Santa Cruz County brief in SV vs. the County

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Santa Cruz County brief in SV vs. the County Powered By Docstoc
					     J TA N
       •
                                                                                                   Jennifer Farrell
                                                                                         Direct Dial: (714)338-1884
                                                                                         E-mail: jfarrell@rutan.com
RUT. N & TUCKER, LLP




                                              May 18, 2012




     Hon. Steven L. Dylina
     Judge of the Superior Court, Dept. 7
     San Mateo County Superior Court
     400 County Center
     Redwood City, CA 94063

            Re:     City of Scotts Valley v. County of Santa Cruz, et al. (Case No. CIV 467230)

     Dear Judge Dylina:

           Respondents and Defendants COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, MARY JO WALKER, and
    THE COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY (collectively, the
    "County") hereby submit the following letter brief ("Brief') in response to this Court's Minute
    Order dated May 8, 2012 and in preparation for the status review hearing scheduled for June 4,
    2012.

            By way of brief background, as this Court is well aware, this case involves multiple
    complicated legal and factual claims regarding the proper interpretation and application of the
    property tax apportionment statutes. (Rev. & Tax. Code § 96 et seq.) The City of Scotts Valley
    ("City") initiated the action on June 29, 2007 when it filed its Petition for Writ of Mandate and
    Complaint for Declaratory and Equitable Relief ("Petition") against the County of Santa Cruz
    and Mary Jo Walker. The County, in turn, filed its First Amended Cross-Complaint for Breach
    of Contract, Damages, and Equitable Relief ("Cross-Complaint") on January 25, 2008 against
    the City and the Community Development Agency of the City of Scotts Valley ("Scotts Valley
    RDA"), which alleges, in essence, that the City and Scotts Valley RDA breached the Pass-
    Through Agreement entered into by the parties in November 1990. Significantly, the County's
    Cross-Complaint seeks, among other things, a declaration that "any amounts which must be paid,
    or are payable, to Scotts Valley by the County, the Auditor-Controller, or both, pursuant to the
    Petition, must be paid, by way of direct payment or offset pursuant to the terms of the Pass-
    Through Agreement." (Cross-Complaint, p. 8, ¶ 2.B.)

            On July 8, 2009, this Court ruled on one of the six total causes of action alleged by the
    parties in this case. Specifically, the Court entered an Order Granting Petitioner City of Scotts
    Valley's Petition for Writ of Mandate and issuing a Writ of Mandate (collectively, the "Order").
    The Order directed the County to reallocate the property taxes distributed to the City in
    accordance with a formula proposed by the City in three equal installment payments over the



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       -TAN
RUTAN S. TUCKER, LLP




       Hon. Steven L. Dylina
       May 18, 2012
       Page 2



       course of three years. The City did not seek, and the Court did not order, the County to pay
       interest. The County appealed.
              On October 26, 2011, the Court of Appeal issued its opinion in City of Scotts Valley v.
       County of Santa Cruz, et al. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4 th 1. The Court of Appeal affirmed the City's
       Writ relief in part and ordered -- and only ordered -- the Trial Court to vacate the portion of its
       Order pertaining to Revenue & Taxation Code sections 97.1 and 97.3 (commonly known as
       "ERAF II") and recalculate the amounts of property taxes the City was entitled to recoup from
       the County commencing with the 2003-2004 tax year. The Court of Appeal did not award and
       did not instruct the Trial Court to award interest on the reallocation payments.
               Despite the narrow modifications ordered by the Court of Appeal, on May 1, 2012, the
       City served the County with a [Proposed] Amended Order and [Proposed] Amended Writ, which
       if signed by this Court, among other things, would order the County to:
                        • pay the full tax reallocation amount owed to the City within thirty days of service
                          of the [Proposed] Amended Writ -- instead of paying the reallocation amount in
                          three equal installments over the course of three years, as the Trial Court
                          originally ordered; and
                        • pay the City 7% interest on the tax reallocation amount, which according to the
                          City, began to accumulate between September 2009 and September 2011 (the
                          original payment dates) -- even though the City did not seek and neither the Trial
                          Court nor the Court of Appeal awarded interest.
              In response, on May 7, 2012, the County filed an Objection to the City's [Proposed]
       Order and submitted its own [Proposed] Order, which more closely complied with the narrow
       revisions mandated by the Court of Appeal. In particular, the County's [Proposed] Order
       eliminated the portion of the Order pertaining to ERAF II, recalculated the allocation amounts,
       and retained the Court's original three year payment schedule in compliance with Revenue &
       Taxation Code section 96.1(c)(3).
               After reviewing the documents submitted by both the County and the City, this Court
       ordered the parties to submit letter briefs on two narrow issues: (1) whether the payments
       specified by this Court in its Writ of Mandate must be made at this time; and (2) whether interest
       is due on the payments ordered by this Court.
              Although each of these issues is discussed in detail below, because the Court has not
       entered final judgment in this matter, and further because the City did not seek monetary
       damages from the City, neither the allocation payments nor the requested interest is due at this



