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					Table of Contents

Contacts          ..............................................................................................................3

Executive           Summary............................................................................................4

Overview       and        Approach.....................................................................................5

Attendees           ............................................................................................................6

Storm         Recap........................................................................................................8

Pre-conference              Survey.....................................................................................11

What Worked Well for Companies...................................................................12

Areas Requiring            More Work.............................................................................18

Appendix A (Individual Seminar Panel Reports)............................................22

Appendix B (Pre-Seminar Survey Results).....................................................38




                                                PROPRIETARY NOTICE

This report contains confidential and propriety company information. In consideration of
receipt of this document, the recipient agrees to maintain such information in confidence
and not to reproduce, share or otherwise disclose this information to any person outside
the recipient’s group directly responsible for evaluation of its contents, except that there is
no obligation to maintain the confidentiality of any information which was known to the
recipient prior to receipt of such information from AliTek Consulting, Ltd or becomes
publicly known through no fault of recipient, or is received without obligation of
confidentiality from a third party owing no obligation of confidentiality to AliTek Consulting.
Contacts


     ImpactWeather

           Joe Stacey Business Continuity
           Industry Manager ImpactWeather 21
           Deacon Drive Pawley’s Island, SC
           29585

           (843) 237-7226 (Office)
           (419) 818-4993 (Fax)
           jstacey@impactweather.com
           www.impactweather.com



     AliTek Consulting

           Peter Kaleda
           Association of Contingency Planners (ACP)
           Partner AliTek
           Consulting 25025 I-45
           N., Suite 525 Houston,
           TX 77380
           (832) 628-9840
           (832) 217-3016 (fax)
           pkaleda@alitek.com
           www.alitek.com
  Executive Summary
Hurricane Ike made landfall on September 12, 2008 leaving a path of destruction that
effectively shutdown the fourth largest metropolitan area in the US and disrupted the
normal business operations of many of the country’s largest corporations as well as
the energy capital of the world. Although officially a Category 2 storm, Ike packed an
intensity and storm surge of a major Category 4 hurricane. Tropical storm force winds
extended out 425 miles, the city’s network of bayous crested 14 feet above flood
stage and over 93% of the region’s population of 5 million were without power, many
for over 2 weeks. Ike resulted in at least 75 deaths, over 300 people are still missing
and estimates of the economic loss total over $52 billion with government assistance
exceeding $664 million. In its path, Ike left 27,000 miles of down power lines and 18
million cubic yards of storm debris enough to fill the Rose Bowl 2 miles high or four
Empire State Buildings a mile high.

In response to the storm, over 60 companies and organizations sent representatives
to a regional business roundtable to discuss the lessons they learned from dealing
with Ike and two other land falling hurricanes that impacted the Texas coastal region
in 2008. Prior to the seminar, companies completed a survey of their planning efforts
and response action to the storms. The half day session resulted in hundreds of
different lessons-learned that were captured in notes from four industry panels. The
inputs were summarized into 16 key findings of what worked and what did not work
well for the companies impacted:

   •       Pre-event Employee Education Helps
   •       It Pays to Link Company and Government
   •       Have a Plan and Follow the Plan
   •       Training and Exercising Makes Companies Better Prepared
   •       Have an Incident/Crisis Management Structure
   •       Multiple Means of Communications Are Required
   •       Dedicated Weather Services/Monitoring is an Advantage =
   •       Emergency Notification Systems Work
   •       Selecting the Right Alternate Site is Critical
   •       Providing Employee Assistance Works
   •       Consider a Longer Planning Period
   •       Integrate Partners in Planning and Recovery
   •       Establish Regular Business Roundtables
   •       Disaster Security Control is Important and Different
   •       Planning to Work Remotely May Not Always Work
   •       Pre-planning Helps but Does Not Overcome All
 Overview and Approach

With three tropical storms impacting Texas Gulf region in 2008, the Association of
Contingency Planners (ACP) and ImpactWeather co-sponsored a business
                             th
roundtable on November 12 with the support and assistance of AliTek Consulting.
To share and examine their collective experiences, regional contingency managers
from all industry sectors were invited to attend the no-cost, invitation only half-day
seminar in Houston, TX. Prior to the event, companies were requested to complete
an on-line survey on their organization’s experiences during the 2008 tropical storm
season. To accommodate demand, companies were asked to send only one
representative to the seminar and provide only one response to the survey.

Over 65 senior continuity leaders from a cross section of the region’s leading firms
attended the event in the Downtown Club atop One Shell Plaza. Organizations ran
the gamut from small businesses and non-profits to mid-sized corporations and large
multi-national companies with international operations. Following breakfast and a
short networking period, ImpactWeather provided an overview of the three recent
tropical storms (Dolly, Gustav and Ike) to set the stage for discussion. Attendees then
broke into industry sector groups that were facilitated to brainstorm what worked and
what did not work in different areas. Recorders took notes on the discussion and
inputs. Attendees were told that responses and comments were not for attribution to
any company or individual. Following the panels, attendees re-assembled and
received an oral out-brief from each of the panel facilitators on each sector’s
lessons-learned and data gathered. The recorder for each panel transcribed the
attendee inputs. The panel inputs are summarized below and attached to this report.
Attendees
   The following corporate personnel participated in the seminar.

   First Name     Last Name      Company                 Position
     Thomas       Abrey          Lyondell Basell         Manager, Enterprise Safety
                                                         &
                                                         Security
      John        Anderson       El Paso Energy          Director, Business
                                                         Continuity
                                                         & Crisis Management
      Edina       Bell           Carriage Services       Office Manager
      David       Bernsen        American General        Director of Business
                                                         Continuity
      John        Brant          Conoco Phillips         Global Business Continuity
                                                         Planner
     Tamra        Brayer         Plains All American     Project Management Officer
     Cynthia      Buchanan       American                Global Business Continuity
                                 International Group -   Advisor
                                 Global
       Jim        Bunch          Menninger Clinic        Safety & Security Manager
    Belarmino     Castellonas    Whataburger             Director, Restaurant
                                                         Operating Systems
      John        Chamberlain    Energy Security         Executive Director
                                 Council (ESC)
     Leland       Dean           Bank of NY Mellon       Regional Security Manager
      Eric        Eckel          KBR                     Senior Crisis Manager
      Gary        Ellison        Texas Medical           Senior Vice President,
                                 Center                  Planning
      James       Evans          Capital One Bank        Facilities Project Manager
     Bethany      Gadfield       BP Americas             Business Continuity
                                                         Manager
      Bruce       Graham         Cheniere Energy         Safety & Security Manager
      Harry       Greenblatt     Pyramid Hotel Group     Vice President/Managing
                                                         Director
     Davine       Hair           Whataburger             Manager, Strategic Planning
     Grant        Hayes          Sandridge Energy        Corporate Security &
                                                         Compliance Manager
      Irene       Hickey         Xerox Services          Contingency Planner
      David       Hill           BHP Billiton            Global Crisis Management
                                                         Director
      Beth        Hochstetler    SYSCO                   Manager, Corporate Safety
                                                         &
                                                         Crisis Management
       Ron        Holten         Chevron                 Senior Emergency
                                                         Response
                                                         Advisor
       Tim        Karl           Gulf Agency             LNG Manager, Shipping
                                 Company (GAC)           Division

                                                                                       Set-up
 Capability
Randy Kostroske Morgan Stanley Vice President, Risk
      (Crescent) Management & Compliance Kash Mahmud Cemex USA Director,
Business Continuity John Manelos BP Americas Regional Security Manager Marcus
Martin Memorial Hermann Operations Architect

      Hospital (Business Continuity) Jon Mason Money Management Business
Continuity Manager Rick Massey PULSE Senior Business Continuity

                             Associate Ian McClellan BP Corporate Crisis
Manager - HR
      Services Clark Meyer Dynegy Corporate Security Director Trey Moeller
Enbridge Energy Business Continuity Manager Anne Moore JP Morgan Chase Vice
President, Business

                            Resiliency Risk Philip Moore Amegy Bank Business
Continuity Manager David Munzenmaier Baker Hughes Corporate Director, Crisis

                             Management Richard Newsom Shell E&P
Strategy & Economics
                             Manager Jim Nowak AIG Retirements Business
Continuity Manager Lynn Perrin Wilson Supply Vice President, Operations

      (Smith International) Dianna Peterson Boardwalk Pipelines Project Manager
(Business Continuity) Sherrye Ramirez Universal Weather & Business Continuity
Manager

      Aviation Susan Riggs Newfield Exploration Treasurer Jim Roberts Wilson
Supply Business Continuity Manager Jason Sanders Total Petrochemicals HSE
Manager Ed Schlichtenmyer Devon Energy Business Continuity Manager Dan
Shellenberger Kinder Morgan Manager, Business


                             Processes Pam Smallwood Spectra Energy
Manager, Office Services Jim Stinson Woodlands Joint General Manager

      Powers Authority Steve Vandermolen CP Chemical Director, Business
Continuity
                             & Security Marian Wendelin AIG Valic Business
Continuity Manager Laura Westfall Excelerate Energy Marine Operations

                             Coordinator John Weust Marathon Emergency
Preparedness Manager
   The following ImpactWeather and AliTek personnel supported the seminar as
   facilitators, recorders or presenters:

