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					       Harvard Model Congress Asia 2012

                           SENATE I
           Libya: An Endgame to Conflict
                             By Jeff Lerman

         The Arab Spring of 2011 will perhaps be known as much for the
political footprint it left on the Middle East and North Africa as it will
for the terrifying speed with which it jumped from country to country
across the Arab world. Fueled by social media and citizen journalism,
the Arab Spring took only a matter of months to spread across the re-
gion, leaving almost no Arab state untouched. However, this remark-
able revolution was met with no international intervention, except in
Libya, where a multinational coalition of military forces led by the
United States, France and the UK launched measures against Libyan
dictator Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. From the early stages of the Lib-
yan conflict, the US supported the rebel army opposing Gaddafi's re-
gime and took strong actions against Gaddafi's military forces. Despite
the absence of ground forces, the multinational coalition succeeded in
delivering a series of devastating blows to Gaddafi's troops. By Sep-
tember, Libyan rebels had captured the capital city of Tripoli and had all
but routed Gaddafi's army. On the cusp of an impending victory in
Libya, the US must develop an endgame strategy that will bring further
hostilities to a close and will prepare the country for a lengthy rebuild-
ing process. Libya must successfully form a new government and effec-
tively transition into peacetime so as not to waste the sacrifices and pro-
gress made by the Libyan revolutionaries. The US has an incredible op-
portunity and challenge to help build a democratic and prosperous
Libya. If the Libyan state fails, disastrous consequences await not only
the Libyan people, but also the people across the Middle East who are
currently struggling against oppressive and corrupt regimes. The US
Senate is faced with the task of determining United States' proper role
in Libya's future and establishing a policy to transition the US and          NATO—North Atlantic
NATO forces out of their combat role in the country.                          Treaty Organization; an
                                                                              military alliance consti-
                    Explanation of the Problem                                tuting a system of col-
                                                                              lective defense whereby
History of the Problem                                                        its member states agree
                                                                              to mutual defense in
                                                                              response to an attack by
Colonial Struggles                                                            any external party.
        In September 1911, Libya found itself in a position of great vul-
nerability. The region, which consisted of three provinces within the
crumbling Ottoman Empire, had attracted the eye of European colonists
and sat open to a Mediterranean invasion. Italy took the colonizing ini-

                              Harvard Model Congress Asia 2012: Senate I                                  1
tiative and invaded the three Ottoman provinces that made up Libya in
September of 1911. By October of 1912, Italy had established full colo-
nial rule over Libya and more than 150,000 immigrants from Italy set-
tled in the country. Libya would remain under Italian rule through
World War I, and the first colonial resistance movement was mounted in
1928. Casualties for the Bedouin population in Libya during this strug-       Bedouin—a predomi-
gle were steep, and the movement ultimately fell short of gaining inde-       nantly desert-dwelling A
pendence from Italian rule. Following World War II, the British and           r a b e t h n i c g ro u p
                                                                              largely found through-
French shared administrative duties over Libyan territory, supporting         out North Africa and
political movements and leaders within the country who were friendly to       the Arabian Peninsula.
French and British interests.

Independence and the United Kingdom of Libya, 1951-1969
        After receiving official recognition by the United Nations in
1949, Libya declared its independence from colonial rule in 1951. The
country was a constitutional monarchy that vested significant power in
King Idris, who was able to personally nominate half of the legislators
to the Libyan Senate. The ruling party successfully suspended opposi-
tion parties immediately following elections in 1952 and began to im-
plement a foreign policy that aligned the country with the West. Both
Britain and the US maintained military bases in Libya during this pe-
riod, and Libya remained a relatively conservative, anti-communist
Arab state during the early Cold War period. However, a sense of na-
tionalism never took hold in the country, and King Idris faced constant
power struggles with municipal and provincial authorities. As a result,
he held little popularity with Libya's educated, and primarily urban, up-
per class. This group favored non-alignment with the West and a more
transparent government that would eliminate the bureaucratic malfea-
sance of King Idris's regime.

