IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES by jolinmilioncherie

VIEWS: 23 PAGES: 48

									                           No. _______________________


                                   IN THE
  SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                       _______________________________


                      Sharon V. Galloway         Petitioner
                                        v
      Johnson Metropolitan Termite and Pest Control Company, Inc., et al
                                                  Respondents
                       _______________________________
               ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
                THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND IN
                               THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
                       _______________________________

                   PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

                       _______________________________

Sharon V. Galloway                               Weems Duvall Jr. P.A.
5634 Mount Gilead Road                            2520 Mountain Road
Reisterstown, Maryland 21136                     Pasadena Maryland 21122
410-833-5588                                   Attorney for Johnson Metropolitan
Petitioner Pro Se                            Termite and Pest Control Company, Inc
                                                      410- 437-1775

                                                  Robert Brager Esq.
                                                  Laura McAfee Esq.
                                                  Beveridge & Diamond, P.C.
                                                201 North Charles Street, Suite 2210
                                                  Baltimore, Maryland 21201-4150
                                            Attorneys for The Dow Chemical Company
                                                  and Dow Agrosciences LLC
                                                        410-230-3868.
                                  QUESTIONS PRESENTED


1 - The Maryland Court of Appeals has entered a decision in conflict with Maryland and

other state precedent, The Maryland Rules, The Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission,

The Maryland States Attorneys Office, The American Bar Association Rules of Ethics, and

decisions by The Supreme Court of the United States regarding the unauthorized practice of

law by Respondents attorneys that violates the Petitioners due process rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution Amendments Five, and Fourteen, § one.

Petitioner respectfully asks for review and a call for an exercise of this courts supervisory

powers regarding these actions.



2 – Court of Appeals has decided an important question of law that conflicts with
   The

previous decisions by state and federal courts : Can a brain injured client with multiple

yt iiu e n s i hah o pctn b “e oh nwe e o hr
  e  ji,
ss mcn rsad eos el cm laos e hltt ko l g” f e
            ru   t    ii      d e     d

attorneys, who chose to not pursue or act upon toxic exposures that include acute, latent, and

permanent injury ?
                       LIST OF PARTIES


All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page



               PETITIONER –Sharon V. Galloway



RESPONDENTS –Johnson Metropolitan Termite and Pest Control

                           Company, Inc.

                                And

    The Dow Chemical Company, and Dow Agrosciences LLC
                                        TABLE OF CONTENTS


 U S IN P E E T D
Q E TO S R S N E …………………………………….
                               Page i

 A TE T H R C E IG ……………………………Page ii
P R IS OT EP O E DN S

N E O P E DC S
ID XT A P N IE ………………………………………Page v

 A L F U H RTE …………………………………….
T B EO A T O IIS             .Page vi

 PNO S N R E S E O
O IIN A DO D R B L W……………………………Page xii

U IDC IN
J RS ITO …………………………………………………Page xii

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED...............................................................Page xiii

 T T ME T F H A E             . 01
S A E N O T EC S ………………………………….
                              Page

 R U N ……………………………………………………. 07
A G ME T                   Page

           I - Unauthorized Practice of Law violates Maryland Rules:

              Maryland Rules 14, 15, 101 (b,), 1-312 (a) (1,2,3 )

              16-701 (a), and Md. Rule 16-811 (3)

         II - Unauthorized Practice of Law Violates Annotated Code of

              Maryland Business Occupations and Professions title 10.§10-101

               (h) and .§10-101(2) (i,ii,iii,iv ), §10-207 (f) , §10-210 (a),

                   1,s c ld ii ”
                      p a    sn
               §10-25“ ei amso.

         III -Unauthorized practice of law violates the Maryland Attorneys

                Rules of Ethics, and the American Bar Association Rules: 5.5,

                and 8.5(a)

         IV- Unauthorized Practice of Law Violates Due Process

              A. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1., and U.S. Const. amend. V.
       S teo Lmti sad knwe e r i “ pr n f
        at       ao        d  qr      s
   II – tu s f iitn,n “ o l g”eu e a e o o

                         o e uo i i ”
                                 qr
       Ordinary prudence tb ptnnu y.

   A. Though there are many cases where a Plaintiff prevailed in court with regards to

      ko l e id cvr r eetitnPt oecu
          d    s y e     ti  ii
      “nweg”n i oe p cdncao,etnrolnot find any
                                   d

      documentation specifically regarding brain injured or neurologically injured

      clients, or similarly disabled clients in the state of Maryland.

       o a “r n y r ec” e ele s c l hnh n r pr hs
             da u          a d p ay     e je t
   B. H wcn o i rp dne b dc r e eilw e t iu d ay a

      brain injury, resulting in total reliance on the fiduciary duty of legal counsel?

      This would be a question of significant importance to all non parties who are

      untrained in law, and science, and who are blameless victims of any number of

      harmful elements.



 O C U IN
C N L SO …………………………………………………. 30
                            Page
                              INDEX TO APPENDICES


APPENDIX A; Decision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals

………………………………………………………………………………..



APPENDIX B; Decision of the Maryland Trial Court, Baltimore County Circuit Court

……………………………………………………………………………….



APPENDIX C ; Decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals Denying Review

………………………………………………………………………………



APPENDIX D ; Order of the Maryland Court of Appeals Denying Rehearing

………………………………………………………………………………



APPENDIX E ; Affidafit of Former Counsel

                    .
                    ………………………….
…………………………………………………….



APPENDIX F ; The Maryland Rules

………………………………………………………………………………..



APPENDIX G; Opposition to Appellants Motion to Dismiss

                              .
……………………………………………………………………………….
                          TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED


CASES                                                                PAGE NUMBER
Allen [v. Zurich Ins. Co.], 667 F.2d [1162], []1166 [(CA4 1982)……………………21

American Farm Bureau, et. Al. v United States Environmental

Protection Agency , et. al.,…………………………………………………………..28

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202

                                    19
(1986)……………………………………………………………………………….

Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul, M. & D. Ry., 151 U.S. 1 (1894)………………………...25

Application of R.G.S., 312 Md. 626, 632, 541 A.2d 977, 980 (1988)). Ashley Arnold et. al.,

Minors, ect. et. el., v The Dow Chemical Company et. al…………………………...29

Attorney Grievance Commission v. Johnson, No. 6, September Term, 2000. ………09,14

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Shaw,

354 Md. 636, 732 A.2d 876, 882 (1999) (quoting In re Application of Mark W., 303 Md. 1,

                                               15
491 A.2d 576, 585 (1985))………………………………………………………….

 tr Gi ac C m ’vWa e
  oe e             k -Turner, AG No. 52,
At ny rvne o m n . l r

September Term, 2001………………………………………………………………14

Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., Inc.,

879 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir. 1989)…………………………………………………19

Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar,

                                             09
377 U.S. 1, 6 (1964)………………………………………………………………….

                                                         .09
Brotherhood of R. Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 6………………………………………….

Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy,

367 U.S. 886, 894-95 (1961)…………………………………………………………25
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978)…………………………………………….. 25

Davis [v. Wakelee], 156 U.S. [680], []689, 15 S.Ct. 555 [(1895)];……………………....21

                                                                             .
Discipio, 163 Ill.2d 515, 206 Ill. Dec. 654, 645 N.E.2d 906, 910 (1994))……………....15

Drew v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 970 S.W.2d 152 (Tex.App.--Austin 1998, writ

denied)…………………………………………………………………………………..12

Frederick Road Ltd. Partnership v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 93-94, 756 A.2d 963, 972-

                                       .4
73 (2000)……………………………………………………………………………….

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970)……………………………………….19,25

Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975)……………………………………09

                                                                               .
                                                                               21
Gordon v. Posner, 142 Md. App. 399, 426- 27, cert. denied, 369 Md. 180 (2002……….

                                                .
                                                12
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110……………………………………………………………….

Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959)……………………………………….19

                                                                 .16
Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884)………………………………….

Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884)………………………………………...16

Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 186-187, 100 A. 83, 85-86 (1917)……………………24

Linda Hammond et al. v Terminix International Company LP., et al , Civil Case No.: 24-C-

                                             .22
04-002664 August 2005……………………………………………………………….

                                                                       3
Helenski v Appleton Papers, 952F Supp. 266, 269 ( D. Md 1997 )………………………2

                                                 0
Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 397………………………………………………………………2

                                                         0
Hughes v Mcdaniel, 202 Md. 626 ( 1953 )………………………………………………2

                                                                       9
ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1913)…………………………1

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)…………..25
Kennedy v. Bar Ass'n of Montgomery County, Inc., 316 Md. 646, 662, 561 A.2d 200, 208

(1989)……………………………………………………………………………………22

                                                                    .
                                                                    12
Lawline v. American Bar Assn. 956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir.1992)………………………….

                                                         08,11
Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438,442 (1979)………………………………………………….

Litzenberg v. Litzenberg, 57 Md. App. 303, 469 A.2d 1279, cert. denied,

300 Md. 89, 475 A.2d 1201 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 307 Md. 408, 514 A.2d 476

                                      1
(1986)……………………………………………………………………………………1

                                                        ………………………….25
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1982)

                                                             .
                                                             .21
Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 223 (CA4 1996)……………………………………….

Lukas v. Bar Ass'n of Montgomery County, 35 Md. App. 442, 448, 371 A.2d 669, 673, cert.