    Mike Arellano ImpactWeather Marine Industry Manager
    Pansy Brown AliTek Consulting Manager, Business
                                   Continuity Mark Chambers ImpactWeather
    President Chris Hebert ImpactWeather Lead Forecaster Keith Howe AliTek
    Consulting Founding Partner Peter Kaleda AliTek Consulting Partner Stephen
    Kastensmidt AliTek Consulting Manager, Business


                                 Continuity Pat Laycock AliTek Consulting Manager,
    Human Capital Mickey Lee ImpactWeather Petrochemical Industry

                                     Manager Dave Morris AliTek Consulting
    Manager, Business
                                  Continuity Jim Rowan AliTek Consulting Principal,
    Security Bob Schoen AliTek Consulting Principal, Security Joe Stacey ImpactWeather
    Business Continuity Industry

                                     Manager Mike Thomson AliTek Consulting
    Principal, Business Continuity



Storm Recap
                                                           st
   Hurricane Ike formed in the eastern Atlantic on the 1 of September. On September
    th
   4 , Ike quickly strengthened to a Category 4 hurricane with sustained winds of 135
   mph. After striking Cuba twice as a major hurricane – once in eastern Cuba and
   once over the western tip of Cuba, Ike entered the Gulf of Mexico as a weaker but
                                                          th
   much larger Category 1 hurricane on September 10 . During Ike’s 60 hour trek
   across the Gulf of Mexico toward the upper Texas coast, Ike had a difficult time
   reorganizing. Landfall occurred across eastern Galveston Island early on the
                              th
   morning of September 13 as a Category 2 hurricane with maximum sustained winds
   of 110 mph.
   Below is a general timeline which represents when the threat to the northwest Gulf of
   Mexico was first identified and the time until impact of hurricane-force winds. Early
   on, it looked like Ike would turn north once it reached the Bahamas, taking the center
                                                                     th
   east of Florida. One key date of note is Saturday, September 6 , about 6 days from
   impact on the Texas coast. That’s the date when Ike was first identified as a
   significant threat to the northwest Gulf coast.
                         th
      Friday Aug. 29 – Disturbance moves off African coast (H-14 days)
                      st
       Monday Sep. 1 – th Tropical Depression Eight Forms (H-11 days)
      Saturday Sep. 6 – Ike forecast to affect NW Gulf (H-6 days)
                        th
       Tuesday Sep. 9 – Track shift to lower Texas coast (H-3 days)
      Wednesday Sep. th
       10 o Track shift to mid Texas coast (H-2 days)
      o Mandatory evacuation west end Galveston 
                      th
      Thursday Sep. 11
            o Track shift to Freeport/Galveston (H-1 days)
            •      o Evacuation for all of Galveston
                                              th
             ordered  Friday Night Sep. 12 – Landfall
Although Ike was never able to regain major hurricane strength prior to reaching the
Texas coast, its impact was felt over quite a large area. Hurricane-force winds
extended up to 115 miles east of the center at landfall, reaching all the way to
southwest Louisiana. Ike’s hurricane-force wind area was nearly as large as
Category 4 Carla which devastated the mid to upper Texas coast in 1961.

Ike’s maximum sustained winds of 110 mph at landfall did not carry very far inland,
but Ike did produce a large area of Category 1 sustained winds in the 75-85 mph
range which carried inland up to 100 miles. Only a few wind gauges still had power
as Ike passed. Those instruments indicated that Ike’s winds were quite variable from
one minute to the next. Reports from one surviving instrument indicated short bursts
of wind in the Category 3 range (over 111 mph) in central parts of Houston.
Strongest winds occurred in Ike’s western and southwestern sectors as the eye
passed east of Houston. It is uncommon that such strong winds would occur west of
a hurricane’s center. While there were no indications of tornadic activity as Ike
moved inland, Doppler radar did identify several small Mesovortices (low pressure
areas) rotating around the eye wall. Winds in these Mesovortices could have been
significantly higher then elsewhere in the eye wall. In addition, small streaks of more
intense wind, sometimes 30-50 mph higher than surrounding areas, likely impacted
localized areas. Such wind streaks can cause extensive damage over isolated
areas.

Although Ike’s large area of hurricane-force winds put more people out of power than
any other natural disaster in U.S. history, it was Ike’s massive storm surge which
produced the most significant structural damage. Although Ike was “only a Category
2”, it produced a surge just inches short of the Great Galveston Hurricane of 1900
which killed over 8,000 people as its wall of water completely covered the island.
Most people incorrectly assume that a hurricane’s category rating on the Saffir-
Simpson scale plays some part in the calculation of potential storm surge. This
is incorrect. The Saffir-Simpson scale is only a wind scale. Some of the main
variables in storm surge calculation are:
     The size of the wind field (radius of maximum winds)
     Forward speed (slower = higher surge)
     Angle of impact on the coast
     Near-shore water depth (shallow water enhances surge)
    Shape of the coastline (bays enhance surge)
Nowhere in the calculations is a hurricane’s Saffir-Simpson rating a factor. The two
most important factors are the radius of maximum winds and the bathymetry (depth)
of the coastal area affected. Fortunately, the upper Texas coast is not nearly as
surge-prone as some other areas like the mid and southeast Louisiana coast and the
Mississippi coast. The same hurricane striking southeast Louisiana would produce a
surge nearly double what it would produce on the Texas coast. Initial
measurements indicate that the surge across Galveston Island was in the 11-14 ft
range. The Bolivar Peninsula saw a surge of 15-19 feet above mean sea level. In
Galveston Bay, the surge was in the 12-17 ft range, with one report of 21.2 feet just
north of Texas City.

Ike produced less rainfall than is typical of a land falling hurricane. Generally, rainfall
amounts across southeast Texas were in the 5-8 inch range as Ike passed Friday
                                              th   th
night and Saturday morning, September 12 -13 . But as Ike merged with a cold front
to the north, a slow-moving squall line developed across the Greater Houston area
                                       th
early Sunday morning, September 14 . This band of squalls moved very slowly
southward across the area, dropping an additional 6-9 inches of rain on Sunday
morning. This additional rainfall caused extensive flooding across parts of Houston.
Even though Ike was “only a Category 2” hurricane, it did produce significant damage
across the Houston/Galveston area and east through the Beaumont/Port Arthur area.
The scope of Ike’s damage far exceeded that of Category 3 hurricane Alicia which hit
the same area in 1983. But Ike was a relatively well-behaved hurricane in that the
threat to the upper Texas coast was identified and known up to 6 days in advance.
Though the threat to the upper Texas coast appeared to diminish some for a time on
                        th
Tuesday, September 9 , the threat to the upper Texas coast was evident for the
entire week leading up to landfall. This is in contrast to Hurricane Alicia of 1983 and
Hurricane #1 of 1943 which formed off the Louisiana coast, striking the upper Texas
coast with less than 72 hours advanced warning after formation.
       •        43 companies (86%) of slides are available for download on-line at:
   Copies of the weather presentationthe organizations invoked their continuity/crisis
   http://chebert.impactweather.org/Powerpoints/AliTek/.
       management plan for Hurricane Ike
       •        Prior to Ike, 30 companies had tested/exercised their plan in the prior 6 months,
       seven in the prior year, five in the prior 2 years and six had never tested their plan
       •        In Survey
Pre-conference developing their plans, 31 companies used only internal resources, 10 solely
               outside consultants, another requested to take an on-line survey about
       usedthe meeting, participants were10 had consultant support, and nine are still
   Prior to
       developing their experience with Hurricane Ike and other recent storms. The
    their organization’s plan
       •        In survey are summarized leading strategy organizations used was relocating
   results of the designing their plan, the below and set forth in detail in Appendix A.
       staff to an alternate site (88%), followed by telecommuting from home (84%) and
       activating an alternate center (63%)
       •        In actually executing their plan during Ike, organizations employed
       telecommuting most often (88%), followed by staff relocation to an alternate company
                                                       rd
       site (65%) and transferring operations to a 3 party or different site (43%)
       •        In designing their continuity programs, organizations set up geographic or
       situational monitoring systems (like weather alerting) most often (78%), followed by
       emergency notification systems (61%) and planning software (16%)
       •        In actually executing their plan during Ike, organizations employed weather
       alerting systems most often (69%), followed by emergency notifications services (55%)
       and suspending operations (25%)
       •        In responding to the storm, 37 companies shutdown non-critical operations
       (76%), 33 lost occupancy of their facilities due to power failures (65%) and 28 lost use of
       facilities due to storm damage (57%)
       •        28 of the organizations (57%) stated that their management was “very satisfied”
       with the effectiveness of their contingency plan, another 14 were “satisfied” (29%) while
       less than 10% were not or only partially satisfied
       •




       •        33 organizations (69%) felt their weather alerting services
       exceeded or effectively met company expectations, 23 companies (48%)
       felt the same
about their emergency notification systems and only eight (17%) felt
planning software met the test In terms of internal organization response,
critical staff availability scored the highest (83%), followed by company
support of impacted staff (81%) and continuity/recovery of critical
business operations (69%)
45 of the organizations (90%) had conducted an internal company review
of their response/recovery from Hurricane Ike; of those, 76% assigned
work teams to develop recommendations and 63% had funded projects
to correct shortfalls
In a companion survey, the disaster pay practices of over 400 regional companies during
Hurricane Ike were analyzed. The results of this second survey are summarized below
and set forth in detail in Appendix B.