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       May 18, 2012
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       (or any other) time. The Court should therefore refuse to sign the [Proposed] Amended Order
       issued by the City and instead sign the [Proposed] Order submitted by the County.

                        1. The Tax Reallocations Ordered By The Writ Of Mandate Are Not Yet Due
                            Because Final Judgment Has Not Been Entered.

               The City first argues that the County has a present duty to comply with the Writ issued by
       this Court on July 8, 2009 as modified by the Court of Appeal. In particular, in its [Proposed]
       Order, the City contends that the tax reallocation amounts are "now owed to the City and shall be
       paid to the City by the County within 30 days of service of this writ on the County and the
       Auditor-Controller." The City is wrong.' Since it is undisputed that final judgment has not yet
       been entered in this action, and further because the causes of action remaining and the
       corresponding relief sought relate directly to the reallocation amounts which will ultimately be
       paid by the County, the County is not yet obligated to begin making payments.

                It is well established that a ruling which does not determine all of the issues between the
       parties (such as the writ and the subsequent appellate opinion issued in this case) is not a final
       judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 577 ["A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the
       parties in an action or proceeding."]; Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Ca1.4 th 725,
       735-745 [ruling which only addressed three of five total causes of action was not a final
       judgment, even if the causes of action were tried separately or could be characterized as separate
       and independent]; see also Griest v. Fair Political Practices Commission (2001) 25 Cate 688,
       696-698.) For instance, in Griest, supra, the California Supreme Court held that an order which
       denied plaintiff's petition for writ of mandate but did not dispose of plaintiff's other three causes
       of action was not a final judgment. (Id. at 698.)

              Likewise, here, although this Court and the Court of Appeal have issued rulings that
       address one of the causes of action at issue — that is, the City's Petition for Writ of Mandate —
       multiple causes of action (including the City's declaratory relief cause of action against the
       County and Walker, as well as the County's declaratory relief and other causes of action against
       the Scotts Valley RDA, remain unresolved. 2 In light of these facts, it is no surprise that the

       I Notably, the City has not filed a new petition for writ of mandate or any other motion to
       compel the County to make the reallocation payments that it claims are now due. (See e.g., Gov.
       Code § 970.2 ["A local public entity shall pay any judgment in the manner provided in this
       article. A writ of mandate is an appropriate remedy to compel a public entity to perform any act
       required by this article."].) The City also has not even attempted to lift the stay granted by this
       Court on May 18, 2009, which remains in full effect today.
       2 In fact, at least one of the causes of action remaining to be determined seeks a declaration
       that "any amounts which must be paid, or are payable, to Scotts Valley by the County, the
       Auditor-Controller, or both pursuant to the Petition, must be paid, by way of direct payment or

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       Court of Appeal in this case determined that the appeal filed by the County was "interlocutory" —
       i.e., not from a final judgment — and thus, only reviewable via writ of supersedeas. (City of
       Scotts Valley v. County of Santa Cruz, et al. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1, 5 ["...the trial court's
       order did not finally dispose of all claims in the case."].) Indeed, even the City readily concedes
       in its March 27, 2012 letter to the County that final judgment has not yet been entered in this
       action. 3

                As a result, because final judgment has not yet been entered (i. e., the remaining causes of
       action have not been disposed of), the County is not obligated to pay or reallocate any amounts
       or taxes at this point in time, or within the next thirty days, as the City's [Proposed] Order
       suggests. 4 (California Civil Writ Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 4 th ed. 2011) Obligation to Comply With
       Peremptory Writ of Mandate or Prohibition, § 10.2, p. 236 ["Once a final judgment has been
       entered and a peremptory writ of mandate or prohibition issued, the respondent (or real party in
       interest, depending on the terms of the peremptory writ) is legally obligated to comply with the
       writ."], Code Civ. Proc. § 577 ["A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties
       in an action or proceeding."]; Gov. Code § 970.1, subd. (b) ["A judgment . . . is enforceable
       under this article once it becomes final."].)