                                                 .
                                                 .15
denied, 280 Md. 733 (1977)…………………………………………………………….

Madbury v Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch ) 137, 163 ( 1803 )………………………………30

                                                                     .21
Middlebrook Tech, LLC v. Moore, 157 Md. App. 40, 62-63 (2004)…………………….

MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY v BARBARA L. HERGENROEDER, Civil Action No.

DKC 2006-1222…………………………………………………………………………14

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,429 (1963). 11. U.S. CONST. art. IV, I -11……………09

                                                                             .
                                                                             21
New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750-51, 121 S.Ct. 1208, 1215 (2001)………….

Owens –Illinois v Armstron 87 Md App. at 734 quoting the restatements (second ) of torts. §

                                           5,24
7 (2) ( 1965 )…………………………………………………………………………….

Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 212 (CA1 1987)…………21

Philadelphia, W., & B.R. Co. v. Howard, 13 How. 307, 335-337 (1852)…………………21

Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000)………………………………………………20

Scarano [v. Central R. Co.], 203 F.2d [510], []513 [(CA3 1953)]…………………………21
                                                            52
Shaw, 354 Md. 636, 732 A.2d 876, 882 (1999)…………………………………………1,2

                                                                  12
State v. Rogers, 705 A.2d 397, 401 (N.J.Sup.Ct.1998)…………………………………….

                                                           7
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576-7)…………………………….
                                                                       07

Supik v. Bodie, Nagle, Dolina, Smith & Hobbs, P.A., No. 1697, Sept. Term, 2002 (Md. App.

Oct. 29, 2003)………………………………………………………………………………24

United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. 111. State Bar Assn, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967)…………09

                                                              .
                                                              20
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979)…………………………………………….

                                                                    .
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949), U.S. at 170 ………………………………..20

Vogel v. Touhey, 151 Md. App. 682, 722 (2003) (citing Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72, 88

(1997)…………………………………………………………………………………...21,29

                                                                16
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997)…………………………………….

Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1963). Cf. Sec. 7(c) of the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 556(d)………………………………………19



                                STATUTES AND RULES


Maryland Rules:

    ra R l 4
     yn    e
1- Ma l d u 1……………………………………………………………09,10,16

2- Maryland Rule 15……………………………………………………………….10,16

    r a R l 0 ()
     yn    e
3- Ma l d u 11 b………………………………………………………….
                                      10,16

                    1…………………………………………………………….
4- Maryland Rule 1-31                       ..
                                             .17

                         ……………………………………………………………17
5- Maryland Rule 1-312 (a)

                    0……………………………………………………………....17
6- Maryland Rule 8-42

                                                      .
7- Maryland Rule 8-501 (c), (e),(j)…………………………………………………...03
8- Maryland Rule 8-414 (c)……………………………………………………….03



Annotated Code of Maryland Business Occupations and Professions Title 10

1- § 10-101 (h)…………………………………………………………………15

2- § 10-101 (2) ( I,ii, iii, iv )……………………………………………………10

                                        10
3- § 10-207 (f)………………………………………………………………….

4- § 10-210 (a)………………………………………………………………….10

         1 “pc ld i i ……………………………………………….10
              a    sn
5- § 10-25 sei am s o”

                                     .
6- § 10-206…………………………………………………………………….15

                                     .
7- § 10-601…………………………………………………………………….15

                                     .15
8- § 10-606…………………………………………………………………….

                                     .
9- § 10-406…………………………………………………………………….15



Opinion of the Attorney General of the State of Maryland

Opinion of the Attorney General, Cite as : 80 Opinions of the Attorney General …14,17



Maryland Attorneys Rules of Ethics and the American Bar Association Rules

1- Rule 5.5……………………………………………………………………08,15,16
                       UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

1- Amendment Five……………………………………………………………xiii,7

2- Amendment Fourteen § one…………………………………………………xiii,7



                             UNITED STATES CODE

1- 28 U.S.C. 1654 ( 2000 )……………………………………………………….08

                                                    27
2- 7 U.S.C. § 136 (a) (c) (5) (D)………………………………………………….

3- 21 U.S.C. § 346 (b) (2) (A) (ii) (C) (ii) (II)……………………………………28

                                               .
4- 40 C.F.R. §§ 152 and 158……………………………………………………..
                                                27




                           LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS
                                                          22
1- Americans With Disabilities Act Title II……………………………………….

4- Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act……………………………….28

5- Food Quality Protection Act……………………………………………………28.




                                      OTHER
1- A. Miller and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4477 ( 1981 )……21

2- Agricultural Health Study……………………………………………………...26

3- December 2004 issue of the journal of the National Cancer Institute………….27

4- Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, Spring 2002 ……………………………13
                            OPINIONS BELOW


The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at Appendix A to

the petition and is unpublished.




                                   JURISDICTION


The date on which the highest state court decided Petitioners case was

September 15, 2006

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix C

A timely petition for reconsideration was thereafter denied on the following date

December 08, 2006,

A copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix D




The jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).
             CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED


Amendment V

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a

presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,

or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person

be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,

without just compensation.



Amendment XIV

Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction

thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall

make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their

respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians

not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and

Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial

officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male

inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or

in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male

citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Section. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President

and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any

State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the

United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of

any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection

or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress

may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including

debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or

rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or

pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States,

or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and

claims shall be held illegal and void.

Section. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the

provisions of this article.
                                STATEMENT OF THE CASE

 1- The Petitioner through her attorney J. Edward Martin Esquire, discovered via the written

 report of her expert physician dated May 13, 2003, that her exposure to the organophosphate

                                   sD r a” aa m j cua a o ihrct le ,
                                       s          o   l cr       e an
 pesticide, chlorpyrifos, marketed a“ u bn w s “ a ras f t ”n eau , t t

 and permanent injury and disease.

 2- Petitioner was toxically and chemically injured in 1991 when she moved to a rural

 residence located in Northern Baltimore County, in Reisterstown, Maryland. The only toxic

 exposures discovered during the Winter of 1991 were; carbon monoxide, and bacteria in her

 well water . As admitted by the Respondents Dow Chemical in brief for Summary Judgment,

 only these two elements were named as toxins and chemicals in all of Petitioners legal

 proceedings before this action.

 3- A complaint that only named the malfunctioning furnace and well water contamination was

 not filed until 1994. As stated in deposition and affidavit, the sprayed application of the

       le id,D r a”adh us et j yo etnr anti oe d t
         ti     s      e
 chemicapsc e” u bn,n t sbeuniu tPt oe w s od cvr a
                          q  nr     i
                                   i ,       s e

 the actual time of application due to the fact that no notice was given that an injurious toxic

 chemical was being applied, nor was there any warning, that Petitioner should be cautious, or

 leave.

4- Edward Birrane, of Birrane Chartered, filed the original 1994 Complaint against

 Reisterstown Federal Bank, and Roger Weinberg, the office manager of Birrane Chartered

                                                       a l fh D r a”nh
                                                        bs e     s
 was named as primary counsel. Weinberg discovered the l e ot “ u bn ite

 defendants files in 1996, or 1997, but he did not act upon this discovery, or amend the

 Complaint to include the Respondents. Weinberg took no action regarding any of the toxic

 exposures, including the carbon monoxide and well water contamination.
5- After almost five years of representation, Weinberg mailed a letter to Petitioner stating that

he was abandoning Petitioner, and the law firm where he was office manager, Birrane

Chartered. Weinberg had actually hastily left Birrane Chartered months before, and had not

informed Petitioner of his departure. Due to this abandonment, Edward Birrane took over as

primary counsel.

6- During Edward Birranes representation, it was discovered that the defendant , Reisterstown

Federal Bank, had become a client of Birrane Chartered while the firm that only consisted of

four lawyers, was under Roger Weinbergs supervisory duty. The defendant bank had been a

lnf oea er h c an aup i “ofc fn r t
 i o      , u ei     cu   lt te .
cet rvr ya t sr tg ssioscn i oie s”

7- Birrane unethically chose to abandon Petitioner as a client, keeping the defendant banks’

collections account.

      i Af ai f o r one f o hmc f u m r ug et oe
       s i t     m     l r        a r    y     ,
8- In h “ fdv oFr eC us ”oD wC e i loSm a Jdm n R gr

                         a t D r a”
                            e  s
Weinberg states that he hdh “ u bn labels from the application to Petitioners residence,

however, in his Affidavit, he omits that he took no action regarding any of the exposures,

including the Dursban. ( Appendix E )

9- Weinbergs specious conduct regarding taking on the defendant as a client, and why he

would choose to submit an affidavit to the fact that he did not act upon these toxic exposures,

are certainly questionable, and should have been addressed by the court as such.

10- The Circuit Court, The Court of Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals gave

Weinbergs affidavit credence over Petitioners, ignoring the fact that he abandoned the

 etnrfrs mn h e nat e ts w Fdr B ns“oetn acut
  ii
Pt oeaea u i t df dnR ie t n ee l ak’clcoscon
      t s g e e       s ro     a      li     .”

And, the fact that he did not even attempt any discovery at any level regarding the numerous

mechanical reports in his files that pertain to the malfunctioning furnace, the contaminated
well water, and the Dursban, is against state and federal precedent, and is prejudicial to the

Respondents.

