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Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance
s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s ,
Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s ,          300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334)
2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made
b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r .




        ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
                                           OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012



                                                              2101127


                                                    Lindsey M i t c h e l l

                                                                    v.

       John Brent Thornley, as a d m i n i s t r a t o r ad l i t e m f o r the
                         e s t a t e o f Fred Webb

                                 Appeal from Walker C i r c u i t                                Court
                                          (CV-07-900237)


BRYAN, J u d g e .

           This        a c t i o n a r i s e s from a t h r e e - c a r                          automobile                 accident

o c c u r r i n g on S e p t e m b e r 27, 2005, i n v o l v i n g L i n d s e y                                         Mitchell,

Fred        Webb, a n d C r y s t a l F i e l d s Day.                                  I n May 2007, Webb                           died
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from      causes        unrelated          to      the    automobile          accident.            On

S e p t e m b e r 2 1 , 2007, M i t c h e l l      filed      a complaint         against       Webb

and     Day, a l l e g i n g c l a i m s    of "negligence             and/or     wantonness."

When M i t c h e l l a t t e m p t e d t o have Webb s e r v e d ,           t h e summons a n d

complaint         were     returned         with       a notification          that     Webb was

deceased.            Although        Webb       died     before        Mitchell       filed      her

complaint,         M i t c h e l l ' s c l a i m s s u r v i v e d a g a i n s t Webb's p e r s o n a l

representative.              See N e l s o n v . E s t a t e o f F r e d e r i c k , 855 So. 2d

1043,     1047 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) ( " P e r s o n a l - i n j u r y   c l a i m s upon w h i c h no

action         has      been       filed        survive          against        the       personal

r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f a d e c e a s e d t o r t f e a s o r , so l o n g a s t h e c l a i m

i s n o t o f an e q u i t a b l e n a t u r e .       § 6-5-462, A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 . " ) .

On A p r i l     13, 2009, more t h a n a y e a r a n d a h a l f a f t e r                  filing

the     complaint,        Mitchell         filed    a motion i n the t r i a l           court t o

appoint        an a d m i n i s t r a t o r a d l i t e m f o r Webb's e s t a t e " t o s e r v e

as t h e p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e " o f Webb's e s t a t e " f o r p u r p o s e s

of    this      lawsuit."           On     October       19, 2009,          the t r i a l      court

appointed         John B r e n t T h o r n l e y as t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r ad l i t e m o f

Webb's e s t a t e .

        Thornley,        as t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r a d l i t e m o f Webb's e s t a t e ,

moved f o r a summary j u d g m e n t , a s s e r t i n g , among o t h e r                 things,


                                                   2
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t h a t M i t c h e l l ' s a c t i o n i s b a r r e d by t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e o f

limitations.          M i t c h e l l f i l e d a r e s p o n s e t o T h o r n l e y ' s summary-

judgment motion, a s s e r t i n g t h a t h e r a c t i o n i s not t i m e - b a r r e d .

On M a r c h 8, 2 0 1 1 , t h e t r i a l       court entered           a summary j u d g m e n t

in    Thornley's         favor,      concluding          that    M i t c h e l l ' s claims     are

time-barred.            The t r i a l   c o u r t a p p e a r s t o have a p p l i e d a t w o -

year l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d t o both the negligence                  c l a i m and t h e

wantonness         claim.

        Mitchell       a p p e a l e d t o t h e supreme         court,     a n d t h e supreme

c o u r t t r a n s f e r r e d t h e a p p e a l t o t h i s c o u r t , p u r s u a n t t o § 12-

2 - 7 ( 6 ) , A l a . Code 1975. B e c a u s e M i t c h e l l ' s c l a i m s a g a i n s t Day

remained pending i n the t r i a l                    court    and t h e t r i a l    c o u r t had

not     certified         the     summary        judgment         as    a    final       judgment

p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., t h e summary j u d g m e n t

was    not a f i n a l ,       appealable         judgment.            See Edmonds          Indus.

