Department of the Army

							                                  Department of the Army
                                   369th Engineer Platoon (FF)
                                         1625 Berks Rd.
                                   Norristown, Pa 19403-4815

                                                                                        2 DEC 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT; After Deployment Review

1. The following is a review of the items that have to be addressed for Firefighting units deploying
to a theater of operations.

          a. Mission Statement. Units need a more descriptive mission statement, such as size of
area of responsibility, No# of base camps if possible No# of troops per camp, or a Point of Contact
early on so this information can be acquired to properly prepare for movement to theater.

          b. Contracted Fire Protection. This unit was ready to deploy down range and sat in
Germany waiting for the Call Forward from 14 Jan 96 to 4 Feb. 96 waiting to go, Leaving the early
on theater without fire protection. I understand that the contract for Brown and Root wasn’t signed
until 24 Jan 96, while we were sitting in Germany waiting to come down. This was an unnecessary
contract for $ 258,000 that could have been saved, had we been deployed earlier.

          1. Special items need to be addressed, Such as Contracting of Fire Protection Services.
To have a contractor perform firefighting and protection is not authorized in AR 420-90. We ran
into the problem of the contracted fire chief fearing for his job and he had Bosnian firefighters
doing unauthorized details when they should have been training or working on their equipment. At
one point he was trying to get the Army personnel off Tuzla Main because we were doing all the
fire inspections and assisting units with Fire Extinguisher training.
          2. His Qualifications were questioned even by the Bosnian Firefighters, because he kept
making basic mistakes about firefighting procedures. At one point, we started taking the Bosnian
Firefighters with us on Fire Inspection of the tent cities and buildings were they were allowed in.
          3. The contractor failed to renew the contract the UN had for the fire truck the Bosnians
used when we arrived. The owner tried to retrieve his equipment around the end of Feb. 96 and
had to go to court so they were forced to release the fire truck to the owner. The owner had offered
to contract them a new Fire Truck but B&R refused. Brown and Root gave the Bosnian firefighters
a 2000 gallon water tanker and told them that was their Fire Truck. On a number of occasions this
tanker was pulled from the fire house and used by the contractor for other than firefighting duties,
thus not supplying any fire protection at all.
          4. The 1st AD Chief of Staff directed our Commander to leave a Army firefighting team
at Tuzla Main, because of language problems when reporting fires and Response time to
emergencies and not being properly equipped. The contracted fire chief tried to have the Army
Fire equipment transferred to him and get rid of the Army firefighters, When this didn’t work he
tried a smear campaign to discredit the Army firefighters, because we were becoming well known
for helping units solve fire safety problems and training the troops. The contracted fire chief was
told by his boss that he was not to leave base, His favorite saying when asked about fire
inspections and training was ‘It’s not in my job description”. This became a concern and was
addressed, because he was not providing any of the requirements set forth in AR 420 -90.
          5. Prior to our unit leaving the theater of operations, He made a comment that when he
gets back from R&R, that he would not allow any Army firefighters to stay at the Tuzla Fire
station, meaning the unit that was to replace us. He also said “ I’ve sat on my ass for six (6)
month’s, when I get back from R&R Katy Bar the doors” He would brag to the Army firemen that
he got $ 54,000 for sitting on his ass.
          6. The interpreter he hired was hired for looks, not ability because there were 5 or 6
Bosnian firefighters that spoke English better than she did, than he would get pissed off if Any
American troops would talk to her. This kind of problems are not conducive to a good working
place and it would be better to deploy army assets earlier than get ripped off.
         c. Fire Teams The number of individual Fire Teams assigned to the Theater of
operations was insufficient as noted by numerous CCIR’s from BCCA, additional teams were
requested and ended up with less personnel on the following rotations. Mutual Aid agreements
were established with Air Force personnel to help each other and an intensive training program
was set up with Base Camp Mayors to train the troops in fire prevention and using fire
extinguishers.

           d. We developed a portable fire pump and used it on two occasions, (1) a vehicle fire
(Susv) and (2) a Brush Fire ( Mt. Vis) and also loaned it to assist Aviation units with washing out
engine compartments after maintenance was performed. The pump used was a fuel transfer pump
from the Forward Area Refueling Kit ( F.A.R.E. ) although used for refueling, the main difference
is the impeller are made of non ferrous metals ( Brass and Aluminum) to prevent explosion.
Lubrication was by Grease fittings at end housings. The prototype made at Tuzla Fire was used
approx. 300 Hours with no break downs. Prior to leaving Theater we assembled 12 of 14, 1000
litter tanks with the needed plumbing and all the replacement unit had to do was plug pump into it
when they arrived from PBO’s office. Training and maintenance requirements were taught to
incoming NCOIC and other team members to ensure proper care and use. Training for base camp
use had to be left to incoming unit because they would be doing the hand-off to base camps. All
information on training and distribution was given to new fire team NCOIC as where all Portable
Pumps go.

          e. Fire Extinguishers. A supply of fire extinguishers needs to fed to the Fire Dept., for
replacement or refilling. One problem was getting Dry Chemical Fire extinguishers filled. A
contract was set up with Brown and Root to refill extinguishers. At one point we had 150 and had
to call just about every day before they picked them up around Mid May and still were not back
when we left at the end of July. ( See Logistics after action )


          f. Fire Equipment. The fire equipment is a problem for most units because of the
situation with replacement parts. This unit was better off because, myself and another firefighter
are mechanics, and I went to the DS, GS Maintenance course in Ft Campbell, Ky. We were able to
maintain our equipment with the help USAREUR Fire Protection with getting repair parts out of
Special Cannibalization points in Germany. The equipment is obsolete and the manufacturer is no
longer in business to supply parts. We brought a basic load with us as far as services and some
repairs. The units that follow on may not be as lucky as we were because the fire trucks are not
something every mechanic gets to work on, because of their multiple rolls and functions.