11- Petitioner has been a patient of Grace Ziem, M.D, Dr. P.H., since 1996. It took over a

year for Petitioner to be able to obtain an appointment with Dr. Ziem, starting well before the

discovery of the Dursban labels. ( Appendix A, page 3, ¶ 3) As stated in deposition, and in the

Brief For Appellant, Dr. Ziem was consulted only for the purpose of the carbon monoxide

exposure, and as the record shows, only a carbon monoxide expert was consulted through Dr.

Ziem.

12- Dow subpoenaed all of Dr. Ziems records and has only produced one document of Dr.

 i tt e r h m nosD r a”sr ptul g r gh y 03 xe
  m  e cd a
Ze soh r o t t etn “ u bn,u et os i o n t Ma 20 E pr
                i     s       i
                           r i y ni e              t

Opinion that though subpoenaed, and submitted again at deposition, and referred to in

deposition by name, refused to allow it to be included in the Record. On motion by the

Appellant/Petitioner, the court ruled against including this submitted report which conflicts

with Maryland Rule 8-501 (c), (e), (j) , and 8-414 (c). The court became angry when

Petitioner acted in accordance with Md. Rule 8-501, when upon Motion, included the

subpoenaed, submitted, and multi-referenced report in her appendix. The courts anger

extended into the Opinion.

13- Dow did not, and can not, produce any documents from Petitioners primary physician,

neurologist, rheumatologists, cardiologists, or any of the then defendant, Reisterstown Federal

Banks’expert physicians or emergency room physicians, that claim Petitioners injury is due to

D r a” Al Pt oe ei l l ,n t e nat xe wt s i
   s
“ u bn. l f etnrm d afe adh df dn epr ie fes were in the
         o i s
             i     c is    e e   s  t n sl

legal files of Roger Weinberg, and those files were copied and examined by Respondents.
14- As stated by the attorneys for Dow Chemical in Summary Judgment, it is an undisputed

fact that Dursban, Dow Chemical , Dow Agrosciences LLC, or the previous distributor of

Dursban, Dow Elanco, and the applicator of the termiticide, Johnson Metropolitan, were never

 etndn n oPt oe ’ gl o p isfe om tn.
   i         i se
              i         a t is    i
m noe iay f etnr l aC m ln ,l ,r oos

15- Though instructed by Petitioners attorney to focus only on the well water and furnace

exposures, Dr. Ziem candidly chose to write her expert opinion in her own words, surprising

 etnrn hr w eE w r rn i h oi se r c t“ u bn r e
  ii     a       d t, h e o f e          s ” Zm
Pt oead el yr d a Mai wtt cp u r e neo D r a,D. i

also wrote about Dursbans unseemly history of WWII Nazi Germany origins, decades of

       o o pre adh ni n et Po co A ec sbn o D r a.
            ts    e r      a ti       e        s
injury tnn ai ,n t E v om n l r etn gni “a” n u bn

16- Petitioner lost at Summary Judgment due to ineffective counsel, and attorney error by her

own attorney, as admitted by the Dow Chemical lawyers in Summary Judgment motions and

                        D w s tit r i f u m r ug et i lnf
                             a   e be r     y     ; f a tf
transcripts. (defendant “ o ”tenhi rfoSm a Jdm n “ P iis

misquote from Bayslinger had been accurate, factual disputes would always preclude the

                                    ti Sm a ug et tn ) n,e i o
                                     ao     y       i        d
Court from granting a statute of limitn u m rJdm nMoo” A dh d nt

correct the wrong dates repeatedly cited by the Dow Chemical lawyers, and he did not even

state the correct dates himself. Petitioners attorney did not attribute any known legal

precedent to the EPA ban of Dursban that he insisted on including in the Complaint, and

Martin was completely unprepared for the Summary Judgment hearing. As Edward Martin,

Petitioners lawyer, did not even answer the Respondents Motion for Summary Judgment,

Petitioner was not aware of any questions to be answered.

17- Petitioner was forced to file a timely appeal pro se, to the Maryland Court of Special

Appeals as her attorney decimated her capital, credit, and possessions.
18- Petitioner discovered during the appeals process that the attorneys representing Dow

Chemical Company, and Dow Agrosciences LLC were in violation of the Maryland Rules,

state and federal law, and filed motions to the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals,

and the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission, regarding the unauthorized practice of

law and violations of the Maryland Rules by Dow. Petitioner asked that Respondents Dow,

have their brief stricken, and the case be remanded back to the lower court. The motions were

denied.

19- Petitioner brings a dedicated perspective to the possibly far reaching impact of this courts

decision, and Petitioner has an important contribution to make to the analysis of the issues

presented to this court as the misrepresentation and deception extends from Petitioners own

attorneys, beginning with Roger Weinberg who as office manager of Birrane Chartered,

acquired the defendant that the Petitioner, with Weinberg as legal counsel, was suing as a

client. And, Weinberg did not investigate any of the toxic exposures, including Dursban. This

abuse of procedure extends to the violation of Petitioners due process, and state and federal

rules from the inception of this case with the out of state attorneys representing Dow

Chemical. This suppression of facts, ineffective representation, and attorney error by

                        otb e o the
                          ru d
Petitioners own lawyers cn i t t“ existence of loss or detriment in the fact of any

i ta e o r ui f m cue
 n    s st on       ”
k do pr ne l gr a as Owens –Illinois v Armstron 87 Md App. at 734

quoting the restatements (second ) of torts. § 7 (2) ( 1965 )

20- The harm to non parties is relevant given the court has ignored its own previous decisions

e r n nu o zd r te fa “nwe e,i oe ,n t agr s r eet
 gdg    hi    ai
r a i uat re p cc ol ,ko l g”d cvr adh dne u p cdn
                    w     d   s y     e   o e

this could set with regards to all litigants who are not wary, and especially injured litigants
who are untrained in law and science, and relying on the duty of their legal counsel to protect

them from further harm..

21- The harm to nonparties is particularly relevant in this case given Respondents Dow

 hmc ad o g s ecs L ’ eaeo wo di ,n cnel nof
     a        oi        ,        n n        m    c
C e i ln D wA r c ne L Csdcds f r go gad oca etfat

and injury, thus creating a public health catastrophe with the organophosphate pesticide

 a e d sD r a,”h ee t g bne f ots , t aaa
  ke      s
m r t a“ u bn t tvnhuh ando m sue isl vible for use in
               a     o       r   ss il l

cri plaosit ne Sa s
  tn i i   e t     t,
“ea apctn”nh U id te thus continuing the exposures, and toxic injury

associated with Dursban that have been known since its origin in World War II Germany as a

potential chemical warfare agent.

22- This case also underscores the necessity of a case-by-case approach in evaluating the

effect of Respondents conduct on nonparties. Without the flexibility of due process to assess

each case on its own facts and, in this case, take into account the harm to potential and existing

identically situated injured citizens of the United States, the purposes of jurisprudence cannot

be achieved.

                                         SUMMARY

1- As the courts have ruled against their own previous decisions not only regarding the

unauthorized practice of law, but precedent by other courts and federal decisions regarding

nu o zd r te f w s teol ti ,i oe ,n “nwe e.
  hi    ai    a at     m ao s y        d
uat re p cc ol ,tu s fiitnd cvr ad ko l g”Petitioner

submits a writ of certiorari in the hope of accomplishing due process, and asks for

consideration of the function of the courts to prevent further harm to non parties who may

possibly be abused, coerced, harassed, or injured by their own legal counsel, like the Petitioner

here.
    en r n “nwe e regarding Petitioners exposure to a pesticide, are comparative
       jy       d
2- Th iu ad ko l g”

to the tobacco and asbestos litigation, and those cases are equally comparable to the injustice,

damage, latent injury, disease, and the potential public health disaster due to various pesticide,

toxic, or chemical injury. All cases should be judiciously examined so that no ones due

process is violated, no injured party is taken advantage of, and no party is the recipient of

e e nie deceit and trickery”
 ph b
r r es l“                  .

3- The Supreme Court listed five factors for the courts to consider when judging the degree of

reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct:

           1) whether it caused physical rather than economic harm; 2) whether it evinced an
           indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; 3) whether its
           target was financially vulnerable; 4) whether it involved repeated actions rather than
           an isolated incident; and 5) whether its harm resulted from intentional malice,
           trickery or deceit, rather than mere accident. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 (citing
           Gore, 517 U.S. at 576-77).

4- These five factors are applicable to Petitioners case.



                                              ARGUMENT
QUESTION ONE:

1- The unauthorized practice of law by the out of state attorneys for the defendant Dow

Chemical and Dow Agrosciences LLC, violated the due process guaranteed by the

Constitution to the Petitioner.

2- The Maryland Courts violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment of the Constitution when its highest court unexpectedly overrules its own binding

interpretation of existing Maryland, other state, and federal statutes .
 I: PRO HAC VICE : LAWYERS MAY OFFICIALLY PRACTICE ONLY WHERE

                                LICENSED OR ADMITTED

1- Lawyers may only practice law in jurisdictions in which they have been admitted or

licensed. The current ABA Model Rule governing where a lawyer may practice provides that

"[a] lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the

legal profession in that jurisdiction." Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5(a)

Throughout the United States, the rule is that a lawyer licensed in one state may not practice in

another state, unless the lawyer has received one of the special forms of admission such as pro

hac vice. The authority of states to regulate the practice of law has a long history.

