No. 08- In the Supreme Court of the United States ______

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                                No. 08-

_________________________________________________________________


                                In the
                   Supreme Court of the United States
                   Supreme Court        United States


_________________________________________________________________



                   Matter of Disbarment of Barbara C. Johnson
            In the Matter of Disbarment of Barbara C. Johnson
                                 Petitioner
                                 Petitioner


_________________________________________________________________



            PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
         ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
                            THE
                        TO THE
                    MASSACHUSETTS
            JUDICIAL COURT FOR THE COMMONWEALTH
    SUPREME JUDICIALCOURT FOR THE COMMONWEALTH


_________________________________________________________________


            PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
            PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI


_________________________________________________________________


                                       Barbara C. Johnson, Pro Se
                                       6 Appletree Lane
                                                  MA 01810-4102
                                       Andover, MA 01810-4102
                                       978-474-0833
                                                               No. 549972
                                       Formerly Mass. B.B.O. No. 549972
                                                     Bar No. 36719
                                       First Circuit Bar No. 36719
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                              QUESTIONS PRESENTED
                              QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Disciplinary actions are "adversary proceedings of a a quasi-criminal nature.”
Disciplinary actions are “adversary proceedings of quasi-criminal nature." In re In re
Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968). In some State jurisdictions, disciplinary actions
Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968). In some State jurisdictions, disciplinary actions
are neither civil nor criminal but genesis. In In some States, actions are are
are neither civil nor criminal but sui sui generis. some States, suchsuch actionsjudi- judi-
cial in nature, and inin other States, they are administrative in nature. Massachu-
cial in nature, and other States, they are administrative in nature. Massachu-
setts is one of the latter States. the action against Petitioner, her her Fourteenth
setts is one of the latter States. In In the action against Petitioner, Fourteenth
Amendment rights to due process and equal protection were denied; e.g.. lacking
Amendment rights to due process and equal protection were denied; e.g.. lacking
was sufficient notice, prosecution witnesses, opportunity to heard, a public trial,
was sufficient notice, prosecution witnesses, opportunity to be be heard, a public trial,
compliance with well-established rules practice and procedure and of of evidence,
compliance with well-established rules of of practice and procedure andevidence,
and a fair and impartial tribunal. genesis of the the disciplinary action out of
and a fair and impartial tribunal. The The genesis of disciplinary action arose arose out of
Petitioner's exercise, during her gubernatorial campaign in 2002 on on web-
Petitioner’sexercise, during her gubernatorial campaign in 2002 andand her her web-
site, of her First Amendment right to free, political speech, which the Massachu-
site, of her First Amendment right to free, political speech, which the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court [“SJC”] found was prejudicial to administration of
setts Supreme Judicial Court ["SJC"] found was prejudicial to the the administration of
justice and thus violative Mass.R.Prof.C. 8.4(d). The question presented is:
justice and thus violative ofof Mass.R.Prof.C. 8.4(d). The question presented is:
        1.
         1.     Whether lawyers may be stripped both their First Amendment
                Whetherlawyers may be stripped ofof both their First Amendment
rights and the full sweep their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due due process
rightsand the full sweep ofof their Fourteenth Amendment rights to process and and
equal protection.
equal protection.

The Massachusetts SJC created the Board of Bar Overseers [“BBO”] and the Office
The Massachusetts SJC created the Board of Bar Overseers ["BBO"] and the Office
of Bar Counsel [“OBC”] as independent administrative bodies to in in unison as
of Bar Counsel ["OBC"] as independent administrative bodies to act actunison as the the
SJC’s disciplinary arm. Given that the BBO and OBC lack an enabling statute and
SJC's disciplinary arm. Given that the BBO and OBC lack an enabling statute and
bylaws, the SJC identifies them as "affiliated entities." The The SJC also appoints both
bylaws, the SJC identifies them as “affiliated entities.” SJC also appoints both
the BBO General Counsel and the OBC Bar Counsel, and although attorneys’
the BBO General Counsel and the OBC Bar Counsel, and although attorneys' an- an-
nual licensing fees finance the BBO and OBC, the SJC retains control and su-
nual licensing fees finance the BBO and OBC, the SJC retains thethe control and su-
pervision of the Siamese entities. When a final determination disciplinary ac-
pervisionof the Siamese entities. When a final determination of a of a disciplinary ac-
tion is contested, the BBO files recommendation of discipline in in single-justice
tion is contested, the BBO files a a recommendation of discipline thethe single-justice
session of the SJC. In the instant case, the single justice adopted BBO's rec-
session of the SJC. In the instant case, the single justice adopted thethe BBO’s rec-
ommendation. The full panel the SJC affrmed the the judgment of disbarment
ommendation.The full panel of of the SJC affirmed judgment of disbarment by by
the single-justice. The questions presented are:
the single-justice. The questions presented are:
        2.
        2.     Whether, by adjudicating an action brought their agents and in
               Whether,by adjudicating an action brought by by their agents and in
which one agent is a named party, the SJC has conflict of interest that makes
which one agent is a named party, the SJC has a a conflict of interest that makes
such a scheme for the discipline of attorneys unconstitutional.
such a scheme for the discipline of attorneys unconstitutional.
        3.
        3.     Whether the BBO and OBC are unconstitutional entities.
               Whether the BBO and OBC are unconstitutional entities.

The single justice disbarred and ordered Petitioner to withdraw, prior to her appeal,
The single justice disbarred and ordered Petitioner to withdraw, prior to her appeal,
from her then-existing cases. Arguing that compliance with the order would de- de-
from her then-existing cases. Arguing that compliance with the order would
prive her clients of their right to have counsel of their choice, interfere the or-
prive her clients of their right to have counsel of their choice, interfere with with the or-
derly prosecution of their cases, cause her clients harm and damage, and interfere
derly prosecution of their cases, cause her clients harm and damage, and interfere
withher obligation toto them, Petitioner did not comply and was held in contempt.
with her obligation them, Petitioner did not comply and was held in contempt.
The question presented is:
The question presented is:
       4.
       4.      Whether Petitioner’s noncompliance was justified.
               WhetherPetitioner's noncompliance was justified.
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                        PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
                        PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

   The parties to the proceedings in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
   The parties to the proceedings in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
were petitioner Barbara C. Johnson and respondents Board of Bar Overseers
were petitioner Barbara C. Johnson and respondents Board of Bar Overseers of of
Massachusetts and/or the Office of Bar Counsel Massachusetts.
Massachusetts and/or the Office of Bar Counsel ofof Massachusetts.

    Johnson uses the expression “and/or,” for there a legal conundrum as to
    Johnson uses the expression "and/or," for there isis a legal conundrum as to
whether the entities are separate entities or whether is is subservient to
whether the entities are separate entities or whether oneonesubservient to the the
other. That is, on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court website, are are
other. That is, on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court website, theythey de- de-
scribed as “affiliated entities.” Yet, in SJC opinion re re some other matter, the
scribed as "affiliated entities." Yet, in an an SJC opinionsome other matter, the Of- Of-
fice of Bar Counsel was deemed to be a subordinate of the Board Bar Overseers.
fice of Bar Counsel was deemed to be a subordinate of the Board ofof Bar Overseers.

   There is no enabling statute clarify the issue.
   There is no enabling statute toto clarify the issue.

   The Board of Bar Overseers and the Office Bar Counsel also have no bylaws.
   The Board of Bar Overseers and the Office ofof Bar Counsel also have no bylaws.
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                                          TABLE OF CONTENTS
                                          TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                                                              Page
                                                                                                              Pave
QUESTIONS PRESENTED……………………...
QUESTIONSPRESENTED ...                                                                                           i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS..…………..……….....................
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ...                                                                                      ii
                                                                                                                    ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLEOF CONTENTS ........................................................................                          iii
                                                                                                                   iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
TABLEOF AUTHORITIES ... ……….....................……….....................                                            v

CONSTITUTIONS...............................................................................
CONSTITUTIONS ...                                                                                                viii
                                                                                                                 viii

STATUTES ………………..………………………...……….....................
STATUTES...                                                                                                      viii
                                                                                                                 viii

RULES ………………..…… ………………….…....……….....................
RULES ...                                                                                                          ix
                                                                                                                   ix

MISCELLANEOUS ……..………………………..……….......................
MISCELLANEOUS ...                                                                                                  ix
                                                                                                                   ix

APPENDICES.......................................................................................
APPENDICES ...                                                                                                      x


                            PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
                            PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

OPINIONS BELOW………………………………………….....................
OPINIONSBELOW ...                                                                                                   1
                                                                                                                    1

JURISDICTION……………………………………...……….....................
JURISDICTION ...                                                                                                    1
                                                                                                                    1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED.……….....................
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED ...                                                                              3

       U.S. Constitution ………………………………..………...................
       U.S. Constitution ...                                                                                        3
                                                                                                                    3
       Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts ………….
       Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts ...                                                        4
                                                                                                                    4
                                                                                                                     .
STATUTES INVOLVED
STATUTESINVOLVED ...…………………………………….....................                                                             4

       Federal Statutes ……………………………….....……….................
       Federal Statutes ...                                                                                         4
                                                                                                                    4
       Massachusetts Statutes
       Massachusetts Statutes …………………….......……….................                                                   5
                                                                                                                    5

RULES INVOLVED
RULES INVOLVED ..................................................................................                   5

       Former Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:07.
       Former Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:07.
       Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct
       Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct ................................                                 6
                                                                                                                    6

       Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:07.
       Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:07.
       Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct
       Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct ............................                                     6
                                                                                                                    6
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      Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01.
      Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01.
      Bar Discipline
      Bar Discipline ...................................................................................               8
                                                                                                                       8

      Board of Bar Overseers Rules ...........................................................
      Board of Bar Overseers Rules ...                                                                                 8
                                                                                                                       8

SINGLE JUSTICE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
SINGLEJUSTICE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ... ............................                                                  9
                                                                                                                       9

STATEMENT OF THE CASE……………………………………………….
STATEMENTOF THE CASE ...                                                                                               9
                                                                                                                       9

I.
1.      Nature of the Case: The Underlying
        Natureof the Case: The Underlying
        Attorney Disciplinary Proceeding
        Attorney Disciplinary Proceeding ... …………………………………….                                                           9
                                                                                                                       9

        How the Federal Question Was Presented ………………………….
        How the Federal Question Was Presented ...                                                                   10
                                                                                                                     10

        How the BBO Avoided “Spelling Out” the Federal Question
        How the BBO Avoided "Spelling Out" the Federal Question ... …….                                              11
                                                                                                                     11

II.
II.     Proceedings in the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers
        Proceedings in the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers ………                                                  12
                                                                                                                     12

        Motions to Dismiss ……………………….…….………………………..
        Motions to Dismiss ...                                                                                       13
                                                                                                                     13

        OBC's Motion for Protection Order and Impoundment
        OBC’s Motion for Protection Order and Impoundment ... ……………                                                  13
                                                                                                                     13

        Motions to Preclude ..…………………….…….………………………..
        Motions to Preclude ...                                                                                      14
                                                                                                                     14

        Mitigation ……………………….……………….………………………..
        Mitigation ...                                                                                               15
                                                                                                                     15

            Day of “Trial” ..…………………….……….………………………..
        The Day of "Trial" ...                                                                                       15
                                                                                                                     15

III. Proceedings the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
III.Proceedings in in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
          Suffolk County ..……………………….………................................
      for Suffolk County ...                                                                                         17
                                                                                                                     17

IV. Proceeding the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
IV. Proceeding inin the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
     for the Commonwealth ……,……………………………………………..
     for the Commonwealth ...                                                                                        18
                                                                                                                     18

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT…….…..…………………………
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ...                                                                                    18
                                                                                                                     18

I.
1.
        Review is warranted because attorney disciplinary proceed-
        Review is warranted because attorney disciplinary proceed-
        ings that are administrative in nature conflict such ac-
        ings that are administrative in nature conflict withwith such ac-
        tions that are quasi-criminal judicial in in nature, depriv-
        tions that are quasi-criminal or or judicialnature, depriv-
        ing attorneys in those States where such actions are admin-
        ing attorneys in those States where such actions are admin-
        istrative in nature their Fourteenth Amendment rights
        istrative in nature of of their Fourteenth Amendment rights
        to due process and equal protection …………………………………….
        to due process and equal protection ...                                                                      19
                                                                                                                     19

II.
II.     Review is warranted because attorney disciplinary proceed-
        Review is warranted because attorney disciplinary proceed-
        ings that are administrative in nature contravene the
        ings that are administrative in nature contravene the due due
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                                                V

     process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
     process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
     Amendment and thereby deprive attorneys their
     Amendment and thereby deprive attorneys of of their
     secured constitutional rights …………………………………………
     secured constitutional rights ...                                                                 27
                                                                                                       27

III. Review warranted where the BBO's findings were trans-
III.Review is is warranted where the BBO’s findings were trans-
     parently invalid, the SJC single justice adopted them, caus-
     parently invalid, the SJC single justice adopted them, caus-
     ing the judgment of disbarment be void, and the subse-
     ing the judgment of disbarment to to be void, and the subse-
     quent affirmance by the SJC full panel that void judg-
     quent affirmance by the SJC full panel of of that void judg-
     ment imparted to no validity, making Petitioner's
     ment imparted to it it no validity, making Petitioner’s
     disbarment unconstitutional...……….……………………………….
     disbarmentunconstitutional ...                                                                    30
                                                                                                       30

CONCLUSION ………..……………..……………………………………….
CONCLUSION...                                                                                          32


                               TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
                               TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Adohr Milk Farm, Inc. v. v. Love, 255 Cal.App.2d 366 (1967) …………..
Adohr Milk Farm, Inc. Love, 255 Cal.App.2d 366 (1967) ...                                              32
                                                                                                       32

Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190 (1941)
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190 (1941) ...…..................                        28
                                                                                                       28

Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) …………..…………..…………
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) ...                                                             28
                                                                                                       28

Butler v. Eaton, 141 U.S. (Mass.) 240 (1891)
Butlerv. Eaton, 141 U.S. (Mass.) 240 (1891) ...…………..…………………                                           32
                                                                                                       32

Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) …………..…………..…………..                                               25
                                                                                                       25

Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961) …………..…………..………………
Cohen v. Hurley,366 U.S. 117 (1961) ...                                                                30
                                                                                                       30

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) ……..…………..…………………..                                              28
                                                                                                       28

Drake v. State, 488 S.W.2d 534
Drake v. State, 488 S.W.2d 534
(Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ……..…………..…….……... 22-23
(Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.)                    22-23

FCC v. League of Women Voters of California,
FCC v. League of Women Voters of California,
468 U.S. 364, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984) ……………………..
468 U.S. 364, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984) ...                                                28
                                                                                                       28

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964)
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) ……..…………..………………                                             28
                                                                                                       28

Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991)
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) .....…………………...                                   28
                                                                                                       28

Giddens v. State Bar, 28 Cal.3d 730, 621 P.2d 851 (1981) ..………..…….
Giddens v. State Bar, 28 Cal.3d 730, 621 P.2d 851 (1981) ...                                           21
                                                                                                       21
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Goldstein v. Commission on Practice of Supreme Court,
Goldstein v. Commission on Practice of Supreme Court,
297 Mont. 493, 995 P.2d 923 (2000) ..………………..……………………
297 Mont. 493, 995 P.2d 923 (2000) ...                                                     24, 27
                                                                                           24, 27

Grievance Adm'r v. Fieger, 476 Mich. 231, 719 N.W.2d 123 (2006)
Grievance Adm'r v. Fieyer, 476 Mich. 231, 719 N.W.2d 123 (2006) ... ….                     18, 28
                                                                                           18, 28

Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960) ..………………..………………….
Hannahv. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960) ...                                                         25
                                                                                                 25

In re Bailey, 439 Mass. 134, 786 N.E.2d 337 (2003)
In re Bailey, 439 Mass. 134, 786 N.E.2d 337 (2003) ....………………..……                                22
                                                                                                 22

In re Curry, 450 Mass. 503, 880 N.E.2d 388 (2008)
In re Curry, 450 Mass. 503, 880 N.E.2d 388 (2008) .………………..……                                    22
                                                                                                 22

In re Driscoll, 447 Mass. 678, 856 N.E.2d 840 (2006)
In re Driscoll, 447 Mass. 678, 856 N.E.2d 840 (2006) ...…………………….                                22
                                                                                                 22

In re Johnson, 450 Mass. 165, 877 N.E.2d 249 (2007) .…………………..
In re Johnson, 450 Mass. 165, 877 N.E.2d 249 (2007) ...                                            1
                                                                                                   1

In re Meade, 103 Wash.2d 374, 693 P.2d 713 (1985) …..…………………
In re Meade, 103 Wash.2d 374, 693 P.2d 713 (1985) ...                                            27
                                                                                                 27

In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct. 623 (1955)
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct. 623 (1955) …..……………                                24, 27
                                                                                           24, 27

In re Robson, 575 P.2d 771 (Alaska 1978) …..……………………………...
In re Robson, 575 P.2d 771 (Alaska 1978) ...                                                     27

In re Rose, 22 Cal.4th 430, 993 P.2d 956 (Calif. 2000) …..……………….
In re Rose, 22 Cal.4th 430, 993 P.2d 956 (Calif. 2000) ...                                       22
                                                                                                 22

In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. (Ohio) 544 (1968)
In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. (Ohio) 544 (1968) …..………………                           i, 19, 24-25, 32
                                                                              i, 19, 24-25, 32

In re Schlesinger, 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961) …..…………………
In re Schlesinger, 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961) ...                                          27
                                                                                                 27

Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Shewmaker, 842 S.W.2d 520 (Ky.1992)
KentuckyBar Ass'n v. Shewmaker, 842 S.W.2d 520 (Ky. 1992) ...……….                                27
                                                                                                 27

Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957)
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) ... ……………                             28
                                                                                                 28

Matter of Budnitz, 425 Mass. 1018, 681 N.E.2d 813,
Matterof Budnitz, 425 Mass. 1018, 681 N.E.2d 813,
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1160, 119 S.Ct. 2052 (1997)
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1160, 119 S.Ct. 2052 (1997) …..…………………..                                  22
                                                                                                 22

Matterof Ellis, 425 Mass. 332, 680 N.E.2d 1154 (June 27, 1997) ... ……...
Matter of Ellis, 425 Mass. 332, 680 N.E.2d 1154 (June 27, 1997)                                  22
                                                                                                 22

Matter of Jaques, 972 F.Supp. 1070 (E.D.Tex.1997)
Matter of Jaques, 972 F.Supp. 1070 (E.D.Tex.1997) ...…..………………….                                 27

Matter of Kerlinsky, 428 Mass 656, 704 N.E.2d 503 (1999)
Matter of Kerlinsky, 428 Mass 656, 704 N.E.2d 503 (1999) ... …..………                          9, 22
                                                                                             9, 22

Matter of Saab, 406 Mass. 315, 547 N.E.2d 919 (1989) …………………..
Matterof Saab, 406 Mass. 315, 547 N.E.2d 919 (1989) ...                                          23
                                                                                                 23

Matterof Schoepfer, 426 Mass. 183, 687 N.E.2d 391 (Dec. 3, 1997) ...
Matter of Schoepfer, 426 Mass. 183, 687 N.E.2d 391 (Dec. 3, 1997) ……...                          22
                                                                                                 22
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Matter of Segal, 430 Mass. 359, 719 N.E.2d 480 (1999) ……………………
Matterof Segal, 430 Mass. 359, 719 N.E.2d 480 (1999) ...                                        22
                                                                                                22

Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988)
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988) …..……………………………………..                                         11
                                                                                                11

Middlesex County Ethics Committee Garden State Bar Ass'n,
Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n,
1981 WL 389660 (Petitioner’s brief) …..…………………………..…………..
1981 WL 389660 (Petitioner's brief) ...                                                         26
                                                                                                26

Middlesex County Ethics Committee Garden State Bar Ass'n,
Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n,
457 U.S. (N.J.) 423 (1982)
457 U.S. (N.J.) 423 (1982) …..…………………………..………………….                                          19-20
                                                                                            19-20

Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966)
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) ...…..……………………………………                                      28.
                                                                                                28.

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) ...…..……………..                              28
                                                                                                28

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ....…..…………………                              29
                                                                                                29

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. (Ky.) 693 (1976) …..…………………………..……..
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. (Ky.) 693 (1976) ...                                                    26
                                                                                                26

People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo.1986) ……..……………………………
People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo.1986) ...                                                  27
                                                                                                27

Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955)
Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) …..……..……………………..……….                                      25
                                                                                                25

Pioneer Land Co. v. Maddux, 109 Cal. 633 (1895) …..………………………
Pioneer Land Co. v. Maddux, 109 Cal. 633 (1895) ...                                             32
                                                                                                32

Pretzer v. Motor Vehicle Bd., 125 S.W.3d 23 (2003)
Pretzer v. Motor Vehicle Bd., 125 S.W.3d 23 (2003) ...…..…………………….                              23
                                                                                                23

Randallv. Brigham, 74 U.S. (Mass.) 523, 7 7 Wall. 523 (1868) ………..
Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (Mass.) 523, Wall. 523 (1868) ...                              25, 29.
                                                                                           25, 29.

Republican Party of Minnesota v.v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) ……………
Republican Party of Minnesota White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002)                                        11
                                                                                                11

     v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) ………………….……………….                                      11
                                                                                                11


Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. (La.) 317 (1917) ………………….……………… 31
Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. (La.) 317 (1917) ...            31

Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917) ..………………….…………………….
Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917) ...                                                      24

Snyder v. Com. of Mass., 291 U.S. 97 (1934)
Snyder v. Com. of Mass., 291 U.S. 97 (1934) ………………….…………....... 31
                                                                31

Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) ………………….……………………… 27
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) ...               27

State v. Turner, 217 Kan. 574, 538 P.2d 966 (1975)
State v. Turner, 217 Kan. 574, 538 P.2d 966 (1975) ...…………………………. 27
                                                                  27

Suber v. Pennsylvania Com'n on Crime and Delinquency,
Suber v. Pennsylvania Com'n on Crime and Delinquency,
885 A.2d 678 (2005)
885 A.2d 678 (2005) ………………….………………….………………….…….                                                 21
                                                                                                21
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                                                            viii
                                                            Vi"


Sullivan v. Gage, 145 Cal. 759, 79 P. 537 (1905) ………………….………..
Sullivanv. Gave, 145 Cal. 759, 79 P. 537 (1905) ...                                                                 32
                                                                                                                    32

Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) ………………….………………..
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) ...                                                                        11
                                                                                                                    11

Trial of John Peter Zenger, 17 Howell's State Trials 675 (1735)
Trialof John Peter Zenger, 17 Howell's State Trials 675 (1735) ... …………                                             29
                                                                                                                    29

Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 US 274 (1876) .....................................................
Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 US 274 (1876) ...                                                                            31
                                                                                                                    31

Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. (Wis.) 433 (1971)
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. (Wis.) 433 (1971) .............................                                26
                                                                                                                    26


                                                CONSTITUTIONS
                                                CONSTITUTIONS

United States Constitution
United States Constitution
Article III
Article III .................................................................................................. 10, 24
                                                                                                               10,
Bill of Rights …………………………………………………………………
Billof Rights ...                                                                                                  30
                                                                                                                   30
First Amendment ................................................. i, 3, 10-11, 14-15, 20, 28, 30
FirstAmendment ...                                                               i, 3, 10-11, 14-15, 20, 28, 30
Fourteenth Amendment                                                             i, iv-v, 1, 4,, 11, 19-20, 25-27
FourteenthAmendment ......................................... i, iv-v, 1, 4,, 11, 19-20, 25-27

Constitution of of Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Constitution Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights                                                         4, 20, 29, 32
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights ................................................ 4, 20, 29, 32
Article XII, Declaration Rights ...                                                             4, 20, 32
Article XII, Declaration of of Rights ........................................................ 4, 20, 32


                                                     STATUTES
                                                     STATUTES

Federal Statutes
Federal Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ......................................................................................
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ...                                                                                            3-4
                                                                                                                   3-4
Civil Rights Act of 1957) .............................................................................
CivilRights Act of 1957) ...                                                                                        25
                                                                                                                    25


Massachusetts Statutes
Massachusetts Statutes
M.G.L. c. 209C, §13, as amended, eff. 3/31/1998 ............ 5-6. APP-4, APP-28,
M.G.L. c. 209C, §13, as amended, eff. 3/31/1998 ...          5-6. APP-4, APP-28,
                                APP-41, APP-45, APP-50-51, APP-60, APP-65
                        APP-34, APP-41, APP-45, APP-50-51, APP-60, APP-65

M.G.L. c. 233, §1 et seq. Administrative Procedures Act ...
M.G.L. c. 233, §1 et seq. Administrative Procedures Act ........................                                 5, 15
                                                                                                                 5, 15


/M.G.L. c. 233, §8 ..........................................
/M.G.L. c. 233, §8 ...                                                      APP-37, APP-60, APP-64
                                                                     APP-4, APP-37, APP-60, APP-64

California Statutes
California Statutes
California Administrative Agency Law
CaliforniaAdministrative Agency Law ... ......................................................                      21
                                                                                                                    21
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                                                          ix
                                                          ix

                                                     RULES
                                                     RULES

Supreme Judicial Court Rules
Supreme Judicial Court Rules
Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:07
Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:07 .................................................................              5-6
                                                                                                                5-6
Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01
Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01 .................................................................              8-9
                                                                                                                8-9

Canon One, DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6) ......................................................... 5-6, 11
Canon One, DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6) ...                                                            5-6, 11
Canon Six, DR 6-101 (A)(l) and (2) ................................................................
Canon Six, DR 6-101 (A)(1) and (2) ...                                                                 6
                                                                                                       6
Canon Seven, DR 7-101(A)(3) ........................................................................
Canon Seven, DR 7-101(A)(3) ...

Massachusetts Rules of of Professional Conduct
Massachusetts Rules Professional Conduct
Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.6 (a) ................................................................................... 6-7
Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.6(a) ...
                                                                                         APP-30, APP-54
                                                                            APP-2, APP-30, APP-54

Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.9(c)(1) ...
Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.9 (c)(1) .................................................................................. 6
                                                                                                             6
                                                                         APP-30, APP-42, APP-54
                                                             APP-2, APP-30, APP-42, APP-54

Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.9(c)(2) ...
Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.9 (c)(2) .................................................................................. 6
                                                                                                             6
                                                                         APP-30, APP-42, APP-54
                                                             APP-2, APP-30, APP-42, APP-54

Mass.R.Prof C. 1.15 (a) .................................................................................
Mass.R.Prof C. 1.15(a) ...                                                                                7
                                                                                                          7
                                                                         APP-30, APP-42, APP-54
                                                             APP-2, APP-30, APP-42, APP-54

Mass.R.Prof C. 1.15 (b) ..................................................................................
Mass.R.Prof C. 1.15(b) ...                                                                                 7
                                                                                                           7
                                                           APP-30, APP-35, APP-42, APP-54
                                              APP-2, APP-30, APP-35, APP-42, APP-54

Mass.R.Prof C. 1.15(c) ...
Mass.R.Prof C. 1.15 (c) .................................................................................. 7
                                                                                                           7
                                                                          APP-30, APP-42, APP-54
                                                             APP-2, APP-30, APP-42, APP-54

                        .................................................................................
Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.16 (d) ...
Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.16                                                                                       7
                                                                                                          7
                                                                                       APP-30, APP-54
                                                                          APP-2, APP-30, APP-54

Mass.R.Prof.C. 3.4(c) ...
Mass.R.Prof.C. 3.4 (c) .................................................................................... 7
                                                                                                            7
                                                            APP-28, APP-32, APP-51, APP-60
                                            APP-2-3, APP-28, APP-32, APP-51, APP-60

Mass.R.Prof.C. 4.4 ........................
Mass.R.Prof.C.                                                     APP-28, APP-51, APP-66
                                                     APP-2, APP-4, APP-28, APP-51, APP-66

Mass.R.Prof.C. 8.3 (b) ............................................................................... 6-7, 28
Mass.R.Prof.C. 8.3(b) ...                                                                              6-7, 28
                                                                          APP-30, APP-42, APP-54
                                                              APP-2, APP-30, APP-42, APP-54

Mass.R.Prof.C. 8.4 (c) .................................................................................. 5, 8
Mass.R.Prof.C. 8.4 (c) ...                                                                                5, 8
                                             APP-28, APP-32, APP-51, APP-54, APP-60
                             APP-2-3, APP-28, APP-32, APP-51, APP-54, APP-60
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                                                               X

Mass.R.Prof.C. 8.4 (d) ....................................................................... 5, 8, 10, 20
Mass.R.Prof.C. 8.4 (d) ...                                                                     5, 8, 10, 20
                                            APP-28, APP-32, APP-51, APP-54, APP-60
                            APP-2-3, APP-28, APP-32, APP-51, APP-54, APP-60

Mass.R.Prof.C. 8.4 (h).................................................................................... 5, 8
Mass.R.Prof.C. 8.4 (h) ...                                                                                 5, 8
                             APP-28, APP-30, APP-32, APP-51, APP-54, APP-60
                 APP-2-3, APP-28, APP-30, APP-32, APP-51, APP-54, APP-60

Board of Bar Rules
Board of Bar Rules
Board Rule 3.15(f) ........................................................................................ 8, 15
Board Rule 3.15(f) ...                                                                                      8, 15
Board Rule 3.18(a) .......................................................................................
Board Rule 3.18(a) ...                                                                                          8
                                                                                                                8
Board Rule §3.22(c) ...............................................
Board Rule §3.22(c) ...                                                    8, APP-3, APP-38, APP-63
                                                                           8, APP-3, APP-38, APP-63
Board Rule §4.5 ........................................................................... 9, 15, APP-37
Board Rule §4.5 ...                                                                            9, 15, APP-37


Single Justice Practice and Procedure ......................................................
Single Justice Practice and Procedure ...                                                                         9, 17
                                                                                                                  9, 17

JuvenileCourt Standing Order 1-84 ... ..................................
Juvenile Court Standing Order 1-84                                                             APP_26, APP-28
                                                                                               APP 26, APP-28


                                               MISCELLANEOUS
                                               MISCELLANEOUS

Black's Law Dictionary 861 (8th 2004) ...
Black's Law Dictionary 861 (8th eded 2004) ...................................................                       32
                                                                                                                     32

Brewer, Wilburn, Jr., Due process Lawyer Disciplinary Cases:
Brewer, Wilburn, Jr., Due process inin Lawyer Disciplinary Cases:
From the Cradle to the Grave, 42 S.C.L.Rev. 925 (1991) ..........................
From the Cradle to the Grave, 42 S.C.L.Rev. 925 (1991)                                                               37
                                                                                                                     37

Ecclesiastes, 3:1, 7 .......................................................................................
Ecclesiastes, 3:1, 7 ...                                                                                             11
                                                                                                                     11

Magna Carta [or Charta]
Magna Carta [or Charta] ................................................................................             29
                                                                                                                     29


                                                   APPENDICES
                                                   APPENDICES

APPENDIX
APPENDIX A A
Opinion, 5 December 2007, Massachusetts
Opinion, 5 December 2007, Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth
Supreme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth ... …...........................                                   APP-1
                                                                                                               APP-1

APPENDIX
APPENDIX B B
Amended Findings and Rulings on
Amended Findings and Rulings on
Bar Counsel's Petition for Contempt, 20 October 2006,
Bar Counsel's Petition for Contempt, 20 October 2006,
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County ………
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County                                                        APP-7
                                                                                                               APP-7

APPENDIX
APPENDIX C C
Findings and Rulings on
Findingsand Rulings on
Bar Counsel's Petition for Contempt, 19 October 2006,
Bar Counsel's Petition for Contempt, 19 October 2006,
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                                                 xi
                                                 Xi

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County ………
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County                                         APP-14
                                                                                                APP-14

APPENDIX
APPENDIX D D
Judgmentof Disbarment, 9 9 August 2006,
Judgment of Disbarment, August 2006,
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County ………                                     APP-21
                                                                                                APP-21

APPENDIX
APPENDIX E E
Memorandum and Judgment Disbarment, 9 9 August 2006,
Memorandumand Judgment ofof Disbarment, August 2006,
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County ………                                     APP-26
                                                                                                APP-26

APPENDIX
APPENDIX F F
Summaries by Petitioner Counts I, II, and III III
Summaries by Petitioner ofof Counts I, II, and ... …………................                         APP-41
                                                                                                APP-41

APPENDIX
APPENDIX G G
The SJC Decision of 5 December 2007
The SJC Decision of 5 December 2007
with Petitioner’s Comments Interleaved ….......................................
withPetitioner's Comments Interleaved                                                           APP-44
                                                                                                APP-44
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                                            1
                                            1
                   PETITION FOR A A WRIT CERTIORARI
                   PETITION FOR WRIT OF OF CERTIORARI

      Petitioner Barbara Johnson respectfully petitions for a of certiorari to
      PetitionerBarbara Johnson respectfully petitions for a writwrit of certiorari to

review the judgments of disbarment and contempt and the affirmance thereof by
review the judgments of disbarment and of of contempt and the affirmance thereof by

the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. In plain contravention require-
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. In plain contravention of theof the require-

ments of the Constitutions the United States and of of Commonwealth of Mas-
ments of the Constitutions ofof the United States and thethe Commonwealth of Mas-

sachusetts, the Board of Bar Overseers and Office Bar Counsel embarked on an
sachusetts, the Board of Bar Overseers and Office ofof Bar Counsel embarked on an

ad hoc, standardless, subjective, arbitrary, and capricious exercise that deprived
ad hoc, standardless, subjective, arbitrary, and capricious exercise that deprived the the

petitioner of her rights due process and equal rights guaranteed by by Four-
petitionerof her rights toto due process and equal rights guaranteed the the Four-

teenth Amendment, and ultimately recommended to SJC that the the Petitioner
teenth Amendment, and ultimately recommended to thethe SJC that Petitioner be be

disbarred, a recommendation that the SJC adopted.
disbarred, a recommendation that the SJC adopted.


                                 OPINIONS BELOW
                                 OPINIONS BELOW

      Johnson filed two appeals, one from the judgment of of disbarment, another
      Johnson filed two appeals, one from the judgment disbarment, another

from the finding and rulings contempt. The The former was entered into the
from the finding and rulings onon contempt. former was entered into the Mas- Mas-

sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth SJC-09820. The lat-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth as as SJC-09820. The lat-

ter was entered into same court as SJC-09866.
ter was entered into same court as SJC-09866.

      On 5 December 2007, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court the
      On 5 December 2007, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court forfor the

Commonwealth [“SJC”] consolidated the appeals and affirmed both of judg-
Commonwealth["SJC"] consolidated the appeals and affirmed both of thethe judg-

ments issued by Justice Francis X. Spina, who sat a a single justice in Massa-
ments issued by Justice Francis X. Spina, who sat asas single justice in thethe Massa-

chusetts Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County [aka "County Court"].
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County [aka the the “County Court”].

      The consolidated opinion by the full panel the SJC entered on that same
      The consolidated opinion by the full panel of of the SJC entered on that same

date, 5 December 2007. The opinion was published In re re Johnson, 450 Mass.
date, 5 December 2007. The opinion was published as as In Johnson, 450 Mass.
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                                                   2

                           [APPENDIX-A APP-1].
165, 877 N.E.2d 249 (2007) [APPENDIX-A at at APP-1].

        The entry of judgment of disbarment after rescript was entered the the Mas-
        The entry of judgment of disbarment after rescript was entered intointo Mas-

sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County 4 4 January 2008.
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County on onJanuary 2008.

        In Massachusetts, an appeal from an attorney-disciplinary proceeding at
        In Massachusetts, an appeal from an attorney-disciplinary proceeding at the the

Board of Bar Overseers, identified by the SJC an "affiliated entity," is taken in
Board of Bar Overseers, identified by the SJC asas an “affiliated entity,” is taken in

the single-justice session of the County Court, not the Appeals Court.
the single-justice session of the County Court, not the Appeals Court.

             August 2006, the Judgment of Disbarment [APPENDIX-D at APP-21]
        On 9 August 2006, the Judgment of Disbarment [APPENDIX-D at APP-211

issued from the County Court (Spina, F.X., J.). This judgment appears not to
issued from the County Court (Spina, F.X., J.). This judgment appears not to have have

been published. On the same day, Justice Spina also issued a Memorandum and
been published. On the same day, Justice Spina also issued a Memorandum and

Judgment of Disbarment [APPENDIX-E at APP-26]. This document was
Judgmentof Disbarment [APPENDIX-E at APP-261. This document was pub- pub-

lished in the Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, but does not appear in Westlaw's da- da-
lished in the Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, but does not appear in Westlaw’s

tabase, so Petitionerassumes that it it was not published thethe Commonwealth’s offi-
tabase, so Petitioner assumes that was not published in in Commonwealth's off-

cial reporter.
cial reporter.

        On 19 October 2006, Justice Spina issued his Findings and Rulings Bar
        On 19 October 2006, Justice Spina issued his Findings and Rulings on on Bar

Counsel's Petition for Contempt against Johnson [APPENDIX-C at APP-14],
Counsel's Petition for Contempt against Johnson [APPENDIX-C at APP-14],

again in the County Court. On October 2006, Justice Spina amended a sentence
again in the County Court. On 2020 October 2006, Justice Spina amended a sentence

in his findings and issued the document entitled Amended Findings Rulings on
in his findings and issued the document entitled Amended Findings andand Rulings on

Bar Counsel's Petition for Contempt [APPENDIX-B at APP-7].\1/
Bar Counsel's Petition for Contempt [APPENDIX-B at APP-7].\1/


i
1   Justice Spina’s amendment consisted of a change in one sentence.
    Justice Spina's amendment consisted of a change in one sentence.
    On October 19th, the sentence read,
    On October 19th, the sentence read,
          "There is nothing remotely flimsy or whimsical about the findings of the Board of Bar Overse-
          “There is nothing remotely fimsy or whimsical about the fndings of the Board of Bar Overse-
         ers as to the respondent’s misconduct” [APP-19].
         ers as to the respondent's misconduct" APP-19].
    On October 20th, the sentence read,
    On October 20th, the sentence read,
        “There is nothing facially fimsy or whimsical about the fndings of the Board of Bar Overseers
        "There is nothing facially flimsy or whimsical about the findings of the Board of Bar Overseers
        that might render the judgment of disbarment transparently invalid" APP-12 .
        that might render the judgment of disbarment transparently invalid” [APP-12].
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                                             3
                                             3
                                   JURISDICTION
                                   JURISDICTION

       The Board of Bar Overseers recommended disbarment on 20 March 2006.
       The Board of Bar Overseers recommended disbarment on 20 March 2006.

Subsequently, the BBO general counsel filed an Information seeking disbarment
Subsequently, the BBO general counsel filed an Information seeking disbarment on on

16 May 2006 with the Supreme Judicial Court Suffolk County (single-justice
16 May 2006 with the Supreme Judicial Court forfor Suffolk County (single-justice

session). The County Court adopted the BBO’s recommendation of disbarment
session). The County Court adopted the BBO's recommendation of disbarment andand

issued the judgment of disbarment on 9 9 August 2006, the judgmentcontempt on on
issued the judgment of disbarment on August 2006, the judgment of of contempt

19 October 2006, and the amended judgment of contempt on 20 October 2006. The
19 October 2006, and the amended judgment of contempt on 20 October 2006. The

affirming judgments of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for for the Com-
affirming judgments of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Courtthe Com-

monwealth entered into the Full Court 5 5 December 2007 and rescript en-
monwealthentered into the Full Court on onDecember 2007 and thethe rescript en-

tered into the County Court on 4 January 2008.
tered into the County Court on 4 January 2008.

       The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
       The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).


                 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
                 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
                             United States Constitution
                             United States Constitution

U.S. Const., Article 6, cl. 2.
U.S. Const., Article 6, cl. 2.      Clause 2 of Article VI reads in pertinent part,
                                    Clause 2 of Article VI reads in pertinent part,
"This Constitution, and the Laws the United States which shall be made in Pur-
“This Constitution, and the Laws of of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; the Judges in every
suance thereof .... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; andand the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing the Constitution or or Laws of State to
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in in the ConstitutionLaws of any any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.”
the Contrary notwithstanding."

U.S. Const., First Amendment. The First Amendment provides, in pertinent
U.S. Const., First Amendment. The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part: part:
"Congress shall make no law . . abridging freedom of of speech, or of press; or
“Congress shall make no law ... .abridging thethe freedomspeech, or of the the press; or
the right of the people . . to petition the Government for a redress of of grievances.”
the right of the people . . . . to petition the Government for a redressgrievances."

U.S. Const., Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent
U.S. Const., Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: part:
"No person shall . . be deprived life, liberty, or or property, without due process
“No person shall ... .be deprived of of life, liberty,property, without due process of of
law.”
law."

U.S. Const., Ninth Amendment. The Ninth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: part:
U.S. Const., Ninth Amendment. The Ninth Amendment provides, in pertinent
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to to
deny or disparage others retained by the people.”
deny or disparage others retained by the people."
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                                               4

U.S. Const., Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1. 1. Sectionof thethe Fourteenth
U.S. Const., Fourteenth Amendment, Section Section 1 1 of Fourteenth
Amendment reads in pertinent part, “No state shall make or enforce law law which
Amendment reads in pertinent part, "No state shall make or enforce any any which
shall abridge the privileges immunities of of citizens of United States; nor nor
shall abridge the privileges oror immunities citizens of the the United States; shallshall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, property, without due process of law;
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within jurisdiction the equal protection of the the laws.”
nor deny to any person within itsits jurisdiction the equal protection oflaws."

              Constitution of of Commonwealth of Massachusetts
              Constitution thethe Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Mass. Const., Part the First, Declaration of Rights, XII. Regulation of prosecu-
Mass. Const., Part the First, Declaration of Rights, art.art. XII. Regulation of prosecu-
tions; right of trial byby jury criminal cases. Article XII reads: "No subject shall be
tions; right of trial jury in in criminal cases. Article XII reads: “No subject shall be
held to answer for any crimes or offence, until the same is fully plainly, substan-
held to answer for any crimes or offence, until the same is fully andand plainly, substan-
tially and formally, described him; or or compelled to to accuse, furnish evidence
tiallyand formally, described to to him; be be compelled accuse, or or furnish evidence
against himself. And every subject shall have a right to produce all proofs, may
against himself. And every subject shall have a right to produce all proofs, thatthat may
be favorable to him; to meet the witnesses against him face to to face, and be be fully
be favorable to him; to meet the witnesses against him face face, and to to fully
heard in his defence by himself, or his council, his election. And no subject shall be
heard in his defence by himself, or his council, at at his election. And no subject shall be
arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived his property, immunities, or privi-
arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived ofof his property, immunities, or privi-
leges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled, deprived of of life, liberty, or es-
leges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled, or or deprived hishis life, liberty, or es-
tate, but by the judgment his peers, or the law of of land...
tate, but by the judgment ofof his peers, or the law thethe land. . . .” ."

Mass. Const., Part the First, Declaration of Rights, XXIX. Article XXIX reads in
Mass. Const., Part the First, Declaration of Rights, art.art. XXIX. Article XXIX reads in
pertinent part, “It essential to to preservation of the the rights of every individual,
pertinent part, "It is is essential thethe preservation of rights of every individual,
his life, liberty, property, and character, that there be an impartial interpretation of
his life, liberty, property, and character, that there be an impartial interpretation of
the laws, and administration justice. It It is right of every citizen to be tried tried
the laws, and administration of of justice.is the the right of every citizen to be by by
judges as free, impartial and independent the lot of of humanity will admit. . . .
judges as free, impartial and independent asas the lot humanity will admit...


                                STATUTES INVOLVED
                                STATUTES INVOLVED
                                     Federal Statutes
                                     Federal Statutes

             §1257(a). JURISDICTION VENUE: State State courts; certiorari.
28 U.S.C. M57(a). JURISDICTION ANDAND VENUE: courts; certiorari. Final Final
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court a a State which a decision
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of of State in in which a decision
could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ certiorari where the
could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of of certiorari where the
validity of a treaty or statute of of the United States is drawn in question or where
validity of a treaty or statute the United States is drawn in question or where the the
validity of a statute of any State is drawn in in question on ground of its being re-
validity of a statute of any State is drawn question on the the ground of its being re-
pugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of United States, or where any any
pugnantto the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the the United States, or where ti- ti-
tle, right, privilege, immunity is is specially set up or claimed under the Constitu-
tle, right, privilege, oror immunityspecially set up or claimed under the Constitu-
tion or the treaties or statutes or any commission held or or authority exercised
tion or the treaties or statutes of,of, or any commission held authority exercised un- un-
der, the United States.
der, the United States.

           §2201(a). DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS: Creation of remedy. In a
28 U.S.C. U201(a). DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS: Creation of remedy. In a case case
of actual controversy within jurisdiction, ... . . any of the United States,
of actual controversy within itsits jurisdiction,, .any, courtcourt of the United States,
upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare rights and other legal
upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare thethe rights and other legal
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further
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                                                  5
                                                  5
relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of
relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a a
finaljudgment or decree and shall be reviewable asas such.
final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable such.

                                   Massachusetts Statutes
                                   Massachusetts Statutes

M.G.L. c. 30A. State Administrative Procedure. [See BBO Rules and 3.391. Sec-
M.G.L. c. 30A. State Administrative Procedure. [See BBO Rules 3.23.2 and 3.39]. Sec-
tion IIA. Definitions TheThe following terms as used in section eleven A1/2 have have
tion 11A. Definitions following terms as used in section eleven A1/2 shall shall
the following meanings: . . . “‘Governmental body’, a state board, committee, special
the following meanings: . . . "`Governmental body', a state board, committee, special
committee, subcommittee or commission, however created oror constituted within the
committee, subcommittee or commission, however created constituted within the
executive or legislative branch the commonwealth or the governing board or or body
executive or legislative branch ofof the commonwealth or the governing boardbody
of any authority established by the general court to serve a public purpose in
of any authority established by the general court to serve a public purpose in the the
commonwealthor any part thereof, but shall not not include the general court or
commonwealth or any part thereof, but shall include the general court or
thecommittees or or recess commissions thereof, orof the judicial judicial
the committees recess commissions thereof, or bodies bodies of the
branch, or any meeting of a quasi-judicial board or commission held for the
branch, or any meeting of a quasi-judicial board or commission held for the
sole purpose of making a decision required an adjudicatory proceeding brought
sole purpose of makinga decision required inin an adjudicatory proceeding brought
before it.        [emphasis supplied].
before it.... . . [emphasis supplied].

M.G.L. c. 209C, §13. Children Born of Wedlock: Inspection of documents; copies;
M.G.L. c. 209C, M. Children Born out out of Wedlock: Inspection of documents; copies;
segregation of records. In an action establish paternity or or in which paternity
segregation of records. In an action toto establish paternityin which paternity of a of a
child is an issue, all complaints, pleadings, papers, documents or or reports filed in
child is an issue, all complaints, pleadings, papers, documents reports filed in
connection therewith, docket entries in in the permanent docket and record books
connection therewith, docket entries the permanent docket and record books
shall be segregated and unavailable for inspection only if the judge of court
shall be segregated and unavailable for inspection only if the judge of thethe court
where such records are kept, for good cause shown, so orders... . . .
where such records are kept, for good cause shown, so orders.

M.G.L. c. 233, §1, Issuance of summonses for witnesses. clerk of a a court record,
M.G.L. c. 233, §1, Issuance of summonses for witnesses. AA clerk of court of of record,
a notary public or justice of the peace may issue summonses for witnesses in all
a notary public or aa justice of the peace may issue summonses for witnesses in all
cases pending before courts, magistrates, auditors, referees, arbitrators or other
cases pending before courts, magistrates, auditors, referees, arbitrators or other
persons authorized to examine witnesses, and all hearings upon applications for
persons authorized to examine witnesses, and atat all hearings upon applications for
complaintswherein aa person may be charged with the commissionaof a crime. . . .
complaints wherein person may be charged with the commission of crime...