   •       The vast majority (82%) paid employees for time that company offices were
   not operational; only 17 organizations (4%) did not pay employees at all. The
   remainder had employees use sick or vacation balances for time missed
   •       For those employees who worked while the worksite was not operational,
   81% received usual pay while 19% received premium pay.
   •       For those employees who could not worked when the worksite was
   operational due to personal circumstances (home damage, loss of transportation,
   etc), 58% of companies allowed the employee to use vacation balances for
   unscheduled absences; 12% would not pay the employee for lost time
   •       Of the responding companies, 22% had fewer than 100 employees, 52%
   had between 100-2500 employees and 26% had more than 2500 employees

What Worked Well for Companies
  The four industry panels identified a number of approaches that worked well for
  companies during the storms. Many times what was a success for one company was
  also a shortcoming for other companies who did not employ the identified approach.
  The key results are summarized below and set forth in detail in the notes from the
  four panels attached in Appendix A.

       •       Employee Education – based on their experiences with Hurricanes
       Katrina and Rita had developed pre-event education programs for employees.
       These programs took many forms from week-long programs with speakers,
       demonstrations and preparedness handouts to company intranet campaigns to
       have employees register for emergency notification alerts or receive materials for
       home and office storm season preparations. Lessons-learned from past storms
       or disaster were incorporated into the company education efforts. The companies
       that employed such pre-event education efforts felt
•       the programs helped overcome employee/management complacency
when a crisis struck and mitigated the damage/impacts from the storm as well
as made response actions go more efficiently and effectively. Linking
Company and Government Actions – companies that tied their plans or
response actions to corresponding government actions faired better than
those that took actions or wrote plans independent of the government. For
example, company plans that linked office closings to governmental
evacuation criteria received less management or employee push-back.
Similarly, companies that structured their crisis management teams using the
NIMS or ICS model were able to communicate more effectively with local
emergency management officials than those that did not owing to standard
terminologies, procedures and actions. Conducting joint exercises with local
government agencies also helped companies respond more efficiently to
subsequent disasters like Ike. When planning for recovery, clean-up and
restoration, companies that coordinated with local governments for access
credentials were able to re-enter damaged areas quicker and easier than
those that did not. In the same vein, close coordination with the appropriate
government agencies provided companies GETS/WPS cards to improve land
line and cell phone access and priority routing during and after the storm
when communications were jammed or otherwise restricted.
   •




•         Having a Plan and Following the Plan – over 80% of the companies had
a business continuity plan but 15% failed to invoke their plan in response to Ike.
Plans that contained specific triggers on when to close the office relocate
personnel or transfer critical operations or data to an alternate site flowed more
smoothly and encountered less management indecision or employee push-back
than plans without such triggers. In several cases, late plan execution led to
difficulties in being able to effectively complete shutdowns or protect facilities
leading to more damage. Companies with headquarters outside the impact area
met with greater resistance to plan execution and disaster response actions than
those with local head offices. Off-shore operations personnel more readily
executed emergency response and closure actions than on-shore corporate office
buildings and facilities owing to greater training and awareness. Many locals
companies used 9/80 employee work schedules resulting in half of the employees
not being at work on Fridays, the day before Ike made landfall. As a result, many
of those employees were unable to prepare their workspace, receive the latest
company instructions or ensure they had equipment in hand to work remotely.
Approximately, 40% of the companies closed their offices on Wednesday or 3
days before landfall, half shut down 2 days out and the
remaining facilities closed the day before. In many cases, early closing
companies cited increased employee support and satisfaction from the
increased time to take care of family and prepare personally. Following the
storm, about 10% of the companies re-opened after only 1 day of closure,
40% were only closed 2 days, 30% were shuttered for 3 days and the
remaining 20% were closed 4 or more days. In general, firms with the most
robust contingency plans and crisis management structures were able to
overcome the most extensive facility damage or equipment failures.
Training and Exercising – several companies cited the importance of
providing training to their crisis/incident management teams and having
conducted annual exercises each year prior to hurricane season as factors
that increased their success in responding to Ike. Thirty organizations (over
60%) had conducted an exercise of their plan within the past 6 months;
seven others had tested their plan in the past year. All felt the training
increased their effectiveness and efficiency while the remaining 11
companies who had not tested their plan in 2 years or never conducted an
exercise felt in hindered their response.
Having an Incident/Crisis Management Structure – most companies
attending the seminar (70%) had implemented an incident/crisis
management structure modeled after the NIMS Incident Command System
(ICS) used by the federal, state and local government agencies and
emergency response forces. Following ICS and paralleling government
organizations allowed these companies to integrate their emergency
response plans and actions more seamlessly with local emergency efforts
because of common terminology, processes, structures and approaches. In
addition, the application of ICS across an organization allowed companies
to effect an orderly transfer of command & control of their response actions
to an alternate office as the storm bore down on the local office. Several
companies also cited ICS as an effective strategy for channeling
high-powered executive interest/involvement away from non-productive
and disruptive activities. For example, incident management teams were
able to send digital pictures and videos to executive management of
damaged areas thereby alleviating the desire of managers to feel they
needed to visit those areas.
•       Need for Multiple Means of Communications – nearly every company
cited the ability to communicate during and after the storm as their greatest
challenge. Over 90% of the region was without power for several days following
the storm severely limiting telephone, cell and data communications
even for companies with back-up power generation. Most satellite phones
were only marginally effective according to those companies that used them.
The only consistently effective means of communications was through text or
peer-to-peer messages like Blackberry PIN that did not rely on
communications networks (servers) or internet service providers.
Unfortunately, many employees particularly older ones did not know how to
text or use P2P messaging. In other cases, companies had intentionally
disabled text and P2P capabilities to meet company policy or legal
requirements. The loss of communications effectively undercut the “work
remotely” response strategies of many companies. In addition, companies that
relied on 800 call-in numbers to communicate with employees found those
systems of limited usefulness. Verizon Wireless received high marks as to cell
and data reliability compared to other carriers. Techniques that worked well
for companies included having “go kits” that included small portable computer
networks, cells phones with non-local area codes and hardwire, rotary style
vs. digital cordless home phones using POTS (plain old telephone service). In
addition, companies that maintained GIS data on employee and facility
locations were able to use the data effectively to effect evacuation/closure
decisions and support accountability and assistance efforts during the
recovery phase after landfall. Dedicated Weather Services/Monitoring – as
opposed to relying on media or public weather forecasting like the National
Weather Service, several companies used dedicated weather alerting and
forecasting services like ImpactWeather. Those companies universally felt the
individualized weather data they received allowed them to make more
targeted and effective operational decisions (facility closure/reopening,
evacuations, employee releases, etc) as the storm approached and traversed
the area than the more generalized data available and spun to the public.
Over 70% of the companies had, used and rated their dedicated weather
service as highly effective during Ike.
•      Emergency Notification System – six in 10 companies set-up and used
emergency notifications systems (ENS) like Send Word Now, MIR3 or
MessageOne to communicate with employees and stakeholders during Ike.
Without exception, the systems worked effectively; however, no one system
alone could meet 100% of the company communication needs. In nearly every
case, companies had to employ multiple means to reach or account for
employees. While ENS allowed companies to reach the vast majority of
employees quickly, most had to also employee call trees or physical contact to
account/communicate with the remaining employees who failed to respond
or receive ENS notices because of communication systems failures due to
the power outage. Selecting the Right Alternate Site – companies that
used alternate sites within driving distance vs. those that required air
transportation found it easier to relocate critical staff, their families and
pets. For example, relocating to San Antonio, Dallas or Austin proved far
less problematic than moving staff to Chicago, Minneapolis or even
Oklahoma. Companies with pre-event lodging contracts fared better than
companies that did not. In each case, companies with contracts
encountered no problems in those contracts being honored; however,
companies that shared facilities found the co-location somewhat disruptive
to incident management and recovery efforts. In addition, at least one
company with alternate sites in Ohio and Pennsylvania found all three
sites out-of-service at the same time due to the inland effects (flooding,
power outages, etc) than Ike’s track took.
Providing Employee Assistance Works – several companies provided
extensive employee assistance including fuel for generators or vehicles,
ice, food, batteries, shelter and even generators for home/family use.
When critical staff was relocated, companies frequently moved and
provided temporary lodging for associated family members and even pets.
When power failures closed schools and day care, companies allowed
employees to bring children to work or organized day care to get as many
people back to work as early as possible. In addition, support was
provided to travelers into but unfamiliar with the area and hurricane
preparations. Although not without impact, companies that emphasized
employee assistance felt that “putting employees first” promoted faster
recovery, more people back to work sooner and a more effective and
motivated workforce.
Consider a Longer Planning Period – most companies planned for
recovery over a 3-5 day period. During Ike, recovery operations took much
longer, in many cases closer to 7-10 days. As a result, planned fuel
supplies for generators and other reserve stock ran dangerously low or fell
short. Greater stock levels and longer supply periods would have
alleviated those shortfalls.
•       Integrate Partners in Planning and Recovery – companies that
owned/operated their own facilities fared better than those that did not. Several
companies cited examples where company and landlord or property management
efforts were not in sync and complicated company recovery/response efforts. For
example, building doors failed safe in the open
position when power was lost, however, no security was in place to prevent
access to the facility. In another case, the building property management
reported to the media that the facility was undamaged/ready for occupancy
when the tenant company was telling people to remain home because their
own inspection disclosed extensive damage that made the offices unusable.
The lack of integration with government infrastructure resulted in company
employees driving on many local streets or into areas that were flooded,
impassable or dangerous. In addition, many drivers did not know how to treat
intersections without traffic signals (who yields) resulting in numerous
accidents or hazardous conditions. Interest in Regular Business
Roundtables – nearly every attendee saw the value in and recommended
having similar industry seminars going forward. Interest was expressed in
forming industry specific groups to address preparedness issues and share
effective techniques as well as concerns and shortfalls. Some members
suggested both a pre-storm season meeting to focus attention and a
post-storm season session to address lessons-learned.
Security Control is Important and Different – the creation of distribution
centers for employee assistance posed unique security challenges. Fuel, ice
and generators became high valued items during the extended power outage
in the area. The typical security workforce employed for facility access control
was not well suited for monitoring or control employee access and larger
numbers of people coming to the distributions centers. The lack of checklists
and procedures around such assistance and distribution areas further
complicated matters.
Planning to Work Remotely May Not Always Work – over 90% of the
companies had planned for employees to work remotely. The extensive
power outages and communications infrastructure damage and interruptions
effectively undercut that strategy. As a result, only about 10% of employees
were able to work remotely or from home as intended. Companies cite
numerous ad hoc efforts to identify locations with communications or internet
connectivity or provided “bulletin board” services where employees assisted
other employees or the company to establish communications or complete
critical business processes when normal capabilities or planned workarounds
failed.
Pre-planning Helps but Does Not Overcome All – no companies with
existing contracts for fuel, ice, lodging or IT support reported that those
contracts were not honored. Equally well, every company reported having
               Lack of Employee Education – (delays, limitations, etc) that
      • some type shortfall in vendor supportcompanies that had not educated their employees,
           incident/crisis management teams addressed and were able to overcome.
      critical staff or management about hurricane preparedness reported difficulties with
      employee complacency and response, lack of workplace and personal preparedness actions
      and increased management “second guessing” and procrastination in their response and
Areas Requiring More Work
        four industry panels result, many plans of approaches that did not work well for
   Therecovery efforts. As aidentified a number were not executed or executed too late to be fully
      effective and operational impacts or damagesapproaches, the areas that many
   companies during the storms. As with successful occurred that were preventable.
      •         identified as requiring more Government Actions – companies that did not
   companies Not Linking Company and work were successful strategies employed by tie their
      plans or response actions to corresponding government are summarized below
   other companies that had taken the actions. The key results actions faired worse than those that
       set actions or wrote plans in from the four government. As a Appendix A.
   andtook forth in detail in the notes concert of thepanels attached in result, office closing decisions
      and the release of employees failed to occur in sync with governmental evacuations, road
      closures or the shutdown of critical infrastructure. Similarly, companies that had not
      structured their crisis management teams using the NIMS or ICS model were unable to
      communicate as effectively with local emergency management officials than those that did
      because they did not use the same terms, procedures and actions. When attempting to
      effect recovery, clean-up and restoration, companies that had not coordinated with local
      governments for access credentials were unable to re-enter damaged areas quickly and in
      sum cases not at all. In the same vein, the lack of government provided GETS/WPS cards
      impeded land line and cell phone access and priority routing during and after the storm when
      communications were jammed or otherwise restricted.
      •