 2- The First Congress, in one of the first acts of the new United States of America,

delegated regulation of attorneys to the courts. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that

"in all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases

personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to

 aae n cnutassh e .
                e i”
m ng ad odccue t r n 28 U.S.C. 1654 (2000)

3- Similarly, the Supreme Court has noted that "since the founding of the Republic, the

licensing and regulation of lawyers has been left exclusively to the States and the District

of Columbia within their respective jurisdictions." Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438,442

(1979).

4- Each state's right "to regulate the practice of law within its borders" (1) is "beyond

question."(2) A state's "inherent power"(3) to regulate lawyers is vested in the supreme

court of that state. That right, however, is limited. The Supreme Court has broadly limited

the types of regulation each state supreme court may impose, directing that states "cannot
ignore the rights of individuals secured by the Constitution,"(4) and "cannot foreclose the

exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels."(5)

5- The original attorney representing Dow Chemical, Ms. Kathleen Lennon Esquire, is from

the law firm of Beveridge and Diamond in Washington D.C. and was not admitted pro hac

vice. Along with Mr. Brager of Baltimore, she represented the then defendants answering the

Complaint, filing motions and subpoenas, phoning, writing letters, and deposing Petitioner.

Ms. Lennons correspondence and Affidavit, show that she was only admitted to practice

law in Washington D.C.

6- In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Johnson, No. 6, September Term, 2000, an out-

of-state attorney practiced law in the State of Maryland without a license, and failed to

acknowledge his jurisdictional limitations on his firms letterhead. The Maryland

Attorney Grievance took disciplinary actions towards that lawyer.

7- From the Order from the Circuit Court signed April 2, 2004 ; Joseph Eaton of the law firm

Barnes and Thornburg located in Indianapolis, Indiana, was admitted pro hac vice for the

l id u oe fper g n prc an itsa so one o oe r r
 i e p       i      ti i    i e     lr    t g
“mt pr soapan ad aiptgnh csac cus f R brBae

                                                                     ”
under Rule 14 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of Maryland.



(1) Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).

(2) United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. 111. State Bar Assn, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).

(3)Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975).

(4) Brotherhood of R. Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 6.

(5) NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,429 (1963). 11. U.S. CONST. art. IV, I -11.
 8- Maryland Rules / Rules Governing Admission To The Bar Of Maryland / Rule 14 -

  pc l d ii f uO S tAt n sd “
    a     sn       a   oe
 Sei A mso O O t f te tr y ()Limitations on an out of state attorneys

          s t h ; A ao e seil d i m y col so one o pr
           as a      tn
 practice”tet t“ n tr y pc l amtd a atn ac cus f a ay
                           ay    e
                                 t      y      lr t

 e e n d y n tr y fe r nh co w osd i tp cc its te
  ps e       tn
 r r et b a ao e or o it atn h iamtdo r tenh S t”
                   cd e i           e
                                    t  ai    i a.

 The Order from the lower court specifically states a co-counsel status for Mr. Eaton, to work

 with Robert Brager of the Beveridge and Diamond law firm Baltimore.

 9- Mr. Eaton under Maryland Rule 14 and a sub-rule of Maryland Rule 14, Md. Rule 101

 (b) was to act as co counsel only, and is not allowed to sign any documents. Only the

 Maryland Attorney, Mr. Brager, can legally sign documents under Maryland law.

 10- Joshua Fleming, also of the law firm Barnes and Thornburg located in Indianapolis,

                                           cus ” i . t . h
                                              l h Eo
 Indiana, signed the Respondents Brief as “one wtMr a n T e

 Appellee/Respondents brief came directly from Mr. Flemings office in Indiana, not from an

 office in Maryland. Joshua Fleming is not admitted to the Bar of Maryland, and did not

 request for admission by pro hac vice. Joshua Flemings letterhead does not indicate he is

 admitted to practice in Maryland.

11- Mr. Fleming did not apply or file a motion for a pro hac vice status, therefore he is in
 violation of ;
                                               sei amso o uos tl e ”and
                                                      a      sn r
          Maryland Rules 14,15,and 101 “pc ld ii f otftea yr , the           a w s
          Annotated Code of Maryland Business Occupations And Professions, title 10.
          Lawyers Subtitle 1 –                                                D f i n”
                                                                                  it
                                   Definitions; General Provisions § 10-101 “ eni s   o
                           0 ( “r i l m aso naen n ot f l n
                                ) cc w
          Section 10-11h Patea ” en tegg iay f eoo i                      h lw g
                 i s“r i l i u s ( i p pr g re i nh r a tn f
                  t e        cc w c d
          activi :Patea ”nl e: i)r an ohln it p pri oi e i            p g e e ao
          any form or document that is filed in a court or affects a case that is or may be filed
          in court; or (iv ) giving advice about a case that is or may be filed in court. Mr.
                                            r a R l 0 “ one ,pci l e i (
                                             yn        e
          Fleming is in violation of Ma l d u 11 C us ” seicl s tn al        fay co )
           i d gnrl ad b ne“ h m y pers one and.§10-101(2)
            tl             ay           )
          t e “ee l” n ( udrw o a apaa cus ”                             l
                                                              s c ld ii ”
                                                               p a
          (i,ii,iii,iv ), §10-207 (f) , §10-210 (a), §10-215, “ ei amso.   sn
12- The Respondents Dow Chemicals out of state lawyers, Eaton and Fleming, signed the

 pea rf scus ”a ii cm i gwi gad umt gh r is
   le is     l stg     l
A pltb e a“one ,ssn,o pi , ri ,n sb i n t i rf
                        n   tn       i
                                     t e be

illegally, consistent with precedent, opinion, and Maryland Rules regarding unauthorized

practice of law.

13- These illegal actions by the Respondents have deprived Petitioner of her basic rights.

Due process requires the formality of judicial proceeding be commensurate with complexity

of dispute. Litzenberg v. Litzenberg, 57 Md. App. 303, 469 A.2d 1279, cert. denied, 300 Md.

89, 475 A.2d 1201 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 307 Md. 408, 514 A.2d 476 (1986).

14- Petitioner was denied a formal judicial proceeding regarding this unauthorized practice of

law, and in fact, Petitioner was told by Maryland Attorney Grievance bar counsel, Melvin

 ih a, s t n or. . r m n l td etnro e a o p i o
  s   o u e    t
Hr m nt“ ehmicu ” Mr ih a a oo Pt oets d cm lnt
                    Hs     s l i i    n     at

Indiana, which Petitioner now knows is procedurally wrong.



         II: ADMISSION TO OTHER JURISDICTIONS BY PRO HAC VICE

1- For litigation matters, an attorney may seek admission to represent a client in another state

"for this matter only," or pro hac vice. While the granting of an admission pro hac vice is not

necessarily a pro forma matter, "there is not the slightest reason to suppose that a qualified

lawyer's pro hac vice request will be denied." In Leis v. Flynt, the Supreme Court discussed

pro hac vice admissions in detail. In that case, in which the State of Ohio indicted Larry Flynt

and Hustler Magazine on obscenity charges, Flynt's two out-of-state attorneys failed to make

the proper applications to appear pro hac vice and were disqualified. On appeal, the Supreme

Court held there does not exist any state-granted right in Ohio for an out-of-state attorney to

automatically be admitted pro hac vice and affirmed that no federal right allows "lawyers to
appear in state courts without meeting that state's bar admission requirements." By filing the

proper application, attorneys are routinely admitted to practice in other jurisdictions under pro

hac vice rules.



 I R S O D N S O A T A L I O ME E Y S ITN ” H
  I
 I : E P N E T N TF C U LC A MS F‘ R L A SS I G T E

  MARYLAND ATTORNEY, WOULD STILL VIOLATE THE UNAUTHORIZED

              PRACTICE OF LAW STATUTE, AND MARYLAND LAW.

1- The unauthorized practice of law Statute was challenged for vagueness in Drew v.

Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 970 S.W.2d 152 (Tex.App.--Austin 1998, writ denied).

Mr. Drew, a non-lawyer, had filed habeas corpus petitions on behalf of people who believed

they had been denied their rights. An order was entered enjoining Mr. Drew from practicing

law. On appeal, he challenged the Statute as being void for vagueness. The Court of Appeals

concluded that ;

        "the statute is sufficiently specific as concerns the actions the court enjoined, including
        preparation of pleadings, giving legal advice, preparing legal documents, and
        attempting to appear before a judge on behalf of another." Id. at 155. This holding is
        consistent with every other court which has considered a vagueness challenge to a
        state's unauthorized practice law. See State v. Rogers, 705 A.2d 397, 401
        (N.J.Sup.Ct.1998) (citing cases upholding unauthorized practice of law statutes against
        vagueness challenges); see also Lawline v. American Bar Assn. 956 F.2d 1378 (7th
        Cir.1992) (upholding against a vagueness challenge state ethical rule prohibiting
        lawyers from assisting others in the unauthorized practice of law). While the Statute is
        not a model of clarity, "condemned to the use of words, we can never expect
        mathematical certainty from our language." Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110.

2- The Statute and the surrounding case law set forth a core of prohibited conduct with

sufficient definiteness to guide those who must interpret it. The Statute speaks of the

preparation of a will or contract or other legal instrument as being potentially prohibited
conduct. This should have put anyone who assists others in the preparation of a legal

document on notice that they may run afoul of the unauthorized practice of law statute.