Coating,       I n c . v . L o l l e y , 863 So. 2d 1121, 1122 ( A l a . C i v . App.

2003) ( s t a t i n g     that     an a p p e a l      ordinarily        lies     only     from     a

final     judgment        and t h a t      a judgment           i s generally         not      final

unless       a l l claims,         or    the      rights        or     liabilities        of     a l l

parties,       have b e e n d e c i d e d ) .         Thus, we r e i n v e s t e d t h e t r i a l

court with        jurisdiction          f o r 14 d a y s f o r t h a t c o u r t e i t h e r t o


                                                  3
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certify       t h e summary j u d g m e n t as a f i n a l                judgment under R u l e

54(b)     or t o adjudicate                the claims            against        Day.       The     trial

court subsequently                c e r t i f i e d t h e summary j u d g m e n t a s a            final

judgment under R u l e 5 4 ( b ) .                This appeal           does n o t c o n c e r n t h e

c l a i m s a g a i n s t Day.

                 "Summary j u d g m e n t i s a p p r o p r i a t e   only     when
        ' t h e r e i s no g e n u i n e i s s u e as t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t
        and ... t h e m o v i n g p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o a j u d g m e n t
        as a m a t t e r o f l a w . ' R u l e 5 6 ( c ) ( 3 ) , A l a . R. C i v .
        P., a n d Dobbs v. S h e l b y C o u n t y E c o n . & I n d u s . Dev.
        A u t h . , 749 So. 2d 425 ( A l a . 1 9 9 9 ) . . . .      In reviewing
        a summary j u d g m e n t , an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t , de n o v o ,
        a p p l i e s t h e same s t a n d a r d     as t h e t r i a l      court.
        Dobbs, s u p r a . "

Bruce v. C o l e ,         854 So. 2d 47, 54 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) .

        I n i t i a l l y , we a d d r e s s w h e t h e r T h o r n l e y ,   the administrator

ad   litem      o f Webb's e s t a t e , was a c t u a l l y made a d e f e n d a n t i n

this     case.         As n o t e d ,      Webb,         the alleged           tortfeasor,          died

before      Mitchell          commenced          this     action.         Any p e r s o n a l - i n j u r y

claims       that      Mitchell          may     have       had a g a i n s t      Webb      survived

against       Webb's p e r s o n a l        representative.                Mitchell        moved t h e

trial     court t o appoint              an a d m i n i s t r a t o r a d l i t e m t o s e r v e a s

the p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n t h i s case,          and t h e t r i a l     court

appointed        Thornley        i n that capacity.                However, M i t c h e l l       never

amended h e r c o m p l a i n t          t o add Thornley,               the proper party i n



                                                     4
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interest,        as a defendant.

        Thornley argues              t h a t M i t c h e l l was r e q u i r e d t o amend h e r

c o m p l a i n t t o add T h o r n l e y as a defendant a f t e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t

a p p o i n t e d h i m as a d m i n i s t r a t o r   ad l i t e m .      Thornley        contends

that     Webb      remains         the nominal            defendant.           Thus,       Thornley

contends, w i t h r e s p e c t t o M i t c h e l l ' s         c l a i m s c o n c e r n i n g Webb,

there       i s no      proper        defendant          i n this        case.       Conversely,

M i t c h e l l a r g u e s t h a t , when t h e t r i a l     court appointed Thornley

as     administrator            ad     litem,       he    was      automatically             made      a

defendant i n t h i s case.                Thus, M i t c h e l l c o n t e n d s , she was n o t

required         to     amend        her    complaint          to       add    Thornley         as     a

defendant.