       •       Having a Plan but Not Following It – 15% of the companies had a
       business continuity plan but failed to invoke their plan in response to Ike. Plans
       that did contain specific triggers on when to close the office relocate personnel or
       transfer critical operations or data to an alternate site failed to flow smoothly and
       encountered increased management indecision or employee
complacency. In several cases, late plan execution led to difficulties in being
able to effectively complete shutdowns or protect facilities leading to more
damage. Companies with headquarters outside the impact area met with
greater resistance to plan execution and disaster response actions than those
with local head offices. Local companies with 9/80 employee work schedules
resulted in half of the employees not being at work on Fridays, the day before
Ike made landfall. As a result, many of those employees were unable to
prepare their workspace, receive the latest company instructions or ensure
they had equipment in hand to work remotely. Not Training and Exercising –
eleven companies had not provided training to their crisis/incident
management teams and conducted exercises of their contingency plans within
the prior 2 years. Most felt the lack of training had decreased their
effectiveness and efficiency or hindered their response to Ike.
Not Having an Incident/Crisis Management Structure – 30% of companies
attending the seminar had not implemented an incident/crisis management
structure modeled after the NIMS Incident Command System (ICS) used by
the federal, state and local government agencies and emergency response
forces. Neither following ICS nor paralleling government organizations
precluded these companies from integrating their emergency response plans
and actions effectively with local emergency efforts. Several companies cited
the lack of an incident/crisis management approach as facilitating increased
untrained executive interest/involvement that resulted in non-productive and
disruptive activities.
•       Not Having Multiple Means of Communications – nearly every
company cited the inability to communicate during and after the storm as their
greatest challenge. Over 90% of the region was without power for several days
following the storm severely limiting telephone, cell and data communications
even for companies with back-up power generation. Most satellite phones were
only marginally effective according to those companies that used them. Despite
the consistent effectiveness of text or peer-to-peer messages like Blackberry
PIN, many employees particularly older ones did not know how to use the
technology. In other cases, companies had intentionally disabled text and P2P
capabilities to meet company policy or legal requirements. The loss of
communications effectively undercut the “work remotely” response strategies of
many companies. In addition, companies that relied on 800 call-in numbers to
communicate with employees found those systems of limited usefulness. In
addition, companies that lacked effective location data on employee and facility
locations (like GIS) were unable to effect
evacuation/closure decisions and support accountability and assistance
efforts during the recovery phase after landfall. Dedicated Weather
Services/Monitoring – companies that relied on media or public
weather forecasting like the National Weather Service felt their ability to
make targeted and effective operational decisions (facility
closure/reopening, evacuations, employee releases, etc) was
somewhat impeded as the storm approached and traversed the area.
About 30% of the companies did not have a dedicated weather service
such as ImpactWeather.
Limits with Emergency Notification System – although six in 10
companies set-up and used emergency notifications systems (ENS)
during Ike, no one system alone could meet 100% of the company
communication needs. In nearly every case, companies had to employ
multiple means to reach or account for employees. While ENS allowed
companies to reach the vast majority of employees quickly, most had to
use more-time consuming employee call trees or physical contact to
account/communicate with the remaining employees who failed to
respond or receive ENS notices because of communication systems
failures due to the power outage.
Selecting the Right Alternate Site – companies that used alternate
sites that required air transportation found it more problematic to and
encountered greater delays in decisions to relocate critical staff out of
the area. For example, relocating to Chicago, Minneapolis or even
Oklahoma took longer to effect and accomplish and in some cases
were ineffective when transport was no longer available or booked. In
addition, at least one company with alternate sites in Ohio and
Pennsylvania found all three sites out-of-service at the same time due
to the inland effects (flooding, power outages, etc) than Ike’s track took.
Consider a Longer Planning Period – most companies planned for
recovery over a 3-5 day period. During Ike, recovery operations took
much longer, in many cases closer to 7-10 days. As a result, planned
fuel supplies for generators and other reserve stock ran dangerously
low or fell short. Greater stock levels and longer supply periods would
have alleviated those shortfalls.
•     Integrate Partners in Planning and Recovery – companies that
owned/operated their own facilities fared better than those that did not. Several
companies cited examples where company and landlord or property
management efforts were not in sync and complicated company
recovery/response efforts. For example, building doors failed safe in the
open position when power was lost, however, no security was in place to
prevent access to the facility. In another case, the building property
management reported to the media that the facility was undamaged/ready
for occupancy when the tenant company was telling people to remain home
because their own inspection disclosed extensive damage that made the
offices unusable. The lack of integration with government infrastructure
resulted in company employees driving on many local streets or into areas
that were flooded, impassable or dangerous. In addition, many drivers did
not know how to treat intersections without traffic signals (who yields)
resulting in numerous accidents or hazardous conditions. Security Control
is Important and Different – the creation of distribution centers for
employee assistance posed unique security challenges. Fuel, ice and
generators became high valued items during the extended power outage in
the area. The typical security workforce employed for facility access control
was not well suited for monitoring or control employee access and larger
numbers of people coming to the distributions centers. Different skills and
capabilities were required than those already under contract/employment.
The lack of checklists and procedures around such assistance and
distribution areas further complicated matters. To further complicate matters,
available security companies demanded increased fees and benefits like
food and water.
Planning to Work Remotely May Not Always Work – over 90% of the
companies had planned for employees to work remotely. The extensive
power outages and communications infrastructure damage and interruptions
effectively undercut that strategy. As a result, only about 10% of employees
were able to work remotely or from home as intended. Companies cite
numerous ad hoc efforts to identify locations with communications or
internet connectivity or provided “bulletin board” services where employees
assisted other employees or the company to establish communications or
complete critical business processes when normal capabilities or planned
workarounds failed.
Pre-planning Helps but Does Not Overcome All – no companies with
existing contracts for fuel, ice, lodging or IT support reported that those
contracts were not honored. Equally well, every company reported having
some type shortfall in vendor support (delays, limitations, etc) that
incident/crisis management teams addressed and were able to overcome.
Appendix A (Individual Seminar Panel Reports)

Notes from Industry Panel I (Bob Schoen,
Facilitator; Keith Howe, Recorder)

   •      Communications and IT

       Opportunities:
           -        Satellite phones were of marginal value. Personnel had to stand
           outside to get signal (not helpful during hurricane).
           -        Employees issued new laptops prior to storm were not properly trained
           on software for remote usage (e.g. VPN).
           -        Communications were either out or severely impacted (phone, cell, and
       internet).
       Worked Well:
           -        Dispatching IT personnel to hardened sites to provide on-site
           technical support.
           -        Texting (for those that were familiar).
                     o Verizon provided best cell & internet coverage.
           -        Employing air cards as backup for internet connection,
           -        Using government-issued GETS and WPS cards for cell phone usage.
           -        Having multiple internal employee notification communications
           systems available for use.
                    o       3N, eCast, Send Word
                  -Issuing more laptops than desk tops to facilitate telecommuting.
                    Now.