 IV: IN REALITY, LAWS GUARDING AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE

                   OF LAW ARE ONLY SELECTIVELY ENFORCED

   I te p m r n r t e i nu , P l w u e n o y n r o ul
    f a s i y te s e c e        w   d   fm      go y
1- “ s t 'r a ie s w rlesr U L a s olb ui r ladi r s

enforced. Instead, enforcement depends upon the status, or clout, if you will, of the party

   o e.
    v ”
invl d (1) The handling of Petitioners case by the Maryland Court of Appeals, and

Maryland Court of Special Appeals, has given rise to the appearance of manipulation of the

judicial process, as the courts have ignored their own previous decisions regarding

unauthorized practice of law.



V: THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS BINDS COURTS TO ADHERE TO THE

HIGHER COURT HOLDINGS IN PREVIOUS CASES IN THE SAME SITUATION

1- Stare decisis is essentially the doctrine of precedent. Courts cite to stare decisis when an

issue has been previously brought to the court and a ruling already issued. Maryland

precedent citations, as well as Federal and other Courts of Appeals decisions that are

established and judicious, and Fourth Circuit precedent that pertain to, and are beneficial to the

Petitioner were utilized by the Applellant, now the Petitioner.

2- The Court ignored, and in fact disregarded previous decisions by Maryland Courts and the

Maryland Rules regarding unauthorized practice of law.



(1) excerpted From the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, Spring 2002
The Court ignored established Maryland law and opinions by the Maryland Attorney General

regarding unauthorized practice of law. This is procedurally faulted, prejudicial to the

defendant Dow Chemical, and ultimately robs Petitioner of her right to due process.

3- Petitioner examined examples of previously decided issues and opinions regarding

unauthorized practice of law in the state of Maryland, by the Maryland Attorney Grievance

bar counsel Melvin Hirshman. Copied and pasted from the Maryland Attorney Grievance

web site exactly as it appears on those web pages, are these examples of the Attorney

Grievance Commission of Maryland decisions regarding unauthorized practice of law that

apply to Petitioners circumstances:

       MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY v BARBARA L. HERGENROEDER, Civil
       Action No. DKC 2006-1222 , in the United States District Court for the District of
       Maryland, Defendant Hirshman informed the Plaintiff that it was "his duty to
       investigate any possible unauthorized practice of law by members of the Bars of other
                           tr Gi ac C m ’vWa e
                            oe e
       jurisdictions." At ny rvne o m n . l r                k -Turner, AG No. 52,
       September Term, 2001 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE - DISCIPLINARY ACTION -
       RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT - UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF
       LAW - The attorney represented a client in the District of Columbia, although he was
       admitted to practice law only in Maryland. This conduct violated Maryland Rule of
       Professional Conduct 5.5(a).
       Attorney Grievance Commission v. Johnson, No. 6, September Term, 2000.
       ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE—DISCIPLINARY ACTION—RULES OF
       PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT—CONFLICT OF INTEREST—CANDOR
       TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL— UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW—
         O        NC TO S O C R IG A E ’ S R IE —FIRM
       C MMU IA IN C N E NN AL WY RS E VC S
       NAMES AND LETTERHEADS— MISCONDUCT—Where an out-of-state attorney
       practiced law in the State of Maryland without a license, and failed to acknowledge his
       jurisdictional limitations on his firms letterhead.

4- Stated in Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, is

the opinion of the Maryland Attorney General Joseph Curran with regards to unauthorized

practice of law:

        Opinion of the Attorney General, Cite as : 80 Opinions of the Attorney
        General____(1995) [Opinion No-95-056 (December 19, 1985)] discusses the Scope
        of the Practice of Law as it relates to Unauthorized Practice of Law, ( UPL ) and
          ens P t l “ ee l e o m y r i l n r a ol f
           i             uy n            aa s
        df eU L hs :Ignr, pr n a patea iMa l d n i           cc w           yn y
        admitted to the Bar by the Court of Appeals. §§10-206 and 10-601 of the Business
        Occupations and Professions ("BOP") Article, Maryland Code. The unauthorized
        practice of law is a misdemeanor and is also subject to injunction. BOP §§10-606(a)
        and 10-406. Moreover, Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5(b) prohibits a
        lawyer from "assist[ing] a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance
        of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law."


5- The above opinion would include Robert Brager of Beveridge and Diamond in Baltimore

who worked with Washington D.C. lawyer Kathleen Lennon who did not have the benefit of

pro hac vice, and who brought in and deferred to Indiana lawyers Joseph Eaton and Joshua

Fleming, allowing them to write and sign motions, and write and sign the Briefs of the

          scus ”
              l
Appellees a“one .

6- Under the General Assembly's definition of "practice of law," the term encompasses giving

legal advice, representing another person before a court or other governmental unit, and

preparing or assisting in the preparation of a form or document to be filed in court.

MD BOP §10-101(h).

7- The term "practice of law" is a "'term of art connoting much more than merely working

             e t m tr’
              le   ts"
with legally-ra d ae . Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Shaw, 354

Md. 636, 732 A.2d 876, 882 (1999) (quoting In re Application of Mark W., 303 Md. 1, 491

A.2d 576, 585 (1985)).

8- The focus of this inquiry is, in fact, 'whether the activity in question required legal

knowledge and skill in order to apply legal principles and precedent. Id. (quoting In re

Discipio, 163 Ill.2d 515, 206 Ill. Dec. 654, 645 N.E.2d 906, 910 (1994)).

            Even where "'trial work is not involved but the preparation of legal documents,
            their interpretation, the giving of legal advice, or the application of legal principles
            to problems of any complexity, is involved, these activities are still the practice of
            law.'" Shaw, 732 A.2d at 883 (quoting Lukas v. Bar Ass'n of Montgomery
            County, 35 Md. App. 442, 448, 371 A.2d 669, 673, cert. denied, 280 Md. 733
            (1977)).

9- Our judicial system has long recognized that the Due Process Clause guarantees more than

fair process. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). In Glucksberg, analyzing

the guarantees of the Due Process Clause, the Court focused on two primary aspects: the

protection of our nation's objective fundamental, historically rooted, rights and liberties; and

the cautious definition of what constitutes a due process liberty interest.

10- The interest affected specifically here is a fundamental liberty interest. Any legal

proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom or newly

devised in the discretion of the legislative power, which regards and preserves these principles

of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law. Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111

U.S. 701, 708 (1884); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884).



                                          SUMMARY

1- Out of state lawyer, Kathleen Lennon of Beveridge and Diamond in Washington D.C., was

not admitted pro hac vice, and she was responsible for Respondents Dow Chemical and Dow

Agrosciences LLC, representation for over a year, telephoning, compiling subpoenas,

submitting Interrogatories and other discovery, and deposing the Petitioner.

                                                                        atsc cusl
2- Out of state Indiana Lawyer Joseph Eaton was admitted pro hac vice to ca“o one

n ”bti e m tn adh rfo pee a“one violating Md. Rules 14,
 y    g    i    e e r    l      l
ol ,us nd oosn t Bi f A plesscus ,”

15, 101, and Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5(b).

3- Out of state Indiana lawyer, Joshua Fleming assisted and wrote the Brief for Appellee-

Respondents Dow Chemical and Dow Agrosciences LLC, signed as “      ,
                                                             counsel”and was not

admitted pro hac vice, and did not apply for pro hac vice.
4- Baltimore, Maryland, attorney Robert Brager worked with all of the lawyers listed above,

and therefore under Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5(b) this rule prohibits a lawyer

from "assisting a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity that

constitutes the unauthorized practice of law." 80 Opinions of the Attorney General_(1995)

5- These attorneys realize they have played fast and loose with the Maryland Rules as their

response to Petitioners Motion to the Court regarding unauthorized practice of law is weak,

incomplete, and contrived. Respondents place blame on the clerks of the court. ( App. G )

                      idn e net O psi tA pln
                       t    p   s
6- The Maryland Rules ce iR sodn “ poi no peatMoo tDs i”
                                     to         i    ms
                                            l s tno i s

are Maryland Rule 14, Maryland Rule 1-311(b) and Maryland Rule 8-402(a). All of these

Maryland Rules have related appendixed rules, that cite to sub-rules that clearly point out that

the out of state attorneys for Dow Chemical, violated the Maryland Rules regarding out of

state lawyers, and lawyers who assist out of state lawyers. ( Appendix G Maryland Rules)



QUESTION TWO:

1- Can a brain injured client with multiple systemic injuries, and serious health complications

e hl oh nwe e o hrtr y
    d e     d       tn
b “e tt ko l g” f eao e?

2- The Court of Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals of Maryland have ignored

                                      h r e o dc i r r n ko l e,n
                                       epvu      sn g d g    d
Maryland precedent, and ruled against t i r i s eiosea i “nweg”ad

statutes of limitations.

3- Petitioner respectfully asks the Court to consider the following: Petitioner has many

n rse t thr uieo c xou s Ptoehsh i ns f chronic
 j i le      t
iu era do em l lt iepsr . etnrat d goio “
              p x     e    ii   ea s

encephalopathy, seizure disorder, migraine, transient ischemic attack ( TIA or small strokes ),

cardiac arrhythmias, cognitive dysfunction, memory deficits, Lupus, Rheumatoid Arthritis,
Scleraderma, Vasculitis, reactive airway disease, fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue, intermittent

blindness, and numerous other ailments that were not present before the toxic chemical

exposures.