        T h o r n l e y was a p p o i n t e d a d m i n i s t r a t o r a d l i t e m p u r s u a n t t o

§ 43-2-250, A l a . Code 1975, w h i c h p r o v i d e s :

                 "When, i n a n y p r o c e e d i n g i n a n y c o u r t , t h e
       e s t a t e o f a d e c e a s e d p e r s o n must be r e p r e s e n t e d , a n d
       there         i s no e x e c u t o r o r a d m i n i s t r a t o r o f s u c h
       e s t a t e , o r he i s i n t e r e s t e d a d v e r s e l y t h e r e t o , i t
       s h a l l be t h e d u t y o f t h e c o u r t t o a p p o i n t an
       a d m i n i s t r a t o r ad l i t e m o f such e s t a t e            f o r the
       p a r t i c u l a r p r o c e e d i n g , w i t h o u t b o n d , whenever t h e
       f a c t s r e n d e r i n g such appointment n e c e s s a r y s h a l l
       a p p e a r i n t h e r e c o r d o f s u c h c a s e o r s h a l l be made
       known t o t h e c o u r t b y t h e a f f i d a v i t o f a n y p e r s o n
       interested             therein."

       No     Alabama         case      appears        t o have         squarely         addressed


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whether             the     appointment             of        an     administrator                   ad      litem

automatically                makes     that        person           a     party         or      whether           the

complaint           must be amended t o add t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r ad l i t e m as

a     party.          However,       Loving         v.       Wilson,           494     So.      2d     68    (Ala.

1986),         is         informative         on     this           issue.             In     Loving,             the

plaintiffs            f i l e d a complaint          seeking             a s a l e of p r o p e r t y        and     a

division             of     the     proceeds.             During           the       proceedings,                 the

p l a i n t i f f s u n s u c c e s s f u l l y moved t h e t r i a l            court to appoint                  an

a d m i n i s t r a t o r ad l i t e m f o r t h e e s t a t e s o f James W i l s o n ,                    one    of

the     named d e f e n d a n t s ,     and        Robert Wilson,                    who     had      allegedly

devised         in his w i l l a part               of the p r o p e r t y             t o be        sold.         494

So.     2d     at     69.     The    supreme             court       concluded             that      the     trial

court        e r r e d by    failing       to appoint               an     administrator               ad    litem

for    the      two       estates.      494        So.       2d    a t 70.        Citing        §     43-2-250,

the    court         i n Loving      a l s o observed t h a t " [ t ] h e appointment                              of

a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ad l i t e m by t h e c o u r t w o u l d have j o i n e d t h e                       two

estates          as       parties     to      the        action."                Id.         Thus,          Loving

indicates that a t r i a l              c o u r t ' s a p p o i n t i n g an a d m i n i s t r a t o r              ad

l i t e m u n d e r § 43-2-250 a u t o m a t i c a l l y makes t h e                         administrator

ad l i t e m a        party.

        This        conclusion       i s s u p p o r t e d by            the     t e x t of §         43-2-250,


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which r e q u i r e s      a trial        court      t o appoint          an a d m i n i s t r a t o r   ad

litem     i f t h e e s t a t e o f a d e c e a s e d p e r s o n must be                 represented

in   "the p a r t i c u l a r proceeding."                 Because the t r i a l            c o u r t must

appoint      an a d m i n i s t r a t o r a d l i t e m f o r c e r t a i n p r o c e e d i n g s , i t

would      seem      unnecessary             to also          require        the      filing      of     an

amendment         t o the complaint             t o add t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r ad l i t e m

as a p a r t y     i n such proceedings.                      Requiring       s u c h an       amendment

would       essentially             make       the         trial         court's         appointment

i n e f f e c t i v e u n t i l an amendment             i s made.        When t h e t r i a l      court

appointed         T h o r n l e y as a d m i n i s t r a t o r      ad l i t e m    on O c t o b e r 19,

2009,      Thornley         automatically                replaced        Webb       as    the    proper

defendant i n t h i s           case.

        We n e x t a d d r e s s M i t c h e l l ' s     argument t h a t t h e t r i a l           court

erred i n concluding              that her negligence                    claim i s time-barred.