Col. Muammar al-Gaddafi and the Libyan Coup D'état
        As King Idris aged, his health quickly deteriorated and he was
forced to take frequent trips outside of Libya to receive medical treat-
ment. In June 1969, the King embarked on a summer trip to Greece and
Turkey where he planned to visit his doctors and then spend summer
months resting. He would never return to Libya. On September 1,
1969, while King Idris was in Turkey, Col. Muammar Gaddafi and a
group of Libyan military officers took advantage of the King's absence
and a launched a coup d'état. Gaddafi and his military partners arrested
key members of the King's regime and forced his abdication from the         sha r i a l a w — I sl a m i c
Libyan throne by September 2. The Libyan monarchy had officially            canonical law based on
                                                                            the teachings of the
ended.                                                                      Quran and the tradi-
        In its place, Gaddafi constructed a radical regime based around     tions of the Prophet
sharia law and a foreign policy that spurned the West in favor of an ag-    Mohammed.
gressive Arab nationalism. Gaddafi quickly expelled British and Ameri-
                             Harvard Model Congress Asia 2012: Senate I
can military personnel from the country and took over former American
military bases. In addition, he forced Western oil companies to provide
Libya with greater shares of the country's oil revenue and threatened
expropriation of their assets if his demands were not met. Culturally,
Gaddafi imposed strict laws against anti-Islamic practices, and he crimi-
nalized homosexuality, women's rights, adultery and pre-marital sex. By
the 1970s, Gaddafi was aggressively acquiring chemical weapons and
building Libya's military capabilities. Gaddafi began supporting
Arab nationalist groups in other states across the Middle East and North
Africa, and he was known to have funded Islamic movements in Egypt,
Chad, Sudan and elsewhere. In addition, Gaddafi generously provided
funding for terrorist organizations in the Philippines, and Libyan agents
carried out a series of terrorist attacks against Western targets, the most
deadly of which occurred in West Berlin in 1986. In the late 1980s,
Libya faced increasing sanctions from international organizations and
Western countries in response to Gaddafi's brutal human rights record
and his sponsoring of terrorist activities. Years of sanctions combined
with US President George W. Bush's new policy of preemptive warfare
forced Gaddafi to seek reconciliation with the West. By 2003, Gaddafi
began the process of halting his chemical weapons programs and of-            chemical weapon—a
fered to compensate victims of Libyan-sponsored terrorism. In addition,       device that uses chemi-
Gaddafi allowed weapons inspectors into the country and began to seek         cals formulated to in-
                                                                              flict death or harm to
normalized diplomatic relations with the US and other Western nations.        human beings.

Recent Developments

Start of the Uprising
         The phenomenon that would become known as the Arab Spring
first started in Tunisia. In December 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tuni-
sian street vendor whose goods had been confiscated by public officials
and who had claimed he was repeatedly harassed and shamed by gov-
ernment authorities, set himself on fire in protest of government author-
ity. Instantly, Bouazizi's act of self-immolation sparked riots across the
country, leading to a full-scale revolution in Tunisia. The fervor that
swept across Tunisia quickly moved to Egypt, where protestors forced
the removal of President Hosni Mubarak. By January 2011, tensions ran
high in Libya as dissatisfaction with the Gaddafi regime mounted in the
face of revolutions in the Arab world. After a group of citizens grew
agitated with massive delays in the building of government housing
units, Libyan protesters organized sit-ins and massive demonstrations
against political corruption across the country. The Gaddafi regime re-
sponded by arresting the leaders of these organized protests and broad-
casting threats to other protestors. This response backfired—instead of
quelling the demonstration, these aggressive actions only fueled the pro-
testors' fervor, and soon riots exploded across the country.
                             Harvard Model Congress Asia 2012: Senate I
       With momentum growing, the protestors organized to form the
National Transition Council (NTC), a political body formed by anti-
Gaddafi forces to represent the Libyan people during the Libyan Civil
War and to coordinate the military actions of all rebel forces. The NTC
proved effective in organizing the rebels into military units, and by early
March, rebel forces were engaged in sustained fights against Gaddafi's