                                      RULES INVOLVED
                                      RULESINVOLVED
            Former Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Court Rule 3:07.
            Former Massachusetts Supreme JudicialRule 3:07.
                Massachusetts Rules of of Professional Conduct\
                Massachusetts Rules Professional Conduct\FN2/ FN2/


   The Rules of Professional Conduct were revised and the Canons were subsumed by them; e.g.,
2 The Rules of Professional Conduct were revised and the Canons were subsumed by them; e.g.,
2

Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(5), was subsumed in Mass.R.Prof.C 8.4(d). The OBC had charged Johnson
Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(5), was subsumed in Mass.R.Prof.C 8.4(d). The OBC had charged Johnson
under the new rules, but the special hearing officer added the former Canons to his written findings,
under the new rules, but the special hearing officer added the former Canons to his written findings,
resulting in the duplication of alleged violations. The SJC also used both the former Canons and the
resulting in the duplication of alleged violations. The SJC also used both the former Canons and the
new rules, continuing the duplication of alleged violations.
new rules, continuing the duplication of alleged violations.
    Notwithstanding that the words “prejudicial to the administration of justice” do not appear in
    Notwithstanding that the words "prejudicial to the administration of justice" do not appear in
the SJC opinion [APP-1 et sea], there are several references to Rule 8.4(d) [APP-3-4; see also
                        et seq],                   references to Rule 8.4(d) APP-3-4;         also
APP-17, 21-22, 29], which was the subject of two motions fled by Petitioner in the BBO: (1) Motion
APP-17, 21-22, 29], which was the subject of two motions filed by Petitioner in the BBO: (1) Motion
to Dismiss Charges of Violation of Mass. Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(c), (d), and (h); (2) Sec-
to Dismiss Charges of Violation of Mass. Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(c), (d), and (h); (2) Sec-
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                                                  6

Former Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6). (A) A lawyer shall not: . (5) Engage
Former Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6). (A) A lawyer shall not:... .(5). Engage in in
conduct that is prejudicial the administration of justice.      (6) Engage in any other
conduct that is prejudicial toto the administration of justice. (6) Engage in any other
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
conduct that adversely refects on his fitness to practice law.
Former Canon 6, DR 6-101(A)(1)-(3).\FN3 (A) A lawyer shall not: (1) Handle a
Former Canon 6, DR 6-101(A)(1)-(3).\FN3// (A) A lawyer shall not: (1) Handle a le- le-
gal matter which he knows should know that he is is competent to handle with-
gal matter which he knows oror should know that henotnot competent to handle with-
out associating with him lawyer who is is competent to handle        (2) Handle le-
out associating with him a a lawyer who competent to handle it. it. (2) Handle aa le-
gal matter without preparation adequate in circumstances.          (3) Neglect legal
gal matter without preparation adequate in the the circumstances. (3) Neglect aalegal
       entrusted to him.
matterentrusted to him.
matter

Former Canon 7, DR 7-101(A)(3). (A) A lawyer shall not: (3) Prejudice or damage
Former Canon 7, DR 7-101(A)(3). (A) A lawyer shall not: (3) Prejudice or damage
his client during the course the professional relationship except as as required under
his client during the course ofof the professional relationship except required under
    7-102(B)
DR 7-102(B)

                         Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:07.
                         Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:07.
                    Massachusetts Rules of of Professional Conduct
                    Massachusetts Rules Professional Conduct

Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.6(a, b(2)). Confidentiality of Information.
Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.6(a, b(2)). Confidentiality of Information. (a) A lawyer shall not
                                                                       (a) A lawyer shall not
reveal confidential information relating to representation of a of a client unless the cli-
reveal confidential information relating to representation client unless the cli-
ent consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized
ent consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized
in order to carry out the representation, and except stated in in paragraph
in order to carry out the representation, and except as as statedparagraph (b). (b). (b)  (b)
A lawyer may reveal, and to the extent required Rule 3.3, Rule 4.1(b), or or Rule
A lawyer may reveal, and to the extent required by by Rule 3.3, Rule 4.1(b),Rule 8.3 8.3
must reveal, such information: . . (2) to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
must reveal, such information:... (2). to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer a a controversy
necessary to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in in controversy be-be-
tween the lawyer and the client, to to establishdefense to to... civil claimclaim against
tween the lawyer and the client, establish a a defense a a . . . civil against
the lawyer . .. .. ., ,or to respond to allegations in in any proceeding concerning the law-
the lawyer              or to respond to allegations any proceeding concerning the law-
yer's representation of the client... . . .
yer's representation of the client.

Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.9(c). Conflict ofof Interest: Former Client. (c) A lawyer who has
Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.9(c). Conflict Interest: Former Client.        (c) A lawyer who has
formerly represented client in a a matter . . . shall not thereafter, unless the
formerlyrepresented aa client in matter ... shall not thereafter, unless the formerformer

and Motion for More Definite Statement or in the Alternative Dismiss the Petition for Discipline.
ond Motion for More Definite Statement or in the Alternative Dismiss the Petition for Discipline.
    The SJC opinion did not state explicitly how Petitioner violated Canon 6, DR 6-101. The only hint
3 The SJC opinion did not state explicitly how Petitioner violated Canon 6, DR 6-101. The only hint
3

is the Court saying Petitioner should have appealed certain orders. Because one order arose out of a
is the Court saying Petitioner should have appealed certain orders. Because one order arose out of a
closed case without anything cognizable as a Complaint and no notice of any Complaint and/or hear-
closed case without anything cognizable as a Complaint and no notice of any Complaint and/or hear-
ing was served on either Petitioner's client or Petitioner, there was no possibility of an appeal. That
ing was served on either Petitioner’s client or Petitioner, there was no possibility of an appeal. That
order commanded Johnson to remove from her website webfles that never existed on her website.
order commanded Johnson to remove from her website webfiles that never existed on her website.
     A second order by retired judge was in a letter to Johnson. Given that the order was invalid on
     A secondorder by aaretired judge was in a letter to Johnson. Given that the order was invalid on
its face and was fled in no court, no appeal was possible.
its face and was filedin no court, no appeal was possible.
     A third judgment merely allowed the OBC prosecutor to obtain files from a closed case in Bristol
     A third judgment merely allowed the OBC prosecutor to obtain fles from a closed case in Bristol
County Probate & Family Court. Petitioner’s client had previously unsuccessfully tried to open that
County Probate & Family Court. Petitioner's client had previously unsuccessfully tried to open that
case. This judgment implicated M.G.L. 209C, §13, amended and effective as of 30 March 1998,
case. This judgment implicated M.G.L. c.c. 209C,§13, amended and effective as of 30 March 1998,
several years before Johnson filed an appearance. Johnson fought this in the lower court, at the
several years before Johnson filed an appearance. Johnson fought this in the lower court, at the
BBO, and attempted to persuade the higher appellate courts in the Commonwealth to review the
BBO, and attempted to persuade the higher appellate courts in the Commonwealth to review the
matter and interpret §13 as amended. The higher courts declined the invitation to interpret the
matter and interpret § 13 as amended. The higher courts declined the invitation to interpret the
amended statute.
amended statute.
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                                                  7
                                                  7
client consents after consultation: (1) use confidential information relating to
clientconsents after consultation: (1) use confidential information relating to thethe
representation to the disadvantage the former client, to to lawyer's advantage,
representation to the disadvantage ofof the former client,thethe lawyer's advantage, .
     except as Rule 1.6, Rule 3.3, or Rule 4.1 would permit require with respect to to
. .. except as Rule 1.6, Rule 3.3, or Rule 4.1 would permit oror require with respecta a
client; or (2) reveal confidential information relating to the representation except
client; or (2) reveal confidential information relating to the representation except as as
Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit require with respect to to a client.
Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit oror require with respecta client.

Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.15(a-c), Safekeeping Property (in effect through 12/31/03).\FN4
Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.15(a-c), Safekeeping Property (in effect through 12/31/03).\FN4/ /
(a) A lawyer shall hold property clients or or third persons is in a in a lawyer's
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of of clients third persons thatthat is lawyer's pos- pos-
session in connection with representation separate from the lawyer's own prop-
session in connection with aarepresentation separate from the lawyer's own prop-
erty. Funds shall be kept a separate account maintained in in State where the
erty. Funds shall be kept inin a separate account maintainedthe the State where the
lawyer's office is situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third
lawyer's office is situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third per- per-
           (b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person
son. . . . (b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person
son..
has an interest, lawyer shall promptly notify client or third person...
has an interest, aalawyer shall promptly notify the the client or third person. . . . (c)
                                                                                       (c)
        in the course of representation lawyer is in possession of property in in which
When in the course of representation a a lawyer is in possession of propertywhich
When
both the lawyer and another person claim interests, property shall be kept sepa-
both the lawyer and another person claim interests, thethe property shall be kept sepa-
rate by the lawyer until there is accounting and severance of of their interests.
rate by the lawyer until there is an an accounting and severancetheir interests. If a If a
dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall
dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be be
kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved.
kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved.

Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.16 (d), Declining or Terminating Representation\FN5 (d) Upon
Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.16(d), Decliningor Terminating Representation\FN5/ / (d) Upon
termination of representation, lawyer shall take steps to the the extent reasonably
termination of representation, a a lawyer shall take steps to extent reasonably
practicable to protect client's interests, such giving reasonable notice to to cli-
practicableto protect aaclient's interests, such asas giving reasonable notice thethe cli-
ent, allowing time for employment other counsel, surrendering papers and prop-
ent, allowing time for employment of of other counsel, surrendering papers and prop-
erty to which the client entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee fee
erty to which the client is is entitled, and refunding any advance payment ofthat that
has not been earned.
has not been earned.

Mass.R.Prof.C. 3.4(c). Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel. A lawyer shall
Mass.R.Prof.C. 3.4 (c). Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel. A lawyer shall
not: (c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for
not: (c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an an
open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists;
open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists;

Mass.R.Prof.C. 8.3(b). Reporting Professional Misconduct. A lawyer having knowl-
Mass.R.Prof.C. 8.3(b). Reporting Professional Misconduct. A lawyer having knowl-
edge that a judge has committed violation of applicable rules of of judicial conduct
edge that a judge has committed aa violation of applicable rules judicial conduct
that raises a substantial question to the judge's fitness for office shall inform the
thatraises a substantial question asas to the judge's fitness for office shall inform the
Commission on Judicial Conduct.
Commission on Judicial Conduct.

                   having found no violation of Mass. R. Prof C. 1.15(a)
4 Despite .the BBO having found no violation of Mass. R. Prof C. 1.15(a) and 1.16(d) [BBO Deci-
4                                                                                    EBBO Deci-
sion, n. 7], both the single justice and the full panel of the Mass. SJC found that Johnson had vio-
sion, n. 71, both the single justice and the full panel of the Mass. SJC found that Johnson had vio-
lated Mass.R.Prof C. 1.15(a)-(c) and 1.16(d) APP-3-4 The BBO findings read:
lated Mass.R.Prof C. 1.15(a)-(c) and 1.16(d) [APP-3-4].. The BBO findings read:
    We agree with the parties (see Bar Counsel’s opposition to the Respondent’s appeal) that, on the
    We agree with the parties (see Bar Counsel's opposition to the Respondent's appeal) that, on the
    facts presented here, the respondent did not violate Mass. R. Prof C. 1.15(a) (safekeeping trust
    facts presented here, the respondent did not violate Mass. R. Prof C. 1.15(a) (safekeeping trust
    property) and 1.16(d) (upon termination of representation, taking steps to protect client's inter-
    property) and 1.16(d) (upon termination of representation, taking steps to protect client’s inter-
    ests and refunding any unearned fee), since special hearing officer did not find that
    ests and refunding any unearned fee), since thethe special hearing officer did not fnd that
    the respondent charged an excessive fee or that she owed her former clients a refund
    the respondent charged an excessive fee or that she owed her former clients a refund
    of an unearned fee.
    of an unearned fee.
5 See note 4, supra.
5 See note 4, supra.
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                                                 8

Mass.R.Prof.C. 8.4(c, d, h). Misconduct. It is professional misconduct for a lawyer
Mass.R.Prof.C. 8.4(c, d, h). Misconduct. It is professional misconduct for a lawyer
to: (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or or misrepresentation;
to: (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that prejudicial to the administration of justice; (h) engage
(d) engage in conduct that isis prejudicial to the administration of justice; (h) engage
in any other conduct that adversely reflects his or or fitness to practice law.
in any other conduct that adversely refects on on his herher fitness to practice law.

                           Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01.
                           Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01.
                                     Bar Discipline
                                     BarDiscipline

§5(3)(i). The Board of Bar Overseers. (3) The BoardBarBar Overseers . . . (i) with
W3)(i). The Board of Bar Overseers. (3) The Board of of Overseers ... (i) with
the approval of this court, may adopt and publish rules of procedure other regu-
the approval of this court, may adopt and publish rules of procedure andand other regu-
lations not inconsistent with this rule…
lationsnot inconsistent with this rule...

 10. Refusal of Complainant Proceed; Compromise; or Restitution.
§10. Refusal of Complainant toto Proceed; Compromise; or Restitution. . . . A lawyerA lawyer
shall not, as condition of settlement, compromise or or restitution, require the
shall not, as aa condition of settlement, compromiserestitution, require the com- com-
plainantto refrain from filing a complaint, to withdraw the complaint, or to failor to fail to
plainant to refrain from filing a complaint, to withdraw the complaint, to
cooperate withthe bar counsel.\FN6/ /
cooperate with the bar counsel.\FN6

                              Board of Bar Overseers Rules
                              Board of Bar Overseers Rules

BBO Rules, §3.2. Procedure to Apply. Except where inconsistent with these Rules,
BBO Rules, X3.2. Procedure to Apply. Except where inconsistent with these Rules,
formal proceedings before hearing committees, hearing panels, special hearing offi-
formal proceedings before hearing committees, hearing panels, special hearing offi-
cers and the Board shall conform generally the practice in in adjudicatory proceed-
cers and the Board shall conform generally toto the practice adjudicatory proceed-
ings under Chapter 30A of the General Laws (State Administrative Procedure).
ings under Chapter 30A of the General Laws (State Administrative Procedure).

BBO Rules, §3.15(f). Service of Petition on Respondent and Answer. (f) Request to
BBO Rules, ?3.15(f). Service of Petition on Respondent and Answer.            (f) Request to
Be Heard in Mitigation. The respondent shall include in the answer any in
Be Heard in Mitigation. The respondent shall include in the answer any factsfacts in
mitigation and may request that a a hearing held on on issue of of mitigation.
mitigation and may request thathearing be be held thethe issuemitigation. Fail- Fail-
ure to include facts in mitigation constitutes a waiver of the to present evi-
ure to include facts in mitigation constitutes a waiver of the rightright to present evi-
dence of those facts.
dence of those facts.

BBO Rules, §3.18(a). Prehearing Motions. (a) Motions Other Than Motions to to
BBO Rules, M18(a). Prehearing Motions.         (a) Motions Other Than Motions
                    motion shall be submitted a member of the Board for determi-
Dismiss. . . . the motion shall be submitted toto a member of the Board for determi-
Dismiss.
nation. The Board member may refer the motion ... . . to the the special hearing
nation.The Board member may refer the motion to to or . or to special hearing off- offi-
cer for determination. AA hearing on the motion may be heldthe the discretion of .the .
cer for determination. hearing on the motion may be held at at discretion of the
     special hearing officer.
. .. special hearing offcer... . . .

     Rules, §3.22(b). Public Access Proceedings
BBO Rules, 0.22(b). Public Access to to Proceedings;
Protective Orders. (b) Upon the service of petition for discipline, Board's pro-
Protective Orders. (b) Upon the service of aapetition for discipline, thethe Board's pro-
ceedings are open to the public…
ceedings are open to the public...

     Rules, §3.39. Admissibility of Evidence. In any proceeding the admissibility of
BBO Rules, 0.39. Admissibility of Evidence. In any proceeding the admissibility of
evidence shall be governed by the Rules of Evidence observed in adjudicatory pro-
evidence shall be governed by the Rules of Evidence observed in adjudicatory pro-

  This arose out of the retired judge’s complaint to the OBC prosecutor. Petitioner assumes the
6 This arose out of the retired judge's complaint to the OBC prosecutor. Petitioner assumes the
6

complaint was oral, given that she has not seen a writing containing the alleged complaint.
complaint was oral, given that she has not seen a writing containing the alleged complaint.
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                                               9
                                               9
ceedings under Chapter 30A of the General Laws (State Administrative Procedure).
ceedings under Chapter 30A of the General Laws (State Administrative Procedure).

      Rules, §4.5(a-b). Hearing Subpoenas. (a) Bar Counsel and the respondent
BBO Rules, §4.5(a-b). Hearing Subpoenas. (a) Bar Counsel and the respondent
may request that the . . . special hearing officer or Board issue a subpoena re-
may request that the ... special hearing officer or the the Board issue a subpoena re-
quiring the attendance and testimony a a witness, including respondent, and
quiringthe attendance and testimony of of witness, including the the respondent, and
the production of any evidence, including books, records, correspondence oror docu-
the production of any evidence, including books, records, correspondence docu-
ments, relating to any matter question in in proceeding.             (b) The request shall
ments, relating to any matter in in questionthe the proceeding. (b) The request shall
be made in writing . to special hearing officer, or to a member of the the Board
be made in writing .... to. thethe special hearing officer, or to a member ofBoard
who may forthwith issue the subpoena.
who may forthwith issue the subpoena.


                SINGLE JUSTICE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
                SINGLE JUSTICE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
                                       publishedat
                                       published at
                     http://www.sjccountyclerk.com/singjusprpr.html
                     htt-D://www.siccountyclerk.com/sinvius-Dr-Dr.html

SJC Rule 4:01 of the Supreme Judicial Court grants the county court jurisdiction
SJC Rule 4:01 of the Supreme Judicial Court grants the county court jurisdiction
over bar discipline matters involving Any lawyer admitted to, or engaging in,
over bar discipline matters involving Any lawyer admitted to, or engaging in, the the
practice of law in the Commonwealth and empowers the Board of Bar Overseers
practice of law in the Commonwealth and empowers the Board of Bar Overseers
(board) with the responsibility investigate and prosecute such matters. Those ac-
(board) with the responsibility to to investigate and prosecute such matters. Those ac-
tions most frequently filed the Office of Bar Counsel (bar counsel) are petitions
tions most frequently filed byby the Office of Bar Counsel (bar counsel) are petitions
for suspension (temporary, term indefinite), disbarment and reciprocal discipline.
for suspension (temporary, term oror indefinite), disbarment and reciprocal discipline.
The grounds upon which bar counsel may petition the single justice disciplinary
The grounds upon which bar counsel may petition the single justice for for disciplinary
action against an attorney include:
action against an attorney include:

       •
       .i   misuse or loss of client funds,
            misuse or loss of client funds,
       •
       .i   neglect of client interests,
            neglect of client interests,
       •
       .i   fraudulent conduct,
            fraudulent conduct,
       •
       .i   sanction in another jurisdiction,
            sanction in another jurisdiction,
       •
       .i   conviction of a crime and
            conviction of a crime and
       •
       .i   misrepresentation to the court.
            misrepresentation to the court.

       An order of the single justice bar docket matters is is appealable to full court
. . .. An order of the single justice inin bar docket matters appealable to thethe full court
and the standard by which the sanction imposed reviewed is is whether sanc-
and the standard by which the sanction imposed is is reviewed whether the the sanc-
tion is markedly disparate from those ordinarily entered in similar cases.\
tion is markedly disparate from those ordinarily entered in similar cases.\FN7/ FN7/


                              STATEMENT OF THE CASE
                              STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.
1.    Nature of the Case: The Underlying Attorney Disciplinary Proceeding
      Nature of the Case: The Underlying Attorney Disciplinary Proceeding

       This case involves a litigator, Barbara Johnson ["Johnson"], against whom
       This case involves a litigator, Barbara C.C. Johnson [“Johnson”], against whom


  Matter of Kerlinsky, 428 Mass 656, 664 (1999).
7 Matterof Kerlinsky, 428 Mass 656, 664 (1999).
7
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                                                   10
                                                   10

the Massachusetts Office of Bar Counsel ["OBC"] brought disciplinary charges be- be-
the Massachusetts Office of Bar Counsel [“OBC”] brought disciplinary charges

     the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers [“BBO”] two months after No-
fore the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers ["BBO"] two months after the the No-

vember 2002 election, in which she ran for governor onon platform of court reform,
vember 2002 election, in which she ran for governor a a platform of court reform,

the need for judicial accountability, particularly in the family-law court,court, and the
the need for judicial accountability, particularly in the family-law and the

abolishment of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity.
abolishmentof judicial and quasi-judicial immunity.

        Johnson also maintains aa website, falseallegations.com, which has drawn the
        Johnson also maintains website, falseallegations.com, which has drawn the

attention of millions across our nation and which she publishes fundamental le-
attentionof millions across our nation and on on which she publishes fundamental le-

gal “how-to” and “what-is” information, some her state and federal pleadings, and
gal "how-to" and "what-is" information, some of of her state and federal pleadings, and

opinions-hers and occasionally some of diverse courts. A A dozen of of website
opinions—hers and occasionally some of diverse courts.fewfew dozenher her website

files were the primary evidence inin the disciplinary action against her.\FN8/
files were the primary evidence the disciplinary action against her.\FN8/


How the Federal Question Presented
Howthe Federal Question WasWas Presented

        The federal question arose out of the OBC charging that Johnson violated
        The federal question arose out of the OBC charging that Johnson violated

Mass.R.Prof.C 8.4(d) by "engag[ing] in conduct that is is prejudicialthe the administra-
Mass.R.Prof.C 8.4(d) by “engag[ing] in conduct that prejudicial to to administra-

tion of justice."
tion of justice.”

        Constituting the conduct that was allegedly "prejudicial to the the administration
        Constituting the conduct that was allegedly “prejudicial to administration

of justice" was (a) Johnson’s run for governor 2002 on the afore-mentioned plat-
of justice” was (a) Johnson's run for governor in in 2002 on the afore-mentioned plat-

form, (b) the website publication of of pleadings that criticized judges, andfilingfiling
form, (b) the website publication pleadings that criticized judges, and (c) (c)


   In her Motion to Dismiss Count on the Grounds That Without an Adjudication by an Article III
8 In her Motion to Dismiss Count II on the Grounds That Without an Adjudication by an Article III
8

Court, There Can Be No Ethical Violation of Professional Ethics (dated 28 November 2003), she ar-
Court, There Can Be No Ethical Violation of Professional Ethics (dated 28 November 2003), she ar-
gued that that the BBO does not have jurisdiction over First Amendment matters.
gued that that the BBO does not have jurisdiction over First Amendment matters.
    She also argued that the disciplinary action was in retaliation for exercising her right to political
    She also argued that the disciplinary action was in retaliation for exercising her right to political
speech and free expression, to wit, for exercising both her right and her obligation to criticize the ju-
speech and free expression, to wit, for exercising both her right and her obligation to criticize the ju-
dicial system where she saw wrongdoing and those judges who intentionally deprived parties of their
dicial system where she saw wrongdoing and those judges who intentionally deprived parties of their
rights to constitutional due process and equal protection. The First Amendment issue was a recur-
rights to constitutional due process and equal protection. The First Amendment issue was a recur-
ring theme in the proceedings and pleadings below.
ring theme in the proceedings and pleadings below.
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                                                     11
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appeals when she believed judges had controverted existing law, abused their dis-
appeals when she believed judges had controverted existing law, abused their dis-

cretion, and deprived her clients ofof their constitutional and statutory rights.\FN9/
cretion, and deprived her clients their constitutional and statutory rights.\FN9/

         Case law in Massachusetts and in other state and federal jurisdictions
         Case law in Massachusetts and in other state and federal jurisdictions is is

overwhelmingly in favor of Johnson, i.e., supports her positions that lawyers have a
overwhelmingly in favor of Johnson, i.e., supports her positions that lawyers have a

duty to report judicial wrongdoing and judicial inequities that that the
duty to report judicial wrongdoing and judicial inequities and and the First First

Amendment guaranteed free, political speech.\FN10
Amendment guaranteed free, political speech.\FNlo/ /

         References to Johnson's rights to free, political speech, the First Amendment,
         References to Johnson’s rights to free, political speech, the First Amendment,

and retaliation for exercising her First Amendment rights are throughout the plead-
and retaliation for exercising her First Amendment rights are throughout the plead-

ings below—beginning with Amended Answer to the the Petition through 6 Novem-
ings below beginning with herher Amended Answer to Petition through 6 Novem-

ber 2007, when she orally argued her appeal toto the full panel thethe SJC.\FN11/
ber 2007, when she orally argued her appeal the full panel of of SJC.\FNll/


How the BBO Avoided “Spelling Out” the Question
Howthe BBO Avoided "Spelling Out" the FederalFederal Question

         To camouflage the Court’s admitted dismay Johnson's free, political speech
         To camouflage the Court's admitted dismay at at Johnson’s free, political speech

about the judiciary, the OBC— supervised controlled by the the SJC—brought
about the judiciary, the OBC- supervised andand controlled bySJC-brought


9 . . .. Time, place and circumstances determine the constitutional protection of utterance. The First
9        Time, place and circumstances determine the constitutional protection of utterance. The First
     Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as protects freedom of speech, are no ex-
     Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as itit protects freedom of speech, are no ex-
     ception to the law of life enunciated by Ecclesiastes: . . . "(A) time to keep silence, and a time to
     ception to the law of life enunciated by Ecclesiastes: . . . “(A) time to keep silence, and a time to
     speak.” Eccles. 3:1, 7. Of course, aalawyer is a person and he too has aaconstitutional freedom of
     speak." Eccles. 3:1, 7. Of course, lawyer is a person and he too has constitutional freedom of
     utterance and may exercise it to castigate courts and their administration of justice.
     utterance and may exercise it to castigate courts and their administration of justice.
In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 666 (1959) (Frankfurter, J. with Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker, JJ.,
In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 666 (1959) (Frankfurter, J. with Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker, JJ.,
joined, dissenting).
joined, dissenting).
10
10   Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (protection afforded campaign
     Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (protection afforded campaign
speech). "The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the
speech). “The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the
least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous re-
least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfullyall matters of public concern without previous re-
straint or fear of subsequentpunishment.” Thornhill v. Alabama 310 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1940). The
straint or fear of subsequent punishment." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1940). The
First Amendment “was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people.” Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
politicaland social changes desired by the people." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421 (1988).
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421 (1988).
11
11   Johnson’s arguments against the judgments of disbarment and contempt are memorialized in
     Johnson's arguments against the judgments of disbarment and contempt are memorialized in
webcasts archived at http://www.suffolk.edu/sjc/archive/2007/SJC_09820.html and
webcasts archived at http://www.suffolk.edu/sic/archive/2007/SJC 09820.html and
http://www.suffolk.edu/sjc/archive/2007/SJC_09866.html.
http://www.suffolk.edu/sjc/archive/2007/SJC 09866.html.
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                                                    12

three counts of charges for which there was no supporting, evidence. The purpose:
three counts of charges for which there was no supporting, evidence. The purpose:

to deflect Johnson’s criticism of the judiciary, particularly in family-law cases.
to deflect Johnson's criticism of the judiciary, particularly in family-law cases.

        The OBC and BBO also improperly used the doctrine offensive collateral
        The OBC and BBO also improperly used the doctrine of of offensive collateral

estoppel to deprive Johnson of a defense to Count III. so doing, the BBO pre-
estoppel to deprive Johnson of a defense to Count III. ByBy so doing, the BBO pre-

cluded the use by Johnson of a clearly fabricated document supplied her by by the OBC
cluded the use by Johnson of a clearly fabricated document supplied her the OBC

prosecutor or of any other document to defend against that count.
prosecutor or of any other document to defend against that count.

        On 2 December 2003, the OBC prosecutor declared during her opening state-
        On 2 December 2003, the OBC prosecutor declared during her opening state-

ment that she would establish Count "largely but not not totally . . Chair's
ment that she would establish Count III III “largely but totally ... by .the by the Chair's

ruling on issue preclusion, and by certain admissions the respondent in in an-
rulingon issue preclusion, and by certain admissions by by the respondenther her an-

swer." The so-called admissions by Johnson were never identified by prosecu-
swer.” The so-called admissions by Johnson were never identified by the the prosecu-

tor before, during, or after the so-called trial.
tor before, during, or after the so-called trial.

        Because the SJC affirming decision contains very different version of of
        Because the SJC affirming decision contains a a very different versionthethe

facts of Counts I, II, and III, Johnson has appended to thethe decisionthe the Appendix
facts of Counts I, II, and III, Johnson has appended to decision in in Appendix

summaries of the facts of those counts at APP-41 and a second copy the SJC de-
summaries of the facts of those counts at APP-41 and a second copy ofof the SJC de-

cision with her own commentary interleaved at APP-44, which she incorporates in
cision with her own commentary interleaved at APP-44, which she incorporates in

entirety herein by reference.
entiretyherein by reference.


II.
II.     Proceedings in the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers
        Proceedings in the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers

        In the BBO, Petitioner filed diverse motions, including motions to dismiss,
        In the BBO, Petitioner filed diverse motions, including motions to dismiss,

motions for protection orders, motions preclude.\FN12/ / of of Petitioner’s motions,
motions for protection orders, motions toto preclude.\FN12AllAll Petitioner's motions,


12
12  A detailed discussion of them may be seen on Petitioner's website at Drano Series #102 at
    A detailed discussion of them may be seen on Petitioner’s website at Drano Series #102 at
http://www.falsealleyations.com/dranol02-bbo-star-chamber-92503-forum.htm. The actual motions
http://www.falseallegations.com/drano102-bbo-star-chamber-92503-forum.htm. The actual motions
she filed at the BBO appear (albeit without the repetition of the caption of the disciplinary action .
she filed at the BBO appear (albeit without the repetition of the caption of the disciplinary action . ....
which would make for boring reading for the visitors to the site) were gathered and uploaded to
which would make for boring reading for the visitors to the site) were gathered and uploaded to
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                                                  13
                                                  13

withouthearings, were summarily endorsed "Denied" and all the the OBC prosecutor’s
without hearings, were summarily endorsed “Denied” and all OBC prosecutor's

motions were, without hearings, summarily endorsed “Allowed.”
motions were, without hearings, summarily endorsed "Allowed."


Motions to Dismiss
Motions to Dismiss

         Specifically, Johnson filed (a) motion to dismiss Count II II on grounds
         Specifically,Johnson filed (a) a a motion to dismiss Counton the the grounds

that the Parkers’ (pseudonym) consent the website publication of of their story
that the Parkers' (pseudonym) consent toto the website publicationtheir story con-con-

stituted a waiver of confidentiality, a motion to dismiss Count III on the grounds
stituteda waiver of confidentiality, (b) (b) a motion to dismiss Count III on the grounds

that during the 5-8 year delay bringing a disciplinary action, the the of a of a neces-
that during the 5-8 year delay in in bringing a disciplinary action,tape tapeneces-

sary hearing was overwritten by the Commonwealth and an eyewitness passed
sary hearing was overwritten by the Commonwealth and an eyewitness hadhad passed

away, and (c) a motion to dismiss Count based both on the admission by by
away, and (c) a motion to dismiss Count III III based both on the admissionthe the

prosecutor that an ex parte communication occurred between the judge and oppos-
prosecutor that an ex parte communication occurred between the judge and oppos-

ing counsel, and on a material document having been physically altered.
ing counsel, and on a material document having been physically altered.


OBC's Motion for Protection and Impoundment
OBC’sMotion for Protection OrderOrder and Impoundment

         The OBC prosecutor moved for a protective order, but her motion was
         The OBC prosecutor moved for a protective order, but her motion was notnot

only a motion for “protective order” but also
only a motion for aa"protective order" but also

   •
   .-i
         a motion for impoundment
         a motion for impoundment
   •
   .J
         a motion to censor Johnson’s website
         a motion to censor Johnson's website
   •
   .i    a motion to enjoin Johnson’s political and free speech and
         a motion to enjoin Johnson's political and free speech and
   •
   .i    a motion for secret hearings
         a motion for secret hearings

The OBC also failed to acknowledge and identify the standards to followed when
The OBC also failed to acknowledge and identify the standards to be be followed when

determining such potpourri motions Bar Counsel's, failed to to show good cause,
determiningsuch potpourri motions asas Bar Counsel’s, failedshow good cause,



Drano Series #106 at http://www.falseallegations.com/drano106-motions-filed-at-bbo-n0603.htm.
Drano Series #106 at http://www.falsealle.-ations.com/dranol06-motions-filed-at-bbo-nO603.htm.
The pleadings in the latter file ought to be in one of the 12 volumes comprising the BBO’s appendix.
The pleadings in the latter fle ought to be in one of the 12 volumes comprising the BBO's appendix.
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                                             14
                                             14

failed to follow the procedures for impoundment, failed to state scope of of
failed to follow the procedures for impoundment, failed to state the the scopethe the

website censorship sought, failed to state how the censorship was to to be imple-
website censorship sought, failed to state how the censorship was be imple-

mented, failed to state the authority giving Bar the right to censor Johnson's
mented, failed to state the authority giving thethe Bar the right to censor Johnson’s

website and stifle her political speech and free expression and override Johnson's
website and stifle her political speech and free expression and to to override Johnson’s

First Amendment rights, and failed to identify sufficient particularity that
FirstAmendment rights, and failed to identify withwith sufficient particularity that

which Bar Counsel wanted toto prevent disclosure and that which wanted to im- im-
which Bar Counsel wanted prevent disclosure and that which he he wanted to

pound.
pound.

      Despite the flaws in Bar Counsel’s motion, the BBO summarily allowed
      Despite the flaws in Bar Counsel's motion, the BBO summarily allowed it. it.


Motion to Preclude
Motion to Preclude

      The BBO Chair did with Bar Counsel’s motion issue preclusion that which
      The BBO Chair did with Bar Counsel's motion for for issue preclusion that which

she did with Bar Counsel’s motion for a protective order: she usurped power of
she did with Bar Counsel's motion for a protective order: she usurped thethe power of

the special hearing offcer [see BBO Rule 3.18(a)1 and precluded Johnson from show-
the special hearing officer [see BBO Rule 3.18(a)] and precluded Johnson from show-

ing that the lower-court orders were based fabricated facts and fndings and on,
ing that the lower-court orders were based onon fabricated facts and findings and on,

literally, a materially altered document.
literally, a materially altered document.

      Other examples of OBC’s bad behavior in the disciplinary action (1) that
      Other examples of OBC's bad behavior in the disciplinary action areare (1) that

the charges were never clear or identified, that Johnson was never given an an
the charges were never clear or identifed, (2)(2) that Johnson was never givenop- op-

portunity to be heard, (3) that Johnson was told she would be precluded from
portunity to be heard, (3) that Johnson was told she would be precluded from pre-pre-

senting any exculpatory facts to the court, and that at at a pretrial hearing,
senting any exculpatory facts to the court, and (4)(4) thata pretrial hearing, the the

hearing officer repeatedly ordered the transcriptionist to record when Johnson
hearing officer repeatedly ordered the transcriptionist not not to record when Johnson

spoke. [See on APP-63 Figure an image excerpted from a transcript of the the
spoke. [See on APP-63 Figure 1, 1, an image excerpted from a transcript offirst first

and final pretrial conference. Johnson believes the instruction to manipulate
and final pretrial conference. Johnson believes the instruction to manipulate the the
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                                                   15
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record was inadvertently left the transcript .\FN13/
record was inadvertently left in in the transcript].\FN13/


Mitigation
Mitigation

        Johnson pled mitigation, as allowed by Rule 3.15(f).
        Johnson pled mitigation, as allowed by Rule 3.15(f).


The Day of “Trial”
The Day of "Trial"

        On the day of the scheduled trial, December 2003, the OBC prosecutor con-
        On the day of the scheduled trial, 2 2 December 2003, the OBC prosecutor con-

firmed that she had no witnesses and the BBO hearing officer quashed all of John-
firmedthat she had no witnesses and the BBO hearing officer quashed all of John-

son’s trialwitness subpoenas. See, supra, M.G.L. c. c. 233, §1, and BBO Rules,
son's trial witness subpoenas. See, supra, M.G.L. 233, §1, and BBO Rules,

§ 4 5 \FN14/ Johnson also learned that the prosecutor’s primary documentary evi-
§4.5.\FN14/ Johnson also learned that the prosecutor's primary documentary evi-

dence were unauthenticated copies of dozens of Petitioner’s website files, again rais-
dence were unauthenticatedcopies of dozens of Petitioner's website files, again rais-

ing First Amendment free, political speech issues.
ing First Amendment free, political speech issues.

        During Johnson’s opening statement, the hearing officer ordered public
        DuringJohnson's opening statement, the hearing officer ordered thethe public

out of the hearing room [Appendix A at APP-4]. Johnson left with the
out of the hearing room [Appendix A at APP-4]. Johnson left with the public public

[Appendix A at APP-4 and Appendix G at G at 62-63]. The stated for exclud-
[Appendix A at APP-4 and Appendix62-63]. The stated reason reason for exclud-

ing the public was that Johnson had used the given name of a complainant andand that
ing the public was that Johnson had used the given name of a complainant that

by so doing, she had violated an order commanding her use pseudonyms. That
by so doing, she had violated an order commanding her toto use pseudonyms. That

was untrue. There was no such order. The prosecutor, confirming what Johnson
was untrue. There was no such order. The prosecutor, confirming what Johnson

said, also told the hearing officer there was no such order, but refused to to reverse
said, also told the hearing officer there was no such order, but he he refused reverse


13
13  Johnson was further hampered during the BBO proceedings by there being (a) no predictable
    Johnson was further hampered during the BBO proceedings by there being (a) no predictable
rules of evidence, (b) no available records as to the admissibility of documents in past cases, and (c)
rules of evidence, (b) no available records as to the admissibilityof documents in past cases, and (c)
a unique interpretation of the scope of confidentiality and entitlement at the Bar.
a unique interpretation of the scope of confidentiality and entitlement at the Bar.
14
14  Massachusetts caselaw regarding the applicability of the Administrative Procedures Act, M.G.L.
    Massachusetts caselaw regarding the applicability of the AdministrativeProcedures Act, M.G.L.
c. 233, to disciplinary proceedings at the BBO conficts with the common-law interpretation of the
c. 233, to disciplinary proceedings at the BBO conflicts with the common-law interpretation of the
applicability of the APA in nondisciplinary cases. See APPENDIX A at APP-4. APPENDIX E at
applicability of the APA in nondisciplinary cases. See APPENDIX A at APP-4, APPENDIX E at
APP-37, and APPENDIX at APP-60. 64-65, where this issue is discussed.
APP-37, and APPENDIX G G at APP-60, 64-65, where this issue is discussed.
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                                                16
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himself. [See Appendix G, APP-62, on which there excerpt from the trialthe trial
himself. [See Aendix G. APP-62, on which there is an is an excerpt from

transcript of the conversation between the prosecutor and hearing officer re-
transcript of the conversation between the prosecutor and thethe hearing officer re-

garding the non-existent order].
garding the non-existent order].

       Remembering that the hearing officer had previously ordered stenogra-
       Remembering that the hearing officer had previously ordered the the stenogra-

pher to go off the record when the petitioner spoke and go back on when he spoke
pher to go off the record when the petitioner spoke and to to go back on when he spoke

(as memorialized in the excerpted image Appendix G at APP-63) and and fearing
(as memorializedin the excerpted image atat Appendix G at APP-63)fearing

thatwere the hearing officer toto manipulate the tape and transcript again, she
that were the hearing officer manipulate the tape and transcript again, she

would have no proof of what she said and did not say atat the hearing, Petitioner left
would have no proof of what she said and did not say the hearing, Petitioner left

with the public. The “trial” went on in the absence of both the petitioner and
withthe public. The "trial" went on in the absence of both the petitioner and the the

public. Only an assistant general counsel forfor the BBO, the BBO’s hearing officer,
public. Only an assistant general counsel the BBO, the BBO's hearing officer,

and the OBC prosecutor attended.
and the OBC prosecutor attended.

       From the transcript provided her, she learned that as long as weeks after
       From the transcript provided her, she learned that as long as twotwo weeks after

the so-called trial ended, the prosecutor offered and thethe hearing officer marked ad-
the so-called trial ended, the prosecutor offered and hearing officer marked ad-

missible even more exhibits . and chalks ... . . . which Johnson had never
missible even more exhibits ... . . and chalks which Johnson had never seen.seen.

Even the prosecutor's exhibit numbers were changed.\15/ /
Even the prosecutor’s exhibit numbers were changed.\15

       Deprived of her right a fair and impartial trial, Johnson moved for a re-
       Deprived of her right toto a fair and impartial trial, Johnson moved for a re-

hearing. That, too, was denied.
hearing.That, too, was denied.

       Because historically, in Massachusetts, attorney-discipline cases have been
       Because historically,in Massachusetts, attorney-discipline cases have been

identifiedas being on the common-law side ofof the court, Johnson had moved for a
identified as being on the common-law side the court, Johnson had moved for a


15
15
    Never having been served with a copy of the 12-volume Appendix subsequently both filed by the
    Never having been served with a copy of the 12-volume Appendix subsequently both filed by the
BBO with the County Court in support of the “Information” recommending disbarment and relied
BBO with the County Court in support of the "Information" recommending disbarment and relied
upon by the full panel of the SJC . . and never having been served a Table of Contents to the 12
upon by the full panel of the SJC ... . and neverhaving been served a Table of Contents to the 12
volumes, Petitioner does not know whether the exhibits and chalks were included in the volumes.
volumes, Petitioner does not know whether the exhibits and chalks were included in the volumes.
Given, however, that there were 12 volumes, a reasonable inference can be drawn that they were.
Given, however, that there were 12 volumes, a reasonable inference can be drawn that they were.
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                                                   17
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jury trial, and was promised a hearing the motion, but ultimately she she with-
jury trial, and was promised a hearing on on the motion, but ultimatelywas, was, with-

out a hearing, denied the jury trial she sought.
out a hearing, denied the jury trial she sought.


III.
III.    Proceedings in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for Suf-
        Proceedings in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for Suf-
        folk County
        folkCounty

        After “trial,” the BBO filed in SJC single-justice session an an “Information,”
        After "trial," the BBO filed in thethe SJC single-justice session"Information,"

recommending that Johnson be disbarred. None the grounds which are listed in
recommending that Johnson be disbarred. None of of the grounds which are listed in

the "Single Justice Practice and Procedure" and upon which Bar Counsel may peti-
the “Single Justice Practice and Procedure” and upon which Bar Counsel may peti-

tion the single justice discipline an attorney was charged against Johnson.\FN16/
tion the single justice toto discipline an attorney was charged against Johnson.\FN16/

In the SJC single-justice session, Johnson was entitled a a trial de novo, that,
In the SJC single-justice session, Johnson was entitled to to trial de novo, butbut that,

too, was denied her. She was, however, during the contempt hearing allowed
too, was denied her. She was, however, during the contempt hearing allowed to to

call the prosecutor to the stand.\FN17
call the prosecutor to the stand.\FN17/ /

        On 9 August 2006, the SJC single justice issued judgment of disbarment
        On 9 August 2006, the SJC single justice issued a a judgment of disbarment

and ordered Johnson to withdraw from her existing cases. Johnson immediately
and ordered Johnson to withdraw from her existing cases. Johnson immediately

filed a notice of appeal and motion stay the disbarment, which was denied.
filed a notice of appeal and aamotion toto stay the disbarment, which was denied.

        Johnson filed a second motion to stay with the Full Court. Waiting for
        Johnson filed a second motion to stay with the Full Court. Waiting for the the

Full Court’s decision on that motion, believing that obligation to her her clients
FullCourt's decision on that motion, believing that her her obligation toclients was was

16
16
    The full panel of the SJC did not address this issue (raised below) in its opinion affirming the
    The full panel of the SJC did not address this issue (raised below) in its opinion affirming the
judgment of Petitioner’s disbarment.
judgment of Petitioner's disbarment.
17
17  By calling the OBC prosecutor to the stand, Johnson’s hoped to prove that the BBO recommenda-
    By calling the OBC prosecutor to the stand, Johnson's hoped to prove that the BBO recommenda-
tion was transparently invalid. Johnson asked the prosecutor, in words for all intents and purposes,
tion was transparently invalid. Johnson asked the prosecutor, in words for all intents and purposes,
What was the URL on which the psychologist’s report exists? The prosecutor’s counsel objected.
What was the URL on which the psychologist's report exists? The prosecutor's counsel objected.
The Court sustained the objection. Johnson asked, Who was the psychiatrist or psychologist whose
The Court sustained the objection. Johnson asked, Who was the psychiatristor psychologist whose
report the prosecutor had alleged Johnson had uploaded to her website? Objection. Sustained.
report the prosecutor had alleged Johnson had uploaded to her website? Objection. Sustained.
Johnson asked, Who was the person who was the subject of the report? Objection. Sustained. John-
Johnson asked, Who was the person who was the subject of the report? Objection. Sustained. John-
son called attention to the funds the prosecutor had alleged Johnson commingled, and asked, Whose
son called attention to the funds the prosecutor had alleged Johnson commingled, and asked, Whose
funds were commingled with Johnson’s personal funds? Objection. Sustained. Johnson asked,
funds were commingled with Johnson's personal funds? Objection. Sustained. Johnson asked,
What was the amount of the funds allegedly commingled? Objection. Sustained.
What was the amount of the funds allegedly commingled? Objection. Sustained.
     Johnson was not provided transcript of that miniature evidentiary hearing.
     Johnson was not provided aatranscript of that miniature evidentiary hearing.
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                                                   18
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greater than to the single justice, and not wanting to abandon them, Johnson
greater than to the single justice, and not wanting to abandon them, Johnson did did

not comply with the order.\FN18
not comply with the order.\FN18/ /

        The prosecutor filed complaint for contempt.
        The prosecutor filed aacomplaint for contempt.

        On 19 October 2006, Johnson was held in civil contempt and jailed to force
        On 19 October 2006, Johnson was held in civil contempt and jailed to force

her compliance with the disbarment order. Because Johnson could not comply
her compliance with the disbarment order. Because Johnson could not comply fromfrom

jail, and therefore did not hold the key to her cell, four human angels graciously
jail, and therefore did not hold the key to her cell, four human angels graciously

came to her assistance and ran errands for days in order to get her released from
came to her assistance and ran errands for 5 5 days in order to get her released from

jail, where she had been held from the morning October 19th until the the evening
jail, where she had been held from the morning of of October 19th until evening of of

October 23d, 2006.
October 23d, 2006.


       Proceedings Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for the
IV. Proceedings in thein the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for the
IV.
       Commonwealth
       Commonwealth

        Johnson filed two appeals from the judgments disbarment and of of con-
        Johnson filed two appeals from the judgments of of disbarment andcon-

tempt. InIn the appeal the contempt judgment, Johnson argued (1) given that she she
tempt. the appeal of of the contempt judgment, Johnson argued (1) given that

had filed a notice of appeal, the SJC single justice did not have the jurisdiction to to
had filed a notice of appeal, the SJC single justice did not have the jurisdiction

find her in contempt ofof the disbarment order and (2) given that contempt was in in
find her in contempt the disbarment order and (2) given that the the contempt was

actuality criminal contempt, Johnson had been entitled jury trial, which she
actualitycriminal contempt, Johnson had been entitled to ato a jury trial, which she

had been denied.
had been denied.

        She also filed a half-dozen motions regarding procedural due process. The
        She also filed a half-dozen motions regarding procedural due process. The

SJC acted on none of them.
SJC acted on none of them.


18   An attorney owes devotion to the interests of his clients. He should be zealous in the mainte-
     An attorney owes devotion to the interests of his clients. He should be zealous in the mainte-
     nance and defense of their rights, and should be in no way restrained in the discharge of such
     nance and defense of their rights, and should be in no way restrained in the discharge of such
     duty by fear of judicial disfavor. But at the same time he should be at all times imbued with the
     duty by fear of judicial disfavor. But at the same time he should be at all times imbued with the
     respect which he owes to the court before whom he is practicing.
     respect which he owes to the court before whom he is practicing.
Grievance Adm'r v. Fieger, 476 Mich. 231, 263, 719 N.W.2d 123, 143 (2006).
Grievance Adm'r v. Fieyer, 476 Mich. 231, 263, 719 N.W.2d 123, 143 (2006).
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                                            19
                                            19

      Prior to the day for oral argument, the court clerk notified Johnson she
      Prior to the day for oral argument, the court clerk notified Johnson that that she

would be allowed 10 minutes for argument rather than 15 15 minutes allowed
would be allowed 10 minutes for argument rather than the the minutes allowed

other parties. Upon arriving at SJC on on 6 November 2007, was informed
other parties. Upon arriving at thethe SJC 6 November 2007, sheshe was informed

thatshe would be allowed only 5 5 minutes in which argue both appeals. The The
that she would be allowed only minutes in which to to argue both appeals.

Court had no questions of her. Standing her ground, she complained. Ultimately,
Court had no questions of her. Standing her ground, she complained. Ultimately,

the SJC panel relented and Johnson was allowed 10 minutes each argument.
the SJC panel relented and Johnson was allowed 10 minutes forfor each argument.

The arguments are memorialized webcasts, which are available at at URLs
The arguments are memorialized inin webcasts, which are available the the URLs

identified in note 11, supra.
identifiedin note 11, supra.

       On 5 December 2007, the Full Court affirmed both the judgment of disbar-
       On 5 December 2007, the Full Court affirmed both the judgment of disbar-

ment and the judgment contempt.
ment and the judgment ofof contempt.

      The SJC’s opinion speaks for itself [APP-1]. Because Johnson disagrees
      The SJC's opinion speaks for itself APP-1]. Because Johnson disagrees with with

the panel’s iteration facts, which standing alone would be be tantamount to an
the panel's iteration ofof facts, which standing alone would tantamount to an ex ex

parte communication with this Court, she has interleaved comments with the
parte communication with this Court, she has interleaved her her comments with the

opinion [APPENDIX G at APP-44].
opinion [APPENDIX G at APP-44].


