Trust and Motivation

							Trust in Motivated Agents
Can you trust the good guys?




Sebastian Fehrler, University of Zurich
Michael Kosfeld, Goethe-University Frankfurt
Bad Homburg, May 7, 2010
Motivation

• Many agents care for the outcome of their work
  besides the monetary benefits they receive.
• Doctors are committed to saving lives, teachers
  to educating children, development workers to
  fighting poverty, …
• Workers are “motivated”, they have a “mission”.
  Besley/Ghatak 05, Prendergast 07, Delfgaauw/Dur 08, Francois 07, …



• What is the impact on explicit incentives?
  (companion paper)


                           Motivated Agents - May 2010
Motivation

• Here: What is the impact on trust and
  trustworthiness?
• Are motivated agents more trustworthy?
• Do others trust motivated agents more?

• Social esteem plays an important role in human
  behavior (particularly, pro-social behavior).
  Benabou/Tirole 06, Falk/Kosfeld 06, Ellingsen/Johannesson 08, …

• Humans seem to discriminate between a “good”
  and a “bad audience”.
• Motivated agents may be a particularly good
  audience  higher trustworthiness.
                            Motivated Agents - May 2010
Experiment

• Laboratory experiment at the University of ZH.
• One-shot trust game.
• Half of the subjects investors, other half trustees.
• Both parties receive 12 points.
• Investor can transfer 0, 4, 8, or 12 points to
  trustee.
• Transfer is tripled.
• Trustee can return any available amount back to
  the investor.
• Strategy method.

                     Motivated Agents - May 2010
Experiment




             Motivated Agents - May 2010
Experiment

• Before the experiment, all subjects answer a
  questionnaire.
  Do you do sports?
  Are you a fan of a particular soccer team in Zurich?
  Do you play an instrument?
  Do you very much like the painters Paul Klee or Wassily Kandinsky?
  Do you strongly identify with the goals of the NGOs WWF or Amnesty International?
  …




                               Motivated Agents - May 2010
Experiment

• Before the experiment, all subjects answer a
  questionnaire.
  Do you do sports?
  Are you a fan of a particular soccer team in Zurich?
  Do you play an instrument?
  Do you very much like the painters Paul Klee or Wassily Kandinsky?
  Do you strongly identify with the goals of the NGOs WWF or Amnesty International?
  …

• Mission treatment: Subjects can make their
  decision contingent on the opponent´s answer to
  the NGO question (156 subjects).




                               Motivated Agents - May 2010
Experiment

• Before the experiment, all subjects answer a
  questionnaire.
  Do you do sports?
  Are you a fan of a particular soccer team in Zurich?
  Do you play an instrument?
  Do you very much like the painters Paul Klee or Wassily Kandinsky?
  Do you strongly identify with the goals of the NGOs WWF or Amnesty International?
  …

• Mission treatment: Subjects can make their
  decision contingent on the opponent´s answer to
  the NGO question (156 subjects).
• Control treatment: Subjects can make their
  decision contingent on the artist question (134
  subjects).
                               Motivated Agents - May 2010
Results

• Mission   treatment
  – 32%     identify with WWF
  – 26%     identify with AI
  – 42%     do not identify with any NGO

• Control   treatment
   – 29%    like Klee
   – 22%    like Kandinsky
   – 49%    do not like any of the painters


                      Motivated Agents - May 2010
Result 1: Beliefs

• Subjects believe that motivated agents are more
  trustworthy (holds for all types).




                   Motivated Agents - May 2010
Result 2: Trust

• All subjects trust motivated agents more.

Transfer          To WWF type             To AI type        To No type
From WWF type           8.3                           7.9       4.6
From AI type            7.1                           8.3       4.6
From No type            6.8                           7.6       5.9


Transfer          To Klee type            To K’ski type     To No type
From Klee type         8.6                            6.6       6.4
From K’ski type        7.6                            8.8       6.7
From No type           6.3                            6.2       8.3


                        Motivated Agents - May 2010
Result 3: Trustworthiness

• Motivated agents are generally more trustworthy.




                   Motivated Agents - May 2010
Result 4: Trustworthiness

• Motivated agents discriminate, non-motivated
  don’t.




                   Motivated Agents - May 2010
Result 4: Trustworthiness

• No such discrimination in the control treatment.




                    Motivated Agents - May 2010
Result 4: Trustworthiness

• In our setting, discrimination is driven by
  negative discrimination against non-motivated
  agents (outgroup members).

 No ingroup favoratism, which seems to drive
 behavior in minimal group experiments
 (Yamagishi et al. 99).




                   Motivated Agents - May 2010
Summary

• Motivated agents are more trustworthy.
• Subjects anticipate this and trust motivated
  agents more.
• Motivated agents discriminate strongly against
  trustors who do not share their motivation.
• Discrimination is purely negative.
• Non-motivated agents do not discriminate.

 Concern for social esteem is type dependent.
 If motivated agents come together (like in NGOs),
  incomplete contracts may be optimal.
                   Motivated Agents - May 2010