirely incremental process, each step serving as a platform to contemplate and launch the next. And each step changes the self-view of the small state itself as it does the attitudes and norms of the larger international community which is being petitioned once again. And so the process goes on, changing the complexion of the players, moving some of them from the wings to the centre stage, with all the new questions, but also aspirations, which that will invariably raise. Annexe: A Comparison with the Ten Smallest Island States The majority of very small states achieved their independence through the late 20th century process of decolonisation. This reflected the waning interests of most metropolitan powers to maintain overseas possessions; even Portugal quickly reversed its resistance after the military coup in 1974. It also demonstrated a growing recognition in the international community that there were no real alternatives to separate independence, particularly when local political leaders were emboldened to pursue sovereignty as every year passed. The power of example, especially when close at hand, was inspiring. As the process of decolonisation advanced, the territories achieving separate independence were increasingly smaller in size. Most of these smaller colonial territories were islands and small archipelagic entities. Generally speaking, the South Pacific was one of the last areas to experience decolonisation though Western Samoa achieved independence from New Zealand as early as 1962 and Nauru gained sovereignty from Australia and the rights to its phosphate riches in 1968. That separate sovereignty was the only practical choice for these small Pacific islands was understandable given the reality of ethnic and historic differences among them and the vast oceans between them. Moreover, unlike the small islands of the Commonwealth Caribbean, most of these islands experienced a strong sense of pre-colonial identity which was overlaid by different European colonial cultures and practices which affected the development of law, education and commerce, thus reinforcing their own sense of separateness. The most dramatic example of a determination to pursue a separate destiny was the 1975 referendum among Ellice Islanders to resist British efforts to forge a post-colonial union with the Gilbert Islanders, a decision which led to an independent Tuvalu in 1978 and an independent Kiribati in 1979. But then, perhaps just as dramatic is the case of the Cook Islands, since 1965 a self-governing parliamentary democracy in free association with New Zealand. Though not a member of the UN, the 15-island archipelago belongs to various regional inter-governmental bodies and participates therein in full equality with other sovereign states. Though Cook Islanders are New Zealand citizens, they have exclusive control over their own affairs. They also maintain their own diplomatic relations; a truly unique arrangement within the international system. These three states are among the world’s ten smallest developing island states today, all with populations of less than 100,000. They will form the basis of this comparative assessment with the smallest European states discussed above. Six of these states are in the South Pacific, three are in the Commonwealth Caribbean and one in the Indian Ocean. The Commonwealth Caribbean states were not initially set for separate independence. After all, they are physically very close together; inter-marriage among the families of the islands is not uncommon; so is inter-island trade and travel; and they shared a 15 common British colonial experience which was particularly notable in education and their legal Page code. After the failure of the West Indies Federation, however, it was clear that island rivalries DRAFT – do not cite were strong, both in the contest for regional leadership as much as in the role of the larger-than- life charismatic personalities of individual island leaders. Attempts to create a federation on a reduced scale failed when some island leaders feared the potential dominance of Guyana, “a shark among the sardines” (fn.) and itself a micro-state. Associate statehood, whereby the United Kingdom continued to maintain responsibility for the defence and external interests of the islands, while the Islanders controlled their own domestic affairs, might have been seen as a plausible alternative, particularly given the model of the Cook Islands with New Zealand. However, separate island identities won out: in 1974, Eric Gairy led Grenada to independence. This set the pattern for most of the remaining Leeward and Windward Commonwealth Caribbean islands. Indeed, independence for St. Kitts and Nevis came only in 1983 when Nevis was finally given its own government and parliament in a federal constitution