4- These illnesses and diseases resulting from the toxic exposures are responsible for

Petitioners difficulty with reasoning, concept, memory, and are the reason Petitioner was

manipulated by legal counsel, whom she trusted and relied upon. Petitioners health

complications also preclude a more cohesive manner of writing or speaking, and was the

subject of sarcasm as written in the Unpublished Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals.

( Appendix A; page 18, ¶ 2)



         I:“
           WHERE IMPORTANT DECISIONS TURN ON QUESTIONS OF FACT,

       DUE PROCESS REQUIRES AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONFRONT AND

                           CROSS EXAMINE ADVERSE WITNESSES”

    oeWe br ’Af ai f o r one , asb i b D w hmc a
        n g     i t
1- R gr i e s“ fdv oFr eC us ” w sumtd y o C e i lt
                      m     l       te          a

 Summary Judgment, and Weinberg states in his affidavit that he knew of the application of

 Dursban. Weinberg omits in his affidavit, that he took no action on any toxic exposures.

2- As stated in Petitioners Affidavit for Summary Judgment, Weinberg omits in affidavit, that

while he was office manager of Birrane Chartered, a firm of only four lawyers, he acquired

the defendant bank that he was suing for the Petitioner, as a client. The fact that this

defendant, Reisterstown Federal Bank, became a client under the aegis of Roger Weinberg,

prompting Weinberg to abruptly abandon his law firm and the Petitioner, should be examined

thoroughly, as this inappropriate, illegal, and unethical behavior and the actions of Roger
Weinberg, are indicative of collusion, deceit, fraud, and are certainly questionable in every

way.

3- 'In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process

requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Goldberg v. Kelly,

397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970). See also ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 93-94

(1913); Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1963). Cf. Sec. 7(c) of the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 556(d).

        Where the ''evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be
        faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice,
        vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealously,'' the individual's right to show that
        it is untrue depends on the rights of confrontation and cross-examination. ''This Court
        has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in
        criminal cases, but also in all types of cases where administrative actions were under
        scrutiny.'' Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959).

4- Reliance on ones attorney for correct and truthful information is an essential and a basic

 right, and that attorney should be conscientious and is genuinely engaged in the

 representation of his client. If ones attorney does not pursue discovery related to a toxic or

 harmful element, and does not inform the client of his decision, exactly how is the client who

                                        n s ec,ups o ae ko l e t ts
                                           i      d         d   ah
 may be injured, and is untrained in lawad c nespoe thv “nweg”ht i

 element could be, or is, injurious? ( Appendix A page 11 ¶ one, App. A page 15, ¶ one )

5- The crux of the matter is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to

 require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a

 matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91

 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., Inc., 879 F.2d 1304,

 1310 (6th Cir. 1989).
 6- It would be judicious and prudent for the Petitioner to be able to question Weinbergs

 motives, his relationship with the former defendant, his lack of action, and what was the

 basis for the breakdown of the attorney –client relationship between he, and the Petitioner,

                                              umt n Af ai f o r one t
                                                  ,    i t   m     l
 and why above all else, he would voluntarily sb ia “ fdv oFr eC us ”o

 the Respondents that implicates him in his breach of fiduciary duty, and in all probability,

 more illegal activities regarding the former defendant that should be fully investigated.

                 In certain types of cases, however, the plaintiff often will not learn of an
        injury, in the ordinary course, until some time after it has been inflicted. In such cases
         t y e en g str i “i ec” yh lnf r h i ot
          m               ne          qr l      g
        i a b m ai l soeu e di ne b t p ii f mt t e f e      e a tf o e m                   h
        unsuspected injury, and inconsistent with legislative intent to allow a period of
        limitation to begin to run (and perhaps to run completely) before the plaintiff is even
        aware of the basic factual predicates for her potential cause of action. It is in such
        situations that this Court has applied the discovery rule. See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122
         m d am l a i )“ a[ e lnf hs enn r if m y e nnw
               c       p cc T            h a tf
        ( ei l a r te( htt p ii]abe iu dnat a b uko n             je         c
        or unknowable until the injury manifests itself; and the facts about causation may be in
        the control of the putative defendant, unavailable to the plaintiff or at least very
          ii lo b i” Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949), U.S. at 170 see
          fc t
        d fu totn )     a .;
        also Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 397 (fraud and concealment).

7- Cases that have recognized a prevailing discovery rule, were decided in two contexts,

a nd es n m d am l a i ,w e h r o s h ]u il e ,Rotella v.
 t s e       c   p cc      e e y ru    l   u t
leti a ad ei l a r te“ hrt c f [ c ar esods”

Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000). See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979); Urie v.

Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).

8- A patients right to be able to rely upon their doctor for accurate, sensitive, and

o pso t di ad nwe esh a t ori e xet ooe tr y
    sn e c          d    e m p   ln     e    ’ tn
cm a i a av e n ko l g it s eye feac epc d fnsao e;

                                                              di i“ udd pn ul
                                                                 c      o
            A clients right to rely upon his or her attorneys av esf ne uo pbc            i
           policy, because the confidential and fiduciary relationship enables an attorney to
           exercise a very strong influence over his client and often affords him opportunities
           to obtain undue advantage by availing himself of the clients necessities, credulity,
            n le l Id
                 b at   y
           adi ri” at 102 ( quoting Hughes v Mcdaniel, 202 Md. 626 ( 1953 )
                 II: THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL PROHIBITS

                                  BO N O N O D
                                  “ L WI GH TA DC L ”

1- The admission of negligence by Weinbergs affidavit should have been addressed by all of

the courts as the exposure to the pesticide Dursban was never included in any Complaint or

legal document before this action. The fact that Weinberg was representing the Petitioner as

legal counsel, theoretically protecting and defending her rights, but then would incriminate

himself in affidavit, was an important obligation of the court to pursue, but was disregarded

   T e otn fu c ls pe p h i l gnf m b wn oad o ,b
        re d i t       o bs ti   o   o g
2- “h dci oj iae opl r itai atr “l i htn cl” yd

taking one position that is accepted by one court and advocating a completely contrary

oi nn nt ror t r o a dat e
  to   h   to y     n  a ”
psi iao ecu , t tgiavn g.Vogel v. Touhey, 151 Md. App. 682, 722

                                                        “
(2003) (citing Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72, 88 (1997)).The purpose of the doctrine is to

r e t iery fh or yt .Id.
 och t i      e t e
p t t en g tot cu ss m”

                                         b wn oad o ”
                                          o g      d
The Maryland Court of Appeals focused on “l i htn cl :

         Middlebrook Tech, LLC v. Moore, 157 Md. App. 40, 62-63 (2004), and also in
         Gordon v. Posner, 142 Md. App. 399, 426- 27, cert. denied, 369 Md. 180 (2002), to
                I o f oe aew r e e tt ur e orsnl i
                 n h h                       fr         e e
         state, “ btot scss ee r doh Sp m C u ’aa s in New              t      ys
         Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750-51, 121 S.Ct. 1208, 1215 (2001), which
          te C u s ae be e t “]e iu stances under which judicial estoppel
           ad         t
         s t : or hv os vdht[h ccmr       a t r
         may appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to any general formulation
          fr c l”
              i p,
         op nie Allen [v. Zurich Ins. Co.], 667 F.2d [1162], []1166 [(CA4 1982)];
         accord, Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 223 (CA4 1996); Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v.
         General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 212 (CA1 1987). [A consideration] is whether
         the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage
         or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped. See Davis [v.
         Wakelee], 156 U.S. [680], []689, 15 S.Ct. 555 [(1895)]; Philadelphia, W., & B.R.
         Co. v. Howard, 13 How. 307, 335-337 (1852); Scarano [v. Central R. Co.], 203 F.2d
                                      j ia s pef b s so“ t i a
                                       u cl t             rd
         [510], []513 [(CA3 1953)] ( d i e oplo i ue fietnl self-      n no
          otd tn. s m as fb in ufrdat e) e l 18
              r co .                        ai        a
         cn aii .aa en ootn g n iavn g” s a o [C.] Wright[,     a ;es
         A. Miller, & E. Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE] § 4477, p.
         782 [(1981)].
3- Weinbergs inconsistency with regards to his knowledge of the Dursban labels, and the fact

that he did not impart this knowledge to his client, the Petitioner, or act upon any of the toxic

xou si otd t yo i Af ai f o r one”
   e s r cr     s i t      m    l
epsr , cn aio th “ fdv oFr eC us .

         In Shaw, 354 Md. 636, 732 A.2d 876, 882 (1999), the court noted that the practice of
         law includes "'utilizing legal education, training, and experience [to apply] the special
         analysis of the profession to a client's problem.'" (quoting Kennedy v. Bar Ass'n of
         Montgomery County, Inc., 316 Md. 646, 662, 561 A.2d 200, 208 (1989)). The Shaw
         court further noted that "the Hallmark of the practicing lawyer is responsibility to
         clients regarding their affairs, whether as advisor, advocate, negotiator, as
         intermediary between clients, or as evaluator by examining a client's legal affairs."
         Shaw, 732 A.2d at 883 (quoting In re Application of R.G.S., 312 Md. 626, 632, 541
         A.2d 977, 980 (1988)).