               In light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that in the multiple letters exchanged between
       the City and the County prior to this Brief, the City was unable to provide any legitimate legal
       authority supporting its contention that the County's obligation to comply with the Writ arises
       any time before final judgment is entered. Although the City attempted (and presumably will
       continue to attempt) to rely upon City of Half Moon Bay v. Superior Court (2003) 106
       Cal.App.4th 795 and Code of Civil Procedure sections 685.010 et seq. to support its arguments,
       these authorities are unavailing.

               In City of Half Moon Bay v. Superior Court, the trial court issued a writ directing the city
       to issue a coastal development permit. ((2003) 106 Cal.App.4 th 795.) No monetary payments

       offset pursuant to the terms of the Pass-Through Agreement" and thus directly relates to the very
       issue at hand here — whether, when, and how much reallocation is due to the City from the
       County at this point in time. In this regard, if the County's requested relief is granted, then some
       (if not all) of the money due to the City will be paid by the Scotts Valley RDA.
       3
            The letters exchanged between counsel for the City and counsel for the County dated
       February 24, 2012, March 14, 2012, March 27, 2012, and March 30, 2012 were submitted to the
       Court as attachments to the April 3, 2012 letter filed by Benjamin Fay on behalf of the City of
       Scotts Valley.
       4
            Moreover, despite the fact that this 30-day payment requirement is contrary to well-establish
       law, it is also worth noting that this was requirement was not contained in the original Order
       granting the City's Writ, the original Writ of Mandate, or the Court of Appeal's opinion in City
       of Scotts Valley v. County of Santa Cruz, et al. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1.


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       were sought. The City complied with the court's order, and issued the permit. Neither the city
       nor the Coastal Commission sought appellate review. (Id. at 806.) As a result, the court held
       that the Coastal Commission could not alter or amend the coastal development permit to add
       conditions that directly "contravened the trial court's order" even though final judgment had not
       been entered in the action. (Id. at 806 [noting the "admittedly unusual circumstances" of the
       case].) The court did not, however, hold that a writ directing an agency to reallocate funds is
       enforceable (i.e., must be paid) prior to entry of final judgment.

                Moreover, the City's reliance upon the provisions contained in Code of Civil Procedure
       sections 685.010 et seq. is likewise misplaced as these provisions do not apply to judgments
       entered against public entities. (Gov. Code § 970.1, subd. (b) ["A judgment, whether or not
       final, is not enforceable under Title 9 (commencing with 680.010) of Part 2 of the Code of Civil
       Procedure but is enforceable under this article once it becomes final."], emphasis added.)

               Finally, even if the City is correct in its assertion that the County must commence its
       reallocation payments before final judgment is entered, as this Court is well aware, Revenue and
       Taxation Code Section 96.1(c)(3) demands that said reallocation must occur in equal installment
       payments over the course of three years. (Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 96.1(c)(3) ["The reallocation
       shall be completed in equal increments within the following three years..."], emphasis added.)
       Thus, the County cannot, as the City suggests, make one "lump sum" reallocation payment, and
       similarly cannot make several smaller reallocation payments in the same tax year. 5

                 The bottom line is this: regardless of how quickly the City wants or wishes to be paid,
       unless and until final judgment is entered in this action, the County has no obligation to pay or
       reallocate any amount of taxes. (California Civil Writ Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. 2011)
       Obligation to Comply With Peremptory Writ of Mandate or Prohibition, § 10.2, p. 236 ["Once a
      final judgment has been entered and a peremptory writ of mandate or prohibition issued, the
       respondent . . . is legally obligated to comply with the writ."], emphasis added.) In fact, such
       action would be directly contradictory to the express terms of Government Code section 970.4
       declaring that a judgment shall be paid "in the fiscal year in which it becomes final." (Gov.
       Code § 970.4 ["the governing body of a local public entity shall pay, to the extent funds are
       available in the fiscal year in which it becomes final, any judgment . . . out of any funds to the
       credit of the local public entity. . ." ]; Gov. Code § 970.2 ["A local public entity shall pay any
      judgment in the manner provided in this article."]; Gov. Code § 970.1, subd. (b) ["A judgment
       . . . is enforceable under this article once it becomes final."].)