   •      Right-sizing of the Corporate Management Team

       Opportunities:
          -       Too many participants on conference calls. Wrong personnel on the line.
          -       Executives joined first responders and operational personnel in
          crisis management teams.
                  •      o       Executives should be excluded from teams.
                  •      o       Video from digital camcorders should be provided to
                  executives to satisfy their information needs.

   •      Business Continuity Plans

       Opportunities:
          -       Determining when to relocate personnel.
    Worked Well:
      -     BCP and DRP plans in place.
      •     Annual training.
      •     Annual exercising of the corporate plans.
      -     Staging of fuel, food, and drinking water.

•      Alternate Site Locations

    Opportunities:
            -Logistics shortfalls occurred when personnel from other companies
          shared remote site.  Bathroom
          cleanliness. Access to
          food/drinks.  Limited parking.


•      Other

    Opportunities:
               o        Large companies unsure how to prioritize humanitarian help
               for employees. Should everyone get help?
                         Overriding Question - Why do U.S. employees get
                        post-hurricane assistance and third world country
                        employees don’t?
                        •       o       Backup power and internet access is needed
               o        at plants.and other critical personnel unable to return to
                        Security
                         County approval card required to enter closed
                        •
               facilities.
                        areas; usually reserved for first responders.
                        •       o       BCP is underfunded and understaffed.
                        Collateral duty for BCP Coordinator.
                        Management doesn’t understand impact and risk.
     Worked Well:
       -       Emergency supplies on-hand and pre-positioned.
       -       GIS mapping of employees’ homes to facilitate assistance.
       •       Employees received financial assistance and supplies in timely
       manner.
       •       Employees became comfortable with hardened sites through
       -       Moved files
       increased usage. and computers to internal spaces, away from windows.
       -       Excellent civil and crowd control. Texans are self-reliant and have
       can-do attitude. They don’t wait for government assistance and response.
       -       Paid AP and payroll early, or had off-site processes in place.
Notes from Industry Panel II (Peter Kaleda,
Facilitator; Pat Laycock, Recorder)

   •       Communications and Event Preparation:
       Customer Impact was a major concern Helping employees prepare (both
       at the office and home) was first priority Keeping track of employees was
       a top priority during and after the storm Employee complacency was a
       major issue and failure

       What worked well:
       -        Plenty of notice/time regarding impact of storm
       -        750+ employees accounted for w/in 8 days
            •       o       24 hour call-in used to track most
            •       o       Others were manually tracked to account for
       - safety Corporate requirement of 3500+ employees should be accounted for
       w/in 8 days or deemed failure
            •       o       10-15% were not accounted for by
            day 8
       - • IT Dept used callMessagetrack faster and determine who was
                    o       Used trees to One (Alert Find)
       available to help rebuild
       -        Employees were very spread out so automated tool was most
       efficient approach
       -        Zip Code evacuations helped companies prioritize who to release and when
       -        Rerouted call centers
       -        Relocated key personnel
       -        Saturday AM landfall helped
       •        Used Rent-Sys to relocate critical employees
       •        Used inbound call systems (1-800#s) to track employees
       -        Transferred call center to backup AWL
            •       o       Representatives were not trained but were able to take Live
            calls and respond to employee requests and needs
            •       o       Used Direct Phone approach where you can take over office
            phones from home or other remote location
       -        Getting critical staff back to work ASAP had greatest impact on
       minimizing customer impact
       -        50% of companies attending have a formal Work From Home
       strategy -- other 50% do not have a ‘formal program’ but allowed it during
       Ike o        Work From Home programs are more tailored around a Pandemic
            situation where building is open but you don’t want employees infecting
            other employees
o      One of those who don’t have a ‘formal’ program will be
looking at implementing one in 2009
-        100% of participating companies had formal BCP programs in place
prior to Ike
    o        80% have reviewed their BCP programs since
- Ike Had designated roles ready pre-landfall
    o        Insurance Adjusters on the ground ready to
- respondImplemented Lessons learned following Rita, Katrina and Gustav
-        Purchased generators for Data Centers
•        Acquired back-up power for Alternate Data Center
•        Acquired back-up power for Alternate Work Locations (AWL)
-        Timeline allowed early preparation
-        Were able to relocate critical teams prior to storm’s impact

Areas for Improvement:
-      Information overload by media may have caused some complacency
-      Employees did not respond to surveys so were not tracked accurately
    o      Was a corporate culture issue, not a technical issue with the
- toolEmployee data was not kept current in database so company did not
have most current contact info for all employees
-      Prohibiting the use of text messages caused problems
    o      Prohibited due to privacy issues and potential cost to
       Did not
- employees activate plan early enough to allow all employees to
prepare adequately
-      Did not get feedback from employees on pushed
messages
    • o        Outbound messages worked fine technically
- • o hourPDA’s and Text message seemedto did notthe well
       24       hot-lines for employees to call in to work work
since employees did not call in
    best
-      Failure to get employees to check in or respond to corporate messages
-      Employees were not prepared personally for the storm
-      100% of companies attending have Humanitarian Programs
       o       Communication of programs not successful since many
       employees were still not prepared
-      Employees did not take plans seriously until the storm hit
       •       o       Clean desk policy ignored
       •       o       Culture in Houston is ‘it won’t happen to us’
       •       o       Employees were not prepare to work remotely
       Did not take laptops home Did not take RSA tokens home
       needed to access server Not aware HOW to log in to networks
       remotely
    -      Loss of local hotels made it challenging to keep employees local
    -      Some employees still traveled in to Houston, taking up critical space
    -      Communication break downs
           •       o       Policy not to use Text Messaging for communication
           •       o       Work at home policy failed due to power outages and lack
           of employee preparation
           •       o       Had critical data not stored or backed up correctly – still on
           paper or hard drives and not accessible remotely
           •       o       Message to employees to prepare NOW was not strong
           enough
           • – 50% of employee work force was not in the office those shutting
                   o       9/80 work schedule posed problems for to following
               procedures  Clean desk Remote access
           down on Friday
               (didn’t take laptops home)

    -        Several companies had policies to activate plan 3 days out but that was
    not followed
             •         o       Ike did not appear to have severe impact to Houston on
             Tuesday
             •         o       Questions around 3 days out from ‘what’? – wind
    -        Had good plans in place but not activated early enough
             sheer, landfall of eye, potential impact
    -        Complacency was a big issue
    -        75% of companies agreed that going forward they won’t focus on
    forecasts or probability charts but rather on the ‘cone’ of impact and its location
    -        Only 33% of participating companies actually tested their plans regularly
    -        If the BCP program is managed at a Corporate level and that is located
    outside of Gulf Coast or similar area then they did not recognize local issues
    related to the impact of a hurricane
    -        Did not plan on impact of Ike to reach north central US.
              o Several attending companies had AWLs located there that were
                  impacted as wellDid not have backup plans ready for
                  those locations
    -        Employees who still get paper paychecks were an issue
        -         Had to be hand delivered
        -         Mail services were down so could not mail
        -         Still required to pay them in a timely manner

•      Humanitarian Efforts:
    Taking care of employees and their families was the top priority
    Security was an issue with some efforts
    What worked well:
    -        One company provided generators and fuel to branch offices
    -        Another company provided fuel, tarps and mobile homes to
    employees needing it
    -        100% of companies attending providing some form of Humanitarian
    Effort to employees in need
    -        Corporate attitude is that of not understanding how employees can not
    be prepared
    o Sufficient information is out there but people just ignore it Average employee
    turnout to preparation meetings prior to storm season is low (10% - 20% on
    average of attending companies)
    -        Allowed employees to bring family members into office post incident