and the constitutional right to secede from St. Kitts with a two-thirds majority, an achievement they nearly won in 1998, falling short by only a few hundred votes (Premdas). Again, the power of separate island identity itself has played a critical role in the story of these small states becoming players in the international system. It was not expected, any more than it was for the smallest European states, that these small island jurisdictions would be able to take up the demands of mainstream diplomacy, including the challenges (and costs) of UN membership. Indeed, Western Samoa (Samoa since 1997) made no move towards UN membership after achieving independence in 1962. Its decision was due, in part, to the fear that its application might have been rejected, particularly in light of the controversy over the admission of another small state, Cyprus (Herr, 1975, 308-9). This was 1962 and the Treaty of Friendship between New Zealand and Western Samoa of that same year provided that New Zealand would act as a conduit for Western Samoa in the outside world in much the same way that Switzerland acted for Liechtenstein though most of the 20th century. Western Samoa did not join the UN until 1976, 14 years later. Similarly Nauru waited 31 years after its independence until it finally joined in 1999, Tuvalu waited for 22 years until 2000, and Kiribati waited 20 years until 1999. An Australian initiative provided offices for many of the smallest Commonwealth states so that they could sustain a permanent mission at the UN in New York (Commonwealth Consultative Group, 1985). Typically, these suites accommodated separate offices for three or four ambassadors and a common reception area. Even then, Kiribati has been unable to maintain a permanent mission in New York; the only UN member state presently in that position. The most glaring difference between these two groups of micro-states lies in the economic resources which they bring to bear (see Table 2). All the smallest states in Europe are in the current World Bank’s High Income classification, with over US$12,276 per capita annual income. In contrast to sharing a small suite with several other states, Luxembourg commands the entire historic estate of Irving Berlin on Beekman Place, a fitting launch pad for its campaign for a seat on the UN Security Council. In contrast, only the Cook Islands is a High Income state: the Cooks suffer from very large patterns of out-migration while benefitting from significant remittances. There are only three very small states (probably four, if the most recent figures for Nauru were available) which fall into the Lower Middle Income group. The remaining five states are in the Upper Middle Income group. In other words, these very small states are not among the 16 most impoverished states in the world; though, in contrast to the smallest European states, only Antigua and Barbuda has a GDP of over US$1 billion. However, relatively low GDP is critical Page when faced with the onerous costs of overseas representations, particularly for far flung Pacific DRAFT – do not cite Island states which face very expensive long distance travel, as well as high priced metropolitan real estate markets. Small size also constrains the recruitment of qualified personnel even in the literate and well-educated islands of the Commonwealth Caribbean. In the smallest European micro-states, particularly Monaco and Liechtenstein, where the indigenous population is far out- numbered by resident foreigners, it is not uncommon today to appoint foreigners in the service of the state. Table 2: Basic Indicators for the World’s Ten Smallest Island Developing States GDP GDP per Year of Year of UN Income State Population (US$m, capita Independence Membership Classification2 2010) (US$, 2010) Kiribati 1979 100,000 1999 151.1 2,010 LMI Seychelles 1976 89,000 1976 936.6 9,490 UMI Antigua and Barbuda 1981 88,500 1981 1015.0 10,670 UMI Dominica 1978 74,000 1978 382.7 4,960 UMI Marshall Islands 1991 62,360 1991 155.8 2,990 LMI St. Kitts and Nevis 1983 50,000 1983 526.0 9,980 UMI Palau 1994 20,520 1994 169.6 6,460 UMI Cook Not a UN Islands 1965 18,030 Member 211.0 15,810 HI Nauru1 1968 12,000 1999 60.0 5,000 UMI Tuvalu 1978 10,500 2000 32.0 3,190 LMI Source: World Bank Atlas for 2010. 1 Nauru’s data is approximate for 2005. Taken from the Hammond World Atlas (2009: 53). 2 Calculations of income classification are based on the World Bank per capita income groups: LI =Low Income (with a GDP of up to US$1,005); LMI=Lower Middle Income (US$1,006- $3,795); UMI=Upper Middle Income (US$3,796 -$12,275); and HI=High Income (US$12,276 and above). 