       5 It is important to note that this reallocation statute contains no reference to interest.

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                         2. The County Does Not Owe Any Amount Of Interest On The Reallocation
                             Payments Because This Is Not An Action For Monetary Damages; Rather
                             The Writ Only Requires The County To Release Wrongfully Allocated
                             Funds.

             The City next argues that it is entitled to interest on each of the reallocation installment
       payments ordered by the Court, which according to the City, automatically began to accrue
       between September 1, 2009 and September 1, 2011. Not so. 6

               Generally, in the traditional mandamus context, a party may only seek, and a court may
       only order, an official to act in compliance with his or her express statutory obligations. 7 (8
       Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5 th ed. 2008) Extraordinary Writs, § 80, p. 965 ["Mandamus is not
       available to compel an act that a respondent has no duty to perform."]; Code Civ. Proc., § 1085,
       subd. (a) [a party may seek a traditional writ of mandate "to compel the performance of an act
       which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station...."]; Santa
       Clara County Counsel Attys. Assn. v. Woodside (1994) 7 Ca1.4th 525, 539-540 [In order to
       obtain writ relief, a party must establish: "(1) A clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the
       part of the respondent... ; and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the
       performance of that duty...."].)

               However, in certain limited scenarios, a petitioner may also recover monetary damages
       for injuries sustained as a result of the agency's or the official's actions. (See e.g., Code Civ.
       Proc. § 1090 [order for trial may instruct jury to award damages]; Code Civ. Proc. § 1095 ["If
       judgment be given for the applicant, the applicant may recover damages for the injuries which
       the applicant has sustained..."]; Ellis v. City Council of Burlingame (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 490,

       6 As this Court may recall, the City voluntarily agreed to the stay the enforcement of the Writ,
       and in particular, the reallocation of property taxes pending appeal. The City, therefore, should
       not now be able to reap the benefits of accrued interest during this timeframe.
       7 In Younger, for example, the Supreme Court found a clear duty was imposed by law upon the
       county defendants because a statute unequivocally required a particular action: "[Government
       Code] section 66801, article VII, subdivision (a) provides that [e]ach county in California shall
       pay the sum allotted to it by the agency from any funds available therefor...." (People ex rel.
       Younger v. County of El Dorado (1971) 5 Ca1.3d 480, 491.) Similarly, in Woodside, the
       Supreme Court held a Government Code section requiring the county to meet and confer with an
       employee association in good faith created a clear and present duty to do so. (Santa Clara
       County Counsel Attys. Assn. v. Woodside, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 540.) On the other hand, absent
       a clear duty imposed by law such as that in Younger or Woodside, mandamus is not a proper
       vehicle for resolution of the asserted grievance. (Cooper v. Estero Mun. Imp. Dist., (1969) 70
       Cal.2d 645, 650 [writ of mandamus action fails where plaintiff does not and cannot allege
       defendants had any statutory duty to act in a particular manner].)

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       498 ["The rule is well settled that where the law requires absolutely a ministerial act to be done
       by a public officer, and he neglects or refuses to do such act, he may be compelled to respond in
       damages to the extent of the injury arising from his conduct."].) For instance, in Ellis, supra, the
       court of appeal held that a petitioner property owner was entitled to recover damages for
       expenditures she incurred as a result of the City's improper refusal to issue her a building permit
       where the petitioner specifically sought both a traditional writ of mandate and damages. (Ibid.)

               If monetary damages are both properly sought and awarded in the mandamus context, the
      award "may be enforced in the manner provided for monetary judgments generally" — that is,
      pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 680.010 et seq., which allows for the automatic
      accrual of post judgment interest. (Compare Code Civ. Proc. § 1095 ["Damages and costs may
      be enforced in the manner provided for monetary judgments generally."]; Code Civ. Proc.
       § 685.020(a) ["...interest commences to accrue on a money judgment on the date of entry of the
      judgment."].) If, however, monetary damages are not awarded, there is no statutory provision
      that allows for the automatic accrual of post judgment interest. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1084 et
      seq..)