Western Military Intervention
        On March 17, 2011, the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 1763, which demanded a ceasefire to the hostilities in Libya,
enforced a no-fly zone over Libya, and froze Libyan assets as well as
imports into the country. On March 19, military operations against
Libya officially commenced, with a coalition of French, British, and
American forces implementing an intense bombing raid and naval
blockade of the country. Other NATO nations also joined the efforts
against the Gaddafi regime, including Canada, Italy, Belgium, Spain,
Bulgaria, Norway, Greece, Denmark, the Netherlands, Turkey, and Al-
bania. The military intervention primarily consisted of missile strikes
against high-level Libyan targets and Gaddafi's troops, with NATO
forces eliminating important Libyan airfields, anti-aircraft guns, Libyan
radars, troop convoys, Libyan weapons stockpiles, and important mili-
tary bases. The missile attacks and bombing campaigns were intended to
wipe out Gaddafi's ability to take action against rebel forces and also
limited his forces' ability to retaliate against NATO forces. By May,
thousands of Libyan tanks and government vehicles had been destroyed
and the Libyan Navy had been decimated after bombing campaigns de-
molished its fleet. Despite the enormous success of the NATO interven-
tion, no ground forces were committed to the operation.

The Battle of Tripoli
         The Battle of Tripoli began on August 20, 2011 after a revolt
broke out inside the city itself. Rebels from outside the city had been
secretly smuggling weapons and ammunition to anti-Gaddafi revolution-
aries inside Libya's capital city throughout the weeks leading up to the
battle. Once rebel forces had successfully advanced on Tripoli from the
city's south and west, they attempted to link up with the revolutionary
fighters inside the city. On August 21, rebel forces staged an amphibi-       amphibious landing—
ous landing at Tripoli and stormed the city from all sides. The raid was      the use of naval fire-
initially successful, although heavy casualties were incurred on both         power and strategy to
                                                                              project infantry troops
sides. By the end of the day, two of Col. Gaddafi's sons had been cap-        ashore.
tured, the Libyan army's elite special forces division had surrendered to
rebels and Tripoli's airport was entirely surrounded. By the following
day, the rebel forces had routed Gaddafi's troops and 90% of Tripoli
was now under the rebel's control. In addition, two more of Gaddafi's
                             Harvard Model Congress Asia 2012: Senate I
sons were captured and rebels began to lay siege to Gaddafi's private
compound. By August 28, Tripoli had completely fallen to the rebels.
Despite this landmark victory, Col. Gaddafi was nowhere to be found
inside his compound or anywhere else in the city. It is believed that he
fled Tripoli towards the Algerian border. With the fall of Tripoli, Gad-
dafi's forces face an impending defeat.

Congressional Action
         Since President Obama ordered American bombings of strategic
Libyan targets without the authorization of Congress, no direct congres-
sional legislation has been passed with respect to the military policy in
Libya. Several members of Congress from both parties have argued that
President Obama circumvented the War Powers Act, and others have              War Powers Act—a
criticized the president of committing significant military resources to      federal law passed in
the Libyan conflict without outlining and clarifying the objectives, long-    1973 that is intended to
                                                                              check the power of the
term plans and mission strategy of the US forces involved. Most of            President in committing
Congress, however, views Obama's actions as falling in line with his          the United States to an
constitutional powers as commander-in-chief. The Obama administra-            armed conflict without
tion has declared its mission in Libya a short-term operation to protect      the consent of Con-
civilians, not a long-term military engagement. Furthermore, the              gress.
Obama administration has argued that since its mission is one of hu-
manitarian support and civilian aid, the United States is thus not en-
gaged in formal hostilities in Libya. Therefore, no congressional per-
mission is required.
         However, as the conflict winds down in North Africa, the
Obama administration will need congressional approval to launch poli-
cies and programs designed to support the NTC as it moves towards
forming a government and rebuilding Libya's infrastructure. The US
Senate will need to authorize any policies that extend beyond direct
military actions, and any public funds that the Obama administration
plans to use to support humanitarian and economic programs in
are subject to legislative approval. Moving forward, the Senate will
play a crucial role in shaping the policies that will transition Libya back
into a functioning state.