                     REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
                     REASONSFOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.
1.    Review is warranted because attorney disciplinary proceedings that
      Review is warranted because attorney disciplinary proceedings that
      are administrative in nature conflict with such actions that
      areadministrative in nature conflict with such actions that are quasi- are quasi-
      criminal or judicial in nature, depriving attorneys in those States
      criminal or iudicial in nature, depriving attorneys in those States
      where such actions administrative in nature nature of their
      wheresuch actions areare administrative inof their Fourteenth Fourteenth
      Amendment rights to process and equal equal protection
      Amendment rights to due due process and protection

      The dispute as to the nature these "adversary proceedings" adds another
      The dispute as to the nature ofof these “adversary proceedings” adds another

dimension legally. The U.S. Supreme Court declared disbarment proceedings to
dimension legally. The U.S. Supreme Court declared disbarment proceedings to be be

of a "quasi-criminal nature." In In re Ruffalo, U.S. (Ohio) 544, 551 (1968); Middle-
of a “quasi-criminal nature.” re Ruffalo, 390390 U.S. (Ohio) 544, 551 (1968); Middle-
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                                             20

sex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. (N.J.) 423, 438
sex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. (N.J.) 423, 438

(1982) (Brennan, J., concurring).
(1982) (Brennan,J., concurring).

       In some State jurisdictions, disciplinary actions neither civil nor nor criminal
       In some State jurisdictions, disciplinary actions areare neither civilcriminal

but sui generis. some States, such actions are judicial in in nature, in other
but sui genesis. InIn some States, such actions are judicialnature, and and in other

States, they are administrative nature. Massachusetts is one of the the latter States.
States, they are administrative in in nature. Massachusetts is one of latter States.

       The Massachusetts scheme allowed Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment
       The Massachusetts scheme allowed Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment

rights to due process and equal protection be denied; e.g.. it allowed insufficient
rightsto due process and equal protection toto be denied; e.g.. it allowed insufficient

notice, no prosecution witnesses and therefore no opportunity to cross-examine
notice, no prosecution witnesses and therefore no opportunity to cross-examine

complainants, the quashing her trial witness subpoenas and the preclusion of
complainants,the quashing ofof her trial witness subpoenas and the preclusion of

documents necessary to her defense and therefore no opportunity be heard, no
documents necessary to her defense and therefore no opportunity to to be heard, no

public trial as allowed by BBO rules, compliance with well-established rules of
public trial as allowed by BBO rules, nono compliance with well-established rules of

practice and procedure and of evidence, and no fair and impartial tribunal.
practice and procedure and of evidence, and no fair and impartial tribunal.

       The genesis of the disciplinary action arose out Petitioner's exercise, during
       The genesis of the disciplinary action arose out ofof Petitioner’s exercise, during

her gubernatorial campaign 2002 and on her website, of of her First Amendment
her gubernatorial campaign inin 2002 and on her website, her First Amendment

right to free, political speech, which the Massachusetts SJC found was prejudicial
rightto free, political speech, which the Massachusetts SJC found was prejudicial to to

the administration justice and thus violative of Mass.R.Prof.C. 8.4(d).
the administration ofof justice and thus violative of Mass.R.Prof.C. 8.4(d).

       If these deprivations happened Petitioner, the likelihood of of such depriva-
       If these deprivations happened toto Petitioner, the likelihoodsuch depriva-

tions happening to other attorneys high.
tions happening to other attorneys is is high.

       Were Massachusetts proceedings been deemed quasi-criminal nature, arti-
       Were Massachusetts proceedings been deemed quasi-criminal inin nature, arti-

cle XII of the Massachusetts Declaration Rights would have been triggered. She
cle XIIof the Massachusetts Declaration of of Rights would have been triggered. She

would have had to be allowed to present all proofs favorable her, to to meet wit-
would have had to be allowed to present all proofs favorable to to her, meet wit-
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                                               21
                                               21

nesses against her face to face, to be fully heard in her defense, and not be de-
nesses against her face to face, to be fully heard in her defense, and not to to be de-

prived of her property but by the judgment of peers.
prived of her property but by the judgment of herher peers.

        The disbarment proceedings in Pennsylvania, too, are “of "unusual na-
        The disbarment proceedings in Pennsylvania, too, are "of anan “unusual na-

ture.”Suber v. Pennsylvania Com'n on Crime and Delinquency. 885 A.2d 678, 683
ture." Suber v. Pennsylvania Com'n on Crime and Delinquency. 885 A.2d 678, 683

(2005). They are “outside of the normal administrative process [and] do involve
(2005). They are "outside of the normal administrative process [and] do not not involve

the Administrative Agency Law in any way” at at 682], but “the application
the Administrative Agency Law in any way" [id. [id.682], but "the application of the of the

`clear and convincing’ standard ] ] appl[ies] because . . Supreme Court decides
‘clear and convincing' standard [ [ appl[ies] because .... our our Supreme Court decides

the case as fact-finder from which there no appeal." Id. at at (internal cite cite
the case as fact-finderfrom which there is is no appeal.” Id.683683 (internal omit-omit-

ted).
ted).

        California “State Bar disciplinary proceedings administrative in nature
        California"State Bar disciplinary proceedings areare administrative in nature

but have been denominated ‘quasi-criminal’ adversary proceedings.
but have been denominated `quasi-criminal' adversary proceedings... . . . These pro-
                                                                          These pro-

ceedings are not governed by the rules of civil oror criminal procedure.” Giddens v.
ceedings are not governed by the rules of civil criminal procedure." Giddens v.

State Bar, 28 Cal.3d 730, 734, 621 P.2d 851, 853-854 (1981) (internal cites omitted).
State Bar, 28 Cal.3d 730, 734, 621 P.2d 851, 853-854 (1981) (internal cites omitted).

The Court in Giddens made clear that an attorney facing discipline "shall also
The Court in Giddens made itit clear that an attorney facing discipline “shall also

have the right to the issuance ofof subpoenas for attendance of witnesses to appear
have the right to the issuance subpoenas for attendance of witnesses to appear

and testify or produce books and papers” [id., Cal.3d at at 735, P.2d at at 854]
and testify or produce books and papers" [j., 28 28 Cal.3d735, 621621 P.2d854] by by

ruling “that fair hearing did not take place [because] Petitioner was not not afforded
ruling "that a a fair hearing did not take place [because] Petitioner wasafforded

the right to ‘defend against the charge by the introduction of evidence.’” Id.,
the right to `defend against the charge by the introduction of evidence."' Id., 28 28

Cal.3d at 735, 621 P.2d at 854. He also never had an opportunity to cross-examine
Cal.3d at 735, 621 P.2d at 854. He also never had an opportunity to cross-examine

the complainants' testimony. Id.Id.
the complainants' testimony.

        "California provides [notice, an opportunity to to heard,] and other protec-
        “California provides [notice, an opportunity be be heard,] and other protec-
        tions. It allows the lawyer to to call witnesses and cross-examine them. . . . At
        tions. It allows the lawyer call witnesses and cross-examine them...              At
        the hearing, the burden isis on the state to establish culpability convincing
        the hearing, the burden      on the state to establish culpability `by ‘by convincing
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                                                           22

         proof and to a reasonable certainty'; `all reasonable doubts must bebe resolved
         proof and to a reasonable certainty’; ‘all reasonable doubts must resolved
         in favor of the accused.’ The California Supreme Court, in deciding whether
         in favor of the accused.' The California Supreme Court, in deciding whether
         to accept the bar's recommendation, grants the bar's findings `great weight'
         to accept the bar's recommendation, grants the bar's findings ‘great weight’
         but is not bound by them. . It must ‘independently examine the record, re-
         but is not bound by them... . . . It must `independently examine the record, re-
         weigh the evidence and pass on the sufficiency.’
         weigh the evidence and pass on the sufciency.'..." . . . ”

In re Rose, 22 Cal.4th 430, 458, 993 P.2d 956, 974-975 (Calif. 2000) (internal cites
In re Rose, 22 Cal.4th 430, 458, 993 P.2d 956, 974-975 (Calif. 2000) (internal cites

omitted). The California safeguards do exist in Massachusetts, at least in the
omitted). The California safeguards do notnot exist in Massachusetts, at least in the

experience of Petitioner . . and the standard used is capricious, inconsistent,
experience of Petitioner ... .and the standard used is capricious, inconsistent, and and

sometimes absent.\19/
sometimes absent.\19/

         Unlike California, Texas deemed jury trial fair although the the attorney
         UnlikeCalifornia, Texas deemed a a jury trial fair althoughattorney in- in-

volved in the disciplinary proceeding was in in the hospital. The court’s rationale was
volved in the disciplinary proceeding was the hospital. The court's rationale was

thatthe counsel of the attorney being disciplined had informed the the court that his
that the counsel of the attorney being disciplined had informed court that his

client was in the hospital but invited court to go go ahead the the Drake v.
clientwas in the hospital but invited thethe court to ahead withwithtrial. trial. Drake v.

     19           the SJC declared, “ ‘While we review the entire record and consider whatever detracts from
         In 2006, the SJC declared, " `While we review the entire record and consider whatever detracts from the
weight of the board's conclusion, as long as there is substantial evidence, we do not disturb the board's fnding, even
weight of the board's conclusion, as long as there is substantial evidence, we do not disturb the board's finding, even
             have come to different conclusion considering the matter de novo.’ ” " re Driscoll, 447 Mass.
if we would have come to aadifferent conclusion ifif considering the matter de novo.'InIn re Driscoll, 447 Mass.
if we
678, 683-684, 856 N.E.2d 840, 846, quoting Matter of Segal, 430 Mass. 359, 364, 719 N.E.2d 480 (1999). The
678, 683-684, 856 N.E.2d 840, 846, quoting Matter of Segal, 430 Mass. 359, 364, 719 N.E.2d 480 (1999). The
Court then cited the Massachusetts Administrative Procedures Act, M.G.L. c, 30A, §1(6), as the source of the defini-
                     Massachusetts Administrative Procedures Act, M.G.L. c, 30A,        as the source of the defni-
tion of “substantial evidence," to wit, "`such evidence as reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
tion of "substantial evidence,” to wit, “‘such evidence as a a reasonable mindmight accept as adequate to
supporta conclusion.'" In re Curry, 450 Mass. 503, 880 N.E.2d 388 (2008) (sameas In re Driscoll).
support a conclusion.’ ” In re Curry, 450 Mass. 503, 880 N.E.2d 388 (2008) (same as In re Driscoll).
                   is    only that the SJC arbitrarily chooses some sections of the APA follow and other sections
     One problem is not only that the SJC arbitrarilychooses some sections of the APA to followand other sections
to ignore or deem inapplicable, but that the APA itself declares it does not apply to "bodies of the judicial branch, or
to ignore or deem inapplicable, but that the APA itself declares it does not apply to “bodies of the judicial branch, or
                  quasi-judicial board or commission held for the sole purpose making a
any meeting of a quasi-judicial board or commission held for the sole purpose of making a decision required in an
              proceeding brought before it." [page 4, supra].
adjudicatory proceeding brought before it.” [pane 4, supra].
    And in the opinion in the case below [APP-1 et seq.], there is no mention of the standard applied.
    And in the opinion in the case below [APP-1 et seq.], there is no mention of the standard applied.
                                   Bailey, 439 Mass. 134, 786 N.E.2d 337 (2003), when declaring the standard to
     Three years earlier, in In re Bailey, 439 Mass. 134, 786 N.E.2d 337 (2003), when declaring the standard to be
           years earlier,
used in "reciprocal discipline” action, the SJC wrote that the standard used              in the Bailey case
used in a “reciprocal discipline" action, the SJC wrote that the standard used by Florida in the Bailey case was “clear
                                                                                                                 "clear
     convincing evidence, a higher standard proof than the preponderance
and convincing evidence, a higher standard of proof than the preponderance of evidence standard applied to disci-
                                                                                           standard applied to
plinary proceedings in this Commonwealth”. Id., 439 Mass. at 137, 786 N.E.2d at 341, citing Matter of Kerlinsky,
plinary proceedings          Commonwealth". Id., 439 Mass. at 137,                at 341, citing Matter Kerlinsky,
428 Mass. 656, 664 n. 10, 704 N.E.2d 503 (1999); Matter of Budnitz, 425 Mass. 1018, 1018 n. 1, 681 N.E.2d 813,
     Mass.                                    (19991; Matter Budnitz, 425 Mass. 1018, 1018 n. 1, 681 N.E.2d 813,
                                                            218 (1997).
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1160, 119 S.Ct. 2052, 144 L.Ed.2d 218 (1997).
    So, at the very least, the Massachusetts SJC abides by no particular standard. The standard it used varies from
    So, at the very least, the Massachusetts SJC abides by no particular standard. The standard it used varies from
    case to another. Petitioner shall not speculate as        reason for the apparent caprice. Matter of Schoepfer,
one case to another. Petitioner shall not speculate as to the reason for the apparent caprice. Matter of Schoepfer,
    Mass. 183, 687 N.E.2d 391 (December 3, 1997) (clear and convincing); Matter Ellis, 425 Mass.
426 Mass. 183, 687 N.E.2d 391 (December 3, 1997) (clear and convincing); Matter of Ellis, 425 Mass. 332, 680
N.E.2d 1154 (June 27, 1997) (preponderance the evidence: "We decline to adopt the somewhat amorphous stan-
N.E.2d 1154 (June 27, 1997) (preponderance of the evidence: “We decline to adopt the somewhat amorphous stan-
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                                                        23
State, 488 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) “Having
State, 488 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1972, writ ref d n.r.e.) "Having

exercised his right to refuse the three-year suspension given him the Grievance
exercised his right to refuse the three-year suspension given him by by the Grievance

Committee appellant became subject to the State Bar rules which permitted the
Committee appellant became subject to the State Bar rules which permitted the in- in-

stitution of a formal complaint seeking disbarment." Id. Id. at
stitution of a formal complaint seeking disbarment.” at 537. 537.

        Texas "requires only preponderance of the evidence standard” disbar-
        Texas “requires only aapreponderance of the evidence standard" in in disbar-

ment proceedings. Pretzer v. Motor Vehicle Bd.. 125 S.W.3d 23, 39 (2003), citing
ment proceedings. Pretzer v. Motor Vehicle Bd.. 125 S.W.3d 23, 39 (2003), citing

Drake, 488 S.W.2d at 538. Texas “administrative system include[s] substantial
Drake, 488 S.W.2d at 538. Texas "administrative system include[s] substantial evi- evi-

dence review, as an alternative to trial district court." Pretzer, at 39. That That
dence review, as an alternative to trial in in district court.” Pretzer, at 39. there there

is no imposition of aaright toto a trial de novo thethe Texas Code appearsarise out out of
is no imposition of right a trial de novo in in Texas Code appears to to arise of

a desire to conserve judicial resources. See id., at 40.
a desire to conserve judicial resources. See id., at 40.

        Had Johnson been a California attorney, it is likely trial would have been
        Had Johnson been a California attorney, it is likely her her trial would have been

deemed unfair . . given that she had been entitled public trial, the public was
deemed unfair....given that she had been entitled to ato a public trial, the public was

commanded to leave the hearing room, no complainants were called trial wit-
commanded to leave the hearing room, no complainants were called asas trial wit-

nesses, and her trial witness subpoenas were quashed. Those circumstances would
nesses, and her trial witness subpoenas were quashed. Those circumstances would

likely have increased the likelihood that her motion for a rehearing would
likely have increased the likelihood that her motion for a rehearing would havehave

been allowed.
been allowed.

        Had Johnson been a Texas attorney, is likely she would have been granted
        Had Johnson been a Texas attorney, itit is likely she would have been granted

a jury trial. If under the the circumstances of her she she might not have
a jurytrial. If not,not, undercircumstances of her case,case,might not have been been

granted a new trial, but she very likely would have obtained a “substantial evidence
granted a new trial, but she very likely would have obtained a "substantial evidence

review,” something her case was not given Massachusetts.
review," something her case was not given inin Massachusetts.


     of"clear and convincing proof”); Matter Saab, 406 Mass. 315, 324 n. 13, 547 N.E.2d 919, 924, n. 13 (1989)
dard of “clearand convincing proof'); Matter ofof Saab, 406 Mass.315, 324 n. 13, 547 N.E.2d 919, 924, n. 13 (1989)
(absence of codifed standards to govern attorney discipline proceedings does not offend due process), and so on.
(absence of codified standards to govern attorney discipline proceedings does not offend due process), and so on.
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                                             24

       In further contrast, the Massachusetts SJC deems, do many other States,
       In further contrast, the Massachusetts SJC deems, asas do many other States,

disciplinary proceedings to be civil and administrative in nature, where live wit-
disciplinary proceedings to be civil and administrative in nature, where live wit-

nesses are considered superfluous and unnecessary, where hearsay and totem-pole
nesses are considered superfluous and unnecessary, where hearsay and totem-pole

hearsay are admissible, where aa prosecutor’s argument is deemed evidence, where
hearsay are admissible, where prosecutor's argument is deemed evidence, where

the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions of the OBC and BBO, respectively,
the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions of the OBC and BBO, respectively, are are

commingled within a a multi-administrative board, and whereArticle III court court
commingled within multi-administrative board, and where the the Article III

(the SJC) not only appoints the heads of the OBC and BBO, which together com-
(the SJC) not only appoints the heads of the OBC and BBO, which together com-

prise the disciplinary arm the judicial branch, but also controls and supervises
prise the disciplinary arm of of the judicial branch, but also controls and supervises

the entities and the appointees, leaving no walls of of division between the functions.
the entities and the appointees, leaving no walls division between the functions.

In this scheme, which is found other States well (for instance, Montana), the ap-
In this scheme, which is found other States asas well (for instance, Montana), the ap-

pearance of bias exists and with that appearance the failure of due process. a
pearance of bias exists and with that appearance the failure of due process. It isIt is a

flaw inherent the process, in the scheme, itself. Cf Cf. Goldstein v. Commission
faw inherent in in the process, in the scheme, itself. Goldstein v. Commission on on
l

Practice of Supreme Court, 297 Mont. 493,513-514, 995 P.2d 923, 936-937 (2000).
Practice of Supreme Court, 297 Mont. 493,513-514, 995 P.2d 923, 936-937 (2000).

In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (ruling, combining the functions of prosecutor,
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (ruling, combining the functions of prosecutor,

judge, and jury in an attorney disciplinary proceeding violates process).
judge, and jury in an attorney disciplinary proceeding violates due due process).

       The case against Johnson below is definitive proof the latter assertions:
       The case against Johnson below is definitive proof ofof the latter assertions:

she was entitledto but was denied (a)(a) procedural due process, (b) fair notice of the
she was entitled to but was denied procedural due process, (b) fair notice of the

charge (e.g., including but not limited the identification of the the offending
charge (e.g., includingbut not limited to to the identification of offending pub- pub-

lished criticism of judges, the psychologist’s report, the funds commingled), (c)
lished criticism of judges, the psychologist's report, the funds commingled), andand (c)

an opportunity afforded for explanation and defense. The infirmity of and and
an opportunity afforded for explanation and defense. The infirmity of proofproofthe the

deprivations result only one reasonable conclusion, to wit, that the "state proce-
deprivationsresult inin only one reasonable conclusion, to wit, that the “state proce-

dure was wanting in due process’’ [Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 550, quoting Selling v. v. Rad-
dure was wanting in due process" [Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at at 550, quoting SellingRad-
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                                               25

ford, 243 U.S. 46, 51], making the disbarment of of Johnson unlawful.
ford, 243 U.S. 46, 51], making the disbarment Johnson unlawful.

       Under Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (Mass.) 523 (1868), which this Court
       Under Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (Mass.) 523 (1868), in in which this Court

wrote,“[I]n any essential particular, the proceeding irregular or defective, the con-con-
wrote,"[I]n any essential particular, the proceeding is is irregular or defective, the

viction will not be by ‘due process of law,’ and the judgment will be a nullity. FN9,”
viction will not be by `due process of law,' and the judgment will be a nullity. FN9,"

the judgment of disbarment against Johnson should deemed a a nullity. Id.,
the judgment of disbarment against Johnson should be be deemed nullity. Id., 74 74

U.S. at 529 (italic emphases in original case). See also FN9 529 in in Randall
U.S. at 529 (italic emphases in original case). See also FN9 at at 529 Randall for for

the more than two dozen cases in which judgments were deemed nullity.
the more than two dozen cases in which judgments were deemed a a nullity.

       Administrative procedures that have safeguards against "[s]uch proce-
       Administrative procedures that have nono safeguards against “[s]uch proce-

dural violation [even minimal] due process would never pass muster in in nor-
duralviolation ofof [even minimal] due process would never pass musterany any nor-

mal civil or criminal litigation.” Ruffalo, 390 at 551. "Confrontation and cross-
mal civil or criminal litigation." Ruffalo, 390 U.S. U.S. at 551. “Confrontation and cross-

examination are so basic to our concept of due process that no proceeding by an ad-
examinationare so basic to our concept of due process that no proceeding by an ad-

ministrative agency is a fair one that denies these rights.” Hannah v. Larche, 363
ministrative agency is a fair one that denies these rights." Hannah v. Larche, 363

U.S. 420, 504 (1960) (involving the form and extent due process and the procedural
U.S. 420, 504 (1960) (involving the form and extent ofof due processand the procedural rules in

proceedings under the Civil Rights Act 1957), citing (Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331,
proceedingsunder the Civil Rights Act ofof 1957), citing (Petersv. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331,

351-352 (concurring opinion).
351-352 (concurringopinion).

       Further, where this Court has held that “federal administrative law requires
       Further,where this Court has held that "federal administrative law requires

that agency adjudication contain many the same safeguards as are available in
that agency adjudication contain many of of the same safeguards as are available in

the judicial process” [Butz Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978)], what reasons
the judicial process" [Butz v.v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978)], what reasons

can justify the absence of those safeguards the Massachusetts attorney-
canjustify the absence of those safeguards inin the Massachusetts attorney-

disciplinary scheme or in those of other State jurisdictions? Why should Massachu-
disciplinary schemeor in those of other State jurisdictions? Why should Massachu-

setts and other States be allowed to circumvent the due process clause the Four-
setts and other States be allowed to circumvent the due process clause of of the Four-

teenth Amendment, creating a a conflict with jurisdictions whose disciplinary
teenth Amendment, creating conflict with jurisdictions whose disciplinary
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                                                      26

schemes are judicial or quasi-criminal nature and with this, the the United States
schemes are judicialor quasi-criminal in in nature and with this, United States

Supreme Court?
Supreme Court?

         Moreover, notwithstanding the controversy over whether bar bar disciplinary
         Moreover, notwithstanding the controversy over whether disciplinary

proceedings are civil, criminal, oror quasi-criminalnature, so longlong as they on on
proceedings are civil, criminal, quasi-criminal in in nature, so as they are are

the common-law side of the court, attorneys are entitled to a jury in a in a discipli-
the common-law side of the court, attorneys are entitled to a jury trialtrial discipli-

nary prosecution, which the Massachusetts administrative scheme circumvents
nary prosecution, which the Massachusetts administrative scheme circumvents and and

thereby deprives its attorneys rights they would have in other jurisdictions, includ-
thereby deprives its attorneys rights they would have in other jurisdictions, includ-

ing the right to appeal ruling by the BBO. In In Massachusetts, it would be a
ing the right to appeal a a ruling by the BBO.Massachusetts, it would be a futile futile

gesture to request the SJC, which created, controls, and supervises the BBO, to
gesture to request the SJC, which created, controls, and supervises the BBO, to de-de-

clare the BBO's, or its own pronouncements, toto be unconstitutional. See Middlesex
clare the BBO’s, or its own pronouncements, be unconstitutional. See Middlesex

County Ethics Committee Garden State Bar Ass'n, 1981 WL 389660 (Petitioner's
County Ethics Committee v.v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 1981 WL 389660 (Petitioner’s

brief), opinion at 457 U.S. (N.J.) 423 (1982).
brief), opinion at 457 U.S. (N.J.) 423 (1982).

         "Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake
         “Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake be- be-

cause of what the government is doing him, notice and an opportunity to be be heard
cause of what the government is doing toto him, notice and an opportunity toheard

are essential.” Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. (Ky.) 693, 708 (1976), quoting Wisconsin
are essential." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. (Ky.) 693, 708 (1976), quoting Wisconsin v. v.

Constantineau, 400 U.S. (Wis.) 433, 437 (1971). person's livelihood should also be
Constantineau,400 U.S. (Wis.) 433, 437 (1971). A A person’s livelihood should also be

of sufficient concern to be deemed “essential.”
of sufficientconcern to be deemed "essential."

         Remaining unanswered by the Court the question, whether under the
         Remainingunanswered by the Court is is the question, whether under the

Fourteenth Amendment, not only notice and opportunity to be heard but the
FourteenthAmendment, not only notice and opportunity to be heard but alsoalso the

totality of procedural due process must be uniformly applied in attorney-discipline
totality of procedural due process must be uniformly applied in attorney-discipline
actions across our nation.\20
actions across our nation.\20/ /

20
20   "[C]ourts.. . have carefully delineated elements of due process specifically for attorney discipli-
     “[C]ourts . . . have carefully delineated elements of due process specifically for attorney discipli-
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                                                     27

II.
II.       Review is warranted because attorney disciplinary proceedings that
          Review is warranted because attorney disciplinary proceedings that
          are administrative in nature contravene the due process or
          are administrative in nature contravene the due process or equal pro- equal pro-
          tection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and thereby thereby
          tection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment anddeprive at-deprive at-
          torneys their secured constitutional rights\FN21/
          torneys ofof their secured constitutional rights\FN21/

          The BBO proceedings (a) were administrative, not judicial in nature, (b)
          The BBO proceedings (a) were administrative, not judicial in nature, (b) did did

not implicate important state interests, did not not provide an adequate opportunity
not implicate important state interests, (c) (c) did provide an adequate opportunity

to raise federal claims, and (d) grew out exceptional circumstances and ire, if not
to raise federal claims, and (d) grew out of of exceptional circumstances and ire, if not




      nary proceedings. See Wilburn Brewer, Jr., Due process in Lawyer Disciplinary Cases: From the
      nary proceedings. See Wilburn Brewer, Jr., Due processin Lawyer DisciplinaryCases: From the
      Cradle to the Grave, 42 S.C.L.Rev. 925 (1991) (identifying seven elements of due process in at-
      Cradle to the Grave, 42 S.C.L.Rev. 925 (1991) (identifying seven elements of due process in at-
      torney disciplinary proceedings). See also In re Robson (Alaska 1978), 575 P.2d 771 (discussing
      torney disciplinary proceedings). See also In re Robson (Alaska 1978), 575 P.2d 771,
      right to neutral decision-maker and holding that counsel associated with either the prosecution
      right to neutral decision-maker and holding that counsel associated with either the prosecution
      (discussing
      or defense of attorney disciplinary proceeding should not be present during deliberations); State
      or defense of attorney disciplinary proceeding should not be present during deliberations); State
      v. Turner (1975), 217 Kan. 574, 538 P.2d 966 (discussing right to public hearing); People v. Mor-
      v. Turner (1975), 217 Kan. 574, 538 P.2d 966 (discussing right to public hearing); People v. Mor-
      ley (Colo. 1986), 725 P.2d 510 (identifying right to call and cross-examine witnesses); In re Meade
      ley (Colo.1986), 725 P.2d 510 (identifying right to call and cross-examine witnesses); In re Meade
      (1985), 103 Wash.2d 374, 693 P.2d 713 (examining right to counsel); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v.
      (1985), 103 Wash.2d 374, 693 P.2d 713 (examining right to counsel); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v.
      Shewmaker (Ky.1992), 842 S.W.2d 520 (discussing right to pretrial discovery and taking of depo-
      Shewmaker (Ky.1992), 842 S.W.2d 520 (discussing right to pretrial discovery and taking of depo-
      sitions); Matter of Jaques (E.D.Tex.1997), 972 F.Supp. 1070 (requiring burden of clear and con-
      sitions); Matter of Jaques (E.D.Tex.1997), 972 F.Supp. 1070 (requiring burden of clear and con-
      vincing evidence).
      vincing evidence).
      ¶ 86 Similarly, in In re Schlesinger (1961), 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835, the Pennsylvania Supreme
      ¶ 86 Similarly,in In re Schlesinger (1961), 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835, the Pennsylvania Supreme
      Court, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in In re Murchison (1955), 349 U.S. 133, 75
      Court, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in In re Murchison (1955), 349 U.S. 133, 75
      S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942, expressly ruled that the combination of the functions of prosecutor,
      S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942, expressly ruled that the combination of the functions of prosecutor,
      judge and jury in an attorney disciplinary proceeding violated due process. One of the concerns
      judge and jury in an attorney disciplinary proceeding violated due process. One of the concerns
      addressed by the Pennsylvania Court was that the Committee on Offenses (like the COP in Mon-
      addressed by the Pennsylvania Court was that the Committee on Offenses (like the COP in Mon-
      tana) appointed counsel to prosecute on its behalf. Schlesinger, 172 A.2d at 840. The court stated:
      tana) appointed counsel to prosecute on its behalf. Schlesinger, 172 A.2d at 840. The court stated:
          Here, a member of the bar, charged with unprofessional conduct by a bar Committee on Of-
          Here, a member of the bar, charged with unprofessional conduct by a bar Committee on Of-
          fenses, was prosecuted on the Committee's complaint before a Subcommittee, composed of
          fenses, was prosecuted on the Committee's complaint before a Subcommittee, composed of
          three members of the Committee, sitting as the trial tribunal. In such procedure, so con-
          three members of the Committee, sitting as the trialtribunal. In such a a procedure,so con-
          trary to traditional American judicial concepts, unfairness was, ipso facto, inherent; it was
          trary to traditional American judicial concepts, unfairness was, ipso facto, inherent; it was
          fraught with the possibility of temptation to each member of the trial tribunal to favor, con-
          fraught with the possibility of temptation to each member of the trial tribunal to favor, con-
          sciously or unconsciously, the prosecuting body which appointed him and of which he was a
          sciously or unconsciously, the prosecuting body which appointed him and of which he was a
          member. The record as a whole contains a reasonable basis for doubt as to whether imparti-
          member. The record as a whole contains a reasonable basis for doubt as to whether imparti-
          ality on the part of the members of the tribunal was completely absent and suggests an un-
          ality on the part of the members of the tribunal was completely absent and suggests an un-
          sympathetic predisposition toward the appellant.
          sympathetic predisposition toward the appellant.
      Schlesinger, 172 A.2d at 841. The Schlesinger court concluded that an actual "predilection to fa-
      Schlesinger, 172 A.2d at 841. The Schlesinger court concluded that an actual “predilection to fa-
      vor one side over the other is not required in order to vitiate a judicial proceeding as being viola-
      vor one side over the other is not required in order to vitiate a judicial proceeding as being viola-
      tive of due process." Schlesinger, 172 A.2d at 841. Rather, the respondent need merely show that
      tive of due process.” Schlesinger, 172 A.2d at 841. Rather, the respondent need merely show that
      a "possible temptation" exists. Schlesinger, 172 A.2d at 841
      a “possible temptation” exists. Schlesinger, 172 A.2d at 841
Goldstein, 297 Mont. at 520-521, 995 P.2d at 940-941 (Hunt, Regnier, and Gray, JJ., concurring, and
Goldstein, 297 Mont. at 520-521, 995 P.2d at 940-941 (Hunt, Regnier, and Gray, JJ., concurring, and
Nelson, J., dissenting).
Nelson, J., dissenting).
21
21    "[L]awyers also                   citizenship.” Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967).
      “[L]awyers also enjoy first-class citizenship." Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967).
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                                                      28

bias, against Johnson fulfilling her duty to report professional misconduct,\FN22/
bias, against Johnson fulfilling her duty to report professional misconduct,\FN22/ ex- ex-

ercising her right free speech during her gubernatorial campaign, and publishing
ercising her right toto free speech during her gubernatorial campaign, and publishing

her work on her Internet website.\FN23/ /
her work on her Internet website.\FN23

         The decision of disbarment is wrong and affects not only the petitioner
         The decision of disbarment is wrong and affects not only the petitioner but but

also other attorneys and laymen as well. Attorneys fear retaliation for speak-
also other attorneys and laymen as well. Attorneys will will fear retaliation for speak-

ing out when they should, and the public a a whole, which relies on zealous repre-
ing out when they should, and the public asas whole, which relies on zealous repre-

sentation, will be deprived that zealous representation when seeking a remedy or
sentation, will be deprived ofof that zealous representation when seeking a remedy or

relief from the courts. “It is . . . important society and the bar the bar itself that
relief from the courts. "It is ... important both to both to society and itself that

lawyers be unintimidated—free to think, speak, and act as members Inde-
lawyers be unintimidated-free to think, speak, and act as members of anof an Inde-

pendent Bar.” Konigsberg State Bar of of California, U.S. 252, 273 (1957).
pendent Bar." Konigsberg v. v. State Bar California, 353353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957).

         The American Colonists were not willing, nor should be, to to take risk
         The American Colonists were not willing, nor should we we be, take the the risk
         that`(m)en who injure and oppress the people under their administration
         that ‘(m)en who injure and oppress the people under their administration

22
22 Mass.R.Prof.C. 8.3(b), "requir[ing] lawyers to report serious violations of ethical duty by lawyers
   Mass.R.Prof.C. 8.3(b), “requir[ing] lawyers to report serious violations of ethical duty by lawyers
and judges." Id. at Comment.
and judges.” Id. at Comment.
23
23                          that speech critical of the exercise the                     at the very cen-
    “There is no question that speech critical of the exercise of the State's power lies at the very cen-
    "There
    of the First Amendment.” Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1034 (1991) (involving
ter of the First Amendment." Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1034 (1991) (involving
ter
"classic political speech"). "'[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the
“classic political speech”). “‘[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the
First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.'" Burson v. Freeman,
First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.’ ”Burson v. Freeman,
504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992), quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218(1966).
504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992), quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218(1966).
          "[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
          “[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
     government.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). “… [C]ommunication of this kind
     government." Garrison v. Louisiana. 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). "... [C]ommunication of this kind
     is entitled to the most exacting degree of First Amendment protection.” [FCC League of Women
     is entitled to the most exacting degree of First Amendment protection." [FCC W.v]. League of Women
                                     364,1375-376 [(1984)]. ... . P]olitical speech ‘occupies the "highest rung
     Voters [of California, 468 U.S. 364,] 375-376 [(1984)]. ]] .… P]oliticalspeech `occupiesthe “highest rung
     Voters [of California,
     of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,” and is entitled to special protection.” Connick v.
     of the hierarchy of First Amendment values," and is entitled to special protection." Connick v.
     Myers. 461 U.S. 138,145 (1983), quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913
     Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983), quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.. 458 U.S. 886, 913
      1982... Rules inhibiting unhampered comment, thus shackling the right to freely express opin-
     (1982). … Rules inhibiting unhampered comment, thus shackling the right to freely express opin-
     ion, must be justified, “[i]f they can be justified at all, ... in terms of some serious substantive evil
     ion, must be justified, "[i]f they can be justified at all, ... in terms of some serious substantive evil
     which they are designed to avert.” Bridges [v. California, 314 U.S. 252,] 270 [62 S.Ct. 190 (1941)]
     which they are designed to avert." Bridges [v. California, 314 U.S. 252,] 270 [62 S.Ct. 190 (1941)]
     (emphasis added); see also id. at 262. ("[T]he likelihood, however great, that a substantive evil
     (emphasis added); see also id. at 262. (“[T]he likelihood, however great, that a substantive evil
     will result cannot alone justify restriction upon freedom of speech or the press.”). And protecting
     will result cannot alone justify aarestriction upon freedom of speech or the press."). And protecting
     the judiciary or other public actors from derision, however crudely or distastefully expressed, has
     the judiciary or other public actors from derision, however crudely or distastefully expressed, has
     consistently been rejected as "serious substantive evil" that would justify restrictions on
     consistently been rejected as aa“serious substantive evil” that would justify restrictions on
     speech.”
     speech."
Grievance Adm'r v. Fieger, 476 Mich. at 309-310, 719 N.W. at 167-168.
Grievance Adm'r v. Fieyer, 476 Mich. at 309-310, 719 N.W. at 167-168.
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                                                   29

       (and) provoke them to cry out and complain’ will also empowered to to ‘make
       (and) provoke them to cry out and complain' will also be be empowered `make
       thatvery complaint the foundation forfor new oppressions and prosecutions.’
       that very complaint the foundation new oppressions and prosecutions.'
            Trial of John Peter Zenger, 17 Howell's St. Tr. 675, 721-722 (1735) (ar-
       The Trial of John Peter Zenger, 17 Howell's St. Tr. 675, 721-722 (1735) (ar-
       gument of counsel to the jury). To impose liability critical, albeit errone-
       gument of counsel to the jury). To impose liability for for critical, albeit errone-
       ous or even malicious, comments on official conduct would effectively resur-
       ous or even malicious, comments on official conduct would effectively resur-
       rect `the obsolete doctrine that the governed must not criticize their gover-
       rect ‘the obsolete doctrine that the governed must not criticize their gover-
       nors.’
       nors.'

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300 (1964) (citations omitted).
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300 (1964) (citations omitted).

       The reason is starkly clear and important. If attorney discipline proceedings
       The reason is starkly clear and important. If attorney discipline proceedings

were judicial in nature, the OBC, BBO, and SJC would have to acknowledge
were judicial in nature, the OBC, BBO, and SJC would have to acknowledge thatthat

they blithely ignore the well-settled rules of procedure and evidence constitu-
they blithely ignore the well-settled rules of procedure and evidence andand constitu-

tional safeguards.\FN24/
tional safeguards.\FN24/

       Although unwritten its opinion, the SJC must find solace in Randall v.
       Although unwritten in in its opinion, the SJC must find solace in Randall v.

Brigham, 74 U.S. (Mass.) 523, Wall. 523 (1868) (action by attorney damages
Brigham,74 U.S. (Mass.) 523, 77Wall. 523 (1868) (action by attorney forfor damages

against judge for disbarring him), which this Court wrote 140 years ago ago it
against judge for disbarring him), in in which this Court wrote 140 years "that“that it

was not essential to the validity of of the order removal that it should be founded on on
was not essential to the validity the order of of removal that it should be founded

legal process according to the signification ofof the words ‘per legem terrae’ as used in
legal process according to the signification the words `per legem terrae' as used in

Magna Charta, or in the Declaration Rights." Id. Id. at Those words are out of
Magna Charta, or in the Declaration of of Rights.” at 541.541. Those words are out of

fashion today. The public wants their constitutions declarations of rights re-
fashion today. The public wants their constitutions and and declarations of rights re-

stored. The Law of the Land what made this country great.
stored. The Law of the Land is is what made this country great.

       Justice Black’s words still reflect pulse of of people today:
       Justice Black's words still refect thethe pulseourour people today:


24
24
     In Massachusetts—and in some other States, e.g., Colorado-the BBO/OBC prosecutor is ap-
     In Massachusetts-and in some other States, e.g., Colorado—theBBO/OBC prosecutor is ap-
pointed by the State's High Court, and being created without bylaws, controlled, and supervised by
pointed by the State’s High Court, and being created without bylaws, controlled, and supervised by
that court, is part of the judicial rather than part the executive branch. Such a scheme evades the
that court, is part of the judicial rather than part ofof the executive branch. Such a schemeevades the
safeguards provided by the constitutional provisions for the separation of powers. Further, by deem-
safeguards provided by the constitutional provisions for the separation of powers. Further, by deem-
ing the scheme administrative when in actual fact, it is sui generis—for many aspects of the Admin-
ing the schemeadministrative when in actual fact, it is sui generis-for many aspects of the Admin-
istrative Procedures Act, M.G.L. c. 30A, are not followed-the scheme deprives the petitioner of his
istrative Procedures Act, M.G.L. c. 30A, are not followed—thescheme deprives the petitioner of his
or her constitutional right to a jury.
or her constitutional right to a jury.
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                                             30

       The majority is holding . . that lawyers are not entitled full sweep of
       The majority is holding .... that lawyers are not entitled to theto the full sweep of
       due process protections because they had no such protections against judges
       due process protections because they had no such protections against judges
       or their fellow lawyers England. But I see no reason why this generation of
       or their fellow lawyers inin England. But I see no reason why this generation of
       Americans should be deprived of part of its Bill of of Rights on basis of
       Americans should be deprived of aa part of its Bill Rights on the the basis of
       medieval English practices that our Forefathers England, fought a revo-
       medieval English practices that our Forefathers leftleft England, fought a revo-
       lution and wrote Constitution to to rid of.
       lutionand wrote a a Constitution getget rid of.

Cohen v. Hurley,366 U.S. 117, 142 (1961),, atat 142 (Black, J., with whom Warren.
Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 142 (1961), , 142 (Black, J., with whom Warren.

C.J., and Douglas, J., concurred, dissenting). Fearing that the majority opinion in
C.J., and Douglas, J., concurred, dissenting). Fearing that the majority opinion in

Cohen implied that “a lawyer not to have the protection of of First Amendment
Cohen impliedthat "a lawyer is is not to have the protectionthe the First Amendment

with regard to his private beliefs and associations whenever exercise of of those
withregard to his private beliefs and associations whenever his his exercisethose

freedoms might interfere with duty to `cooperate' with a judge"' [id. [id. at
freedoms might interfere with his his duty to ‘cooperate’ with a judge’”at 145],145],

Judge Black continued:
Judge Black continued:

       It seems to me that the majority takes a fundamentally unsound position
       It seems to me that the majority takes a fundamentally unsound position
       when it endorses a practice based upon the artificial notion that rights
       when it endorses a practice based upon the artificial notion that rights and and
       privileges can be stripped from man in his capacity as a a lawyer without
       privilegescan be stripped from a a man in his capacity aslawyer without af- af-
       fecting the rights and privileges that man as as a man.
       fecting the rights and privileges of of that man a man.

Id. at 145 (dissent).
Id. at 145 (dissent).

       In Petitioner’s case, the absence of due process was admitted and blatant,
       In Petitioner's case, the absence of due process was admitted and blatant,

statutes and well-settled common law were ignored deemed, inappropriately, in-
statutes and well-settled common law were ignored or or deemed, inappropriately, in-

admissible, and the BBO and OBC failed follow the rules promulgated by by an
admissible, and the BBO and OBC failed toto follow the rules promulgatedan SJCSJC

committee without statutory authority—all of worked to deprive Petitioner of
committee without statutory authority-all of whichwhich worked to deprive Petitioner of

her constitutional rights.
her constitutional rights.


III.
III.   Review is warranted where the BBO’s findings were transparently
       Review is warranted where the BBO's findings were transparently
       invalid, the SJC single justice adopted them, them, the judgment of
       invalid, the SJC single justice adoptedcausing causing the judgment of
       disbarment to be void, and the the subsequent affirmance by the
       disbarment to be void, andsubsequent affirmance by the SJC full SJC full
       panel of that void judgment imparted to it no validity, making Peti-
       panelof that void judgment imparted to it no validity, making Peti-
       tioner’s disbarment unconstitutional.
       tioner's disbarment unconstitutional.
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                                            31
                                            31

       Where the BBO’s proceedings were devoid of due process—insufficient notice
       Where the BBO's proceedings were devoid of due process-insufficient notice

and no opportunity to be heard, e.g., no prosecutorial trial witnesses, quashing
and no opportunity to be heard, e.g., no prosecutorial trial witnesses, the the quashing

of all of Johnson trial witness subpoenas, and the preclusion of her documents bear-
of all of Johnson trial witness subpoenas, and the preclusion of her documents bear-

ing on the issues at the time ofof trial—the BBO findingsconclusions were were trans-
ing on the issues at the time trial-the BBO findings and and conclusions trans-

parently invalid.
parentlyinvalid.

       "[A] departure from established modes procedure will often render the
       “[A] departure from established modes ofof procedure will often render the

judgment void.” Windsor McVeigh, 93 US 274, 282 (1876).
judgment void." Windsor v. v. McVeigh, 93 US 274, 282 (1876).

       The commonwealth of Massachusetts is free to regulate the procedure its
       The commonwealth of Massachusetts is free to regulate the procedure of of its
       courts in accordance with its own conception policy and fairness, unless in
       courts in accordance with its own conception ofof policy and fairness, unless in
       so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted the traditions and
       so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted inin the traditions and
       conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.
       conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.

Snyder v. Com. of Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). Due process is one of those prin-
Snyder v. Com. of Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). Due process is one of those prin-

ciples of justice.
ciples of justice.

       To conform to modern conditions, [states] may substitute a new form of pro-
       To conform to modern conditions, [states] may substitute a new form of pro-
       cedure for one long practiced and recognized. But, whatever the form
       cedure for one long practiced and recognized. But, whatever the form or or
       method of procedure adopted, they remain always subject the prohibition
       method of procedure adopted, they remain always subject to to the prohibition
       against that which commonly thought essentially unfair to him him is to
       against that which isis commonly thought essentially unfair to who who is to
       be afforded a hearing. Tested by this principle, . . deprivation of the
       be afforded a hearing. Tested by this principle, ... .the the deprivation of the
       right to present evidence bearing on the issue [has] been adjudged deny
       right to present evidence bearing on the issue [has] been adjudged to to deny
       due process.
       due process.

Snyder, 291 U.S. at 128, citing Saunders Shaw, 244 U.S. (La.) 317 (1917) (judg-
Snyder, 291 U.S. at 128, citing Saunders v.v. Shaw, 244 U.S. (La.) 317 (1917) (judg-

ment reversed).
ment reversed).

       As the SJC noted in its opinion: “The single justice adopted findings and
       As the SJC noted in its opinion: "The single justice adopted thethe findings and

conclusions as adopted by the board and entered judgment ordering that re-
conclusions as adopted by the board and entered aajudgment ordering that thethe re-

spondent be disbarred” [APP-2].
spondent be disbarred" [APP-2].
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                                              32

       Given that the BBO’s findings and conclusions, having been reached in a vac-
       Given that the BBO's findings and conclusions, having been reached in a vac-

uum devoid of due process, were transparently invalid, the SJC single justice’s sub-
uum devoid of due process, were transparently invalid, the SJC single justice's sub-

sequent judgment of disbarment must be deemed have had no legal force or ef-
sequent judgment of disbarment must be deemed toto have had no legal force or ef-

fect. See Black's Law Dictionary 861 (8th eded 2004)
fect. See Black's Law Dictionary 861 (8th 2004)

       That a void order is appealable does not permit to consider the appeal on
       That a void order is appealable does not permit usus to consider the appeal on
       its merits and to affirm the order if were so so disposed, because our affir-
       its merits and to affirm the order if we we were disposed, because our affir-
       mance would impart no validity and would be be similarly [Citations.]
       mance would impart itit no validity and would similarly void.void. [Citations.]
       One of the cases mentioned (Pioneer Land Co. v. Maddux, [109 Cal. 633
       One of the cases mentioned (Pioneer Land Co. v. Maddux, [109 Cal. 633
       (1895)])) has been cited for the further proposition that dismissal of an
       (1895)])) has been cited for the further proposition that thethe dismissal of an
       appeal from a void order imparts it validity, either.
       appeal from a void order imparts it nono validity, either.

Adohr Milk Farm, Inc. Love, 255 Cal.App.2d 366, 371 (1967). Sullivan v. Gave,
Adohr Milk Farm, Inc. v. v. Love, 255 Cal.App.2d 366, 371 (1967). Sullivan v. Gage,

145 Cal. 759, 771, 79 P. 537, 542 (1905) ("[T]he affirmance by an appellate court a
145 Cal. 759, 771, 79 P. 537, 542 (1905) (“[T]he affirmance by an appellate court of of a

void judgment imparts it it validity...       ."), also quoting Pioneer Land Co. See
void judgment imparts toto nono validity. . . .”), also quoting Pioneer Land Co. See

also Butler v. Eaton, 141 U.S. (Mass.) 240, 242-243 (1891) (judgment Mass. SJC
also Butler v. Eaton, 141 U.S. (Mass.) 240, 242-243 (1891) (judgment of of Mass. SJC

"subverted and rendered null and void.” . Execution in force to judgment
“subverted and rendered null and void." . . .. .Execution in force priorprior to judgment

being found null and void and reversed became entirely annulled. “[T]he whole
being found null and void and reversed became entirely annulled. "[T]he whole

foundation of that part the judgment which is is in favor of the defendant
foundation of that part ofof the judgment whichin favor of the defendant is ... is . . .

without any validity, force, effect, and ought never to to have existed”).
without any validity, force, or or effect, and ought neverhave existed").

       Lastly, and significantly, were proceedings Massachusetts deemed to to
       Lastly,and significantly, were proceedings in in Massachusetts deemed be be

quasi-criminal, as in Ruffalo, the judgment and order of of disbarment would be
quasi-criminal, as in Ruffalo, the judgment and orderdisbarment would be void void

of the grounds that under Article of of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights,
of the grounds that under Article XIIXII thethe Massachusetts Declaration of Rights,

Petitioner was entitled a a trial jury, which she was denied.
Petitionerwas entitled toto trial by by jury, which she was denied.


CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, petitioner prays that this Court grant a of
       For the foregoing reasons, petitioner prays that this Court grant a writ writ of
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                                           33

certiorarito review the affirmance of both thethe judgment of disbarment judg-judg-
certiorari to review the affirmance of both judgment of disbarment and and

ment of contempt—with consideration of validity of the judgments themselves
ment of contempt-with consideration of the the validity of the judgments themselves

and the proceedings at the BBO—by Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is-
and the proceedings at the BBO-by thethe Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is-

sued on 5 December 2007 and rescript entered on January 2008.
sued on 5 December 2007 and rescript entered on 44January 2008.