              Here, unlike the Petitioner in Ellis, the City did not request monetary damages in its
      prayer for relief. 8 (Petition, p. 8, ¶ 1 [requesting a "peremptory writ of mandate compelling the
      County . . . to pay over to the City . . . the property tax revenues improperly withheld."].) The
      City also did not file a claim for damages with the County prior to commencing litigation within
      the requisite time frame, thus, significantly, is now forever precluded from doing so. (Gov. Code
      §§ 905, 911.2; City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cake 859, 867-868 [tort claim
      required in actions for monetary damages, not mandamus actions]; Colhurst v. Fitzgerald (1922)
      56 Cal.App. 740 [petitioner is not entitled to recover damages where he neither alleges not
      proves any].)

               Because the City did not request it, the July 8, 2009 Order issued by this Court did not
      award (or even address) monetary damages. Rather, the Order did nothing more than grant the
      City's request to issue "peremptory writ of mandate compelling the County . . . to pay over to the
      City . . . the property tax revenues improperly withheld." (Petition, p. 8, ¶ 1.) Stated another

      8 It is at least theoretically possible that the City might have been able to allege facts
      supporting a traditional mandamus cause of action for monetary damages. (See e.g., Code Civ.
      Proc. § 1090 [order for trial may instruct jury to award damages]; Code Civ. Proc. § 1095 ["If
      judgment be given for the applicant, the applicant may recover damages for the injuries which
      the applicant has sustained..."].) However, the County notes that even if the City had alleged an
      action for monetary damages, such claims would be specious at best because the County's
      actions would likely be protected by the immunity provided by Government Code section 860.2
       [public entity not liable for any injury caused by "[a]n act or omission in the interpretation or
      application of any law relating to a tax"] among others.

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       way, the Order only directed the County to perform its mandatory statutory duty (i.e., allocate
       and/or reallocate property taxes in compliance with the property tax apportionment statutes) — it
       did not, for instance, order the County to pay the damages (if any) resulting to the City for its
       delay in performing its mandatory duties as the court did in Ellis, supra. (See County of
       Sacramento v. Lackner (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 576, 586-587 ["An action in traditional
       mandamus, which seeks an order compelling an official to perform a mandatory duty, is not an
       action against the state for money, even though the result compels the public official to release
       money wrongfully detained."]; City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Ca1.4th 859, 867
       ["Plaintiffs do not seek damages; they seek only to compel defendants to perform their express
       statutory duty. While compliance with that duty may result in the payment of money, that is
       distinct from seeking damages."]; Board of Administration v. Wilson (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th
       1109, 1125-1126 [mandamus to compel transfer of payments is not equivalent to seeking money
       damages]; Ellis, supra, 222 Cal.App.2d at 498 [City ordered to pay petitioner monetary damages
       for delayed pool construction resulting from improperly denied permits].)
               As a result, there is no statutory (or any other legal) basis upon which to assess and
       collect interest. To the contrary, the Legislature, in Revenue and Taxation Code Section
       96.1(c)(3), provide the exclusive means by which all property tax disputes shall be remedied —
       that is, reallocation in equal increments over the course of three years. This provision is
       comprehensive, and significantly, does not permit the recovery of interest on any property tax
       amount that is mis- or re-allocated.
                The legal authority the City has attempted to rely upon in the past (and will presumably
       continue to rely upon in its Letter Brief) is unavailing. Specifically, Code of Civil Procedure
       section 685.010 et seq. does not apply to the enforcement of any judgment (including a writ of
       mandate) against a public entity. (Gov. Code § 970.1, subd. (b) ["A judgment, whether or not
       final, is not enforceable under Title 9 (commencing with 680.010) of Part 2 of the Code of Civil
       Procedure but is enforceable under this article once it becomes final."], emphasis added.)
       Moreover, the cases that the City has cited in its letters to the County and to this Court all deal
       with either an award of monetary damages (Munoz v. City of Union City (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th
       199 [tort action for negligence and battery]; Civ. Code § 3482 [interest on awards of monetary
       damages]) or an action for a tax refund on behalf of a private taxpayer who was wrongfully
       forced to pay a tax, which is similar to a claim for monetary damages (California Fed. Savings &
       Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 11 Cal.4th 342; Macy's Dept. Stores Inc. v. City and
       County of San Francisco (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1444) -- not the issuance and/or enforcement
       of a writ of mandate for property tax reallocations against a public entity. 9
       9
           In fact, although there are multiple cases addressing mandamus actions between two public
       entities regarding the improper allocation of funds (including, but not limited to taxes,
       reimbursements, and credits), the County was unable to find any case in which a public entity
       was ordered to pay interest on the reallocated or released amount of funds. (See e.g., City of