                         Focus of the Debate                                  WMD—weapon of
                                                                              mass destruction; a
Conservative View                                                             weapon that can kill and
        The conservatives have focused their endgame strategy in Libya        bring significant harm to
around national security objectives and political goals. The conserva-        a large number of
                                                                              humans and/or cause
tives are primarily concerned with confiscating WMD stockpiles in             great damage to man-
Libya and eliminating any capabilities Gaddafi and other extremist            made and natural struc-
groups may have to strike at American or NATO targets. Libya must be          tures.
completely pacified and any capacity that bellicose groups may have to
cause damage in the region must be quickly addressed. Conservatives
                              Harvard Model Congress Asia 2012: Senate I                                 5
are wary that Libya has the potential to become a hotbed for insurgents
and terrorists groups. Conservatives also believe that Libya presents the
US with a tremendous opportunity to support a democratic, stable gov-
ernment in the Middle East. They would like to see the US support de-
mocratic movements within Libya and pursue a policy that brings re-
formers to power in the country. Conservatives do not want radical Is-
lamic parties gaining power in Libya—for conservatives, Libya could
become a useful base from which to fight radical Islam in the region.
However, conservatives have become increasingly focused on reducing
government spending. Accordingly, they are not in favor of extending
loans and generous financial support to Libya nor do they look favora- bly
on costly, long term humanitarian aid programs.

Liberal View
        By and large, liberals have supported President Obama in his
decision to intervene in Libya. Many liberals have viewed the military
intervention as a major success and believe that the US should undertake
an active role in supporting Libya through both political and economic
assistance as well as humanitarian aid. Liberals believe that the US
should take the initiative in providing Libya with loans and economic
aid to help rebuild the country and jumpstart the economy. Liberals also
view the Libyan rebels as freedom fighters who need material assistance to
complete the liberation of their country from the tyranny of the Gad- dafi

Presidential View
          President Obama has frequently stressed the importance of op-
posing the Gaddafi regime and has stated on multiple occasions the im-
portance of removing Gaddafi from power. Obama has primarily or-
dered aerial assaults on Libyan targets, and has followed a policy of not
sending ground troops into the country. As such, he is reluctant to sup-
port any military missions that would require a significant troop pres-
ence on the ground in the country. However, Obama supports extending
political and economic aid to Libya, and believes it is especially impor- tant
to rebuild Libya's economy and devastated infrastructure. Obama believes
that it is in the United States' interest to facilitate negotiations
between various Libyan factions in order to arrive at a power sharing
agreement that is both legitimate and durable. President Obama be-
lieves it is important that the US maintain a high profile and a high level of
involvement in Libya in order to ensure that democracy continues to
expand into the Middle East. The President also believes that the US
should play a major role in Libyan reconstruction.

                             Harvard Model Congress Asia 2012: Senate I
                    Interest Group Perspectives

The Center for American Progress
         The Center for American Progress (CAP), a liberal think tank
committed to improving the quality of life for those in America through
a dedication to progressive ideas and community action, believes that it
is crucial for America and its NATO allies to take an active role in the
process of rebuilding Libya. Among the priorities that the Center for
American Progress emphasizes is securing Libya's oil assets and pro-           asset—resources owned
tecting Libya's oil infrastructure. Libya is one of the world's largest        or controlled by a
producers of oil and its energy sector is by far the most important sector     country that provide su b
                                                                               stan tia l milita ry, social,
in its economy. The CAP stresses the importance of protecting and pre-
                                                                               and/or economic benefits.
serving this industry so that Libya can begin to prosper again as a coun-
try and create opportunities for its population. Without a strong econ-
omy, Libya faces the possibility of relapsing into social disorder, a prob-
lem that could jeopardize the important process of state building. The
CAP urges the Obama administration to continue its policy of interna-
tional engagement with Libya, and believes there should be a strong
American presence in the country until it becomes stable and function-
ing. Researchers at the CAP warn that Libya could face a counterinsur-
gency now that Gaddafi's forces have been formally defeated. Libya,
these researchers argue, could be another Iraq unless the US and its
NATO allies make a strong commitment to remain in the region until
the Libyan government can effectively govern. The CAP does not be-
lieve that the mission in Libya has been accomplished yet, and until
the political process succeeds in creating a strong government in the
coun- try, the CAP asserts that the US and its allies should protect the
country and provide material support to the new Libyan state.