A    negligence          claim       i s subject              to    a    two-year        limitations

period.       §    6-2-38(l),           A l a . Code       1975; a n d B o o k e r          v.    United

American          I n s . Co.,        700     So.        2d    1333,       1339        ( A l a . 1997).

However,          in    this      case,        the       limitations               period      f o r the

negligence         c l a i m was t o l l e d f o r an a d d i t i o n a l          s i x months u n d e r

§ 6-2-14, A l a . Code 1975.                   S e c t i o n 6-2-14 p r o v i d e s :        "The t i m e

between        the death           of    a    person          and       the grant         of     letters


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t e s t a m e n t a r y o r o f a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , n o t e x c e e d i n g s i x months,

is   not    t o be       t a k e n as      any      part        of      the      time l i m i t e d         for    the

commencement             of      actions         by       or       against             his         executors        or

administrators."                    Our      supreme            court           has         interpreted           this

s e c t i o n t o mean t h a t t h e r u n n i n g              of the l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d i s

tolled      f o r a p e r i o d up          t o , but          not      exceeding,                 s i x months     to

allow      the     personal          representative                   to      sue      or     be     sued i n      the

decedent's            name.         Nelson,           855       So.        2d     at        1047.       See       also

S a n d e r s v. M a r t i n ,      662    So.      2d 241,             245      ( A l a . 1995); Jones             v.

Blanton,          644    So.      2d      882,      887        (Ala.          1994);         and      Edwards       v.

V a n z a n t , 492     So.     2d 990,       992      ( A l a . 1986) .               Because t h e r e          were

no l e t t e r s t e s t a m e n t a r y o r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n g r a n t e d a f t e r Webb's

death,      the       limitations            period           f o r the          negligence            claim       was

tolled      f o r s i x months.

       M i t c h e l l ' s c a u s e o f a c t i o n a c c r u e d on S e p t e m b e r 27,                    2005,

when       she     allegedly              suffered             injuries               in     the      automobile

accident.          See       N e l s o n , 855   So.          2d a t 1047             ("A    cause of a c t i o n

accrues          when    a     party       suffers            an     injury           or     loss      or     damage

entitling         him    or her           to maintain              an      action.").                Tolling       the

limitations             period         for       six          months            under         §     6-2-14,        the

l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d f o r the negligence                        c l a i m e x p i r e d on       March


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27,     2008,      two     and o n e - h a l f      years        after     the accident            of

S e p t e m b e r 27, 2005.         As n o t e d , a l t h o u g h M i t c h e l l named Webb,

a deceased person,                as a d e f e n d a n t ,     the proper            defendant i s

actually        Webb's      representative.                  Thus,    M i t c h e l l had       until

March      27, 2008,        to f i l e      a negligence           claim      against       Webb's

personal       representative.               See N e l s o n , 855 So. 2d a t 1047-48.

Because        there       was      no     personal          representative,             Mitchell

p e t i t i o n e d the court       t o a p p o i n t an a d m i n i s t r a t o r    t o serve i n

that capacity.            However,         M i t c h e l l d i d not p e t i t i o n the t r i a l

court     to appoint          an a d m i n i s t r a t o r   ad l i t e m u n t i l     April    13,

2009, w e l l      after the l i m i t a t i o n s period              f o r negligence          had

e x p i r e d on M a r c h 27, 2008.          The t r i a l c o u r t a p p o i n t e d T h o r n l e y

as a d m i n i s t r a t o r a d l i t e m on O c t o b e r 19, 2009, m a k i n g T h o r n l e y

a d e f e n d a n t on t h a t     date, w e l l a f t e r the l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d

for   the negligence             c l a i m had e x p i r e d .