    Areas for Improvement:
    -      Security was an issue and had to be increased to protect generators and fuel
    -      Allowing employees to bring family members into office posed issues
           •       o      Poses additional liability
           •       o      100% of the companies attending were unable to
           provide a formal ‘daycare’ service due to legal liabilities
           •       o      Having children in the office created additional
    -      Larger customers requesting large sums of cash for humanitarian efforts
           distractions
    -      Did not activate plan early enough to allow all employees to
    prepare adequately
    -      24 hour hot-lines for employees to call in to did not work as well as
    planned to track employees since employees did not call in
    -      Employees were not prepared personally for the storm
    -      100% of companies attending have Humanitarian Programs
           o       Communication of programs not successful since many
           employees were still not prepared

•       Recovery Efforts
    Getting employees back to work safely but quickly was top priority Damage
    to buildings caused closures longer than most plans had projected Third
    party vendors provided some problems not addressed in BCP Plan

    What worked well:
    -     Used Rent-Sys or other vendors to relocate employees
    -     Allowed employees to work remotely (from home, safe location, AWL, etc..)
    -     Relocated employees to other office locations
          •      o      Bused employees from Houston to alternate location and
          back (approx. 100 miles out)
          •      o      Were able to put this in place within days
          •      o      Allowed them to take family with them if they desired
    -     Moved key employees to other locations further north in Texas.
          •      o      Still performed some services from
          Houston area
    -     •      o      Had excess office to open 1 location
          Those with retail branches lookedspace available in in each area of
    town ASAP
          Houston
    -     80% of companies participating have reviewed their BCP programs since Ike

    Areas for Improvement: Building damage was more
    severe than planned for:
    -      One company lost approximately 80% of their windows
           •      o       Still not all back in building 2 months after
           Ike
    -      •      o
           Another company lost approximately 275 windows data
                          Suffered significant damage to their
           o
           center Location of damage was very sporadic so multiple
           teams/groups impacted
    -      Impact of building damage:
    -      Relocated employees to other office locations
           o      Costs were high due to employee
    -      Working from home did not work well since many employees did not
           expenses
    have power at home either

•      Return to work not as efficient as it should have been
    •        90% of buildings were structurally ready to re-enter with days in most
    cases
    •        Supporting needs not ready Bottled water not available
    Food services not available Fuel not readily available and limited
    employees ability to commute to
       office Public transportation not available Public roadways
       (lights, damage to roads, etc.) not easily accessible Security not
       available

             •        Third parties not prepared to provide needed resources
             •        Security officers rates dependant upon food and water
             being provide
                       o $35/hour if food and water provided on site
       o $50/hour if food and water NOT provided Allowed
       employees to bring family members into office
              •      Poses additional liability
              •      None of the companies attending could provide a formal
              ‘daycare’ service due to legal liabilities
              •      Having children in the office created additional distractions

•       Average time out tended to be longer than BCP Plans were written for
    - The average schedule of 75% of companies attending was:  Closed
    Friday Some had skeleton crews on hand Saturday & Sunday to
    monitor
        situation Opened Monday/Tuesday for essential personnel only to
        assess damage and begin recovery Opened on Wed/Thurs/Friday –
        non-mandatory days for employees who come in to the office Monday (1
        week from impact) – Open for business as usual for full time employees.



              •      Those who could not come in needed to make arrangements
              with supervisor
    -     Those with retail branches looked to open 1 location in each area of
    town ASAP
       o      Issues trying to install generators – by the time they got
       everything hooked up, electricity may be back on

•     Third Party Vendors not
   -
prepared Did not
   show 100% of companies attending had some impact to business due to
   -
   vendors not being prepared
      • o         Security
      • o         Mail delivery
      • o        Food and water services
   •     City infrastructure not prepared when Houston reopened
   downtown and other areas

          -      Street lights out
          -      Heavy traffic on major freeways since local streets inaccessible
          -      Restaurants not open
          -      Schools not open
          -      Daycares not open
Notes from Industry Panel III (Jim Rowan, Facilitator;
Stephen Kastensmidt, Recorder)

   •      Communications and IT – agreed by all to be the largest issue

       Opportunities:
          -       Satellite phones with dead batteries or limited knowledge of use
          -       Senior employees unfamiliar with using text messaging
          -       Phones not working
          -       IT systems down
          -       Specific IT issues:
                  •       o         payroll,
                  •       o         service
                  agreements
                  •       o       accounts
                  payable
                  •       o       accounts
          •       Limited or no access email
                  receivable
          •       Limited o
                  •        availability of VPN networks
                                  contractual
                  o antiquated protocols or o outdated
                  obligations
                  procedures on access and use
                  •       o         lease
          -       UPS systems were inadequate
                  agreements
          -       Establish local emergency management contacts
          -       Integration into the information networks and plans of local
          government’s emergency management
                  •       o         Curfews
                  •       o         health issues
                  •       o         access/egress
                  •       o         water quality
                  •       o       general situational
                  awareness
       Worked Well:
          -       Texting (for those that were familiar)
          -       Multiple employee notification systems
          -       Employee websites; secure websites in order to disseminate
          corporate intelligence.
          -       1-800- call in numbers with employee return to work information.
          -       Telecommuting
          -       Remote work access
          -       Air cards when electricity and other systems meshed
       -       Having multiple internal employee notification communications
       systems available for use.
       -       Magic card (analog phone connection that works through the computer)
       -       “Go Kits” (Approximately 40% of the companies had this)
               •       o       Laptops (Most did not have procedures in place for IT
               to keep upto-date software and security updates
               •
               o       Digital cameras with video
                        Allows for upper management to see issues and cuts
               capability
                       down on a lot of communication
                       •       o       Updated calling lists for phone trees
               o       •
                       GETS and WPS cards for priority phone serviceFor
               the companies that has these (hospitals) Companies were
               interested in procedures for obtaining
                           cards if the y were qualified
                           •       o       Multiple cell
                           phones (pay as you go)
                           established from various
                           area codes
                           •       o       An analog
•      Right-sizing of the Corporate Management Team
                           phone
                           •       o       Appropriate
  All of the corporations represented had a Corporate Management Team and an
                           power inverter
  Emergency Operations Center of some sort. Most of these Emergency
  Operations Centers are manned or monitored on a 24-hour basis.

   Opportunities:
      -       Having the correct decision makers available
              •      o      Structuring teams for correct “roles” and/or
              succession
                            “Empowering” team members with adequate
              • legal to be effective.
                     o
                   Legally  Fiscally
              permission through

       -     Having a structure to the Corporate Management
       -
       Team. Having an agenda for meetings (conference calls, etc…) to limit
       time
           • o       Schedule meeting on a regular basis
       - • Ride out Team vs. transfer to personnel at an alternate location
             o       Structure calls to effective for decision making vs.
             Having
       - informative the correct disciplines represented
             o
             o
             Logistics
             o
             Planning
             Finance
o
o
Operations
o
Legal
o
Media IT subject matter
experts)
        -        Unclear delineation of duties
        -        The Human Factor of too many Type A individuals showing up
        that all want to be in charge and operate by the seat of their pants.

    Worked Well:
      -      Having specific thresholds that will activate a tiered plan.
      -      Triggers in place to activate various aspects of the BCP.
      -      Utilizing the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the
      Incident Command System (ICS) in the designated Operations Center.

•       Business Continuity Plans

    Opportunities:
       -       Staging of fuel for critical commuting employees
       -       Having security assessments for critical situations
                o “Fail-safe” doors but no security for building entrances

    Worked Well:
      •     Annual training
      •     Annual exercising of the corporate plans
      -     Staging of fuel, food, and drinking water

•       Alternate Site Locations

    Over 80% of the participants have one or more alternate locations established
    and stocked. The corporations that don’t are mainly hospitals and hospitality
    (hotel) that would need to shelter in place or take advantage of own housing
    infrastructure.

    Opportunities:
       -       Not truly redundant;
               o       Missing pieces of the operation.
               Examples include: check writing capability 
               access to contracts
               
               



                                                                                      



          -       Having an alternate location pre-identified
          -       Stocking of the alternate location with needed supplies
          -       Having contracts in place and vendors on standby for the
          alternate location.
          -       Alternate location nearby.

Notes from Industry Panel IV (Mike Thomson,
Facilitator; Pansy Brown, Recorder)

   •      Communications and IT – agreed by all to have issues

       Opportunities:
          -       Satellite phones have limitations; has to be used external to building
          with no building interference. All agreed they would not rely on this as
          communication tool.
          -       Cell phone/broadband card signal booster for every location
          -       Most homes did not have a back up land-line; when electricity was
          lost so was use of all cordless phones
          -       Expand functionality of employee check-in/status update solutions
          -       Text messaging worked well for those who had it (however not all
          have/or use it)
          -       Mass notification specific issues:
                  •       o       Need SMS text capability
                  •       o       Those with rotary phone could not reply to press 1
                  to respond
                  •       o       Need to develop a tiered process as a backup plan
          -       Limited or issues
                  to contact no access to email/ network due to electricity and
          phone outage
          -       Location of call center had impact on time of call, due to time
          zone difference
          -       Telecommuting and remote access good until loss of electricity
          and internet
          -       Cooler for server failed; plenty of backup plans for servers but did
          not think of having a cooler issue
          •       Need to establish local emergency management contacts (pre-event)
          •       Need to clarify communication plan with Landlord, Property
          •       Communicating with stakeholders and partners within the company;
          Management
          those not familiar or have the knowledge of hurricane season and the impact
          •       Communicating across the company to try to get the product out when
          area producing the product is impacted
    Worked Well:
       -        Employee communication was good (for onset of event while
       everyone still had electricity and internet capability)
       -        Text messaging (limited to those that were familiar)
       -        Mass notification system (in particular ‘Peer-to-peer system’ worked
       well for Marathon)
       -        Iridium, fixed unit not handheld unit is reliable
       -        HughesNet high speed satellite internet
       -        Established good local emergency management contacts
       -        Having good communications set up (pre-event) with those external
       to company
                •       o        Vendors
                •       o
                Suppliers
                •       o
•      Right-sizing of the Corporate Management Team
                Stakeholders
    9 out of the 13 Companies have an Incident Management Team set up.