                                                  Respectfully submitted,
                                                  Respectfullysubmitted,



                                                  Barbara C. Johnson, Pro Se
                                                  BarbaraC. Johnson, Pro Se
                                                  6 Appletree Lane
                                                  6 Appletree Lane
                                                  Andover, MA 01810-4102
                                                  Andover, MA 01810-4102
                                                  978-474-0833
                                                  978-474-0833
27 February 2008
27 February2008                                   First Circuit Bar No. 36719
                                                  FirstCircuit Bar No. 36719
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          165,            249
450 Mass. 165, 877 N.E.2d 249


                                                of Massachusetts, Suffolk.
                         Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.
                         Supreme Judicial

                                       Matter of Barbara C. Johnson.
                                In the Matter of Barbara C. Johnson.

                                      SJC-09820, SJC-09866.

                                              Nov. 6, 2007.
                                       Argued Nov. 6, 2007.
                                       Decided Dec. 5, 2007.

Attorney at Law, Disbarment. Contempt.
Attorney at Law, Disbarment. Contempt.

INFORMATION filed the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on May 16, 2006.
INFORMATION filed inin the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on May 16, 2006.

    case was heard by Francis X. Spina, J., and petition for contempt, fled on September
The case was heard by Francis X. Spina, J., and aapetition for contempt, filedon September 27,
2006, was also heard by him.

**250 Barbara C. Johnson, pro se.
**250Barbara C. Johnson, pro se.
                                         Counsel.
Susan A. Strauss Weisberg, Assistant Bar Counsel.
Susan A. Strauss Weisberg,

      Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY,                 CORDY, & BOTSFORD,
**251 Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, COWIN, CORDY, & BOTSFORD,
JJ.
JJ.


RESCRIPT.

              BY THE COURT. Barbara C. Johnson (respondent) appeals from judgments
        *165 BY THE COURT. Barbara C. Johnson (respondent) appeals from judgments of a
single justice of this court disbarring her from the practice of law and finding her in contempt of
single justice of this court disbarring her from the practice of law and fnding her contempt of
    judgment disbarment. We affrm both judgments.
the judgment of disbarment. We affirm both judgments.

                Disbarment.                   Following a hearing
        *166 1. Disbarment. a. Background. Following a hearing on a three-count petition for dis-
                                                                       three-count petition
cipline, a special hearing ofcer made fndings of fact and conclusions of          culminating
cipline, a special hearing officer made findings of fact and conclusions of law culminating in a
recommendation that the respondent be disbarred. The Board Bar Overseers
recommendation that the respondent be disbarred. The Board of Bar Overseers (board) adopted adopted
those findings and conclusions, and fled                   in the county court recommending
those findings and conclusions, and filed an information in the county court recommending dis-
                                        fndings and conclusions as adopted by the board and
barment. The single justice adopted the findingsand conclusions as adopted by the board and en-
tered judgment ordering that the respondent be disbarred. The findings and conclusions as
tered a judgment ordering that the respondent be disbarred. The fndings and conclusions as
adopted by the board are summarized as follows.
                                      as follows.

                 one.      respondent                                            she posts
        i. Count one. The respondent owns and maintains a Web site on which she posts informa-
                                              and maintains a Web site
tion about allegations of child sexual abuse. In 2001, the respondent represented a father
tion about allegations of child sexual abuse. In 2001, the respondent represented a father in a pa-
        and custody              the Probate               Court who had been accused
ternity and custody action in the Probate and Family Court who had been accused of sexually sexually
                    son.                    been the subject of care and
abusing his minor son. The son had also been the subject of a care and protection proceeding in
abusing his                                                                           proceeding
                     The respondent posted on her Web site information that had been
the Juvenile Court. The respondent posted on her Web site information that had been impounded
   the care and protection action, e.g.,               identifying the son as having been
in the care and protection action, e.g., information identifying the son as having been allegedly
                                           the son's full name and photographs him. The respon-
sexually abused by his father, including the son's full name and photographs of him. The respon-
           abused by his father,
dent also posted the full names of                                                   of the mother's
dent also posted the full names of the son's mother and a half-brother (the product of the mother's
                                        son's mother and a half-brother


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partnership with man             she married and                  pleadings           mother's
partnership with a man whom she married and later divorced); pleadings from the mother's di-
              and comments        the respondent
vorce action; and comments by the respondent characterizing the mother as a perjurer who had
                                                 characterizing the mother as a perjurer       had
                children out of wedlock and who had falsely accused both fathers of sexual abuse.
conceived both children out of wedlock and who had falsely accused both fathers of sexual abuse.

                    and son      complaints with bar counsel requesting that the respondent
       The mother and son filed complaints with bar counsel requesting that the respondent re-
                                           addition, a judge in the Juvenile Court ordered the
move the material from her Web site. In addition, a judge in the Juvenile Court ordered the re-
move the material
                                                                          references to
spondent to return any impounded material to the court and remove all references to that material
spondent to return any impounded
from her Web site. The respondent                              A subsequent order a
from her Web site. The respondent ignored the court orders. A subsequent order by a judge in the
                          declared that the materials fled in that action were also impounded.
Probate and Family Court declared that the materials filed in that action were also impounded.
Probate and Family

               board adopted the hearing offcer's conclusions          engaging                  ac-
          The board adopted the hearing officer's conclusions that by engaging in the foregoing ac-
tivities, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof C. 3.4(c), 426
tivities, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(c), 426 Mass. 1389 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C.
                                                                                   Mass. R. Prof C.
_4, 426 Mass. 1405 (1998); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(d) and (h), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998).
4.4, 426 Mass. 1405 (1998); and
4                                           Prof C. 8.4(d) and (h), 426 Mass. 1429

               ii. Count two. In 1999, the parents of a mentally retarded adult daughter
         *167 ii. Count two. In 1999, the parents of a mentally retarded adult daughter paid the re-
spondent a $10,000 retainer to represent them in connection with criminal and protective services
spondent a $10,000 retainer to represent them in connection with criminal and protective services
proceedings           from allegations that the father had sexually abused his daughter. The respon-
proceedings arising from allegations that the father had sexually abused his daughter. The respon-
                                                                                                 sub-
dent deposited the retainer in her personal account rather than in a trust account. The clients sub-
dent deposited the retainer in                account rather than
sequently discharged the respondent and requested refund of                         retainer.
sequently discharged the respondent and requested a a refund ofaaportion of the retainer. The re-
                                                                      portion of
spondent refunded less than the clients had expected. When the clients disputed the amount of the
spondent refunded less than the clients had expected. When the clients                 amount
             respondent failed place the disputed sum in a            account. Thereafer, the clients
refund, the respondent failed to place the disputed sum in a trust account. Thereafter, the clients
filed a             with bar counsel.
filed a complaint with bar counsel.

           2002,      respondent posted on her Web site the identities of her former **252
        In 2002, the respondent posted on her Web site the identities of her former **252 clients
           daughter          their permission; details of the sexual abuse            and
and their daughter without their permission; details of the sexual abuse allegations; and informa-
and
     regarding the fee dispute. The clients demanded             respondent remove the information
tion regarding the fee dispute. The clients demanded that the respondent remove the information
      her Web site. In telephone message, the respondent said that she might remove the infor-
from her Web site. In aatelephone message, the respondent said that she might remove the infor-
                 if the        withdrew their complaint with bar counsel.
mation but only if the clients withdrew their complaint with bar counsel.

               board adopted the hearing offcer's conclusions          engaging
          The board adopted the hearing officer's conclusions that by engaging in the foregoing ac-ac-
tivities, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof C. 1.6(a),
tivities, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6(a), 426 Mass. 1322 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C.
                                                                      1322 (1998); Mass. R. Prof
1.9 (c)(1) and (2), 426 Mass. 1342 (1998); Mass. R. Prof C. 1.15(a)-(c), 426 Mass. 1363
1.9(c)(1) and (2), 426 Mass. 1342 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(c), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998);
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d), 426 Mass. 1369 (1998); Mass. R. Prof.C. 8.4(c), (d), and (h), 426 Mass.
Mass.       Prof C. 1.16(d), 426 Mass.                         Prof C. 8.4(c), (d), and (h), 426 Mass.
                                                                           (1997).
1429 (1998); and S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 10, as appearing in 425 Mass. 1313 (1997).
                                             appearing

          iii. Count three. In 1995,                       representing a plaintiff               termina-
          iii. Count three. In 1995, in connection with representing a plaintiff in a wrongful termina-
       action the District Court, the respondent fled motions for leave to depose nonparty
tion action in the District Court, the respondent filed motions for leave to depose nonparty wit-
nesses out of the presence of defendants' counsel. The judge denied the motions, found that they
nesses out of the presence of defendants' counsel. The judge denied the motions, found that
                             basis and were fled in bad faith, and ordered that the respondent
lacked a legal or factual basis and were filed in bad faith, and ordered that the respondent or plain-
         a
tiff pay the defendants' legal fees               in opposing the motions. When the payments
tiff pay the defendants' legal fees incurred in opposing the motions. When the payments were not
made, the judge imposed civil penalties on the respondent and found the respondent and the plain-
made, the                      civil penalties on the respondent      found the respondent
tiff in contempt, warning them that failure to pay the fees                     dismissal of the plaintiff s
tiff in contempt, warning them that failure to pay the fees would lead to dismissal of the plaintiff's
                 Following further nonpayment, judgment entered dismissing the plaintiffs action
*168 action. Following further nonpayment, judgment entered dismissing the plaintiff's action and
ordering costs to be paid to the defendants. The respondent did not file a notice of appeal follow-
             costs to be paid to the defendants. The respondent did not fle a notice of appeal follow-
           dismissal but fled a motion for retransfer of the case to the Superior
ing the dismissal but filed a motion for retransfer of the case to the Superior Court. The motion
was             with instructions to the respondent         an appeal       the dismissal
was struck with instructions to the respondent that an appeal from the dismissal was the proper


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                                             amended fnal judgment dismissing the plaintiffs ac-
avenue of relief. Following the entry of an amendedfinal judgment dismissing the plaintiff's ac-
avenue of relief.
       the respondent again sought    retransfer     case to                    rather than appeal
tion, the respondent again sought to retransfer the case to the Superior Court rather than appeal
                     the request for retransfer was again struck. The respondent fled a notice of
from the dismissal; the request for retransfer was again struck. The respondent filed a notice of
                                the motion for retransfer. The Appeals Court dismissed the appeal
appeal from the order striking the motion for retransfer. The Appeals Court dismissed the appeal
appeal from
as frivolous.
as frivolous.

                                                       following reconsideration    his earlier
       Meanwhile, the judge in the District Court, following reconsideration of his earlier judg-
       Meanwhile, the judge in the
         contempt against       respondent, entered fnal judgment of contempt against her. She
ment of contempt against the respondent, entered aafinal judgment of contempt against her. She
ment
appealed and the Appeals Court affirmed the judgment.                 Assocs., Inc. v. Johnson,
appealed and the Appeals Court affirmed the judgment. HMM Assocs. Inc. v. Johnson 44
Mass.App.Ct.                                      Thereafter, the District       judge gave
Mass.A .Ct. 1126, 694 N.E.2d 1318 (1998). Thereafter, the District Court judge gave the re-
                      694
spondent a deadline for paying the outstanding fees and penalties, warning her that failure to com-
spondent  a deadline for paying      outstanding fees and penalties, warning her that failure
ply would result in further penalties and referral to the board. The respondent violated the order.
ply would result in further penalties and referral to the board. The respondent violated the order.
           a hearing, the judge held her in continuing contempt and ordered her              until she
Following a hearing, the judge held her in continuing contempt and ordered her jailed until she
purged herself contempt.           respondent did not appeal from those orders, but the following
purged herself of contempt. The respondentdid not appeal from those orders, but the following
                        of contempt and was released.
day she purged herself of contempt and was released.
    she purged

              board adopted the hearing offcer's conclusions          engaging                   ac-
          The board adopted the hearing officer's conclusions that by engaging in the foregoing ac-
          the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof C. 3.4(c); Mass. R. Prof
tivities, the respondentviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(c); Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(d and (h); S.J.C.
                                                                              8.4(d) and (h); S.J.C.
                          1-102(A)(5) and (6), as
Rule 3:07, Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6), as appearing in 382 Mass. 769 (1981); Canon 6, DR
                                                                                       Canon 6,
6-101(A)(1)-(3), as appearing 382 Mass.           (1981); and           DR 7-101(A)(3), as appear-
6-101(A)(1)-(3),as appearing in 382 Mass. 783 (1981); and Canon 7, DR 7-101(A)(3), as appear-
      in 382 Mass.
ing in 382 Mass. 784 (1981).

                           respondent raises                procedural, and substantive challenges
        b. Discussion.The respondent raises constitutional, procedural, and substantive challenges
       disciplinary proceedings. We address
to the disciplinary proceedings. We address them in turn.

         **253[l][2][31 i. The respondent claims that, under a “class one" theory, see
        **253[1][2][3] i. The respondent claims that, under a "class ofof one” theory, see
                  Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct.
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000), the board
                                                                  145
              right to equal protection under the Fourteenth *169 Amendment to the United States
violated her right to equal protection under the Fourteenth *169 Amendment to the United States
                                                                      failing to pursue disciplinary ac-
Constitution by improperly singling her out for discipline while failing to pursue disciplinary ac-
Constitution                            her out
      against        attorneys              the underlying cases. Generally, "[w]hether bar counsel
tion against other attorneys involved in the underlying cases. Generally, “[w]hether bar counsel
pursues discipline of others is
pursues discipline of others is irrelevant ... to the respondent's current disciplinary action.” Matter
                                                      respondent's current disciplinary action." Matter
           417 Mass.                                                        respondent fails to
of Tobin, 417 Mass. 92, 103, 628 N.E.2d 1273 (1994). Moreover, the respondentfails to point to
any evidence adduced before the board showing that she was “intentionally treated differently
any evidence    adduced before the board showing that she was "intentionally treated
              similarly situated           there                basis                        treatment.”
from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment."
                  Olech, supra. Cf Matter of Cobb, 445 Mass. 452, 479, 838 N.E.2d 1197 (2005)
Willowbrook v. Olech, supra. Cf. Matter of Cobb, 445 Mass. 452, 479, 838 N.E.2d 1197 (2005)
     support      attorney's claim that bar counsel vindictively sought to punish him          reporting
(no support for attorney's claim that bar counsel vindictively sought to punish him for reporting
                       need     address the respondent's bald accusation-unsupported by anything
acts of judges). We need not address the respondent's bald accusation-unsupported by anything in
acts
               this case-that     disciplinary process          from inherent bias, nor do we address
the record of this case-that the disciplinary process suffers from inherent bias, nor do we address
other claims in which she seeks merely to incorporate arguments from prior memoranda. See
other claims in which she seeks merely to incorporate arguments from prior memoranda. See
Matter of London, 427 Mass. 477, 483,                   337 (1998).
Matter of London, 427 Mass. 477, 483, 694 N.E.2d 337 (1998).

                The respondent argues that the board chair improperly               counsel's motion
        [4] ii. The respondent argues that the board chair improperly allowed bar counsel's motion
         [41
    a protective order in connection with the disciplinary proceeding. The respondent failed
for a protective order in connection with the disciplinary proceeding. The respondent failed to
challenge the order. See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 20(4), appearing in 425 Mass. 1302 (1997); Rule
challenge the          See S.J.C.       4:01, § 20(4), appearing      425 Mass. 1302
3.22 (c) of the Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers          In any event, the protective order was
3.22(c) of the Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers (2007). In any event, the protective order was
                entered where impounded
appropriately entered where impounded material was at issue in the disciplinary proceeding. Con-
                                                   was at issue in the disciplinary


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                                               offcer instructed the parties to use pseudonyms
sistent with the protective order, the hearing officerinstructed the parties to use pseudonyms dur-
sistent
                            respondent                                            by using the parties'
ing the hearing. When the respondent repeatedly violated the protective order by using the parties'
                                        repeatedly violated
     names, the hearing offcer              cleared the public             forum.FN1     such circum-
real names,the hearing officer properly cleared the public from the forum.FN In such circum-
stances, the respondent cannot be heard to complain about being deprived of a public hearing.
stances,  the respondent cannot be heard to complain about being deprived of

           FN1. With members of the public gone, the respondent refused to participate in the
                  With members of the public gone, the respondent refused         participate   the
                                 hearing offcer considered the matter
           hearing and left. The hearing officerconsidered the matter solely on documentary evi-
           hearing and left.
                                           (exhibits submitted by bar counsel and the respondent's
           dence submitted by the parties (exhibits submitted by bar counsel and the respondent's
           dence submitted
                                                                 respondent was furnished with
           amended answer to the petition for discipline). The respondent was furnished with cop-
           amended answer to the petition for discipline).
                  bar counsel's                              the hearing, which she used to prepare
           ies of bar counsel's exhibits and transcripts of the hearing, which she used to prepare
           her appeal to the board.

        [51 iii. The respondent contends that      hearing offcer wrongly quashed subpoenas
        [5] iii. The respondent contends that the hearing officerwrongly quashed subpoenas that
                                                                              issue
the respondent had issued on her own, *170 arguing that she was entitled to issue them under G.L.
    respondent had issued on her own, *170
c. 233, § 8. We need not decide whether the statute applies to bar discipline proceedings because
c.                 need     decide             statute           bar discipline proceedings because
     hearing officer properly quashed the subpoenas       grounds     irrelevance: through the sub-
the hearing offcer properly quashed the subpoenas on grounds of irrelevance: through the sub-
poenaed witnesses, the respondent had sought to relitigate issues in        underlying cases
poenaed witnesses, the respondent had sought to relitigate issues in the underlying cases and at-
                        process       See Matter           supra 102-103,
tack the disciplinary process itself. See Matter of Tobin, supra at 102-103, 628 N.E.2d 1273 (re-
          issue subpoenas appropriate where attorney sought to relitigate underlying matters
fusal to issue subpoenas appropriate where attorney sought to relitigate underlying matters in dis-
ciplinary proceeding).
ciplinary proceeding).

                        With respect to count one, the respondent claims that she cannot
         [6][7][8] iv. With respect to count one, the respondent claims that she cannot be disci-
          f61[7][81
         for having posted impounded material on her Web site               following reasons:
plined for having posted impounded material on her Web site for the following reasons: (1) the      the
                   orders       invalid because she                                the care
Juvenile Court orders were invalid because she never obtained material from the care and protec-
                                                     never obtained material
      proceeding                                                       from that case; (2) the Probate
tion proceeding and thus never posted impounded **254 material from that case; (2) the Probate
                              never posted impounded **254
                      order was invalid because                      the paternity and custody matter
and Family Court order was invalid because material related to the paternity and custody matter
and
                            pursuant         c. 209C, 13, as appearing in St.1998, c. 64,
was open to the public pursuant to G.L. c. 209C, § 13, as appearing in St.1998, c. 64, § 229; (3)
      open to the
                                                                               States Constitution;
her Web site postings are protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; and
                          are protected by the First
     there was insuffcient evidence conclude that she had posted confdential information with
(4) there was insufficient evidence to conclude that she had posted confidential information with
    substantial purpose other than to embarrass the third parties involved-she claims
no substantial purpose other than to embarrassthe third parties involved-she claims that she in-she
tended only educate the public about her client's plight. The problem with the frst three
tended only to educate the public about her client's plight. The problem with the first three claims
             respondent neither sought to appeal from nor otherwise
is that the respondent neither sought to appeal from nor otherwise legally challenge the courts' or-
ders, and she was not free to ignore them and challenge them for the first time in the disciplinary
ders,  and she was not free to ignore them and challenge them for the frst time in the disciplinary
proceeding.FN2,FN3 See *171Florida Bar v. Gersten, 707 So.2d 711, 713 (Fla. 1998); Florida
proceeding.FN2'FN3 See *171Florida Barv.Gersten, 707 So.2d 711, 713 (Fla.1998); Florida Bar v.       v.
Rubin,                                                      Bar v. Wishart, 543
Rubin, 549 So.2d 1000, 1003 (Fla.1989); Florida Bar v. Wshart
                        1000, 1003 (Fla.1989);                                543 So.2d 1250, 1252
                                                                                            1250,
 Fla.1989 , cert. denied,
(Fla.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044, 110 S.Ct. 839, 107 L.Ed.2d 834 (1990). As for the fourth
                                       1044,                107 L.Ed.2d 834 (1990). As for the
        it was reasonably              from the mother's having complained to bar counsel
claim, it was reasonably inferable from the mother's having complained to bar counsel about the
                                                embarrassed by them.                   respondent
respondent's postings that the mother was embarrassedby them. Moreover, the respondent went
respondent's postings that the mother
far beyond merely educating the public about her client's case-she violated the confidences of third
                                 the                         case-she violated the confdences of third
parties                    information that she knew was impounded. See Matter
parties by publicizing information that she knew was impounded. See Matter of Comfort, 284Comfort, 284
             191-195, 159 P.3d 1011 (2007) (under disciplinary rule identical to Mass. R. Prof C.
Kan. 183, 191-195, 159 P.3d 1011 (2007) (under disciplinary rule identical to Mass. R. Prof. C.
4.4, court held that objective evaluation of conduct would lead reasonable person to conclude
_4, court held that objective evaluation of conduct would lead reasonable person to conclude that
4
              of disparaging information about third party was done for no substantial purpose
publishing of disparaging information about third party was done for no substantial purpose other
      to embarrass).
than to embarrass).

           FN2. While the respondent claims that she filed a petition in the county court seeking
                While the respondent claims that she fled petition in the county court seeking


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                   from the order entered in the Probate and Family Court, she has shown neither
           relief from the order entered in the Probate and Family Court, she has shown neither
                she actually       such            nor that, if she had, she obtained     relief; she
           that she actually filed such a petition nor that, if she had, she obtained any relief; she
           was        free disobey the order. See Florida            Wishart, 543 So.2d 1250, 1252
           was not free to disobey the order. See Florida Bar v. Wshart, 543 So.2d 1250, 1252
            Fla.1989 , cert. denied,
           (Fla.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044, 110 S.Ct. 839, 107 L.Ed.2d 834 (1990).

                 With respect     count       we reject the respondent's claim that her posting of
           FN3. With respect to count two, we reject the respondent's claim that her posting of
           confidential information about her former clients was protected under the First
           confidential information about her former clients was protected under the First
           Amendment            United States                Whatever         she        have had
           Amendment to the United States Constitution. Whatever rights she may have had to
           “defend herself against false accusations” regarding the fee dispute, those rights did not
           "defend                       accusations"                            those rights did
                               highly sensitive personal information regarding allegations
           include publishing highly sensitive personal information regarding allegations that the
                                           mentally retarded daughter.
           father had sexually abused his mentally retarded daughter.

          Sanction."We do not conclude, and the respondent
       c. Sanction.“We do not conclude, and the respondent makes no argument, that the sanction
imposed by the single justice ‘markedly disparate’         sanctions            cases.”        of
imposed by the single justice is `markedly disparate' from sanctions in similar cases." Matter o
             at 103, 628 N.E.2d 1273. Cf Matter of Cobb, supra at 479, 838 N.E.2d 1197.
Tobin, supra at 103, 628 N.E.2d 1273. Cf. Matter of Cobb, supra at 479, 838 N.E.2d 1197.

            Contempt.Pursuant to a petition fled         counsel and following a hearing,
         2. Contempt. Pursuant to a petitionfiled by bar counsel and following a hearing, the single
justice
justice found the respondent in civil contempt for failing timely to comply with the following pro-
               the respondent in civil contempt for failing timely to comply with the following
            the judgment of disbarment: close her IOLTA account, give notice of her disbarment,
visions of the judgment of disbarment: close her IOLTA account, give notice of her disbarment,
                 affdavit of compliance pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:02, 17, as amended, 426 Mass.
and submit an affidavitof compliance pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:02, §§17, as amended, 426 Mass.
 and
                    ordered her      until she                                             four days
1301 (1997). He ordered her jailed until she purged herself of contempt, which she did four days
 1301
      and was released.
later and was released.

        [9][ 10][ 11][ 121 We reject the respondent's challenges to the contempt as follows.
        [9][10][11][12] We reject the respondent's challenges to the contempt judgmentjudgment
(a) She as follows.                                            of disbarment
    She was not entitled to ignore the underlying judgment of disbarment on the ground that it was
         was not entitled to       the underlying                                                  it was
"transparently invalid"; that she needed to fulfl her clients' right to counsel of        choice;
“transparently invalid”; that she needed to fulfil her clients' right to counsel of their choice; or that
                                              **255 receive fees from her clients. She presents
she had a property interest in continuing to **255 receive fees from her clients. She presents no
she had a property interest in
persuasive factual                      substantiate          those          (b) The respondent's
persuasive factual or legal grounds to substantiate any of those claims. (b) The respondent's argu-
ment that she was found in criminal rather than civil contempt because she did not “hold the key
ment       she was found in                         civil contempt because she did not "hold
            door” (and       she was denied the right to jury trial        criminal contempt)
to the cell door" (and that she was denied the right to aajury trial for criminal contempt) is belied
             that she eventually complied        the terms of the judgment of disbarment*172 and
by the fact that she eventually complied with the terms of the judgment of disbarment*172 and
was released.FN4 We reject the the respondent's that the single single justice lacked
was released.FN4 (c) (c) We reject respondent's claim claim that the justice lacked jurisdiction to
     her in to
jurisdictioncontempt where she had appealed from the disbarment judgment. She had moved un-
find her in contempt where she had appealed             the disbarment judgment. She
                  a stay of the judgment pending appeal. The cases              on by the respondent-a
successfully for a stay of the judgment pending appeal. The cases relied on by the respondent-a
successfully
criminal case
criminal case holding that an appeal divests aalower court of jurisdiction to rule on motions “to re-
                             an appeal divests lower court of jurisdiction to            motions "to
hear or vacate,” Commonwealth v. Cronk, 396 Mass. 194, 197, 484 N.E.2d 1330 (1985), and a di-
hear or vacate," Commonwealth v. Cronk 396 Mass.                                 1330          and
       case holding                                                    husband's obligation
vorce case holding that, absent a specific order to the contrary, a husband's obligation to make in-
                          absent a specifc
           payments pursuant to a judgment dividing marital property was stayed by the husband's
stallment payments pursuant to a judgment dividing marital property was stayed by the husband's
                                                           N.E.2d 863 (1990)-are inapposite.
appeal, Huber v. Huber, 408 Mass. 495, 499-500, 561 N.E.2d 863 (1990)-are inapposite. Here the
appeal, Huber
single justice merely acted to enforce the disbarment judgment. Cf Mass.                    P. 62(a), as
single justice merely acted to enforce the disbarment judgment. Cf. Mass. R. Civ. P. 62(a), as
                 Mass. 1409 (1996).(d)             the respondent's argument that the
amended, 423 Mass. 1409 (1996).(d) Finally, the respondent's argument that the single justice
amended,                                                                                          justice
erred in "implicit[ly]" finding that she had engaged in the unauthorized practice of
erred in “implicit[ly]”fnding that she had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law is mis-       mis-
placed because the finding of contempt was based on other violations of the terms of the judgment
        because the finding of                based on other violations of        terms of
of
of disbarment.FN5
disbarment.FN5
                Generally, a civil contempt proceeding “ ‘remedial and coercive,’ intended
           FN4. Generally, a civil contempt proceeding is " `remedial and coercive,' intended to


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                                                                   criminal contempt proceeding
          achieve compliance with the court's orders,” while a criminal contempt proceeding is
          achieve compliance with the court's orders,"
          “exclusively punitive. It is designed wholly to punish an attempt to prevent the course
          "exclusively punitive. It is designed wholly to punish an attempt to prevent the course
             justice.” Furtado v. Furtado, 380 Mass. 137, 141, 402 N.E.2d 1024
          of justice." Furtado v. Furtado. 380 Mass. 137, 141, 402 N.E.2d 1024 (1980), quoting
          Cherry v. Cherry. 253 Mass. 172, 174, 148 N.E. 570 (1925), and Blankenburg v.
          Cherry       Cherry,       Mass. 172, 174, 148          570 (1925), and Blankenbury.v
          Commonwealth, 260 Mass. 369, 373, 157 N.E. 693 (1927). See Matter of DeSaulnier
          Commonwealth. 260 Mass. 369, 373, 157 N.E. 693 (1927). See Matter
                         Mass. 769, 772-773, 279 N.E.2d 287 (1971), quoting Shillitani v.
          (No. 3), 360 Mass. 769, 772-773, 279 N.E.2d 287 (1971), quoting Shillitani v. United
                 3).
          States. 384 U.S. 364, 368, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (1966) (discussing features of
          States, 384 U.S. 364, 368, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (1966) (discussing features of
                                              contemnor does not hold "the keys of ... [his]
          criminal contempt, including that contemnor does not hold “the keys of ... [his] prison
             ...       own pockets”); Commonwealth v. Raczkowski, 19
          in ... [his] own pockets"); Commonwealth v. Raczkowski. 19 Mass.App.Ct. 991, 992,     992,
                                                                               trial attaches
          475 N.E.2d 417 (1985), and cases cited (constitutional right to jury trial attaches to cer-
                                         cases cited (constitutional right
                criminal contempts            civil contempts).
          tain criminal contempts but not to civil contempts).

                      parties have fled motions regarding the proper scope of the record
          FN5. Both parties have filedmotions regarding the proper scope of the record on ap- ap-
          peal, and      respondent has filed              repeat    add to arguments that she
          peal, and the respondent has filed motions that repeat or add to arguments that she
                                We have considered      those materials that were part
          raised in her briefs. We have considered only those materials that were part of the re-
          raised
               below and decline to address legal           not raised in the respondent's
          cord below and decline to address legal arguments not raised in the respondent's briefs.

      Judgments afirmed.
      Judgments affirmed.

Mass., 2007.
In re Johnson
450 Mass. 165, 877 N.E.2d 249

END OF DOCUMENT




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                                       APPENDIX
                                       APPENDIX B B

                     COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
                     COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

SUFFOLK, ss.
SUFFOLK,SS.                                             SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
                                                        SUPREMEJUDICIAL COURT
                                                         FOR THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK
                                                         FOR THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK
                                                            DOCKET No. SJ-BD-2006-039
                                                            DOCKET No. SJ-BD-2006-039




                              IN RE: BARBARA C JOHNSON
                              IN RE: BARBARA C..JOHNSON

                     AMENDED FINDINGS AND RULINGS
                     AMENDED FINDINGS AND RULINGS
                ON BAR COUNSEL'S PETITION FOR CONTEMPT
                ON BAR COUNSEL'S PETITION FOR CONTEMPT


       Bar counsel has filed a petition seeking that the respondent be held in contempt of the
       Bar counsel has filed a petition seeking that the respondent be held in contempt of the

judgment of disbarment that was entered against the respondent on August 9, 2006. In order to
judgment of disbarment that was entered against the respondent on August 9, 2006. In order to

establish her petition for contempt, bar counsel must show by preponderance of the evidence
establish her petition for contempt, bar counsel must show by aapreponderance of the evidence

the respondent's "clear and undoubted disobedience of aaclear and unequivocal command." Nicho-
the respondent's "clear and undoubted disobedience of clear and unequivocal command." Nicho-

las v. Dowd, 342 Mass. 462, 464 (1961).
las v. Dowd, 342 Mass. 462, 464 (1961).

       The judgment that entered in this matter ordered the disbarment of the respondent from
       The judgment that entered in this matter ordered the disbarment of the respondent from

    practice of law effective September 8, 2006. The judgment also ordered the respondent to
the practice of law effective September 8, 2006. The judgment also ordered the respondent to

do the following:
   the following:

       1.
       1.
                                   by September 8, 2006.
              Cease practicing law by September 8, 2006.
              Cease practicing

       2.
       2.     By August 23, 2006,
              By August 23, 2006,

                  file a notice of withdrawal effective September 8, 2006, with every court,
              (a) file a notice of withdrawal effective September 8, 2006, with every court,

              agency, or tribunal before which a matter is pending, together with a copy of the
              agency, or tribunal before which a matter is pending, together with a copy of the

              notices sent pursuant to paragraphs (c) and 2 (d) hereinbelow, the client's or cli-
              notices sent pursuant to paragraphs 22 (c) and 2 (d) hereinbelow,the client's or cli-

                             residence, and
              ents' place of residence, and the case caption and docket
                                                case caption


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          the client's or clients' proceedings;
number of the client's or clients' proceedings;

(b)
(b)     resign effective September 8, 2006, from all appointments as
        resign effective September 8, 2006, from all appointments as

guardian, executor, administrator, trustee, attorney-in-fact, or other fiduciary,
          executor, administrator, trustee, attorney-in-fact, or other fduciary,

attaching to the resignation a copy of the notices sent to the wards, heirs, or
attaching to the resignation a copy of the notices sent to the wards, heirs, or

beneficiaries pursuant paragraphs 2 (c) and 2 (d) hereinbelow, the place of
beneficiaries pursuant to paragraphs 2 (c) and 2 (d) hereinbelow, the place of

residence of the wards, heirs, or beneficiaries,and the case caption and
residence of the wards, heirs, or benefciaries, and the case caption and

                 the                 any;
docket number of the proceedings, if any;

(c)
(c)                       all clients
        provide notice to all clients and to all wards, heirs, and beneficiaries
                                                               and benefciaries

     she has been disbarred, that she disqualified from acting as lawyer
that she has been disbarred, that she isis disqualifed from acting as a lawyer

      September                      not represented
after September 8,2006; and that, if not represented by co-counsel, the client,

ward, heir, or benefciary should act promptly to substitute another lawyer or
ward, heir, or beneficiaryshould act promptly to substitute another lawyer or

fiduciary or to seek legal advice elsewhere, calling
fiduciaryor to seek legal advice elsewhere, calling attention to any urgency

        from the circumstances of the case;
arising from the circumstances of the case;

(d)
(d)     provide notice to counsel for all parties (or, in the absence of counsel,
        provide notice to counsel for all parties (or, in the absence of counsel,

              in pending matters that she has been disbarred and, as
the parties) in pending matters that she has been disbarred and, as a

consequence, is disqualifed from acting as lawyer afer September
consequence, is disqualified from acting as a lawyer afterSeptember 8,2006;

(e)
(e)                       all clients being represented            matters
        make available to all clients being represented in pending matters any

papers or other property to which
papers or other property to which they are entitled, calling attention to any
                                       are entitled, calling

        for obtaining the papers
urgency for obtaining the papers or other property;

(f)
(f)     refund any part of any fees paid in advance that have not been
        refund any part of any fees paid in advance that have not been earned;
        earned;
and
and



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                      (g)
                      (g)     close every IOLTA, client, trust, or other fiduciary account and prop-
                              close every IOLTA, client, trust, or other fduciary account and prop-

                           disburse                                  and fduciary funds in her possession,
                      erly disburse or otherwise transfer all client and fiduciaryfunds in her possession,
                                                 transfer all

                      custody, or control.

                                  ordered to be served by certifed mail, return receipt requested,
       The aforesaid notices were ordered to be served by certified mail, return receipt requested, in a

     approved by the board.
form approved by the board.

          By August 30, 2006, file with the Office of Bar Counsel affidavit certifying that she
       3. By August 30, 2006, file with the Office of Bar Counsel an an affidavit certifying that she

       has fully complied with the provisions of the judgment of disbarment and with bar disciplinary
       has fully complied with the provisions of the judgment of disbarment and with bar disciplinary

                  was further ordered to append    the affidavit of compliance:
       rules. She was further ordered to append to the affidavit of compliance:

              (a)               each form of notice, the names and addresses
                      a copy of each form of notice, the names and addresses of the clients,

                            benefciaries, attorneys, courts, and agencies to which
              wards, heirs, beneficiaries, attorneys, courts, and agencies to which notices

              were sent, and all return receipts or returned mail received up to the date of
                         and all        receipts or returned mail                the date of

              the affidavit. The respondent was ordered to fle supplemental affdavits
              the affidavit. The respondent was ordered to file supplemental affidavits

                       subsequent return receipts and returned mail. Such names
              covering subsequent return receipts and returned mail. Such names and

              addresses of clients were ordered to be kept confdential unless otherwise
              addresses of clients were ordered to be kept confidential unless otherwise

              requested in writing by the respondent or ordered by the court;
              requested in writing by the respondent

              (b)
              (b)     a schedule showing the location, title, and account number of every
                        schedule showing the location, title,     account number of

              bank         designated as an IOLTA, client, trust, or other fduciary account
              bank account designated as an IOLTA, client, trust, or other fiduciary account

              and of every account in which the respondent holds or held as of August 9,
              and of every account in which the respondent holds or held as of August 9,

              2006, any client, trust, or fduciary funds;
              2006, any client, trust, or fiduciary funds;

              (c)
              (c)     a schedule describing the respondent's disposition of all client and
                      a schedule describing the respondent's disposition of all client and


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      fiduciary funds in her possession,
      fiduciaryfunds in her possession, custody, or control as of August 9, 2006, or thereafter;
                                                 or control as of                    thereafer;

      (d)                             distribution such
             such proof of the proper distribution of such funds and the closing of
                  proof                                          and the closing of

      such accounts as has been requested by bar counsel, including copies of
           accounts as has been requested by bar counsel, including copies of

      checks and other instruments;
      checks and other instruments;

      (e)
      (e)      list all other
             a list of all other State, Federal, and administrative jurisdictions to
                                        Federal, and administrative jurisdictions

      which the respondent
      which the respondent is admitted to practice; and

      (f)
      (f)    the residence or other street address where communications to the
                                           address where communications

      respondent     thereafter be directed.
      respondent may thereafter be directed.

                  respondent                                     notices sent
              The respondent was ordered to retain copies of all notices sent and shall maintain
                                 ordered to retain copies of

      complete records of the steps taken to comply with the notice requirements of S.J.C. Rule
               records of the steps taken to comply with the notice requirements

      4:01, § 17.
      4:01, § 17.

4.
4.                             with the clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court for
      By August 30, 2006, file with the clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk
      By

      County:
      County:

      (a)
      (a)                  affidavit of compliance required by paragraph
             a copy of the affidavit of compliance required by paragraph 33
             a

      hereinabove;

      (b)      list all other
             a list of all other State, Federal, and administrative jurisdictions to
                                        Federal, and administrative jurisdictions

      which the respondent             to practice; and
      which the respondent is admitted to practice; and

      (c)
      (c)    the residence or other street address where communications to the
             the residence or other street address where communications to the

      respondent may thereafter be directed.
      respondent may thereafter be directed.

    respondent was aware of the judgment of disbarment and its terms. She
The respondent was aware of the judgment of disbarment and its terms. She


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acknowledged as much during the hearing held on the petition for contempt. She also fled on
acknowledged as much during the hearing held on the petition for contempt. She also filed on

August 23, 2006, a        to stay                 disbarment, which she expressed familiar-
August 23, 2006, a motion to stay the judgment of disbarment, in which she expressedfamiliar-

ity with the terms of the judgment She understood its significance. The motion seeking a stay
ity with the terms of the judgment She understood its signifcance. The motion seeking a stay

was denied, without hearing, on August 25, 2006.
was denied, without hearing, on August 25, 2006.

          The respondent has failed to serve any of the notices to clients and opposing counsel, as re-
          The respondent has failed to serve any of the notices to clients and opposing counsel, as re-

        She has failed to fle notices of withdrawal in matters pending in courts. She
quired. She has failed to file notices of withdrawal in matters pending in courts. She has failed to

          IOLTA account(s). Indeed, on September 14, 2006, the respondent appeared in
close her IOLTAaccount(s). Indeed, on September 14, 2006, the respondent appeared in Hamp-

             Superior Court on behalf of the plaintiff in a civil action entitled Fran9ois Gouin,
shire County Superior Court on behalf of the plaintiff in a civil action entitled Fran9ois Gouin,
shire

Jr. vs. Deborah Ann Chandler, docket number 01-00065, and filed a pretrial memorandum over
Jr. vs. Deborah Ann Chandler, docket number 01-00065, and filed a pretrial memorandum over

her signature and Board of Bar Overseers registration number on September 11, 2006. She has
her signature and Board of Bar Overseers registration number on September 11, 2006. She has

not filed notice of withdrawal that case. On September 5, 2006, the respondent fled a
not filed aanotice of withdrawal in in that case. On September 5, 2006,the respondent filed a

      on behalf of the defendant-appellant in the Massachusetts Appeals Court a matter cap-
brief on behalf of the defendant-appellant in the Massachusetts Appeals Court in a matter cap-

            Court Reporting Service, Inc. vs. Fran9ois Gouin, Jr., docket number 2006-P-1324.
tioned Eyal Court Reporting Service, Inc. vs. Fran9ois Gouin, Jr., docket number 2006-P-1324.

As of September 25, 2006, she had not filed a notice of withdrawal in that case. The respondent
As of September 25, 2006, she had not filed a notice of withdrawal in that case. The respondent

had not filed a notice of withdrawal in an action entitled Franfois Gouin, Jr. vs. White Inker
had not filed a notice of withdrawal in an action entitled Franfois Gouin, Jr. vs. White Inker

                    Suffolk County Superior Court, docket number SUC V2005-01626, as of Sep-
Aronson PC., et al, Suffolk County Superior Court, docket number SUC V2005-01626, as of Sep-

tember 26,2006, or in an action entitled Susan Payne vs. Brian Meuse, Essex County Probate
tember 26,2006, or in an action entitled Susan Payne vs. Brian Meuse, Essex County Probate

       docket number 99W1466PA1, as of September 18, 2006. The respondent appeared
Court, docket number 99W1466PA1, as of September 18, 2006. The respondent appeared in the

       Division of the District Court Department on August 28,2006, on behalf of the defendant
Palmer Division of the District Court Department on August 28,2006, on behalf of the defendant

in the case of Commonwealth vs. Philip B. Rayder, docket number 0643CR000712, and re-
in the case of Commonwealth vs. Philip B. Rayder, docket number 0643CR000712, and re-

quested
quested



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 additional time to investigate the case. She obtained a continuance the case until
 additional time to investigate the case. She obtained a continuance ofof the case until

 November 30, 2006, and continues to represent
 November 30, 2006, and continues to represent him.

                                                                                           dis-
        The respondent has admitted she failed to comply with the terms of the judgment of dis-
            respondent has admitted she failed to comply with the terms of

barment, but she claims by way of defense that she has an overriding duty to her clients. That
barment, but she claims by way of defense that she has an overriding duty to her clients. That

duty ended on September 8, 2006. Moreover, she had a duty to obey the court's order of August
              September 8, 2006. Moreover, she had a duty to obey the court's order of August

        She knowingly disobeyed that order. The respondent also contends that she
9,2006. She knowinglydisobeyed that order. The respondent also contends that she is unable to

comply with the terms of the judgment of disbarment because she lacks the fnancial resources
comply with the terms of the judgment of disbarment because she lacks the financial resources

to send the required notices by certified mail. This argument unavailing because she failed
to send the required notices by certifed mail. This argument isis unavailing because she failed

   prepare the requisite notices and affdavits and she has made no request for funds for certifed
to prepare the requisite notices and affidavits and she has made no request for funds for certified

mailing based on her alleged indigency. Finally, the respondent claims that the judgment of dis-
mailing based on her alleged indigency. Finally, the respondent claims that the judgment of dis-

barment is "transparently invalid." See, e.g., City of Fitchburg v. 707      Corp., 369 Mass.
barment is "transparently invalid." See, e.g., City of Fitchburg v. 707 Main Corp., 369 Mass.

748, 754-755 (1976). There is nothing facially fimsy or whimsical about the fndings of the
748, 754-755 (1976). There is nothing facially flimsy or whimsical about the findings of the

Board of Bar Overseers that might render the judgment of disbarment transparently invalid.
Board of Bar Overseers that might render the judgment of disbarment transparently invalid.

           find that the respondent has clearly and undoubtedly disobeyed        and un-
        I find that the respondent has clearly and undoubtedly disobeyed a clear and un-

          command as set forth the           9, 2006, judgment of disbarment, and that she
equivocal command as set forth in the August 9, 2006, judgment of disbarment, and that she is

   contempt of that judgment.
in contempt of that judgment.

           respondent has indicated that she would refuse cooperate with a commissioner
       The respondent has indicated that she would refuse to cooperate with a commissioner

who may be appointed to assist her. The only remedy,               incarceration.
who may be appointed to assist her. The only remedy, therefore, is incarceration.

           respondent, Barbara C. Johnson, is hereby adjudged in contempt of      court's
       The respondent, Barbara C. Johnson, is hereby adjudged in contempt of this court's

judgment of disbarment dated August 9,2006. She is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff
judgment of disbarment dated August 9,2006. She is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff



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Of SAW { "aunty !;at:l such One as she purges herszlf ofsuch conternpt. which she
ni:!\ do
by smtng thw requisite notices, by filing the requisite affidavits and withdrawals described

in the aforesaid judgment, and by complying *Ith the other directives ofsaic:l judo                         >.,
nlent (e
close all IOLTA account(s)).

               I would be remiss if f did not comment on the respondent's conduct in the conteript

proceeding before nte. She was openly rude, crass, and contemptuous of assistant
bar
counsel, whose conduct toward th resp:`I:a:'.nt. ;\'      ;,?t,'1?\-? re??'a1t'h%i171\ controlled.
                                                          reserved,
a; d
CourtCOU-s'
                                                    By the Court,

                                                                                   ;j

                                                    Francis X. Spina
                                                    Associate Justice
                                                    Suprem e Judicial Court

l?:ti t't.tz   ;t):   October       2000




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                                             APPENDIX
                                             APPENDIX C C
10/20;20043 14:13 FAX 617 357 1033             SjC CLERKS OFF                                                uu3




                                 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETS

           SUFFOLK, S5.                                                 SUPREME JUDICIAL
                                                                     COURT
                                                                   FOR THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK
                                                                  DOCKET No.
                                                                  SJ-BD-2006-039


                                      IN RE: BARBARA C.
                                      JOHNSON

                               FINDINGS AND RULINGS ON BAR
                               COUNSEL'S
                                      PETITION FOR CONTEMPT


                  Bar counsel has filed a petition seekin that the respondent be held in contempt of

           the judgment of disbarment that was entered against the respondent on August 9, 2006. In

           order to establish her petition for contempt, bar counsel must show by a preponderance of

           the evidence the respondent's "clear and undoubted disobedience of a clear and unequivocal

           cornnland." Nicholas v. Dowd, 342 Mass. 462, 464 (1961).

                  The judgment that entered in this matter ordered the disbarment of the respondent

           from the practice of law effective September 8, 2006. The judgment also ordered the

           respondent to do the following:

                  I      Cease practicing law by September 8, 2006.
                  .
                  2.     By August 23, 2006,

                         (a)     file a notice of withdrawal effective September 8, 2006, with every

                         court, agency, or inbutmal before which a matter is pending, together with a

                         copy of the notices sent pursuant to paragraphs 2 (c) and 2 (d)
                         hereinbelow,
                         the client's or clients' place of residence, and the case caption and docket




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                         nurnbcr of the client's or clients' proceedings;

                         (b)     resign effective September 8, 2006, from all appointments as

                         guardian, executor, administrator, trustee, attorney-in-fact, or other fduciary,

                         attaching to the resignation a copy of the notices sent to the wards, heirs, or

                         beneficiaries pursuant to paragraphs 2 (c) and 2 (d) hereinbelow, the place of

                         residence of the wards, heirs, or beneficiaries, and the case caption and

                         docket number of the proceedings, if any;

                         (c)     provide notice to all clients and to all wards, heirs, and beneficiaries

                         that she has been disbarred, that she is disqualified from acting as a lawyer

                         after September 8, 2006; and that, if not represented by co-counsel, the client,

                         ward, heir, or beneficiary should act promptly to substitute another lawyer or

                         fiduciary or to seek legal advice elsewhere, calling attention to any urgency

                         arising from the circumstances of the case;

                         (d)     provide notice to counsel for all parties (or, in the abeence of counsel,

                         the parties) in pending matters that she has been disbarred and, as a

                         consequence, is disqualified from acting as a lawyer afer September 8, 2006;

                         (e)     make available to all clients being represented in pending matters any

                         papers or other property to which they are entitled, calling attention to any

                         urgency for obtaining the papers or other property;

                         (f)     refund any part of any fees paid in advance that have not been earned;

                         and



                                                       - 7-



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                        (g)     close every IOLTA, client, trust, or other fduciary account and

                       properly disburse or otherwise transfer all client and fduciary funds in her

                       possession, custody, or control.

                               The aforesaid notices were ordered to be served by certified mail,

                       return receipt requested, in a form approved by the board.