        M i t c h e l l a r g u e s , a s she d i d b e f o r e    the t r i a l      court,     that

she may u s e f i c t i t i o u s - p a r t y p r a c t i c e t o a v o i d t h e b a r o f t h e

statute of l i m i t a t i o n s f o rher negligence                     claim.        R u l e s 9(h)

and   15(c)(4),        A l a . R. C i v . P., " ' a l l o w          a plaintiff         to avoid

the   bar of a statute               o f l i m i t a t i o n s by f i c t i t i o u s l y    naming

defendants           for       which         actual          parties         can       later       be


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substituted.'"              Ex p a r t e   C h e m i c a l Lime o f A l a b a m a , I n c . ,        916

So.     2d 594, 597          ( A l a . 2005)       (quoting       F u l m e r v. C l a r k     Equip.

Co.,     654 So. 2d 45, 46 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) ) .                  R u l e 9(h) p r o v i d e s :

        "When a p a r t y i s i g n o r a n t o f t h e name o f an o p p o s i n g
        p a r t y a n d so a l l e g e s i n t h e p a r t y ' s p l e a d i n g , t h e
        o p p o s i n g p a r t y may be d e s i g n a t e d b y any name, a n d
        when t h a t p a r t y ' s t r u e name i s d i s c o v e r e d , t h e
        p r o c e s s and a l l p l e a d i n g s and p r o c e e d i n g s i n t h e
        a c t i o n may be amended b y s u b s t i t u t i n g t h e t r u e
        name."

Rule 15(c)(4)           s t a t e s : "An amendment o f a p l e a d i n g r e l a t e s b a c k

t o t h e d a t e o f t h e o r i g i n a l p l e a d i n g when ... r e l a t i o n b a c k i s

permitted          by     principles           applicable           to     fictitious           party

p r a c t i c e pursuant t o Rule             9(h)."

        In h e r c o m p l a i n t ,   M i t c h e l l , i n a d d i t i o n t o n a m i n g Webb a s

a      defendant,         designated           a    fictitiously                named    defendant

d e s c r i b e d as " t h a t p e r s o n , f i r m , c o r p o r a t i o n , o r o t h e r   entity

or     successor        i n i n t e r e s t who      or which        jointly,           separately,

wantonly,          and/or         wrongfully             caused      or         contributed       [to

Mitchell's]          injuries          ... made          the basis        of t h i s     lawsuit."

M i t c h e l l maintains        that Thornley,            a s Webb's a d m i n i s t r a t o r a d

litem,       i s Webb's          "successor         i n interest"               designated      as a

f i c t i t i o u s l y named d e f e n d a n t i n t h e c o m p l a i n t .     Thus, M i t c h e l l

argues       that,      when      Thornley         was    appointed         administrator            ad


                                                   10
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litem,        Thornley      was     substituted          f o r the f i c t i t i o u s l y     named

defendant        i n the complaint.               T h e r e f o r e , M i t c h e l l argues     that

the     negligence         claim      against Thornley               relates       back      to the

original        c o m p l a i n t and t h a t     the claim         i s n o t b a r r e d by t h e

statute of l i m i t a t i o n s .

        F i c t i t i o u s - p a r t y p r a c t i c e does n o t a p p l y t o t h e s i t u a t i o n

in     this   case.       Mitchell's          attempt       t o r e l a t e back       Thornley's

appointment         to the f i l i n g       of the complaint a c t u a l l y              concerns

t h e s e p a r a t e r e l a t i o n - b a c k p r a c t i c e o f R u l e 1 5 ( c ) ( 3 ) , A l a . R.

Civ.     P., n o t t h e f i c t i t i o u s - p a r t y p r a c t i c e o f R u l e s 9(h) a n d

15(c)(4).