The Heritage Foundation
         The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank that pro-
motes public policies centered on the concepts of limited government,
traditional American values and a robust national defense, believes that
the US should take an active role in supporting an effective and democ-
ratic state in Libya, but does not believe that the US should play any
role in Libya's economy or in providing other forms of aid to the
Researchers at the Heritage Foundation stress the importance of Amer-
ica's role in facilitating reconciliation between the various factions and
rebel groups that have emerged as Gaddafi's regime has collapsed. This
reconciliation, Heritage argues, is vital to the effort to create a new Lib-
yan state that will effectively share power amongst the various elements
of Libyan society. If a strong government is formed and agreements and
peace are made between the tribes and the various factions in the coun-
try, then Libya will quickly become a viable state. At that point, there
                              Harvard Model Congress Asia 2012: Senate I
will be little need for American support, and the US will not face an un-
ending military involvement in the country. In addition, the Heritage
Foundation stresses the importance of locating and destroying the stock-
piles of WMDs and chemical weapons that Gaddafi maintained during
his rule. The US should launch a mission with its NATO allies to elimi-
nate these dangerous arsenals and also seize any other arms or weapons
that Gaddafi loyalists may possess. According to the group, Libya
needs security and political reconciliation. Economic policymaking can
only happen after insurgents are pacified and tribal factions have made
peace. The Heritage Foundation is also concerned with extreme Islamist
rebel forces that could potentially exert an outsized influence on the
process of drafting a Libyan constitution and forming a new Libyan
state. If extremists dominate the state-building process in Libya, the re-
sulting regime could be even worse than its predecessor.

The Cato Institute
         The Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank devoted to the princi-
ples of limited government, individual liberty, a dynamic free-enterprise
economy, and the pursuit of global peace, argues that America's incur-
sion into Libya represents a waste of resources. Moreover, the Cato In-
stitute asserts that the overthrow of Col. Gaddafi does not advance any
vital American security interests and only serves to divert resources and
personnel from more pressing security needs in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Cato researchers recommend that the United States and NATO should
end all military engagement in Libya as quickly as possible and cease all
aerial assaults. Cato believes that the US government should play a very
limited role in helping to rebuild Libya. Cato researchers are wary that
further engagement in Libya will force the United States to make long-
term commitments to help the Libyan people form a new government
and restart the economy. This will in turn require a US military pres-
ence in Libya well into the future and could entangle the US in further
conflicts in the region. The benefits of a stable, democratic Libya do not
outweigh the costs of future American involvement in the country, and
any further intervention in the country risks creating a relationship be-
tween Libya and the US that will require military, economic and politi-
cal assistance well into the future. Furthermore, Cato researchers argue
that establishing more American military outposts in the Middle East
will only create opportunities for terrorists and insurgents to strike at
American targets and take costly action against American interests.