                3.     By August 30, 2006, file with the Ofce of Bar Counsel an affdavit

                       certifying that she has fully complied with the provisions of the judgment of

                       disbarment and with bar disciplinary rules. She was further ordered to

                       append to the affidavit of compliance:

                      (a)      a copy of each form of notice, the names and addresses of the clients,

                      wards, heirs, benefciaries, attorneys, courts, and agencies to which notices

                      were sent, and all return receipts or returned mail received up to the date of

                      the affidavit. The respondent was ordered to fle supplemental affdavits

                      covering subsequent return receipts and returned mail. Such names and

                      addresses of clients were ordered to be kept confdential unless otherwise

                      requested in writing by the respondent or ordered by the court;

                      (b)     a schedule showing the location, title, and account number of every

                     bank account designated as an IOLTA, client, trust, or other fduciary account

                     and of every account in which the respondent holds or held as of August 9,

                     2006, any client, trust, or fduciary funds;

                     (c)      a schedule describing the respondent's disposition of all client and



                                                  -3-



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                           i
                           :dliciaty funds in her possession, custody, or control as of August 9, 2006,
                           or thereafter;

                           (d)     such proof ofthe proper distribution of such funds and the closing of

                           such accotlrits as has been requested by bar counsel, including copies of

                           checks and odder instrtnnertts;

                           (e)     a list of all other State, Federal, and administrative jurisdictions to

                           which the respondent is adinittcd to practice;
                           and
                           (t)    the residence or other street address %hcrc communications to the

                          respondent may thercatlcr be directed.

                                  The rewondent was wdeie+l to tet:tin copitts of all notices. sent and

                          ,h;ill. tuaintain complete records of th:- steps taken to comply with the
                          notice
                          requirenients of S.J.C. Rule
                          4:U1, § 17.
                   4.     By August 30. 2006. file with the rlerk of the Suprem.e Judicial Ccu i for

                          Suffolk ('ot)nty

                          (a)     a copy of the affidavit of compliance require4l by paragraph 3

                          hereinabove;

                          (b)     a list of all other State, Frilalal, arid administrative jurisdictions to

                          wliidl the respondent i admitted to practice;
                          and
                          (c)     the residence or other street address where communications
                                  to the
                          respondent may thereafter be directed.

                   The respondent was aware of the judgment of dkharment and it F, terries.She




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               ack lowlecdyed its rrx.ieh daring the hearing held on the petition for contempt. She also
               filed
               on August 23, 2006, a motion to stay the judgment of disbarment., in which she expressed

               familiarity with the tennis of the judgment. The motir)n seeking a stay was denied, without

               hearing, on August 25, 2006.

                      The respondent has failed to serve any ot'the notices to clients and opposing counsel,

               as required. She has failed to File notices of withdrawal in matters pending in courts. She

              has failed to close her IOLTA accnvnt() In&ed. on September 11, 2006, the respondent

              appeared in Rampzbi e County Superior Court on behalf of the plaintiff in a civil actiuu

              not itl d Fr u3qois Gouin, Jr. is. Deborah Arid Chandler, docket number 01-00065, and filed

              a pretrial memorandum over her 3it;ntt11re and Board of Rur Overseers registration ntunber

              on Septambcr 11, 2006. She has not filed a notice of Withdrawal m that case. On

              September ;, 2006, the resxmdent filed a brief on behalf of the defendant-appellant in t1i

              Massachusetts AF1- als Court in a matter captioned T ynl Court Reporting Service, Inc.
              is.
              Francois Gouin. Jr._ docket number 7,006-P-1 124 As c f September 27, 2006, ulic hod not

              filed a noticeofwidhdraw:,t in that case. T`herespondenthad not filed anotioc of withdrawal

          in an action entitt i Fran,iais Gouin, Jr. vs. White Inker Aronson PC., el cll., SuIulkk County

          Stnperlor Court, docket number SUCV2005-01626, as ofScpieint r 26, 2006, or in an
          action
          entitled Susan Pane vi Brian Meuse, sex County Probate Court. docket number

          99W 140'6PA1, ns of September 18, 2006. The resoomient appeared in the Palmer T)ivi?ion

          of the Disu icr Court Department on August 21), 2006, on behalf of the defendant in the case

          of Commonwealth us. Philip B. katder, docket number 0643CR000712, and requested



                                                         -



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                  additional time to investis:atc the case. She obtanied a corttinuarice of the case until

                  November 30, 2006, and continues to represent
                  hirn.
                          The respondent has admitted she failed to comply with the. tcir.s of t1u, judgnu-rit of

                  disbarment, but she claims by way of defense that she has an overriding duty to her clients.

                  h
                  Tat duty ended on September 8, 2006. Moreover, she had a duty to obey the court's
                  order
                  of August 9, 2006. She knowingly disobeyed that order. The respondent also contends that

                  she is unable to comply with the talus of the judgment of disbarment because she lacks tile

                  financial resources to send the required notices by certified mail- This argument is

                 wravai ling because she failed to prepare the requisite notices and affidavits and she has made

                 no request for funds for certifed mailing based on her alleged indigency. Finally, the

                 respondent clans that the. judgment of disbarment is "transparently invalid." See, e.g., City

                 ofFitchburg Y. 707 kfain Corp., 369 Mass. 748, 754-755 (1976). There is nothing remotely

                 flimsy or tvlrirnsical about the fndings of the Board of Bar Overseers as to the respondent's

                 misconduct

                          I find that the respondent has cleat ly and undoubtedly disobeyed a clear and

                 unequivocal command as set loth in the August 9, 2006, judstrnent of disbarment, and that

                 she is in contempt of that judgment.

                         The respondent has indicated that she would refuse to cooperate with a commissioner

                 who may be appointed to assist her. The only remedy, therefore, is incarceration.

                         The respondent, Barbara C. Johnson, is hereby adjudged in contempt of this court's

                 judgment ofdisharrnent dared .August 9, 2006. She is remanded to the ctistodyofthe
                 Sheriff




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              of Suffolk County until such time as she purges herself ofsuch contempt, which she trrav
              do
              by serving the requisite notices, by fling the requisite affdavits and withdrawals de;crihed

              in the aforesaid judgment, and by co_nplvln.?;wx•ith'e other directives of said judgment ((?.g.

              close all IOLTA. iccou.nt(s)).

                            I ,would be remiss if I did not comment on the respondent's conduct in the contempt

              proccedir c before me. She was openly rude, crass, and contemptuous of assistant bar

              counsel, whose conduct toward the respondent was always remarkably controlled,
              reserved,
              and courteous.

                                                                  By the Court,




                                                                  Francis X. Spina
                                                                  A.;sociate Justice
                                                                  Supreme Judicial Court

              EN-yEUD:             19 October
                                   2006




                                                               -7



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                                  APPENDIX
                                  APPENDIX D D

                       COMMONWEALTH OF
                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

SUFFOLK, SS.
SUFFOLK, SS.                                                     SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
                                                                 SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
                                                                 FOR SUFFOLK COUNTY
                                                                 FOR SUFFOLK COUNTY
                                                                 NO: BD-2006-039
                                                                      BD-2006-039




                          IN RE: BARBARA C. JOHNSON
                          IN RE: BARBARA C. JOHNSON

                            JUDGMENT OF DISBARMENT
                            JUDGMENT OF DISBARMENT


      This matter came before the Court, Spina, J.,
      Thismatter came before the Court, Spina, J., on an Informa- on an Informa-

tion and Record of Proceedings with the Recommendation and Vote of
tion and Record of Proceedings with the Recommendation and Vote of

the Board of Overseers filed by the Board the Board
theBoard of Bar Bar Overseers filed by on May 16, on May 16, 2006.Af-Af-
                                                             2006.
ter hearing and for reasons stated in the Memorandum and Judgment of
ter hearing and for reasons stated in the Memorandum and Judgment of

this date, it is it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED
this date, ORDERED and ADJUDGED that: that:

      1.
      1.     BARBARA C. JOHNSON is hereby disbarred from the
             BARBARA C. JOHNSONis hereby disbarred from the

practice of law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the
practice of law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the

lawyer's name is is stricken Roll of Attorneys. of
lawyer's name stricken from the from the Roll In Attorneys.                           In

accordance with S.J.C. Rule Rule 4:01, sec. 17(3), thedisbarment
accordance with S.J.C.4:01, sec.            17 (3) , the disbarment

shall be effective thirty days from days from the date of
shall be effective thirty the date of the entry of this the entry of this

Judgment. The lawyer, after the entry the Judgment, shall
Judgment. The lawyer, after of thisentry of this Judgment, shall

notaccept anyany new retainer or engage as a lawyer for another in
not accept new retainer or engage as a lawyer for another in

any new case or legal of any nature. During the period
any new case or legal matter matter of any nature. During the period

between the entry date of this Judgment and its
between the entry date of this Judgment and its effective date, effective date,
however, the lawyer wind up and complete,complete, any behalf of any
however, the lawyer may may wind up and on behalf of on

client, all all matters which were the entry on
client, matters which were pending on pending date.the entry date.

      It is FURTHER ORDERED that:
      It is FURTHER ORDERED that:

      2.
      2.                     (14) days of the date of entry of this
             Within fourteen (14)days of the date of entryof this
             Within fourteen


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                                          2
                                          2

Judgment, the lawyer
Judgment,the lawyer shall:shall:

            a)
            a)    file a a notice of withdrawal as of
                  file notice of withdrawal as of the effective the effective

      date the disbarment with every court, agency, or tribunal
      date ofof the disbarment with every court, agency, or tribunal
      before which a matter is together with a copy of
      before which a matter is pending,pending, together with a copy of

      the notices pursuant to paragraphs          2 (c) and 2 (d) of
      the notices sentsent pursuant to paragraphs 2 (c)and 2(d) of

      this Judgment, the the client's or clients' place of residence,
      this Judgment, client's or clients' place of residence,

      and the case caption and number number of the client's or
      and the case caption and docket docket of the client's or

      clients' proceedings;
      clients' proceedings;
            b)
            b)    resign as of of the effective disbarment
                  resign as the effective date of thedate of the disbarment

      all appointments as guardian, executor, administrator,
      all appointments as guardian, executor, administrator,
      trustee, attorney-in-fact, or other fiduciary, attaching to
      trustee, attorney-in-fact, or other fiduciary, attaching to

      the resignation a copy of the notices sent
      theresignation a copy of the notices sent to the wards, to the wards,

      heirs, or beneficiaries to paragraphs                   2 (c) and 2 (d)
      heirs, or beneficiaries pursuant pursuant to paragraphs 2(c)and 2(d)

      of this Judgment, the place of residence
      of this Judgment, the place of residence of the wards, of the wards,

      heirs, or beneficiaries, and the and caption and docket
      heirs, or beneficiaries, and the case caption casedocket
      number of the proceedings,
      number of the proceedings, if any; if any;
            c)
            c)    provide notice to all clients clients and
                  provide notice to alland to all wards, to all wards,

      heirs, and beneficiaries that the lawyer has
      heirs, and beneficiaries that the lawyer has been disbarred;been disbarred;

      that she is is disqualified from acting as a
      that she disqualified from acting as a lawyer after the lawyer after the

      effective of the disbarment; and that, if and
      effective datedate of the disbarment; not that, if not

      represented by by co-counsel, the client,
      represented co-counsel, the client, ward, heir, or ward, heir, or

      beneficiary should act promptly to substitute
      beneficiary should act promptly to substitute another lawyer another lawyer

      or fiduciary or legal advice elsewhere, calling
      or fiduciary or to seekto seek legal advice elsewhere, calling

      attention to to any urgency arising from the of
      attention any urgency arising from the circumstances circumstances of

      the case;
      the case;

            d)
            d)    provide notice to counsel for all parties (or, in
                  provide notice to counsel for all parties (or, in

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                                        3

     the absence of counsel, the parties) in pending matters that
     theabsence of counsel, the parties) in pending matters that

     the lawyer been disbarred and, as and, as a consequence, is dis-
     thelawyer hashas been disbarred a consequence, is dis-

     qualified from acting as a lawyer a lawyer after the
     qualified from acting as after the effective date of effective date of

     the disbarment;
     the disbarment;

            e)
            e)    make available to all clients being represented in
                  make available to all clients being represented in
     pending matters any papers or other which they
     pending matters any papers or other property toproperty to which they

      are entitled, calling attention to any urgency for obtaining
      are entitled, calling attention to any urgency for obtaining

      the papers or other property;
      thepapers or other property;

            f)
            f)    refund any part of any fees paid in paid that
                  refund any part of any feesadvancein advance that

      have not been earned; and and
      have not been earned;
            g)
            g)    close every IOLTA, client, trust or trust or other
                  close every IOLTA, client,other

      fiduciary account and and properly disburse
      fiduciary accountproperly disburse or otherwise or otherwise

      transfer all all and fiduciary fiduciary funds in
      transfer client client and funds in her possession, her possession,

      custodyoror control.
      custody control.
All notices required by this paragraph shall be served by be served by certified
All notices required by this paragraph shall certified
mail, return receipt requested, in a form approved by the Board.
mail, return receipt requested, in a form approved by the Board.
      3.
      3.                      (21) days after the entry of
            Within twenty-one (21)days after the date ofdate of entry of
            Within twenty-one

this Judgment, the the lawyer with the Office of the Bar
this Judgment, lawyer shall fileshall file with the Office of the Bar

Counsel an affidavit certifying that fully complied
Counsel an affidavit certifying that the lawyer hasthe lawyer has fully complied
with the provisions of this Judgment disciplinary
with the provisions of this Judgment and with bar and with bar disciplinary
rules. Appended to the affidavit of compliance shall be:
rules. Appended to the affidavit of compliance shall be:

            a) copy of of each form of notice, the
            a) a a copyeach form of notice, the names and ad- names and ad-

      dresses the the clients, wards, heirs, beneficiaries, attor-
      dresses of of clients, wards, heirs, beneficiaries, attor-
      neys, courts agencies to which notices were sent,
      neys, courts and and agencies to which notices were sent,




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                                         4
                                         4

     and all return receipts or returned up to received up to the
     and all return receipts or returned mail received mail the

     dateofof the affidavit. Supplemental affidavits shall be filed
     date the affidavit. Supplemental affidavits shall be filed
     covering subsequent return receipts and returned mail. Such
     covering subsequent return receipts and returned mail. Such

     names and addresses of clients shall remain
     names and addresses of clients shall remain confidential confidential

     unless otherwise requested in writing by ordered
     unless otherwise requested in writing by the lawyer or the lawyer or ordered
     by the court;
     by the court;
            b)
            b)   a schedule showing the location, title
                 a schedule showing the location, title and account and account

     number of every bank account designated as an IOLTA, an IOLTA, client,
     number of every bank account designated as client,

     trust or or other fiduciary account account every account in
     trust other fiduciary account and of every and of in

     which the lawyer or held as held as date of entry date of this
     which the lawyer holdsholds or of the entryof the this

     Judgment any client, trust or^ fiduciary funds;
     Judgment any client, trust or^ fiduciary funds;

            c)
            c)   a schedule describing the disposition disposition of
                 a schedule describing the lawyer'slawyer's of

     all client and and fiduciary funds in the lawyer's possession,
     all client fiduciary funds in the lawyer's possession,

     custody or control as of as of date of this date of this Judgment or
     custody or control the entrythe entry Judgment or

     thereafter;
     thereafter;
            d)
            d)   such proof of the proper distribution
                 such proof of the proper distribution of such fundsof such funds

     and the closing of such accounts as has been
     and the closing of such accounts as has been requested by requested by

     the bar counsel, including copies of checks and other
     thebar counsel, including copies of checks and other

     instruments;
     instruments;
            e)
            e)   a list of all other state,
                 a list of all other state, federal and federal and

      administrative jurisdictions to which the lawyer is the lawyer is admitted
      administrative jurisdictions to which admitted

      to practice;
      topractice; and and

            f)
            f)   the residence or street street address where
                 theresidence or other otheraddress where

     communications to to the lawyer may thereafter
     communications the lawyer may thereafter be directed. be directed.

The lawyer shall retain copies copies of all notices sent
The lawyer shall retain of all notices sent and shall main- and shall main-

tain complete records of the of the steps taken to comply with the n
tain complete records steps taken to comply with the n

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notice requirements of S.J.C. Rule 4:01, Section 17.
notice requirements of S.J.C. Rule 4:01, Section 17.
     4.
     4.                       (21) days after the entry date
            Within twenty-one (21)days after the entry date
            Within twenty-one

of this Judgment, the lawyer the Clerk of
ofthis Judgment, the lawyer shall file with shall file with the Clerk of

the Supreme Judicial Court County:
theSupreme Judicial Court for Suffolk for Suffolk County:

            a)
            a)     a copy of the affidavit of compliance required by
                      copy of the affidavit of compliance required by

     paragraph     of this Judgment;
     paragraph 3 3 ofthis Judgment;
            b)
            b)         list other state, federal and
                   a list of allof all other state, federal and

      administrative jurisdictions to which the to which the lawyer is admit-
      administrative jurisdictionslawyer is admit-

      tedtoto practice; and
      ted practice; and
            c)
            c)     the residence or other street address where
                   theresidence or other street address where

     communications to to the lawyer may thereafter be di-
     communicationsthe lawyer may thereafter be di-

     rected.
     rected.


                                  B/ e Court                       na, J, ) ,
                                                             ( ,qp(i 1, J, ) ,




Entered:
Entered:         August 9, 9,
                 August           2006
                                  2006



                 Supreme Judicial
                           Judicial
                   Court For Suf-
                   CourtFor Suf-
                   folk County
                   folk County
             Fee Waived               Date
                                      Date
             Only

          Assistant Clerk
          Assistant Clerk




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                                       APPENDIX
                                       APPENDIX EE

                        COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
                        COMMONWEALTHOF MASSACHUSETTS

SUFFOLK, ss
SUFFOLK,SS                                                 SUPREME JUDICIAL
                                                           SUPREMEJUDICIAL
COURT
COURT
                                                                  FOR SUFFOLK COUNTY
                                                                  FOR SUFFOLK COUNTY
                                                                        NO: BD-2006-039
                                                                        NO: BD-2006-039


          IN RE : BARBARA C JOHNSON MEMORANDUM AND JUDGMENT
          IN RE: BARBARA C. .JOHNSON MEMORANDUM AND JUDGMENT

        The Board of Bar Overseers (board) filed an information recommending the dis-
        The Board of Bar Overseers (board) filed an information recommending the dis-
barment Attorney Barbara       Johnson (respondent) from the practice of          board
barment of Attorney Barbara C. Johnson (respondent) from the practice of law. The board

adopted the special hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law, with two minor
adopted the special hearing officer's fndings of fact and conclusions of law, with two minor

                                                        fndings, supported by substantial
exceptions. I adopt those findings and conclusions. The findings,supported by substantial
exceptions. I adopt those fndings

                                                                                (4), as
evidence, see Matter of Segal, 430 Mass. 359, 364 (1999); S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (4), as
evidence, see Matter of Segal, 430 Mass. 359, 364         S.J.C.

                                                                are
appearing in 425 Mass. 1311 (1997), and the conclusions of law, are summarized as follows.
                                            conclusions of                     as follows.

       Count I. William Jones,'1 bom in 1985, was the subject of a care and protection
       Count I. William Jones, bom in 1985, was the subject of a care and protection

proceeding                       in which was alleged that his father, John Jones, had
proceeding in the Juvenile Court in which ititwas alleged that his father, John Jones, had

physically, sexually, and emotionally abused                                             the
physically, sexually, and emotionally abused him. John Jones filed a paternity action in the
                                                       Jones fled

                                                                    two matters were
Probate Court Department alleging that he was William's father. The two matters were
Probate Court Department alleging that he was William's

assigned specially to a judge in the Juvenile Court. In 1989, John Jones's custody and
assigned specially to a judge in the Juvenile Court. In 1989, John Jones's custody and


        1 The
        '     names
         The names used are pseudonyms, as Count II arises out of a matter decided in the
                          are pseudonyms, as Count arises out of
                                                                        adopted
Juvenile Court Department. Standing Order 1-84 of the Juvenile Court, adopted May 8,
                             Standing Order
1984, states: "All juvenile court case records and reports are confdential and are the
1984, states: "All juvenile court case records and reports are confidential and are the
         of the
property of the court.

                                      for attorneys of record, or such other persons as
         "Reports loaned to or copied for attorneys of record, or such other persons as the
                         be                                  use
court may permit, shall be returned to the court after their use or at the conclusion of the
litigation, whichever occurs frst.
litigation, whichever occurs first.
        "Said reports shall not be further copied or released without permission of the court."
        "Said reports shall not be further copied or released without permission of the court."




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visitation rights as to William were terminated. The respondent was not involved in those
visitation rights as to William were terminated. The respondent was not involved in those

proceedings.
proceedings.

       William's mother, Jane Doe, married Robert Brown in 1989, and William thereafer
       William's mother, Jane Doe, married Robert Brown in 1989, and William thereafter

          as William Brown. The Browns had a son, David, who was      in 1990.
was known as William Brown. The Browns had a son, David, who was born in 1990. The

Browns subsequently divorced, and William and David lived with their mother.
Browns subsequentlydivorced, and William and David lived with their mother.

       In May, 2000, eleven years after his visitation and custody rights were terminated,
       In May, 2000, eleven years after his visitation and custody rights were terminated,
John Jones, represented by the respondent, filed complaint for modifcation of the
John Jones, represented by the respondent, filed aacomplaint for modification of the
judgment in the paternity action. The respondent also fled a separate action on behalf of
judgment in the paternity action. The respondent also filed a separate action on behalf of

                                had concluded that Jones     sexually abused his son, the
John Jones against a doctor who had concluded that Jones had sexually abused his son, the
     Jones against a doctor

                          practiced, the court-appointed investigator, the Department of
hospital where the doctor practiced, the court-appointed investigator, the Department of
Social Services, and others involved in the original care and protection matter. The re-
Social Services, and others involved in the original care and protection matter. The re-
                                                                         as deposition
spondent had obtained copies of psychological and other reports, as well as deposition
spondent had obtained copies of psychological and other reports, as

            fled in the care and protection matter. The respondent had not sought or obtained
transcripts filedin the care and protection matter. The respondent had not sought or obtained
the permission of the Juvenile Court judge before taking possession of these materials, which
the permission of the Juvenile Court judge before taking possession of these materials, which

contained confdential, privileged, or personal information about Jane, William, and David
contained confidential, privileged, or personal information about Jane, William, and David
Brown, including references findings that William had been sexually abused by his father.
Brown, including references to fndings that William had been sexually abused by his father.
At the time, the respondent      that these records were confdential and that she
At the time, the respondent knew that these records were confidential and that she could not

       or release them without the judge's
obtain or release them without the judge's authorization.
       In early 2001, the respondent posted on her website various items about Jane,
       In early 2001, the respondent posted on her website various items about Jane,
William, and David Brown, including pleadings
William, and David Brown, including pleadings from the two actions she filed on behalf of
                                                           actions she fled on behalf of

John Jones, pleadings from Jane's divorce action, and part of a report by a psychologist who
     Jones, pleadings from Jane's divorce action, and part of a report by a psychologist

treated Jane and William. These papers contained material that had been quoted from, and
treated Jane and William. These papers contained material that had been quoted from, and
summarized from, Juvenile Court records that were impounded, including Jane, William, and
summarized from, Juvenile Court records that were impounded, including Jane, William, and
        names and addresses, and the additional identifcation of William as William Jones.
David's names and addresses, and the additional identification of William as WilliamJones.
The respondent identifed both boys as illegitimate, and as victims of sexual abuse by their
The respondent identified both boys as illegitimate, and as victims of sexual abuse by their
respective fathers. She referred to Jane Brown as a perjurer. In mid February, 2001, the
respective fathers. She referred to Jane Brown as a perjurer. In mid February, 2001, the

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judge allowed bar counsel's motion     limited release the                     records
judge allowed bar counsel's motion for limited release of the paternity action records for

purposes of bar discipline proceedings against the respondent. As of August, 2003, the
purposes of bar discipline proceedings against the respondent. As of August, 2003, the

respondent had not complied with
respondent had not complied with the Juvenile Court order of May, 2001.
                                              Court

       By disseminating                    from the care
       By disseminating impounded material from the care and protection and paternity

actions, by failing to return to the Juvenile Court impounded reports              the
actions, by failing to return to the Juvenile Court impounded reports belonging to the court,
                                                                     from her website,
as ordered by the judge, and by failing to remove impounded material from her website,
as ordered by the judge, and by failing

again as ordered by the judge, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (d) and (h). In
      as ordered by the judge, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof C. 8.4 (d) and (h).

          by deliberately
addition, by deliberately disobeying the Juvenile Court judge's May 1, 2001, order and by
                    violations of Juvenile Court Standing Order 1-84 and L. c.
engaging in knowing violations of Juvenile Court Standing Order 1-84 and G. L. c. 209C,
engaging in

§ 13, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4 (c) and 8.4 (d) and (h). Finally, by
§ 13, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof C. 3.4 (c) and 8.4 (d) and (h). Finally,

                          about William, David, and Jane on her website with no substantial
disseminating information about William,David, and Jane on her website with no substantial
purpose
purpose other than to embarrass or burden them, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.
              than embarrass or burden them, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof

4.4 and
4.4 and 8.4 (h).

        Count II. In October, 1999,      Parker consulted the respondent concerning
        Count II. In October, 1999, Mary Parker consulted the respondent concerning
criminal charges her husband was facing that arose out of allegations that Mr. Parker had
criminal charges her husband was facing that arose out of allegations that Mr. Parker had
sexually abused their adult daughter, who was mentally retarded and living in a residential
sexually abused their adult daughter, who was mentally retarded and living in a residential
facility supervised by the Department of Mental Retardation (department). The department
facilitysupervised by the Department of Mental Retardation (department). The department
brought a protective services action against the Parkers. At the time, the Parkers suspected
brought a protective services action against the Parkers. At the time, the Parkers suspected

someone at the facility had done      Mr. Parker was accused of        They were rep-
someone at the facility had done what Mr. Parker was accused of doing. They were rep-
resented by other counsel. Mrs. Parker consulted with the respondent several times in
resented by other counsel. Mrs. Parker consulted with the respondent several times in
early October, 1999. On November 1, 1999, the respondent advised Mrs. Parker that she
early October, 1999. On November 1, 1999, the respondent advised Mrs. Parker that she
            her all relevant documents to enable
should give her all relevant documents to enable her to determine whether she could be of
                                                        determine         she could be of

assistance. Several days later, Mrs. Parker sent the respondent aacheck and aabox of
assistance. Several days later, Mrs. Parker sent the respondent check and box of

documents. On November 11 the respondent recommended to Mrs. Parker that, after re-
documents. On November 11 the respondent recommended to Mrs. Parker that, after re-
viewing the documents, she be retained to take depositions in the protective services ac-
viewing the documents, she be retained to take depositions in the protective services ac-

tion. The respondent indicated the balance         her services
tion. The respondent indicated the balance due for her services rendered thus far, and told
                                                                              far,     told


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Mrs. Parker that she                        $10,000, which she said she would place an
Mrs. Parker that she required a retainer of $10,000, which she said she would place in an

                    which she would pay herself for future services as they were rendered.
escrow account from which she would pay herself for future services as they were rendered.
            respondent received the Parkers' retainer on November
        The respondent received the Parkers' retainer on November 22,1999, but she did not
                                                                               she did

deposit it in a client funds account. Instead, she deposited it to her personal account. In
deposit it in a client funds account. Instead, she deposited it to her personal account. In
early December, 1999, Mrs. Parker discharged the respondent. She asked the respondent to
early December, 1999, Mrs. Parker discharged the respondent. She asked the respondent to
                    bill and return the balance of the retainer after deducting any amounts
provide an itemized bill and return the balance of the retainer after deducting any amounts

        services rendered. One week           respondent sent an itemized bill and
due for services rendered. One week later the respondent sent an itemized bill and her check
              of $3,174.50. The Parkers demanded the return of
in the amount of $3,174.50. The Parkers demanded the return of an additional $6,400. The
                                                                              account.
respondent refused, and also failed to deposit the disputed amount in a trust account. In
respondent refused, and also failed to deposit the disputed amount in

March, 2000, the Parkers filed a complaint with the officeof bar counsel.
March, 2000, the Parkers filed a complaint with the offce of bar counsel.

        In mid December, 2002, the respondent posted on her website the Parker bill, cor-
        In mid December, 2002, the respondent posted on her website the Parker bill, cor-
respondence between her and Mrs. Parker, and copies of her response to bar counsel re-
respondence between her and Mrs. Parker, and copies of her response to bar counsel re-
garding the Parkers' complaint. The posted materials disclosed confdential, personal, and
garding the Parkers' complaint. The posted materials disclosed confidential, personal, and
private information that the respondent received the course her professional
private information that the respondent received in the course of her professional relationship

with the Parkers,           the true identities of the Parkers and their family members,
with the Parkers, including the true identities of the Parkers and their family members, their

                                     the history and details of the sexual abuse allegations,2 and
daughter's history and disabilities, the history and details of the sexual abuse allegations,2 and
daughter's history

communications among the respondent, the Parkers, and the Parkers' other counsel. The
communications among the respondent, the Parkers, and the Parkers' other counsel. The
respondent never obtained the Parkers' permission to disclose or disseminate the information
respondent never obtained the Parkers' permission to disclose or disseminate the information

about them on her website, or the permission of anyone authorized to consent on behalf of
              her website, or the permission of anyone authorized to consent on behalf of

    Parkers' daughter before posting information about her.
the Parkers' daughter before posting information about her.
        On December 23,2002, the Parkers' attorney made written demand of the respondent
        On December 23,2002, the Parkers' attorney made written demand of the respondent
that she immediately remove the confidential and privileged information about them from
     she immediately remove the confdential and privileged              about them from

her              respondent answered by suggesting that she would consider          the
her website. The respondent answered by suggesting that she would consider removing the

postings if the Parkers frst withdrew their complaint to bar counsel. As of August, 2003,
postings if the Parkers first withdrew their complaint to bar counsel. As of August, 2003,


        2
                              the Commonwealth nolleprossed the criminal charges against
        2 On October 27,2000, the Commonwealth nolleprossed the criminalcharges against
          On October
Mr. Parker.
Mr. Parker.

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the respondent had not removed any information about the Parkers from her website.
the respondent had not removed any information about the Parkers from her website.

        The special hearing offcer found that bar counsel had failed to prove that the re-
        The special hearing officer found that bar counsel had failed to prove that the re-
spondent had charged a clearly excessive fee. He also concluded that bar counsel failed to
         had charged a clearly excessive fee. He also concluded that bar counsel failed

prove that the respondent intentionally had made false, deceptive, or misleading represen-
prove that the respondent intentionally had made false, deceptive, or misleading represen-

tations to the Parkers about her fees, time, and charges. Bar counsel has not appealed
tations to the Parkers about her fees, time, and charges. Bar counsel has not appealed

those findings.
those findings.

        By commingling the Parkers' retainer payment with her own funds, failing to seg-
        By commingling the Parkers' retainer payment with her own funds, failing to seg-

regate the disputed portion          retainer,     failing to account adequately the
regate the disputed portion of their retainer, and failing to account adequately to the Park-

                                        of the retainer,
ers for her application and disposition of the retainer, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof.
ers for                                                      respondent violated Mass. R. Prof

C. 1.15 (a)-(c), 1.16 (d), and 8.4 (c) and (h). In addition, by revealing confdential infor-
C. 1.15 (a)-(c), 1.16 (d), and 8.4 (c) and (h). In addition, by revealing confidential infor-
mation gained in the course of her professional relationship with the Parkers without their
mation gained in the course of her professional relationship with the Parkers without their

consent, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6(a) and 1.9 (1) and (2). Finally, by
consent, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof C. 1.6(a) and 1.9 (1) and (2). Finally,

demanding the withdrawal of the Parkers' bar discipline grievance as a condition of re-
demanding the withdrawal of the Parkers' bar discipline grievance as a condition of re-
             confidential information from her website, the respondent violated Mass. R.
moving their confdential information from her website, the respondent violated Mass. R.

Prof. C. 8.4 (d) and (h) and SJ.C.      4:01, §
Prof. C. 8.4 (d) and (h) and SJ.C. Rule 4:01, § 10.

        Count III. In 1992 the respondent filed a wrongful termination action on behalf of
        Count III. In 1992 the respondentfiled a wrongful termination action on behalf of
                        was fled in the Superior Court and later remanded to the District
a client. The complaint was filedin the Superior Court and later remanded to the District
Court. In January, 1995, a judge in the District Court Department entered an order per-
Court. In January, 1995, a judge in the District Court Department entered an order per-
mittingthe respondent to inspect the defendants' documents. The respondent failed to ap-
mitting the respondent to inspect the defendants' documents.    respondent failed to ap-

pear for the scheduled inspection. In February she fled a motion to reconsider the sched-
pear for the scheduled inspection. In February she filed a motion to reconsider the sched-

uling order, and a motion seeking leave to depose nonparty witnesses outside the pres-
uling order, and a motion seeking leave to depose nonparty witnesses outside the pres-

ence of defense counsel. The motions were denied, and the judge found      the motions
ence of defense counsel. The motions were denied, and the judge found that the motions
were brought without legal or factual basis and in bad faith. The judge ordered the re-
were brought without legal or factual basis and in bad faith. The judge ordered the re-

spondent and her client to pay attorney and paralegal fees totaling $981.25. They did not
spondent and her client to              and paralegal fees totaling $981.25. They did

         payments and both subsequently were found contempt.         judge ordered
make the payments and both subsequently were found in contempt. The judge ordered
make

           further fees                 civil penalty of $50 for every day that the fees
payment of further fees of $558, plus a civil penalty of $50 for every day that the fees were

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          together                that, a
not paid, together with a warning that, as a further sanction, the plaintiffs complaint was
                                                     sanction, the plaintiffs

                                       made. On April 5,1995, the judge ordered payment
subject to dismissal. No payments were made. On April 5,1995, the judge ordered payment
   a civil penalty of $650. Again, no payments were made. On April 19, 1995, the
of a civil penalty of $650. Again, no payments were made. On April 19, 1995, the
complaint was dismissed, and the respondent's            ordered to pay the defendants
complaint was dismissed, and the respondent's client was ordered to pay the defendants
$3,809.25 in costs.
$3,809.25 in costs.
                               appeal the amended fnal judgment of dismissal. Instead, she
        The respondent did not appeal the amended final judgment of dismissal. Instead, she
            respondent did

filedaarequest for retransfer to the Superior Court, purportedly under G. L. c. 231, § 102C.
fled request for retransfer to the
i                                                    purportedly under L. c. 231, § 102C.
             Court judge ordered                 retransfer                 The respondent
The Superior Court judge ordered the request for retransfer to be stricken. The respondent
                                                               appeal was frivolous,
appealed that order. The Appeals Court affirmed, held that the appeal was frivolous, and
appealed that order. The Appeals Court affirmed,

awarded attorney's fees and costs to be determined at a later date. The Appeals Court
awarded attorney's fees and costs to be determined at a later date. The Appeals

                                fees                  costs. The amounts ordered were
subsequently awarded $30,000 in fees and $1,071.65 in costs. The amounts ordered were
             awarded

     by
paid by July, 2000.

                                                          contempt                    the
        On December 13,1995, the judge modified the prior contempt rulings by holding the
           December 13,1995, the judge modifed

respondent's client contempt only for nonpayment of the paralegal fees ($261.25),3 and
respondent's client in contempt only for nonpayment of the paralegal fees ($261.25),3 and

holding the respondent in               for nonpayment of the attorney's fees
holding the respondent in contempt only for nonpayment of the attorneys fees ($ 1,278) plus
    civil penalty ($650). The order further provided that the respondent       purge
the civil penalty ($650). The order further provided that the respondent could purge her
         and be forgiven payments of the civil penalty if she paid $ 1,278 by December 20,
contempt and be forgiven payments of the civil penalty if she paid $ 1,278 by December 20,
1995. The respondent made no payments. As result final judgment of contempt was
1995. The respondent made no payments. As aaresult aafinal judgment of contempt was
entered against her in July, 1996.
        against her in

        The respondent appealed the final judgment of contempt entered against her. The
        The respondent appealed the final judgment of contempt entered against her. The
Appeals                                                    contempt was affrmed, the
Appeals Court affirmed the judgment. After the judgment of contempt was affirmed, the
                           judgment. After

         Court judge notified the respondent that she      become liable     additional
District Court judge notifed the respondent that she could become liable for additional
penalties and the matter of her contempt would be referred to the Board of Bar Overseers if
penalties and the matter of her contempt would be referred to the Board of Bar Overseers if

            purge              by July 30, 1998. The respondent made no payment.
she did not purge her contempt by July 30, 1998. The respondent made no payment.
she did


        3
          The final judgment in the civil action     amended to refect that the plaintiff owed
        3 The final judgment in the civil action was amended to reflect that the plaintiff owed
the defendants   $261.25, plus interest.
the defendants $261.25, plus interest.

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            District Court judge held hearing on December 17, 1998, on the issue
        The DistrictCourt judge held aahearing on December 17, 1998, on the issue of the
respondent's continuing contempt. After determining that the respondent had wilfully, and
respondent's continuing contempt. After determining that the respondent had wilfully, and
without justification or cause, failed to purge herself of contempt, the judge ordered that the
without justifcation or cause, failed to purge herself of contempt, the judge ordered that the

                                                  next day the respondent arranged for
respondent immediately be taken into custody. The next day the respondent arranged for
respondent immediately

payment of all sums owed for her contempt, and she was thereupon released. She filed no
payment of all sums owed for her contempt, and she was thereupon released. She filed no

further appeal.
further appeal.
        By knowingly disobeying the District Court judge's orders of December 13, 1995,
        By knowingly disobeying the District Court judge's orders of December 13, 1995,

      those orders were affirmed appeal, engaging in contempt of
after those orders were affirmed on appeal, engaging in contempt of court, and refusing to
                         incarcerated, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof
purge her contempt until incarcerated, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4 (c) and

8.4 (d) and (h). By filing motions without any legal or factual basis and in bad faith, ex-
8.4 (d) and (h). By filing motions without any legal or factual basis and in bad faith, ex-
posing her client to dismissal of her claims and personal liability for sanctions and dam-
posing her client to dismissal of her claims and personal liabilityfor sanctions and dam-

                                                                     contempt judgment
ages through the respondent's misconduct, failing to appeal from the contempt judgment
ages through the respondent's misconduct, failing to appeal from

                                                                            judge's
against her client, and pursuing a frivolous appeal from the Superior Court judge's order
against her client, and pursuing a frivolous

striking the retransfer request, the respondent violated Canon One, DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6),
striking the retransfer request, the respondent violated Canon One, DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6),
                    (A)(l)
Canon Six, DR 6-101 (A)(1) and (2), and Canon Seven, DR 7-101(A)(3).
                                              Seven, DR 7-101(A)(3).

        In aggravation, the respondent has history of prior discipline,                 in 1995
        In aggravation, the respondent has aahistory of prior discipline, an admonition in 1995

    repeated
for repeated insults to the opposing party, and interruptions and other interference in the
                                                               Mass. Att'y Disc. R. 468
course of witness examinations in aacivil matter. AD-95-80, 11 Mass. Att'y Disc. R. 468
course of witness examinations in civil matter. AD-95-80,

                                              related misconduct, that is, refusing to conform
(1995). Because this prior discipline was for related misconduct, that is, refusing to conform
        Because this prior discipline

her behavior to professional norms and showing contempt for the legal process, it merits
her behavior to professional norms and showing contempt for the legal process, it merits

consideration in determining the sanction. See Matter of Gross, 435 Mass. 444, 453, 17
consideration in determining the sanction. See Matter of Gross, 435 Mass. 444, 453, 17
Mass. Att'y Disc. R. 271, 280-281 (2001).
Mass. Att'y Disc. R. 271, 280-281 (2001).
        The respondent's conduct during the disciplinary proceeding, in which she was
        The respondent's conduct during the disciplinary proceeding, in which she was
insulting, vituperative, demonstrated utter disrespect and contempt for the process, and
insulting, vituperative, demonstrated utter disrespect and contempt for the process, and
refused to participate in the hearing, is also an aggravating factor that merits consideration
                                               an aggravating factor




                                              -8-

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   determining the sanction.4
in determining the sanction 4

       4
       4 For example, at the prehearing conference, the respondent made the following
         For example, at the prehearing conference, the respondent made the following
comments:
comments:

             one
        "The one that says something for protective order. I mean, all that is hog wash." (Tr.
                      says something for protective                all
        11/17/03, at 22)

       "[Assistant Bar Counsel] has        everything to make
       "[Assistant Bar Counsel] has done everything to make sure this is a kangaroo court
       and this particular hearing goes along just the way the star chamber would want it,
       and                         goes along just the way     star chamber would
       without any witnesses whatsoever." (Tr. 11/17/03, at 27)
       without any witnesses whatsoever." (Tr. 11/17/03, at 27)

       "So that document that you wanted to find out whether received is the most bogus
       "So that document that you wanted to find out whether II received is the most bogus
                    you would ever want to read. There are people she's named as she written
       document you would ever want to read. There are people she's named as she written
          little something about them, but she                   of calling them as witnesses.
       a little something about them, but she has no intention of calling them as witnesses.
       It's valueless, it's hollow, it's a sack of cow chips. The smell of it - " (Tr. 11/17/03,
       It's valueless, it's hollow, it's a sack of cow chips. The smell of it - " (Tr. 11/17/03,
       at 27-28)
       at 27-28)

       "Would you recuse yourself from being a Hearing Offcer? You have shown your
       "Would you recuse yourself from being a Hearing Officer? You have shown your
       bias, you have shown you're not the brightest bulb in the chandelier . . ." (Tr.
       bias, you have shown you're not the brightest bulb in the chandelier . ... ." (Tr.
       11/17/03, at 40-41)
       11/17/03, at 40-41)

        "I'm old and            can yell." (Tr. 11/17/03,
        "I'm old and deaf, so I can yell." (Tr. 11/17/03, at 43)

       "But I'm sure as shit not going to pay for it. If [Assistant Bar Counsel] wants it, she
       "But I'm sure as shit not going to pay for it. If [Assistant Bar Counsel] wants it, she
       can pay for it." (Tr. 11/17/03, at 66)
       can pay for it." (Tr. 11/17/03, at 66)

       "No. Damn it, no. Unless you agree that you're carrying a kangaroo court here,
       "No. Damn it, no. Unless you agree that you're carrying a kangaroo court here,
       unless you're willing to agree that you have a kangaroo court here, you cannot say to
       unless you're willingto agree that you have a kangaroo court here, you cannot say to
               is Count 3 and you can't have any defense to it because      all been
       me this is Count 3 and you can't have any defense to it because it's all been decided
       before.. .. That's a wagon of                chips horse manure."         11/17/03, at
       before.. . . That's a wagon of detritus, cow chips horse manure." (Tr. 11/17/03, at
       79)
       79)

       "You're not going to accept them anyway, so who the hell cares. There, I swore."
       "You're not going to accept them anyway, so who the hell cares. There, I swore."
            11/17/03, at
       (Tr. 11/17/03, at 81)

       "She [Assistant Bar Counsel] is a liar. She is a liar." (Tr. 11/17/03, at 82)
       "She [Assistant Bar Counsel] is a liar. She is a liar." (Tr. 11/17/03, at 82)

       "If you're [Special Hearing Offcer] going to really make this into a clown thing."
       "If you're [Special Hearing Officer] going to really make this into a clown thing."
       (Tr. 11/17/03, at 88)
       (Tr. 11/17/03, at 88)

       "Come on, cut the crap. Excuse me, I swore then. This protective order is a piece
       "Come on, cut the crap. Excuse me, I swore then. This protective order is a piece
          foolishness this point." (Tr. 11/17/03, at 108)
       of foolishness at this point." (Tr. 11/17/03, at 108)


                                             -9-

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       Discussion.
       Discussion.

                 I. The respondent contends                             not have disobeyed
       (a) Count I. The respondent contends that she deliberately could not have disobeyed
                                                 she deliberately

                   judge's order of May, 2001, because she              the          Court.
the Juvenile Court judge's order of May, 2001, because she was never in the Juvenile Court.
She ignores the simple fact that the judge ordered her to return certain materials and to
She ignores the simple fact that the judge ordered her to return certain materials and to
remove certain postings on her website. A copy of the order was served on her, and she
remove certain postings on her website. A copy of the order was served on her, and she

ignored it. She never sought to vacate or appeal the order. Nor did she appeal the com-
ignored it. She never sought to vacate or appeal the order. Nor did she appeal the com-
plementary ruling and order of the Probate Court judge stating that the records fled in the
plementary ruling and order of the Probate Court judge stating that the records filed in the

paternity                                                            papers fled after G.
paternity action before 1998 were impounded by operation of law, and papers filed after G.
                             were impounded by operation of

L. c. 209C, § 13, was amended                           order of the court. The issue
L. c. 209C, § 13, was amended in 1998 were impounded by order of the court. The issue is
waived and cannot be litigated for the frst time in her disciplinary proceedings. An at-
waived and cannot be litigated for the first time in her disciplinary proceedings. An at-

torney must obey a court order where she has exhausted all appeals. See Florida Bar v.
torney must obey a court order where she has exhausted all appeals. See Florida Bar v.

Gerstein, 707 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1998). The respondent's claim that the 1998 amendment to
Gerstein, 707 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1998). The respondent's claim that the 1998 amendment to
G. L. c. 209C, § 13, has retroactive effect similarly is waived.
G. L. c. 209C, § 13, has retroactive effect similarly is waived.
           respondent argues that                                            material she
       The respondent argues that there was no evidence that a source of the material she
                                        was                  a source of

posted                                            Court records. The posted
posted on her website included impounded Juvenile Court records. The posted material

contained quotations from, and summaries of reports fled in the Juvenile Court. Moreover,
contained quotations from, and summaries of, reports filed in the Juvenile Court. Moreover,
         1, 2001, Juvenile Court order states      the respondent wrongfully disseminated
the May, 1, 2001, Juvenile Court order states that the respondent wrongfully disseminated
          material. She never sought a            explain that her sources      not copies
impounded material. She never sought a hearing to explain that her sources were not copies
   impounded Juvenile Court records; she simply ignored the                  is
of impounded Juvenile Court records; she simply ignored the order. The point is waived.
       The respondent, citing the absence of any testimony, argues the absence of any
       The respondent, citing the absence of any testimony, argues the absence of any
evidence to support the findings that the information posted on her website had no
evidence to support the findings that the information posted on her website had no


          the first day of hearing, the respondent made the following statements:
       On the first day of hearing, the respondent made the followingstatements:

       "If [Bar Counsel] doesn't lie so much, I wouldn't need to interrupt." (Tr. 12/2/03, at
       "If [Bar Counsel] doesn't lie so much, I wouldn't need to interrupt." (Tr. 12/2/03, at
       17)
       17)


       "Mr. Brown was not on her witness list. Plus, his affdavit is, oh god, belongs
       "Mr. Brown was not on her witness list. Plus, his affidavit is, oh god, it belongs in
       a pig farm." (Tr. 12/2/03, at 18)
       a pig farm." (Tr. 12/2/03, at 18)

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substantial purpose other than to embarrass Jane, William and David Brown. No live
substantial purpose other than to embarrass Jane, William and David Brown. No live

testimony was required to draw this inference from the highly personal nature of the in-
testimony was required to draw this inference from the highly personal nature of the in-

           (one reason
formation (one reason why care and protection records are impounded and the public is
                                                      are impounded and the public

         from such
excluded from such proceedings), and from the fact that the respondent had filed an action
                                 and from               the respondent had fled

seeking modifcation of the judgment in the paternity
seeking modification of the judgment in the paternity action.
       (b) Count II. The respondent claims that because it was determined that she did not
       (b) Count II. The respondent claims that because it was determined that she did not
charge an excessive fee, she owed nothing to the Parkers and therefore was not required to
       an excessive fee, she owed nothing        Parkers and therefore was not

set aside any money she legitimately earned by placing it in a trust account. There are two
set aside any money she legitimately earned by placing                              are

laws in her argument. The frst is that her conduct is in violation of the plain language of
flawsin her argument. The firstis that her conduct is in violation of the plain language of
f
         Prof C. 1.15 (b)(2)(ii), which requires an attorney
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b)(2)(ii), which requires an attorney to restore withdrawn funds to
                   the right of the attorney to receive the funds has been disputed and
a trust account if the right of the attorney to receive the funds has been disputed and the
            notifed of the dispute within reasonable        after
attorney is notifiedof the dispute within aareasonable time after the funds were withdrawn.