                  " U n l i k e some, i f n o t i n d e e d most, j u r i s d i c t i o n s ,
        A l a b a m a h a s two a l t e r n a t i v e k i n d s o f r e l a t i o n b a c k
        o f amendments as t o p a r t i e s .                   One i s t h e o r d i n a r y ,
        u n p r e d i c a t e d k i n d o f r e l a t i o n back [ p r o v i d e d f o r i n
        Rule 1 5 ( c ) ( 3 ) ] and f a m i l i a r t o t h e a t t o r n e y s o f
        perhaps every other j u r i s d i c t i o n .                     The o t h e r i s ,
        from t h e n a t i o n a l p o i n t o f view, a perhaps                         less
        familiar              kind      of      relation          back.          Known     as
         ' f i c t i t i o u s p a r t y p r a c t i c e ' o r 'Doe p r a c t i c e , ' i t i s
        p r e d i c a t e d upon t h e a l l e g a t i o n o f f i c t i t i o u s names
        in      the pre-bar pleading[,                        i . e . , pleading f i l e d
        b e f o r e the s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s has run,] which a
        p a r t y now w i s h e s t o amend.                   Rule 15(c) addresses
        both k i n d s o f r e l a t i o n back, b u t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s
        for        changing          parties          and t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r
        substituting               fictitious             parties       ... a r e q u i t e
        different.             Thus, an amendment w h i c h c h a n g e s a p a r t y
        under Rule               15(c)(3) r e l a t e s           back o n l y i f the
        requirements of that p r o v i s i o n are s a t i s f i e d , while
        an amendment w h i c h s u b s t i t u t e s a t r u e name f o r a

                                                  11
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        f i c t i t i o u s name u n d e r R u l e 1 5 ( c ) ( 4 ) r e l a t e s b a c k
        only        when     the requirements           of Rule           9(h) a r e
        satisfied."

Jerome A. H o f f m a n ,         Alabama        Civil         Procedure     § 4.26       (3d e d .

2008).

        The   C o m m i t t e e Comments on t h e 1973 A d o p t i o n o f R u l e 15,

Ala.    R. C i v . P, i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f R u l e 1 5 ( c ) ( 3 )

"permit[]        an amendment t o r e l a t e b a c k w h i c h              substitutes the

real     party       i n interest          f o r a named           plaintiff."           (Emphasis

added.)        Such     an     amendment,          which        changes      a   named     party,

relates       back o n l y i f t h e requirements                   of Rule       15(c)(3) are

met.       Conversely,           an amendment            merely      substituting          a     real

party      for a fictitiously                   named    party      relates       back     i f    the

p r o v i s i o n s o f R u l e 9(h) a r e s a t i s f i e d .     C o m m i t t e e Comments on

1973    Adoption.

        In h e r c o m p l a i n t , M i t c h e l l named Webb, a d e c e a s e d        person,

as a d e f e n d a n t i n t h i s c a s e ; h o w e v e r , t h e p r o p e r d e f e n d a n t was

Webb's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , n o t Webb.          N e l s o n , 855 So. 2d a t 1047.

To c o r r e c t t h a t s i t u a t i o n , M i t c h e l l    requested that the t r i a l

court      appoint       an a d m i n i s t r a t o r   ad l i t e m ,     and T h o r n l e y   was

appointed        as a d m i n i s t r a t o r   ad l i t e m     t o r e p l a c e Webb a s t h e

defendant        i n this      case.        T h o r n l e y was s u b s t i t u t e d   f o r Webb,


                                                  12
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not    fora fictitiously               named d e f e n d a n t t o be s u e d i n a d d i t i o n

t o Webb.        Thus, t h e r e l a t i o n - b a c k p r a c t i c e o f R u l e       15(c)(3),

not    fictitious-party practice, controls this                               case.

        T h i s c a s e i s p r o c e d u r a l l y a n a l o g o u s t o S a n d e r s v. M a r t i n ,

662    So. 2d 241             ( A l a . 1995).          I n Sanders,           the     plaintiff,

Martin,      was i n v o l v e d i n an a u t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n t        with Elkins.