                          Possible Solutions
Economic Aid and Energy Security
        This solution focuses on the primacy of Libya's oil and energy
sector in its economy. Currently, oil production in Libya has been dev-
                              Harvard Model Congress Asia 2012: Senate I
astated by the civil war. Oil fields have been unable to operate at full
capacity and transportation of petroleum to refineries and to the market      refinery—an industrial
has become dangerous and unreliable. As a result, incomes in Libya            process plant where
have shrunk tremendously in the last six months and the country's econ-       crude oil is processed
omy offers its citizens little respite from the harsh conditions that the     and refined into more
                                                                              useful petroleum prod-
civil war has created. Under this solution, the US and its NATO allies
                                                                              ucts such as gasoline,
would focus their efforts on protecting Libya's oil fields and securing the   diesel fuel, and kero-
transportation of crude oil to refineries and the marketplace. This           sene.
possibly could require the deployment of troops and security forces to
oil fields and would certainly necessitate that military convoys help
transport oil shipments to the marketplace. Terrorists and Gaddafi's
loyalists must be stopped from destroying Libya's economy and plung-
ing the country into economic recession and further chaos.
         In addition, this solution would call for extending Libya loans
and economic aid in order to rebuild the country's razed infrastructure.
Urban warfare in cities like Benghazi and Tripoli has ruined roads,
bridges, buildings, buses, water supplies and other crucial infrastructure.
Libya must rebuild itself physically and will need aid and loans in order
to accomplish this daunting task. This solution proposes that the US
work with its NATO allies and also the World Bank and other develop-
mental organizations to help secure monetary aid and loans to facilitate
Libya's reconstruction. A Libyan infrastructure fund must be formed to
raise the capital necessary to rejuvenate the country's physical state. In    capital—wealth in the
                                                                              form of money or other
providing economic support and energy security, the US and its allies         assets available or con-
will help Libya's economy quickly recover from the disturbances the           tributed for a particular
fighting has caused and will provide opportunities for Libya's citizens to    purpose such as invest-
return to work. With a thriving economy, Libya has a much greater             ing.
chance of becoming a viable and functioning state. However, this solu-
tion will come at a cost. Not only will it require potential troop deploy-
ments, but it will also demand that the US make a substantial financial
commitment to the Libyan state in the form of loans and direct aid. The
US Senate must determine if the benefits of a prospering Libyan econ-
omy are worth the significant costs that will be incurred.

Political Support and Tribal Negotiations
        This solution focuses on the importance of forming a stable and
democratic political system in Libya and bringing about peace amongst
the various factions and rebel groups in the country. Proponents of this
solution believe that the US should assume primary responsibility in
helping to negotiate peace between the diverse factions and rebel groups
within the country. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military and State
Department played a significant role in helping to form alliances and
negotiate treaties across the various ethnic and religious groups in the
country. This solution adopts a similar model, and proposes that the US
and its allies engage in multilateral talks with all Libyan factions in or-
                              Harvard Model Congress Asia 2012: Senate I
der to build a consensus from which to create a government and consti-
tution. This proposal is rooted in the assumption that Libya cannot
move forward without making peace with itself. Real progress in gov-
erning and administering the country can be made only after factions
and tribes come together to work out their differences and resolve their
grievances with each other. As the problems in Iraq and Afghanistan
demonstrated, supporters of this solution argue, a country that is deeply
divided will resort to violence even if the apparatuses of government
have been established. Once agreements have been made, this solution
proposes that the US provide assistance in drafting a constitution and
developing a government for the newly formed state. The advantages of
having US diplomatic and military personnel involved in this process
are that it will ensure that Libya adopts democratic policies, establishes a
representative government, and develops strong ties and relationships with
American officials. However, this solution is not without its draw-
backs. It will still require the deployment of American officials and
military personnel to Libya, a move that puts American lives at risk.
Beyond that, maintaining an American deployment in Libya would be an
expensive undertaking. More importantly, the negotiation process will
heavily involve the US in regional politics, potentially entangling the
United States in other affairs in the region.

Weapons Elimination
         Libya has amassed a fairly substantial stockpile of chemical
weapons and WMDs, including anti-aircraft guns and other forms of
heavy artillery. It is crucial that these weapons be confiscated and de-
stroyed before they find their way into the hands of Gaddafi loyalists,
insurgents, or terrorists. Under this solution, the US would launch mis-
sions with the help of its allies aimed at recovering and destroying these
dangerous weapons stockpiles. These missions would require that
ground troops be used to ensure and confirm that WMDs were properly
handled and destroyed. This policy serves to eliminate any ammunition
that Gaddafi loyalists could potentially use to wreak havoc on Libya or
attack American and NATO targets. With dangerous armaments all but
eliminated, Libya will regain stability and fighting will eventually sub-
side. The drawback of this policy is that it will require the work of US
intelligence personnel on the ground in Libya in order to locate all of
Gaddafi's WMDs, which will in turn necessitate the use special forces
who will be able to raid these weapons compounds and successfully de-
stroy them. This mission will put American lives at risk and will require
ground forces and advanced military strategy.