Second, the respondent never placed the funds in trust account in the frst place. The
Second, the respondent never placed the funds in aatrust account in the first place. The
                                               time she deposited         her personal
respondent had not earned all the funds at the time she deposited them to her personal
respondent had not earned all the

                                                   with her personal funds.
account, and therefore she commingled client funds with her personal funds.
         and therefore she commingled client

       There is no merit to the claim that the Parkers had consented to the posting of
       There is no merit to the claim that the Parkers had consented to the posting of
              information on the respondent's                  Parker       that they were
confidential information on the respondent's website when Mrs. Parker wrote that they were
looking forward to seeing their story on her website. As they apply to this case, Mass. R.
looking forward to seeing their story on her website. As they apply to this case, Mass. R.
Prof. C. 1.6 (a) and 9.1 (c) require the "communication of information reasonably sufficient
                 and 9.1 (c) require the "communication of information reasonably suffcient

to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the disclosure of confdential in-
to permit the client to appreciate the signifcance of the disclosure of confidential in-

          before the disclosure made. There          evidence any such
formation before the disclosure is made. There is no evidence of any such communication
by the respondent       to the disclosure. In fact, the respondent acknowledges she
by the respondent prior to the disclosure. In fact, the respondent acknowledges she had not

even met the Parkers. It also is immaterial that the Parkers did not personally complain
even met the Parkers. It also is immaterial that the Parkers did not personally complain

about the disclosure. Bar counsel may initiate an investigation of any conduct by a lawyer
about the disclosure. Bar counsel may initiate an investigation of any conduct by a lawyer
         violate the Massachusetts                                See Rules of
that may violate the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rules of the Board
   Bar Overseers
of Bar Overseers § 2.1 (b)(2).

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            respondent also argues                   evidence, other than hearsay, that she
        The respondent also argues that there was no evidence, other than hearsay, that she
left a message on the telephone answering            the Parkers' other
left a message on the telephone answering machine of the Parkers' other attorney demanding
the withdrawal of their complaint with bar counsel as a condition of removing their con-
the withdrawal of their complaint with bar counsel as a condition of removing their con-

fidential information from her website. The simple answer is that the respondent admit-
fidential information from her website. The simple answer is that the respondent admit-
ted in paragraph 93 of her amended answer to the petition for discipline (see docket #46)
ted in paragraph 93 of her amended answer to the petition for discipline (see docket #46)

that she left a
that she left a voice message. A taped message (Exhibit 75), which the special hearing offi-
                      message. A taped message (Exhibit 75), which the special hearing off-

    properly could have determined is in her voice, contains the message in question. See also
cer properly could have determined is in her voice, contains the message in question. See also
Exhibit 75 A transcript of the voice message.
Exhibit 75 A --transcript of the voice message.

        (c) Count III. The respondent argues that the December 13,1998, orders, which sh
        (c) Count II. The respondent argues that the December 13, 1998, orders, which sh
e is charged with disobeying after they were affrmed on appeal, was not a fnal order, and
e is charged with disobeying after they were affirmed on appeal, was not a final order, and
therefore may not be the basis for discipline. There is no basis to the argument. The re-
therefore may not be the basis for discipline. There is no basis to the argument. The re-
spondent was ordered to do something and she was bound to comply with the orders. See
spondent was ordered to do something and she was bound to comply with the orders. See
Florida Bar v. Rubin, 546 So.2d 1001 (Fla. 1989). It does not matter that the orders were
Florida Bar v. Rubin, 546 So.2d 1001 (Fla. 1989). It does not matter that the orders were

interlocutory. She could have sought a stay of the orders pending rehearing or appeal, see
interlocutory. She could have sought a stay of the orders pending rehearing or appeal, see
       of R.I. Select Comm'n Subpoena,
Matter of R.I. Select Comm'n Subpoena, 415 Mass. 890, 893 (1993); Ward v. Coletti, 10
                                           Mass. 890, 893 (1993); Ward

           Ct. 629 (1980), S.C., 383 Mass. 99 (1981), but she failed to pursue that course.
Mass. App. Ct. 629 (1980), S.C., 383 Mass. 99 (1981), but she failed to pursue that course.
In any event, she is charged with failing to obey the orders after they were affrmed on
In any event, she is charged with failing to obey the orders after they were affirmed on
                        they issued. Bar counsel has chosen     to prosecute the respondent
appeal, not at the time they issued. Bar counsel has chosen not to prosecute the respondent
     the interim disobedience of the orders. The respondent's argument necessarily
for the interim disobedience of the orders. The respondent's argument necessarily
evaporates.
            respondent claims that the underlying basis for the contempt fndings, namely,
        The respondent claims that the underlying basis for the contempt findings, namely,
              she filed frivolous motions that resulted in the imposition of fees and costs
the fact that she filed frivolous motions that resulted in the imposition of fees and costs that

                               ordered to do so, is erroneous. The issue has been
she refused to pay after being ordered to do so, is erroneous. The issue has been decided
she refused to

previously and affirmed in an appeal to which the respondent was a party.
previously and affrmed in an appeal to which the respondent was a party. She had a full and
                                                                                 a full

     opportunity to litigate this issue in that matter, and she         collaterally attack
fair opportunity to litigate this issue in that matter, and she may not collaterally attack that
decision in this proceeding. See Matter of Goldstone, 445 Mass. 551, 559-560 (2005).
decision in this proceeding. See Matter of Goldstone, 445 Mass. 551, 559-560 (2005).

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       The respondent has raised other issues concerning the evidentiary basis of the three-
       The respondent has raised other issues concerning the evidentiary basis of the three-
count petition for discipline, none of which has merit.
count petition for discipline, none of which has merit.
       (d) Selective Prosecution. The respondent contends that bar counsel improperly
       (d) Selective Prosecution. The respondent contends that bar counsel improperly
refused to investigate and prosecute opposing counsel in Counts and III. Whether bar
refused to investigate and prosecute opposing counsel in Counts I Iand III. Whether bar

                                                   in these
counsel pursues discipline of others is irrelevant in these proceedings, see Matter ofTobin,
        pursues discipline                                               see Matter ofTobin,

417 Mass. 92, 103 (1994), unless it can be shown that the respondent has been prosecuted
417 Mass. 92, 103 (1994), unless it can be shown that the respondent has been prosecuted

selectively because of                in a protected class. See United States v. Armstrong,
selectively because of her membership in a protected class. See United States v. Armstrong,
    U.S. 456, 464-465 (1996). There has been
517 U.S. 456, 464-465 (1996). There has been no such showing.
           Subpoenas.                argues that parties to bar discipline proceedings are
       (e) Subpoenas. The respondent argues that parties to bar discipline proceedings are
         to issue subpoenas to witnesses, pursuant to G. L.
entitled to issue subpoenas to witnesses, pursuant to G. L. c. 233, § 8, to produce books and
papers at a hearing before the special hearing offcer.
papers at a hearing before the special hearing officer. The statute provides that parties may

      subpoenas to witnesses to testify and produce books and papers
issue subpoenas to witnesses to testify and produce books and papers at hearings before
                                 of Bar Overseers               in the statute.
certain listed boards. The Board of Bar Overseers is not listed in the statute. Bar counsel

                                       offcer was authorized to approve such subpoenas,
contends that only the special hearing officerwas authorized to approve such subpoenas,
         that only

pursuant to the Board of Bar Overseers Rules, § 4.5. The precise question need not be
pursuant to the Board of Bar Overseers Rules, § 4.5. The precise question need not be

        because the special hearing offcer's order quashing the subpoenas issued by the
decided because the special hearing officer's order quashing the subpoenas issued by the
respondent was proper. It prevented the respondent from circumventing his prior ruling
respondent was proper. It prevented the respondent from circumventing his prior ruling

refusing to issue subpoenas to witnesses whose testimony was irrelevant to the issues before
refusing to issue subpoenas to witnesses whose testimony     irrelevant to the issues

      The respondent has failed to show how such testimony would have been relevant.
him. The respondent has failed to show how such testimony would have been relevant.
Moreover, the respondent had made no request for a subpoena for production of books,
Moreover, the respondent had made no request for a subpoena for production of books,

papers, or documents in her original request for subpoenas to be issued pursuant to Board of
papers, or documents in her original request for subpoenas to be issued pursuant to Board of

Bar Overseers Rules, § 4.5.
Bar Overseers Rules, § 4.5.

           Protective Order. The board's chair properly entered
       (f) Protective Order. The board's chair properly entered a protective order directing
                                                                                   directing

     hearings [to] be conducted in such way as to preserve the confidentiality of. .
"the hearings [to] be conducted in such a a way as to preserve the confdentiality of...
          information." Indeed, one of the conditions of the judge's
[certain] information." Indeed, one of the conditions of the judge's order permitting bar
                                            I in this matter was that bar counsel keep the
counsel to use impounded documents in Count I in this matter was that bar counsel keep the
           use impounded


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            confidential. Supreme
information confdential. Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, § 20 (4), and Board of Bar
                                                                         Board

                             allow such an order, and contemplate an appeal    the single
Overseers Rules, § 3.22 (c), allow such an order, and contemplate an appeal to the single
Overseers Rules, § 3.22

justice from the grant or denial of protective order. The respondent took no such appeal.
justice from the grant or denial of aaprotective order. The respondent took no such appeal.

        When the respondent persisted in using the true names of one of the individuals
        When the respondent persisted in using the true names of one of the individuals

whose identity was protected, the special hearing offcer properly excluded the public from
whose identity was protected, the special hearing officer properly excluded the public from

the hearing.
the hearing.

        (g) First Amendment. With respect to Counts and II, the respondent argues that
        (g) First Amendment. With respect to Counts IIand II, the respondent argues that
                                to publish information, as she chose, on her website, and
she had a First Amendment right to publish information, as she chose, on her website, and
she had a First Amendment

                                                                               An attorney's
that any sanction for this conduct would constitute a violation of this right. An attorney's
         sanction for      conduct would constitute a violation

right to speak, in contrast with that of other citizens, can be and, in fact, is constrained by
right to speak, in contrast with that of other citizens, can be and, in fact, is constrained by

                          State Bar                                      With respect
ethical rules. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991). With respect to
        rules.

      I, the respondent had a duty to raise her First Amendment           challenging the
Count I, the respondent had a duty to raise her First Amendment claims by challenging the
      orders specifcally impounding the information she published on her
court orders specifically impounding the information she published on her website - and, in

                      from disclosing the impounded material. See
raising them, refrain from disclosing the impounded material. See Mass. R.A.P. 16 (m).

Instead, she simply defed the orders and
Instead, she simply defied the orders and belatedly claims here her First Amendment rights
                                                           here her First

as a collateral defense to her disobedience of the court orders. See Florida Bar v. Rubin,
as a collateral defense to her disobedience of the court orders. See Florida Bar

               Bar v. Gerstein, supra. Because the respondent failed to timely raise
supra; Florida Bar v. Gerstein, supra. Because the respondent failed to timely raise her First
supra;

                                    validity of the court orders,
Amendment claims by challenging the validity of the court orders, it was misconduct to defy

      and she waived     such claim this proceeding.
them, and she waived any such claim in this proceeding.
            Sanction. The board      the following statement about the sanction
        (h) Sanction. The board made the followingstatement about the sanction that should
be imposed.
be imposed.

                                    the three counts and the factors in aggravation, the
        "Based on the misconduct in the three counts and the factors in aggravation, the
        "Based

special hearing offcer recommended disbarment. We agree.
special hearing officerrecommended disbarment. We agree.
        "The respondent's misconduct has been directed toward her clients, opposing parties,
        "The respondent's misconduct has been directed toward her clients, opposing parties,
      counsel, judges and       adjudicators, witnesses              third parties. She has
other counsel, judges and other adjudicators, witnesses and innocent third parties. She has
        court                        has made infammatory and contemptuous statements
ignored court orders repeatedly. She has made inflammatoryand contemptuous statements

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both          and writing on her website and this disciplinary proceeding. Her mis-
both verbally and in writing on her website and in this disciplinary proceeding. Her mis-

conduct demonstrates her outright refusal to conform her conduct to professional stan-
conduct demonstrates her outright refusal to conform her conduct to professional stan-
dards and ethical requirements. As a result, the judicial system     the public must be
dards and ethical requirements. As a result, the judicial system and the public must be pro-
tected from her repeated misconduct.
tected from her repeated misconduct.

            Counts and II, the respondent repeatedly violated                            the
        "In Counts II and II, the respondent repeatedly violated court orders, for which the
                                                                       orders, for

standard sanction is at least a suspension. See, e.g., Matter of Cohen, [435 Mass. 7, 17
standard sanction is at least a suspension. See, e.g., Matter of Cohen, [435 Mass. 7, 17
(2001)]; Matter ofTobin, supra. Moreover, in Count III, her misconduct resulted in the
(2001)]; Matter ofTobin, supra. Moreover, in Count III, her misconduct resulted in the
dismissal of her client's complaint. In Counts and I, the respondent publicized confdential
dismissal of her client's complaint. In Counts II and II, the respondentpublicized confidential
                                           doing so, in Count I, she flouted court orders
and private information on her website. In doing so, in Count I, she flouted court orders and
    private

publicized private information about a minor who was simply related to opponents in liti-
publicized private information about a minor who was simply related to opponents in liti-

gation. In Count II, she disclosed confdences of her former clients in retaliation for dis-
gation. In Count II, she disclosed confidences of her former clients in retaliation for dis-
puting her fee and refused to remove that information from her website. Such miscon-
puting her fee and refused to remove that information from her website. Such miscon-

duct, standing alone[,J would warrant substantial discipline. Matter of Pool, 401 Mass.
duct, standing alone[,J would warrant substantial discipline. Matter of Pool, 401 Mass.
460,5 Mass. Att'y Disc. R. 290 (1988) (disbarring attorney who furnished confidential client
      Mass. Att'y                     (disbarring attorney who furnished confdential

                             in order                            the ABA Standards for
information to U.S. Attorney in order to collect his fee). Under the ABA Standards for Im-
posing Lawyer Sanctions § 6.21 (1992), '[djisbarment is generally appropriate when a
posing Lawyer Sanctions § 6.21 (1992), '[djisbarment is generally appropriate when a
       knowingly violates                                          obtain a beneft for the
lawyer knowingly violates a court order or rule with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
                                  order or rule

       or another,                                                  injury to a party, or causes
lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potentially serious injuryto a party, or causes
                       causes serious injury or potentially

serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding.' In this case there can be
serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding.' In this case there can be
                  respondent has repeatedly defied court orders over substantial periods of
no doubt that the respondent has repeatedly defied court orders over substantial periods of

time, has revealed confdential information solely to harass, and has interfered       the
time, has revealed confidential information solely to harass, and has interfered with the

judicial process and this disciplinary proceeding.
judicial process and this disciplinary proceeding.

             sanction should be more severe where, as here, the respondent has
        "The sanction should be more severe where, as here, the respondent has engaged in
                                                                           related
a pattern of misconduct, persisting over a matter of time, including prior related discipline.
  pattern of misconduct, persisting over a matter of time, including

Matter of Saab, 406 Mass. 315 (1989). We agree with the special hearing officer that, 'Of
Matter of Saab, 406 Mass. 315 (1989). We agree with the special hearing offcer that, 'Of

               ... is the respondent's                  to comply with, or even
utmost concern . . . is the respondent's patent refusal to comply with, or even acknowledge,

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                                                           her misconduct is analogous
her ethical responsibilities as an attorney.' In our view, her misconduct is analogous to that
                                an attorney.' In

in Matter of Cobb, [445 Mass. 452 (2005)]. Our review of the record establishes that the
in Matter of Cobb, [445 Mass. 452 (2005)]. Our review of the record establishes that the

respondent,      Cobb,
respondent, like Cobb,

        'has demonstrated rather convincingly by [her] quick and ready disparage-
        'has demonstrated rather convincingly by [her] quick and ready disparage-
        ment judges, [her] disdain for [her]              attorneys, and [her] lack of
        ment of judges, [her] disdain for [her] fellow attorneys, and [her] lack of
        concern for and betrayal of [her] clients that [s]he is utterly unft to practice
        concern for and betrayal of [her] clients that [s]he is utterly unfit to practice
        law.'

"Id. at
"Id. at 479."

                 The appropriate sanction here
        I agree. The appropriate sanction here is disbarment, and an order disbarring the

respondent from the practice of law shall enter.
respondent from the             law shall enter.
                                                  By
                                                  By the Court,




                                                  Francis X. Spina
                                                  Francis X. Spina
                                                  Associate Justice
                                                  Associate Justice
ENTERED: August_
ENTERED: August            jj 2006
                              2006




                      Supreme Judicial Court
                        For Suffolk County Fee
                        Waived Only

Date                        _ Assistant Clerk
                            -I ,Assistant Clerk




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                                               APPENDIX
                                               APPENDIX F F

                           SUMMARIES OF COUNTS I, II, AND III
                           SUMMARIES OF COUNTS I. II, AND III

        In Count Johnson was charged with publishing allegedly confidential mate-
        In Count I, I, Johnson was charged with publishing allegedly confidential mate-
rial on her website and thereby harming people, but OBC never identified with
rial on her website and thereby harming people, but thethe OBC never identified with
any particularity, even nonparticularity, the the confidential material offending
any particularity, oror even nonparticularity, confidential material or the or the offending
language.
language.

       Due process required the identification, i.e., notice, the allegedly offending
       Due process required the identification, i.e., notice, of of the allegedly offending
language. The prosecutor produced no evidence supporting the allegations. She pro-
language. The prosecutor produced no evidence supporting the allegations. She pro-
duced only her speculation. Notwithstanding that the prosecutor admitted that
duced only her speculation. Notwithstanding that the prosecutor laterlater admitted that
Johnson did not publish impounded documents from the Juvenile Court, but con-
Johnson did not publish impounded documents from the Juvenile Court, but she she con-
tinued to assert that the information Johnson's website "was derived from confi-
tinuedto assert that the information on on Johnson’s website “was derived from confi-
dential reports and records on file the juvenile ... . . or probate courts, and thus
dentialreports and records on file inin the juvenile or. probate courts, and thus im- im-
pounded or shielded from public view by rule by statute."
pounded or shielded from public view by rule or or by statute.”

        One case to which the prosecutor was referring was Care & Protection action
        One case to which the prosecutor was referring was a a Care & Protection action
brought by the Department Social Services in juvenile court. The other was an an
brought by the Department ofof Social Services in juvenile court. The other wasac- ac-
tion for paternity and custody brought the putative father in family court. Both
tion for paternity and custody brought by by the putative father in family court. Both
were brought circa 1988. The cases were closed years before Johnson ever met the
were brought circa 1988. The cases were closed years before Johnson ever met the
client (the father), and Johnson had never been the juvenile court.
client(the father), and Johnson had never been to to the juvenile court.

        The OBC alleged and the BBO found that publishing online her client's
        The OBC alleged and the BBO found that byby publishing online her client’s
Complaint for Modification Probate & & Family Court, Johnson published im-
Complaintfor Modification in in Probate Family Court, Johnson had had published im-
pounded material. Johnson disagreed and filed a Motion for BBO to Report Issue
pounded material. Johnson disagreed and fled a Motion for BBO to Report Issue of of
WhetherM.G.L. c. 209C, &13, As Amended, Effective March 31, 1998, Has Retroac-
Whether M.G.L. c. 209C, §13, As Amended, Effective March 31, 1998, Has Retroac-
tive or Prospective Effect. When the motion was denied the grounds that Johnson
tive or Prospective Effect. When the motion was denied on on the grounds that Johnson
had used true names in it, Johnson attempted to to get review thethe issuethe the appel-
had used true names in it, Johnson attempted get review of of issue in in appel-
late courts. That effort, too, was unsuccessful, i.e., the court evaded reviewing the is- is-
late courts. That effort, too, was unsuccessful, i.e., the court evaded reviewing the
sue.
sue.

         In Count the OBC accused Johnson of of commingling a client’s funds
         In Count II,II, the OBC accused Johnson commingling a client's funds with with
her own personal funds, but the OBC never identified the amount of the funds
her own personal funds, but the OBC never identifed the amount of the funds alleg-alleg-
edly commingled. Contending that she had already earned the money before deposit-
edly commingled. Contending that she had already earned the money before deposit-
ing it into her account, Johnson denied that she commingled funds.
ing it into her account, Johnson denied that she commingled funds.

        After the trial with witnesses and no parties present,\1/ the the hearing
        After the trial with nono witnesses and no parties present,\1/ BBOBBO hearing
officer nevertheless found that Johnson had committed fraud, no deceit, no no mis-
officer nevertheless found that Johnson had committed nono fraud, no deceit, mis-
representation to anyone or to any court, and that she owed money to to anyone.
representation to anyone or to any court, and that she owed no no money anyone.



1
      caption read, Daniel P. Crane, Bar Counsel v. Barbara C. Johnson.
i The caption read, Daniel P. Crane, Bar Counsel v. Barbara C. Johnson.

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       Despite the BBO finding, the SJC found that Johnson violated Mass. R. Prof.C
       Despite the BBO finding, the SJC found that Johnson violated Mass. R. Prof.C
1.15 (a)-(c) and 8.4(c) [APP-3-4, 21 and APP-37]. mention is made, however, in
1.15(a)-(c) and 8.4(c) [APP-3-4,21 and APP-37 . NoNo mention is made, however, in
words of fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or misrepresentation [APP-1et segl,
words of fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or misrepresentation  [APP-1 et seq],

         As in Count I, the OBC charged Johnson Count II II with publishing “personal
         As in Count I, the OBC charged Johnson inin Countwith publishing "personal
and confidential” information. Again denying charge, Johnson produced to the
and confidential" information. Again denying thethe charge, Johnson produced to the
OBC prosecutor a copy of the email which Johnson received from the Complainant.
OBC prosecutor a copy of the email which Johnson received from the Complainant.
In the email, the Complainant wrote that was looking forward to seeing her her
In the email, the Complainant wrote that sheshe was looking forward to seeing fam- fam-
ily's story on Johnson’s educational website. Johnson construed email as as permis-
ily’s story on Johnson's educational website. Johnson construed thethe email permis-
sion, the OBC and the BBO did not. [See Mass.R.Prof.C.1.9(c).]
sion, the OBC and the BBO did not. [See Mass.R.Prof.C.1.9(c).]

        Count III arose from a “whistleblower” case brought female geologist in
        CountIII arose from a "whistleblower" case brought by aby a female geologist in
the early ‘90s. In that case, Johnson was gathering evidence of fraud by defen-
the early `90s. In that case, Johnson was gathering evidence of fraud by the the defen-
dant company of the state and federal governments. Petitioner’s opponent during
dant company of the state and federal governments. Petitioner's opponent during
"the time of trouble”—–between 1995 and               was Tyco, headed by Dennis
“the time of trouble" between 1995 and 19981998—–was Tyco, headed by Dennis
Kozlowski. Former Tyco CEO Kozlowski has since been found guilty of charges
Kozlowski.Former Tyco CEO Kozlowski has since been found guilty of 30 30 charges
and sentenced to a term of years in federal prison. (Defense counsel the case did
and sentenced to a term of years in federal prison. (Defense counsel in in the case did
not disclose the purchase by Tyco of the original defendant company.)
not disclose the purchase by Tyco of the original defendant company.)

      On 22 March 1995, Johnson was found in contempt a non-existent order.
      On 22 March 1995, Johnson was found in contempt ofof a non-existent order.

       She appealed and despite her considerable documentary evidence—–docket
       She appealed and despite her considerable documentary evidence docket
sheets, a memo from the courtroom clerk, tapes and transcripts of hearings, or-
sheets, a memo from the courtroom clerk, tapes and transcripts of thethe hearings, or-
ders from the court—–to prove her contention that was no such such the Ap-
ders from the court to prove her contention that there there was noorder, order, the Ap-
peals Court in the summer ofof 1998 affirmed the decision contempt.
peals Court in the summer 1998 affirmed the decision of of contempt.

       On 17 December 1998, Johnson was jailed by the same court that had held her
       On 17 December 1998, Johnson was jailed by the same court that had held her
in contempt of the 1995 non-existent order.
in contempt of the 1995 non-existent order.

       Prior to the Petition for Discipline issuing, OBC prosecutor sent Johnson a
       Prior to the Petition for Discipline issuing, the the OBC prosecutor sent Johnson a
copy of the alleged order in order to convince Johnson that the order existed. Sur-Sur-
copy of the alleged order in order to convince Johnson that the order existed.
prised by the document, for safekeeping she scanned in to her computer. The
prised by the document, for safekeeping she scanned it it in to her computer. The
scanned copy revealed the document to be a different order materially altered
scanned copy revealed the document to be a different order materially altered to to
make it appear to be the non-existent order.
make it appear to be the non-existent order.

       In the disciplinary petition of January 2003, OBC prosecutor revised the
       In the disciplinary petition of January 2003, the the OBC prosecutor revised the
truthof the event ofof 17 December 1998 by averring that Johnson was jailed to force
truth of the event 17 December 1998 by averring that Johnson was jailed to force
payment of funds allegedly ordered inin 1995 by the non-existent order, and charged
payment of funds allegedly ordered 1995 by the non-existent order, and charged
Johnson with aaviolation ofof professional conduct. grounds were based on Johnson
Johnson with violation professional conduct. He He grounds were based on Johnson
having been found in contempt 1995.
having been found in contempt inin 1995.

       When Johnson wrote her Answer toto the Petition, she included a copy thethe
       When Johnson wrote her Answer the Petition, she included a copy of of
fabricateddocument with full explanation, and uploaded it toit to website, where it
fabricated document with full explanation, and uploaded her her website, where it
remains today. She included a a copy of the fabricated document legal briefs filedfiled at
remains today. She included copy of the fabricated document in in legal briefs at


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the BBO. See drano90-part-iii-answer-bbo-count-three-lily.htm, which file Johnson
the BBO. See drano90-part- iii- answer-bbo-count-three -lily. htm, which file Johnson
believes was included in the BBO’s appendix submitted to Massachusetts SJC.
believes was included in the BBO's appendix submitted to thethe Massachusetts SJC.
Johnson is unsure of this because she was never given copy of the 12-volume ap-
Johnson is unsure of this because she was never given a a copy of the 12-volume ap-
pendix, not even a table of contents to The SJC failed to to on on motion seeking
pendix, not even a table of contents to it.it. The SJC failed act act herher motion seeking
a copy of the volumes, or in the alternative, a table contents.
a copy of the volumes, or in the alternative, a table of of contents.




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                                          APPENDIX
                                          APPENDIX G G

                             THE SJC DECISION WITH
                             THESJC DECISION WITH
                     PETITIONER’S COMMENTS INTERLEAVED
                     PETITIONER'S COMMENTS INTERLEAVED



                                              NOTES
                                              NOTES

 Please read Petitioner’s Summaries of Counts II, and III III at pages-12-15 of Ad-
 Please read Petitioner's Summaries of Counts I, I, II, and at pages-12-15 of this this Ad-
                                       dendum.
                                       dendum.

  The SJC decision appears in 9.5-point Verdana, the typeface and size in which it ap-
  The SJC decision appears in 9.5-point Verdana,the typeface and size in which it ap-
                                 peared on the Internet.
                                 peared on the Internet.
 Petitioner’s interleaved comments appear in 12-point, boldfaced Century Schoolbook.
?Petitioner's interleaved comments appear in 12-point, boldfaced Century Schoolbook.

 The references to Petitioner’s website files link some files that are in the the Board
 The references to Petitioner's website files link to to some files that are in Board of of
 Bar Overseers’ Appendix, which has not been made available Petitioner, making it
 Bar Overseers' Appendix, which has not been made available to to Petitioner, making it
                 impossible for Petitioner provide a a page number.
                 impossible for Petitioner toto provide page number.

   Some references to Petitioner's website files link some files that might not be be
   Some references to Petitioner’swebsite files link to to some files that might notin in
                                  the BBO’s Appendix,
                                  the BBO's Appendix,

 The reference to Drano Series #106 is to aawebsite file that gathers all allPetitioner's
 The reference to Drano Series #106 is to website file that gathers of of Petitioner’s
 motions and opposition that she filed the BBO. All All those pleadings ought in
 motions and opposition that she filed atat the BBO. those pleadings ought to beto be in
 the BBO's Appendix, but because she was also not supplied with a Table of Contents
 the BBO’s Appendix, but because she was also not supplied with a Table of Contents
   to the 12-volume Appendix, she cannot say with certainty that they are in the
   to the 12-volume Appendix, she cannot say with certainty that they are in the Ap- Ap-
                                          pendix.
                                          pendix.

                               In The Matter of Ba rbara C. JOHNSON.
                               In The Matter of Ba rbara C. JOHNSON.

                                                 SJC-09866.
                                      SJC-09820, SJC-09866.

                               November 6, 2007. - December 5, 2007.
                               November 6, 2007. - December 5, 2007.

Attorney at Law, Disbarment. Contempt.
Attorney at Law, Disbarment. Contempt.

                                                                              May 16, 2006.
 INFORMATION filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on May 16, 2006.
 INFORMATION filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk

                                                                                on September 27,
 The case was heard by Francis X. Spina, J., and a petition for contempt, filed on September 27,
     case was heard by Francis X. Spina, J., and a petition for contempt,
 2006, was also heard by him.
 2006,          heard by

                         se.
 Barbara C. Johnson, pro se.

                            Assistant Bar Counsel.
 Susan A. Strauss Weisberg, Assistant Bar Counsel.

                          Greaney, Ireland, Cowin, Cordy, & Botsford, JJ.
 Present: Marshall, C.J., Greaney, Ireland, Cowin, Cordy, & Botsford, JJ.
 Present: Marshall,

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RESCRIPT.
RESCRIPT.

BY THE COURT. Barbara C. Johnson (respondent) appeals from judgments of a single justice of
BY THE COURT. Barbara C. Johnson (respondent) appeals from judgments of a single justice
this court disbarring her from the practice of law and finding her in contempt of the judgment of
                          from              of law and finding her in contempt of the judgment
disbarment. We affirm        judgments.
disbarment. We affirm both judgments.

                                                                                   discipline,
1. Disbarment. a. Background. Following a hearing on a three-count petition for discipline, a spe-
 1. Disbarment.                   Following a hearing on a three-count petition
                                           and              of law culminating a recommendation
cial hearing officer made findings of fact and conclusions of law culminating in a recommendation
cial hearing
that the respondent be disbarred. The Board of Bar Overseers (board) adopted
that the respondent be disbarred. The Board of Bar Overseers (board) adopted those findings andand
                                                     court recommending disbarment. The
conclusions, and filed an information in the county court recommending disbarment. The single
conclusions, and filed an information in
        adopted       findings and conclusions as adopted by the board and entered a judgment
justice adopted the findings and conclusions as adopted by the board and entered a judgment or-
dering that the respondent be disbarred. The findings and conclusions
dering that the respondent be disbarred. The findings and conclusions as adopted by the board are
                                                                             adopted by the
                 follows.
summarized as follows.

i. Count one. The respondent owns and maintains a Web site on which she posts information
i Count one. The respondent owns and maintains a Web site on which she posts information
                                                  the respondent
about allegations of child sexual abuse. In 2001, the respondent represented a father in a pater-
about allegations of child sexual abuse. In                                   a father in pater-
nity and         action in the Probate and Family Court who had been accused      sexually abusing
nity and custody action in the Probate and Family Court who had been accused of sexually abusing
                                                                                            Juve-
his minor son. The son had also been the subject of a care and protection proceeding in the Juve-
his minor           son had also been the subject of a care and protection            in
     Court.
nile Court.

       I met the client in 2000. He had been accused of sexual 1987.
       I met the client in 2000. He had been accused of sexual abuse in abuse in 1987.
       The care and protection [“C&P”] in 1987 or 1988 and had
       The care and protection ["C&P"] beganbegan in 1987 or 1988 and had
       reached final judgment soon thereafter ... no later no early'90s. In
       reached final judgment soon thereafter . . . thanlater than early '90s. In
       1988, the client had brought a paternity and suit (M.G.L. c.
       1988, the client had brought a paternity and custodycustody suit (M.G.L. c.
       209C, for out-of-wedlock situations) in County County Fam-
       209C, for out-of-wedlock situations) in Bristol BristolProbate &Probate & Fam-
       ily Court [“P&F”]. The P&F case had also closed years client
       ilyCourt ["P&F"]. The P&F case had also closed years ago. The ago. The client
       had had SIX lawyers, none of whom was able to get himget him or
       had had SIX lawyers, none of whom was able to custody custody or
       visitation with the the or even even an evidentiary
       visitation with childchild oran evidentiary hearing. hearing.

The respondent posted on her Web site information that had been impounded in the care and pro-
      respondent posted on her Web site information that             impounded in the
                 e.g., information identifying the son as having been allegedly sexually abused
tection action, e.g., information identifying the son as having been allegedly sexually abused by
tection
                        the son's full name and photographs of him. The respondent also
his father, including the son's full name and photographs of him. The respondent also posted the
his father,
             of the son's mother and a half-brother (the                                      with a
full names of the son's mother and a half-brother (the product of the mother's partnership with a
full
                                                                             divorce action;
man whom she married and later divorced); pleadings from the mother's divorce action;
man whom she married and later divorced);                  from

       I posted my client’s Complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court in Bos-
       I posted my client's Complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court in Bos-
       ton. AA public record. I absolutely NO impounded files. No file
       ton. public record. I absolutely posted posted NO impounded files. No file
       was ever identified by the OBC, the Judge Spina, Spina, or
       was ever identified by the OBC, the BBO, BBO, Judgeor the SJC the SJC
       panel as being impounded.
       panelas being impounded.

       I had used pseudonyms of children's' names but had missed a few
       I had used pseudonyms of two two children‘s' names but had missed a few
       appearances of the true names that that were in .jpg files. the
       appearances of the true names were in.jpg files. I changed I changed the
       ones found. The search tools do not work on .jpg fles. Those I saw, I
       ones IIfound. The search tools do not work on.jpg fes. Those I saw, I
       cut out the jpg files. There are two or two in the website files.
       cutout ofof the .jpg files. There are so stillor so still in the website files.
       The photos my client's child were taken taken when he was
       The photos ofof my client’s child were when he was an infant, an infant,
       when he was his first birthday party, party, and was riding a
       whenhe was atat his first birthday and when hewhen he was riding a
       plastic choo-choo train (a la(á la Fisher Price). We wereshow to show
       plastic choo-choo train Fisher Price). We were trying to trying


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       the father and son together. This was not an father. By the
       thefather and son together. This was not an abusive abusive father. By the
       time uploaded the photo files files website, the boy the boy was
       timeI I uploaded the photoon my on my website,was around 15 around 15
       or 16. No one would have recognized him from pictures. pictures. Al-
       or 16. No one would have recognized him from his babyhis baby Al-
       though the child's birthname appears in the in the affidavit in her
       though the child’s birthname appearsmother'smother’s affidavit in her
       divorce action, she registered the child child in school stepfa-
       divorce action, she registered thein school under hisunder his stepfa-
       ther's surname.
       ther's surname.

                                                            as perjurer who had conceived
and comments by the respondent characterizing the mother as a perjurer who had conceived both
and comments by the              characterizing the
             of wedlock and who had falsely accused      fathers of sexual abuse.
children out of wedlock and who had falsely accused both fathers of sexual abuse.
children

       This is true and facts of my comments are true. The documents I
       Thisis true and thethe facts of my comments are true. The documents I
       posted prove that mother had had lied. Of it is true it is true that the
       postedprove that thethe motherlied. Of course, course, that the
       mother had never been prosecuted for perjury. It would
       mother had never been prosecuted for perjury. It would have been have been
       rare had she been. Mendacity is a human quality or state
       rarehad she been. Mendacity is a human quality or state witnessed witnessed
       daily in every family court across this nation.
       daily in every family court across this nation.

       Proof of Mother's mendacity is in is in ¶6 of her in her divorce ac-
       Proof of Mother’s mendacity ¶6 of her AffidavitAffidavit in her divorce ac-
       tion: i.e., inin http://www.falseallegations.com/drano23-af-rgs.htm. In
       tion: i.e., http://www.falsealleLations.com/drano23-af-rLs.htm. In
       it, mother affianced the subject child was from a previous previous mar-
       it,mother affianced that that the subject child was from amar-
       riage. That was untrue. He was conceived and of wedlock,
       riage.That was untrue. He was conceived and born out born out of wedlock,
       butapparently sheshe had told her husband the truththe truth of the child’s
       but apparently had not not told her husband of the child's
       origins.
       origins.

       The mother also accused husband of child child sexual abuse.
       The mother also accused the the husband ofsexual abuse. DSS did DSS did
       not substantiate accusation. I identified, by name, the social
       notsubstantiate thethe accusation. I identified, by name, the social
       worker who cleared the the husband. her continuing mendacity,
       worker who cleared husband. DespiteDespite her continuing mendacity,
       the mother received child support from the men the men
       themother received child support from each of each of whom shewhom she
       had accused a a heinous crime . . and each of was caused
       hadaccused ofof heinous crime ... and. each of the menthe men was caused
       considerable anxiety and attorneys' fees, facts which no court no court consid-
       considerable anxiety and attorneys’ fees, facts which consid-
       ered in its computations of support for the for the woman
       eredin its computations of child child supportwoman who lied. who lied.
                                             counsel requesting that
The mother and son filed complaints with bar counsel requesting that the respondent remove the
              her Web site.
material from her Web site.

       The son did not a complaint with bar counsel. A lawyer A lawyer
       The son did not filefile a complaint with bar counsel. claiming claiming
       to be his counsel filed one. The problem: the lawyer had beenhad been ap-
       to be his counsel filed one. The problem: the lawyer ap-
       pointed his lawyer circa 1990, had had not been re-appointed, and
       pointed his lawyer circa 1990,not been re-appointed, and had not had not
       re-interviewed the then-young man.
       re-interviewed the then-young man.

       I served subpoenas the mother, the son, and the lawyer, lawyer,
       I served subpoenas on on the mother, the son, and the but the but the
       BBO quashed my trial subpoenas . . everyone else I caused I
       BBOquashed my trial subpoenas ... and .onand on everyone else to caused to
       be served. My application, pursuant Rule 4.11 and dated 11
       be served. My application, pursuant to BBOto BBO Rule 4.11 and dated 11
       June 2003, for authorization to take depositions of witnesses
       June2003, for authorization to take depositions of potential potential witnesses
       was denied.
       was denied.


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       The OBC prosecutor not not call any potential or percipient
       The OBC prosecutor did did call any potential or percipient witnesses witnesses
       to testify at at trial.
       to testify trial.

              a judge in the Juvenile                               to return any
In addition, a judge in the Juvenile Court ordered the respondent to return any impounded mate-
In                                                  the
            court and                       to that material from her Web site.
rial to the court and remove all references to that material from her Web site.
rial

       Never having been in or gotten any documents from that Court, I did
       Neverhaving been in or gotten any documents from that Court, I did
       not have any impounded material from the Court to return.
       nothave any impounded material from the JuvenileJuvenile Court to return.
       If referred to document in Juvenile Court, the OBC the OBC
       IfIIreferred to anyany document in Juvenile Court, prosecutor prosecutor
       (an assistant bar counsel) did not identify it. The accusation has al-
       (an assistant bar counsel) did not identify it. The accusation has al-
       ways struck me bizarre in that that the Juvenile Court docket was se-
       waysstruck me as as bizarre inthe Juvenile Court docket was se-
       cret and I had no no knowledge of what had been filed there. My client
       cret and I had knowledge of what had been filed there. My client
       was never allowed to take the stand in his defense never al-
       was never allowed to take the stand in his defense and wasand was never al-
       lowed to examine anyone. In fact, in or 13 years after the after
       lowedto examine anyone. In fact, in the 12 the 12 or 13 years C&P the C&P
       case was brought, there never any any evidentiary hearing
       case was brought, there waswas neverevidentiary hearing of any sizeof any size
       or sort or any time.
       or sort or at at any time.

       My information regarding the case came from my client
       My information regarding the case came from my client with a few with a few
       exceptions, e.g., a a report from a Juvenile-Court-appointed
       exceptions, e.g., report from a Juvenile-Court-appointed investiga- investiga-
       tor and some reports from some social workers, who been
       torand some reports from some social workers, who had NOThad NOT been
       appointed by either the the juvenile or the family court in the
       appointed by either juvenile or the family court in the two subject two subject
       cases. The investigator's report from one of one of the client's former
       cases. The investigator's report came came fromthe client's former
       attorneys OR my client. I have no memory from whom I got it ap-
       attorneys OR my client. I have no memory from whom I got it ap-
       proximately eight years ago.
       proximately eight years ago.

                                 orders.
The respondent ignored the court orders.
    respondent ignored the

       To this day, I am aware of one one from the juvenile juvenile court.
       To this day, I am aware of only onlyorder order from the court.

       Upon receiving order, I wrote a letter letter to the juvenile
       Uponreceiving thethe order, I wrote ato the juvenile court judgecourt judge
       who issued the order on 29 2001. I iterated essentially
       whoissued the order on 29 MayMay 2001. I iterated essentially

              that document\2/ which was was served upon me
          (1) that aa document\2/ which served upon me

              (a)
              (a)            had no summons,
                             hadno summons,

              (b)
              (b)            was not Complaint,
                             was not aa Complaint,




    On 7 May 2001, was served with a pleading entitled "Verified Complaint for Equity Re-
2 On 7 May 2001, I I was served with a pleading entitled“Verified Complaint for Equity Re-
2

lief." The so-called Complaint was not in recognizable form and neither myself nor my cli-
lief.” The so-called Complaint was not in recognizable form and neither myself nor my cli-
ent was named as a defendant.
ent was named as a defendant.

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      (c)
      (c)    did not comport with any known set of civil pro-
             didnot comport with any known set of rulesof rules of civil pro-
             cedure, and most certainly not not with the Massachusetts
             cedure, and most certainlywith the Massachusetts
             Rules of Civil Procedure,
             Rulesof Civil Procedure,

      (d)
      (d)           did not contain a short and statement of the
                    didnot contain a short and plain plain statement of the
             claim showing that the the pleader is entitled
             claim showing that pleader is entitled to relief, to relief,

      (e)
      (e)           was not simple, concise direct,
                    was not simple, concise andand direct,

      (f)
      (f)           did not inform of of what the plaintiff's claim is and
                    didnot inform me mewhat the plaintiffs claim is and
             the grounds upon which it rests,rests,
             the grounds upon which it

      (g)
      (g)          did not set out the facts in separately numbered
                   didnot set out the facts in separately numbered
             paragraphs,
             paragraphs,

      (h)
      (h)           did not have numbered paragraphs, making
                    didnot have numbered paragraphs, making it im- it im-
             possible for me to answer the the complaint in accordance
             possible for me to answer complaint in accordance
             with the rules,
             with the rules,

      (i)
      (i)            did not set out facts clearly, unequivocally and
                     didnot set out thethe facts clearly, unequivocally and
             directly so as to enable me me to respond directly and
             directly so as to enable to respond directly and intelli- intelli-
             gently,
             gently,

      (j)
      (j)           was verbose, argumentative, redundant, and
                    was verbose, argumentative, redundant, and con- con-
             tained material thatthat is both impertinent and scandalous,
             tained material is both impertinent and scandalous,

      (k)
      (k)            did not have separate counts founded on separate
                    didnot have separate counts founded on separate
             transactions or occurrences. I have have here the in-
             transactions or occurrences. Ihere omitted omitted the in-
             ternal cites,
             ternal cites,

   (2) that I had juvenile court documents to return, return, and
   (2) that I had nono juvenile court documents toand

   (3) that wrote in in of the the of 29 May 2001 to the judge, "I
   (3) that I I wrote ¶17¶17 ofletter letter of 29 May 2001 to the judge, “I
       would suggest, with all all respect for the court, that the that
       would suggest, withdue due respect for the court,court the court
           to my site and see if there is anything there which
       go to my site and see if there is anything there which the court the court
       believes it it has right to order removed, or references to docu- to docu-
       believes has a a right to order removed, or references
       ments which it believes it has the authority to impound.”
       mentswhich it believes it has the authority to impound."

I never received any further communication from court or
I neverreceived any further communication from either the either the court or
the judge personally.
thejudge personally.

Of greater significance is that that court and/or not issue
Of greater significance is that that court and/or judge did judge did not issue
any contempt complaint or a summary of contempt. Why?
anycontempt complaint or a summary holdingholding of contempt. Why?
Because the court could not identify any impounded documents on
Becausethe court could not identify any impounded documents on


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       my website.
       my website.

       Absent any basis the juvenile-court order, became became clear that I
       Absent any basis forfor the juvenile-courtitorder, it clear that I
       was being retaliated against for filing
       was being retaliated against for filing both both

              •   on or around September 2000 in the United States States
                  on or around 2525 September 2000 in the United District District
                  Court in Boston a a §1983 action [Docket No. 00-CV-11048-REK],
                  Court in Boston§1983 action [Docket No. 00-CV-11048-REK],
                  which arose out of of egregious rulings in the in the original Care
                  which arose out the the egregious rulingsoriginal Care
                  and Protection action in that juvenile court. See
                  andProtection action filed filed in that juvenile court. See
                  http://www.falseallegations.com-/drano5-complaint-linn.htm
                  http://www.falseallegations.com-/drano5-complaint-linn.htm
                  and
                  and

              • on or around 9 May 2001 in Bristol CountyCounty Probate & Family
              .? on or around 9 May 2001 in Bristol Probate & Family
                 Court first a a Complaint and then an Amended Complaint for
                 Court firstComplaint and then an Amended Complaint for
                 Modifcation [Paper 55, 55, Docket No. 88W0113-P1].
                 Modification [PaperDocket No. 88W0113-P1].

       Believing that the public should be educated as to court’s retaliation
       Believing that the public should be educated as to court's retaliation
       against me for properly representing my client, I uploaded the letter
       against me for properly representing my client, I uploaded the letter
       to the juvenile-court judge who the order. Although had a
       to the juvenile-court judge who issuedissued the order. itAlthough it had a
       docket number [Docket No. No. EQ01N001], the clerk would not
       docket number [Docket EQ01N001], the clerk would not release release
       any documents me. See http://www.falsealleLvations.com/drano37-
       anydocuments to to me. See http://www.falseallegations.com/drano37-
       impound-ment-lawton.htm.
       imp o and-me nt-l a wto n. htm.

A subsequent order by a judge in the Probate and Family Court declared that the materials filed in
A subsequent order by a judge in             and Family Court declared that the materials
that action were also
that action were also impounded.

       The P&F order was, in simply a judgment allowing the OBC's mo-
       The P&F order was, in fact,fact, simply a judgment allowing the OBC’s mo-
       tion for documents filed in the custody and paternity case, which had
       tion for documents fled in the custody and paternity case, which had
       long since been closed. judgment did not order me to do me
       longsince been closed. The The judgment did not order any-to do any-
       thing. did not not havedocuments sought;sought; the P&F court had them.
       thing. I I did have the the documents the P&F court had them.
       I did not ask them; the the assistant bar counsel did.
       I did not ask forfor them; OBCOBC assistant bar counsel did.

            the criticism of by by the OBC, the BBO, and the SJC single justice
       So the criticism of me methe OBC, the BBO, and the SJC single justice
       forfailing to appeal the P&F P&F order was criticismunjust was unjust ab
       for failing to appeal the order was criticism that was that ab
       initio.
       initio.

       I had not even met client until until 2000; I 2000; I had an
       I had not even met thethe client aroundaroundhad never flednever filed an
       appearance in the custody and and paternity case closed; it closed; and at
       appearance in the custody paternity case before it before and at
       the time the OBC assistant bar counsel filed the had not
       the time the OBC assistant bar counsel filed the motion, Imotion, I had not
       been served with a Petition for Discipline. I had, however,
       been served with a Petition for Discipline. I had, however, unsuc-      unsuc-
       cessfully tried twice to open the action with a with a Complaint and then an
       cessfully tried twice to open the actionComplaint and then an
       Amended Complaint for Modification.
       Amended Complaint for Modifcation.



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As noted, the P&F court judge allowed the OBC counsel’s motion and
As noted, the P&F court judge allowed the OBC counsel's motion and
gave her the documents sought. I have have what the documents
gave her the documents sheshe sought. Ino clueno clue what the documents
were, never saw them, and I was was given given even a list
were,I I never saw them, and I nevernever even a list of them. of them.

The documents the OBC counsel received were allegedly
The documents the OBC counsel received were allegedly put in theput in the
OBC/BBO's Appendix accompanying their their "Information" (the
OBC/BBO's Appendix accompanying"Information" (the document document
in which they seek disbarment) filed in the single-justice session of the
in which they seek disbarment) filed in the single-justice session of the
SJC, but I I was never given a copy of 12-volume Appendix.
SJC, but was never given a copy of their their 12-volume Appendix.

The decision says that I received all papers. That is another untrue
The decision says that I received all papers. That is another untrue
statement. I I never given a copy of the 12-volume Appendix Appendix of
statement. waswas never given a copy of the 12-volume of
even a Table Contents of of the Appendix. motion a get them,
evena Table ofof Contentsthe Appendix. I filed a I filed to motion to get them,
butthe SJC never acted on it. During oral argument on 6 November November
but the SJC never acted on it. During oral argument on 6
2007, I requested the Court to act The Court did not do so.
2007, I requested the Court to act on it. on it. The Court did not do so. (A
                                                                           (A
webcast of my oral argument against disbarment and my and my re-
webcast of my oral argument against disbarmentstatementstatement re-
garding the unacted-upon motion is archived at
garding the unacted-upon motion is archived at
http://www.suffolk.edu/sjc/archive/2007/SJC_09820.html. It is 14 min-
http://www.suffolk.edu/sic/archive/2007/SJC 09820.html. It is 14 min-
utes in length. oral oral argument appealing the judgment
utesin length. TheThe argument appealing the judgment of contempt of contempt
is archived http://www.suffolk.edu/sic/archive-/2007/SJC 09866.html.
is archived at at http://www.suffolk.edu/sjc/archive-/2007/SJC_09866.html.
It is 11 minutes in length.)
Itis 11 minutes in length.)