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                 In light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that to date, the County has not been ordered
       by any court to pay the City any amount of interest on the property taxes that must be
       reallocated. In fact, neither the original Order granting the City's Writ, nor the original Writ of
       Mandate, nor the Court of Appeal's opinion in City of Scotts Valley v. County of Santa Cruz, et
       al. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1, order the County to pay interest. Rather, all of the above-listed
       documents only compel the County to pay and reallocate certain specific amounts as to past
       years and, as to future years, to use "the methodology for calculating Tax Equity Allocation[,]
       . . . calculate the amount of property taxes that should be reallocated to the CITY OF SCOTTS
       VALLEY[,]" divide the total sum by three, and pay the quotient to the City in equal annual
       payments . 1° (Original Writ, ifif 1 -8 .) 11

               Finally, notwithstanding the foregoing, the County cannot, and should not, be ordered to
       include interest in its property tax reallocation payments (as the City requests) because such
       action would violate Proposition 1A (2004) by altering the share of property taxes allocated to
       the City (and away from other local government agencies) without the requisite 2/3 vote of the
       State Legislature. (Cal. Const. Art. XIII, § 25.5(a)(3) [forbidding the alteration, in any fiscal
       year, of "the pro rata shares in which ad valorem property taxes are allocated among local
       agencies in a county other than pursuant to a bill passed in each house of the Legislature . . . two-
       thirds of the membership concurring."].)




       Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4 th 859; County of Los Angeles v. Riley (1942) 20
       Ca1.2d 652; County of Sacramento v. Lackner (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 576 [noting that "[w]hile
       the action has the practical effect of awarding plaintiffs money (which has routinely been
       referred to as 'damages' by all parties), in law it is simply an action in mandamus to compel by
       ministerial act the release of funds, not one for damages from the sovereign."].)
        10 Even assuming arguendo that interest did apply to mandamus actions (such as this one), it
       would not begin to accrue until after final judgment is entered, which the City concedes has not
       yet occurred in this action. Thus, the County is not obligated to pay any amount of money to the
       City (including, but not limited to, interest) at this point in time. (See e.g., Code Civ. Proc.
        § 685.020(a) ["...interest commences to accrue on a money judgment on the date of entry of the
       judgment."].)
       11 This Court's jurisdiction in relation to the Order is limited to the implementing the express
       directions of the Court of Appeal.

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       Hon. Steven L. Dylina
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               In light of all of the above, the County respectfully requests that the Court reject the
       City's request for the immediate payment of the reallocation amounts and the City's request for
       interest. Accordingly, the City's [Proposed] Order should be rejected.

                                                   Respectfully Submitted,

                                                  4ftiTAN & TUCKER, LLP



                                                   J i.ii)ifer Farrell
       JF




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 1                                          137.0C g OF SERVICE BY NORCO

 2                                       (Superior Court for the County of San Mateo
                                                    Case No. CIV 467230)
 3

 4 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE

 5
          I am employed by the law office of Rutan & Tucker, LLP in the County of Orange, State of
 6 California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is
   611 Anton Boulevard, Suite 1400, Costa Mesa, California 92626-1931.
 7
          On May 18, 2012, I served on the interested parties in said action the within .
 8
                  LETTER BRIEF TO THE HONORABLE STEVEN L. DYLINA DATED
 9                                           MAY 18, 2012
10 by depositing in a box or other facility regularly maintained by Norco, an express service carrier,
   or delivering to a courier or driver authorized by said express service carrier to receive documents,
11 a true copy of the foregoing document in sealed envelopes or packages designated by the express
   service carrier, addressed as stated below, with fees for overnight delivery provided for or paid.
12
   Kirsten M. Powell                                    Jack Woodside
13 Logan & Powell, LLP                                  Assistant Attorney General
   61 East Main Street, Ste. C                          California Department of Justice
14 Los Gatos, CA 95030                                  1300 I Street
                                                        Sacramento, CA 95814
15
   Benjamin P. Fay
16 Jarvis, Fay, Doporto & Gibson, LLP
   492 Ninth Street, Ste. 310
17 Oakland, CA 94607

18              Executed on May 18, 2012, at Costa Mesa, California.

19          I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
     foregoing is true and correct.
20

21
                              Tara Morgan
22                         (Type or print name)

23

24

25

26

27

28


     2346/011706-0092
     3331361.1 a05/09/12

				
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