   III: THE VERY NATURE OF DUE PROCESS NEGATES ANY CONCEPT OF

                                INFLEXIBLE PROCEDURES

1- To hold a severely, and brain injured client to the knowledge of her attorney who engages

in illicit and prohibited activities such as taking on the defendant as a client and then

abandoning her and his law firm is appalling, violating all persons rights to due process, and

violates all disabled persons rights according to the Americans With Disabilities Act, Title II,

cgi e yf co”
   tv  u i
“oni ds ntn that would preclude understanding and perception of the legal process

that she is relying on her attorney to perform for her.

   K o l e cu ob ah vd n st
        d    d     e    e e
2- “ nweg” olnte ci e ul sh attorney acted upon the toxic exposures,

and engaged the client in this action. With specific regards to pesticide poisoning, and Statutes

of Limitations wherein the Plaintiffs were already suspicious, therefore having a certain

m utfko l e that
         d
a ono“nweg” the Petitioner did not have:

        In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Linda Hammond et al. v Terminix
        International Company LP., et al , Civil Case No.: 24-C-04-002664 August 2005,
         B s o t osltne r f m uie hs i w o lnffs
             e        e
        “ a d nh cnuao r o sr m l lpyias hmP ii met
                               ti c d o                 tp        cn             at
        with, it is obvious that Plaintiffs were suspicious and indeed thought the pesticides
          e as gh r m t s ay er e rt tu dt” H w vr h
            e        n es o                        s o e at e
        w rcui t i y p m m n ya bf eh s te a .“ o ee ts                                ,i
        court cannot hold as a matter of law that Plaintiffs had inquiry notice of their claim
        prior to April 5, 2001. See Helenski v Appleton Papers, 952F Supp. 266, 269 ( D. Md
                  “ lnf e up i a osfc nt osten i nte )
                         iis e            cn e
        1997 ) (APa tfm rssiosrntu iet cnt ti u y oc”       fi o          i u qr i

3- Exacerbation of Appellants illness at the time of the Dursban application ( Appendix A

page 15 ¶ two ) is factually, and chronologically, when the furnace was malfunctioning and

being repaired. Appellant, as stated in deposition, did not know a dangerous pesticide with a

l g n vla d io ocui s i hah os ecsn u n et cue
 o      i e sr
“ n ad adt h t y fas g eos el cneunei l i da ” as
                    n ru    t   q    cd g h      d

her to become ill.

4- There were many emergency room and doctor visits by Petitioner at that time, but there was

no record, mention, or suspicion that the application of the pesticide Dursban was responsible

for Petitioners injury. In fact, at that time, Petitioner did not know she was injured by

xou soo n ow esPt oew sh e p nos s m d aoio ( e
   e   xs         i
epsr tt i .Fr ek,etnr at r ietfei “ ei lp i ” i.
                   i    e ci    xt    c  n n .;

yu ed hsad )n qe i n fh x t e f “er i ,
                 tn g e s n       os
“o ne a ubn” ad usoi ot eiec oa nu s”even though the

m r nyo it hw d hs ad tsi nie wt hpcod a.
   g    o ss         c se c s n h         i
e e ec r mv i so e pyi lir snost t i “yohnr”

5- At that time, there was no knowledge of the origin of these sudden and painful symptoms,

no one, not the emergency room doctors, or the Petitioners own personal primary physician

could not attribute these findings to any known cause. All medical reports were eventually and

ultimately related to the carbon monoxide exposure from the malfunctioning furnace and the

                                       r at “nwe e r r n h ew
                                        e    e     d  gdg e
contaminated well water. Eventually, the w shn ko l g”ea i t sto

exposures, only. There are no emergency room or medical reports that mention or ascribe

D r a”o etnr l s h it e etnr m r nyo it ot
   s     i s l s a ni d i s
          i
“ u bn tPt oe i e t t i t Pt oe e e ec r mv i,rh
               n       a    i      g    o ss   e

Respondents would have submitted the medical reports, the emergency room reports, primary

physician reports, neurology reports, cardiology reports, and rheumatology reports to the
record, as they are all in Roger Weinbergs files that Respondents have viewed and copied.

But, there are none to submit.

6- The Courts unrealistic assumption as stated in the Unpublished Opinion that Appellant

o eo nw t ei otsplao oa e id w scua” os of t
         h m    h   ii     ti       l     ih
sm hwke at t e f iapctn f psc e a“as ,dent t e

timeline or the timeline of discovery, and is not backed up by documents relating to

D r a” xou s
   s      e
“ u bn epsr .

    oeWe br ’cosostee l a r i ,r c odt ce i ad
        n g i      iu g    p cc e      y  cn
7- R gr i e satn cnt tl am l ateb ah fu ,oro,n

 eletc h cn i e o t eie e fo odtm ni h a oay i ta
  i   sa
nggnatt totbt t“ e x t c ol s reiet t f tfn k do
           ru d h sn       s    r  n ec      n

                   m cue ”
person resulting fro a as Owens –Illinois v Armstron 87 Md App. at 734 quoting the

restatements (second ) of torts. § 7 (2) ( 1965 )

8- The Maryland Court of Special Appeals has granted learned decisions regarding the

malpractice of attorneys, and the tolling of the statute of limitations due to attorney error. The

a e w aha e t a ere rPt oe : T e r a C u f pc l
 e o      ds a      o
csbl w s erl shn yabf e etnr “h Ma l d oroSei
                         i s
                          i       yn    t    a

Appeals Applies Statute of Limitations To Legal Malpractice Claim Based On Negligent

 el et
  te .
St m n”

        In Supik v. Bodie, Nagle, Dolina, Smith & Hobbs, P.A., No. 1697, Sept. Term, 2002
        (Md. App. Oct. 29, 2003), the Court noted that under the "continuation of events"
         h r “vnf e lnf hd utn a iuy r ro p l,97t
          ey             t a tf
        t o ,ee i h p iis a ss i d nn rp otA r 119, e
                                              ae          j       i         i          h
        question whether the statute was tolled is an issue for a jury to decide. As the Court of
                                            “ lni ntdo eee l ew o a ‘
                                                 i s i       l
        Appeals noted in Frederick Road,Acet et e tblv aa yr h s sI    i       w           y
        am your lawyer, why not trust me, I am a lawyer, I would not do anything that is
          r .
            n”
        wog 360 Md. at 101 (citation omitted) In (Frederick Road Ltd. Partnership v.
        Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 93-94, 756 A.2d 963, 972-73 (2000), ) The Court
        emphasized that the discovery rule generally requires factual determinations that are
        inappropriate for resolution by summary judgment. The Court stated, id. at 95-96: “
        Recognizing the unfairness inherent in charging a plaintiff with slumbering on his
        rights where it was not reasonably possible to have obtained notice of the nature and
        cause of an injury, this Court has adopted the discovery rule to determine the date of
        accrual [of a cause of action]. Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 186-187, 100 A. 83,
        85-86 (1917).  ”
9- Inasmuch as the Due Process Clause protects against arbitrary deprivation of ''property,''

privileges not constituting property are not entitled to protection. Because an existing right of

action to recover damages for an injury is property, that right of action is protected by the

clause. Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul, M. & D. Ry., 151 U.S. 1 (1894).

10- The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced

by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss,' . . . and depends upon

whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in

summary adjudication. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970), (quoting Joint Anti-

Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Justice Frankfurter

concurring).

11- The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally

applicable to every imaginable situation.'' Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy,

367 U.S. 886, 894-95 (1961). In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36

(1982 ''Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but

from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property. ''Carey v. Piphus, 435

U.S. 247, 259 (1978).



                    H P ’ “ E A L I D N O U N ”T E A E
               IV: T EE AS L G L YBN I GD C ME T , H L B L

1- As Petitioners lawyer J. Edward Martin, in Summary Judgment insisted upon including,

    ee pnh bn oD r a b t ni n et Po co A ec,n ts o t
     ld    e       s    e r       a ti          i n
and ri uo t “a” f u bn yh E v om n l r etn gnyadh pi

was contemptuously dismissed as not having a precedent, it should be clarified that the label

n l e idsr e l b d g ou et adh tsbn w s etnd
   l ti e g l n n        s    ah          i
o a psc ea l ay i i dcm n ,n t t i“a” am noe in Dr.

 r Ze ’ y 03e r
  c m         pt
Gae i sMa 20 r o . Petitioners attorney Edward Martin, discovered due to Dr.
 i r r t t u bn aa m j cua a o ad e s h P
  m p th    s          o   l cr         d e
Ze seo , aD r a w s “ a ras f t ,” n h ue t E Aban mentioned

in her report, as evidence that the general population would or should be warned from that

date on.

2- As the label of the pesticide Dursban that was applied to Petitioners rental property stated

that this pesticide is an EPA approved pesticide, even the applicators would in all probability,

mistakenly believe they will not be harmed. Most people still trust the government to do

w ais
“ ht in the best interest for the citizens of the United States”most notably regarding food
                                                               ,

and chemicals.

3- Chlorpyrifos's ( Dursban ) neurotoxicity led to its EPA sanctioned 2000 ban from

numerous residential uses, including termite suppression and use in pet collars. Nevertheless,

it is still widely used for many nonresidential purposes, including pest control for turf and

ornamental plants. It may be used indoors in warehouses, ship holds, boxcars, factories, and

food processing plants, or as containerized pesticide baits in child-resistant packages.

Currently, about 800 registered products contain this compound. This continuing usage would

negate the argument by Dow and the Court that Petitioner can not utilize the ban of Dursban

by the EPA. ( Appendix A page 5 ¶ two ) And, the press release makes this ban on Dursban,

public knowledge. Petitioner can cite to press releases.