THE BACKGROUND OF THE P&F DOCUMENT STORY
THEBACKGROUND OF THE P&F DOCUMENT STORY
On or around 9 May 2000, I my client's Amended Complaint for
On or around 9 May 2000, I filedfiled my client’s Amended Complaint for
Modification in in P&F court. be seen at
ModificationP&F court. It may It may be seen at
http://www.falseallegations.com/drano22-js-rgs.htm.
http://www.falsealleLvations.com/drano22-is-rLys.htm.

Two years prior to filing the Complaint Rule 15(a) Amended
Twoyears prior to filing the Complaint and the and the Rule 15(a) Amended
Complaint, §13 of of M.G.L. c. 209C out-of wedlock chapter) had
Complaint, §13 M.G.L. c. 209C (the (the out-of wedlock chapter) had
been amended. The amendment became effective at the end
beenamended. The amendment became effective at the end of March of March
1998, prior my meeting the the client.
1998, prior toto my meeting client.

Under the pre-amended section, all documents in an out-of-wedlock
Under the pre-amended section, all documents in an out-of-wedlock
action were impounded and could be made made public only after
action were impounded and could be public only after a show- a show-
ing of good cause.
ingof good cause.

Under the amended section, all filed filed documents in an out-of-wedlock
Under the amended section, all documents in an out-of-wedlock
action were open to to public and closed, i.e., impounded, only after
action were open the the public and closed, i.e., impounded, only after
a showing good cause.
a showing ofof good cause.

Under Massachusetts law, to get get a modification of a court order,
Under Massachusetts law, toa modification of a court order,
counsel must show four things (1) the order order which wants
counsel must show four things (1) the which the clientthe client wants
modifed, (2) the circumstances that brought that order about, (3) about, (3) the
modified, (2) the circumstances that brought that orderthe
substantial change in in circumstances "today," the (4) the new
substantial changecircumstances "today," and (4) andproposedproposed new

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       order. Without showing items 1 and 2, the 2, the client will not get
       order. Without showing items 1 andclient will not get a modifi- a modifi-
       cation, because unless the client or counsel educates the court as court as to
       cation, because unless the client or counsel educates the to
       what elements 1 and 2 were in yesteryear, the client or counsel cannot
       whatelements 1 and 2 were in yesteryear, the client or counsel cannot
       show how the change in circumstances is substantial.
       showhow the change in circumstances is substantial.

       The BBO and the court found that my using the early information
       The BBO and the court found that my using the early information
       from the P&F court for items 2 in my in my Complaint of
       fromthe P&F court for items 1 and 1 and 2 Complaint was a usewas a use of
       impounded material, a use that that was forbidden. Clearly, the
       impounded material, a use was forbidden. Clearly, the BBO and BBO and
       OBC ignored the amendment of
       OBC ignored the amendment of §13. §13.

       In fact, I never uploaded to my website “pre-amendment”
       Infact, I never uploaded to my website "pre-amendment" materials materials
       from the 209C (out-of-wedlock) I simply referred in my client's
       fromthe 209C (out-of-wedlock) case.case. I simply referred in my client’s
       Amended Complaint for Modification to of date of the court
       Amended Complaint for Modification to the datethethe court order we order we
       sought to modify. The Amended Complaint for Modification was a
       sought to modify. The Amended Complaint for Modification was a
       PUBLIC record, having been filed filed two years after §13
       PUBLIC record, having been two years after §13 had beenhad been
       amended.
       amended.

       The BBO and the SJC (both the single and the full the ses-
       The BBO and the SJC (both the single justicejustice andpanelfull panel ses-
       sions) ignored my argument re §13, although it was of issue of first
       sions)ignored my argument re §13, although it was an issuean first
       impression. Thus the the alleged impounded documents formed
       impression. Thus alleged use ofuse of impounded documents formed
       one of the reasons forfor my disbarment.
       one of the reasons my disbarment.

The board adopted the hearing officer's conclusions that by engaging in the foregoing activities,
     board adopted the hearing officer's conclusions that by engaging in the foregoing
               violated Mass.             3.4(c), 426 Mass. 1389 (1998); Mass.
the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(c), 426 Mass. 1389 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 4.4,
the                                                                                         4.4,
426 Mass. 1405 (1998); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(d) and (h), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998).
426 Mass. 1405 (1998); and Mass.       Prof. C. 8.4(d)     (h), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998).

       I addressed each the professional-conduct rules by moving moving to dis-
       I addressed each of of the professional-conduct rules byto dis-
       misseach one ofof them. I alsoa MotionMotion for More Definite State-
       miss each one them. I also filed filed a for More Definite State-
       ment:
       ment:
                      moves for more definite statement of Counts I and II of Petition
               . . .. moves for more definite statement of Counts I and II of thethe Petition
               for Discipline, that is, (a) to to identify with specificity those webpages,
               for Discipline, that is, (a) identify with specificity those webpages,
               statements, and phrases which Bar Counsel claiming are sufficient to
               statements, and phrases which Bar Counsel is is claiming are sufficient to
               constitute a violation the Professional Rules of Conduct and (b) to
               constitutea violation ofof the Professional Rules of Conduct and (b) to
               identifyeach person who Bar Counsel claims has been harmed byby those
               identify each person who Bar Counsel claims has been harmed those
               webpages, statements, and phrases.
               webpages, statements, and phrases.
               "These are adversary proceedings of a quasicriminal nature.” In re Ruf-
               “These are adversary proceedings of a quasicriminal nature." In re Ruf-
               falo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968) (disbarment of petitioner reversed). "The
               falo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968) (disbarment of petitioner reversed). “The
               charge must be known before the proceedings commence. They become
               charge must be known before the proceedings commence. They become
               a trap... ." Id. “The absence fair notice as to to reach of of griev-
               a trap. . . .” Id. "The absence of of fair notice as thethe reachthethe griev-
               ance procedure and the precise nature of the charges deprived petitioner
               ance procedure and the precise nature of the charges deprived petitioner
               of procedural due process." Id. atat 552.
               of procedural due process.” Id. 552.



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       I filed my Second Motion for Definite Statement or in the Alter-
       I filed my Second Motion for More More Definite Statement or in the Alter-
       native Dismiss the Petition for Discipline.
       native Dismiss the Petition for Discipline.

       I filed motions to dismiss and and charge of alleged alleged
       I filed motions to dismiss eacheachevery every charge ofviolation violation
       on the grounds that OBC failed to state the elements of the claims
       on the grounds that the the OBC failed to state the elements of the claims
       .
       All my motions were summarily denied hearing.
       All my motions were summarily denied without without hearing.

       All the motions I at the BBO BBO are in Drano Series #106:
       All the motions I fledfiled at theare in Drano Series #106:
       http://www.falseallegations.com/drano106-motions-filed-at-bbo-
       http://www.falsealleLations.com/drano 106-motions-fled-at-bbo-
       n0603.htm.
       n0603.htm.

       I detailed the procedure by which the BBO broke its (cre-
       I detailed the procedure by which the BBO broke its own rules own rules (cre-
       ated by SJC committee), in http://www.falseallegations.com/-drano102-
       atedby SJC committee), in http://www.falsealleaations.com/-dranol02-
       bbo-star-chamber-92503-forum.htm, an article in which I which law-
       bbo-star-chamber-92503-forum.htm, an article incontend I contend law-
       yers are entitled to full full sweep process rights.
       yersare entitled to the thesweep of dueof due process rights.
ii Count two. In 1999, the parents of a mentally retarded adult daughter paid the respondent a
ii. Count two. In 1999, the parents of a mentally retarded adult daughter paid the respondent a
                   to represent them in connection with criminal and protective services proceed-
$10,000 retainer to represent them in connection with criminal and protective services proceed-
$10,000
                              that the father had sexually abused     daughter.
ings arising from allegations that the father had sexually abused his daughter.
ings arising from

       I was paid for consulting, not for representation. to the
       I was paid for consulting, not for representation. In additionIn addition to the
       criminal case for which they had representation. (I told them told them to keep
       criminal case for which they had representation. (I to keep
       thehusband's lawyer, since he was a retired judge's judge's son po- had po-
       the husband’s lawyer, since he was a retired son and had and
       litical and judicial clout.)\3/
       litical and judicial clout.)\3/

       The husband and wife several cases in mind: mind: one against
       The husband and wife hadhad several cases in one against the De- the De-
       partment of Mental Retardation. Their Their lawyer, wanted help
       partment of Mental Retardation.niece, a niece, a lawyer, wanted help
       on the case. I sent them a contract. They signed it, but I did not, be-
       on the case. I sent them a contract. They signed it, but I did not, be-
       cause they could not decide for which, if the cases they wanted
       cause they could not decide for which, if any, of any, of the cases they wanted
       to hire me as a consultant. because their cases were in were
       to hire me as a consultant. Also,Also, because their cases Berk- in Berk-
       shire County, which is on the other the mountains at the far
       shireCounty, which is on the other side of side of the mountains at the far
       western end of the Commonwealth, I did I did not represent them
       western end of the Commonwealth,not want to want to represent them
           legal counsel. I reside in Essex County, which Atlantic
       as legal counsel. I reside in Essex County, which hugs thehugs the Atlantic
       Coast. They were too distant.
       Coast.They were too distant.

       NOTE: supplied to to OBC assistant counsel every email and every
       NOTE:I I supplied the the OBC assistant counsel every email and every
       other piece of paper (approximately 500 pages) that went between
       other piece of paper (approximately 500 pages) that went between
       myself and the complainant wife wife and mother, her other (all
       myself and the complainant and mother, her other daughters daughters (all
       married), and sons-in-law. In the package, included the several beau-
       married), and sons-in-law. In the package, included the several beau-
       tiful letters thanks for my work. work.
       tiful letters of of thanks for my


    Proof of that clout came in January 2008, when the son was nominated for a judgeship
3 Proof of that clout came in January 2008, when the son was nominated for a judgeship
3

   the family court.
in the family court.
in

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                                                      account rather than in trust account.
The respondent deposited the retainer in her personal account rather than in a trust account.
    respondent deposited the retainer in

       I finished the work (all hours) and deposited their check. Then I
       I finished the work (all but 6but 6 hours) and deposited their check. Then I
       sent them bill. In In the envelope in which I which I put the
       sentthem a a bill. the samesame envelope in put the bill, I re- bill, I re-
       turned $3100-plus dollars to them, having discounted the bill
       turned $3100-plus dollars to them, having deeply deeply discounted the bill
       ($50/hr for over half work and and $250 for lawyerly work,
       ($50/hrfor over half the the work$250 for lawyerly work, e.g., re- e.g., re-
       search and analyzing their etc.). I fgured they were facing con-
       searchand analyzing their case,case, etc.). I figured they were facing con-
       siderable legal fees to to defend the father from two counts of
       siderable legal fees defend the father from two counts of rape and, rape and,
       if my memory is correct, two of sexual molestation (it is seven years
       if my memory is correct, two of sexual molestation (it is seven years
       ago and my memory of those two charges is dim).
       ago and my memory of those two otherother charges is dim).
The clients subsequently discharged the respondent and requested a refund of a portion of the re-
     clients subsequently discharged the respondent and requested a refund of a portion of the
tainer. The respondent refunded less than the clients had expected.
tainer. The                                the clients had expected.

       This is NOT true. I not not "discharged." My work simply
       Thisis NOT true. I waswas"discharged." My work simply was done. was done.
       They did not expect return of any money. I returned returned it
       Theydid not expect the the return of any money. I it on my own on my own
       volition because I felt sorry for them. them. It after receiving the
       volition because I felt sorry for It was onlywas only after receiving the
       returned money, the wife wrote and wanted all but 1 hour and hour and 26
       returned money, the wife wrote and wanted all but 1 26
       minutes of my fees returned. We We exchanged emails about the money
       minutes of my fees returned.exchanged emails about the money
       and my bill. She wrote four lawyers the couple knew, and complained
       andmy bill. She wrote four lawyers the couple knew, and complained
       about me, and cc'd a copy of letter to me. She did not, did not,
       aboutme, and cc'd a copy of that that letter to me. She however, however,
       send to the four lawyers any copies correspondence explaining
       send to the four lawyers any copies of my of my correspondence explaining
       my fees. AtAt an impasse, I recommended that we send all the corre-
       my fees. an impasse, I recommended that we send all the corre-
       spondence to those lawyers and let them decide the dispute. If she
       spondence to those lawyers and let them decide the dispute. If she
       did not want those lawyers to mediate, then she should consider,
       didnot want those fourfour lawyers to mediate, then she should consider,
       I suggested, seeking assistance the fee arbitration board. She
       I suggested, seeking assistance fromfrom the fee arbitration board. She
       did not pursue either avenue. Four later she complained to
       didnot pursue either avenue. Four monthsmonths later she complained to
       the Bar.
       theBar.
                                                        the respondent failed to place disputed
When the clients disputed the amount of the refund, the respondent failed to place the disputed
When the clients disputed the
         trust account. Thereafter, the clients filed a complaint with bar counsel.
sum in a trust account. Thereafter, the clients filed a complaint with bar counsel.

       There was no dispute prior to depositing the money into my
       Therewas no dispute prior to depositing the money into my account. account.
       I had earned In In the BBO BBO hearing officer, who was
       I had earned it. it. fact,fact, the hearing offcer, who was very hos- very hos-
       tile,found that I owed no one any money. In otherIn other words, the money
       tile, found that I owed no one any money. words, the money
       in my account was own earned money.
       in my account was mymy own earned money.
         the respondent
In 2002, the respondent posted on her Web site the identities of her former clients and their
In                              on her Web site the identities of her former clients and their
daughter without their permission;
daughter without their permission;

       Bar Counsel Daniel Crane gone public (newspapers) with the
       BarCounsel Daniel Crane had had gone public (newspapers) with the
       case. had a a right to defend myself publicly. Their daughter, the al-
       case. I I had right to defend myself publicly. Their daughter, the al-
       leged victim, was monosyllabic, had the mentality of a 15-month-old
       legedvictim, was monosyllabic, had the mentality of a 15-month-old
       infant, and had no "friends." She She certainly did my know
       infant, and had no "friends." certainly did not know notwebsite.my website.
       And had implicit permission to put to put their story up on the
       And I I had implicit permission their story up on the website. An website. An

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         email from Deb Sano stated they they were forward forward
         emailfrom Deb Sano stated that that were looking lookingto seeing to seeing
         their story on my "wonderful website." In actual fact, I uploaded my
         their story on my "wonderful website." In actual fact, I uploaded my
         bill and only those diverse emails relevant to the accusations by the
         bill and only those diverse emails relevant to the accusations by the
         OBC/BBO.
         OBC/BBO.

 details the sexual abuse allegations;
 details of the sexual abuse allegations;

         This is UNtrue.
         Thisis UNtrue.
                           the fee dispute.
 and information regarding the fee dispute.
 and information

        Yes, was entitled to do so under well-settled law.
        Yes, IIwas entitled to do so under well-settled law.
 The clients demanded that the respondent remove the information from her Web site. In a tele-
     clients demanded that the respondent remove the information from her Web site. In
 phone message,

         I received letter from a retired judge, William Simons (the father of
         I received a a letter from a retired judge, William Simons (the father of
         the husband's criminal lawyer), ordering me to remove files re thefiles re the
         the husband’s criminal lawyer), ordering me to remove
         Sanos/ “Parkers” from my website. that Simons Simons was
         Sanos/ "Parkers" from my website. Given Given that was retired, heretired, he
         did not have the authority to order me to do anything. Notwithstand-
         didnot have the authority to order me to do anything. Notwithstand-
         ing that fact, I a return message on his answer-machine. I never
         ingthat fact, I leftleft a return message on his answer-machine. I never
         spoke to him. never returned the phone phone instead, com-
         spoketo him. HeHe never returned the call. He,call. He, instead, com-
         plained toto the Bar.
         plained the Bar.
 the respondent said that she might remove the information but only if the clients withdrew their
 the respondent said that she might remove the information but only if the clients withdrew their
 complaint with bar counsel.
 complaint with bar counsel.

         If we were negotiate, that was was the only thing they could
         Ifwe were toto negotiate, thatthe only thing they could do. The do. The
         rules seem to demand that a lawyer not ask a complainant
         rulesseem to demand that a lawyer not ask a complainant to with- to with-
         draw the complaint.
         draw the complaint.

The board adopted the hearing officer's conclusions that by engaging in the foregoing activities, the
            adopted the                   conclusions that by engaging in the foregoing
             violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6 (a),                (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.9 (c)(1)
respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6(a), 426 Mass. 1322 (1998);Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.9(c)(1)
     (2), 426 Mass. 1342 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a)--(c),       Mass.        (1998); Mass. R.
and (2), 426 Mass. 1342 (1998);Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)--(c), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998); Mass. R.
      C. 1.16 (d),                                R. Prof. C. 8.4(c), (d), and (h), 426 Mass. 1429
Prof. C. 1.16(d), 426 Mass. 1369 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c), (d), and (h), 426 Mass. 1429
                       Mass. 1369 (1998);
(1998); and S.J.C.       4:01, § 10, as appearing in 425 Mass. 1313 (1997).
(1998); and S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 10, as appearing in 425 Mass. 1313 (1997).

        I addressed each the professional-conduct rules as explained, su-
        I addressed each of of the professional-conduct rules as explained, su-
        pra, at Addendum pages 25-26.
        pra, at Addendum pages 25-26.
                                          with representing a plaintiff
iii. Count three. In 1995, in connection with representing a plaintiff in a wrongful termination action
iii Count three.
                Court, the respondent filed motions for leave to depose
in the District Court, the respondent filed motions for leave to depose nonparty witnesses out of the
                           counsel.
presence of defendants' counsel.
presence of

         True,I I filed two motions in February 1995. They were styled after two
         True, filed two motions in February 1995. They were styled after two
         motions filed and allowed in District Court inCourt in Boston by Magis-
         motions filed and allowed in U.S. U.S. District Boston by Magis-
         trate-Judge Robert B. B. Collings.
         trate-Judge RobertCollings.



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                                     that they lacked a legal or factual basis and             in bad
The judge denied the motions, found that they lacked a legal or factual basis and were filed in bad
      judge denied the motions,
faith, and ordered that the respondent or plaintiff pay the defendants' legal fees incurred in oppos-
faith, and ordered that the respondent or plaintiff pay the defendants' legal fees incurred in oppos-
ing the motions.
     the motions.

        This is not true. judge, Paul Paul McGill, simply denied
        Thisis not true. TheThe judge, McGill, simply denied them. TENthem. TEN
        months later, in in December 1995, in one many many orders amending a
        months later, December 1995, in one of his of hisorders amending a
        previous one, Judge McGill wrote that I that I filed motions but
        previous one, Judge McGill wrote filed frivolous frivolous motions but
        never identified which motions were frivolous. I only assumed the
        neveridentified which motions were frivolous. I only assumed the
        twofiled in in February were those to he was referring. referring. The
        two filed February were those to which which he was The
        judge ordered to to defendants' legal legal every motion and
        judge ordered meme paypay defendants'fees forfees for every motion and
        daily sanctions.
        daily sanctions.

        THE BACKGROUND
        It all began 22 March 1995, when Judge McGill found both my both my cli-
        Itall began onon 22 March 1995, when Judge McGill found cli-
        ent (living then in California) and myself in of a NON-
        ent(living then in California) and myself in contemptcontempt of a NON-
        existent order allegedly dated 3 March 1995, 1995, the previous time
        existent order allegedly dated 3 Marchthe previous time we had we had
        been in court. docket sheet shows he never issued that order. So
        been in court. TheThe docket sheet shows he never issued that order. So
        does a summary prepared by the (who (who was the time the
        does a summary prepared by the clerk clerkwas dead bydead by the time the
        OBC brought a petition for discipline). And so did the transcript of
        OBC brought a petition for discipline). And so did the transcript of
        the March 3d hearing. He clearly would take the take un-
        the March 3d hearing. He clearly said hesaid he wouldmotionthe motion un-
        der advisement. never ruled on it. kept           kept on challenging the
        deradvisement. He He never ruledIon it.onIchallenging the
        judge: Produce the order. He not.
        judge: Produce the order. He could could not.

        When the BBO/OBC began its so-called investigation of
        When the BBO/OBC began its so-called investigation of its case its case
        against me, the assistant bar counsel produced the alleged alleged order. One
        against me, the assistant bar counsel produced the order. One
        had been fabricated either by the district-court judge or by
        hadbeen fabricated either by the district-court judge or by opposing opposing
        counsel. I I never learned the culprit was because my trial witness
        counsel. never learned who who the culprit was because my trial witness
        subpoenas were quashed. See my my website:
        subpoenas were quashed. See website:
        drano90-part-iii-answer-bbo-count-three-lily.htm. I scanned I scanned the fabri-
        drano90-part-iii-answer-bbo-count-three-lily.htm. the fabri-
        cated order, enlarged it, and included Answer to the Petition
        catedorder, enlarged it, and included it in my it in my Answer to the Petition
        for Discipline.
        forDiscipline.

        Judge McGill repeatedly issued onerous from April through
        JudgeMcGill repeatedly issued onerous orders orders from April through
        December 1995. After he he made order, I questioned him, after
        December 1995. After made eacheach order, I questioned him, after
        which he amended the complained-of order. I made I made a chart. The
        which he amended the complained-of order. a chart. The
        chart, too, is on my website. Never didMcGill write a clear
        chart, too, is on my website. Never did Judge Judge McGill write a clear
        and unequivocal order, necessary before contempt. Never was
        andunequivocal order, necessary before fnding finding contempt. Never was
        there an order with a total amount of what was to be paid. be paid.
        there an order with a total amount of what was toNever did Never did
        he identify who was to be the payee. Were the daily due to
        he identify who was to be the payee. Were the daily sanctions sanctions due to
        the Commonwealth or the defendants? learned the answer to
        theCommonwealth or the defendants? I never I never learned the answer to
        this question.
        thisquestion.

        I defended nonpayment by pleading inability to pay. produced my
        I defended nonpayment by pleading inability to pay. I producedImy
        financial records, which had had been subpoenaed, to the judge. He re-
        financial records, whichbeen subpoenaed, to the judge. He re-

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viewed them in chambers with my then-counsel present, but never
viewed them in chambers with my then-counsel present, but never
committed anything to paper, including whether he had seen had I
committed anything to paper, including whether he them.seen them. I
believe they were notnot given to the defendants, . . . andIInever learned
believe they were given to the defendants...            and never learned
what happened thereafter.
whathappened thereafter.

I was jailed October 1998, after an appeal was decided. There was
I was jailed in in October 1998, after an appeal was decided. There was
no order for me to pay [in 1998]. The judge apparently wrote an or-
no order for me to pay [in 1998]. The judge apparently wrote an or-
der after the fact. of my sons sons spent a day in District
derafter the fact. One One of my spent a day in Concord Concord District
Court to find out what he had had to get to out me out of jail.
Court to find out what heto payto pay me get of jail. The clerk The clerk
simply did not know. Why? Because there there had order.
simply did not know. Why? Becausehad been no been no order.

In actual fact, I was jailed because I had I had some mythical
Inactual fact, I was not not jailed becausenot paidnot paid some mythical
order. I I was jailed during a motion session. The defendants had
order. was jailed during a motion session. The defendants had
amain, in 1998, subpoenaed financial records. I think I think
again, in 1998, subpoenaed mymy financial records.I had filed I had filed
either a motion to to quash motion to extend the time to produce
either a motionquash or a or a motion to extend the time to produce
the documentation. (Ten years later, mymy memory is dim.) dur-
thedocumentation.        (Ten years later, memory is dim.) It was It was dur-
ing that hearing I began an answer to the judge with the word
ingthat hearing thatthat I began an answer to the judge with the word
"No". As soon as I uttered “No,” he immediately locked up.
"No". As soon as I uttered "No," he immediately had me had me locked up.

It was an innocent "No." By coincidence. My husband husband was in
Itwas an innocent "No." By coincidence. My lawyer'slawyer’s was in
Concord court for one of his his own cases. His wife had given
Concord court for one ofown cases. His wife had given him to re- him to re-
turn to me a package, a boxboxafor a ream of paper, containing the papers
turn to me a package, a for ream of paper, containing the papers
I produced the court in 1995. The The ream on was on the
I produced to to the court in 1995.ream box wasboxthe table at table at
which I I was standing. The thinking the box contained contained the 1998
which was standing. The judge,judge, thinking the box the 1998
papers -- that the papers that had had been newly subpoenaed -- told
papers-- that is,is, the papers thatbeen newly subpoenaed -- told
me to give opposing counsel the box. I was about to Your
me to give opposing counsel the box. I was about to say, "No.say, "No. Your
Honor, this box does not contain the subpoenaed papers," but I only
Honor, this box does not contain the subpoenaed papers," but I only
got as far as the "No" when he said, "Lock her
gotas far as the "No" when he said, "Lock her up." up."

I never could get tape of that that day’s proceeding. Neither
I never could get thethe tape of day's proceeding. Neither could the could the
OBC or the BBO. The court had "overwritten" it.
OBC or the BBO. The court had "overwritten" it.

    I was jailed not handing a box containing 3-year-old personal
So I was jailed forfor not handing a box containing 3-year-old personal
financial papers to to opposing counsel.
financial papersopposing counsel.

Opposing counsel represented Tyco, whose CEO CEO at that
Opposing counsel represented Tyco, whoseat that time wastime was
Dennis Kozlowski, who embezzled $600 million from the company and
Dennis Kozlowski, who embezzled $600 million from the company and
who is now Federal prison, having been found guilty of guilty of
whois now in in Federal prison, having been found 38 indict- 38 indict-
ments.
ments.

After the Petition for Discipline was against me, I learned
After the Petition for Discipline was broughtbrought against me, I learned
from the OBC prosecutor that Judge had exparte ex parte contact with
fromthe OBC prosecutor that Judge McGill McGill hadcontact with
Tyco's counsel and told to subpoena my personal financial re-
Tyco’scounsel and told himhim to subpoena my personal financial re-

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        cords anew.
        cordsanew.

                                                   imposed  penalties on the respondent and
When the payments were not made, the judge imposed civil penalties on the respondent and
When the payments were not
      the respondent and the plaintiff in contempt, warning them      failure to pay the fees
found the respondent and the plaintiff in contempt, warning them that failure to pay the fees
would lead to dismissal of the plaintiff's action.
would lead to dismissal of the plaintiff's action.

       As noted on page 20, supra, Judge McGill repeatedly issued
       As noted on page 20, supra, Judge McGill repeatedly issued onerous onerous
       orders from April through December 1995.
       orders from April through December 1995.
                                                                 the plaintiff's action and ordering
Following further nonpayment, judgment entered dismissing the plaintiff's action and ordering
Following further nonpayment, judgment
costs to be paid to the defendants. The respondent did not file a notice of appeal following the
costs to be paid to                       respondent did not file                       following the
                                  retransfer of the case to the Superior           The
dismissal but filed a motion for retransfer of the case to the Superior Court. The motion was struck
dismissal but filed a motion                                                                        struck
                   to the respondent that an appeal from the dismissal was
with instructions to the respondent that an appeal from the dismissal was the proper avenue of re-
with                                                                                                of
lief. Following the entry       amended final judgment dismissing the plaintiff's             the respon-
lief. Following the entry of an amended final judgment dismissing the plaintiff's action, the respon-
dent again sought to retransfer the case to the Superior Court rather than appeal from the dis-
dent         sought to retransfer           to              Court rather                 from
                          retransfer was again struck.
missal; the request for retransfer was again struck.
missal;

        This appears be chronologically scrambled and difficult difficult
        Thisappears to to be chronologically scrambled andto sepa- to sepa-
        rate. I have put proper sequence in my in my to the Petition for
        rate.I have put the the proper sequenceAnswer Answer to the Petition for
        Discipline, which appears in http://www.falseallegations.-
        Discipline, which appears in http://www.falseallegations.-
        com/drano90-part-iii-answer-bbo-count-three-lily.htm. A capsulized
        com/drano90-part-iii-answer-bbo-count-three-lily.htm. A capsulized
        explanation follows.
        explanation follows.

        During 1995, Massachusetts still had had remand cases. I had brought the
        During 1995, Massachusetts stillremand cases. I had brought the
        whistleblower case in in superior which which remanded the case to dis-
        whistleblower casesuperior court, court,remanded the case to dis-
        trict court.unhappy with awithjudgment in district court, the
        trict court. If If unhappy final a final judgment in district court, the
        plaintiff was allowed to appeal the judgment to superior superior court, not the
        plaintiff was allowed to appeal the judgment to court, not the
        appeals court, but to to superior
        appeals court, butsuperior court.court.

        The so-called judgment by Judge Paul was improperly writ-
        The so-called judgment by Judge Paul McGillMcGill was improperly writ-
        ten.I filed to have it donedone properly. I lost. Opposing counsel argued
        ten. I filed to have it properly. I lost. Opposing counsel argued
        thejudgment was fine and and final. So I appealed tocourt.
        the judgment was fine final. So I appealed to superior superior court.

       Once we were superior court, opposing counsel, from a well-known
       Once we were in in superior court, opposing counsel, from a well-known
       prestigious firm, changed his tune tune and that it was not a final
       prestigious firm, changed his and argued argued that it was not a final
       judgment. the superior-court judge judge sent it back to Concord, where
       judgment. SoSo the superior-courtsent it back to Concord, where
       Judge McGill once again changed his causing the cycle to cycle
       JudgeMcGill once again changed his order, order, causing thebegin to begin
       repeating itself.
       repeating itself.

        In December 1995, Judge McGill separated the contempts against my
        InDecember 1995, Judge McGill separated the contempts against my
        client and myself. My My client's contempt stayed under the original
        client and myself. client's contempt stayed under the original
        docket number and the contempt against me was eventually, at the
        docket number and the contempt against me was eventually, at the
        top of 1996, given a new docket number.
        topof 1996, given a new docket number.

        On that day December, however, a lawyer who was in court in court when
        On that day in in December, however, a lawyer who waswhen


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        Judge McGill declared he separating the "contempt" issue\4/ be-
        JudgeMcGill declared he was was separating the “contempt” issue\4/ be-
        cause it was too confusing to simultaneously with the contempts
        cause it was too confusing to deal deal simultaneously with the contempts
        against the client and against me, introduced herself herself of-
        against the client and against me, introducedto me andto me and of-
        fered free representation. She had experienced, a false
        feredfree representation. She had experienced, she said,she said, a false
        charge in Michigan.
        charge in Michigan.

        I was successful convincing Judge McGill to lower the amount of
        I was successful in in convincing Judge McGill to lower the amount of
        money he had order client to pay; pay; i.e., the sanction was
        money he had order my my client toi.e., the sanction was lowered lowered
        from approximately $3500 to a little over $200. The judge
        fromapproximately $3500 to a little over $200. The judge had also had also
        said if paid, would restore my client's case to the list. therefore
        saidif paid, hehe would restore my client’s case to Ithe list. I therefore
        paid the two hundred-and-something but the but never re-
        paidthe two hundred-and-something for her,for her,judgethe judge never re-
        stored the case to the list. He He his promise.            (I have the tape and
        stored the case to the list.brokebroke his promise. (I have the tape and
        transcript of thethe subject hearings.)
        transcript of     subject hearings.)

                                                                           for retransfer. The Ap-
The respondent filed a notice of appeal from the order striking the motion for retransfer. The Ap-
    respondent filed a notice of appeal from the order striking the
peals Court dismissed the appeal as frivolous
peals Court dismissed the appeal as frivolous

        After the superior court struck my for retransfer, I appealed
        After the superior court struck my motion motion for retransfer, I appealed
        my client's case the Appeals Court. We lost and the court said the
        my client's case to to the Appeals Court. We lost and the court said the
        appeal was frivolous ordered my client client to pay counsel's
        appealwas frivolous andand ordered myto pay opposingopposing counsel's
        fees. My contention that it was anything but frivolous frivolous
        fees. My contention waswas that it was anything but to appeal to appeal
        from contempt of of a NON-existent My client was a geologist
        fromaa contempt a NON-existent order.order. My client was a geologist
        and fortunately started a consulting business in California, and
        andfortunately hadhad started a consulting business in California, and
        was very successful in so doing. She had, fortunately, enough money
        was very successful in so doing. She had, fortunately, enough money
        to hire lawyer out West, bargained, and settled for some smaller
        to hire a a lawyer out West, bargained, and settled for some smaller
        amount, paid it, it, and it behind her. She has been absolutely loyal
        amount, paid and put put it behind her. She has been absolutely loyal

 4 Judge McGill did reduce to writing the reason he gave for bifurcating the case into two
 4 Judge McGill did reduce to writing the reason he gave for bifurcating the case into two
 separate cases, namely, that it was too confusing to keep them together. I can only specu-
 separate cases, namely, that it was too confusing to keep them together. I can only specu-
 late that his and opposing counsel’s inability to produce a true March 3d order was the mo-
 late that his and opposing counsel's inability to produce a true March 3d order was the mo-
 tive for fabricating the order of which the assistant bar counsel produced a copy to me.
 tive for fabricating the order of which the assistant bar counsel produced a copy to me.

     noted, the case was whistleblower case. The original corporate defendant was an
 As noted, the case was aawhistleblower case. The original corporate defendant was an en-
 vironmental consulting firm that also worked on the Big Dig. The firm was falsifying time
 vironmental consulting firm that also worked on the Big Dig. The firm was falsifying time
 sheets and submitting falsified bills to the government. My client had obtained a time
 sheets and submitting falsified bills to the government. My client had obtained a time
 sheet filled out in pencil and had learned who had been instructed to falsify the time
 sheet filled out in pencil and had learned who had been instructed to falsify the time
 sheets by changing the hours written in pencil to hours written in pen. (The government
 sheets by changing the hours written in pencil to hours written in pen. (The government
 contracts allowed a maximum of 8 hours a day and 40 hours a week to be charged. The
 contracts allowed a maximum of 8 hours a day and 40 hours a week to be charged. The
 company charged the hours over 8 a day and the hours over 40 a week on another week’s
 company charged the hours over 8 a day and the hours over 40 a week on another week's
 time cards and/or against other “jobs.” Professional staff took extra paid vacations on
 time cards and/or against other "jobs." Professional staff took extra paid vacations on
 those weeks they had already “worked.”)
 those weeks they had already "worked.")

 Having proof of the entire scheme, I was going to bring a qui tam suit, but being a sole-
 Having proof of the entire scheme, I was going to bring a qui tam suit, but being a sole-
 practitioner and being papered continuously, literally, had no time to do so. Instead, I
 practitionerand being papered continuously, literally, IIhad no time to do so. Instead, I
 notified the FBI and upon my request, an FBI agent came to my home. Unexpected by me,
 notifiedthe FBI and upon my request, an FBI agent came to my home. Unexpected by me,
 he was accompanied by a State agent, who was openly hostile, so fearing the evidence
 he was accompanied by a State agent, who was openly hostile, so fearing the evidence
 would be deep-sixed, I did not hand over the evidence.
 would be deep-sixed, I did not hand over the evidence.

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         to me and scolded the OBC for bringing against me. We me.
         to me and scolded the OBC for bringing a case a case against email We email
         each other regularly meet when she comes East.
         each other regularly and and meet when she comes East.
.
Meanwhile, the judge in the District Court, following reconsideration of his earlier judgment of con-
Meanwhile, the judge in the District                                  of his earlier judgment
tempt against the respondent, entered a final judgment of contempt against her. She appealed and
tempt against the respondent, entered a final judgment of contempt against her. She appealed and
            Court affirmed the judgment. HMM Assocs., Inc. v. Johnson, 44 Mass.App.Ct. 1126
the Appeals Court affirmed the judgment. HMM Assocs., Inc. v. Johnson, 44 Mass.App.Ct. 1126
(1998).
(1998).

         Eventually the contempt case against me came came to final and
         Eventually the contempt case against meto final judgmentjudgment and
         I, through my counsel, appealed Appeals Court.
         I, through my counsel, appealed to theto the Appeals Court. (Contempts
                                                                      (Contempts
         arising in district court may may be appealed directly to the
         arising in district courtbe appealed directly to the Appeals Appeals
         Court.) The appeal was unsuccessful.
         Court.) The appeal was unsuccessful.

         The original defendant HMM [baby bear], bear], which bought
         The original defendant was was HMM [babywhich then was then was bought
         out by Earth Technologies, Inc. [a medium-sized mama bear com-
         outby Earth Technologies, Inc. [a medium-sized mama bear com-
         pany], which was then bought out by Tyco [papa bear]. Tyco was Tyco
         pany], which was then bought out by Tyco [papa bear]. the was the
         defendant in the summer of 1995, when all this became heated, heated,
         defendant in the summer of 1995, when all this becameand its and its
         counsel used to come to to court saying her bring her toothbrush
         counsel used to come court saying "Have“Have her bring her toothbrush
         next time.” That was Dennis Kozlowski speaking.
         nexttime." That was Dennis Kozlowski speaking.
                District Court judge gave the respondent a deadline       paying the outstanding fees
Thereafter, the District Court judge gave the respondent a deadline for paying the outstanding fees
and penalties, warning her that failure to comply would result in further penalties and referral to the
and penalties, warning her that failure to        would result in further           and referral to
board.
board.

         There was never identified a and unequivocal order with the
         Therewas never identifed a clear clear and unequivocal order with the
         amount, the payee(s), and the the time or date by which money
         amount, the payee(s) , andtime or date by which money was to be was to be
         paid.
         paid.
The respondent violated the order. Following a hearing, the judge held her in continuing contempt
    respondent violated the order. Following a hearing, the judge held her in continuing
and ordered her jailed until she                   contempt. The
and ordered her jailed until she purged herself of contempt. The respondent did not appeal from
                                                                             did           from
                  the following day she purged herself of contempt and was released.
those orders, but the following day she purged herself of contempt and was released.
those

         Not so. See above, about box holding a ream ream of
         Notso. See above, about the the box holding aof paper. paper.

         In sum, the OBC said misconduct was that I that I was con-
         Insum, the OBC said thethe misconduct waswas found in found in con-
         tempt and had be be jailed before paying (unidentifed) ordered
         tempt and had to to jailed before paying a sum a sum (unidentified) ordered
         by the court.
         by the court.

         I have always maintained the original order never existed,
         I have always maintained the original order never existed, and it did- and it did-
         n't, and that every order based on the non-existent order that thereaf-
         n't,and that every order based on the non-existent order that thereaf-
         ter issued was not only unclear and equivocal void.
         terissued was not only unclear and equivocal but also but also void.

 The board adopted the hearing officer's conclusions that by engaging in the foregoing activities,
      board adopted the hearing officer's conclusions that by engaging in the foregoing
                                                                                (h); S.J.C. Rule
 the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(c); Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(d) and (h); S.J.C. Rule
 the                            R. Prof. C. 3.4(c);      R. Prof. C. 8.4(d)
 3:07, Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6), as appearing in 382 Mass.         (1981); Canon 6, DR
 3:07, Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6), as appearing in 382 Mass. 769 (1981); Canon 6, DR 6-
 101 (A)(1)--(3), as appearing in 382 Mass. 783 (1981); and Canon 7, DR 7-101(A)(3), as appear-
 101(A)(1)--(3),as appearing in 382 Mass. 783 (1981); and Canon 7, DR 7-101(A)(3), as appear-
 ing in 382 Mass. 784 (1981).
 ing 382 Mass. 784 (1981).


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       I addressed each the professional-conduct rules as explained, su-
       I addressed each of of the professional-conduct rules as explained, su-
       pra.
       pra.
b. Discussion. The respondent raises constitutional, procedural, and substantive challenges to the
   Discussion. The respondent raises constitutional,
disciplinary proceedings. We address them in turn.
                          We address them in turn.

       I raised many issues and the sidestepped them, them, including
       I raised many issues and the SJC SJC sidestepped including but not but not
       limited to the following:
       limited to the following:

               • theFirst Amendment issues (free, political speech)speech)
               -1
                  the First Amendment issues (free, political

               •
               .1   thelack ofof public trialtrial (to which I was under the under the
                    the lack a a public (to which I was entitled entitled
                    BBO's rules)
                    BBO’srules)

               •
               .1   theamendment of §13 of c. 209C, by which all records in pro- in pro-
                    the amendment of §13 of c. 209C, by which all records
                    bateand family court became open open records and became
                    bate and family court became records and became
                    closed only upon a showing of cause
                    closedonly upon a showing of goodgood cause

               • thedeprivation of my entitlement to issue trial witness sub-
               -1
                  the deprivation of my entitlement to issue trial witness sub-
                  poenas under M.G.L. c. 233,
                  poenasunder M.G.L. c. 233, § 8 § 8

               •
               .1   thelack ofof personal jurisdiction of New Bedford Juvenile
                    the lack personal jurisdiction of New Bedford Juvenile
                    Court (I had never appeared in the Juvenile Court and there
                    Court (I had never appeared in the Juvenile Court and there
                    was no case there in in which I eithereither a party or counsel)
                    was no case there which I was was a party or counsel)

               •
               .1   due process rights to notice and opportunity to
                    due process rights to notice and opportunity to be heardbe heard

               • selective enforcement
               -1
                  selective enforcement

               • equalprotection on a "class-of-one" theorytheory
               -1
                  equal protection on a “class-of-one”

                                          "class         theory, see Willowbrook v. Olech,
i. The respondent claims that, under a "class of one" theory, see Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.
i . The respondent claims that,
           (2000), the board violated her right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amend-
562, 564 (2000), the board violated her right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution by improperly singling her out for discipline while failing to
                                                     involved in the underlying cases. Generally,
pursue disciplinary action against other attorneys involved in the underlying cases. Generally,
pursue
"[w]hether bar counsel            discipline of others is irrelevant ... the respondent's
"[w]hether bar counsel pursues discipline of others is irrelevant ... to the respondent's current dis-
ciplinary action." Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass.
ciplinary action." Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass. 92, 103 (1994).
                                                    103 (1994).

       In any equal-protection case, one show show disparity. to
       Inany equal-protection case, one must must disparity. Therefore,Therefore, to
       my case, the quoted conclusion of TobinTobin is inapplicable, if not also bad
       my case, the quoted conclusion of is inapplicable, if not also bad
       law.
       law.
Moreover, the respondent fails to point to any evidence adduced before the board showing that
Moreover, the respondent fails to point to any evidence adduced before the board showing that
she was "intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no ra-
she was "intentionally treated differently from                               that
                                   treatment." Willowbrook v. Olech, supra.
tional basis for the difference in treatment." Willowbrook v. Olech, supra.
             for



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       This is untrue. I identified several cases, including the adjudicated
       Thisis untrue. I identified several cases, including the adjudicated
       contempt of Kozlowski's counsel for nonpayment of child of child
       contempt of Kozlowski’s counsel for nonpaymentsupport support
       and uninsured medical expenses [61 Mass.App. Ct. 1109, 809
       anduninsured medical expenses [61 Mass.App. Ct. 1109, 809 N.E.2d N.E.2d
       1099, No. 02-P-1709 (2004)]. No action discipline against Tyco
       1099, No. 02-P-1709 (2004)]. No action for for discipline against Tyco
       CEO Kozlowski’s counsel issued the family court, and my trial
       CEO Kozlowski's counsel issued from from the family court, and my trial
       subpoena served on him was quashed.
       subpoena served on him was quashed.

Cf. Matter Cobb, 445 Mass. 452, 479 (2005) (no support        attorney's claim bar counsel
Cf. Matter of Cobb, 445 Mass. 452, 479 (2005) (no support for attorney's claim bar counsel vindic-
                 punish         reporting acts of judges).
tively sought to punish him for reporting acts of judges).

       Unlike me, Cobb raised allegations of selective prosecution for the
       Unlike me, Cobb raised allegations of selective prosecution for the
       first time on appeal.
       first time on appeal.

       On or around 2 October 2001, did sue four in federal federal court
       On or around 2 October 2001, I didIsue four judges judges incourt
       [Docket No. 01-CV-11702-GAO].\5/ Amongst the grounds for the for the
       [Docket No. 01-CV-11702-GAO].\5/ Amongst the grounds causes causes
       of action were the judges’ in contravention of mandatory statutes
       of action were the judges' acts acts in contravention of mandatory statutes
       and outside in in excess of jurisdiction. See Drano #57:
       andoutside oror excess of theirtheir jurisdiction. See Drano #57:
       http://www.falseallegations.com/drano57-complaint-against-
       http://www.falseallegations.com/drano57-complaint-against-
       iudLyes.htm. The case was dismissed on immunity grounds. (I had
       judges.htm.The case was dismissed on immunity grounds.               (I had
       brought it test immunity and to bring it eventually to the U.S. to
       brought it to to test immunity and to bring it eventually Su-the U.S. Su-
       preme Court.) (Thereis more to to this, but irrelevantwithin within
       premeCourt.)       (There is more this, but irrelevant to the to the
       document.)
       document.)
We need not address the respondent's bald accusation-- unsupported by anything in the record of
We need not address the respondent's bald accusation-- unsupported by anything in the record of
     case--that the disciplinary process              inherent bias, nor do we address       claims
this case--that the disciplinary process suffers from inherent bias, nor do we address other claims
         she seeks merely to incorporate arguments from prior memoranda. See Matter
in which she seeks merely to incorporate arguments from prior memoranda. See Matter of Lon-
in
don, 427 Mass. 477, 483 (1998).
don, 427 Mass. 477, 483 (1998).

       This conclusion, too, is specious. If I had not raised the arguments
       Thisconclusion, too, is specious. If I had not raised the arguments
       during the BBO and the SJC single-justice, the SJC full panel would
       during the BBO and the SJC single justice, the SJC full panel would
       havefound, as it diddid in Cobb, Ithat I raised allegations of selective
       have found, as it in Cobb, that raised allegations of selective
       prosecution for the frst first time on
       prosecution for the time on appeal.appeal.

            the detailed the procedure in http://www.falseallegations.com-
       See the detailed the procedure in http://www.falsealleaations.com-
       /drano102-bbo-star-chamber-92503-forum.htm and the in
       /drano102-bbo-star-chamber-92503-forum.htm and the motions motions in
       http://-www.falseallegations.com/drano106-motions-filed-at-bbo-
       http://-www.falsealleaations.com/dranol06-motions-fled-at-bbo-
       n0603.htm.
       n0603.htm.

ii. The respondent argues that the board chair improperly allowed bar counsel's motion for a pro-
ii . The respondent argues that the board chair improperly        bar counsel's motion for
              in connection with the disciplinary proceeding.
tective order in connection with the disciplinary proceeding.

       There was no such order in connection with the disciplinary pro-
       Therewas no such order in connection with the disciplinary pro-
       ceeding. Aswrote on page 13 of13 of my appellate brief: On the sched-
       ceeding. As I I wrote on page my appellate brief: On the sched-

   1st Cir. Court of Appeals, Docket No. 02-1144 (judgment entered 28 January 2004);
5 1st Cir. Court of Appeals. Docket No. 02-1144 (judgment entered 28 January 2004);
5

UnitedStates Supreme Court Docket No. 03-1478.
United States Supreme Court Docket No. 03-1478.

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       uled first day of trial, 2 December 2003, the officer ordered
       uledfirst day of trial, 2 December 2003, the hearinghearing officer ordered
       the public from hearing room during my opening opening He
       thepublic from the the hearing room during my statement.statement. He
       claimed that there was an an order commanding me to use pseudonyms
       claimed that there wasorder commanding me to use pseudonyms
       for certain people. following excerpt from the transcript transcript sup-
       forcertain people. The The following excerpt from the sup-
       ports my statement there was was no such
       portsmy statement thatthat thereno such order. order.

       HEARING OFFICER: Do happen to to know whether that name [Com-
       HEARING OFFICER: Do youyou happenknow whether that name [Com-
       plainant’s male roommate circa 1988-1989]ais on a protection list, Miss
       plainant's male roommate circa 1988-1989] is on protection list, Miss
       Weisberg?
       Weisberg?
       MS. WEISBERG: No, don't actually have a list. We We documents that
       MS. WEISBERG: No, wewe don't actually have a list. havehave documents that
       are protected. That's a name appears -- I believe the evidence will
       are protected. That's a name thatthat appears -- I believe the evidence will
       show that that name is ais a name appears in documents that Miss that Miss
       show that that name name that that appears in documents
       Johnson published on on her web site. Soare out there inthere in the public
       Johnson published her web site. So they they are out the public
       domain.
       domain.
       HEARING OFFICER: I'm going to assume was was an inadvertent slip,
       HEARING OFFICER: I'm going to assume that that an inadvertent slip, Miss Miss
       Johnson. No more of those. I'm going to to have the record redact that name,
       Johnson. No more of those. I'm going have the record redact that name,
       (name redacted).
       (nameredacted).
                       Fig. 2. Transcript, 12/2/03, I: 56-57,
                       Fig.2. Transcript, 12/2/03, Day Day I: 56-57,
                                    emphasis supplied.
                                    emphasis supplied.