    Opportunities:
            -Having management agree with decision maker on evacuation timeline
               o        “Empowering” team members with adequate permission
                   legal
               through to be effective.
                    Legally Fiscally

       -     Transfer of command back to local IMT for business resumption
       -     Re-evaluate Crisis Management Business Continuity (CMBC)
       Team staffing levels

    Worked Well:
      -      Having specific thresholds (triggers) that will activate a tiered plan.
      -      Triggers in place to activate various aspects of the BCP.
      -      Utilizing the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the
      Incident Command System (ICS) in the designated Operations Center.
      -      Moving the IMT
•      Business Continuity Plans

    Opportunities:
       -       Offshore responded and took plan action well; however Corporate
       was not as supportive and questioned decisions made, not wanting to
       follow plan
       -       Hurricane allows time from planning, and also hence allows time
       for doubting
       -       Plan to move things away from window actually moved it into harms
       way when roof blew off
       -       Length of outage - plan did not scope for impact to last for more
       that 3 days; in the future will need to go to at least 7-10 days out
       -       Fire safety system problem not accounted for
       -       Water sanitary conditions
       -       Having security assessments for critical situations
                o “Fail-safe” doors but no security for building entrances
       -       Travelers coming into Houston; timeline decision needed to stop travel-in
       -       Carlson Travel could not help international travelers to leave Houston
       (UK travelers were stuck on Houston)
       -       Length of outage - plan did not scope for impact to last for more
       that 3 days; in the future will need to go to at least 7-10 days out
       -       Hotel Room acquisition pre-storm
       -       Humanitarian aid staging pre-season
       -       Gasoline & Diesel Fueling Plan for facilities and Humanitarian needs
       -       Preventative maintenance of large diesel generators and adequate
       supply of fuel filters

    Worked Well:
      -       Having a plan and sticking to it.
      -       Polled attendees for companies that shut down during IKE. From a total
          of 13 companies the following shut down:
          Wed – 5, 38% Thu – 6, 46% Fri – 1, 1%


               Did not raise hand – 1, 1%
       -       Preparation/ pre-planning helped to drive response actions during
       time of event
               o        ‘Family first’
               o
               policy Had plan and timeline for deploying essential staff and
               nonessential staff back to work
o       Tying actions to triggers helped to facilitate decision process:
City of Houston, weather tool, school closing
       -      Humanitarian assistance for staff; “if company cares for family and
       me, then employee will care for company”
       -      Coverage of family homes (provided by company for employee
       deployed to alternate work location)
       -      Distribution sites: ice, water, generator, MRE
       -      Staging of fuel, food, and drinking water
       -      Fuel contract in place
       -      Education and employee awareness
       •      Annual training
       •      Annual exercising of the corporate plans

•      Alternate Site Locations

    Opportunities:
       -       Alternate work location did not work; alternate work location needs to
       be a tier 4 hardened facility
       -       Option to work from home did not work this time
       -       Employees will not travel if alternate work location is too far from
       family and home
       -       All who had pre-existing contracts were satisfied (contract
       honored); however in one instance when not used was still charged for all
       rooms, while another hotel only charged for a minimum number of rooms
       -       HR compliance issues
       -       Good employee contact info - “sight of the gallows”
       -       Management buy-in

    Worked Well:
      -       Pre-identified alternate location
      -       Alternate location nearby, not too far from impacted location
      -       Pre-existing contracts in place; vendors on standby for the
      alternate location.

•      Employee Comfort and Humanitarian Efforts

    Opportunities:
       -       Type of generator (a smaller generator using less gas was more
       practical to replace fuel when having to get on a gas station line during an
       -
       event) Humanitarian aid staging pre-season
       -       Gasoline & Diesel Fueling Plan for Humanitarian
       needs
Worked Well:
       -       Several companies allowed families to come into work
       -       Provided Child Care
       -       Staged help for employees so that they are provided peace of mind
       and may return to work more readily.
       -       Allowed telecommuting
       -       Provided ice, food, fuel and home generators
       -       One company allowed the employees to buy-back the generator
       at a discount after the event

•       Where do you get your Intel on which to base your business
decisions?
   •     Most of the corporations listened to local emergency management
   officials, the National Weather Service, and the National Hurricane Center;
   one incorporated school closing, too.
   •     Those who utilized Impact Weather to get forecasts for specific locations
   stated that these forecasts allowed them to selectively evacuate and
   selectively close operations and bring operations back on line more readily.
   In other words they were able to develop specific weather notification for
   specific sites and specific timelines for those sites.
•       General Security & Other


   Opportunities:
      -       Fail safe doors that open when the electricity goes out.
      -       Type of security – contract versus staff
      -       Security officer not good for protecting site; police is better resource
      -       Securing location of site for distributing humanitarian efforts
      -       Reliability of resource
      -       Defensive driving (traffic lights out)
      -       Subscribed weather service reports conflicting with local TV
      media reports


   Worked Well:
     -     Hired Navy Seals (expensive)
     -     Having good Business Continuity tools; weather service,
     mass notification…
Appendix B (Pre-Seminar Survey Results)
1.
Was
your
orga
nizati
on’s
conti
nuity
or
crisis
mana
geme
nt
plan
invok
ed
for
Hurri
cane
Ike?
2.

Prior
to
Hurri
cane
Ike,
when
was
the
last
time
that
your
orga
nizati
on
cond
ucte
d an
exer
cise
of or
teste
d
your
plan
?
Withi
n    6
Withi
n    1
Withi
n    2
Neve
r (6)
mo
(30)
Yr (7)
Yrs
(5)
                                    0
3.
                                   %
     P
                                   20
lease
                                   %
indic
                                   40
ate                                %
the                                60
resou                              %
rces                               80
used                               %
in the
devel
opme
nt of
your
orga
nizati    Internal resource only
on’s
                (31) Consultant
plan.
(Che             leadership (10)
ck all
that     Consultant analyst (10)
apply
         Incomplete plan (9) No
)
                        plan (1)
            First Name    Last Name     Company                 Position
              Thomas      Abrey 28      Ac Basell
                                        Lyondell                Manager, Enterprise
                                (5      tiv Operat              &
4 & 5.                                                          Security
              John              7
                          Anderson      ati
                                        El Paso Energy          Director, Business
Please                                              ing         Continuity
                                %)      ng                      & Crisis Managemen
indicat       Edina       Bell
                                21      an General
                                        Carriage Services       Office Manager
              David       Bernsen       American from           Director of Business
e the                           (4      alt                     Continuity
              John        Brant         Conoco Phillips         Global Business Con
busine                          3        er local               Planner
ss           Tamra        Brayer
                                %)      na
                                        Plains All American     Project Management

                                         te “harde
             Cynthia      Buchanan      American                Global Business Con
recove                                  International Group -   Advisor
                                        Global
ry                                      da
               Jim        Bunch                   ned”
                                        Menninger Clinic        Safety & Security Ma

capabil     Belarmino     Castellonas    ta
                                        Whataburger             Director, Restaurant
                                                                Operating Systems
                                        ce faciliti
ities         John        Chamberlain   Energy Security         Executive Director
                                         nt
                                        Council (ESC)
that          Leland
               Eric
                          Dean
                          Eckel
                                        Bank of NY Mellon
                                         er es 15
                                        KBR
                                                                Regional Security Ma
                                                                Senior Crisis Manag
your           Gary       Ellison
                          Tr            Texas Medical
                                        31                      Senior Vice Presiden
                                        Center                  Planning
organi       James   Evansan             (6 (31%)
                                        Capital One Bank        Facilities Project Man
            Bethany  Gadfield           BP Americas             Business Continuity
zation                    sf              3                     Manager
             Bruce   Graham                          11
                                        Cheniere Energy         Safety & Security Ma
has           Harry
                          err
                     Greenblatt         %) Hotel Group
                                        Pyramid                 Vice President/Mana
establi                   in            15 (22%)                Director
             Davine  Hair               Whataburger             Manager, Strategic P
shed         Grant   Hayesg              (3
                                        Sandridge Energy        Corporate Security &