4- An evaluation was done as a part of the Agricultural Health Study, which is supported by

the National Cancer Institute ( NCI ), the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences,

(NIEHS ) and the Environmental Protection Agency ( EPA ) in collaboration with the

University of Iowa and Battelle. Won Jin Lee, a visiting fellow in the NCI Occupational and

Environmental Epidemiology Branch, and his team evaluated the incidence of cancer among a

cohort of 54,383 licensed pesticide applicators in Iowa and North Carolina. They assessed the
association between chlorpyrifos ( Dursban ) exposure and cancer incidence after adjusting for

known or suspected confounding factors. Study subjects were recruited between 1993 and

1997 and followed for an average of 6.4 years.

                About 3.8% of the applicators developed malignant lung neoplasms. The
        researchers found a statistically significant exposure-response relationship between
        increasing chlorpyrifos exposure and lung cancer, but not for any other cancer
        examined. The most frequent users of chlorpyrifos had a relative risk of lung cancer of
        about twice that of nonusers, an association that could not be explained by smoking,
        previous lung disease, other occupational exposures, or type of farming operation. The
        results were published in the 1 December 2004 issue of the Journal of the National
        Cancer Institute.

5- Since 1975, the EPA has had an interagency agreement (IAG) with the USDA to distribute

funds to the state cooperative extension service for the purpose of training restricted use

pesticide applicators.

                    oe i t t s pla rhv seic ko l e adrn g
                      az a h e i o       f      d    ai
6- It is imperative tr leht e apct s aepci“nweg” n tin

s c t i r npopa e idsn o enu l c l i bn “ sie ue
 s ad h g      e ti     h   o g ay s i e rt
a oie wto aohshtpsc ead t rer oi l d alg r tc d s”

pesticides. Will these applicators have to succumb to the archaic notion and injudicious

 elao fko l e w e t r i aeya f o i sn pla rhy n
  a tn     d       e az t   s   kg     i ot
dc ri o“nweg” hnhyele fr erow r n aa apct , e ad

their families have been injured by a product they were trained to use, and have detailed

ko l eoand,
    d
“nweg”f this product had an EPA approved label ? The applicators, as the

Petitioners attorney did, should be able to cite to the EPA regulatory power as a source.

7- In American Farm Bureau, et. Al. v United States Environmental Protection Agency , et.

al., it was noted that a pesticide cannot be registered unless the EPA, after substantial testing,

determines that "it will not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects in the environment."

7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(D). The process for registering a pesticide is described in the Federal

Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, (FIFRA) and EPA regulations at 7 U.S.C. § 136a

and 40 C.F.R. §§ 152 and 158.
8- The Food Quality Protection Act significantly amended both FIFRA and the Federal Food

Drug and Cosmetic Act by increasing the number of factors that the EPA must consider in

establishing a tolerance or exemption, including "aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical

residue" from "all anticipated dietary exposures and all other exposures for which there is

reliable information" and the cumulative effects of substances that have a "common

mechanism of toxicity." 21 U.S.C. § 346(b)(2)(A)(ii). Furthermore, the EPA must use "an

additional tenfold margin of safety" when applying the standard to children and infants.

21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C)(ii)(II)

9- While it is entirely possible, though not likely, that EPA could prove after discovery, that

its science policies do not qualify as final agency action or are not binding rules at the 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss stage, the court is required to "accept as true all well-pleaded factual

allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs." Fitts, 44 F. Supp.2d at

321 (D.D.C. 1999).

                  y e id icni r tb a l ay i i dcm n n E A s
                     ti     de       e l nn
10- The label of an psc esos e do e “ gl b d g ou et ad P i
                                                   ,”

the enforcement agency for pesticide label laws. Before a chemical may be used as a pesticide

in the United States, it must be registered by the United States Environmental Protection

Agency under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).

11- The foundation of pesticide registration is the label. A U.S. EPA approved label signifies

to the user that the pesticide is registered for use in the United States. The pesticide label is a

legally binding document. The information and instructions on the label are based on

extensive scientific research. Information gathered through this research has been carefully

crafted into the label which you must follow if you are to use the pesticide safely and

effectively.
12- If you fail to obey label instructions, you are violating the Federal law and you may be

subject to severe legal penalties. Petitioners position is that if one can be federally prosecuted

under an EPA label law, then one can cite to this same law and regulatory power as a source .

13- Respondents vociferous complaints against the Petitioner regarding her lawyers use of the

 P bn o D r a icn a o ht e t s vs
          s      ry     h e l ,
E A“a” n u bnsotrtw at yhm e e have used as grounds to prevent

injured parties to seek damages : In Ashley Arnold et. al., Minors, ect. et. el., v The Dow

Chemical Company et. al., a Los Angeles Court of Appeals will allow consumers to sue pest

control companies that use EPA approved pesticides. Dow Chemical and other heavy-hitting

chemical companies argued that EPA approval of the pesticides prevented consumers from

seeking damages under state law.

                     cos yh e net a b cnt e a“l i oad o .
                      i    e p    s       r    o g      d
14- These ambiguous atn b t R sodn cn e osud sb wn htn cl”

Vogel v. Touhey, 151 Md. App. 682, 722 (2003) (citing Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72, 88

(1997)

                                          SUMMARY

    oeWe br su ed cvr t a l o h e id “ u bnin
        n g   r s e e b s r e ti        s
1- R gr i e Eqi,i oe dh l e f t psc e D r a” the defendant

Reisterstown Federal Banks files, but took no action at all regarding not only the Dursban, but

also the carbon monoxide from the malfunctioning furnace, and the contaminated well water.

2- Roger Weinberg is responsible for acquiring the defendant Reisterstown Federal Bank, as a

client, then abruptly abandoning the Petitioner, and his law firm, Birrane Chartered.

    sD r a” anvr c ddn n C m ln l acus oo n
        s         nu           a te    l lw g i e
                                                n g
3- A “ u bn w s eei l e iay o p i, glonef l i We br

 ol ohv “nwe e ot Pt oe xou oh t i e id.
   d         d    h i s
                      i     e a o c ti
w u ntae ko l g” f e etnrepsrtt t x psc e
4- Petitioners attorney, J. Edward Martin Esquire, was alerted to the injurious qualities of

Dursban only after reading Dr. Ziems 2003 report. It was Edward Martins idea to utilize the

 P ’regulatory power and bn n u bnaaepi f “i oe ”
E As                            s      t no s y
                          a o D r a s s o t rd cvr .



                      REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

O ef e
     h
“ n ot most fundamental rights is the right of aggrieved persons to seek legal redress in

the courts for wrongful injury. The great Chief Justice John Marshall viewed this right as the

cornerstone of the civil justice system:

 T e e s ne filb t
      y s     v ley
“ h vre ec o c ii r certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim

the protection of laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government

so f r h p t i .
   f d a o co ”Madbury v Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch ) 137, 163 ( 1803 )
ita o t tr etn

        This case presents an excellent vehicle to resolve the issues presented.




                                           CONCLUSION



The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.



Respectfully submitted,



__________________________________
date: ______________________________
                               No. _______________________


                              ____________________________


                                            IN THE
                      SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                            _______________________________


                             Sharon V. Galloway - PETITIONER


                                                V


  Johnson Metropolitan Termite and Pest Control Company, Inc., et al RESPONDENT(S)


                                    PROOF OF SERVICE
I, __________________________________ do swear or declare that on this date,
_________________________ 20____ as required by Supreme Court Rule 29 I have served
the enclosed MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS and
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI on each party to the above proceeding or that
 ay one ad n vr t re o r ido ee e,y eoi g n ne p
  ts   l       y h
pr ’cus ,n o ee o epr neu e tb s vdb dpsi a evl e
                    s qr        r       tn    o
containing the above documents in the United States mail properly addressed to each of them
and with first class postage prepaid, or by delivery to a third party commercial carrier for
delivery within 3 calendar days.
                          The names and address of those served are:


Robert Brager Esquire and Laura McAfee Esquire, Beveridge & Diamond, P.C., 201 North
Charles Street, Suite 2210, Baltimore, Maryland 21201-4150, Attorneys for The Dow
Chemical Company and Dow Agrosciences LLC,
                                               And
Weems Duvall Jr. P.A., 2520 Mountain Road Pasadena Maryland 21122 Attorney for
Johnson Metropolitan Termite and Pest Control Company, Inc.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on ______________________________ 20______


                                                          _______________________________
                                                                             Sharon V. Galloway
                                                                                       Petitioner




I hereby certify the font used in this petition is Times New Roman size 12, proportionally
spaced as per Rule 33.1




                                                            _____________________________
                                                                             Sharon V. Galloway
                                                                                Petitioner Pro Se
                                                                        5634 Mount Gilead Road
                                                                  Reisterstown, Maryland 21136
                                                                                  410-833-5588
                 No. _______________________


                           IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
               _______________________________


              Sharon V. Galloway            Petitioner


                                 v


 Johnson Metropolitan Termite and Pest Control Company, Inc., et al
                                            Respondents
               _______________________________


       ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
            THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND
               _______________________________


                           APPENDIX
               _______________________________


                       Sharon V. Galloway,
                         Petitioner, pro se
                     5634 Mount Gilead Road
                     Reisterstown, MD. 21136
                           410-833-5588

								
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