                                   the order.
The respondent failed to challenge the order.
    respondent failed to

       There was no order to challenge. the use of non-existent or-
       Therewas no order to challenge. As for As for theause of a non-existent or-
       der: moved for a new trial. My was denied without hearing
       der:IImoved for a new trial. My motionmotion was denied without hearing
       and without reasons—oral or
       andwithout reasons-oral or written.written.

       I did, however, challenge several months earlier the Bar
       I did, however, challenge several months earlier the Bar Counsel's Counsel’s
       Motion for Protective Order re documents. See page 18 page 18 of
       Motion for Protective Order re documents. See of my Peti- my Peti-
       tion for Writ of of Certiorari, the protective order re documents
       tion for WritCertiorari, where where the protective order re documents
       is discussed, and my Motion to Strike Bar Counsel’s Motion
       is discussed, and my Motion to Strike Bar Counsel's Motion for Pro- for Pro-
       tective Order as to to Counts I and II 26 August 2003) at
       tective Order as Counts I and II (dated(dated 26 August 2003) at
       http://www.falseallegations.com-/drano106-motions-filed-at-bbo-
       http://www.falseallegations.com-/drano106-motions-filed-at-bbo-
       n0603.htm.
       n0603.htm.

See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 20(4), appearing in 425 Mass. 1302 (1997); Rule 3.22(c) of the Rules of
See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 20(4), appearing in 425 Mass. 1302 (1997); Rule 3.22(c) of the Rules of
                 Overseers (2007).
the Board of Bar Overseers (2007).

       See discussion, supra.
           discussion, supra.

               the protective order was appropriately entered where impounded
In any event, the protective order was appropriately entered where impounded material was at
                          proceeding.
issue in the disciplinary proceeding.
issue




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       I was in the midst of my Opening Statement when the hearing officer
       I was in the midst of my Opening Statement when the hearing officer
       wrongly invoked a protective order order not did Although the
       wrongly invoked a protective that didthatexist. not exist. Although the
       protective order also sought the impoundment of documents, I was
       protective order also sought the impoundment of documents, I was
       not using offering any documents during my Opening Statement.
       notusing oror offering any documents during my Opening Statement.

       There is no way to challenge a hearing who is who is de-
       Thereis no way to challenge a hearing officer officerwading inwading in de-
       ception. And the transcript, which I assume was in the Appendix
       ception. And the transcript, which I assume was in the Appendix
       filed by the BBO, shows clearly there were were no documents
       filed by the BBO, shows clearly thereno documents whatso- whatso-
       ever, including “impounded material . at issue [during my Opening
       ever,including "impounded material .... at. issue [during my Opening
       Statement] in the disciplinary proceeding.”
       Statement] in the disciplinaryproceeding."

                                      the hearing officer instructed the parties to use pseudonyms
Consistent with the protective order, the hearing officer instructed the parties to use pseudonyms
Consistent with the protective
during the hearing. When the respondent repeatedly violated the protective order by using the
during                     the              repeatedly violated the protective               the
parties' real names, the hearing officer properly cleared the public from the forum. [FN1] In
parties' real        the hearing officer properly cleared the public from the forum. [FN1] In
such circumstances, the respondent cannot be heard to complain about being deprived of a
such circumstances, the respondent cannot be heard to complain about being deprived of a
public hearing
public hearing

       There was no protective order with which to be “consistent.”
       Therewas no protective order with which to be "consistent."

       Despite the OBC prosecutor informing the hearing officer that there
       Despite the OBC prosecutor informing the hearing officer that there
       was no such order [page 48, supra[, the hearing officer As-
       was no such order [pace 48, supra[, the hearing officer and BBOand BBO As-
       sistant General Counsel Carol Wagner ignored the prosecutor’s ad-
       sistant General Counsel Carol Wagner ignored the prosecutor's ad-
       mission that there was no no protective order, and demanded that
       mission that there wassuchsuch protective order, and demanded that
       the public leave hearing room.
       thepublic leave thethe hearing room.

       Further, because the hearing officer had previously "played" “played” with the
       Further, because the hearing officer had previouslywith the
       transcription process [as [as shown figure figure did not dare
       transcription processshown in the in thebelow], I below], I did not dare
       stay without public as witnesses, so I, too, I, the left the hearing room.
       staywithout thethe public as witnesses, so lefttoo, hearing room.
                                         Now, writc this I want to g0 oil the
                                9
                               to rightfmora If you want to say
                                        now.
                               somcthing. you can say
                               11 1cmcthing off the
                               12
                                    reLwd(Discus ion off the rtwrd
                                         )
                       Fig. 1. 11/17/03 Transcript, p. lines 9-12
                       Fig.1. 11/17/03 Transcript, p. 40,40, lines 9-12

       In such circumstances, I and and should, indeed, be heard complaining
       Insuch circumstances, I can can should, indeed, be heard complaining
       about being deprived public hearing. There There is no way to
       aboutbeing deprived of a of a public hearing.is no other legal other legal way to
       challenge a deceptionaof a hearing officer.
       challenge a deception of hearing officer.

                                                               quashed subpoenas that the
iii. The respondent contends that the hearing officer wrongly quashed subpoenas that the respon-
iii . The respondent contends that the
                                                                                              8.
dent had issued on her own, arguing that she was entitled to issue them under G.L. c. 233, § 8.
dent        issued on her own, arguing that   was entitled          them
We need not decide whether the statute applies to bar discipline proceedings because the
We need not decide whether the statute applies to bar discipline proceedings because the hearing
                  quashed the subpoenas on grounds of irrelevance: through      subpoenaed wit-
officer properly quashed the subpoenas on grounds of irrelevance: through the subpoenaed wit-
officer
                                                                         cases and attack the dis-
nesses, the respondent had sought to relitigate issues in the underlying cases and attack the dis-
nesses, the respondent had sought to relitigate         in the
ciplinary process itself.
ciplinary process itself.



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       It is significant the the SJC applied c. 30A, c. 30A, §12 of
       Itis significant thatthatSJC applied M.G.L. M.G.L.§12 in Matterin Matter of
       Tobin, 417 Mass. 92, 103, 628 N.E.2d 1273, 1279 (1994), to justify
       Tobin,417 Mass. 92, 103, 628 N.E.2d 1273, 1279 (1994), to justify its va-its va-
       cating of subpoenas, butbut incase,case, the panel "we need We need not decide
       cating of subpoenas, in my my the panel wrote, wrote, “ not decide
       whether the statute [G.L. c. 233, § 8 applies bar discipline proceedings." The
       whether the statute [G.L. c. 233, § 8]]applies to bar discipline proceedings.” The
       non-application appears to be arbitrary and capricious.
       non-application appears to be arbitrary and capricious.

       There is no evidence in the record that my subpoenas were
       Thereis no evidence in the record that my subpoenas were irrelevant.irrelevant.
       There is evidence that I opposed the OBC’s offensive collateral
       Thereis evidence that I opposed the OBC's use of use of offensive collateral
       estoppel for their alleged proof of Count III, but III, is no dispute
       estoppel for their alleged proof of Count therebut there is no dispute
       that the issues in Counts I and not previously litigated. litigated. My
       thatthe issues in Counts I and II hadII had not previouslyMy
       subpoenas should not have been quashed! There There was
       subpoenas should not have been quashed! was evidence-evidence—
       from my summaries of what witness's testimony would be-that
       frommy summaries of what eacheach witness’s testimony would be—that
       their testimony would not be irrelevant.
       their testimony would not be irrelevant.

       Where had been found in contempt of a NON-existing order, the con-
       Where I I had been found in contempt of a NON-existing order, the con-
       tempt finding in in 1995 transparently invalid. invalid. Fundamental fair-
       tempt finding1995 waswas transparently Fundamental fair-
       ness, the cornerstone of process, mandated that I be allowed allowed to
       ness, the cornerstone of duedue process, mandated that I be to
       show that that order did not I had an had an abundance
       showthat that order did not exist. exist. I abundance of court- of court-
       created records to to show the NON-existence of the order: the clerk’s
       created records show the NON-existence of the order: the clerk's
       notes, the docket sheet, a court notice, transcript of the relevant
       notes,the docket sheet, a court notice, and a and a transcript of the relevant
       hearing. See http://www.falseal-legations.com/drano90-part-iii-
       hearing. See http://www.falseal-legations.com/drano90-part-iii-
       answer-bbo-count-three-lily.htm, in Iwhich I inserted those docu-
       answer-bbo-count-three-lily.htm, in which inserted those docu-
       ments.\6/
       ments.\6/

                                                  to issue subpoenas appropriate where attorney
See Matter of Tobin, supra at 102-103 (refusal to issue subpoenas appropriate where attorney
See Matter of Tobin, supra at 102-103
sought to relitigate underlying matters in disciplinary proceeding).
sought to relitigate underlying matters in disciplinary proceeding).

       It is significant the SJC SJC applied M.G.L. c. in Matter of
       Itis signifcant that that theapplied M.G.L. c. 30A, §1230A, §12 in Matter of
       Tobin, 417 Mass. 92, 103, 628 N.E.2d 1273, 1279 (1994), to justify
       Tobin,417 Mass. 92, 103, 628 N.E.2d 1273, 1279 (1994), to justify its va-its va-
       cating of subpoenas, butbut incase,case, but refused towhether c.
       cating of subpoenas, in my my but refused to decide decide whether c.
       30A, §8, was applicable to case. As As observed the SJC opin-
       30A, §8, was applicable to my my case.observed above,above, the SJC opin-
       ion appears arbitrary and capricious.
       ionappears arbitrary and capricious.

                    count one, the respondent claims that she cannot be disciplined     having
iv. With respect to count one, the respondent claims that she cannot be disciplined for having
posted impounded material on her Web site
posted impounded

       I did not post                        on my website. No one-from the OBC prosecu-
       I did not post impounded material on my website. No one—fromthe OBC prosecu-
                         single justice, to the SJC full panel-ever identifed any such
       tor, the BBO, the single justice, to the SJC full panel—ever identified any such im-
                            The unfettered power of the OBC is the          support for the ac-
       pounded material. The unfettered power of the OBC is the only support for the ac-
                                                      It simply never existed on my website.
       cusation of uploading impounded material. It simply never existed on my website.
                   uploading

   I had been told by an attorney to file everything I had with my Answer, for it was
6 I had been told by an attorney to file everything I had with my Answer, for it was
6

unlikely that would have another opportunity to enter them into the record. He was cor-
unlikely that IIwould have another opportunity to enter them into the record. He was cor-
rect.
rect.


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                  "impounded material” were like words being waved
        The words “impounded material" were like words being waved by a Good Fairy’s
                                                                        Good Fairy's
             or
        wand or being let out of a Genii’s bottle.
                                   Genii's

                   Juvenile              were invalid because she never obtained material from
because: (1) the Juvenile Court orders were invalid because she never obtained material from the
because: (1)
care and protection proceeding and thus never posted impounded material from that case; (2) the
care and protection proceeding and thus never posted impounded material from that case; (2)
Probate and Family Court order was invalid because material related to the paternity and custody
Probate and Family Court order was invalid because material related to the paternity
matter was open to the public pursuant to G.L. c. 209C, § 13, as appearing in St.1998, c. 64, §
matter             to                            c. 209C, § 13,     appearing in St.1998, c.
229; (3) her Web site postings are             by the First Amendment to the United States Consti-
229; (3) her Web site postings are protected by the First Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution; and (4) there was insufficient evidence to conclude that she had
tution; and (4) there was insufficient evidence to conclude that she had posted confidential infor-
                                                                                              infor-
                                                              the third parties involved--she claims
mation with no substantial purpose other than to embarrass the third parties involved--she claims
mation with                           other than
that she                                                        plight.
that she intended only to educate the public about her client's plight.
                                    the              her

        All of my reasons discussed above and are true and/or and/or valid. As to
        All of my reasons areare discussed above and are truevalid. As to
        embarrassment, the single justice had before him absolutely no evi-
        embarrassment, the single justice had before him absolutely no evi-
        dence except the say-so of OBC prosecutor that the complainant
        denceexcept the say-so of the the OBC prosecutor that the complainant
        was embarrassed, and then the single justice declared that
        was embarrassed, and then the single justice declared that "no live “no live
        testimony was required to draw [an] inference [of embarrassment.”
        testimony was required to draw [an] inference [of embarrassment."
        Given that “arguments of counsel were not evidence not could not be
        Giventhat "arguments of counsel were not evidence and couldand be
        considered by them as as evidence” [Com. v. Correia, 65 Mass.App.
        considered by them evidence" [Com. v. Correia, 65 Mass.App. Ct. 27, Ct. 27,
        36 (2005)], is with some surprise that that the single justice
        36 (2005)], itit is with some surprisethe single justice relied on relied on
        such am unusual basis for his finding. detailed argument in
        sucham unusual basis for his finding. See mySee my detailed argument in
        footnote 7 on page 5 5 and Issue on pages 44-47 appellate brief.
        footnote 7 on pageand Issue 3 on3pages 44-47 of myof my appellate brief.
                                   claims        the respondent
The problem with the first three claims is that the respondent neither sought to appeal from nor
    problem with the first                                                                  from
otherwise legally challenge the courts'                                         them and challenge
otherwise legally challenge the courts' orders, and she was not free to ignore them and challenge
                                                          was not free
         the first time in the disciplinary proceeding. [FN2][FN3] See Florida Bar v. Gersten, 707 So.2d
them for the first time in the disciplinary proceeding. [FN2][FN3]SeeFloridaBarv. Gersten, 707 So.2d
them
                                                So.2d 1000, 1003 (Fla. 1989); Florida Bar v. Wshart 543 So.2d 1250,
711, 713 (Fla.1998); Florida Bar v. Rubin, 549 So.2d 1000, 1003 (Fla.1989); Florida Bar v. Wishart,543 So.2d 1250,
         (Fla. 1998); Florida
                                                                         834 (1990).
1252 (Fla.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044, 110 S.Ct. 839, 107 L.Ed.2d 834 (1990).

        As noted, supra, I was neither a to nor to nor in any juvenile
        As noted, supra, I was neither a party party counsel counsel in any juvenile
        court action. See http://www.falseallegations.com-/drano37-
        court action. See http://www.falsealleLvations.com-/drano37-
        impoundment-Lawton.htm. This This was one of the few dozen
        impoundment-Lawton.htm. was one of the few dozen files the files the
        OBC used as evidence and wanted me to delete from my (The
        OBC used as evidence and wanted me to delete from my website.website. (The
        files of which OBC complained are shown with a green a green back-
        filesof which thethe OBC complained are shown withback-
        ground in the Drano Series table on my Home Home
        ground in the Drano Series table on my Page.) Page.)

                 • The juvenile-court judge never had jurisdiction over me. over me.
                 -1
                    The juvenile-court judge never had jurisdiction

                 •
                 .1   The retired judge no no authority to order any-
                      The retired judge hadhadauthority to order me to dome to do any-
                      thing.
                      thing.

                 • I I had no standing to appeal family-courtjudgment judgment
                 .? had no standing to appeal family-court judge's judge’s
                     and/or order allowing the the release of documents in
                     and/or order allowingrelease of documents in a closed a closed
                     case to OBC assistant counsel. I never saw the docu-
                     case to OBC assistant barbar counsel. I never saw the docu-
                     ments. Nor was I ever supplied list of the documents
                     ments.Nor was I ever supplied with awith a list of the documents
                     allegedly supplied. I do I do believe they were pre-1998 docu-
                     allegedly supplied. believe they were pre-1998 docu-
                     ments.
                     ments.

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       In sum, there were so many appealable issues, would have time to do
       Insum, there were so many appealable issues, I wouldIhave time to do
       little except appeal from unlawful decisions and conduct conduct by
       little except appeal from unlawful decisions andby the OBC the OBC
       and BBO. And given the the SJC controls and supervises
       andBBO. And given thatthatSJC controls and supervises the OBC the OBC
       and BBO and appoints both the General Counsel Bar the Bar
       andBBO and appoints both the General Counsel and the andCounsel, Counsel,
       any appeal would have been futile. The SJC about to about
       anyappeal would have been futile. The SJC was notwas not reverseto reverse
       itself or its agents.
       itself or its agents.

              Since plaintiffs were challenging disciplinary rules adopted by
              Sinceplaintiffs were challenging disciplinary rules adopted by
              the Supreme Court of New Jersey, they alleged that no
              theSupreme Court of New Jersey, they alleged that they hadthey had no
              realistic remedy within the legal legal machinery of of New
              realistic remedy within the machinery of the State the State of New
              Jersey and that “it would be a futile to request request
              Jerseyand that "it would be a futile gesturegesture tothe Ethics the Ethics
              Committee, which was created by the said Court, Court, or
              Committee, which was created by the said or the said the said
              Court itself, declare its its pronouncement to be unconstitu-
              Courtitself, to to declareown own pronouncement to be unconstitu-
              tional” (Emphasis added) . . .
              tional" (Emphasis added) ...

       Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 1981
       Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 1981
       WL 389660 (Petitioner’s brief), opinion U.S. (N.J.) 423, (1982).
       WL 389660 (Petitioner's brief), opinion at 457 at 457 U.S. (N.J.) 423, (1982).

As for the fourth claim, it was reasonably inferable from the mother's having complained to
As for the fourth claim, it was reasonably inferable from the mother's having complained to
bar counsel about the respondent's postings that the mother was embarrassed by them.
bar counsel about the respondent's postings that the mother was embarrassed by them.
Moreover, the respondent went far beyond merely educating the public about her client's
Moreover, the respondent went far beyond merely educating the public about her client's
case-she violated the confidences of third parties by publicizing information that she knew
case-she violated the confidences of third parties by publicizing information that she knew
was impounded. See Matter of Comfort, 284 Kan. 183, 191-195, 159 P.3d 1011 (2007) (un-
was impounded. See Matter of Comfort, 284 Kan. 183, 191-195, 159 P.3d 1011 (2007) (un-
der disciplinary rule identical to Mass. R. Prof. C. 4.4, court held that objective evaluation of
der disciplinary rule identical to Mass. R. Prof. C. 4.4, court held that objective evaluation of
conduct would lead reasonable person to conclude that publishing of disparaging information
conduct would lead reasonable person to conclude that publishing of disparaging information
about third party was done for no substantial purpose other than to embarrass).
about third party was done for no substantial purpose other than to embarrass).

       As to the embarrassment, as noted, supra, I discussed the issue fully
       As to the embarrassment, as noted, supra, I discussed the issue fully
       in footnote 7 page 5 and Issue 3 on pages 44-47 of my appellate
       in footnote 7 onon page 5 and Issue 3 on pages 44-47 of my appellate
       brief. The case law supports my position 100 percent.
       brief. The case law supports my position 100 percent.

   Sanction. We do not conclude, and
c. Sanction. "We do not conclude, and the respondent makes no argument, that the sanction im-
                                                        makes no argument,
                                                         sanctions in
posed by the single justice is 'markedly disparate' from sanctions in similar cases." Matter of
posed by the single justice is 'markedly disparate'                           cases." Matter of
                                 of Cobb,          479.
Tobin, supra at 103. Cf. Matter of Cobb, supra at 479.
Tobin, supra

       As stated my appellate argument,
       As IIstated inin my appellate argument,

              Ultimately, the single justice not only parroted that which the
              Ultimately, the single justice not only parroted that which the
              BBO wrote and did. He failed to follow follow the written prac-
              BBOwrote and did. He also also failed to the written prac-
              tices and procedures for a single justice, which set out
              ticesand procedures for a single justice, which set out grounds grounds
              upon which bar counsel petition the single justice for dis-
              uponwhich bar counsel maymay petition the single justice for dis-
              ciplinary action against an attorney. They include:
              ciplinary action against an attorney. They include:

                      •
                      .i   misuseor loss of of client funds,
                           misuse or loss client funds,


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                        •
                        .i   neglect of client interests,
                             neglect of client interests,
                        •
                        .i   fraudulent conduct,
                             fraudulent conduct,
                        •
                        .i   sanction in another jurisdiction,
                             sanction in another jurisdiction,
                        •
                        .i   conviction of a a crime
                             conviction ofcrime and and
                        .1
                        •    misrepresentation to court.
                             misrepresentation to the the court.

                None, none, none those grounds is in is disciplinary case
                None,none, none of of those grounds thein the disciplinary case
                against me. I I appear the exception to the rule.
                against me. appear to be to be the exception to the rule.

                The sanction disbarment imposed upon upon me could
                The sanction of of disbarment imposed me could not havenot have
                beenmore "`markedly disparate' from sanctions in [other]in [other]
                been more “‘markedly disparate’ from sanctions
                cases." There no no “similar”
                cases.”There areare "similar" cases!cases!

                Pursuant to a petition       by bar counsel
2. Contempt. Pursuant to a petition filed by bar counsel and following a hearing, the single justice
2.                                                              following
found the respondent in civil contempt for failing timely to comply with the following provisions
found the respondent in civil contempt for failing timely to comply with the following provisions of
the judgment of disbarment: close her IOLTA
the judgment of disbarment: close her IOLTA account, give notice of her disbarment, and submit
                                                           give notice of her
an affidavit of compliance              to S.J.C.     4:02, § 17, as amended, 426 Mass. 1301
an affidavit of compliance pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:02, § 17, as amended, 426 Mass. 1301
(1997). He            her jailed until she
(1997). He ordered her jailed until she purged herself of contempt, which she did four days later
                                                          of contempt,           did four days later
and was released.

We reject the respondent's challenges to the contempt judgment as follows. (a) She was not enti-
We reject the                 challenges to the contempt judgment           follows. (a)      was not enti-
tled to ignore the underlying judgment of disbarment on the ground that it was "transparently in-
                                                            on the ground that it        "transparently in-
valid"; that she needed to fulfil her clients' right to counsel     their choice; or that she had
valid"; that she needed to fulfil her clients' right to counsel of their choice; or that she had a prop-
erty interest in continuing to receive fees from her clients. She presents no
erty interest in continuing to receive fees from her clients. She presents no persuasive factual or
                                                                                                factual or
                                               claims. (b) The                  argument that she was
legal grounds to substantiate any of those claims. (b) The respondent's argument that she was
legal grounds to substantiate any
                          than civil contempt because she did not "hold the                   cell
found in criminal rather than civil contempt because she did not "hold the key to the cell door"
       in
(and that she was denied the right to a jury trial for criminal contempt) is belied by the fact that
(and that she was denied the right to a jury trial for criminal contempt) is belied by the fact that
                                              the judgment of disbarment and was released. [FN4]
she eventually complied with the terms of the judgment of disbarment and was released. [FN4]
she eventually complied with the
(c) We reject the respondent's claim that the single justice lacked jurisdiction to find her in con-
(c)      reject the               claim that             justice lacked jurisdiction to
tempt where she         appealed from                     judgment. She had moved unsuccessfully for
tempt where she had appealed from the disbarment judgment. She had moved unsuccessfully for
               judgment pending appeal. The cases relied on by            respondent--a criminal case
a stay of the judgment pending appeal. The cases relied on by the respondent--a criminal case
a stay
                  appeal divests a lower court of jurisdiction to rule on motions to rehear
holding that an appeal divests a lower court of jurisdiction to rule on motions "to rehear or va-
holding that
                                                                                   case holding that,
cate," Commonwealth v. Cronk, 396 Mass. 194, 197 (1985), and a divorce case holding that, ab-
cate,"                   v. Cronk, 396 Mass. 194, 197 (1985),
                                                                                          payments
sent a specific order to the contrary, a husband's obligation to make installment payments pursu-
sent specific order to the contrary,                   obligation to
        a judgment dividing marital property was stayed by the husband's appeal, Huber v. Huber,
ant to a judgment dividing marital property was stayed by the husband's appeal, Huber v. Huber,
ant
     Mass. 495, 499-500 (1990)--are inapposite. Here             single                  acted to enforce
408 Mass. 495, 499-500 (1990)--are inapposite. Here the single justice merely acted to enforce
    disbarment judgment. Cf. Mass. R. Civ. P. 62(a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1409 (1996).(d) Fi-
the disbarment judgment. Cf. Mass. R. Civ. P. 62(a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1409 (1996).(d) Fi-
nally, the respondent's argument that the single justice erred in "implicit[ly]" finding that she had
nally, the respondent's argument that the single justice erred in "implicit[ly]" finding that she had
                                                               because the finding
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law is misplaced because the finding of contempt was
engaged in the                                                                                     was
                                                             of disbarment. [FN5]
based on other violations of the terms of the judgment of disbarment. [FN5]
based on other violations of the terms of the

       I was appalled the abandonment of my clients' interests by both
       I was appalled by by the abandonment of my clients’ interests by both
       the SJC single-justice session and the SJC full bench session . . . and
       theSJC single justice session and the SJC full bench session ... and
       the disparate treatment: For instance, the SJCthe SJCAttorneys Attorneys
       the disparate treatment: For instance, allowed allowed
       Crossen and Curry to practice until their appeal was heard, and At-
       Crossenand Curry to practice until their appeal was heard, and At-
       torney Donohue to to practice until he negotiated a 3-year suspension.
       torney Donohue practice until he negotiated a 3-year suspension.
       Why could I not continue to represent my then-existing as
       Why could I not continue to represent my then-existing clients, so clients, so as
       to preserve their interests in their
       to preserve their interests in their cases? cases?


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The judgment contempt and and my subsequent imprisonment
The judgment of of contempt my subsequent imprisonment was more was more
  punishment my clients because they they had me lawyer than a
a punishment of of my clients becausehad me as their as their lawyer than a
punishment against me me . . . althoughthat, too.that, too.
punishment against ... although it was it was

By denying my Motion to the Order to withdraw from my clients'
By denying my Motion to Stay Stay the Order to withdraw from my clients’
cases, the single justice both deprived my of their of their right to have
cases, the single justice both deprived my clients clientsright to have
counsel of their choice and interfered with the orderly prosecution of
counsel of their choice and interfered with the orderly prosecution of
their cases. The judge never considered the immediate and irrepara-
their cases. The judge never considered the immediate and irrepara-
ble harm and damage his his order would cause my clients.
ble harm and damage order would cause my clients.

The full Court similarly when when the the Court's behalf, so
The full Court diddid similarly the clerk onclerk on the Court’s behalf, so
I've been told, summarily denied the to Stay filed there.
I’vebeen told, summarily denied the MotionMotion Ito Stay I filed there.
Upon learning of denial, I reasonably concluded that the Judg-
Uponlearning of the the denial, I reasonably concluded that the Judg-
ment of Disbarment predetermined and that the that justice,
mentof Disbarment waswas predetermined and singlethe single justice,
too,knew that... . . . forwere the SJC bench neutral and the option to
too, knew that,        for were the SJC bench neutral and the option to
reverse the single justice's decision still open, he would have allowed allowed
reverse the single justice’s decision still open, he would have
me to continue, at thethe very least, to represent my then-existing cli-
me to continue, at very least, to represent my then-existing cli-
ents.
ents.

Each of my clients’ cases about to be horribly and needlessly
Eachof my clients' cases waswas about to be horribly and needlessly
prejudiced.
prejudiced.

I was less upset that time about my own disbarred status than I
I was less upset at at that time about my own disbarred status than I
was for my clients. Their cases were generally and at stages
was for my clients. Their cases were generally complexcomplex and at stages
which made it it unlikely that another lawyer could be effective. My
which made unlikely that another lawyer could be effective. My
clients would be left without their their of choice when they most
clients would be left withoutcounselcounsel of choice when they most
needed counsel familiar their their My duty to them and them and to
neededcounsel familiar with withcases. cases. My duty to to
their cases was my responsibility and had
their cases was my responsibility and had priority.priority.

I thought the court would understand and would not exalt
I thought the court would understand and would not exalt procedure procedure
over substance. And I unwilling to defy justice by sacrificing
oversubstance. And I waswas unwilling to defy justice by sacrificing
substance for procedure.
substance for procedure.

During the 30 days between the the Judgment of Disbarment and
During the 30 days betweenJudgment of Disbarment and the date the date
it became effective, I been working to tie up as many loose ends in
itbecame effective, I hadhad been working to tie up as many loose ends in
my cases as possible.
my cases as possible.

The disbarment was effective on September 8th, a Friday, 2006. Prior
The disbarment was effective on September 8th, a Friday, 2006. Prior
to that date, two of my my clients hadordered to court on the fol- on the fol-
to that date, two of clients had been been ordered to court
lowing Monday and Tuesday. Without adequate opportunity to find
lowing Monday and Tuesday. Without adequate opportunity to find
substitute counsel, my clients would be at loss a loss were I So
substitute counsel, my clients wouldabe atwere I not there.not there. So
in one court, I appeared to deliver what I what I had been ordered prior
in one court, I appeared also also to deliver had been ordered prior
to the disbarment to write and produce on Monday. And in theAnd in the sec-
to the disbarment to write and produce on Monday. sec-
ond court, I appeared to inform the judge of for idea for a reasonable
ondcourt, I appeared to inform the judge of my idea mya reasonable

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settlement—as well as to inform him that I had not heard from this
settlement-as well as to inform him that I had not heard from this
Court regarding my Motion to Stay.
Court regarding my Motion to Stay.

Those appearances prompted the assistant bar who was
Thoseappearances prompted the assistant bar counselcounsel who was
prosecuting the case against me me to add an allegation of Unauthorized
prosecuting the case againstto add an allegation of Unauthorized
Practice of Law to to Complaint for Contempt she filed in the single-
Practice of Law the the Complaint for Contempt she filed in the single-
justice session.
justice session.

Given that I had already an appeal of the judgment of disbar-
Giventhat I had already filed filed an appeal of the judgment of disbar-
ment, the single justice no longer had jurisdiction to hear the con- the con-
ment, the single justice no longer had jurisdiction to hear
tempt.
tempt.

At that hearing, I attempted to show that where an no pre-
At that hearing, I attempted to show that where an order had order had no pre-
tense of validity when it issued, it is a transparently invalid order,
tenseof validity when it issued, it is a transparently invalid order,
void ab initio, and cannot the basis basis for a contempt
voidab initio, and cannot form form thefor a contempt citation. citation.

Nevertheless, because I had failed to withdraw from my cases as cases as the
Nevertheless, because I had failed to withdraw from my the
judge ordered, he found in contempt and imprisoned me to force to force
judge ordered, he found me me in contempt and imprisoned me
my compliance. Nothing, however, that the single justice
my compliance. Nothing, however, that the single justice wanted mewanted me
to do could be done from prison. I hold the key to my cell to my
to do could be done from prison. I did notdid not hold the key door. cell door.
I was being punished.
I was being punished.

The contempt was thus criminal in with the possibility of in-
The contempt was thus criminal in nature nature with the possibility of in-
definite incarceration, and and but for friends, friends, a few
definite incarceration,but for having havinga few human an- human an-
gels, would still be imprisoned. That gave me an entitlement to a
gels, IIwould still be imprisoned. That gave me an entitlement to a
jury trial, which I asked but was denied.
jury trial, for for which I asked but was denied.

Further, where I did not not hold the key to my and the con-
Further, where I didhold the key to my cell door cell door and the con-
tempt charge brought against me was de facto criminalcriminal in nature, the
tempt charge brought against me was de facto in nature, the
County Court had no no jurisdiction either to hear or to sentence me to
County Court had jurisdiction either to hear or to sentence me to
any incarceration, definite or indefinite.
anyincarceration, definite or indefinite.

Significantly, the single justice did not declare it a criminal contempt
Significantly, the single justice did not declare it a criminal contempt
because there is currently no statute law addressing the issue
becausethere is currently no statute or caseor case law addressing the issue
of incarceration for criminal contempt in the single-justice session.
of incarceration for criminal contempt in the single-justice session.
He would have had to treat me disparately and thus violate
He would have had to treat me disparately and thus violate my right my right
to equal protection.
to equal protection.

The denial equal protection is, unfortunately, done in our courts
The denial ofof equal protection is, unfortunately, done in our courts
daily. For instance, a defendant being being criminal criminal
daily. For instance, a defendant tried fortried forcontempt in contempt in
family court is is denied a jury trial, but a defendant for
family courtdenied a jury trial, but a defendant being triedbeing tried for
criminal contempt in superior court court is a jury trial.
criminal contempt in superioris affordedafforded a jury trial.

Where the single justice acted intentionally and knowingly
Where the single justice acted intentionally and knowingly to deprive to deprive

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      me of my constitutional rights, the judge was no longer acting as a
      me of my constitutional rights, the judge was no longer acting as a
      judge, but a a “‘minister’ of his own prejudices.”
      judge, but asas "`minister' of his own prejudices."

       In sum, where I appeal the the Judgment of Disbarment on the
       Insum, where I diddid appealJudgment of Disbarment on the
       grounds that it it was transparently or had only had only a frivolous pre-
       grounds thatwas transparently invalid invalid or a frivolous pre-
       tense to validity, I could ignore the order appeal was re-
       tenseto validity, I could ignore the order until the until the appeal was re-
       solved. Therefore, Order issuing simultaneously with the disbar-
       solved.Therefore, the the Order issuing simultaneously with the disbar-
       ment judgment was void ab initio; the of contempt, a clear er-
       ment judgment was void ab initio; the finding finding of contempt, a clear er-
       ror of law requiring reversal; the resulting incarceration, an
       rorof law requiring reversal; the resulting incarceration, an egregious egregious
       abuse of discretion and clear of law.
       abuseof discretion and clear error error of law.

      Where was deprived of equal protection, the judge not only not only
      Where I I was deprived of equal protection, the judgedeprived deprived
      me of the benefit of appealing the disbarment to the of the
      me of the benefit of appealing the disbarment to the full panel full panel of the
      High Court the Commonwealth. It gave the appearance that the
      HighCourt in in the Commonwealth. It gave the appearance that the
      right to appeal his judgment was was but a
      right to appeal his judgmentbut a sham. sham.

       The practice law, allegedly a "learned profession," is a fundamental
       The practice of of law, allegedly a “learned profession,” is a fundamental
       right. To have deliberately, recklessly, and with callous callous indifference
       right. To have deliberately, recklessly, and withindiference
       deprived me of my fundamental rights to property and subsequently
       deprived me of my fundamental rights to property and subsequently
       my liberty before I had had the benefit of an appeal as other
       my liberty before I had had the benefit of an appeal as other members members
       of the populace have, single justice also violated both article IV,
       of the populace have, the the single justice also violated both article IV,
       section 2, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the of the United States
       section 2, and the Fourteenth AmendmentUnited States Consti- Consti-
       tution.
       tution.

       I rested on my brief the the justice's implicit implicit or inferential find-
       I rested on my brief thatthatsinglesingle justice’sor inferential find-
       ing that I was practicing law appearance in court in business
       ingthat I was practicing law by myby my appearanceone court one business
       day after the disbarment order became effective (“Axe Day”)
       dayafter the disbarment order became effective ("Axe Day") was clear was clear
       error. A A criminal charge must have elements to as not to be
       error. criminal charge must have elements so as not so be vague or vague or
       overbroad. If If practice of law cannot be defined, neither can the
       overbroad. thethe practice of law cannot be defined, neither can the
       unauthorized practice of law law be, making §§41, 46A, 46B, 46C unconsti-
       unauthorized practice ofbe, making §§41, 46A, 46B, 46C unconsti-
       tutionally vague.
       tutionally vague.

       I still maintain the contempt was a was a not civil, one. did
       I still maintain thatthat the contemptcriminal,criminal, notI civil, one. I did
       not hold the key to cell cell I could could not have with the
       nothold the key to the the door.door. Inot have complied complied with the
       court's order but for for the help of a few extraordinary friends who did
       court’s order but the help of a few extraordinary friends who did
       all the “running” for me outside But for But for their kind
       allthe "running" for me outside of jail. of jail.their kind and gener- and gener-
       ous assistance, I would be sitting in South South Bay
       ous assistance, I would be still still sitting inBay prison. prison.

          affirmed.
Judgments affirmed.

FN1. With members of the public gone, the respondent refused to participate in the hearing
FN1. With members of the public gone, the respondent refused to participate in the hearing
      and left. The hearing officer considered the matter solely on documentary evidence
      and left. The hearing officer considered the matter solely on documentary evidence
      submitted by the parties (exhibits submitted by bar counsel and the respondent's
      submitted by the parties (exhibits submitted by bar counsel and the respondent's
      amended answer to the petition for discipline). The respondent was furnished with
      amended answer to the petition for discipline). The respondent was furnished with


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       copies of bar counsel's exhibits and transcripts of the hearing, which she used to pre-
       copies of bar counsel's exhibits and transcripts of the hearing, which she used to pre-
       pare her appeal to the board.
       pare her appeal to the board.

              Because the hearing officer had “played” with the transcription
              Becausethe hearing officer had "played" with the transcription
              process [as shown in figure below], I did not dare stay with-
              process[as shown in thethe figure below], I did not dare stay with-
              out the public witnesses, so I, too, too, left the room.
              outthe public as as witnesses, so I,left the hearinghearing room.
                                               Now, writc this want to go off Ux
                                      9          record
                                      10   nght now If you want to !ay somUlun& you
                                           can say of the rocmd
                                           aonrthing
                                      11
                                      12        (Diccvnsion off the
                                                rxotd)
                                 Fig. 1. 11/17/03 Transcript, p. 11. 9-12
                                 Fig.1. 11/17/03 Transcript, p. 40,40, ll. 9-12

              It is untrue that I supplied copies of the of the OBC exhibits. In
              Itis untrue that I was was supplied copiesOBC exhibits. In
              fact, the transcript shows that they changed the numbering sys-
              fact,the transcript shows that they changed the numbering sys-
              temfor the exhibits as much as two weeksweeks after thetrial
              tem for the exhibits as much as two after the alleged alleged trial
              was over. The OBC prosecutor appears to have submitted even
              was over. The OBC prosecutor appears to have submitted even
              new chalks two weeks after the alleged trial. people
              new chalks two weeks after the alleged trial. The onlyThe only people
              present were the hearing officer, an assistant general counsel,
              present were the hearing officer, an assistant general counsel,
              and the OBC prosecutor. There were no witnesses. Te
              andthe OBC prosecutor. There were no witnesses. Te prosecu- prosecu-
              tor read exhibit numbers and the titles hearing hearing officer
              tor read exhibit numbers and the titles and the and theofficer
              admitted them. That was the extent of the of the so-called
              admitted them. That was the extentso-called trial. The trial. The
              entire process was but a sham.
              entire process was but a sham.

              I did move for a new trial, but my was denied.
              I did move for a new trial, but my motionmotion was denied.

FN2. While the respondent claims that she filed a petition in the county court seeking relief
FN2. While the respondent claims that she filed a petition in the county court seeking relief
      from the order entered in the Probate and Family Court, she has shown neither that
      from the order entered in the Probate and Family Court, she has shown neither that
      she actually filed such a petition nor that, if she had, she obtained any relief; she was
      she actually filed such a petition nor that, if she had, she obtained any relief; she was
      not free to disobey the order. See Florida Bar v. Wishart, 543 So.2d 1250, 1252
      not free to disobey the order. See Florida Bar v. Wishart, 543 So.2d 1250, 1252
      (Fla.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990).
      (Fla.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990).

              This is an inaccurate statement assertions. See the See
              Thisis an inaccurate statement of my of my assertions. Peti- the Peti-
              tion of Discipline andandAnswer to Count 1 of the 1 of thefor
              tion of Discipline my my Answer to Count Petition Petition for
              Discipline: http://www.falseallega-tions.com/drano90-part-i-
              Discipline: http://www.falsealleLva-tions.com/drano90-part-i-
              answer-bbo-count-one-linnehan.htm. The subject family-court
              answer-bbo-count-one-linnehan.htm. The subject family-court
              order was not mentioned in the Petition for Discipline. There-
              order was not mentioned in the Petition for Discipline. There-
              fore, basing one the reasons of the disbarment on my on my
              fore,basing one of of the reasons of the disbarmentalleged alleged
              failure to appeal that order is improper. In fact, is fact, it is
              failure to appeal that order is improper.it Inuntrue. As untrue. As
              theSJC Public Case Information website reveals, I filed three
              the SJC Public Case Information website reveals, I filed three
              appeals on my client's behalf, one one included the Bristol
              appeals on my client’s behalf, included the Bristol County County
              Probate & Family Court.
              Probate & Family Court.



          Linnehan, James - Defendant/Petitioner
          Linnehan, James - Defendant/Petitioner                                                        2001-J-0718


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                       Disposed: Case Closed
          Case status: Disposed: Case Closed
          Case
                               SYLVIA vs. JAMES LINNEHAN
          ROBYN L. GERRY SYLVIA vs. JAMES LINNEHAN

          Linnehan, James - Defendant/Petitioner
          Linnehan, James - Defendant/Petitioner                                               2001-J-0717
          Case status: Disposed: Case Closed
          Case status:
                               SYLVIA vs. JAMES LINNEHAN
          ROBYN L. GERRY SYLVIA vs. JAMES LINNEHAN

          Linnehan, James - Defendant/Petitioner
          Linnehan, James - Defendant/Petitioner                                                 SJ-2002-0044
          Case status: Decided: petition denied
          Case status: Decided: petition denied
                  LINNEHAN vs.
          JAMES LINNEHAN vs. ROBYN L. (GERRY) SYLVIA,
                                                 SYLVIA,
          BRISTOL COUNTY PROBATE & FAMILY COURT
          BRISTOL COUNTY PROBATE & FAMILY COURT

              How many times must one’s appeals be summarily disposed of
              Howmany times must one's appeals be summarily disposed of
              before one may conclude thatthat another appeal would be futile?
              before one may conclude another appeal would be futile?

FN3. With respect to count two, we reject the respondent's claim that her posting of confi-
FN3. With respect to count two, we reject the respondent's claim that her posting of confi-
      dential information about her former clients was protected under the First Amendment
      dential information about her former clients was protected under the First Amendment
      to the United States Constitution. Whatever rights she may have had to "defend her-
      to the United States Constitution. Whatever rights she may have had to "defend her-
      self against false accusations" regarding the fee dispute, those rights did not include
      self against false accusations" regarding the fee dispute, those rights did not include
      publishing highly sensitive personal information regarding allegations that the father
      publishing highly sensitive personal information regarding allegations that the father
      had sexually abused his mentally retarded daughter.
      had sexually abused his mentally retarded daughter.

              No highly sensitive personal information was by the
              No highly sensitive personal information was identifiedidentified by the
              OBC, the BBO, the SJC (both courts). I could could ghosts.
              OBC, the BBO, oror the SJC (both courts). Inot fight not fight ghosts.
              Notwithstanding that inability, as an educational publisher
              Notwithstanding that inability, as an educational publisher
              since 1998, rely on the First Amendment and have never been
              since1998, I I rely on the First Amendment and have never been
              sued for defamation or other tort associated with my with
              sued for defamation or any any other tort associated web- my web-
              site.
              site.

FN4. Generally, civil contempt proceeding is 'remedial and coercive,' intended to achieve
FN4. Generally, aacivil contempt proceeding is ""'remedial and coercive,' intended to achieve
      compliance with the court's orders," while a criminal contempt proceeding is "exclu-
      compliance with the court's orders," while a criminal contempt proceeding is "exclu-
      sively punitive. It is designed wholly to punish an attempt to prevent the course of
      sively punitive. It is designed wholly to punish an attempt to prevent the course of
      justice." Furtado v. Furtado, 380 Mass. 137, 141 (1980), quoting Cherry v. Cherry,
      justice." Furtado v. Furtado, 380 Mass. 137, 141 (1980), quoting Cherry v. Cherry,
      253 Mass. 172, 174 (1925), and Blackenburg v. Commonwealth, 260 Mass. 369, 373
      253 Mass. 172, 174 (1925), and Blackenburg v. Commonwealth, 260 Mass. 369, 373
       (1927). See Matter of DeSaulnier (No. 3), 360 Mass. 769, 772-773 (1971), quoting
      (1927). See Matter of DeSaulnier (No. 3), 360 Mass. 769, 772-773 (1971), quoting
      Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368 (1966) (discussing features of criminal
      Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368 (1966) (discussing features of criminal
      contempt, including that contemnor does not hold "the keys of ... [his] prison in
      contempt, including that contemnor does not hold "the keys of ... [his] prison in ...
       [his] own pockets"); Commonwealth v. Raczkowski, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 991, 992 (1985),
      [his] own pockets"); Commonwealth v. Raczkowski, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 991, 992 (1985),
      and cases cited (constitutional right to jury trial attaches to certain criminal contempts
      and cases cited (constitutional right to jury trial attaches to certain criminal contempts
      but not to civil contempts).
      but not to civil contempts).

              See my comments, supra, regarding the contempt
              See my comments, supra, regarding the contempt charge. charge.

FN5. Both parties have filed motions regarding the proper scope of the record on appeal,
FN5. Both parties have filed motions regarding the proper scope of the record on appeal,
      and the respondent has filed motions that repeat or add to arguments that she raised
      and the respondent has filed motions that repeat or add to arguments that she raised
      in her briefs. We have considered only those materials that were part of the record be-
      in her briefs. We have considered only those materials that were part of the record be-
      low and decline to address legal arguments not raised in the respondent's briefs.
      low and decline to address legal arguments not raised in the respondent's briefs.




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The motions which the the Court was referring are the
The motions to to which Court was referring are the following, following,
about which I spoke at the oral argument in November 2007.
aboutwhich I spoke at the oral argument in November 2007.

The first motion (Paper 7) arose the of the BBO’s appendix
The first motion (Paper 7) arose out ofout BBO's appendix
which was filed in in single justice session and was accepted as
which was filedthe the single-justice session and was accepted as
the record the full court. The BBO did not did me give of
therecord byby the full court. The BBO give notcopiesme copies of
the appendix and Court failed to act to act on my motion
theappendix and thethe Court failed on my motion to order to order
the BBO to give me a copy. If I or any tried to tried to
theBBO to give me a copy. If I or any lawyer lawyerfile plead- file plead-
ings or documents that not not served on opposing coun-
ingsor documents that had hadbeen been served on opposing coun-
sel, or any lawyer would not be allowed to file those docu-
sel, IIor any lawyer would not be allowed to file those docu-
ments.
ments.

Therefore having wrongly accepted for filing the BBO’s appen-
Therefore having wrongly accepted for filing the BBO's appen-
dix which I have seen, the the should have (1) stricken
dixwhich I have not not seen,CourtCourt should have (1) stricken
those documents in BBO's appendix, with the exception of
thosedocuments in thethe BBO’s appendix, with the exception of
any and all documents written or supplied by me which appear
anyand all documents written or supplied by me which appear
in the 12 volumes of BBO's appendix and (2) proceeded only
in the 12 volumes of thethe BBO’s appendix and (2) proceeded only
on those parts the original record before the single justice
on those parts of of the original record before the single justice
which are my pleadings.
which are my pleadings.

In the second motion (Paper sought an order commanding
Inthe second motion (Paper 12), I12), I sought an order commanding
the BBO to correct docket sheets for BBO case, to me a
theBBO to correct docket sheets for BBO case, to provide provide me a
table of contents to 12-volumes of the appendix, and to pro-
tableof contents to the the 12-volumes of the appendix, and to pro-
vide me copy of the 12-volume appendix). I am entitled entitled to
videme aa copy of the 12-volume appendix). I amto
those three orders. Where they reverse the judgment of
thosethree orders. Where they did notdid not reverse the judgment of
disbarment, I I shall need those should my intended peti-
disbarment,shall need those itemsitems should my intended peti-
tion for certiorari by the Supreme Court be granted. granted.
tion for certiorari by the Supreme Court be

In the third motion (Papers 20 and 22, the moved for a
Inthe third motion (Papers 20 and 22, the reply), Ireply), I moved for a
declaration as to to what constitutes the unauthorized
declaration as what constitutes the unauthorized practice ofpractice of
law. As the Court stated, it is difficult to define the unau-
law.As the Court hashas stated, it is difficult to define the unau-
thorized practice of law. law. Given, however, that the statute car-
thorized practice of Given, however, that the statute car-
ries a criminal punishment, it is mandatory that set
riesa criminal punishment, it is mandatory that this Court this Court set
out the elements before charging anyone, including myself, with
outthe elements before charging anyone, including myself, with
the unauthorized practice of
theunauthorized practice of law. law.

The fourth (Paper was my my motion (1) to reverse the
The fourth (Paper 24) 24) was motion (1) to reverse the denial of denial of
my motion to to stay and allow me to continue representing my
my motion stay and allow me to continue representing my
then-existing clients' cases, (2) to hold the Office of Bar Counsel Counsel
then-existing clients’ cases, (2) to hold the Office of Bar
and the BBO default, (3) (3) to dismiss the for discipline,
andthe BBO in in default,to dismiss the petitionpetition for discipline,
and (4) to vacate the judgment of disbarment.
and(4) to vacate the judgment of disbarment.




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The fifth (Paper was my my motion to exceed the page
The fifth (Paper 28)28) was motion to exceed the page limit for limit for
  reply brief the reasons set out in the in the
a reply brief forfor the reasons set out motion. motion.

I, of course, opposed of of the prosecutor's motions, which
I, of course, opposed all allthe BBOBBO prosecutor’s motions, which
were for the most part, motions to impound everything or al-
werefor the most part, motions to impound everything or al-
most everything I filed in the
mosteverything I filed in the SJC. SJC.




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