for                       op              2 Teleco              Compliance Manage
              Irene  Hickey             Xerox Services          Contingency Planner
             David   Hill er            %) Billiton
                                        BHP                     Global Crisis Manag
critical                                         mmuti          Director
                          ati
operati       Beth   Hochstetler
                          on
                                 SYSCO                          Manager, Corporate
                                                                &
ons in                                     ng                   Crisis Management
               Ron        s
                     Holten an   Chevron                        Senior Emergency
your                      (n ot           from
                                                                Response
                                                                Advisor
plan.          Tim   Karl ot he Gulf Agency                     LNG Manager, Shipp
                                 Company (GAC)                  Division
(Check                    st r           home
all that   Capability affsit             41 (84%)
apply)                    ) e
           Relocating staff to alternate Company site
                          to             43 (88%)
           Relocating staff to 3rd party site
                         Very satisfied (28)
                                Satisfied (14)
                  E       38          Su
           Us                    Pl         No
                  m       (7          sp
4 & 5.     ed                    an         Pl
                  er      8           en
Please                           ni         an
                  ge      %)          di
                                 ng         or
indicat           nc      34          ng
                                 so         no
e the             y       (6     ft   op
busine            no                        ca
           Se             9      wa   er
                  tifi                      pa
ss         t-u            %)     re   ati
                                            bil
recove            ca                  on
           p      tio
                                  8         iti
ry                               (1    s
                  n                         es
capabil                           6   14
                  sy                         1
                                 %)   (2
ities             st                        (2
                                  7    9
that              e                         %)
                                 (1   %)
your              m      Ge                  0
                                  4   12
organi            s      og                 (0
                                 %)   (2
zation            30     ra                 %)
                                       5
has               (6     ph           %)
establi    C      1      ic
           ap     %)     or
shed
           ab     27     sit
for               (5     ua
critical   ilit
                  5      tio
operati    y      %)     na
ons in                   l
your                     m
plan.                    onsy
(Check                   itost
all that                 rine
                         g m
apply)                       s
  6.     % Sh Sh Lo 33                  IT 43
Plea        ut    ut    ss     65      eq
  se        do    do    of              ui
indic        w     w    oc              p
  ate        n     n    cu              m
Hurri       of    of    pa             en
         # no                              Da
cane              cri   nc               t
            n-                             ta
Ike’s             tic    y             fai
                                           or
            cri    al   (d             lur
impa        tic                            vo
  cts             op    ue               e
             al                            ic
                  er    to             12
 that       op    ati   sit            25
                                           e
caus        er                             co
                  on     e
  ed        ati                            nn
                   s    da
disru       on                             ec
                  21    m     Lo
             s                             tiv
ption             43    ag    ss
            37                             ity
  of                    e)    of
                                           fai
critic   Im 76          28    oc
                                           lur
   al    pa             57    cu
                                           e
         ct                   pa
oper                                       21
                              nc
ation                         y
 s at                         (d inf
your                          ue ra
orga                          to str
nizat                         puuc
 ion.                         blitur
(Che                          c e)
ck all
 that
 appl
  y)
6.
                  7    No    Ot   %
                       im    he
Plea
                  14   pa     r
se                     ct
         Critic
indic                  to     5
ate      al            cri   10
Hurri    #
         staff         tic
cane                    al
         could
Ike’s                  op
impa     not    Cr     er
cts             iti    ati
         report        on
that            ca
         to     l       s
caus
                su
ed       work         10
                pp
disru    17 35 ly     21
ption           ch
of       Im     ai
critic   pa     n
al       ct     ve
oper            nd
ation           or
s at            s co
                co m
your
                ul mi
orga            d tm
nizat           noen
ion.            t ts
(Che            m
ck all          ee
that            t
appl
y)
7.
     Ple
ase
indicate
your
manage
ment’s
satisfact
ion with
the
effective
ness of
your
organiz
ation’s
plan in
address
ing the
challeng
es of
Hurrica
ne Ike.
8.
Indicate
the
areas of
your
organiz
ation’s
plan
that
would
be rated
as
“effectiv
e” or
“exceed
ed
expecta
tions”
during
and
after
Hurrica
ne Ike’s
impact.
(Check
all that
apply)
 First Name    Last Name     Company                 Position
   Thomas      Abrey
                                   0
                             Lyondell Basell         Manager, Ente
                                   %                 &
                                                     Security
   John        Anderson
                                  10
                             El Paso Energy          Director, Busin
                                   %                 Continuity
                                                     & Crisis Mana
   Edina       Bell
                                  20
                             Carriage Services       Office Manage
   David       Bernsen             %
                             American General        Director of Bus
                                                     Continuity
   John        Brant
                                  30
                             Conoco Phillips         Global Busine
                                   %                 Planner
  Tamra        Brayer        Plains All American     Project Manag
                                  40
  Cynthia      Buchanan      American                Global Busine
                                   %
                             International Group -   Advisor
                                  50
                             Global
    Jim        Bunch         Menninger Clinic        Safety & Secu
 Belarmino     Castellonas
                                   %
                             Whataburger             Director, Resta
                                  60                 Operating Sys
   John        Chamberlain   Energy Security
                                   %                 Executive Dire
                             Council (ESC)
   Leland      Dean          Bank of NY Mellon       Regional Secu
    Eric       Eckel         KBR                     Senior Crisis M
    Gary       Ellison       Texas Medical           Senior Vice Pr
                             Center                  Planning
   James       Evans         Capital One Bank        Facilities Proje
  Bethany      Gadfield      BP Americas             Business Con
                                                     Manager
   Bruce       Graham        Cheniere Energy         Safety & Secu
   Harry       Greenblatt    Pyramid Hotel Group     Vice Presiden
                                                     Director
   Davine      Hair          Whataburger             Manager, Stra
   Grant       Hayes         Sandridge Energy        Corporate Sec
                                                     Compliance M
   Irene       Hickey        Xerox Services          Contingency P
   David       Hill          BHP Billiton            Global Crisis M
                                                     Director
    Beth       Hochstetler   SYSCO                   Manager, Corp
                                                     &
                                                     Crisis Manage
    Ron        Holten        Chevron                 Senior Emerge
                                                     Response
                                                     Advisor
    Tim        Karl          Gulf Agency             LNG Manager
                             Company (GAC)           Division


Capability
Relocating staff to alternate Company
Relocating staff to 3rd party site
              Very satisfied (28)
                       Satisfied (14)
       Cu               E      33      8
             Manag                          %
        st              m      69      17
 Staff o               er
             ement
        m              ge
comm
#       er   comm      nc
unicat or               y
       pa    unicati   no
ions   rtn             tifi
              ons
39 81 er               ca
       co     and      tio    Ge
        m               n     og
        m    decisi    sy     ra
       un               st    ph
               on             ic
        ic              e
       ati              m     or
             makin
       on               s     sit
         s    g 38     23     ua
Are    23              48     tio
a              79             na
       48
                              l
             Threat
                              aw
             escala           ar
                              en
              tion            es       B
                              s        C
             proce
                              m        P
                                  sy
             dures            on       so
                                  st
                              ito      ft
             27 56                e
                              rin      wa
                                  m
                              g        re
                                  s
8.                                            81 36 64
                   Co    Contin St     Cr                        %
Indicate           nti           aff    iti
the                nu    uity/re cr    ca
areas of Contin ity      cover os        l
                   /re           s-t    st    Co    Re     Mi
your      #
          uity/re co      y of rai     aff    m     pa     tig
organiz covery ve                ni    av     pa    ir/r   ati
                         buildi
ation’s             ry           ng    ail    ny    es     on
          of        of     ng 11       ab
plan                                          su    tor    of
          critical cri           23    ilit   pp    ati    pu
that               tic    and            y
          comp al                             ort   on     bli
would                    buildi        40     of    of     c
be rated uter bu           ng
                                       83     st    da     inf
                    si                        aff   m      ra
as        syste ne
                         infrast              im    ag     str
“effectiv ms 24 ss                            pa    ed     uc
e” or     50
                   op    ructur               ct    eq     tur
                   er
“exceed            ati
                          e 29                ed    ui     e
                                              by    p      lo
ed        Ar       on      60                 th    m      ss
expecta ea          s
                         Contin               e     en     29
                   33
tions”             69
                                              hu    t
                         uity/re              rri   24
during                                        ca
and                      cover
                                              ne
after                     y of                39
Hurrica                  critica
ne Ike’s                    l
impact.
                         suppl
(Check
all that                   y
apply)                   chain
                         vendo
                         rs 14
                           29
10.
Assumi      % No Do      37     Re    49    63
ng that        ac cu     76     qu
your           tio m            ire
organiz         n en            tar
                0    t          ge
ation
                0 mi              t
conduct     #                         Re    Fu
                   nu           da
sa                                    qu    nd
                    te           te
                                      ire   an
formal               s            s
                                      co    d
review,            of           fro
                                      st    re
if areas           re            m
                                      es    so
                    vi           w
of                                    ti    ur
                   ew            or
improve                               m     ce
                    m             k
ment                                  at    re
                   ee            te
                                      es    co
are                tin            a
                       As             for   m
discover           gs            m
                       si             re    m
ed,                31             s
            St         gn             co    en
indicate           63           30
            ep         w              m     de
                                61
the         s          or             m     d
steps                  k re           en    pr
                       te co          da    oj
your
                       a m            tio   ec
organiz                               ns    ts
                       mm
ation’s                s en           24    31
manage                 to da
ment is                de tio
likely to              ve ns
take.                  lo
                       p
(Check
all that
apply)
 0
%
10
%
20
%
30
%
40
%
50
%
60
%

				
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