662    So. 2d a t 2 4 2 .           Martin       sued E l k i n s , a l l e g i n g c l a i m s o f

negligence         and wantonness, and M a r t i n                 sued E l k i n s ' s f a t h e r ,

a l l e g i n g c l a i m s o f n e g l i g e n t and wanton e n t r u s t m e n t .      However,

s i m i l a r t o t h i s case, E l k i n s had d i e d before             the complaint           was

filed.         Sanders       was e v e n t u a l l y     appointed         administrator            of

Elkins's estate.               662 So. 2d a t 2 4 3 .            As t o t h e c l a i m s       filed

against      t h e d e c e a s e d E l k i n s , M a r t i n d i d n o t a t t e m p t t o amend

his    complaint          t o name       a proper         defendant         until       a f t e r the

expiration           of     the      period         allowed         by     the      statute         of

limitations.           The i s s u e i n S a n d e r s was w h e t h e r t h a t amendment

r e l a t e d back t o t h e o r i g i n a l f i l i n g of t h e complaint               so as t o

avoid     the bar of the statute of l i m i t a t i o n s .                      662 So. 2d a t

242.

        I n S a n d e r s , as i n t h i s c a s e , a p r o p e r p a r t y n e e d e d t o be

substituted          f o r a named d e f e n d a n t who was d e c e a s e d when t h e


                                                  13
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complaint      was f i l e d .    The supreme c o u r t e x a m i n e d w h e t h e r s u c h

an amendment t o t h e c o m p l a i n t ,       f i l e d a f t e r the running        of the

limitations       period,        would    r e l a t e back t o t h e f i l i n g       of the

original     complaint.          Our supreme c o u r t         stated:

       " R u l e 1 5 ( c ) [ , A l a . R. C i v . P.,] s t a t e s :

                       "'Whenever           the       claim      or     defense
             a s s e r t e d i n t h e amended p l e a d i n g a r o s e o u t
             of the conduct, t r a n s a c t i o n or occurrence
             s e t f o r t h o r a t t e m p t e d t o be s e t f o r t h i n
             the        original         pleading,           the    amendment
             r e l a t e s back t o the date of the o r i g i n a l
             pleading             except      a s may         be     otherwise
             provided             i n Rule        13(c).       An   amendment
             c h a n g i n g t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom a c l a i m i s
             a s s e r t e d r e l a t e s back i f the f o r e g o i n g
             p r o v i s i o n i s s a t i s f i e d and, w i t h i n t h e
             p e r i o d p r o v i d e d b y l a w f o r commencing t h e
             a c t i o n a g a i n s t h i m , t h e p a r t y t o be b r o u g h t
             i n b y amendment                (1) h a s r e c e i v e d       such
             notice of the i n s t i t u t i o n of the a c t i o n
             that         he       will     n o t be         prejudiced        in
             m a i n t a i n i n g h i s d e f e n s e on t h e m e r i t s , a n d
              (2) knew o r s h o u l d have known t h a t , b u t f o r
             a mistake concerning the i d e n t i t y of the
             p r o p e r p a r t y , t h e a c t i o n w o u l d have b e e n
             brought a g a i n s t him.'

      "Under t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e , t h e r e c a n be no
      r e l a t i o n back, because t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r o f E l k i n s ' s
      e s t a t e , ... S a n d e r s , was n o t a p p o i n t e d u n t i l a f t e r
      the       statutory limitations               period          had r u n and,
      t h e r e f o r e , c o u l d n o t have h a d k n o w l e d g e o f M a r t i n ' s
      complaint           u n t i l a f t e r the l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d had
      run."

662   So. 2d a t 243 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) .


                                              14
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       The      t e x t o f R u l e 1 5 ( c ) was amended f o l l o w i n g S a n d e r s ; t h e

a b o v e - e m p h a s i z e d p o r t i o n o f t h e r u l e upon w h i c h t h e c o u r t i n

Sanders r e l i e d          i s substantially similar               to the current              Rule

15(c)(3).       1
                        Similar    to     Sanders,          Thornley        —      the      proper

defendant t o take              the place       o f Webb —         was n o t a p p o i n t e d    to

r e p r e s e n t Webb's e s t a t e u n t i l a f t e r t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d h a d

run.        Thus, as i n S a n d e r s , t h e r e       c a n be no r e l a t i o n b a c k t o

the    filing           of   the complaint.             The     trial      court      correctly

concluded that M i t c h e l l ' s negligence                  claim i s barred            by the