17 When we examine the bilateral outreach of all these states, it is clear that they are Page primarily focused on their own regions, and on New York or Washington DC. In the Pacific, DRAFT – do not cite Canberra and Wellington have largely replaced London as the metropolitan focus. In the Commonwealth Caribbean, ties to the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada are of the highest priority, though there is growing evidence of Venezuelan and Cuban reach into the region. The former US Trust Territories maintain embassies in Washington DC, as do the Caribbean states; the exception is Antigua and Barbuda, whose US embassy is based in New York. Of all the smallest island states, only the Seychelles maintains a level of representation similar to that of the smallest European states. They have strong historical and tourism market ties to the United Kingdom, France, India and South Africa. They have rounded this out with embassies in Washington DC, Beijing and Brussels. Finally, a reflection of ‘the battle of the Chinas’: Taiwan is recognized and has reciprocal embassy agreements with Dominica, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Tuvalu. China has resident embassies in the Seychelles, and Antigua and Barbuda. Taiwan does not have diplomatic relations with any of the smallest European states (See Table 3). There in one other interesting comparison between the smallest European states and their small island developing counterparts: none has been able to attract more than a few resident missions, even from the larger metropolitan states. Again, the Seychelles is the one exception in the combined group of 14 states, with eight embassies resident in Victoria. This has much to do with its position as a favoured tourist destination as it does with its relative remoteness from the main tourist markets. A US mission was in place initially there but has been closed. Indeed, the US maintains missions only in the two former Pacific Trust Territories of Palau and the Marshall Islands. The representation of the other five Pacific states in this group is not much different: China in represented only in Dominica and Antigua and Barbuda; the United Kingdom, France and Russia are only represented in the Seychelles. For the small states of Europe and the Caribbean, it is so much easier to accredit an ambassador in a nearby European capital; in Barbados or New York; and (in the Pacific), Fiji or Australia. With the exception of Luxembourg, for reasons noted above, the four European micro- states have a resident diplomatic corps that pales in comparison to their own overseas representation. San Marino, the smallest of these states, is astonishing in maintaining 16 embassies abroad and a further three resident missions to intergovernmental organisations. Moreover, San Marino’s diplomatic reach stretches to Latin America and Asia. In that sense, it is unique as the three other European smallest states confine their embassies and missions to Europe and New York. Yet, for all of that, there are only three diplomatic missions resident in San Marino. In the early post-1945 years, none of these states had any diplomatic presence at the ambassadorial level. After joining the UN and the CoE, and having concluded agreements with the EU, all these countries have changed their relations with their larger neighbours to the formalities of equal and reciprocal ambassadorial exchange. There are now French and Italian ambassadors in Monaco; French, Spanish and Portuguese ambassadors in Andorra; and an Italian embassy in San Marino. Because relations with Liechtenstein have been historically handled in Berne and Vienna that situation has not changed with the Liechtenstein embassy in those two capitals serving as the main conduits for the Principality’s dealings with its two immediate neighbours. 18 Page DRAFT – do not cite Table 3: Comparing the Diplomatic Reach of the Ten Smallest Island Developing States and that of Europe’s Smallest Continental States Missions to Inter- State Embassies Overseas Resident Missions governmental Organisations 8 (China, Cuba, France, India, Libya, 8 (Belgium + EU, China, France, Holy Sovereign Military Order of Malta, Russia, Seychelles See, India, South Africa, UK, USA) UK) 1 (UN) St. Kitts and 6 (Belgium + EU, Canada, Jamaica, Nevis Taiwan, UK, USA) 4 (Brazil, Cuba, Taiwan, Venezuela) 1 (UN) Marshall Islands 4 (Fiji, Japan, Taiwan, USA) 2 (Taiwan, USA) 1 (UN) Palau 4 (Japan, Philippines, Taiwan, USA) 4 (Japan, Philippines, Taiwan, USA) 1 (UN) 5 (Belgium, China, Cuba, Taiwan, Dominica 3 (Canada, UK, USA) Venezuela) 1 (UN) Antigua and Barbuda 4 (Canada, China, France, UK) 3 (China, Netherlands, Venezuela) 1 (UN) Nauru 3 (Australia, Fiji, Taiwan) 2 (Australia, Taiwan) 1 (UN) Cook Islands 3 (Belgium + EU, New Zealand, UK) 0 0 Tuvalu 2 (Fiji, UK) 1 (Taiwan) 1 (UN) No permanent Kiribati 1 (Fiji) 4 (Australia, Cuba, New Zealand, Taiwan) UN Mission 16 (Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, 