Withdrawal and Non-Involvement
         Since Libya holds no immediate security value to the U.S., nor
does it represent any vital foreign interest, the US could simply with-
                             Harvard Model Congress Asia 2012: Senate I
draw all forces from Libya and play no role in the formation of its gov-
ernment or in the economic development of the new state. For years,
the United States has policed the world vigilantly, exercising its power
against malevolent dictators and regimes that endanger its interests and
threaten its citizens. However, many believer that it has become far too
expensive for the US to continue to govern the world's rogue states and        rogue       state—states
support fledgling democracies against their enemies. The US neither            that, according to some
has the mandate nor the financial resources to continue its hyperactive        political theo rists,
                                                                               threaten international or
involvement in global affairs. Libya, supporters of this solution argue,
                                                                               regional peace.
is not worth the steep costs that Americans will incur in supporting and
assisting it. Americans should focus their limited resources domesti-
cally and look to fix problems at home before they throw away money
on projects that may yield very little benefits for them.

                 Questions a Bill Should Address
          Any bill must first determine what should be the goal of Ameri-
can policy in Libya. What constitutes a successful mission in Libya?
What role, if any, should the US and its NATO allies play in developing
a new political system in Libya? Can a reconstructed, democratic Libya
offer the US any strategic value that warrants the cost of continued en-
gagement in the country? How can the US prevent the new Libyan re-
gime from being more extreme than its predecessors? What role should
the US play in reconciling tribal factions in the country? Does the US
have an obligation to assure that Libya's vital oil resources are pro-
tected? What measures, if any, should the US take to help Libya's en-
ergy sector recover? Should the US help train Libyan soldiers and secu-
rity forces? Should the US offer economic aid and military assistance to
the newly formed Libyan state? These questions should form the center
of any bill that is passed. It is crucial for the US to define and determine
its role in Libya.

                     Summary and Conclusion

        After six months of hard fighting, Libyan rebels and NATO and
US forces have dealt a crippling and devastating blow to Col. Muammar
Gaddafi's 42-year stranglehold over his country. As Gaddafi and his
loyalists face a certain defeat, the US needs to create a coherent and
comprehensive policy to close out hostilities in the country and bring to
an end its mission in the region. Libya represents a tremendous oppor-
tunity for the US to promote democracy and freedom in a region of the
world where those two principles are largely neglected by ruling gov-
ernments. Establishing a prosperous and democratic country in the re-
gion could help efforts to end the tyrannical and oppressive regimes that

                              Harvard Model Congress Asia 2012: Senate I
reign in countries across the Middle East. However, Libya also is a ma-
jor challenge for the United States. Any involvement in the country's
political process or rebuilding will come at a substantial cost to Ameri-
can taxpayers. The burden of supporting US personnel abroad in Libya
could be a heavy one, and continued foreign engagement also runs the
risk of entangling the US in future conflicts in the Middle East. The
benefits of a functioning Libyan state must warrant the cost of helping
to build and protect it. The US Senate must determine the proper course
of action the nation will take in bringing to a close its engagement in
Libya. A failed state could be a disastrous result. However, a failed
state in which American personnel played a role in rebuilding could be
an even more disastrous outcome. The Senate must exercise caution and
good judgment in reaching its conclusion.

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Margon, Sarah. "Libya will still need help after Qaddafi's departure."
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Murphy, Dan. "Tripoli has fallen and the battle for Tripoli rages on."
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Silverleib, Alan. "White House defends Libya response." 24
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                              Harvard Model Congress Asia 2012: Senate I

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