          g. Fire Protective Clothing. The fire gear used by firefighter is special and a lot of
MACOM’s don’t realize that the fire units can’t train properly if the don’t have this equipment. We
were asked by the Commander of the 376th Eng. Plt., if we were leaving our Bunker Gear           (
Fire Gear ), because they haven’t had any for two (2) years, their MACOM had it unfunded. This
totally shocked me, because you need this equipment to train with. If a unit doesn’t have the
equipment, how can it prepare to do it’s mission?

          h. Redeployment. When units redeploy and leave their equipment in theater for the next
unit, they are transferred equipment from the new unit. We found that some units equipment is not
properly maintained or sheltered IAW FORSCOM directive. Just about everything we received
from the 376th Eng Plt had to have major repairs and all breathing apparatus had to be updated
IAW NFPA & IFSTA standards. All air tanks had to be hydrostatic tested to insure safe use. It is
not known when a Fire Pump Certification was done. M1025’s & Tanker Trucks did no have
current Emergency lights or sirens IAW NFPA, IFSTA. AR 420-90, AR 420-18.

2. Command Structure: This Fire Headquarters reported directly to the Theater Commander.
This provides a theater wide Fire Protection Policy. The Fire teams report problems to the Fire
Team Headquarters, This way they can keep the Theater Commander up to date as to his risk
assessment problems. When a Fire team is assigned to a Battalion element, they have a tendency to
pressure the team leader about reporting problems to the higher commands. In Bosnia the teams
reported directly to the area Fire Chief, If he couldn’t solve the problem, it would be addressed to
the Fire Headquarters for assistance. If it couldn’t be solved there, It would go to BG O’neal
ADC-S and he would solve the problem. One instance was a Camp Mayor ( A Major ) didn’t want
anything reported to Fire HQ because he felt the fire team there belonged to him. He was corrected
by BG O’neal, as to whom the Fire Dept. works for. That was the end of the problem. In most
cases, we received very good marks from the Camp Mayors, because when we found problems, we
didn’t just write them up and leave, we helped to solve them. ( Fire extinguishers, hazmat disposal
problems and would give them points of contact of the right people who could help them)
This way units would not try to hide problems, but address them to us for help.

3. Commander / Fire Marshall: The rank structure needs to be changed to reflect at minimum a
Captain, because of working with senior officers ( Col, BG, etc. ). A 1st LT. doesn’t have the
experience or the skills and is easily bullied into doing things if senior officers don’t like the
reports. ( if they don’t like policy, the try and change it by bulling the Commander ) In Bosnia, we
were lucky, because our Commander was a Senior Captain, and he knew how to deal with and to
work with senior officers who didn’t always like the Fire Protection Policy. If they tried to ignore
him or his NCO’s, he could always take the problem to BG O’neal (ADC-S ), He was the
approving authority for the Fire Protection Program. We had an 0-6 Commander come to the Tuzla
station wanting to know what thought process went into the Task Force Fire Policy. After
explaining to him what Fire Load, Fire Flow and Fire Suppression were and how it would affect
his camp, he left the station happy to comply and was please to know there was a lot of thought
went into it’s development.

4. Fire Chief: The Fire Chief needed to be SFC E-7 because of the experience required for the
position. He has to oversee operations, Coordinate support, Assist Commander in developing a
Fire Protection Policy, Mutual Aid agreements. Training programs, establishes workload
schedules, etc. This is critical to providing the best Fire Protection available to the Theater
Commander.

5. Fire Team Leaders; The fire team leader needs to SSG E-6, Because they not only have the
experience with fighting fires, but they have learned how to better deal with people. When the
teams are split up in theater of operations, The fire team leader may be required to attend meetings
in his Area of operations. A E-5 SGT doesn’t have the rank clout or the experience needed to
explain policy or pass on directives

6. Fire Team SGT: The fire team SGT is responsible for his men, he has to maintain their training
level, Maintains readiness of the fire equipment, In charge of station operations when the team
leader is out of the area. Ensures the health and welfare of his team.

7. Fire Protection Program; The Fire Protection Program is Theater Unique. What I mean is, it
doesn’t matter if your in Bosnia or anywhere else, you can not effectively apply NFPA and Life
Safety Code requirements to an area where construction and conditions are totally different from
the United States. This means a program had to be developed from NFPA, Life Safety Codes and
USAREUR Req 385-15 and Common sense to come up with aggressive Fire safety Plan. The
Force Provider Tentage setup at the base camps did not in any stretch of the imagination meet the
requirements in USAREUR reg 385-15. This Has to be looked at for future deployments. Most
tents were approx. 4 ft apart, a fire in there could be catastrophic on a windy night, or in the event
hostilities break out, one lucky incoming round would be devastating.

7. If there are any questions regarding the above, please feel free to contact me at Coml. (610)
584-1290.



                                                        CHARLES CREGO
                                                        SFC EN USAR
                                                        369th Eng. Plt. (FF)