       1
           Rule 15(c) c u r r e n t l y p r o v i d e s ,     i n pertinent         part:

                " ( c ) R e l a t i o n B a c k o f Amendments. An amendment
       of a p l e a d i n g r e l a t e s back t o the date of the
       o r i g i n a l p l e a d i n g when

                    "




                 "(3) t h e amendment, o t h e r t h a n one naming a
       p a r t y u n d e r t h e p a r t y ' s t r u e name a f t e r h a v i n g b e e n
       i n i t i a l l y s u e d u n d e r a f i c t i t i o u s name, c h a n g e s t h e
       p a r t y o r t h e n a m i n g o f t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom a
       c l a i m i s a s s e r t e d i f t h e f o r e g o i n g p r o v i s i o n (2) i s
       s a t i s f i e d and, w i t h i n t h e a p p l i c a b l e p e r i o d o f
       l i m i t a t i o n s o r one h u n d r e d t w e n t y (120) d a y s o f t h e
       commencement o f t h e a c t i o n , w h i c h e v e r comes l a t e r ,
       t h e p a r t y t o be b r o u g h t i n b y amendment (A) h a s
       r e c e i v e d such n o t i c e of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e
       a c t i o n t h a t t h e p a r t y w i l l n o t be p r e j u d i c e d i n
       m a i n t a i n i n g a d e f e n s e on t h e m e r i t s , a n d (B) knew o r
       s h o u l d have known t h a t , b u t f o r a m i s t a k e c o n c e r n i n g
       the i d e n t i t y of the proper p a r t y , the a c t i o n would
       have b e e n b r o u g h t a g a i n s t t h e p a r t y            "

                                                 15
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statute of l i m i t a t i o n s .

        However,        we     come     to a      different         conclusion            regarding

Mitchell's         wantonness          claim.          Recently,         o u r supreme            court

clarified        that     a wantonness            claim       i s subject        t o a two-year

limitations period,                o v e r r u l i n g a p r e v i o u s supreme c o u r t        case

t h a t had i n d i c a t e d t h a t a s i x - y e a r p e r i o d      applies.         Ex      parte

Capstone Bldg. Corp.,                 [Ms. 1090966, M a r c h 16, 2012]                        So. 3d

        (Ala.    2012) .         However, b e c a u s e        t h e supreme c o u r t         i n Ex

parte       Capstone            Building          Corp.         applied          i t s    decision

prospectively,            the six-year             limitations period                applies        to

M i t c h e l l ' s wantonness c l a i m .         M i t c h e l l ' s cause o f a c t i o n f o r

her   w a n t o n n e s s c l a i m a c c r u e d on S e p t e m b e r 27, 2005, when she

allegedly         suffered           injuries          in    the    automobile           accident.

N e l s o n , 855 So. 2d a t 1047.               On O c t o b e r 19, 2009, w e l l            within

the     six-year       limitations period                   then   applicable,           the      trial

court     a p p o i n t e d T h o r n l e y as t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r   ad l i t e m .     At

t h a t t i m e , T h o r n l e y became a d e f e n d a n t i n t h i s c a s e .         Because

the     wantonness           claim     was     commenced           against       Thornley,         the

proper defendant, w i t h i n the six-year l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d                       that

must be a p p l i e d        t o M i t c h e l l ' s c l a i m u n d e r Ex p a r t e     Capstone

B u i l d i n g Corp., the t r i a l         court      erred      i n concluding         that the


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wantonness c l a i m s i s t i m e - b a r r e d .

       We   affirm      t h e summary       judgment      as   to the       negligence

claim.      We r e v e r s e t h e summary j u d g m e n t as t o t h e w a n t o n n e s s

c l a i m , and we remand t h e c a s e .

      AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

     Thompson,         P . J . , and P i t t m a n ,   Thomas,    a n d Moore, J J . ,
concur.




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