3 (New York- Belgium + EU, Bosnia-Herzegovina, UN, Geneva- Colombia, Egypt, France, Holy See, UN), Italy, Japan, Romania, Serbia, Spain, 3 (Italy, Holy See, Sovereign Military Strasbourg- San Marino UK, USA) Order of Malta) CoE) 9 (Belgium + EU, France, Germany, 3 (New York-UN, Holy See, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, UK, 3 (France, Italy, Sovereign Military Order Geneva-UN), Monaco USA) of Malta) Strasbourg-CoE) 3 (New York-UN, 6 (Austria, Belgium +EU, France, Geneva-UN), 19 Andorra Portugal, Spain, UK) 3 (France, Portugal, Spain) Strasbourg-CoE) Page DRAFT – do not cite 3 (New York-UN, 5 (Austria, Belgium + EU, Germany, Geneva-UN), Liechtenstein Switzerland, USA) 1 (Sovereign Military Order of Malta) Strasbourg-CoE) Finally, a word about multilateral diplomacy: for the European states, Europe is largely their world. They all have deep relations with the EU, particularly through the customs unions with their larger and neighbouring EU member states. Liechtenstein is a member of EFTA and therefore of the EEA. Apart from Liechtenstein, these states are part of the eurozone, though they can print their own face on their currency. As Deputy Ambassador Barriga from Liechtenstein explained to me recently in New York, virtually all of their diplomatic work is in, with and through these bodies, particularly the UN, with the whole world in its corridors: better to be in the UN than not! (fn.). Their missions to the EU in Brussels are central in maintaining a voice in European matters. The Council of Europe has proven to be of immense significance given all of these states’ interests in human rights and humanitarian affairs. As any cursory review of their activities would indicate, they demonstrate initiative and genuine commitment in their roles within these bodies. For the smallest island developing states, the nature of international organisation itself and the growing importance of regional bodies such as the Pacific Islands Forum and CARICOM, provide opportunities for coalition building among the very small and those sympathetic larger states to give full voice to issues which might not hold the same profile. The annual debate on climate change and the ensuing dangers to very small low-lying island states is a most dramatic case in point. Are there then very real differences between the international relations of these two groups of very small states? The differences in size are not significant: only three island states are larger than Andorra, while four are smaller than San Marino. Moreover, issues of small size in relation to the right to sovereignty have waned, though that has been a lengthy process, as has been indicated above. There are nevertheless huge economic differences between the two groups: the Europeans enjoy modern, advanced economies, with diversified and healthy economic sectors, including research and development, manufacturing, and finally tourism, contributing to quite enviable standards of living. The very small island states are well behind by these indices; for them, the burden of diplomatic relations is a much greater challenge. The real differences between these states lie in the historical foundations of this journey to sovereignty. The European states were always regarded as sovereign; that has been noted on countless occasions. They signed treaties and even sat in on conferences. But they did not enjoy the equal status as ‘normal’ sovereign states. Their diplomatic relations were confined to consular relations which two of them, San Marino and Monaco, exploited extensively both at home and abroad. It is ironic that Liechtenstein, the most removed, would under the leadership of Prince Hans Adam, emerge from the dark recesses off-stage into the full glare of the world beyond its Alpine redoubt (Beattie). The others followed suit, sharing the central objectives of both the recognition of their 20 sovereignty and the rights to participate in the organised international system in the same fashion as any other state. The legitimacy of statehood and full legal personality were and remain central Page priorities. And they have now won that long campaign. For the small island developing states, DRAFT – do not cite their statehood and its legitimacy was never in question. Once decolonisation was underway, neither was their candidacy for statehood seriously challenged. The real issues are rooted in the management of their sovereignty, given the paucity of their resource bases, their lack of self- defence capability and the limited finances and personnel for effective international diplomacy (vulnerability literature). Nevertheless, some solutions can be found, as the Australian supported initiative for shared missions in New York illustrates. References (to be added) 21 Page